Some reßections on the Liber de causis

C. J.DE VOGEL

yearshave passed since Bardenhewerpublishedhis edition of

Many both the Arabic text of the early Medieval Book "on the Pure
Good", and its Latin translation,made towards the end of the
12th centuryby Gerhard of Cremona. It is still a highlyvaluable work,
and up till a few monthsago it was the only text of the so-called Liber
de Causis we could consult. Very rightlythis edition of 1882 has been
recentlyreprinted.Though the text edition, of course, was of the first
interest,this is by no means all. The volume also containsthe historyof
thisfamouslittlebook throughoutthe Middle Ages. It is veryinteresting,
indeed, to consider how fromthe end of the 12th century(Alanus ab
Insulis) onwardsthisbook is cited by almost all 13th centuryecclesiasti-
cal authorsof any importance,and how they interpretcertain texts of
it. Bardenhewerduly mentions St. Thomas' commentaryand gives us
some idea of its significance.However, it was notuntil19^4 thata modern
criticaledition of thiswork appeared fromthe hand of Fr. H. D. Saffrey,
and not until 1966 that A. Pattin published a new edition of the Latin
text of the De Causis.It appeared in the TijdschriftvoorFilosoße, (Louvain)
March 1966.
Saffrey'sedition of St. Thomas' commentaryis a verywelcome and
trulyinterestingcontributionto the study of the Liberde causis. It is
preceded by an introductionof which the "Partie historiqueet doctri-
nale" mighthave been somewhatfullerand, in a sense, more critical (I
hope to explain this), but at least it does give a few points of view that
are of real interest.In my followingreflectionson some aspects of the
"concept" of God found in the Liber I gratefullyused Saffrey'swork,
afterand next to Bardenhewer'sand the new text edition of Pattin.
The modernreader who has spenta greatdeal of his lifeon reading
and meditatingthe Greek text of Plato and of Plotinus,will come to the
Liberde causisand its direct source, Proclus' Elementatheologiae , with
verydifferentideas fromthose St. Thomas had when readingthe same
treatise. At the time St. Thomas commented on the De causis (which
must have been a few years after William of Moerbeke finishedhis
translationof Proclus' Elementa(1268)), i.e. in the last yearsof his life,
he had spent manyyearson the main works of Aristotle,which he read
in recent Latin translations;he had commented on the Physics,the

