REPUBLIC ACT No.
7877
AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNLAWFUL IN THE
EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION OR TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall value the dignity of
every individual, enhance the development of its human resources,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and uphold the dignity of
workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or those
undergoing training, instruction or education. Towards this end, all
forms of sexual harassment in the employment, education or training
environment are hereby declared unlawful.
Section 3. Work, Education or Training -Related, Sexual Harassment
Defined. - Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in
granting said individual favorable compensation, terms
of conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal
to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any
way would discriminate, deprive ordiminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights
or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
(b) In an education or training environment, sexual
harassment is committed:
(1) Against one who is under the care, custody or
supervision of the offender;
(2) Against one whose education, training,
apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the
offender;
(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the
giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors
and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend,
allowance or other benefits, privileges, or
consideration; or
(4) When the sexual advances result in an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
student, trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act
of sexual harassment as herein defined, or who cooperates in
the commission thereof by another without which it would not
have been committed, shall also be held liable under this Act.
Section 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related,
Education or Training Environment. - It shall be the duty of the
employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training
environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts
of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment.
Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in
consultation with and joint1y approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the
 investigation of sexual harassment cases and the
administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in
the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this
subsection (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on
proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training
institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases
on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings,
as the case may be, with officers and employees, teachers,
instructors, professors, coaches, trainors, and students or
trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of
sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of
alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee
shall be composed of at least one (1) representative each from
the management, the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative
from the administration, the trainors, instructors, professors
or coaches and students or trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or training
institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the
information of all concerned.
Section 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or
Training Institution. - The employer or head of office, educational or
training institution shall be solidarily liable for damages arising from
the acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment,
education
or training environment if the employer or head of office, educational
or training institution is informed of such acts by the offended party
and no immediate action is taken.
Section 6. Independent Action for Damages. - Nothing in this Act
shall preclude the victim of work, education or training-related sexual
harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for
damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person who violates the provisions of this
Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less
than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more than Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000), or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall
prescribe in three (3) years.
Section 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this
Act is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or
provisions hereof shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity Clause.- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its complete publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Republic Act No. 6955 June 13, 1990
AN ACT TO DECLARE UNLAWFUL THE PRACTICE OF MATCHING
FILIPINO WOMEN FOR MARRIAGE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS ON
A MAIL ORDER BASIS AND OTHER SIMILAR PRACTICES,
INCLUDING THE ADVERTISEMENT, PUBLICATION, PRINTING OR
DISTRIBUTION OF BROCHURES, FLIERS AND OTHER
PROPAGANDA MATERIALS IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF AND
PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFORE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. It is the policy of the State to ensure and guarantee the
enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living. Towards this
end, the State shall take measures to protect Filipino women from
being exploited in utter disregard of human dignity in their pursuit of
economic upliftment.
Section 2. Pursuant thereto, it is hereby declared unlawful:
(a) For a person, natural or juridical, association, club or any
other entity to commit, directly or indirectly, any of the
following acts:
(1) To establish or carry on a business which has for
its purpose the matching of Filipino women for
marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order
basis or through personal introduction;
(2) To advertise, publish, print or distribute or cause
the advertisement, publication, printing or distribution
of any brochure, flier, or any propaganda material
calculated to promote the prohibited acts in the
preceding subparagraph;
(3) To solicit, enlist or in any manner attract or induce
any Filipino woman to become a member in any club
or association whose objective is to match women for
marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order
basis or through personal introduction for a fee;
(4) To use the postal service to promote the prohibited
acts in subparagraph 1 hereof.1awphi1©alf
(b) For the manager or officer-in-charge or advertising
manager of any newspaper, magazine, television or radio
station, or other media, or of an advertising agency, printing
company or other similar entities, to knowingly allow, or
consent to, the acts prohibited in the preceding paragraph.
Section 3. In case of violation of this Act by an association, club,
partnership, corporation, or any other entity, the incumbent officers
thereof who have knowingly participated in the violation of this Act
shall be held liable.1awphil©a1f
Section 4. Any person found guilty by the court to have violated any
of the acts herein prohibited shall suffer an imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than eight (8) years,
and a fine of not less than Eight thousand pesos (P8,000) but not
more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000): Provided, That if the
offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately deported and barred
forever from entering the country after serving his sentence and
payment of fine.
Section 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction on
the freedom of speech and of association for purposes not contrary to
law as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Section 6. All laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its publication for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Republic Act No. 9710 August 14, 2009
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MAGNA CARTA OF WOMEN
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Magna
Carta of Women".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the economic,
political, and sociocultural realities affect women's current condition,
the State affirms the role of women in nation building and ensures
the substantive equality of women and men. It shall promote
empowerment of women and pursue equal opportunities for women
and men and ensure equal access to resources and to development
results and outcome. Further, the State realizes that equality of men
and women entails the abolition of the unequal structures and
practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality. To realize
this, the State shall endeavor to develop plans, policies, programs,
measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality
in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of women and men.
The State condemns discrimination against women in all its forms
and pursues by all appropriate means and without delay the policy of
eliminating discrimination against women in keeping with the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and other international instruments consistent
with Philippine law. The State shall accord women the rights,
protection, and opportunities available to every member of society.
The State affirms women's rights as human rights and shall intensify
its efforts to fulfill its duties under international and domestic law to
recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of women, especially marginalized women, in
the economic, social, political, cultural, and other fields without
distinction or discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender,
language, ethnicity, religion, ideology, disability, education, and
status. The State shall provide the necessary mechanisms to enforce
women's rights and adopt and undertake all legal measures
necessary to foster and promote the equal opportunity for women to
participate in and contribute to the development of the political,
economic, social, and cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's concerns in the
mainstream of development, shall provide ample opportunities to
enhance and develop their skills, acquire productive employment and
contribute to their families and communities to the fullest of their
capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in
all sectors to participate in policy formulation. planning,
organization, implementation, management, monitoring, and
evaluation of all programs, projects, and services. It shall support
policies, researches, technology, and training programs and other
support services such as financing, production, and marketing to
encourage active participation of women in national development.
Section 3. Principles of Human Rights of Women. - Human rights
are universal and inalienable. All people in the world are entitled to
them. The universality of human rights is encompassed in the words
of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
states that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.
Human rights are indivisible. Human rights are inherent to the
dignity of every human being whether they relate to civil, cultural,
economic, political, or social issues.
Human rights are interdependent and interrelated. The fulfillment of
one right often depends, wholly or in part, upon the fulfillment of
others.
All individuals are equal as human beings by virtue of the inherent
dignity of each human person. No one, therefore, should suffer
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, age, language, sexual
orientation, race, color, religion, political, or other opinion, national,
social, or geographical origin, disability, property, birth, or other
status as established by human rights standards.
All people have the right to participate in and access information
relating to the decision- making processes that affect their lives and
well-being. Rights-based approaches require a high degree of
participation by communities, civil society, minorities, women, young
people, indigenous peoples, and other identified groups.
States and other duty-bearers are answerable for the observance of
human rights. They have to comply with the legal norms and
standards enshrined in international human rights instruments in
accordance with the Philippine Constitution. Where they fail to do so,
aggrieved rights-holders are entitled to institute proceedings for
appropriate redress before a competent court or other adjudicator in
accordance with the rules and procedures provided by law.
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 4. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
(a) "Women Empowerment" refers to the provision, availability,
and accessibility of opportunities, services, and observance of
human rights which enable women to actively participate and
contribute to the political, economic, social, and cultural
development of the nation as well as those which shall provide
them equal access to ownership, management, and control of
production, and of material and informational resources and
benefits in the family, community, and society.
(b) "Discrimination Against Women" refers to any gender-
based distinction, exclusion, or restriction which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment, or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil, or any other field.
It includes any act or omission, including by law; policy,
administrative measure, or practice, that directly or indirectly
excludes or restricts women in the recognition and promotion
of their rights and their access to and enjoyment of
opportunities, benefits, or privileges.
A measure or practice of general application is discrimination
against women if it fails to provide for mechanisms to offset or
address sex or gender-based disadvantages or limitations of
women, as a result of which women are denied or restricted in
the recognition and protection of their rights and in their
access to and enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or
privileges; or women, more than men, are shown to have
suffered the greater adverse effects of those measures or
practices.
Provided, finally, That discrimination compounded by or
intersecting with other grounds, status, or condition, such as
ethnicity, age, poverty, or religion shall be considered
discrimination against women under this Act.
(c) "Marginalization" refers to a condition where a whole
category of people is excluded from useful and meaningful
participation in political, economic, social, and cultural life.
(d) "Marginalized" refers to the basic, disadvantaged, or
vulnerable persons or groups who are mostly living in poverty
and have little or no access to land and other resources, basic
social and economic services such as health care, education,
water and sanitation, employment and livelihood
opportunities, housing, social security, physical
infrastructure; and the justice system.
These include, but are not limited to, women in the following
sectors and groups:
(1) "Small Farmers and Rural Workers" refers to those
who are engaged directly or indirectly in small farms
and forest areas, workers in commercial farms and
plantations, whether paid or unpaid, regular or
season-bound. These shall include. but are not limited
to, (a) small farmers who own or are still amortizing for
lands that is not more than three (3) hectares, tenants,
leaseholders, and stewards; and (b) rural workers who
are either wage earners, self-employed, unpaid family
workers directly and personally engaged in agriculture,
small-scale mining, handicrafts, and other related
farm and off-farm activities;
(2) "Fisherfolk" refers to those directly or indirectly
engaged in taking, culturing, or processing fishery or
aquatic resources. These include, but are not to be
limited to, women engaged in fishing in municipal
waters, coastal and marine areas, women workers in
commercial fishing and aquaculture, vendors and
processors of fish and coastal products, and
subsistence producers such as shell-gatherers,
managers, and producers of mangrove resources, and
other related producers:
(3) "Urban Poor" refers to those residing in urban and
urbanizable slum or blighted areas, with or without
the benefit of security of abode, where the income of
the head of the family cannot afford in a sustained
manner to provide for the family's basic needs of food,
health, education, housing, and other essentials in life;
(4) "Workers in the Formal Economy" refers to those
who are employed by any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
an employee and shall include the government and all
its branches, subdivisions, and instrumentalities, all
government- owned and -controlled corporations and
institutions, as well as nonprofit private institutions or
organizations;
(5) "Workers in the Informal Economy" refers to self-
employed, occasionally or personally hired,
subcontracted, paid and unpaid family workers in
household incorporated and unincorporated
enterprises, including home workers, micro-
entrepreneurs and producers, and operators of sari-
sari stores and all other categories who suffer from
violation of workers' rights:
(6) "Migrant Workers" refers to Filipinos who are to be
engaged, are engaged, or have been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a State of which they are not
legal residents, whether documented or
undocumented;
(7) "Indigenous Peoples" refers to a group of people or
homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and
ascription by other, who have continuously lived as
organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of
ownership since time immemorial, occupied;
possessed customs, tradition, and other distinctive
cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social, and cultural inroads of colonization,
non- indigenous religions and culture, became
historically differentiated from the majority of
Filipinos. They shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent
from the populations which inhabited the country, at
the dime of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or
the establishment of present state boundaries, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic,
cultural, and political institutions, but who may have
been displaced from their traditional domains or who
may have resettled outside their ancestral domains as
defined under Section 3(h), Chapter II of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as "The Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997" (IPRA of 1997);
(8) "Moro" refers to native peoples who have
historically inhabited Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu,
and who are largely of the Islamic faith;
(9) "Children" refers to those who are below eighteen
(18) years of age or over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
(10) "Senior Citizens" refers to those sixty (60) years of
age and above;
(11) "Persons with Disabilities" refers to those who are
suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a
result of a mental, physical, or sensory impairment to
perform an activity in the manner or within the range
considered normal for a human being; and
(12) "Solo Parents" refers to those who fall under the
category of a solo parent defined under Republic Act
No. 8972, otherwise known as the "Solo Parents
Welfare Act of 2000".
(e) "Substantive Equality" refers to the full and equal
enjoyment of rights and freedoms contemplated under this
Act. It encompasses de jure and de facto equality and also
equality in outcomes.
(f) "Gender Equality" refers to the principle asserting the
equality of men and women and their right to enjoy equal
conditions realizing their full human potentials to contribute
to and benefit from the results of development, and with the
State recognizing that all human beings are free and equal in
dignity and rights.
(g) "Gender Equity" refers to the policies, instruments,
programs, services, and actions that address the
disadvantaged position of women in society by providing
preferential treatment and affirmative action. Such temporary
special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality
between men and women shall not be considered
discriminatory but shall in no way entail as a consequence
the maintenance of unequal or separate standards. These
measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
(h) "Gender and Development (GAD)" refers to the
development perspective and process that are participatory
and empowering, equitable, sustainable, free from violence,
respectful of human rights, supportive of self-determination
and actualization of human potentials. It seeks to achieve
gender equality as a fundamental value that should be
reflected in development choices; seeks to transform society's
social, economic, and political structures and questions the
validity of the gender roles they ascribed to women and men;
contends that women are active agents of development and
not just passive recipients of development assistance; and
stresses the need of women to organize themselves and
participate in political processes to strengthen their legal
rights.
(i) "Gender Mainstreaming" refers to the strategy for making
women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an
integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring,
and evaluation of policies and programs in all political,
economic, and societal spheres so that women and men
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. It is the
process of assessing the implications for women and men of
any planned action, including legislation, policies, or
programs in all areas and at all levels.
(j) "Temporary Special Measures" refers to a variety of
legislative, executive, administrative, and regulatory
instruments, policies, and practices aimed at accelerating this
de facto equality of women in specific areas. These measures
shall not be considered discriminatory but shall in no way
entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or
separate standards. They shall be discontinued when their
objectives have been achieved.
(k) "Violence Against Women" refers to any act of gender-
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in,
physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life. It shall be understood to encompass, but not
limited to, the following:
(1) Physical, sexual, psychological, and economic
violence occurring in the family, including battering,
sexual abuse of female children in the household,
dowry-related violence, marital rape, and other
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence, and violence related to exploitation;
(2) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence
occurring within the general community, including
rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and
elsewhere, trafficking in women, and prostitution; and
(3) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence
perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it
occurs.
It also includes acts of violence against women as defused in
Republic Acts No. 9208 and 9262.
(l) "Women in the Military" refers to women employed in the
military, both in the major and technical services, who are
performing combat and/or noncombat functions, providing
security to the State, and protecting the people from various
forms of threat. It also includes women trainees in all military
training institutions.
(m) "Social Protection" refers to policies and programs that
seek to reduce poverty and vulnerability to risks and enhance
the social status and rights of all women, especially the
marginalized by promoting and protecting livelihood and
employment, protecting against hazards and sudden loss of
income, and improving people's capacity to manage risk. Its
components are labor market programs, social insurance,
social welfare, and social safety nets.
CHAPTER III
DUTIES RELATED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN
The State, private sector, society in general, and all individuals shall
contribute to the recognition, respect, and promotion of the rights of
women defined and guaranteed under this Act.
Section 5. The State as the Primary Duty-Bearer. - The State, as
the primary duty-bearer, shall:
(a) Refrain from discriminating against women and violating
their rights;
(b) Protect women against discrimination and from violation of
their rights by private corporations, entities, and individuals;
and
(c) Promote and fulfill the rights of women in all spheres,
including their rights to substantive equality and non-
discrimination.
The State shall fulfill these duties through law, policy, regulatory
instruments, administrative guidelines, and other appropriate
measures, including temporary special measures.
Recognizing the interrelation of the human rights of women, the State
shall take measures and establish mechanisms to promote the
coherent and integrated implementation, and enforcement of this Act
and related laws, policies, or other measures to effectively stop
discrimination against and advance the rights of women.
The State shall keep abreast with and be guided by progressive
developments in human rights of women under international law and
design of policies, laws, and other measures to promote the objectives
of this Act.
Section 6. Duties of the State Agencies and Instrumentalities. -
These duties of the State shall extend to all state agencies, offices,
and instrumentalities at all levels and government-owned and -
controlled corporations, subject to the Constitution and pertinent
laws, policies, or administrative guidelines that define specific duties
of state agencies and entities concerned.
Section 7. Suppletory Effect. - This chapter shall be deemed
integrated into and be suppletory to other provisions of this Act,
particularly those that guarantee specific rights to women and define
specific roles and require specific conduct of state organs.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT
Section 8. Human Rights of Women. - All rights in the Constitution
and those rights recognized under international instruments duly
signed and ratified by the Philippines, in consonance with Philippine
law, shall be rights of women under this Act to be enjoyed without
discrimination.
Section 9. Protection from Violence. - The State shall ensure that
all women shall be protected from all forms of violence as provided for
in existing laws. Agencies of government shall give priority to the
defense and protection of women against gender-based offenses and
help women attain justice and healing.
Towards this end, measures to prosecute and reform offenders shall
likewise be pursued.
(a) Within the next five (5) years, there shall be an incremental
increase in the recruitment and training of women in the police force,
forensics and medico-legal, legal services, and social work services
availed of by women who are victims of gender-related offenses until
fifty percent (50%) of the personnel thereof shall be women.
(b) Women shall have the right to protection and security in
situations of armed conflict and militarization. Towards this end, they
shall be protected from all forms of gender-based violence,
particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all forms of
violence in situations of armed conflict. The State shall observe
international standards for the protection of civilian population in
circumstances of emergency and armed conflict. It shall not force
women, especially indigenous peoples, to abandon their lands,
territories, and means of subsistence, or relocate them in special
centers for military purposes under any discriminatory condition.
(c) All government personnel involved in the protection and defense of
women against gender-based violence shall undergo a mandatory
training on human rights and gender sensitivity pursuant to this Act.
(d) All local government units shall establish a Violence Against
Women's Desk in every barangay to ensure that violence against
women cases are fully addressed in a gender-responsive manner.
Section 10. Women Affected by Disasters, Calamities, and Other
Crisis Situations. - Women have the right to protection and security
in times of disasters, calamities, and other crisis situations especially
in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation, and construction
efforts. The State shall provide for immediate humanitarian
assistance, allocation of resources, and early resettlement, if
necessary. It shall also address the particular needs of women from a
gender perspective to ensure their full protection from sexual
exploitation and other sexual and gender- based violence committed
against them. Responses to disaster situations shall include the
provision of services, such as psychosocial support, livelihood
support, education, psychological health, and comprehensive health
services, including protection during pregnancy.
Section 11. Participation and Representation. - The State shall
undertake temporary special measures to accelerate the participation
and equitable representation of women in all spheres of society
particularly in the decision-making and policy-making processes in
government and private entities to fully realize their role as agents
and beneficiaries of development.
The State shall institute the following affirmative action mechanisms
so that women can participate meaningfully in the formulation,
implementation, and evaluation of policies, plans, and programs for
national, regional, and local development:
(a) Empowerment within the Civil Service. - Within the next
five (5) years, the number of women in third (3rd) level
positions in government shall be incrementally increased to
achieve a fifty-fifty (50-50) gender balance;
(b) Development Councils and Planning Bodies. - To ensure
the participation of women in all levels of development
planning and program implementation, at least forty percent
(40%) of membership of all development councils from the
regional, provincial, city, municipal and barangay levels shall
be composed of women;
(c) Other Policy and Decision-Making Bodies. - Women's
groups shall also be represented in international, national,
and local special and decision-making bodies;
(d) International Bodies. - The State shall take all appropriate
measures to ensure the opportunity of women, on equal terms
