CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (4th BATCH)
1.) MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot
FACTS: In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period
of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment The Office of the President said that that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to
his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt
the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited.The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon
the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable.
A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
2.) DENNIS FUNA vs. EXEC SEC ERMITA, DOTC Sec Mendoza, DOTC
USec/MARINA OIC Bautista
GR 184740, 11 February 2010
THE CASE: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent USec Maria
Elena H. Bautista as MARINA OIC.
FACTS: In 2006, President Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena Bautista as
DOTC Usec. Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Suazo, Jr. in
2008, Bautista was designated as MARINA OIC, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
USec. Petitioner, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed a
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment and designation,
which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment. During the pendency of petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator
of the MARINA and she assumed her duties in 2009.
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Petitioner’s arguments: (1) Bautista’s concurrent positions violate the Constitution,
saying that the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC
USec; (2) Temporary designations must not violate a standing constitutional
prohibition; (3) The positions are incompatible for there is no more checking and
counter-checking of powers and functions; (4) If the case is rendered moot by
revoking the temporary designation, a similar violation can be committed in the future,
hence supervening events should not prevent the Court from deciding the case.
Respondents’ arguments: (1) Lack of actual controversy in view of the appointment
of Bautista as MARINA Administrator and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC
Usec; TRO or preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic; (2) Lack of legal
standing as taxpayer for neither alleging any personal or substantial interest in the
case nor claiming that public funds were actually disbursed in connection with
respondent Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC, as Bautista did not receive any
salary while she was MARINA OIC; (3) The designation was constitutional, as it was
only temporary and it falls under the exceptions to the rule against multiple offices;
(4) No incompatible offices because admin and policy recommendations of the
MARINA Administrator is submitted to the Board, not the Undersecretary.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of respondent violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition
against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more
positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen
sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public
officials.
In Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec Secretary, SC held that since the evident purpose of
the framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants, the exception to
this prohibition must be read with equal severity.
ART. VII, SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
ART. IX-B, SEC. 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
As DOTC Usec, Bautista, she is thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Sec.
13 and cannot invoke the exception in Sec. 7. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union. Respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that Bautista’s designation as OIC
was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of MARINA, the
designation of Bautista as OIC was not merely an imposition of additional duties
related to her primary position; she is not even a member of the Maritime Industry
Board. Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. Where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold
the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. However, the Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same,
or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification in Sec. 13 is
aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials
As to the contention on incompatible offices, the SC ruled that it is irrelevant in this
case.
Therefore, the designation of Bautista as MARINA OIC in her concurrent capacity as
DOTC Usec is unconstitutional. The petition was granted and the designation is null
and void.
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3.) ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from
a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25,
2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply
to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that
the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list
is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
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to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is
absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
4.) PORMENTO vs. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 191988, 31 August 2010
THE CASE: Petitioner, Atty. Evillo Pormento, filed before the Supreme Court this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to
review the COMELEC’s decision denying his petition for disqualification against
former President Joseph Estrada.
FACTS: Former President Joseph Estrada was seeking reelection when he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the May 2010 Presidential Election. Prior to this, Estrada
was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held
on May 11, 1998.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed
a petition for disqualification on the ground that Estrada is prohibited from seeking
reelection as provided for by Art. 7, Sec. 4(1987 Consti.)
However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
On May 7, 2010, Pormento filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban
on the President from any reelection.
RULING: Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised
on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no
case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
5.) MAKALINTAL vs. PET
FACTS: A petition was filed by Atty. Macalintal questioning the constitution of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.”
While SC is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the
creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a
seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional
mandate. He also contends that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of
the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section
12, Article VIII, which prohibits the designation of Members of the SC and of other
courts to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
ISSUE:
I. Whether the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7, section 4 of article
vii of the 1987 constitution.
II. Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as
members of the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of section 12, article viii of the 1987 constitution.
HELD:
I
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ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We
intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should
be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel
provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to
act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public
officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted;
it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the
abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given
our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method
by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision,
the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise
thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules
for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),37 which we have affirmed on numerous
occasions.38
Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the
parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable
conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning
as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of
government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but not separate therefrom.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme
Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET
was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption
of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was
designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions
as a special electoral court.