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Metaphysics , the De cáelo and the De anima; he had read and meditatedthe
De generatione , the logical works and the Ethics. His informationon
Plato came fromAristotle.Metaph . A 9 had lefta freshimpressionon his
mind: to him "Platonism" meant a doctrine of substantiae separatae, that
is to say, abstractionssuch as "man", "animal", "justice", were made by
Plato into separatelyexistingbeings of a transcendentorder and con-
sidered as "gods". Hence, when Proclus, speaking of the "henads"
which he posits as self-completebeings or "gods", beyond Being, Life
and Noûs - i.e. above the level of EternalBeing, which for Plotinuswas
identicalwith the voy)toc -, saysthat "Everygod is participable(7rãç
[as&sxtóç),except the One"1, St. Thomas, not disturbedby this strange
construction,explains: These henads are Plato's so-called Ideas, the
formaeuniversales of sensible objects, raised into separate existence and
called "gods"2. Moreover, since intellects are supposed to think by
means of intelligibleforms, "the Platonists" according to St. Thomas
posited the existence of a number of superior intellects that "partici-
pated" in the above-mentioneddivine Forms.
We can hardly find fault with St. Thomas for this explanation,
since he had to do, firstly,without direct contact with Plato's own
works, secondly, without Plotinus' profound thoughtsabout eternal
Being. But we do thinkthatSaffrey mighthave said somethingabout the
character of Thomas' explanations of what he calls "Plato and the
Platonists",insteadof just presentingthis commentaryto the reader of
to-day as, say, an acceptable and well-founded interpretationof the
matter under discussion. This is what it was not. It is a commentary
which not only had undeniablemeritsin its own day, but which can still
be read with profit in the present century - under the condition,
however, that certain reservationsare made.
Two thingswere clearly recognized by St. Thomas: first,the de-
pendence of the De causis on Proclus' Elements(which, of course,
"
Thomas could see, since he had the complete translationof the "Elementa
by Van Moerbeke before him), second, that the Arabic author did not
simplyfollow Proclus' text but altered its line of thoughtin a theist
sense. Because Thomas had also the Areopagitica at his disposal, this
way of "correcting" the clearly polytheistic tendency of Proclus'
argumentinto a monotheisttheoryreminded Thomas of a number of
passages in the Book on theDivine Names.I do not thinkhe wanted to
assert that the author of the De causis wrote his work under the in-
1 Proclus,
Elem.116.
1 banrey,
p. 18(inFrop.3); ct.alsop. 12,11-17(inprop.2).
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fluence of the Christian author who called himself by the name of
Dionysiusthe Areopagite.He doesstatethatthe Arabicauthorsharedthe
same views: "Et hoc sequitur auctor huius libri"1. Hoc, not hunc. And
rightlyso; for it is certainlymore probable that the Arabic author's
monotheisticviews are fromIslamic ratherthan fromChristianorigin.
On these two points, then, Thomas' interpretationwas correct.
But they are by no means the only merit of his work. His further
reflectionson the theorycontained in the De causisare valuable. How-
ever, one must be well aware of the fact that for him "Platonism"was
-
essentiallya doctrine of "substantiaeseparatae" considered as gods, a
view which was inspired by Aristotle's criticism of the theoryof the
Ideas without being checked by a first-hand knowledge of the original.
In fact,this "interpretation"of Plato made by a veryuncongenialmind,
farfrombeing a "true development" (to use a good Newmanianterm),
ratherlooks like a parody. Grantingthat Plotinus' doctrine of eternal
Being, which is identicalboth with Noûs and the voyjTá(since the tran-
scendentNoûs has its objects withinitself),- grantingthatthisdoctrine
as it is found in the £thEnnead is a "development"as well, I wish to
state that this doctrine, which a St. Augustine could understandand
make his, bears all the signs of being a "true development". For Plato
-
certainlyconsidered the intelligibleWorld as a whole as divine, he
even called it "God" in that famouspassage of the Theaetetus 2 where he
of
speaks ófxoícaortç tío fteco
xaxà to Suvoctóv. Moreover, there are a few
clear indicationsthat in his later years he came to consideringthe in-
telligibleworld as an organicalwhole or Çcoov,a "perfectlivingbeing"
whichobviouslywas conceived as a thinkingMinds. When St. Augustine
says that "eternal Truth" must be identical with "Wisdom", which is
"the Word of God" and "equal to the Father", this too was a develop-
ment, - but of a much more congenial mind than St. Thomas' "sub-
stantiaeseparatae" conception, which made Plato's Ideas into a kind of
idols insteadof - as theyactuallywere - a true intuitionof the Divine
Mind.
The matteris of a certain interest,because generationsof priests
and lay people studyingphilosophyin Catholic Universitiesleft their
seminariesand universitieswith the idea that Platonismwas a theoryof
substantiae separatae considered as gods, and that Aristotle freed
humanityfromthese idols and led mankindto the knowledgeof the one
true God . . .
1 Saffrey,
p. 20,line21f. 2 176a.
3 Sophistes
249a, Timaeus
37d.
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 This is what theylearntfromSt. Thomas,- and thisis preciselywhat
Catholic Christianshave to unlearnas soon as possible iftheywant to get
a more trulyhistoricalview of those great Greek thinkers.Plato meant
somethingto the greatestspiritsof the early ChristianChurch, not as
the creator of some queer abstractidols, but as a thinkerwho, some
centuries before the incarnation of the Word, had a true and clear
intuitionof thateternal Truth which is the Word and Wisdom of God,
and equal to Him.

Afterthese introductoryremarks,inspiredby St. Thomas' commentson

certain passages of the De causis and by Saffrey'sintroductionto this
commentary,let us now turnto the text of the Liberde Causisitselfand
consider the problems it offersto those who are well acquainted both
with Plato's and Plotinus' thought.1 wish to considerfouraspects of the
FirstCause as described in the Book, namely:
1. The characterof the First Principle as the most comprehendingand
mosteffectiveCause ;
2. this Principle conceived as supreme Being;
3. the same Principle conceived as anteaeternitatem;
4. the same Principle both as firstand pure Infinity,and as being
beyond Infinity.
Afterhaving studied these four aspects it might be possible to say a
word about that which, according to Bardenhewer,was both the chief
characteristicand the cardinal mistake of the author of the Book,
namely,his method of hypostatizingabstracts.

I - The Liberde causisopens with the followingproposition:

A primary itsobjectmoreintensely
Causeinfluences cause;
thana secondary
its inßuencecontinues whenthatof thesecondary , it
causehas ceased;moreover
the
precedes secondary cause
.
This is illustratedby the example of "individualthing- animal -
man" and explained as follows.
1. The primaryCause covers a larger fieldand affectsits objects more
intenselythan the secondarycause which is nearer to the object; by
its intensityit adheres more stronglyto its object.
2. The primaryCause precedes the secondary.
3. It helps the secondarycause by supportingits influence,but does so in
a more perfectand powerfulway.
4. The primaryCause is still presentand operativewhen the secondary
cause has withdrawn.

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 The secondary cause depends entirelyon the primary,both for its
existence and its operation.