with men and without any discrimination, to represent their
governments at the international level and to participate in
the work of international organizations;
(e) Integration of Women in Political Parties. - The State shall
provide incentives to political parties with women's agenda. It
shall likewise encourage the integration of women in their
leadership hierarchy, internal policy-making structures,
appointive, and electoral nominating processes; and
(f) Private Sector. - The State shall take measures to
encourage women leadership in the private sector in the form
of incentives.
Section 12. Equal Treatment Before the Law. - The State shall
take steps to review and, when necessary, amend and/or repeal
existing laws that are discriminatory to women within three (3) years
from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 13. Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination in
Education, Scholarships, and Training. - (a) The State shall
ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational materials
and curricula are adequately and appropriately revised. Gender-
sensitive language shall be used at all times. Capacity-building on
gender and development (GAD), peace and human rights, education
for teachers, and all those involved in the education sector shall be
pursued toward this end. Partnerships between and among players of
the education sector, including the private sector, churches, and
faith groups shall be encouraged.
(b) Enrollment of women in nontraditional skills training in vocational
and tertiary levels shall be encouraged.
(c) Expulsion and non-readmission of women faculty due to
pregnant;- outside of marriage shall be outlawed. No school shall
turn out or refuse admission to a female student solely on the
account of her having contracted pregnancy outside of marriage
during her term in school.
Section 14. Women in Sports. - The State shall develop, establish,
and strengthen programs for the participation of women and girl-
children in competitive and noncompetitive sports as a means to
achieve excellence, promote physical and social well-being, eliminate
gender-role stereotyping, and provide equal access to the full benefits
of development for all persons regardless of sex, gender identity, and
other similar factors.
For this purpose, all sports-related organizations shall create
guidelines that will establish and integrate affirmative action as a
strategy and gender equality as a framework in planning and
implementing their policies, budgets, programs, and activities
relating to the participation of women and girls in sports.
The State will also provide material and nonmaterial incentives to
local government units, media organizations, and the private sector
for promoting, training, and preparing women and girls for
participation in competitive and noncompetitive sports, especially in
local and international events, including, but not limited to, the
Palarong Pambansa, Southeast Asian Games, Asian Games, and the
Olympics.
No sports event or tournament will offer or award a different sports
prize, with respect to its amount or value, to women and men
winners in the same sports category: Provided, That the said
tournament, contest, race, match, event, or game is open to both
sexes: Provided, further, That the sports event or tournament is
divided into male or female divisions.
The State shall also ensure the safety and well-being of all women
and girls participating in sports, especially, but not limited to,
trainees, reserve members, members, coaches, and mentors of
national sports teams, whether in studying, training, or performance
phases, by providing them comprehensive health and medical
insurance coverage, as well as integrated medical, nutritional, and
healthcare services.
Schools, colleges, universities, or any other learning institution shall
take into account its total women student population in granting
athletic scholarship. There shall be a pro rata representation of
women in the athletic scholarship program based on the percentage
of women in the whole student population.
Section 15. Women in the Military. - The State shall pursue
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination of women in the
military, police, and other similar services, including revising or
abolishing policies and practices that restrict women from availing of
both combat and noncombat training that are open to men, or from
taking on functions other than administrative tasks, such as
engaging in combat, security-related, or field operations. Women in
the military shall be accorded the same promotional privileges and
opportunities as men, including pay increases, additional
remunerations and benefits, and awards based on their competency
and quality of performance. Towards this end, the State shall ensure
that the personal dignity of women shall always be respected.
Women in the military, police, and other similar services shall be
provided with the same right to employment as men on equal
conditions. Equally, they shall be accorded the same capacity as men
to act in and enter into contracts, including marriage.
Further, women in the military, police; and other similar services
shall be entitled to leave benefits such as maternity leave, as provided
for by existing laws.
Section 16. Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory Portrayal of
Women in Media and Film. - The State shall formulate policies and
programs for the advancement of women in collaboration with
government and nongovernment media-related organizations. It shall
likewise endeavor to raise the consciousness of the general public in
recognizing the dignity of women and the role and contribution of
women in the family; community, and the society through the
strategic use of mass media.
For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of space; airtime,
and resources, strengthen programming, production, and image-
making that appropriately present women's needs, issues, and
concerns in all forms of media, communication, information
dissemination, and advertising.
The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism, information,
and communication, as well as the national media federations and
associations, shall require all media organizations and corporations
to integrate into their human resource development components
regular training on gender equality and gender-based discrimination,
create and use gender equality guidelines in all aspects of
management, training, production, information, dissemination,
communication, and programming; and convene a gender equality
committee that will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework
and affirmative action as a strategy, and monitor and evaluate the
implementation of gender equality guidelines.
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health
Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which
addresses the major causes of women's mortality and
morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious
convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous
drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to
address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of
family planning;
 (4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality
education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers
like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-
related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women
and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing
years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental
health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through
programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State
shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth and the development of moral character
and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening
of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human
dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
Section 18. Special Leave Benefits for Women. - A woman
employee having rendered continuous aggregate employment service
of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months shall be
entitled to a special leave benefit of two (2) months with full pay
based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused
by gynecological disorders.
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage
and Family Relations. - The State shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure:
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or
common law relationships referred to under the Family Code
without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into
marriage only with their free and full consent. The betrothal
and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their
children and to have access to the information, education and
means to enable them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law
spouses including the right to choose freely a profession and
an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses
in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management,
administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled
or not, and inheritance, whether formal or customary; and
 (g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire,
change, or retain their nationality. The State shall ensure in
particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of
nationality by the husband during marriage shall
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her
stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband.
Various statutes of other countries concerning dual
citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by women and men
shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do
not discriminate against women.
CHAPTER V
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF MARGINALIZED SECTORS
Women in marginalized sectors are hereby guaranteed all civil,
political, social, and economic rights recognized, promoted, and
protected under existing laws including, but not limited to, the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, the Urban Development and Housing
Act, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Fisheries Code, the
Labor Code, the Migrant Workers Act, the Solo Parents Welfare Act,
and the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act.
Section 20. Food Security and Productive Resources. - The State
recognizes the contribution of women to food production and shall
ensure its sustainability and sufficiency with the active participation
of women. Towards this end, the State shall guarantee, at all times,
the availability in the market of safe and health-giving food to satisfy
the dietary needs of the population, giving particular attention to the
specific needs of poor girl-children and marginalized women,
especially pregnant and lactating mothers and their young children.
To further address this, the State shall ensure:
(a) Right to Food. - The State shall guarantee the availability
of food in quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary
needs of individuals, the physical and economic accessibility
for everyone to adequate food that is culturally acceptable and
free from unsafe substances and culturally accepted, and the
accurate and substantial information to the availability of
food, including the right to full, accurate, and truthful
information about safe and health-giving foods and how to
produce and have regular and easy access to them;
(b) Right to Resources for Food Production. - The State shall
guarantee women a vital role in food production by giving
priority to their rights to land, credit, and infrastructure
support, technical training, and technological and marketing
assistance. The State shall promote women-friendly
technology as a high priority activity in agriculture and shall
promote the right to adequate food by proactively engaging in
activities intended to strengthen access to, utilization of, and
receipt of accurate and substantial information on resources
and means to ensure women's livelihood, including food
security:
(1) Equal status shall be given to women and men,
whether married or not, in the titling of the land and
issuance of stewardship contracts and patents;
(2) Equal treatment shall be given to women and men
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program, wherein
the vested right of a woman agrarian reform
beneficiary is defined by a woman's relationship to
tillage, i.e., her direct and indirect contribution to the
development of the land;
(3) Customary rights of women to the land, including
access to and control of the fruits and benefits, shall
be recognized in circumstances where private
ownership is not possible, such as ancestral domain
claims:
(4) Information and assistance in claiming rights to the
land shall be made available to women at all times;
(5) Equal rights to women to the enjoyment, use, and
management of land, water, and other natural
resources within their communities or ancestral
domains;
(6) Equal access to the use and management of
fisheries and aquatic resources, and all the rights and
benefits accruing to stakeholders in the fishing
industry;
(7) Equal status shall be given to women and men in
the issuance of stewardship or lease agreements and
 other fishery rights that may be granted for the use
and management of coastal and aquatic resources. In
the same manner, women's organizations shall be
given equal treatment as with other marginalized
fishers organizations in the issuance of stewardship or
lease agreements or other fishery rights for the use
and management of such coastal and aquatic
resources which may include providing support to
women-engaged coastal resources;
(8) There shall be no discrimination against women in
the deputization of fish wardens;
(9) Women-friendly and sustainable agriculture
technology shall be designed based on accessibility
and viability in consultation with women's
organizations;
(10) Access to small farmer-based and controlled seeds
production and distribution shall be ensured and
protected;
(11) Indigenous practices of women in seed storage
and cultivation shall be recognized, encouraged, and
protected;
(12) Equal rights shall be given to women to be
members of farmers' organizations to ensure wider
access to and control of the means of production;
(13) Provide opportunities for empowering women
fishers to be involved in the control and management,
not only of the catch and production of aquamarine
resources but also, to engage in entrepreneurial
activities which will add value to production and
marketing ventures; and
(14) Provide economic opportunities for the indigenous
women. particularly access to market for their
produce.
In the enforcement of the foregoing, the requirements of law shall be
observed at all times.
Section 21. Right to Housing. - The State shall develop housing
programs for women that are localized, simple, accessible, with
potable water, and electricity, secure, with viable employment
opportunities and affordable amortization. In this regard, the State
shall consult women and involve them in community planning and
development, especially in matters pertaining to land use, zoning,
and relocation.
Section 22. Right to Decent Work. - The State shall progressively
realize and ensure decent work standards for women that involve the
creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions of freedom, equity,
security, and human dignity.
(a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are productive
and fairly remunerative as family living wage, security in the
workplace, and social protection for families, better prospects for
personal development and social integration, freedom for people to
express their concerns organize, participate in the decisions that
affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all
women and men.
(b) The State shall further ensure:
(1) Support services and gears to protect them from
occupational and health hazards taking into account women's
maternal functions;
(2) Support services that will enable women to balance their
family obligations and work responsibilities including, but not
limited to, the establishment of day care centers and breast-
feeding stations at the workplace, and providing maternity
leave pursuant to the Labor Code and other pertinent laws;
(3) Membership in unions regardless of status of employment
and place of employment; and
(4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples' cultural
practices even in the workplace.
(c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas work, the State
shall exert all efforts to address the causes of out-migration by
developing local employment and other economic opportunities for
women and by introducing measures to curb violence and forced and
involuntary displacement of local women. The State shall ensure the
protection and promotion of the rights and welfare of migrant women
regardless of their work status, and protect them against
discrimination in wages, conditions of work, and employment
opportunities in host countries.
Section 23. Right to Livelihood, Credit, Capital, and
Technology. - The State shall ensure that women are provided with
the following:
(a) Equal access to formal sources of credit and capital;
(b) Equal share to the produce of farms and aquatic
resources; and
(c) Employment opportunities for returning women migrant
workers taking into account their skills and qualifications.
Corollarily, the State shall also promote skills and
entrepreneurship development of returning women migrant
workers.
Section 24. Right to Education and Training. - The State shall
ensure the following:
(a) Women migrant workers have the opportunity to undergo
skills training, if they so desire, before taking on a foreign job,
and possible retraining upon return to the country:
(b) Gender-sensitive training and seminars; and
(c) Equal opportunities in scholarships based on merit and
fitness, especially to those interested in research and
development aimed towards women-friendly farm technology.
Section 25. Right to Representation and Participation. - The
State shall ensure women's participation in policy-making or
decision-making bodies in the regional, national, and international
levels. It shall also ensure the participation of grassroots women
leaders in decision and policy-making bodies in their respective
sectors including, but not limited to, the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) and its local counterparts; community-based
resource management bodies or mechanisms on forest management
and stewardship; the National Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
Management Council (NFARMC) and its local counterparts; the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor; the National Anti-Poverty
Commission; and, where applicable, the local housing boards.
Section 26. Right to Information. - Access to information regarding
policies on women, including programs, projects, and funding outlays
that affect them, shall be ensured.
Section 27. Social Protection. -
(a) The Social Security System (SSS) and the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) shall support indigenous
and community-based social protection schemes.
(b) The State shall institute policies and programs that seek to
reduce the poverty and vulnerability to risks and enhance the
social status and rights of the marginalized women by
promoting and protecting livelihood and employment,
protecting against hazards and sudden; loss of income, and
improving people's capacity to manage risks.
(c) The State shall endeavor to reduce and eventually
eliminate transfer costs of remittances from abroad through
appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements. It shall
likewise provide access to investment opportunities for
remittances in line with national development efforts.
(d) The State shall establish a health insurance program for
senior citizens and indigents.
(e) The State shall support women with disabilities on a
community-based social protection scheme.
Section 28. Recognition and Preservation of Cultural Identity
and Integrity. - The State shall recognize and respect the rights of
Moro and indigenous women to practice, promote, protect, and
preserve their own culture, traditions, and institutions and to
consider these rights in the formulation and implementation of
national policies and programs. To this end, the State shall adopt
measures in consultation with the sectors concerned to protect their
rights to their indigenous knowledge systems and practices,
traditional livelihood, and other manifestations of their cultures and
ways of life: Provided, That these cultural systems and practices are
not discriminatory to women.
Section 29. Peace and Development. - The peace process shall be
pursued with the following considerations:
(a) Increase the number of women participating in discussions
and decision-making in the peace process, including
membership in peace panels recognizing women's role in
conflict- prevention and peace-making and in indigenous
system of conflict resolution;
(b) Ensure the development and inclusion of women's welfare
and concerns in the peace agenda in the overall peace
strategy and women's participation in the planning,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of rehabilitation
and rebuilding of conflict-affected areas;
(c) The institution of measures to ensure the protection of
civilians in conflict-affected communities with special
consideration for the specific needs of women and girls:
(d) Include the peace perspective in the education curriculum
and other educational undertakings; and
(e) The recognition and support for women's role in conflict-
prevention, management, resolution and peacemaking, and in
indigenous systems of conflict resolution.
Section 30. Women in Especially Difficult Circumstances. - For
purposes of this Act, "Women in Especially Difficult Circumstances"
(WEDC) shall refer to victims and survivors of sexual and physical
abuse, illegal recruitment, prostitution, trafficking, armed conflict,
women in detention, victims and survivors of rape and incest, and
such other related circumstances which have incapacitated them
functionally. Local government units are therefore mandated to
deliver the necessary services and interventions to WEDC under their
respective jurisdictions.
Section 31. Services and Interventions. - WEDC shall be provided
with services and interventions as necessary such as, but not limited
to, the following:
(a) Temporary and protective custody;
(b) Medical and dental services;
(c) Psychological evaluation;
(d) Counseling;
(e) Psychiatric evaluation;
(f) Legal services;
(g) Productivity skills capability building;
(h) Livelihood assistance;
(i) Job placement;
(j) Financial assistance: and
(k) Transportation assistance.
Section 32. Protection of Girl-Children. - (a) The State shall
pursue measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against girl-
children in education, health and nutrition, and skills development.
(b) Girl-children shall be protected from all forms of abuse and
exploitation.
(c) Equal access of Moro and indigenous girl-children in the Madaris,
schools of living culture and traditions, and the regular schools shall
be ensured.
(d) Gender-sensitive curriculum, including legal literacy, books, and
curriculum in the Madaris and schools of living culture and
traditions shall be developed.
(e) Sensitivity of regular schools to particular Moro and indigenous
practices, such as fasting in the month of Ramadan, choice of
clothing (including the wearing of hijab), and availability of halal food
shall be ensured.
Section 33. Protection of Senior Citizens. - The State shall protect
women senior citizens from neglect, abandonment, domestic violence,
abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. Towards this end, the State
shall ensure special protective mechanisms and support services
against violence, sexual abuse, exploitation, and discrimination of
older women.
Section 34. Women are entitled to the recognition and protection of
their rights defined and guaranteed under this Act including their
right to nondiscrimination.
Section 35. Discrimination Against Women is Prohibited. -
Public and private entities and individuals found to have committed
discrimination against women shall be subject to the sanctions
provided in Section 41 hereof. Violations of other rights of women
shall be subject to sanctions under pertinent laws and regulations.
CHAPTER VI
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
Section 36. Gender Mainstreaming as a Strategy for
Implementing the Magna Carta of Women. - Within a period
prescribed in the implementing rules and regulations, the National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) shall assess its
gender mainstreaming program for consistency with the standards
under this Act. It shall modify the program accordingly to ensure that
it will be an effective strategy for implementing this Act and attaining
its objectives.
All departments, including their attached agencies, offices, bureaus,
state universities and colleges, government-owned and -controlled
corporations, local government units, and other government
instrumentalities shall adopt gender mainstreaming as a strategy to
promote women's human rights and eliminate gender discrimination
in their systems, structures, policies, programs, processes, and
procedures which shall include, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation for GAD.
GAD programs addressing gender issues and concerns shall
be designed and implemented based on the mandate of
government agencies and local government units, Republic
Act No. 7192, gender equality agenda of the government and
other GAD-related legislation, policies, and commitments. The
development of GAD programs shall proceed from the conduct
of a gender audit of the agency or the local government unit
and a gender analysis of its policies, programs, services and
the situation of its clientele; the generation and review of sex-
disaggregated data; and consultation with gender/women's
rights advocates and agency/women clientele. The cost of
implementing GAD programs shall be the agency's or the local
government unit's GAD budget which shall be at least five
percent (5%) of the agency's or the local government unit's
total budget appropriations.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7192, otherwise known as the
Women in Development and Nation Building Act, which
allocates five percent (5%) to thirty percent (30%) of overseas
development assistance to GAD, government agencies
receiving official development assistance should ensure the
allocation and proper utilization of such funds to gender-
responsive programs that complement the government GAD
funds and annually report accomplishments thereof to the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and
the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW).
The utilization and outcome of the GAD budget shall be
annually monitored and evaluated in terms of its success in
influencing the gender-responsive implementation of agency
programs funded by the remaining ninety-five percent (95%)
budget.
The Commission on Audit (COA) shall conduct an annual
audit on the use of the GAD budget for the purpose of
determining its judicious use and the efficiency, and
effectiveness of interventions in addressing gender issues
towards the realization of the objectives of the country's
commitments, plans, and policies on women empowerment,
gender equality, and GAD.
Local government units are also encouraged to develop and
pass a GAD Code based on the gender issues and concerns in
their respective localities based on consultation with their
women constituents and the women's empowerment and
gender equality agenda of the government. The GAD Code
shall also serve as basis for identifying programs, activities,
and projects on GAD.
Where needed, temporary gender equity measures shall be
provided for in the plans of all departments, including their
attached agencies, offices, bureaus, state universities and
colleges, government-owned and -controlled corporations,
local government units, and other government
instrumentalities.
To move towards a more sustainable, gender-responsive, and
performance-based planning and budgeting, gender issues
and concerns shall be integrated in, among others, the
following plans:
(1) Macro socioeconomic plans such as the Medium-
Term Philippine Development Plan and Medium-Term
Philippine Investment Plan;
(2) Annual plans of all departments, including their
attached agencies, offices, bureaus, state universities
and colleges, and government-owned and -controlled
corporations; and
(3) Local plans and agenda such as executive-
legislative agenda, comprehensive development plan
(CDP), comprehensive land use plan (CLUP), provincial
development and physical framework plan (PDPFP),
and annual investment plan.
(b) Creation and/or Strengthening of the GAD Focal Points
(GFP). All departments, including their attached agencies,
offices, bureaus, state universities and colleges, government-
owned and -controlled corporations, local government units,
and other government instrumentalities shall establish or
strengthen their GAD Focal Point System or similar GAD
mechanism to catalyze and accelerate gender mainstreaming
within the agency or local government unit.
The GAD Focal Point System shall be composed of the agency
head or local chief executive, an executive committee with an
Undersecretary (or its equivalent), local government unit
official, or office in a strategic decision-making position as
Chair; and a technical working group or secretariat which is
composed of representatives from various divisions or offices
within the agency or local government unit.
The tasks and functions of the members of the GFP shall form
part of their regular key result areas and shall be given due
consideration in their performance evaluation.
(c) Generation and Maintenance of GAD Database. All
departments, including their attached agencies, offices,
bureaus, state universities and colleges, government-owned
and - controlled corporations, local government units, and
other government instrumentalities shall develop and
maintain a GAD database containing gender statistics and
sexdisaggregated data that have been systematically gathered,
regularly updated; and subjected to; gender analysis for
planning, programming, and policy formulation.