II
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,48 the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority
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in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On
the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the
PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate
and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in
Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge
that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides
that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the
prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in
Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET,
from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members
of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland49 proclaimed
that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise
of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this
Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict
an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
6.) DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO
FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men
and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946,[1] placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
Three days later, Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273) transferring
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office
of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Claiming
that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy filed this petition for prohibition
They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to
take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments powers, in violation
of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the
Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary
the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the
ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[
Petitioner claimed President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation as well as
AOs 2 declared unconstitutional the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted
President issued Proclamation to restore peace and order in subject places.
Pursuant to her calling out power[9] as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence
of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise
this power rests solely on her wisdom.[10] She must use her judgment based on
intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to call out the
armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these
reared their ugly heads.
President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. They did not give
him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.[11] The delegation was
necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. Further, the assailed
proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency
powers.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of
local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article
V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
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HELD:
1.NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After
law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post pursuant to the rule on succession
found in Article VII, Section 12,[14] of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong
named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-
Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.[15] In short, the DILG Secretary did not take
over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. No.Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers
when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places
mentioned in the proclamation.[16] But such deployment is not by itself an exercise
of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that
the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides.[17]
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
As the Court acknowledged
it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.
In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is
a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any
effect at all petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in
the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged
that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis
too.
OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the Presidents decision to call out
the armed forces, as follows:
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the
political control of Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both families have an
arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM
and the rest of Mindanao.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of
the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members
and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to prepare for
and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional
offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
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In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and
armed men sympathetic to the two clans.[23] Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and
stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the
armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed
groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn
the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been
reported[24] that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a need
to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of
troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry
and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of
more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
7.) JAMAR KULAYAN VS GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN
G.R. No. 187298
FACTS: On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga
City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba,
a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed
to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers
was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports
linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the Local
Crisis Committee. The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the
Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents
General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP
component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag,
the Police Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM).
Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male
civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding
areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum
of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the provincial
government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police,
represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum
alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian
supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the
early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved.".
This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the
responsibilities of each of the party signatories, as follows:
Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:
1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed
for the activation of the CEF;
2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units
which shall participate in the operations and to propose them for the
approval of the parties to this agreement;
3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral
action(s) by the CEF without the knowledge and approval by both parties.
Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):
1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military
operations and law enforcement;
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2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the
performance of their assigned task(s);
3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified
areas of operation(s);
4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as
called for in the course of operation(s)/movements of the CEF.
Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
announced to the media that government troops had cornered some one hundred
and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3) hostages.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It
cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it
as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security.
Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence.
The office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines
for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of
Emergency in the Province of Sulu."These Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry.
Petitioners contention: That Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines
were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the
Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under
his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private
army.
Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts
when they filed the instant petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the
Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) possessed concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether Governor Tan has the power to declare a state of emergency, and
exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of
general searches and seizures.
RULING: No.
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-
chief of the Republic
i. One executive, one commander-in-chief
As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, it has already been established that there
is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This
means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power,
it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose
which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of
Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive
of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution,
as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7,
Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they
are exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the
notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed
by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the
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bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes
a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only
by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section
23, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority
to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which
is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the
President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in
person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of
those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the
civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II,
Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does
not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but
as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. As
Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and
military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he
may deem most effectual.
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to
rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether
it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine
the necessity for the exercise of such power.
8.) GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FACTS: There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they raise a
common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove
from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
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1st case -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the dismissing
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The
petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the
President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring petitioner Wendell
Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions
constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement
entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of
Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President the administrative
case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2)
of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Cause of 1st case: Hostage Drama involving Rolando Mendoza and Hong Kong
nationals in a tourist bus. Rolando Mendoza demanded his reinstatement. Sometime
in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed against him and other police officers.
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission turned over, upon
the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence
in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication
The administrative case against Mendoza was dismissed upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of
Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were
assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor
Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order for appropriate action by his
immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded
said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10)
days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together
with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in
whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza
hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC): found Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish
for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there
is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking
Case was elevated to OP. OP instituted a Formal Charge against petitioner Gonzales
for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under
Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292
and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in
Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
OP Dismissed Gonzales from his office.