This proposition,the example and the explanatoryargumentsare taken

from Proclus1, Elementa70, with the exception of my last-mentioned
point. Under Proclus' 56th proposition this last mentioned point is
present.
It must be noted that neither in Proclus nor in the Liberde causis
the primaryCause is spoken of in the singular. Omniscausa primaria,
says the Latin text. The Greek text somehow is a bit more vague.
Dodds, who is a master in the renderingof such vague and abstract
terms,formulatesthe 70th propositionas follows:
All thosemoreuniversalcharacters (rcavto oXixcoTSpov) whichinherein
the originativeprinciples(èv tolç àpxYjytxoïç)both irradiatetheir
participantsbeforethe specißccharacters(izpb tcov fjispixûv)and are
slowerto withdraw froma beingwhichhas oncesharedin them.
And $6:
All thatis producedbysecondary beingsis in a greatermeasure produced
from thosepriorand moredeterminativeprinciples(¿7uot&v TcpOTépcov
xal
1.
amcùTépcov) fromwhichthesecondary werederived
Now it is clear that,ifone supremePrincipleis assumed- as it was done,
of course, by Proclus, who in thiscardinaldoctrinefollowed the lead of
Plotinus,whichultimatelywas Plato's lead - this is statingimplicitlythat
the FirstPrincipleis theultimateand total Cause of all and everything, and
this not only indirectly,by the intermediatepower of secondarycauses
(Noûs or voyjtoc) , which in their turn create tertiarycauses (souls) that
are the direct causes of movementand of order in the visible world.
This, of course, is the view of thingswe know well, both from Plato
and from Plotinus. But what we find stated here is more. Here it is
definitelytaughtthat theFirstPrinciplemustbe thedirectCauseof all later
things : that it "adheres to them" and affectsthem more intenselyand
longer than any subsequentcause. It is so dominantand powerful,that
its direct presence is foundin everything,even where Form (the second
Cause) is lacking,- thatis, in matter.
This is, in fact, what Proclus taught. Dodds2 cites a passage from
Proclus' Commentary on theTimaeus 3 in which this doctrine is
strikingly
1 Dodds,Proclus
yTheElements , A revised
ofTheology textwithtranslation, andcom-
introduction
mentary, 1933,21963,pp.67and55.
Oxford
2 Intheabove-cited
work,p. 231.
3 Proclus
inTimaeum
ed.DiehlI, p. 209,13ff.

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confirmed,- with this restriction,however, that it is not said that
everythingis caused directlyby the First Principle (to "Ev), but that
all thingsare broughtinto being directly"by the Gods". IIocvtoc tocSvtoc
&scovecmv sxyovocxai 7rapáyeTatU7u'auTcová(ji<j<oç 7rávTaxai íSpóeTai
lv aÒTOtç*ou&svòçyàp ácpéaryjxe to ftetov,áXXà TcãatvIĶ íaou 7uápe<mv.
'
Very rightlyDodds describes the tendencyof Proclus doctrinein these
words: "What he is anxious to vindicate is the direct presence of the
divine everywhere, even in Matter". - In which it must be noted,
however, that for Proclus to frsïovwas a collectivum . Though we might
in
say that, fact, his theoryimplied that the Oney which alone was the
supreme and ultimatePrinciple, was actuallytheonlyand absoluteCause
of all things,and this by its directand overwhelmingPresence, Proclus
deliberatelyavoided that consequence. He did so by introducingthose
"henads", which he called "gods", placing them on the firstlevel of
his hierarchyof being. They were not identical with the Forms or
intelligibleBeing (the Nous or voyjTáof Plotinus). In thisSt. Thomas was
mistaken.For the Forms were rankedas secondaryBeing and secondary
Causes, the "Henads", however, were of the firstlevel.
This was a strangeconstruction,indeed. What I call strangeis not
that "gods" were recognized on the levels of Noûs and Soul as well.
This is known to us both from Plato and Plotinus. For the Demiurge
in the Timaeuswas a transcendentNoûs, and perfectsouls were called
gods both in the Phaedoand the Phaedrus.In the Timaeusthe World-soul
and the star-soulswere introducedas "createdgods", and it was onlydue
to modern theisticmisunderstanding that these gods of the lower levels
were supposed either to have taken the place of the FirstPrinciple that
is beyond the intelligible world or (as the Demiurge was sometimes
supposed) to be identical with it. Plotinus spoke about the Nous or
intelligibleWorld as "a great God" but not the highestGod ; and to him,
too, perfect souls were divine. Only after having dealt with Soul he
states: xaí (iixP1t°ÚtcovT(*fteia1.
This, then, is not new to us. What is new and startlingis that
according to Proclus, who adopts Plotinus' distinctionof three hier-
-
archicallyordened levels of Being, Soul, Noûs and the One -, each
of these orders has a henad at its top which, as a god, is "beyondBeing,
Life and Noûs"2. Or rather,since on the level of Noûs the distinction
between voyjtoçand voepóçis introduced, while on that of Soul the
supra-mundanesouls are distinguishedas being of a higherkind fromthe
1 Plotinus,
Enn.v i, 7,attheend.
2 Proclus,
Elem.
theol.iij.
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intra-mundaneclass, Proclus arrives at four kinds of Henads, which,
"
though they are heading hierarchicallyordened aeipai, qua "henads
and &eot are placed on theFirstlevel, which was that of the "Ev1. For
Plotinus such a conception would have been completely impossible.
Though fullyaware of the tremendousdifficulty of derivingthe plurality
of Being fromthe FirstPrinciplewhich was the absolute One2, Plotinus
does maintainthatfromthe One alone all thatcomes afterit has sprung,
"while THAT is turnedalways towards itself"3.For there was no other
thingwhere it could turn to. "But far be fromus the genesis in time,
since we are speakingabout thingseternal". The FirstPrincipledoes not
move. Hence, if there is some thingsecond afterit, it must have come
into being withoutanyinclination,deliberatewill or motion whatsoever
ouSè pouXrj&évTOç
(où 7rp0(TvsúcravT0<; ouSè ôXwç xivyj&svtoçi>7coaTY)vai
aÒTÓ)4.
The Arabic author of the so-called TheologiaAristotelis understood
this perfectlywell, when renderingthis beautifulchapter of Plotinus.
"You must dismissfromyour imaginationall coming into existence in
time, ifyou wish to know how the true everlastingnoble essences were
originatedfromthe First Originator,for theywere broughtinto exist-
ence from Him withouttime and with no intermediarybetween their
beingoriginatedand made, and the Originatorand Maker"5.
And the Dicta sapientisGraeciI i 8Mread : "The FirstAgentmust be
stationaryand motionless,if it is necessarythatsome thingis secondary
to Him. His action must be without reflection,motion and volition
which would be inclinedto the action product"6.
Though in the last-citedpassage the predicate "Agent"forthe First
Principle is not Plotinian, the author gives a faithfulrendering of
Plotinusin the above-cited lines.
How then was it that intelligibleBeing (which is Sv 7toXXá)came
forthfromThat which was absolutelyone? And what should we think
round about THAT which remains what it is? - "A circumradiation ,
going out from IT, from IT while it remains what it is, similar to the