Section 37. Gender Focal Point Officer in Philippine Embassies
and Consulates. - An officer duly trained on GAD shall be
designated as the gender focal point in the consular section of
Philippine embassies or consulates. Said officer shall be primarily
responsible in handling gender concerns of women migrant workers.
Attached agencies shall cooperate in strengthening the Philippine
foreign posts' programs for the delivery of services to women migrant
workers.
Section 38. National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW). - The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) shall be renamed as the Philippine Commission on Women
(PCW), the primary policymaking and coordinating body of the
women and gender equality concerns under the Office of the
President. The PCW shall be the overall monitoring body and
oversight to ensure the implementation of this Act. In doing so, the
PCW may direct any government agency and instrumentality, as may
be necessary, to report on the implementation of this Act and for
them to immediately respond to the problems brought to their
attention in relation to this Act. The PCW shall also lead in ensuring
that government agencies are capacitated on the effective
implementation of this Act. The chairperson shall likewise report to
the President in Cabinet meetings on the implementation of this Act.
To the extent possible, the PCW shall influence the systems,
processes, and procedures of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government vis-a-vis GAD to ensure the implementation
of this Act.
To effectively and efficiently undertake and accomplish its functions,
the PCW shall revise its structure and staffing pattern with the
assistance of the Department of Budget and Management.
Section 39. Commission on Human Rights (CHR). - The
Commission, acting as the Gender and Development Ombud,
consistent with its mandate, shall undertake measures such as the
following:
 (a) Monitor with the PCW and other state agencies, among
others, in developing indicators and guidelines to comply with
their duties related to the human rights of women, including
their right to nondiscrimination guaranteed under this Act;
(b) Designate one (1) commissioner and/or its Women's
Human Rights Center to be primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing programs and activities related
to the promotion and protection of the human rights of
women, including the investigations and complaints of
discrimination and violations of their rights brought under
this Act and related laws and regulations;
(c) Establish guidelines and mechanisms, among others, that
will facilitate access of women to legal remedies under this Act
and related laws, and enhance the protection and promotion
of the rights of women, especially marginalized women;
(d) Assist in the filing of cases against individuals, agencies,
institutions, or establishments that violate the provisions of
this Act; and
(e) Recommend to the President of the Philippines or the Civil
Service Commission any possible administrative action based
on noncompliance or failure to implement the provisions of
this Act.
Section 40. Monitoring Progress and Implementation and
Impact of this Act. - The PCW, in coordination with other state
agencies and the CHR, shall submit to Congress regular reports on
the progress of the implementation of this Act highlighting the impact
thereof on the status and human rights of women: Provided, That the
second report shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of this
Act and recommend amendments to improve its provisions: Provided,
finally, That these reports shall be submitted to Congress every three
(3) years or as determined in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 41. Penalties. - Upon finding of the CHR that a department,
agency, or instrumentality of government, government-owned and -
controlled corporation, or local government unit has violated any
provision of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations, the
sanctions under administrative law, civil service, or other appropriate
laws shall be recommended to the Civil Service Commission and/or
the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The person
directly responsible for the violation as well as the head of the agency
or local chief executive shall be held liable under this Act.
If the violation is committed by a private entity or individual, the
person directly responsible for the violation shall be liable to pay
damages.
Filing a complaint under this Act shall not preclude the offended
party from pursuing other remedies available under the law and to
invoke any of the provisions of existing laws especially those recently
enacted laws protecting women and children, including the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act (Republic Act No. 7192), the
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act (Republic Act No. 7610), the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 7877), the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8353), the Rape Victim Assistance and
Protection Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8505), the Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9208) and the Anti- Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Republic Act No.
9262). If violence has been proven to be perpetrated by agents of the
State including, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings, enforced
disappearances, torture, and internal displacements, such shall be
considered aggravating offenses with corresponding penalties
depending on the severity of the offenses.
Section 42. Incentives and Awards. - There shall be established an
incentives and awards system which shall be administered by a
board under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by
the PCW to deserving entities, government agencies, and local
government units for their outstanding performance in upholding the
rights of women and effective implementation of gender-responsive
programs.
Section 43. Funding. - The initial funding requirements for the
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current
appropriations of the agencies concerned. Thereafter, such sums as
may be necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be included
in the agencies' yearly budgets under the General Appropriations Act.
The State shall prioritize allocation of all available resources to
effectively fulfill its obligations specified under this Act. The State
agencies' GAD budgets, which shall be at least five percent (5%) of
their total budgetary allocation, shall also be utilized for the
programs and activities to implement this Act.
Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - As the lead
agency, the PCW shall, in coordination with the Commission on
Human Rights and all concerned government departments and
agencies including, as observers, both Houses of Congress through
the Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations (Senate) and
the Committee on Women and Gender Equality (House of
Representatives) and with the participation of representatives from
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups with
proven track record of involvement and promotion of the rights and
welfare of Filipino women and girls identified by the PCW, formulate
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act within one
hundred eighty (180) days after its effectivity.
Section 45. Separability Clause. - If any provision or part hereof is
held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the
provisions not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 46. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order,
rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of
this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.
Section 47. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Approved,
Republic Act No. 9262 March 08, 2004
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004".
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State
values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect
for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited
to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily
or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to
live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
 b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat
of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in
any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to
unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or
attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing
the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity,
except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon
the woman or her child resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a
person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows
the woman or her child or places the woman or her child
under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination
thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or
may not result in the bearing of a common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution
maintained or managed by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary
organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this
Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing
temporarily to receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age
or older but are incapable of taking care of themselves as
defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it
includes the biological children of the victim and other
children under her care.
SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child
to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall
include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with
the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's
or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the
woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity or
controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself
for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to
engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape,
by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her child or
her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman
or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the
woman's child/children.
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and
their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to
the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted,
frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting
serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison
mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall
be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting
slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by
imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed
penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the
preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than
arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished
by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision
correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto
mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision
mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is
pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the
penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty
prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a
fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred
thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory
psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.
SECTION 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed,
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the compliant.
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued
under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and
granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection
order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm,
minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating
the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain
control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be
enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders that
may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order
(BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection
order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit
or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts
mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the
residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are
violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from
the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and
escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and
designated family or household member at a distance
specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented
by the petitioner and any designated family or household
member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an
automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of
ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement
officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the
parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
possession of the automobile and other essential personal
effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's
removal of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman
and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding
other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's
employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to
the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in
the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child
without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession
of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender
the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court,
including revocation of license and disqualification to apply
for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a
law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to
surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate
action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence
inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide
petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems
necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the
petitioner and any designated family or household member,
provided petitioner and any designated family or household
member consents to such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted
even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for
BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the
court from granting a TPO or PPO.
SECTION 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders. – A petition
for protection order may be filed by any of the following:
(a) the offended party;
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
(d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of
local government units (LGUs);
(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and
children's desks;
(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the
petitioner;
(h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or
municipality where the violence against women and their
children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the
offense committed.
SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. – Applications for
BPOs shall follow the rules on venue under Section 409 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and its implementing rules and
regulations. An application for a TPO or PPO may be filed in the
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place
of residence of the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family
court exists in the place of residence of the petitioner, the application
shall be filed with that court.
SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. – The application
for a protection order must be in writing, signed and verified under
oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as
incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the subject matter or
issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A
standard protection order application form, written in English with
translation to the major local languages, shall be made available to
facilitate applications for protections order, and shall contain, among
other, the following information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;
(b) description of relationships between petitioner and
respondent;
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as
specified in Section 8 herein;
(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and
(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a
protection order in another court.
If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be
accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the
circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the
circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the
application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose
danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a
case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the
municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and
shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.
An application for protection order filed with a court shall be
considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the
preparation of the application. Law enforcement agents shall also
extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases
brought to their attention.
SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. – All TPOs and PPOs
issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine
ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.
SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order.
– If the woman or her child requests in the applications for a
protection order for the appointment of counsel because of lack of
economic means to hire a counsel de parte, the court shall
immediately direct the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to represent the
petitioner in the hearing on the application. If the PAO determines
that the applicant can afford to hire the services of a counsel de
parte, it shall facilitate the legal representation of the petitioner by a
counsel de parte. The lack of access to family or conjugal resources
by the applicant, such as when the same are controlled by the
perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation by the
PAO.
However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred
from representing the petitioner.
SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and
How. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.
A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex
parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for
the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is
personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection
Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on
the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that
such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some
or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for
thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance
of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The
court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of
the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. – Permanent Protection
Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by the court after notice
and hearing.
Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a
lawyer, or the non-availability of his lawyer shall not be a ground for
rescheduling or postponing the hearing on the merits of the issuance
of a PPO. If the respondents appears without counsel on the date of
the hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a lawyer for the
respondent and immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the
respondent fails to appear despite proper notice, the court shall allow
ex parte presentation of the evidence by the applicant and render
judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The court shall
allow the introduction of any history of abusive conduct of a
respondent even if the same was not directed against the applicant or
the person for whom the applicant is made.
The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Where the court is
unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued
is due to expire, the court shall continuously extend or renew the
TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until final
judgment is issued. The extended or renewed TPO may be modified
by the court as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs
of the applicant.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section
8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be effective until revoked by a court
upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued.
The court shall ensure immediate personal service of the PPO on
respondent.
The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis
of the lapse of time between the act of violence and the filing of the
application.
Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court
must determine whether or not the PPO shall become final. Even in a
dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as there is no clear showing
that the act from which the order might arise did not exist.
SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. – The following
statement must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters on
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay or court:
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW."
SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For
Protection Orders – Failure to act on an application for a protection
order within the reglementary period specified in the previous section
without justifiable cause shall render the official or judge
administratively liable.
SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal separation,
where violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the
Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main
case and other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing
on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must
be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
SECTION 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. – Ex parte
and adversarial hearings to determine the basis of applications for a
protection order under this Act shall have priority over all other
proceedings. Barangay officials and the courts shall schedule and
conduct hearings on applications for a protection order under this
Act above all other business and, if necessary, suspend other
proceedings in order to hear applications for a protection order.
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a
violation of a BPO issued under this Act must be filed directly with
any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal
circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay
that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by
imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other
criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the
acts committed.
A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the
Rules of Court. During trial and upon judgment, the trial court may
motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without
need of an application.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall
constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that
the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.
SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal Cases. –
The foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be applicable in
impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence
against women and their children.
SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. – The Court may order any
person against whom a protection order is issued to give a bond to
keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall
undertake that such person will not commit the violence sought to be
prevented.
Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be
detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six (6) months, if
he shall have been prosecuted for acts punishable under Section 5(a)
to 5(f) and not exceeding thirty (30) days, if for acts punishable under
Section 5(g) to 5(I).
The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the
PPOs issued only by the courts.
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to
5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections
5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
SECTION 25. Public Crime. – Violence against women and their
children shall be considered a public offense which may be
prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having
personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the commission of
the crime.
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was
suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the
commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the influence of
alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering substance shall
not be a defense under this Act.
SECTION 28. Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence
shall be entitled to the custody and support of her child/children.
Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical
disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to
support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be
disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall
custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who
is suffering from Battered woman syndrome.
SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. – Prosecutors
and court personnel should observe the following duties when dealing
with victims under this Act:
a) communicate with the victim in a language understood by
the woman or her child; and
b) inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies
available and procedure, and privileges for indigent litigants.
SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers. –
Barangay officials and law enforcers shall have the following duties:
(a) respond immediately to a call for help or request for
assistance or protection of the victim by entering the
necessary whether or not a protection order has been issued
and ensure the safety of the victim/s;
 (b) confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the
perpetrator or within plain view;
(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their
choice or to a clinic or hospital;
(d) assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the
house;
(e) assist the barangay officials and other government officers
and employees who respond to a call for help;
(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by
the Punong Barangy or the courts;
(g) arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when
any of the acts of violence defined by this Act is occurring, or
when he/she has personal knowledge that any act of abuse
has just been committed, and there is imminent danger to the
life or limb of the victim as defined in this Act; and
(h) immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of
the DSWD, social Welfare Department of LGUs or accredited
non-government organizations (NGOs).
Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident
shall be liable for a fine not exceeding Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or administrative
liability.
SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse – Any
healthcare provider, including, but not limited to, an attending
physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or
counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed by the victim of
violence shall:
(a) properly document any of the victim's physical, emotional
or psychological injuries;
(b) properly record any of victim's suspicions, observations
and circumstances of the examination or visit;
(c) automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical
certificate concerning the examination or visit;
(d) safeguard the records and make them available to the
victim upon request at actual cost; and
(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights
and remedies provided under this Act, and services available
to them.
SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs – Other
government agencies and LGUs shall establish programs such as,
but not limited to, education and information campaign and
seminars or symposia on the nature, causes, incidence and
consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the
public on its social impacts.
It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGU's
to ensure the sustained education and training of their officers and
personnel on the prevention of violence against women and their
children under the Act.
SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay
Kagawad or the court hearing an application for a protection order
shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he
applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon any of the
reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act. Section
7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and
413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in
proceedings where relief is sought under this Act.
Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge
administratively liable.
SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. – In every
case of violence against women and their children as herein defined,
any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official
who, acting in accordance with law, responds or intervenes without
using violence or restraint greater than necessary to ensure the
safety of the victim, shall not be liable for any criminal, civil or
administrative liability resulting therefrom.
SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under (c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);
existing laws, victims of violence against women and their children
shall have the following rights: (d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)