2nd case: the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl
Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons
with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong
to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
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By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap
in the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to
appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from
a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require
no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there
is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office
of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution
itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are
not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise
- that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other
than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the
power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court
may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2,
Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court
by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11,
Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C),
and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed
by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article
XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President
(Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political
considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people.
What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially,
political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians." And so it was that Section 5,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office
of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are
described as "protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a
term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease
in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the
office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of
constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to
build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as
official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog and protector of the
people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled
acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman
from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid
down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a
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Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must
be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that
there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment
laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8
of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for
the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment,
namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving
the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor
for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge
of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
9.) FORTUN vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR no. 190293 | 20 March 2012
The President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS: On Nov. 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried 57 innocent civilians in Maguindanao. On
Dec. 4, 2009 Pres. Arroyo issued PD Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. She submitted
her report to Congress stating that she acted based on her finding that lawless men
have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The
Congress, in joint session, convened to review the validity of the President’s action.
However, two days later or before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
Proclamation 1959.
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
HELD: The Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating
a dead horse. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the SC the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is
implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which
is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to
defend the Constitution through such review should the SC step in as its final rampart.
The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before
it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Since Pres. Arroyo withdrew her proclamation before the joint Houses of Congress
could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same, then the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The
lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
10.) ALMARIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028 | July 16, 2013 | 701 SCRA 269
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee and the NCCA decided to team up
and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for
determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was
agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the
aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from
various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private
respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring
Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
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Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-
Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting
her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion
with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to
be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they
were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and
conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from
the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an
exceptional position. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads
right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing
in this case.
11.) FUNA vs. AGRA
FACTS: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon
Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his
capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations,
claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor
General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January
12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run
for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections;
that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that
pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as
the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which
is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises
herein.
ISSUE: WON the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting
Solicitor General is unconstitutional
HELD: At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13,
Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence,
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.
The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
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Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of
his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this
regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section
13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment
or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section
13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet
and their deputies and assistants.
The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided
for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice
President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex
officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
officials’ offices. in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, whereby the
Court held that the phrase "the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants" found in Section 13, supra, referred only to the heads of the various
executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and did not
extend to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or
Assistant Secretary.
It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of
Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being
the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the stricter prohibition
embodied in Section 13, supra, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad
exceptions provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the Constitution
("Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position") to justify
his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as
Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa.
To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the
other office was "allowed by law or the primary functions of his position." To claim the
exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, supra, he needed to establish herein that his concurrent
designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he did not do so.
To be sure, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting
Solicitor General did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity. Had either
of his concurrent designations been in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other,
the Court might now be ruling in his favor.
The import of an ex officio capacity has been fittingly explained in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary as follows:
x x x. The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An
ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. The ex officio position being
actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.
While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to all elective
and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, thereof applies in particular to Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. In the Resolution in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court already clarified the scope of the
prohibition provided in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Citing the case
of US v. Mouat, it specifically identified the persons who are affected by this
prohibition as secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; and
categorically excluded public officers who merely have the rank of secretary,
undersecretary or assistant secretary.
Another point of clarification raised by the Solicitor General refers to the persons
affected by the constitutional prohibition. The persons cited in the constitutional
provision are the "Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants." These
terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the heads
of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public
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officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant
Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected
thereby. (Italics supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as
neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the
former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still
comply with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein; failing which,
his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution.
Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both an incompatibility
between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
12.) VINUYA vs. ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary
of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to
the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed
a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for
former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
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committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to
overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and
our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint
of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that
basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or
necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking
up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure,
in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is
acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with
a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within
the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that
the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation
or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of
states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms
are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
13.) RISOS- VIDAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR 206666, 21 January 2015
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FACTS: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence
and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon,
to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political
rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of
the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested
upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor
of Manila.
ISSUE: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
HELD: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered
by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article
IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of
the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his
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civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition
– a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act
as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language
of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction
to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where
the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand
nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s
promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated
the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make
this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada
14.) PRESIDENTATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL vs. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT
FACTS: Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several government offices.
For purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid
appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight
appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall
under this exception.