1 Thescheme of"participation" implied inProclus' propositions is charted

162-165, byDodds,
' Elem. 282.
Proclus DeVogel, GreekPhil. hi,p.gjj.
p.
2 See,forinstance,theimpressing opening linesofthe6thchapter ofthetreatiseIlepl T&v
Tptcõv ápxtx&v U7roaTáae<ov (Enn. v i, 6, inparticularthelines4-8;Greek
Phil.nr.1366,the
beginning).
3 STctaTpaçévToç áei èxeívou7rpòç auro.Enn.v 1,6.
4 Plotinus,
Enn.v 1, 6.25-27.
5 Theologia viii142,transi,
Aristotelis byG. Lewis inPlotiniopera t. 11p. 275.
ed.Henry-Schwyzer,
6 Dicta Graeci
sapientis 1g ( 18**)
, inHenry-Schwyzer 11,p. 275.
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brightlight of the sun, runninground about it, perpetuallygenerated
fromit, while itselfremainswhat it is"1.
That is Plotinus' account of the origin of intelligibleBeing. "And
all thingsthat attain perfectiongive birth to some offspring",he adds.
"Now that which is always perfectálways generates an object that is
eternal": to 8y)áel tsXsiováel xai áíStov yevvã2.
This is profoundand worthyof a true philosopher. Proclus could
not correct it. He could only pervertit by introducinghis queer henads
from which some colourless and abstract "Being" which is said to be
beyond Noûs derives. Plotinussays: "Nothingcould springfromit than
what is greatestafterit, and greatestafterIt is Noûs, which is second"3.
"For Noûs sees HIM and needs Him alone", Plotinus continues;
„but HE does not need Noûs at all. "
In these words Plotinus expresses both the direct dependence of
primaryBeing (which is Noûs) on the First,and the absolutenessof the
latter. No intermediatestagesshould be introduced,eitherbetween the
One and Noûs or between Noûs and Soul. For the dependence of the
second on the Firstmust be direct - if not, Noûs would not be able to
"see" the First,as in factit can and similarlySoul dependsdirectlyon
Noûs. Ifany intermediateshould be introduced,Soul would be bereftof
her communicationwith the Spirit. She would no longer be able to
"see" Noûs, i.e., she would lose her spiritualcharacter.
This is Potinus' doctrine. Proclus pervertsit, not only in thathe
introducedother "henads" on the level of the One, but - as we shall
findlater on - also in that he inserted "Being" between the One and
Noûs. One thing,however, must be said in favourof Proclus: his was a
keensenseof the all-comprehensiveness of the FirstCause. For
and intensity
Plato, no doubt, the Good lateralso called the One - was theultimate
-
Cause of all good, and a universalCause in so far as it was the direct
Cause of intelligible Being, which was the archetype of the sensible
world. But I cannot see in this doctrine thatthe Good itselfwould have
been considered as the directCause of sensible things. It was not even
recognizedas the direct Cause of Soul, and Plato was far,indeed, from
thinkingthatthere was any direct and positive relationshipbetween the
Good and the indefinitePrinciple which Aristotlecalled "Matter".
As to Plotinus,in the Enneadswe get a perfectlyclear idea of how he
explained that "procession"of the multitudeof thingsfromthe One, of
1 Plotinus,
Enn.v i, 6.28-30.
2 Plotinus,
ib.38.
3 Ib.40-41
.
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which Proclus speaks so much. Without any doubt the One was for
Plotinus the Source whence all thingsexistingspring. It is the ultimate
and universalCause. Yet, I do not see in the Enneadsthat their author
considered the One as directlyoperating "on" or "in" those kinds of
thingsthat, according to his terms, came "after"the second level: for
him, very clearly, Noûs or intelligibleBeing sprangdirectlyfrom the
One, but I do not finda trace of the view that the subsequent kind of
Being which sprung from Noûs would have been primarilyand more
intensely influencedby the One itself. Nor can I see that in Plotinus*
opinion Nature which was the lowest reflectionof the Divine, would
have been primarilyand most intenselyoperated on by the One itself.
On the contrary,thisview is definitelyabsentfromthe Enneads.
As to Matter, that "circle of darkness"which in Plotinus' descrip-
tion of the universeis situatedoutside the circle of theSoul, whichis the
last and outermost circle of Light that springsfrom the One - not