(a) to be treated with respect and dignity; (e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal assistance office;
(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and
LGUs'
(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);

(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided (i) Department of Health (DOH);
for under the Family Code; and
(j) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to
them including their right to apply for a protection order.
(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and
SECTION 36. Damages. – Any victim of violence under this Act shall
(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.

SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. – The court shall expedite the These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to
process of issuance of a hold departure order in cases prosecuted eliminate VAW based on their mandates as well as develop capability
programs for their employees to become more sensitive to the needs
under this Act.
of their clients. The Council will also serve as the monitoring body as
regards to VAW initiatives.
SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other
Expenses. – If the victim is an indigent or there is an immediate
necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act on an The Council members may designate their duly authorized
representative who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant
application for a protection order, the court shall accept the
secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council
application without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of
meetings in their behalf, and shall receive emoluments as may be
transcript of stenographic notes.
determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and
accounting rules and regulations.
SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and
Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In pursuance of the abovementioned
SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims. – The
policy, there is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council on
DSWD, and LGU's shall provide the victims temporary shelters,
Violence Against Women and their children, hereinafter known as the
provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or, recovery,
Council, which shall be composed of the following agencies:
rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.
(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.
(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. – The DSWD
(NCRFW);
shall provide rehabilitative counseling and treatment to perpetrators
towards learning constructive ways of coping with anger and
emotional outbursts and reforming their ways. When necessary, the
offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit to psychiatric
treatment or confinement.
SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to Violence
Against Women and their Children Cases. – All agencies involved in
responding to violence against women and their children cases shall
be required to undergo education and training to acquaint them with:
a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women
and their children;
b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of
violence against women and their children;
c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;
d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest
and to offer protection and assistance; and
e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against
women and their children that minimize the likelihood of
injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim or
survivor.
The PNP, in coordination with LGU's shall establish an education and
training program for police officers and barangay officials to enable
them to properly handle cases of violence against women and their
children.
SECTION 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act shall be
entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in addition
to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules
and Regulations, extendible when the necessity arises as specified in
the protection order.
Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this
section shall be penalized in accordance with the provisions of the
Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an
employer who shall prejudice any person for assisting a co-employee
who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for
discrimination.
SECTION 44. Confidentiality. – All records pertaining to cases of
violence against women and their children including those in the
barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees
and public or private clinics to hospitals shall respect the right to
privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published,
in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school,
business address, employer, or other identifying information of a
victim or an immediate family member, without the latter's consent,
shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one
(1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred
Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
SECTION 45. Funding – The amount necessary to implement the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated
agencies and LGU's shall be used to implement services for victim of
violence against women and their children.
SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6)
months from the approval of this Act, the DOJ, the NCRFW, the
DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3)
representatives from NGOs to be identified by the NCRFW, shall
promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act.
SECTION 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of this Act, the
Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory
application.
SECTION 48. Separability Clause. – If any section or provision of this
Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or
provisions shall not be affected.
SECTION 49. Repealing Clause – All laws, Presidential decrees,
executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 50. Effectivity – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
from the date of its complete publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC October 19, 2004
RE: RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN
RESOLUTION
Acting on the report of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the
Proposed Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on November 15, 2004 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than
October 30, 2004.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
SECTION 1. Applicability. - This Rule shall apply to petitions for
protection orders in cases of violence against women and their
children under R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
SEC. 2. Construction. - This Rule shall be liberally construed to
promote its objectives pursuant to the principles of restorative
justice.
SEC. 3. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are:
(a) To protect the rights of the family and its members
particularly women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security;
(b) To enable the courts to manage and monitor cases
involving violence against women and children and the
members of their family or household;
(c) To prevent any disruption in the daily lives of the offended
parties and assist them to regain control of their lives;
(d) To ensure that treatment is provided for the offended
parties and offenders; and
(e) To hold the offenders accountable for their acts.
SEC. 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule:
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or a woman with whom
the person has or had a dating or sexual relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
(b) "Children" refers to persons below eighteen years of age or
older but are unable to fully take care of themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition. It includes the
biological children of the offended party and other children
under her care.
(c) "Members of the family" shall include husband and wife,
parents and children, the ascendants or descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood, whether
living together or not.
(d) "Members of the household" shall include:
(1) Spouses, common-law spouses, former spouses,
whether living together or not, and their children;
 (2) Relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the
sixth civil degree, including stepparents and
stepchildren living together in the same house; and
(3) Domestic helpers in the service of the employer,
whose services are usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment of the home, who
attend to the personal comfort and convenience of the
members of the household.
(e) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon
the woman or her child resulting in physical and
psychological or emotional distress.
(f) "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature
committed against a woman or her child. It includes the
following:
(1) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's
body, forcing the offended party to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or to do indecent acts
or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress or
lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
(2) acts causing or attempting to cause the offended
party to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm or coercion; and
(3) prostitution of the woman or her child.
(g) "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the offended
party such as intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the
offended party to witness the physical, sexual or psychological
abuse; of a member of the family to which the offended party
belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or .to witness
abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation
of the right to custody or visitation of common children.
(h) "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes the
following:
(1) withdrawing of financial support or preventing the
offended party from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases where the other spouse or partner objects on
valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;
(2) depriving or threatening to deprive financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
(3) destroying household property; and
(4) controlling the offended party's own money or
property or solely controlling the conjugal money or
property.
(i) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act of knowingly and
without lawful justification, following the woman or her child
or placing the woman or her child under surveillance directly
or indirectly or through a combination thereof.
(j) "Sexual relationship" refers to a single sexual act which
may or may not result in the bearing of a common child;
(k) "Program of intervention for offended parties" refers to a
specialized program that provides advocacy, shelter, crisis
intervention, social services, treatment, counseling,
education, or training.
(I) "Program of intervention for offenders" refers to court-
ordered treatment of offenders given by agencies or persons
who have demonstrated expertise and experience in anger
control, management of alcohol, substance abuse; and other
forms of intervention to stop violence,
(m) "Safe Place or Shelter" refers to any home or institution
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) or by any agency or voluntary
organization accredited by the DSWD or any other suitable
place the resident of which is willing to receive the offended
party temporarily.
(n) "Safety plan" refers to a written plan of action prepared by
a social worker and approved by the court to secure the
protection of the offended party.
(o) "Protection order" is an order issued by the court to
prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant
other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain
control of their life.
(p) "Barangay protection order" (BPO) refers to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the
Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts of violence against the family or household
members particularly women and their children under
Sections 5a and 5b of R.A. No. 9262.
(q) "Temporary protection order" (TPO) refers to the protection
order issued by the court on the filing of the application and
after ex parte determination of its need. It may also be issued
in the course of a hearing, motu proprio or upon motion.
(r) "Permanent protection order" (PPO) refers to the protection
order issued by the court after notice and hearing.
(s) "Live-link television testimony" refers to the testimony of a
child, who is an eyewitness or offended party in violence
against women and their children, taken in a room outside
the courtroom and televised to the courtroom by live-link
television, as provided for in Section 25 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness. It may also refer to the live-
link testimony of an adult female victim of violence, which
may be allowed at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 5. Acts of violence against women and their children
under R.A. No. 9262. - Violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing, threatening or attempting to cause physical harm
to the woman or her child;
(b) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
(c) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child
to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting
to restrict .or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical on other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or her child.
This shall include, but is not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the movement or conduct of the woman or her
child:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the
woman or her child of custody or access to her/his
family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right; and
(4) Preventing the woman from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
except in cases where the spouse or partner on valid,
serious and moral grounds, or controlling the victim's
own money or property, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money or property;
 (d) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical ham on oneself
for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(e) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to
engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape,
by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her child or
her/his immediate family;
(f) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman
or her child.
This shall include, but is not limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; or
(g) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of a minor child or denial of
access to the woman's child.
SEC. 6. Remedies of offended party. - The offended party may file a
separate petition for protection order without claiming damages. The
offended party may also pursue other remedies in accordance with
Part II of this Rule by the filing of any of the following:
(a) Criminal action;
(b) Criminal action with reservation of a separate civil action;
or
(c) Civil action for damages.
Part I
PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER
SEC. 7. Form of petition. - A petition for protection order shall be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner. It shall be accompanied
by a certificate of non-forum shopping which the petitioner must sign
personally.
SEC. 8. Who may file petition. - A petition for protection order may
be filed by any of the following:
(a) The offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians of the offended party;
(c) Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives of the
offended party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity;
(d) Officers or social workers of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) or social workers of local
government units (LGUs);
(e) Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and
children's desks;
(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
(g) Lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the
petitioner; or
(h) At least two concerned, responsible citizens of the place
where the violence against women and their children occurred
and who have personal knowledge of the offense committed.
The filing of a petition for protection order by the offended party
suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar
petitions. A petition filed by the offended party after the filing of a
similar petition by an authorized party shall not be dismissed but
shall be consolidated with the petition filed earlier.
SEC. 9. Where to file the petition. - The verified petition for
protection order may be filed with the Family Court of the place
where the offended party resides. If there is no existing Family Court,
it may be filed with the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court or municipal
circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of
residence of the offended party.
SEC. 10. Contents of the petition. - The petition filed by the
offended party shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age and residence of the offended party;'
(b) The name, age and residence of the respondent;
(c) A description of the relationship between the offended
party and the respondent;
(d) A complete description of the alleged act constituting
violence including the date, time and place of occurrence;
(e) A request for counsel and the reasons for such;
(f) A request for waiver of application fees;
(g) The relief from violence prayed for, including protection
orders to cover any designated family or household member
who consents to such relief.
If the petitioner is not the offended party, the petition shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the petitioner attesting to the
following:
(a) facts showing the authority of the petitioner to file the
petition;
(b) circumstances of the abuse suffered by the offended party;
and
(c) circumstances of consent given by or refusal to consent of
the offended party to file the petition.
When disclosure of the address will pose danger to the life of the
offended party, it shall be so stated in the petition. In such a case,
the petitioner shall attest that the offended party is; residing in the
municipality or city over which the court has territorial jurisdiction,
and shall provide a mailing address for purposes of service
processing.
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. - The protection
order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, acts of violence
against the offended party;
(b) Prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any
form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence
of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporally for the purpose of protecting the
offended party, or permanently where no property rights are
violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from
the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there
until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him
from the residence;
(d) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended
party and any designated family or household member at a
distance specified by the court;
(e) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment or any specified place frequented
regularly by the offended party and any designated family or
household member;
(f) Directing lawful possession and use by the offended party
of an automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law
enforcement officer to accompany the offended party to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the offended party is
safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other
essential personal effects;
(g) Ordering temporary or permanent custody of the
child/children with the offended party, taking into
consideration the best interests of the child. An offended party
who is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome shall not be
disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case
shall custody of minor children be given to the batterer of a
woman who is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome;
(h) Directing the respondent to provide support 'o the woman
and/or her child, if entitled to legal import. Notwithstanding
other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent to be withheld regularly by his employer and to
automatically remit it directly to the offended party. Failure to
withhold, remit or any delay in the remittance of support to
the offended party without justifiable cause shall render the
respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of
court;
(i) Prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any
firearm or deadly weapon and ordering him to surrender the
same to the court for appropriate disposition, including
revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any
license to carry or possess a firearm. If the respondent is .a
law enforcement agent, the court shall order him to surrender
his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate him and take appropriate action thereon;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to prepare a
program of intervention for the offended party that provides
advocacy, temporary shelter, crisis intervention, treatment,
therapy, counseling, education, training and other social
services that the offended party may need;
(k) Requiring the respondent to receive professional
counseling from agencies or persons who have demonstrated
expertise and experience in anger control, management of
alcohol, substance abuse and other forms of intervention to
stop violence. The program of intervention for offenders must
be approved by the court. The agency or person is required to
provide the court with regular reports of the progress and
result of professional counseling, for which the respondent
may be ordered to pay; and
(I) Awarding the offended party actual damages caused by the
violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expanses, childcare expenses and loss of
income; and compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages,
subject to Sections 26a and 35 of this Rule.
The court may grant such other forms of relief to protect the offended
party and any designated family or household member who consents
to such relief.
SEC. 12. Duties of the clerk of court. - The clerk of court shall
assist the petitioner or the offended party by:
(a) Communicating in a language understood by the
petitioner;
(b) Providing the petitioner with a standard petition form