The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty.
Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor
II at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with
Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed Prosecutor IV (City
Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva
(Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of
Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B.
Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the National Commission
of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie
U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of the Board of
Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All petitions
question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent
with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
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To summarize, the pertinent dates for each petitioner are as follows: ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution; (2) Whether EO 2 is constitutional. Ruling of the Court
G.R. No. Date of Date of Date of Date of Assumption
Appointment Transmittal Receipt Oath of of Office RULING: All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void for
Letter Letter by MRO Office violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

203372 This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that
22
(Atty. 8 March 13 May "none of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal
5 March 2010 March 6 April 2010
Velicaria- 2010 2010 letters) have been issued (and released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by the
2010
Garafil) MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the
206290 15 appointment papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during
23 February 9 March 12 March 15 March the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all the
(Atty. March
2010 2010 2010 2010 appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section 15,
Venturanza) 2010
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
209138 4 May 13 April
3 March 2010
(Villanueva) 2010 2010 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EO 2
18
209138 13 May Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section
5 March 2010 March
(Rosquita) 2010 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an
2010
appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
25 appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper
March by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by
212030
2010 his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
(Atty. 1 March 2010
and
Tamondong)
6 July During the deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, then Constitutional Commissioner
2010 (now retired Supreme Court Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. referred to this
Court's ruling in Aytona and stated that his proposal seeks to prevent a President,
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath whose term is about to end, from preempting his successor by appointing his own
of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President people to sensitive positions.
Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by
President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight [T]he well-settled rule in our jurisprudence, that an appointment is a process
appointments. that begins with the selection by the appointing power and ends with
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee, stands.
The CA consistently ruled that EO 2 is constitutional. The CA, however, issued
different rulings as to the evaluation of the circumstances of petitioners' appointments. The dissent's assertion creates a singular exception to the well-settled doctrine that
In the cases of Attys. Velicaria-Garafil and Venturanza, the CA stated that the OP appointment is a process that begins with the signing of the appointment paper,
should consider the circumstances of their appointments. In the cases of Villanueva, followed by the transmittal and receipt of the appointment paper, and becomes
Rosquita, and Atty. Tamondong, the CA explicitly stated that · the revocation of their complete with the acceptance of the appointment. The dissent makes the singular
appointments was proper because they were midnight appointees. exception that during the constitutionally mandated ban on appointments, acceptance

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is not necessary to complete the appointment. The dissent gives no reason why this
Court should make such singular exception, which is contrary to the express provision
of the Constitution prohibiting the President from making appointments during the
ban. The dissent's singular exception will allow the President, during the ban on
appointments, to remove from office incumbents without cause by simply appointing
them to another office and transmitting the appointment papers the day before the
ban begins, appointments that the incumbents cannot refuse because their
acceptance is not required during the ban. Adoption by this Court of the dissent's
singular exception will certainly wreak havoc on the civil service.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should
be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint
and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper
and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The
concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the
appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a
single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. And,
unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further distinguish between an
effective and an ineffective appointment when an appointment is valid.
15.) RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE
TANON STRAIT vs REYES
FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They
are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-
Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the
Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established
for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial
(Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal
capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
In 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies
included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic
data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as
well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
In 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
In 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-
channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
determine the area's underwater composition.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the
project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental
Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related
Measures And For Other Purposes."
In 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
The EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore
oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February
8, 2008.
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for
redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein
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they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for,
among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
In 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
ISSUE/s: Whether PGMA is correctly impleaded in the present case.
Whether the Service Contract is constitutional.
RULING:
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President
Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-
petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act
she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public
policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.”

Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co- Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the
petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Petitioner
Ruling of the Court On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a vis Section
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident
XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
of Malacañang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
official relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political law.
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
This is incorrect.
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor
shall be stated in the complaint.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a
Filipino citizens.
plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case.
This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
denial of due process.