directly,but throughthe intermediaryof the firstcircle of Lightwhich
is Noûs -, that "circle of darkness"sometimesis said to have been pro-
duced by the Soul itselfwhich, next, "forms"it by penetratingit with
its rays1.But I do not see in Plotinus what Proclus definitelytaught:
thatthe influenceof the FirstCause is immediatelypresentin thatnon-
being where the operation of the second or third cause has stopped.
There is one remarkablepassage in the Enneadsin which it is said that
Matter,too, mustparticipateof the natureof the good: for "thatwhich
gives existence as it were by grace" could not stop beforecomingto it.2
Proclus may have had this passage in mind when he wrote the above-
cited lines of his Timaeus Commentary3 . It is important,however, to
markthe differences.
i. In Plotinus, what follows immediatelyafter the above-cited
lines is that thebeauty foundin sensiblethingsis a proof of this, for sen-
sible things"imitate"the intelligiblenatureas faras theycan*. But how
is it that the sensible thingsimitate the intelligible?- Plotinus says:
by beingan etxcovof Soul, a perpetual image arisingfromSoul, as long as
the latter "looks at" thatwhich is before it, - the eternal Noûs5. For as
soon as the Soul turnsaway from the eternal archetyponand attaches
herself to thingsbelow, she will lose her creative power and will no
longerbe able to illuminatethe darknessof Matter.
1 Enn.Ill9, 3. 7-16(Greek
Phil.nr.1402c).
2 Enn.IV8,6. 16-24(Greek Phil.nr.1401b).
3 Supra, p. 71,n. 3.
4 Enn.IV8,6.24-28.
5 Enn.
II 3, 18.8-22. Cp.,forinstance,
iv8,4. 1-3$(GreekPhil.nr.1375"
c.)
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 That is to say,PlotinusdoessaythatMattermustpartakeofgoodness,
but he does not in the least imagine that the One directlyilluminates
Matterbecause Noûs and Soul do not penetratethatfar. He would have
deemed thatan absurd idea. Matterpartakesof the good because, and in
so faras, it is illuminatedby Soul ; and thisis whathappensif,and onlyif,
the Soul continueslookingat "whatis beforeher", i.e. Nous.
2. Accordingto Proclus thingsare broughtinto being "by the gods
immediately": the Divine is directlypresent even in that which seems
most remotefromit. Two thingsmustbe noticed. First,thatwhich acts
directlyon all thingsis nottheOne: the One standsbeyondparticipation,
cut offfromwhatcomes afterit ; the "gods" thatproduce all thingsbeing
are the "henads". These are said to be presenteverywhere.Second, it is
the "intermundanehenads" (Proci. 166) which, accordingto Proci. 70,
are still presentin matter,where Noûs and Soul have ceased to operate.
He thinksof the factthat,when soul has withdrawnfroma livingbeing,
the existingorder of the body is not immediatelydisturbed,but "some-
thing"remains.Now certainlyany trace of order in the sensibleworld is
a last image of "the Good" (to put it in Plotinianlanguage). But Proclus
intendsto attributethe order of lifelessmaterialthingsto the immediate
operation of the èyxóafjuoi èváSeçthatrepresentthe One. At least,thatis
what he says. For Plotinus, it is a last reflectionof the Intelligible,
remainingin matter,even when soul has withdrawn.
Now thisdoctrineof the immediateoperationof primaryCauses on
"later" things,includingthe last, is new to the reader who comes from
Plato and Plotinus. Dodds1 remarks: "This is a post-Plotiniandevelop-
ment, at least in its explicit formulation.But it is older than Proclus:
-
Syrianusformallyapplies it to the relationof the One and Being tò yàp
iv xaí ÚTcèpto Ôv xaí <rùvtco Övti xaí èizi tocSstou ovtoç, <*)<;ènl tt)ç
uXyjçxal ty)ç aTspYjcreoix;(in Metaph.£9.17.)*"
The question maybe raisedof how these £thcenturyPlatonistscame
to emphasizingso greatlythe universality and immediateoperationof the
FirstCause(s) in everypartof the universe.I thinkthisdevelopmentmay
be due to the discussionwith - or ratherthe apology against,Christian
theism: confrontedwith the Christiandoctrine of an almightyCreator
these Greek philosophersmay have felt the need of formulatingmore
clearlythe actual influenceof the FirstCause on everything derivedfrom
it. Thus, theymay have reconstructedtheirsystemso as to offera poly-
theisticcounterpartto Christianmonotheism.