written in English with translation into the major local
dialects, including the instructions for its accomplishment;
(c) Ensuring the privacy of the offended party to the extent
practicable while the form is being accomplished;
(d) Advising the petitioner on the availability of legal
assistance from the Public Attorney's Office of the Department
of Justice or any public legal assistance office;
(e) Advising the petitioner on entitlement of support services
from the DSWD and LGUs;
(f) Advising the petitioner on the availability of an affidavit of
indigency in lieu of payment of the filing fee;
(g) Providing the offended party with a certified copy of the
protection order as well as giving the necessary information
regarding the process for its service and enforcement;
 (h) Making available informative materials on violence against
women and their children, including their rights as victims;
and
(i) Informing the offended party that compensation is available
from the Department of Justice Board of Claims in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7309 (1992),
otherwise known as "An Act Creating a Board of Claims Under
the Department of Justice for Victims of Unjust Imprisonment
or Detention and Victims of Violent Crime and For Other
Purposes."
SEC. 13. Exemption from payment of docket fee and other
expenses. - If the offended party is an indigent or there is an
immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to
act on a petition for a protection order, the court shall accept the
petition without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of
transcripts of stenographic notes.
SEC. 14. Raffle in multi-sala courts. - The petition filed in a multi-
sala court shall be raffled without delay.
If an action contains an application for a protection order, it shall be
the subject of a special raffle.
SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If
the court is satisfied from the verified allegations of the petition that
there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against women and their children exists or is about to recur,
the court may issue ex parte a temporary protection order which
shall be effective for thirty days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined.
(b) The temporary protection order shall include notice of the date of
the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits. The following
statements must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters on
the protection order issued by the court:
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
"IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE
DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE
MERITS ON THE ISSUANCE OF .A PERMANENT PROTECTION
ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR POSTPONE
THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL
APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY
PROCEED WITH SAID HEARING.
"IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS
DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL ALLOW EX PARTE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE
ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE
SHALL BE ALLOWED."
(c) The court shall likewise order the immediate issuance of a notice
requiring the respondent to file an opposition within five days from
service. It shall further order service of (1) the notices to file
opposition and of dates of the preliminary conference and hearing, (2)
the protection order, and (3) copy of the petition, upon the
respondent by the court sheriff, or any person authorized by the
court, who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement officers.
SEC. 16. Notice where no temporary protection order is issued
ex parte. - Where no temporary protection order is issued ex parte,
the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding notice to
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition within five days.
The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits
shall be indicated on the notice.
Where the notice could not be served personally or by substituted
service despite diligent efforts, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court shall
apply as far as practicable.
SEC. 17. Enforceability of protection order. - The protection order
issued by the court shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Violation of the protection order shall be punishable by a fine ranging
from Five Thousand (P5.000.00) Pesos to Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment of six months or both.
SEC. 18. Duties of the law enforcement officer. - Upon the receipt
of the protection order, the law enforcement officer shall use all
reasonable means to enforce the order and prevent further violence,
such as by:
(a) Taking any action necessary to provide for the safety of the
offended party;
 (b) Taking custody of the weapon used in the violence against
women and their children;
(c) Transporting or obtaining transportation for the offended
party to a safe place;
(d) Assisting the offended party in obtaining medical
treatment, including transportation to a medical clinic or
hospital; and
(e) Assisting the offended party in removing essential personal
effects from the residence.
The law enforcement officer shall submit a written report to the court
within twenty-four hours from receipt setting forth compliance with
such order.
SEC. 19. Duties of social worker. - The social worker assigned by
the court shall assist the petitioner seeking a protection order by:
(a) Preparing a case study and a program of intervention for
the offended party, including her children, and referring them
to DSWD havens, crisis intervention centers and private
entities rendering appropriate social services;
(b) Formulating a safety plan which shall be approved by the
court; and
(c) Monitoring the measures indicated in the protection order.
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. - (a) The respondent may file an
opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which
could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action.
SEC. 21. Effect of failure to file an opposition. - If the respondent
fails to file an opposition to the petition within the period above
provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the petitioner, shall
issue the corresponding order as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the petition.
SEC. 22. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following
pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed:
(a) Motion to dismiss the petition except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit,
position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Third-party complaint;
(f) Reply;
(g) Motion to declare the respondent in default;
(h) Intervention;
(i) Memorandum;
(j) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
(k) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a protection
order, or for reopening of trial; and
(I) Petition for relief from judgment.
SEC. 23. Preliminary conference. -
(a) When conducted. - A preliminary conference, which is
mandatory, shall be held on the date indicated in the notice.
(b) Notice.—The notice shall be served the parties, including
the offended party, who shall be required to notify their
respective counsels, if any. The parties shall appear in person
at the preliminary conference and submit their position
papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by
them.
(c) Nature and purpose.—The court shall consider:
(1) The propriety of issuing a protection order. The
court shall not deny the issuance of a protection order
due to the lapse of time between the act of violence
and the filing of the petition, subject to Section 24,
R.A. No. 9262. The issuance of a barangay protection
order or the pendency of an application for a barangay
protection order shall not preclude a petitioner from
applying for, or the court from granting, a protection
order;
(2) The simplification of the issues; and
(3) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition.
The court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a
mediator,
(d) Prohibited compromise.—The court shall not allow
compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence
against women and their children and other prohibited
matters, such as the following:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage, declaration of nullity or
annulment of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for declaration of nullity or annulment
of a marriage or of legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(6) Future legitime.
(e) Effect of failure to appear.—
(1) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the
petition shall be dismissed unless the counsel or a
duly authorized representative of the petitioner
appears in court and gives a justifiable reason for the
non-appearance of the petitioner; however, if the
petition is filed by a person other than the offended
party, it shall not be dismissed if the offended party is
present and does not agree to its dismissal.
(2) If the respondent appears without counsel, the
court shall not reschedule or postpone the conference
but shall appoint a lawyer for the respondent and
immediately proceed therewith; and
(3) If the respondent has filed his opposition but fails
to appear despite proper notice; the petitioner shall be
allowed to present evidence ex parte. The court shall
then render judgment on the basis of the pleadings
and evidence on record.
SEC. 24. Protection order issued after preliminary conference. -
Within five days after the termination of the preliminary conference,
the court may issue a protection order, based on the pleadings and
stipulations or admissions made by the parties.
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines
the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the
following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been
marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their
direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties
which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within
 the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued.
SEC. 26. Hearing. -
(a) Rule applicable. - The Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure shall apply as far as practicable.
(b) Period to hear petition.—The court shall, to the extent
possible, endeavor to conduct in one day the hearing en the
merits for the issuance of a permanent protection order.
Where the court is unable to finish the hearing within one day
and the temporary protection order issued is due to expire, it
may extend or renew the temporary protection order for a
period of thirty days each time until final judgment is
rendered. The court may modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the
needs of the parties.
(c) Evidence of history of abusive conduct.—The court may
allow the introduction of any evidence of history of abusive
conduct of a respondent even if the same was not directed
against the victim, provided the same is relevant.
(d) Exclusion of persons from courtroom.—The court may
order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons who do
not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be
made if the court determines on the record that requiring a
party to testify in open court:
(1) would not enhance the ascertainment of truth;
(2) would cause the party psychological harm or
inability to effectively communicate due to
embarrassment, fear or timidity;
(3) would violate the right of a party to privacy; or
(4) would be offensive to decency or public morals.
SEC. 27. Prohibited acts. - The court hearing a petition for a
protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly
influence the applicant for a protection order to compromise or
abandon any of the reliefs sought in the petition for protection under
the law and this Rule. Failure to comply with this section shall render
the judge administratively liable.
SEC. 28. Availability of live-link television to eyewitnesses or
victims. - (a) The testimony of a child, as an eyewitness or an
offended party in an act of violence against women and their children,
may be taken by live-link television. The application for an order for
live-link testimony, the factors to be considered by the court in
granting or denying the use of live-link television and the procedure
involved in the actual taking of the testimony shall be followed as
provided for in Section 25 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness.
(b) The testimony of an adult female, victim of violence, may likewise
be taken by live-link television, if it appears that she would suffer
trauma if she were to testify in the presence of the; offender or
perpetrator.
SEC. 29. Period to decide. - (a] The court shall decide the petition
within thirty days after termination of the hearing on the merits.
(b) Where no hearing has been conducted, the court shall decide the
petition within ten days after the termination of the preliminary
conference.
SEC. 30. Judgment. - If the court finds the petition meritorious, it
shall render judgment granting the offended party permanent
protection against acts of violence and such other necessary reliefs
provided in Section 11 of this Rule. The court shall not deny the
issuance of a permanent protection order due to the lapse of time
between the act of violence and the filing of the petition, subject to
Section 24, R.A. No. 9262. The judgment shall be immediately
executory.
SEC. 31. Appeal. - Any aggrieved party may appeal by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the final order or judgment
within fifteen days from notice and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the final
order or judgment.
Part II
APPLICATION FOR PROTECTION ORDER AS AN INCIDENT
IN A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL ACTION AND OTHER REMEDIES
SEC. 32. Applicability to applications for protection orders filed
as incidents in civil or criminal cases. - The foregoing provisions
shall also apply to applications for protection orders filed as incidents
in criminal or civil actions.
SEC. 33. When petition may proceed separately from or be
deemed instituted with criminal action. - (a) An offended party
may file a petition for protection order ahead of a criminal action
arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court may consolidate
the petition with the criminal action.
(b) Where the offended party chooses to file a criminal action, the
petition for protection order is deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party reserves the right to institute it
separately.
SEC. 34. When petition may proceed separately from or be
deemed instituted with the civil action for damages. - (a) An
offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a civil
action for damages arising from the same act. The same shall proceed
separately from the civil action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court
may consolidate the petition with the civil action.
(b) Where the offended party chooses to file a civil action for damages,
the petition for protection order is deemed instituted with the civil
action.
SEC. 35. Prosecution of civil action for damages. - The civil
action for damages shall be governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, the offended party cannot recover the same
damages twice for the same act or omission.
SEC. 36. Prosecution of criminal action. - An act of violence
covered by R.A. No. 9262 constituting a criminal offense shall subject
the offender to criminal proceedings, which shall be governed by the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Where the judgment of conviction declares that the guilt of the
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the permanent
protection order shall issue as a matter of course.
Where the judgment of acquittal declares that the quantum of
evidence is not enough to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, the court shall determine whether or not to issue a permanent
protection order.
Where the judgment of acquittal expressly declares that the basis of
the offender's criminal liability did not exist, a permanent protection
order shall not issue. A temporary protection order that may have
been earlier issued shall be dissolved.
SEC. 37. Bond to keep the peace. - The court may also order any
person, against whom a permanent protection order is issued, to give
a bond to keep the peace. It shall be the duty of said person to
present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person
will not commit the violence sought to be prevented, and that in case
such violence is committed they will pay the amount determined by
the court in its judgment. The court in its discretion shall fix the
duration of the bond.
Part III
COMMON PROVISIONS
SEC. 38. Reproduction of evidence. - An order granting the
issuance of a permanent protection order is without prejudice to a
trial on the merits of the criminal or civil action involving violence
against women and their children. The evidence adduced during the
hearing for the issuance of a permanent protection order may, upon
motion, be reproduced in the criminal or civil action without
prejudice to the cross-examination of witnesses and presentation of
additional evidence.
SEC. 39. Jurisdiction and venue for criminal actions or civil
actions. - The Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children
regardless of the amount of damages claimed. The action may also be
filed with the appropriate regional trial courts in places where there
are no Family Courts, at the option of the offended party.
SEC. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings. - All
hearings of cases of violence against women and their children shall
be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and
their children and respect for their privacy.
Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality.
Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the
name, address, telephone number, school, business address,
employer or other identifying information of the parties or an
immediate family or household member, without their consent or
without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of court
and shall suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of
not more than Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
Part IV
BARANGAY PROTECTION ORDER
SEC. 41. Venue. - Applications for barangay protection orders shall
observe the following rules on venue:
(a) where the parties reside, in the same barangay, the dispute
shall be brought for settlement in said barangay;
(b) where the parties reside in different barangays in the same
city or municipality, the dispute shall be settled in the
barangay where the respondent or any one of the respondents
actually resides, at the choice of the complainant;
(c) disputes arising at the workplace where the contending
parties are employed or at the institution where such parties
are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located; and
(d) any objection relating to venue shall be raised before the
Punong Barangay during the proceedings before him. Failure
to do so shall be deemed a waiver of such objections.
SEC. 42. Where to file complaint for violation of a barangay
protection order. - A complaint for violation of a barangay protection
order may be filed with any metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court in cities, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay which issued the
said protection order.
SEC. 43. Procedure. - (a) The complaint shall be accompanied by
affidavits and other evidence proving the alleged violation;
(b) Upon receipt of the complaint, the court shall issue an order
requiring the accused to submit within five days his counter-affidavit,
the affidavits of his witnesses and other evidence in his behalf;
(c) If the court, upon a consideration of the complaint, the counter-
affidavits of the accused and other evidence submitted by the parties,
finds no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order
the dismissal of the case; otherwise, it shall set the case for
arraignment and trial;
(d) Violation of a barangay protection order shall be punishable by
imprisonment of thirty days without prejudice to any other criminal
or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts
committed; and
(e) A judgment of violation of a barangay protection order may be
appealed to the regional trial court whose decision shall be final. An
appeal from a judgment of violation of a barangay protection order
shall not stay the enforcement of a protection order that might have
been issued by the trial court during the trial.
SEC. 44. Issuance of protection order when warranted;
contempt of court for violation. - During trial or upon judgment,
the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order when
warranted. Violation of any protection order issued under this
Section shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil
action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.
SEC. 45. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on the 15th day of
November 2004 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than 30 October 2004.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven)
were married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and
Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita
L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer
for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents'
Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule
of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be
applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents
under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262;
that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her
by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected
from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary
parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case
is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws
as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application
of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.
9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992,
otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did
not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service
of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v.People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express
provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private
places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the
woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing
further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET
this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, SO ORDERED.