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The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still
allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the
words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations
of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures
to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime, to wit:
Summation of the ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the
ConCom deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the
term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or
financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973
Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or
eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would
eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief,
they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors,
but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm
established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves
or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60 percent of which is owned by
such citizens — the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the
felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be
considered adequate and reasonable. But some of them, having more "radical"
leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for them, the provision would
permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's natural resources, which they felt
should be reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the
entire body. They sounded off their individual opinions, openly enunciated their
philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's
viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony — including
paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to
the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article — was resoundingly
approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service Contracts
with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact
service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between
foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the
government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the
foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive
enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that
paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1,
Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated
in La Bugal:
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Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among
which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null
and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to
Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the
President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that: It is basic that the law
is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the
parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written
therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties, x x x. (Citations
omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46
appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their
acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case.
In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine
of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
16.) GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC
FACTS: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
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American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped
using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-
born citizenship issue.
ISSUE:
WON Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
WON Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
WON the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing
material misrepresentations in her COC
HELD:
1. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For
that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-
born Filipinos may run for presidency. First, there is a high probability that
Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such
province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’
nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible,
as the norm. Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings
are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC
felt the need to examine the intent of the framers. Third, that foundlings are
automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which
the foundling is found.
2. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with
animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace Poe’s domicile had
been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when
her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s
reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the country cannot
be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires
her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile
in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was
for good.
3. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she
misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because such
facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that
a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.In
this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any
false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency
17.) SAGUISAG vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before
the SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement),
an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on
June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and
use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right
to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types
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of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other
activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country
should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through
Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.
ISSUE 1: W/N the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the requirements of legal standing
in assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as
citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal
interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from general
statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their
constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any
specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement
of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the
Court as citizens’ suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements.
ISSUE 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as “taxpayers”
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax
measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those
challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this
case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has
been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
ISSUE 3: W/N the petitions qualify as “legislator’s suit”
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislator’s suit, the injured
party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is
the Senate’s constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
ISSUE 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental
importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The
challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII,
Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign
military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount
public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
18.) REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope
of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety
simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their
transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination
of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted
the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial
law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited
only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the
present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent
the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy
reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao.
Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual
rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the
exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with
the passing of time. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City
and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a
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whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once
Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No.
216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same
Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the
same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full
support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216.
Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various
citizens filed several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and
seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks
sufficient factual basis.
ISSUES:
1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?
2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus,:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of
National Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation,
even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately
reported?
3. Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately?
4. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration
of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within
the entire Mindanao region?
RULING:
1. YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly
indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those
enumerated in Article VIII.
Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith
will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the
Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings
in Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is likewise
not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the
limited period within which the Court has to promulgate its decision.
In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
2.
A.) NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or
the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the
factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect
absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written
Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity
of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement
will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the
correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the
circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
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B.) NO. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of
National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the
President to declare martial law.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for
the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it.
Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is
made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is
only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
C.) YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President,
the determination of the Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for
the exercise of the power to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts or information known by
or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension
which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written
Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the
past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are
included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President
had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools,
guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis,
but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
3. YES. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the
other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the
Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to, or at
the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not
only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike
the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will
be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the
accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a
petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not
only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly,
they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential
proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
4. YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the President to believe
that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed
and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A.) Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency
of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the
concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck
down.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending
to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the
allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was
reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
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satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
B.) After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable
cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
C.) What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for
a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
5. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain
of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.
6.
A.) NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague
when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55,
which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
B.) NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and
other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus,
any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the
laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these
areas, it would be deemed a trespassing into the sphere that is reserved
exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
19.) DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR
[G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012]
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar
as Chairman of the Commission on Audit.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA
from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve
as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the
expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded
him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that
his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned
from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from
office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his
position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements
for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to
the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following
requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition,
viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
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c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and
must be the very litis mota of the case
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and
the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it
obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that
will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume
a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the
so-called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold
office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another
position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson)
is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the
word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by
the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he
can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the
full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or
Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer
be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious
intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by
allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2),
Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to
the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms
in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the
position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational
system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under
the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
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The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there
had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there
has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either
as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term
of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the
aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as
it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-
year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be
invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose
of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first
set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years
cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of
the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to
a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after
the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall
always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is
void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term
of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion
of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this
will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed
for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in
the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the
ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court
clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one
and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On
the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in
the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity.
20.) DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al.