1 Dodds, ofTheol
TheElements
Proclus, . p. 231.

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II - The authorof the De causisspeaks of the FirstCause as being.He does
so in his second propositionas a conclusion fromProclus' tripartitionof
to Ôvtíoçöv in Elem. 88. In this case again we have to point to the
differences.
The text of Liberde Causis 2 runs: Omneessesuperiusaut estsuperius
aeternitate et ante ipsam, aut est cumaeternitate , aut estpostaeternitatem et
supratempus . Esseveroquod estante aeternitatem
est causaprima.
Proclus, Elem. 88: Ilãv to ovtcoçöv r¡ 7rpòouôvóç £<jtivr¡ èv tco
auovi ïj (JteTs^ov odcovoç.
Proclus does not say thatthe firstkindof Ôvtíoçöv is the FirstCause.
What he does say is that "Being-itself is primarilybeing", such in contra-
distinctionto Eternity,which is "eternal" in the primarysense, but is
"being" by participation.Certainlyhe did not identify his7rp<oT0t)ç
Övwith
the ř/Ev.It is interestingthatthe Arabic author,going againstthe unani-
mous traditionof Neoplatonismin this, made the identificationas if it
were the most naturalaffairin the world. Behind this is probablythe
Moslimbeliefin one God who is the Cause of everything and is more than
anything"existent".
To the Greek world thisthoughtwas certainlynot strange.Plutarch
assertsmost emphaticallythatonly God is "trulyBeing"1,and Philo had
learntthe same fromGreek philosophers.St. Justin,in the middle of the
2nd century,somewhatvaguelyidentifiesboth the "eternalbeing" of the
Platonic Ideas and theirultimateGround with God: forhim there is no
essentialdistinction2.Plato, no doubt, did raise the Good, as the Source
of intelligibleBeing, beyond the level of the voyjtoc. And so most em-
phatically did Plotinus, because intelligibleBeing included the principle
of differentiation and, hence, was a plurality,thoughofa unitedcharacter.
It was not primarilyone, and thereforemustbe preceded by a principle
which was totallyOne, and as such beyondbeing3.
St. Augustinewas the firstto make the identification of the firstand
the second level quite consciouslyand on the basis of revealed Truth:
eternal Being was to him the Wisdom and Word of God, and fromthe
Churchhe had learntthatthe Word is equal to the Father4.
As to the authorof the De Causis, it is not impossible,of course, but
at least less probable thathe was influencedby Christianideas. He rather
makes the impressionof just having found no problem in the text of

1 DeE apudDelphos2o(393AB);Greek Phil.1312 c.

2 Dialogus , ch.3 and4.
c.Tryphone
3 E.g.,Enn.
v 2,1(thebeginning);vi9,2. 29-32
; vi9,3. 36-44.
Greek
Phil.1370a, 1392ab.
4 Augustinus,
DeliberoArbitr
io11,ïj, 39.

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Proclus and of havingidentifiedthe 6vtíoç 6v with the First Cause as a
matterof course - a thingwhich, afterall, he can have done as a Moslim
as easilyas othersdid as Christians.

Ill - "Beingis beyondEternity",Proclussays( Elem. 87). And theauthorof

the Liberde Causisrepeats: "The FirstCause is anteaeternitatem" .
What is the background of these ?
statements
First,in rankingthe ovabove eternityProclus is not at all represen-
tative of Neoplatonism. For the classical doctrine of Plotinus was that
eternal Being was contained in Noûs as its eternal object: Noûs is rà
7cpčoTa, i.e. Noûs is the intelligibleuniversewhich is primaryBeing1; and
intelligibleBeing is eternal, which means that there is no "prior" and
"posterior"in Noûs, but thatall is immediatelypresentin it, at the same
time2. For Plato, of course, the ôvtoíçov was intelligibleBeing,definedas
"thatwhich is alwaysthe same and identicalwith itself".What is new in
Proclus is : ( 1) that Being is detached fromthe vorjTáand superposed to
them; (2) that "Eternity"as an abstractis separatedfrom"eternalthings"
and rankedimmediately"after"Beingand "before"(i.e. "above") eternal
things.To the reader of both Plato and Plotinus this is strange,indeed.
Second, Proclus gives us his argumentsfor proceeding thus. They
are as follows.
1. "Being" is a wider concept than "eternal". Now, since more
thingsparticipatein it, it rankshigherthanwhatis eternal,or even higher
than Eternity3.
2. Eternityhas perpetuitycombined with Being,and eternalthings
haveboth, byparticipationin Eternity.Eternity,however,has perpetuity
primarily,and Being by participation,while Being itself is primarily
Being*.
Now, certainly,the firstpointwould neverhave been grantedeither
by Plato or Plotinus. For what was it that Proclus had in mind, when
assertingthat "Being" is predicable of a wider circle of objects than
"eternal"? He thoughtof the "existence" of concrete things,which are
called "being" because they are not non-existent.Eternity,however,
nevercan be predicatedof thiskindof things.
1 Enn. v 2. i-i2.Greek
v 9,7. 8-17; cp.alsoEnn. Phil,i384ab.
2 Wecannot findfault withSt.Thomas forhaving theconcept
illustrated ofaeternitas
byciting
Boethius'
definition estintermi
v, prosa6: Aeternitas
inConsolatio Iis vitae
nabi etperfecta
totasimul
Butwedothink
possessio. themodern editor
Saffreymight havementionedheretheauthorofthis
from
definition, whom Boethiustookit over: it wasPlotinusinhistreatise
Ilepial&voçxai
Xpóvou,Enn.hi7, 3. 37-38(DeVogel, GreekPhil.1433b).
3 Proclus,
Elem. 87. *•Proclus,
Elem. 88.