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the

protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio
alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
"ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature.25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the
attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-
blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this
Court is not a trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary
matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether
respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or
absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against
women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman,
not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of
Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile
phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend,
whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of
another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted
in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and
accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province.
Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner
(now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to
convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was
about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages,
namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but
it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face
superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated
in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He
boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of
her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of
the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali
lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the
police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and
he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the
waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan
was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology,
testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said
that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture
and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures
can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face
and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct
irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a
lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been
copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this
could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the
Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac
in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed
that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December
2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was
already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at
Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he
arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and
the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to
help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages.
Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the
person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster,
which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the
obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number.
Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to
him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2
to 7).5
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the
or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating
six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory
relationship. Thus:
card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did
not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in
sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of
the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was
the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the
picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an
honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while
recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were
tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in
the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony
is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human
nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC
found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision
dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed
the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by
cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude
woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the
nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h)
of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained
from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
women and these include any form of harassment that causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
 5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of
violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series
of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that
accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that
a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or
social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender
and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him,
"romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word
"romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He
romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the
offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun
"romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law
itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed,
Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual
relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in
the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the
"on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having
developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of
2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and
love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common
occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between
the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.
Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could
not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed,
she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not
be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This
means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be
enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in
her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims
having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was
already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their
testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the
obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the
picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish
sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that
she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the
pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete
them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory
card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures
remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years,
given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to
Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony. 1avvphi 1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules
Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings,
obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined and administrative proceedings.15
based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every
obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained
if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as
Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the
to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution
dated April 25, 2008.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized
SO ORDERED.
from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be
deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in
evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized ROBERTO A. ABAD
from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to Associate Justice
prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted WE CONCUR:
owning during the pre-trial conference.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s Associate Justice
testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages
that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had
been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION
belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to Associate Justice Associate Justice
come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not
have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
sent those messages.
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to
Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same
Respondents.
to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of
the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same.
The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely
tried to help her identify the sender. Facts:

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by
means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late
since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at
the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived
such ground for objection.14
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face
superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said
accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that
he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were
in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be
easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),
the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA
denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence.
He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions,
quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each
and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged
child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection
order that she brought against the supposed father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the
blanks in the pro-formacomplaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial
support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the
latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The
petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to
withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially
one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child
abuses; that he was not the child’s father; that the signature appearing on the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit
intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial
support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina,
rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior
judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the
right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina
filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008
Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition
of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present
petition for review directly with this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly
dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child.
 The Court’s Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object
of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of
women and children who are victims of abuse or violence.6 Although the
issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the
grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are
entitled to a protection order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But 1avv phil
it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since,
contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it
turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from
Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course
vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s
demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The child’s
remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter
of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. 10
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera
for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand
support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue
of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire
case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between
Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the alleged
violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they
are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the
bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends
credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to
obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate
family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the
preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in
an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed
petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4,
2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140604 March 6, 2002
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer
Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment, thusly:
"That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to the
provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then the City
Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high
ranking official by express provision of RA 7975, committing the offense
in relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his position,
did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit,
request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old
woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who
was seeking employment in the office of the accused, namely: by
demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow
her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which
sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms. Yee in
the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual
harassment."1
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence,
trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28
November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City
Health Office to seek employment. Juliet’s father and petitioner were childhood
friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then
filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be
able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City
Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from
Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into putting up a clinic in
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December
1995, around nine o’clock in the morning, she and her father went back to the
office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family
planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview
her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions.
When asked at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend, she said
"no." Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could
afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue,
decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a virgin,
explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He "hypothetically"
asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to
intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the
subject of a "research" program. She was requested to be back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the
nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so "confused." When she got
to the office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire
whether there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again
offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed
hesitation if a physical examination would include "hugging" her but petitioner
assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go
bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not
see them on board the same car together. Soon, at the designated place, a white
car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her
not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire,
petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she
said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired
whether she had varicose veins, and she said "no." Petitioner told her to raise
her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it
was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees
and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic
hair. Surprised, she exclaimed "hala ka!" and instinctively pulled her pants up.
Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of
endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to
raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a
while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast.
Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to
cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He
begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she
alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He
then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the
money he gave her but she did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded
her for accepting the money and instructed her to return it. In the morning of 04
December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but
she was not able to see him until about one o’clock in the afternoon. She tried to
give back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she
attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her
mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some psychological problem, the
family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later
testify that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21 December
1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for
being so stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that
Juliet’s frustration was due to post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28
November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see him in his office,
among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a boyhood friend.
When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet
who expressed her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there
was no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really had the
power to appoint city personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the
alleged incident happened, he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards
in the Office of the City Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went
to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was
scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He submitted in evidence a photocopy of his
plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for sexual harassment, as well as all
the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva
and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05
November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused,
Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act
No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused
RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual Harassment,
defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of
the same Act, properly known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is
further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages;
Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary
damages and to pay the cost of suit."2
In the instant recourse, it is contended that -
"I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in
view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
"II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due
process of law and presumption of innocence on account of the
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction." 3
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act
7877 provides:
"SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
"(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
"(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in
the employment, re-employment or continued employment of
said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employee."
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held
when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her
desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father
being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he
asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all
started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
"x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical
examination would be a part of a research, accused asked complainant
if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be seen. Accused
assured her that with her cooperation in the research, she would gain
knowledge from it. As complainant looked upon the accused with utmost
reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to undergo the
physical examination. At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the
interview and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, December 1, 1995.
Complainant returned at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, but did not
proceed immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a
nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a
loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once inside,
accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy,
but he was told that she would only accept a registered nurse.
Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when the latter
prevailed upon her to stay because he would call one more hospital. In
her presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that there
was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed,
accused renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the
research in the Family Planning Program where there would be physical
examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go
out of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked
her if she would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not
agree because the research included hugging. He then assured her that
he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have
already been subjected to such examination. With assurance given,
complainant changed her mind and agreed to the research, for she is
now convinced that she would be of help to the research and would gain
knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a
‘tomboy’, she answered in the negative. He then instructed her to go
with him but he would first play bowling, and later proceed with the
research (physical examination). On the understanding of the
complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research will
be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But accused
instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as
it was not good for people to see them riding in a car together. She
walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as
instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened
to her and she was instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside the
car, he called her attention why she was in a pensive mood. She
retorted she was not. As they were seated side by side, the accused
held her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he
would go home for a while to put on his bowling attire. After a short
while, he came back inside the car and asked her if she has taken a
bath. She explained that she was not able to do so because she left the
house hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused directed her to raise
her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her legs.
Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told
her to raise it higher, but she protested. He then instructed her to lower
her pants instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half of her legs. But
then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed her
legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of
the situation, she raised her shirt as instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed,
 ‘hala ka!’ because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused
then held her abdomen, saying, ‘you are like my daughter, ‘Day’!
(Visayan word of endearment),’ and let the back of his palm touch her
forehead, indicating the traditional way of making the young respect their
elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and
uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she
raised her shirt up to her breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting,
she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar while silently
asking God what was happening to her and asking the courage to resist
accused’s physical advances. After a short while, she asked him if there
could be a right place for physical examination where there would be
many doctors. He just exclaimed, ‘so you like that there are many
doctors!’ Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was
planning to kiss her, she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth.
He advised her then to have them treated. Finally, she informed him that
she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that
complainant was entertaining malice and reminded her of what she
earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what happened. He
then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the
examination. She was about to open the door of the car when he
suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant instantly parried
his hand with her bag."4
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it
should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in
the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good
weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words
and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. Indeed,
petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of
Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de
Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of
Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo,
Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of
whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner,
i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:
"There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on
the evidence adduced by the defense, particularly in the Minutes of the
meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by witness Myrna
Maagad on September 8, 1998.
"First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of
witness Myrna Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. ‘3-A’ and
‘3-B’) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting,
Exh. ‘5’, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The
documents, Exhs. ‘3-A’ and ‘3-B’ certify that the officially designated
secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita Rozabal.
"Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance
logbook and how was she able to personally bring the same in court
when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted
during her testimony that she retired from the government service on
December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be the
custodian of the logbook when she testified.
"And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, ‘Others Present,’ the
attendance of those who attended was individually handwritten by the
persons concerned who wrote and signed their names. But in the case
of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk
Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin. However, Myrna
Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to attending
individuals inside the conference room."5
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive
upon, the tribunal,6 no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now
hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best
left to the trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that
elusive and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the
stand, an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.7
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary
damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral
damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to
enable an injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings
sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not
appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice,8 and it must always
reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong
committed. Indeed, Juliet should be recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr.
Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be
emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress
following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to
award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should
be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or
as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.9
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual
Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly
Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayan’s award
of moral and exemplary damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered
to indemnify the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00 by way of, respectively, moral damages and exemplary damages.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a
novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly
constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to
complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate
and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological
resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she suffered
diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under
paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the
hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her
life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from
BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now
apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has already
served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the
pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No.
5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court
finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after
finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of
mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty
of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one
BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly
weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,
[causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity.
Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes
out of the mouth.
 'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone
of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous
rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the
brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing
severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest,
trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version
of the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19,
1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in
their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and
his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and
Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel,
Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and
Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight
after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before
heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching his.
When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had
gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while
Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for
the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but
on his way home passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he
heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill
me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close
friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look
after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up.
Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor
Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was
waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of
their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the
gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph
lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph,
appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about
the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and
appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the
house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key
with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw.
He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after
destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went
inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming
from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed
covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back
of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada
Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then
assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report
regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together with
SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin
proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found
the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There
was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3
Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparadora metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The
metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a
diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a
stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its
stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the
postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of
the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for
medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to
three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem
examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information
 for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause
of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
[bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after
work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was
not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her
cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace
and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben
drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite
appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently
disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the
use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her
from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to
attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and
whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for
help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she
wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home,
Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom
towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as
well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was
aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have
the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She
however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the
blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the
pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter
ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by
shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was
and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19,
1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos,
Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business
Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death, as
a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three
(3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they
were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third
degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but
Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her.
Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents,
together with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become
violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not
remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and
Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic
would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw
Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left
hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week,
she returned apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another
incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently
rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and
Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic
had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying
that Ben and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in
Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went along, Marivic
became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after
the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.'
The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his
left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic
struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was
also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to
Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had
already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand
was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for
medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15,
1995 'After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of
ISCO.' They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to
'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After
drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben,
after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher
of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I
can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he
heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their
house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks.
Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by
him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben
replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were
joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the
Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at
the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told
Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that
he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she
would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a
long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound'
on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became
cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he
would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and
sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home
to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to
change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be
beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero
and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon
her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel
with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic,
testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the
Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel
between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the
open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had
Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily
to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the
night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut
which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses
grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both
hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while,
Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children.
After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He
returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while
they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50)
meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living
together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling.
Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use
the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would
come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and
when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say,
'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which
means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that
Ben 'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to
me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that
once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified
only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her
house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market
place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him.
She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in
the Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.'
When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss
Arano said that 'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss
Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking and I can
also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them
quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the
first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would
be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time
when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening
when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I
had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into
her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a
chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill and
he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came.
On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic's house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many
times' and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing
testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six
(6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries
were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him
an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of
Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits
'2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which
reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents
of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he
could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime
committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine
the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the
Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died,
Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help
to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family
troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear
from her again and assumed 'that they might have settled with each
other or they might have forgiven with each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that
night it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she
was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her
husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent
and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she
said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by
anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she
left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother
anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field
researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that
she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her
baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun
away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to
'smash him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the
bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her
'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had
packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa
residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and
some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health
Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her
responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases,
such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra.
Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board
exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer
and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying
in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only
a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury
involving the skeletal area of the head' which she described as a
'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3
days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic
Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with
intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997,
17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16
December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the
last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty
'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic
review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty.
Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel,
attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her
own, were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter
dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through
Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial
Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the
Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February
2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-
received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned
counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic
Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr.
Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country,
who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from the
post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than
a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court
partly granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded
the case 'to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety
(90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and
testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc
City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if
she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court
that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the
clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty
(20) years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De
La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the
Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the
faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St.
Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National
Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of
the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology
from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of
the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the
American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the
International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a
member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the
ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing
research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled
'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an
expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period
of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that
cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of
incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to
physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has
a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of
themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x
comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also
has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority
complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very
aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for
frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling,
drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usually
comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes
them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents
abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the
family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered
woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that
she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her
husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family
intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence:
some leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or
sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence on both of them.'
She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but
these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and]
day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in
and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the
victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered
woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can
see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of
humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person.
And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she
had experienced in the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not
even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It
was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a
victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has
since passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a
Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the
Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry
for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was
connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained
his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to
active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V.
Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement
from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He
obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He
was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the
Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the
Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was
presented twice in international congresses. He also authored 'The
Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was
likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook
published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first
to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published
the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder
of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal
cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and
a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a
specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr.
Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations,
and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty
thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence
cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon
City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping,
pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability
of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy,
perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the
psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the
victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the
post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under
the 'anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by
'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to
become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her
'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an
individual's illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and
love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is
around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own personality.
He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he
shows his strong façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone
to act without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-
experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot
control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder
try to defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed
weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding
or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household.' He said a
victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom
of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an
interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes.
He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help
in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated
22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that
at the time she killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that
she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to
explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that
point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the
trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was
more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally
stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the
private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of
this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial
a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence
to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was
in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless
when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe
at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that
this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the
cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her
spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the
case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellant's Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman
syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of
Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo
Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with
their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower
court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the
case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's
consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic
Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for
parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by
beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence
adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a
drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely
erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the
children of Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to
Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a
clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an
aggravating circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of
foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the
crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant
acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery
attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not
collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this
Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the
case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify
the trial court's disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose
of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note
that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the
basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the
testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this
Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily
conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence
presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously
hasty" manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November
14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a
year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to
promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with
dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for
being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should
be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his
constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and
appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their
marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of
appellant's deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during
her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her
marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the
admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact
made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage
contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in
court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a
palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal
consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution,
"[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and
the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of
his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to
determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death." Determining
which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben
was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for
automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman
syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-
defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed
shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence
ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of
the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not
constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in
whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are
necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor
the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses.
Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of
Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia
of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible
error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing
on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-
defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by
clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases,
self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been
recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least,
incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is
afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and
controlled over a period of time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains
in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for
the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
"cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2)
the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal
or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually
tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by
simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to
be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are
not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each
partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair.
Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws
emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable
point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering
incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident
as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only
the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as
the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance
would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible
pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent
passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is
almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful
experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely
to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the
one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his
partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it,
begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never
happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this "good,
gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible
for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or
seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains
with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as
a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that
she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered
woman's psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness.
Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each
partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may
really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as
follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he
was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband Q You mean Ben Genosa?
was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty
manifested to you? A Yes, sir.

A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and xxx xxx xxx

sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate
each other.
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury
inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how
frequent was the occurrence?

Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home? A Everytime he got drunk.

A He is following me, after that he sought after me. Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a
week?
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A Three times a week.
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced
and after that I go to him and he said 'sorry'. Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just
abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor? quarrel me." 32

A Yes, sir. Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital,
Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this
Q Who are these doctors? manner:

A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. "Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are
found in the chart of your clinic?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A Yes, sir.
A I did.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for
A Of course my husband. the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) xxx xxx xxx
lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area,
pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; A Yes, sir.

3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla; Q What did she tell you?

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these
Attending physician: Dr. Caing; injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
physician: Dr. Canora; and
A Yes, sir.
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were
the attending physician, is that correct? ATTY. TABUCANON:

A Yes, sir. Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident
happened?
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A As per record, yes.
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the date?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who
attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
something rough substance if force is applied.

A Yes, sir.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion. Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was
the patient pregnant?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A Yes, sir.
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was
left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is
she?
traumatized, there is tenderness pain.

A Eight (8) months pregnant.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination
about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates
her pregnancy.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional
in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient
is the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this
disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the
domestic problem.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined? Q You mean problem in her household?

A Yes, sir. A Probably.

Q For how many days? Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A One day. A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q Where?
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
A At PHILPHOS Hospital. pressure of the accused?

xxx xxx xxx

A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that Q Is this considered hypertension?
you were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she
was 8 months pregnant.
A Yes, sir, severe.
What is this all about?
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is
dangerous level of blood pressure?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from
1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times. A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34

Q For what? Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and
that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the
A Tension headache.
injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35

Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the
patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was given to
her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and
emotional in nature.
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by
Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would
come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she
was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy
… and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running
into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a
chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time A Renting.
to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where
they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and
when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the
following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing
in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her: A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep
with me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I
"ATTY. TABUCANON: was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to
sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same
thing will happen again last year.
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15,
1995 in the evening?
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
after office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I
reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father,
then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while
waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow
my children. her because of Ben.

Q This is evening of November 15, 1995? Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, 8 months.

Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive? Q How advance was your pregnancy?

A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him. A Eight (8) months.

Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him? Q Was the baby subsequently born?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q Did you come back to your house? Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

A Yes, sir. A Marie Bianca.

Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time? Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

A Bilwang. A Yes, sir.

Q Is this your house or you are renting? Q What time?

A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior. Q What was the bolo used for usually?

Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition? A For chopping meat.

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was
carrying that bolo?
Q What was he yelling all about?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you?
What else did he do if any? A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell
to the bedside.
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for
him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
again.
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I
want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was A Outside perhaps to drink more.
disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch
off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
children were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who
were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering
his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the A I packed all his clothes.
antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A I wanted him to leave us.
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom
were scared and he was already holding the bolo. holding my neck.

Q How do you described this bolo? Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you?
How did he drag you?
A 1 1/2 feet.
COURT INTERPRETER:
 The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand COURT INTERPRETER:
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be A Outside.
nobody to nag me.'
Q In what part of the house?
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Dining.
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were the children during that time?
Q What is there in the drawer?
A My children were already asleep.
A I was aware that it was a gun.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
COURT INTERPRETER:
A Yes, sir.
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
ATTY. TABUCANON: describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer? A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

A Yes, sir. Q Is it a flexible blade?

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer? A It's a cutter.

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he
pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the
wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it
was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet Q How did he do it?
and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that
very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the A He wanted to cut my throat.
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. Q With the same blade?
 A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had
met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based
on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as
follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could
you in layman's term describe to this Court what her life was like as said
to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that
she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of
abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The
husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was
practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a
lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being
involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a
lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from
the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was
not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very
depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory
or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but
wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown
below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where
you talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant
information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The
most important information were escalating abuses that she had
experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you
already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial
knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can
consider them as substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her
husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her
husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are
also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a
hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her]
several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that
room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying
this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the
Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind
happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been
provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person.
She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that
happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's
not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the
physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that
she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
 A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality
test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory.
The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the
person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is
she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality
test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a
person that I can trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the
truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified
on his Psychiatric Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of
Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage
to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy --
until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining
his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his
family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic
claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got
drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected
that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve
years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated
relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further
quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives
and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening
to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more
severe. x x x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's
mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman,
her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot
rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating
the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly
pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives
and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental
state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the
public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who
beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose
and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person
confronted with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be
drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of
a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a
similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the
United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered
woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist
explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her
feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape."46 In her years of
research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of
separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually
think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the
violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does
not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from
the latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to
keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the
only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
"probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty
(40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the
woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may
believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation.
x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's
ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore,
x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable
positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but
believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation
with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He
referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of beliefs or
perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the
battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible,
because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or
anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for
the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing
her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from
pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is
available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a
means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would
be found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support
such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence"
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quohow the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail
the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at
least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses?
What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into
the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or
father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise
to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common
abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that
she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely,
how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their
relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences
and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential
characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they
failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had
related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records
lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered
woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must
still be considered in the context of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial
to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the
offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-
defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal
Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went
to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her
life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's
bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that
he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence
of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized
person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault
at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have
a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly
attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder
by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in
previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger.66Considering such circumstances and the existence of
BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant
self-defense.67 In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben
was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to
evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal
liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly
for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in
her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as
follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated
battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of
[cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance
and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened
sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously.
Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence
on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect
of "repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment"
as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is
posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second,
the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of
battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is
the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is
interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
 xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in
terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head
like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like
holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the
individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim
is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is
very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is
also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher
irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute]
cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of
suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious
maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute]
is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you
become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6)
months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the
individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get
neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic
stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness
clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome
x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and
"difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will
power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts.There was,
thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent.
Pursuant to paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating
factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime
is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur:
(1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal
equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill
her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun.
It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The
attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts,
an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn
child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even
though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental
state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled
with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a
fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then
she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her
normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety"
-- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the
victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually COURT:
being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing,
the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar flexed forcibly in her front neck)
circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time
interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly,
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. Q Where did he bring you?