FACTS: The independence of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly
mandated under Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits its Members, during their tenure, from holding
any other office or employment.
Facts: On January 11, 2010, then President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of
the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment on
February 3, 2010. Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the following government-owned or government-
controlled corporations (GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH;(c) ECC; and (d)
HDMF.
Petitioner: Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14,
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Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known
as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of
the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear
violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner asserts that these provisions violate the independence of the CSC, which
was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political
pressures due to the significance of its government functions. Such independence is
violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government
while the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch
of the Government. In this situation, the President may exercise his power of control
over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are
attached to the Executive Department.
It violates the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from
holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event
that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning
personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have
original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and
regulations.
Respondents: Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, as well as the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, are consistent with each other. While the charters of these GOCCs do not
provide that CSC Chairman shall be a member of their respective governing Boards,
there islikewise no prohibition mentioned under said charters. EO 864, issued in
conformity with Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, could not have
impliedly amended the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF because
the former relates to the law on the CSC while the latter involve the creation and
incorporation of the respective GOCCs. As their subject matters differ from each
other, the enactment of the subsequent law is not deemed to repeal or amend the
charters of the GOCCs, being considered prior laws.
ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair
the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the
holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
HELD: The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque
in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provide: Section
1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon
the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way
may be affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or – controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the
disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duque’s tenure
as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification
in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution Section 7,
paragraph (2),Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so
that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of
the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.
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Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7,
paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the
Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position.
The Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form
of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position
by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not
part of the Executive Branch.
The Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS,
PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he
was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is
necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the public
with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duque's official
actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board
resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to positions in the concerned
GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and employee
benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS,
PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF.
Notes:
Power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by
supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public
interest;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified
and whose term of office has not expired. A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority,
by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those
of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein
are concerned.
21.) DELA LLANA vs. COA
FACTS: COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of
government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed
the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or
utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or
wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency,
economy and effectiveness in the operations of government. Further, the circular
emphasized that the responsibility to ensure faithful adherence to the policy rested
directly with the chief or head of the government agency concerned. The circular was
also designed to further facilitate or expedite government transactions without
impairing their integrity.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave
irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were
uncovered. Hence, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-
audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to
be an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-
audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and
government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs). The rationale for the circular
was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as
embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to
contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving government
operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of
government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of
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these transactions. Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit of government
transactions of NGAs and GOCCs, Circular No. 89-299 mandated the installation,
implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control system, which would
be the direct responsibility of the government agency head.
Circular No. 89-299 further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA
as therein outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the implementation or
prosecution of projects and the payment of claims. The COA aimed to henceforth
focus its efforts on the post-audit of financial accounts and transactions, as well as on
the assessment and evaluation of the adequacy and effectivity of the agencys fiscal
control process. However, the circular did not include the financial transactions of
local government units (LGUs) in its coverage.
The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 and Circular No. 95-006 Both circulars
clarified and expanded the total lifting of pre-audit activities on all financial
transactions of NGAs, GOCCs, and LGUs. The remaining audit activities performed
by COA auditors would no longer be pre-requisites to the implementation or
prosecution of projects, perfection of contracts, payment of claims, and/or approval of
applications filed with the agencies.
Dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee
on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-
audit service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the
prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299. The reply of the COA emphasized the required
observance of Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992, which directed the
strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through the
installation of an internal audit service (IAS).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He
alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2
of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of
pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-
million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and
many others.
ISSUE: Is COA allowed to pre-audit?
RULING: The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds,
vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenues and
expenditures and the use of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to establish the techniques
and methods for the review; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. Its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct pre-
audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their consumption
or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present: (1)
the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the proposed
expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance of
appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of
the expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the
claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence.It could, among others,
identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their
implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.
Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads as follows:
Section 2.
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and
on a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as
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a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal

control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary
or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining
thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties. (Emphasis supplied)

He claims that under the first paragraph quoted above, government transactions must
undergo a pre-audit, which is a COA duty that cannot be lifted by a mere circular.

We find for public respondents.

Petitioner’s allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision.

There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of
all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference
to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a
post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or
equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.
In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special
pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel
the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no
room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be
unduly enlarged by this Court.

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