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 It is true that Plato sometimesused the term "being" in the wider
sense (e.g. in the Phaedo*, where he speaks of "two kinds of being, the
visible and the invisible"). Nonethelesshe explicitlydenied "Being" to
thingsof temporal origin which are always changing,in an important
passage of the Timaeus 2, and the same view is present in the Philebusas
well3. The term övtgx;öv expressesthis view perfectlywell: this term,
which in the Liberde Causis is rendered by the formulaof essesuperius ,
certainlyimplies that there is an esse ius
infer as well, a so-called
Öv which is
not "truly"what it is called.
Plato and Plotinus,however,thoughtheywould havegrantedthatin
this sense "being" covers a wider fieldthan "eternal", did not findany
reason in thisforplacingthe öv beyond "eternaltruth"in theirhierarchi-
cal order. Nor did theyever dream of placing "Eternity"above "whatis
eternal" because it seems to be more general. Of course not, for they
knew only too well that "eternal Being" is primaryBeingand primarily
eternal, so that "whatis eternal"is Eternityitself.St. Thomas, as is natu-
ral, did not protestagainstProclus, since he credits"Platonists"withthe
method of makingabstractsinto "substances"and placing them higher
according to their degree of abstractness.Accordingly,he thinksthat
what Proclus is doing here is just normal Platonismi. In fact, it is a
perversionof Platonismand a parody.
In the Liberde Causis, theauthorof whichunderstoodthe ôvtg>çÖvof
Proclusas "theFirstCause", prop. 88 of the Elements is transposedinto the
-
thesis: Causa primaest ante aeternitatem a correct transposition,yet
'
absurd in its contents,as absurd as Proclus distinctionof öv, ocítov and
aîamov as beings of differentlevels. It is remarkable,nonetheless,that
the Arabic author who did correct Proclus both by ignoringhis henads
while speakingof Causa primain the singularand by identifying the ôvtcoç
Övwiththe FirstCause, did notsee theabsurdityofplacingthisFirstCause
which is "trulyBeing" "before"or beyond Eternity.

IV - "The FirstcreatingBeingis the Firstpure Infinity ; the firstcreated

Being (i.e. the Intelligence) is not Infinity",says the Liber de Causis
i
(prop, s).
A fewlinesfurtheron theauthorcorrectshimselfwhilesaying: "The
First creatingBeing is beyondInfinity;second, created Being is without

1 Phaedo
y79a.
2 Timaeus
28a.
3 Philebus
£9a-c.
4 Saffrey,
S. Thomae
deAquino Liber
super deCausis pp.13-14.
expositio
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end, and thatwhich is between the First,creatingBeing, and the second,
created Being is Infinity."
The writer, apparently,was firstinclined to state that the First
Cause, which he calls here "First,creatingBeing", was Infinity.Next,
byfollowingProclus who in his 90thand 92nd thesesplaces rcpcoTov rcépaç
and TcpcùTT) a^eipía immediatelyafterthe First Principle (the One) and
before "Being", our author arrivesat placing Infinitybetween his First
Cause and created Being, which as such is called second. The Latin text
makes rathera confusedimpression.
It is interestingthat the author started by the statement: Ens
primum creansestinfinitum
purum . When statingthat "all those powers that
are endless depend on the FirstInfinitewhich is the Power of powers",
he clearlyintendedto say thatthese endless powers depend on the First
'
Cause. Thus the First Cause which had taken the place of Proclus
7rpa>TG)ç Ôv, now is identifiedwith auTÓSuvajJiiç and is conceived as
primary Infinitude or 7rpo)T7]
ájtsipta. Of "first
created Being" it is said
that it is not Power, but it has some power. Moreover, the power of
this firstcreated Being (which is "intelligentia")is endless "downwards
-
only" thatis to say, in its effects-, not "upwards" (because it depends
on the FirstCause). Follows the statement"Ens autem primumcreansest
infinitumprimum purum".
Up to thispoint our author's transpositionof Proclus is consistent.
But his next reflectionis : since these derived endless powers are caused
by the FirstCause, "the latter,doubtless, is beyond infinity".And con-
sequently Infinityis placed afterthe First Cause and before created
Being.
The Greek backgroundof thisis the following.(1) For Proclus it is
the One that is beyond Infinity,not the ovtwç öv. (2) The latter is
composed of 7uspaçand árcsipov and, hence, rankedafterthem(prop. 89).
To find árceipovas one of the constitutiveelements of intelligible
Being is not entirelyunexpected or strangeto the readers of Plotinus.
Though he did not put the doctrine precisely in this form, it was at
which was the araipov
least prepared by him in his concept of öXt)voyjty),
in its functionon the level of intelligible Being (£nn. II 4, i$). It
differedfromuXt)atatbjni)in this, thatthe latterwas totallyindefiniteby
lackinganyform,whereas "intelligiblematter"was infiniteby havingall
formsin itself1.Plotinus clearly recognized that there must be infinity
in Noûs, since there is an infinitevarietyof being within it. Plato had