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis,
which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
kept on shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be
nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent A Yes, sir.
aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred
when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an Q What is there in the drawer?
attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such
perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
A I was aware that it was a gun.
Second Legal Issue:
COURT INTERPRETER
Treachery
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to ATTY. TABUCANON:
oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.81 In order to
qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82Because of the A Yes, sir.
gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself.83
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he
from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an
pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was
"open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly
aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the
how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to
wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it
establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the
was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet
events surrounding his death:
and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that
very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you?
How did he drag you?
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I
know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure.

xxx xxx xxx COURT INTERPRETER:

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed
him, the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her
neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him,
I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my
blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

COURT

Q How did he do it?

/to Atty. Tabucanon

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q You shot him?

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There
is no showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the
xxx xxx xxx shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by
an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
ATTY. TABUCANON: circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and
to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.85
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
A Yes, because I smashed him. aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that
might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the
Q What happened? present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking
her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to
smashed him and I ran to the other room. her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse.
In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of
the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article
64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to
be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the
offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty
shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor --
and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper
to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and
one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or
14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already
served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
detention on parole.91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts
in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-
day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are
made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven
facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a
good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the
intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused
person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor
general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such
learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work
within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its
wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second,
the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save
her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable --
not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her
penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice
Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide, our esteemed colleague
Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban found that there was no factual basis to
conclude that Marivic was suffering from "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) at
the time she took the life of her husband. With due respect, I register my dissent.
The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndrome" is recognized in foreign
jurisprudence as a form of self-defense. It operates upon the premise that a
woman who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time
develops a fearful state of mind. Living in constant danger of harm or death, she
knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over
time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert
to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten her
survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that
she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to
the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an
existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity
beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of
eliminating her sufferings.1
As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the "Battered Woman Syndrome" has
three phases, to wit: (1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterings in the
form of verbal or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to pacify
the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out
of his way; (2) the acute battering incident phase which is characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death. The battered woman usually
realizes that she cannot reason with him and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition; and (3) the tranquil period, where the couple
experience a compound relief and the batterer may show a tender and nurturing
behavior towards his partner.
Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the defense was able to establish the
occurrence on more than one occasion of the "tension-building phase" of the
cycle. The various testimonies of appellant's witnesses clearly reveal that she
knew exactly when she would once again be subjected to acute battery. Her
cousin, Ecel Arano, testified that she often asked the latter to sleep in her house
as she was afraid every time her husband came home drunk. Clearly, whenever
appellant requested for Arano's company, she was experiencing a tension-
building phase. The barangay captain, Panfilo Tero, also testified that appellant
sought his help two months before she killed her husband, again demonstrating
that she was in the tension-building phase and was attempting to prevent another
incident of acute battery. Appellant presented evidence to prove that the tension-
building phase would occur whenever her husband would go out looking for other
women, would lose at cockfights or would come home drunk. She often tried to
ignore her husband's attitude or, as testified to by some witnesses for the
prosecution, even shouted back, fought off or even injured her husband during
the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute battery.
Appellant was able to perfectly describe the tension-building phase of the cycle
immediately prior to the death of her husband, i.e., when she knew or felt that
she was going to be killed by the deceased. She could not possibly have testified
with clarity as to prior tension-building phases in the cycle as she had never tried
to kill her husband before this time.
It was shown by the testimonies of appellant and even witnesses for the
prosecution that appellant would seek shelter in her mother's or her father's
house after an acute battering incident, after which would begin the process of
begging for forgiveness, promises of change in behavior and return to the
conjugal home, only for the same cycle to begin all over again.
To require appellant to prove the state of mind of the deceased, as seems to be
required in the ponencia, would mean that no person would ever be able to prove
self-defense in a battered woman case. Appellant could not possibly prove
whether the deceased felt provoked into battering by any act or omission of
appellant. She cannot possibly prove that she felt herself to be the sole support
of the deceased's emotional stability and well-being. Nevertheless, appellant felt
trapped and helpless in the relationship as, in the end, she resorted to killing her
husband as no one could or did help her, whether out of fear or insensitivity,
during the violent marriage she endured.
The "acute battering incident stage" was well demonstrated by the severe
beatings suffered by Marivic in the hands of the deceased as well as the threats
to kill her using a bolo or a cutter.2 The physical abuses occurred at least 3 times
a week in the 11 miserable years of their marriage,3 six incidents of which were
documented by the 1990-1995 medical records of Marivic. They included, among
others, hematoma, contusion, and pain on the breasts; multiple contusions and
trauma on the different parts of her body even during her pregnancy in
1995.4 The tranquil period underwent by Marivic was shown by the repeated "kiss
and make-up" episodes of their relationship. On more than 5 occasions, Marivic
ran to her parents' house after violent fights with the deceased only to forgive the
latter every time he would fetch her and promise to change.5
All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance and forgiveness
developed a trauma in the mind of Marivic making her believe that a forthcoming
attack from the deceased would cause her death. This state of mind of Marivic
was revealed in her testimony given way back in 1998, before she was examined
by experts on BWS. Unaware of the significance of her declarations, she
candidly narrated how she felt immediately before she killed the deceased, thus -
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?
 A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen
he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I
was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then
the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw,
it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room, and on that
very moment everything on my mind was pity on myself, then the feeling
I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx6
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know
my blood pressure has raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure.
xxx xxx xxx
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through him, I
took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood
pressure and the baby, so I got the gun and shot him.7
It must be stressed that the defense of "Battered Woman Syndrome" was not
raised by Marivic before the lower court but only here on automatic review. This
makes the foregoing testimony more worthy of great weight and credence
considering that the same could not have been cunningly given to suit or conform
to the profile of a battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic to fear death because of her
medical history. Dr. Dino Caing testified that he treated Marivic for hypertension
due to domestically related emotional stress on 23 separate occasions. The
latest one was on November 6, 1995 when she suffered from severe
hypertension and had a blood pressure of 180/120 on the 8th month of her
pregnancy.8
Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist and an expert on
BWS who examined Marivic, assessed the effects of the repeated violence on
the latter as follows:
A What I remember ... was it was more than ten years that she was
suffering from emotional anguish. There were a lot of instance of
abuses, ... emotional abuse...verbal abuse and... physical abuse. The
husband had very meager income, she was the one who was practically
the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of
vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing, being
involved in cockfighting and in going home very angry which... triggered
a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience of taunting from the
husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity,
the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own.
So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed
because she .. .[felt] almost like living in purgatory or even in hell when it
was happening day in and day out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what was it that triggered ... that tragedy in your opinion?
A I think for several weeks, she was already having all those tensions,
all those anxieties, they were not enough, that the husband was even
going to cockfighting x x x
A She was angry with him, he was angry with her and I think he dragged
her and even spun her around. She tried to fight him so there was a lot
of fight and when she was able to escape, she went to another room and
she locked herself with the children. And when the husband was for a
while very angry he calms down then and then (sic). But I remember
before that the husband was looking for the gun and I think he was not
able to open the cabinet because she had the key. So during that time, I
remember, that she was very much afraid of him, so when the husband
calmed down and he was asleep, all she was concerned was to end up
her misery, to save her child which she was carrying and to save her two
children. I believe that somehow she's not rational.9
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. TRUYA
Q Mrs. Witness, being an expert witness, giving more the facts and
circumstances on this case that the books you studied in the expertise in
line and in the 77 hour contact with appellant Mrs. Genosa, could you
say that this is not ordinary self-defense but a survival on her part?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what she did to her husband (sic)?
 A Yes, sir this is not an ordinary self-defense, but this [is] a need to A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
survive, a need to survive with her two sons and [the] child she's
bringing. xxx xxx xxx

Q Had she not able to kill her husband, would she still be in the very
short moment with the victim (sic)?
A If she did not do that she believes that she will be the one who would
be killed.10
There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was afflicted with the "Battered Woman
Syndrome" and that it was an apprehension of death and the instinct to defend
her and her unborn child's life that drove her to kill her husband.
The ponente further refused to sustain the self-defense proffered by Marivic
because there was allegedly no aggression or danger posed on her life by the
victim at the time she attacked the latter. Again, I beg to disagree.
A He was nagging ... me at that time and I just ignore[d] him because I
want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore[d] hi[s] provocation and he switch off
the light and I said to him, "why did you switch off the light when the
children were there." At that time I was also attending to my children who
were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering
his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and g[o]t a bolo and cut the
antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
xxx xxx xxx
A He switch[ed] off the light and the children were shouting because
they were scared and he was already holding a bolo.

Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be appreciated, the unlawful Q How do you describe this bolo?
aggression or the attack must be imminent and actually in existence. This
interpretation must, however, be re-evaluated vis-a-vis the recognized inherent A 1 1/2 feet.
characteristic of the psyche of a person afflicted with the "Battered Woman
Syndrome." As previously discussed, women afflicted by this syndrome live in
xxx xxx xxx
constant fear for their life and thus respond in self-defense. Once BWS and an
impending danger based on the conduct of the deceased in previous battering
episodes are established, actual occurrence of an assault is no longer a Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was
condition sine qua non before self defense may be upheld. Threatening behavior carrying that bolo?
or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. As stated in
the ponencia, to require the battered person to await an obvious deadly attack A He was about to attack me so I ran to the room.
before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by
installment. Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the deceased, which A When I attempted] to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I
culminated in the physical assaults and an attempt to shoot Marivic when she fell [on] the bedside.11
was 8 months pregnant, took the place of unlawful aggression, thus entitling her
to a complete self defense even if there was no actual employment of violence by
the deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic had every reason to believe that xxx xxx xxx
the deceased would kill her that night not only because the latter was verbally
threatening to kill her while attempting to get a gun from the drawer, but more COURT
importantly because the deceased wounded her on the wrist with a bolo, and
because of the deceased's previous conduct of threatening to cut her throat with To the witness
a cutter which he kept in his wallet. Quoted hereunder are the relevant
testimonies of Marivic -
xxx xxx xxx

A When I arrived home, he was already in his usual behavior.

Q The bolo that you said which Ben was holding at that time, [was] it a
bolo or a knife?
xxx xxx xxx
A Bolo. A I packed all his clothes.

Q Were you wounded or were there inflictions on your body when he Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
was holding and trying to frighten you [with] that bolo?
A I wanted him to leave us.13
A No, only here.
A I was frightened that my husband would hurt me, so I packed all his
COURT INTERPRETER things then on the following day I will leave, I was afraid and I want to
make sure I would deliver my baby safely.14
(The witness pointed to her wrist).
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and got angry with me for
To the witness packing his clothes, then he dragged me again outside of the bedroom
holding my neck.
Q You were demonstrating a motion, whirling, did your husband really
whirl you? ATTY. TABUCANON

A Yes, your Honor. Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you?
How did he drag... you?
Q How did he whirl you?
COURT INTERPRETER
A Whirled around.
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
Q Just like spinning.
A And he dragged me towards the door backwards.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q Where did he whirl you, was it inside the bedroom or outside?
Q Where did he bring you?
A In our bedroom.
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
Q Then after the whirling what happened?
kept shouting at me that "you might as well be killed so there will be
nobody to nag me.
A He kicked my ass and then I screamed.12
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
Q What is there in the drawer?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
A I was aware that it was a gun.
Q When he left what did you do...?
 xxx xxx xxx A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer? Q And the whirling happened in the first incident?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the A Yes, sir.
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen
he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I Q And the dragging with arms flexed in her neck and on that blade
was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then
the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw,
happened on the second incident (sic)?
it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room, and on that
very moment everything on my mind was pity on myself, then the feeling A Ye, sir.
I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx COURT

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please To the witness

describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like? Q Why, what is that blade about?

A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide. A A cutter about 3 inches long.

Q Is it a flexible blade? Q Who used that?

A It's a cutter. A Ben.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges? Q He used that on you?

A Yes, because he once used it to me. A He scared me on that (sic).

Q How did he do it? xxx xxx xxx

A He wanted to cut my throat. Q But he did not hit you with that?

Q With the same blade? A Yes, because I managed to run every time he scared (sic).16

A Yes sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.15
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. TABUCANON
Q In other words, there were two (2) incidents, the first incident and then
he left and then two (2) hours after he came back?
There are many things which cannot be proved by direct evidence. One of this is
state of mind. In the case at bar, there is more than sufficient physical evidence
presented by the appellant from which her mental state can be inferred. The
prosecution did not object to the presentation of these physical and testimonial
pieces of evidence, namely, the medical records of 23 instances of domestic
violence-related injuries and the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the
barangay captain. Indeed, no person would endure 23 reported instances of
beatings if she were planning to kill her spouse in the first place. The majority
need not worry that women around the country will mastermind the killings of IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Marivic Genosa.
their husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their attempts to employ the
BWS defense.

Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be allowed the mitigating

circumstance of passion and obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a
finding that the acts of violence and battery committed by the deceased were
illegal and unlawful and were committed immediately before appellant could
recover her natural equanimity. But what is the natural equanimity of a battered
woman? Appellant was not a normal married woman. She can never be in a
state of natural equanimity as she was in a constant state of alertness and
hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute battery. The esteemed ponente also
correctly found that the appellant acted with diminished will-power. However, he
failed to go further. In the case of People v. Javier,17 it was held:

Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon

him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case,
however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when
he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented
regarding his mental condition at the time of the killing. This Court can hardly rely
on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and
conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at
the time of the killing.18

In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact present clear and
convincing evidence that she was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that she
suffered from the "Battered Woman Syndrome". Expert testimony was presented
and admitted to this effect, such that the ponente ably discussed the causes and
effects of the syndrome. To ignore the testimony and the evidence thus
presented is to make impossible the proof of mental state. Evidence as to the
mental state need not be also "beyond reasonable doubt."

Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in

previous violent episodes was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This,
juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction with BWS justified the killing of the deceased.
The danger posed or created in her mind by the latter's threats using bladed
weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the circumstances, the natural
response of the battered woman would be to defend herself even at the cost of
taking the life of the batterer.

The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid

form of self-defense, is a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for
battered women who are trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This
would however be an empty victory if we deliberately close our eyes to the
antecedents of this case. The facts are simple. Marivic was suffering from the
"Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending herself when she killed her
husband. Her acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in order.