1 fnn.II4, 3. i-i6; De Vogel,

Greek
Phil.1406a.

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accounted forthe pluralityof intelligibleBeing by statingthat,together
with the öv, both "identity"and "difference"must be assumed. Thus,
the sTspovof the Sophistes became the originof Plotinus' higherkind of
or
a7T6ipov uXt)voyjty)1 .
The differencebetween those earlier thinkersand Proclus is, that
the former recognized both the principleof differentiation (the ŠTepov
or sTspóryjç)and the a7retpov resultingfrom it as a principle immanent
in intelligibleBeing itselfand separable from it only by the reflecting
intellect, whereas Proclus raised it into a hypostasis,ranked beyond
Being. This is the same method as we foundwhen he dealt with the 8v
and with "Eternity",which I qualifiedas a perversionand a parody of
true Platonism. Its pervertingcharacter is, that intelligible Being -
whichaccordingto Plotinusspringsas LightfromLight- is dealt withas
an analogon of sensible things, "composed" of constitutingelements.
Both Plato (in Resp.vi £09 c) and Plotinusgave a much purer expression
of the spiritualcharacterof the intelligibleworld than the £thcentury
NeoplatonistSchool2.
Afterall, the Platonismof St. Augustinewas a simpler and purer
kindof Platonismthanthatof the authorof the De causis. It is interesting,
however, to see how the Christianauthor who called himselfby the
name of Dionysius the Areopagitefound a more audacious and a more
satisfactory solution of the problems involved in Proclus' text than the
author of the De causisby takingthe izépoLç and inzipicnprinciplesback
into the essence of God, who surpassesthe oppositesbyabsorbingthem3.

V - Bardenhewerobservedthatthe methodof hypostatizing abstractswas

both the chief characteristicand the chief error of the author of the
Liberde Causis. We foundthat in this our author was a faithfulfollower
of Proclus. Moreover, Proclus' manner of hypostatizingabstracts
appeared to be a kind of pseudo-Platonismratherthan a true develop-
ment of Platonism.
We have a few words more to say about thispoint. How was it that
such Platonistsas Proclus came to proceedingin such a manneras must
be called a perversion of Platonism and a parody? And how did an
Arabic philosopher such as the author of the Liberde Causis come to

1 Enn.II4, g. 24-37;Greek
Phil.1406e.
2 On theimmediate ofProclus
precedents intheSchool
ofAthens, seeDodds, *Elements
Proclus
p. 246f.
3 DionysiusAreop.,De div.nom.g, 10: ó 7Tpowv(&eóç). . . .îtépaç7rávTo>v
xal áTcetpía,
7ráa7)ça7rsipíaçxai 7répaToçÚ7repoxix&ç tõv o>çávTixei
è$Y)py)(xévoç (xévwv.
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followingthis example? I thinkthe answer to these questions must be
the same for both, namelythat both these authors had rathera strong
trainingin formallogic and thereforeapproached Platonismnot so much
in the spiritof what Plato called "dialectic", but ratherin the spiritof
Aristotle's "analytics". Apparentlythey thought, as St. Thomas did,
thata Platonisťs job is to raisegeneraltermsinto a supposed existenceof
a superior degree of transcendency;and at the end, to forgetthat all
thisis just a creationofyourown intellect,and takeyourown production
most seriouslyas a metaphysicaltruthof the most sublimeorder.
I mean, to them hypostatizingabstractswas rathera technique, -
while for Plato, and also for Plotinus, philosophywas not a technique
but livingon the level of Noûs.
As to the Arabic writer of the De causis, he certainlylived truly
enough in a certain spiritualrealityto be able to correct Proclus' ab-
stractionsmore than once. But he was somewhat too much impressed
by his Greek master's authority. He might have raised himself to a
somewhatgreaterindependence,as we sometimessee thatthe Christian
author Dionysius has done.

Utrecht,
NieuweGrachtyçbis

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