INTRODUCTION
1. This paper examines the changes in India’s labour market since 1980s, and in the
2000s in particular.
2. It is frequently argued – notably in the western media – that the “demographic
dividend” will take India to the front lines of the global economy.
3. Development experience, especially since the mid-1950s, suggests that two
features stand out during the modernisation of a country’s labour market.
a. First is the movement of “surplus labour” from the traditional (also
agricultural or informal) sectors to the modern (also industrial or formal)
sectors – as famously modelled by Arthur Lewis.
i. With the exhaustion of surplus labour reserves in agriculture, the
share and absolute size of the agricultural labour force fall and real
wages begin to rise in the economy.
ii. Asian Tigers moved to this stage in the mid 1960s, and China too
seem to moving to this stage where not much surplus labour is left in
agriculture.
b. Second, modernising changes in the labour market involve an improvement
in the skill and educational levels of the workforce, along with the emergence
of new industries or sectors that demand higher labour skills.
4. The analysis in this paper is based mainly on the National Sample Survey Office’s
(NSSO) reports on Employment and Unemployment in India.
5. The paper finds that the much-delayed movement of the labour force away from
agriculture has clearly begun in India.
6. There has also been a noticeable improvement in the educational levels of the
country’s workforce.
7. However, the modernisation of the labour force in India is hitting a roadblock,
given the slow rate of non-agricultural job generation.
8. In fact, the size of the manufacturing workforce in the country declined between
2004-05 and 2009-10.
9. Also, the large-scale withdrawal of women from the labour force is a continuing
challenge for India’s progressive transformation.
1. BROAD TRENDS IN LABOUR ABSORPTION
1. Low labour participation rates (LPR) and workforce participation rates (WPR) have
been persistent characteristics of India’s labour market. (Remember: LF = WF +
Unemployed)
2. These are also the severest challenge to the realisation of the demographic
dividend for the country.
3. In 2008, the LPR in India was only 56% compared to 74% in China and 71% in
Brazil.
4. Figure 1 shows the usualprincipal and usualsubsidiarystatus workers as a
proportion of the total population of India over the years.
5. There are two striking aspects of this data observed from the National Sample
Survey (NSS) reports.
a. First, in general, there has been very little change in India’s WPR. Little
improvement in WPR after 1993-94 is only in the case of urban males.
b. Secondly, there is an extremely low level of female work participation. For
example
c. In 2009-10, on 13.8% of urban female population is in the workforce (Figure
1).
ESTIMATES OF WORKERS
1. The size of the workforce in India can be estimated by multiplying the WPR
obtained from the NSS with the total population figures available from the Census
of India (Table 1 &2)
Table 1: Estimates of Workers in India, by Categories in Various Years
(numbers in millions)
Table 3: Annual Net Increase in the Number of Workers and Annual Rates of Growth of GDP in
India (1983 to 2009-10)
2. All estimates of workers in this paper (unless otherwise specified) are based on the
usual status of persons, considering both the usual principal and the usual
subsidiary economic activities.
3. Previous studies have pointed out that the 1980s were a period of relatively fast
growth of non-agricultural employment opportunities in India’s rural areas. This
growth contributed to the rise in real agricultural wages and in the reduction of
poverty during that decade.
4. Employment growth slowed down sharply during the 1990s, especially in rural
areas. As Table 2 shows, the net increase in employment in India was 71 million
between 1983 and 1993-94, but fell to 24 million between 1993-94 and 1999-
2000.
5. Further, there was a predominance of casual workers in the new employment
generated during the 1990s. In fact, according to the author, this record of
employment growth cast serious doubts on the sustainability of India’s economic
growth during the post-reform years.
6. During the first half of the 2000s (between 1999-2000 and 2004-05), employment
growth in India revived impressively with a net increase of 59.5 million new jobs,
and with a significant jump in the numbers of the self-employed.
7. However, during the same period of time, the quality of employment suffered a
decline (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2006).
a. The average educational achievements of persons who newly joined the
workforce fell between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 relative to the earlier periods
(Thomas 2011a).
b. The growth of wages slowed down and wage inequalities increased in India
during the post-reform period of 1993-94 to 2004-05 (Karan and Selvaraj
2008; Sarkar and Mehta 2010).
c. Studies also pointed to the large size of the “working poor” in the country.
d. 66th round of the NSS in 2009-10 indicated that employment generation in
the Indian economy declined sharply again, with only 1.25 million new jobs
recorded in the country between 2004-05 and 2009-10.
8. Notably, this slowdown in employment growth occurred during a time when the
country’s economic growth showed a distinct acceleration.
a. Employment generation during the 2ndhalf of the 2000s also missed by a huge
distance the target of 50 million new jobs set by the 11th Five-Year Plan.
b. The rate of employment generation in India during the post-1991 period fell
short of the employment growth record during the 1980s.
c. New jobs were created at the rate of 5.3 million a year between 1993-94 and
2009-10 compared to the rate of 6.8 million a year between 1983 and 1993-
94.
9. However, if we consider only non-agricultural jobs, the post-1991 years have had a
better record compared to the 1980s (see Table 3).
2. EXPLAINING JOBLESS GROWTH (SECOND-HALF OF 2000S)
1. The exceptionally slow rate of employment generation in India between 2004-05
and 2009-10 requires some explanation.
a. Pointers in the direction of jobless growth were emerging from the 64th
round of the NSS, held in 2007-08.
b. When the 2009-10 survey results provided further confirmation of such a
tendency, the Planning Commission even questioned the methodology
adopted by the NSSO in data collection.
c. The results of the survey in 2004-05 (61st round) had been widely seen as
vindication that economic reforms had finally delivered on the employment
front.
2. According to the present paper one of the reasons why the NSS data failed to
capture the true nature of economic and employment growth in India, is the
behaviour of agricultural employment.
3. Agricultural employment rose in India during the first half of the 2000s alongside
the stagnation in the growth of rural incomes, while agricultural employment
declined during the second half of the 2000s even as the rural economy recovered
somewhat.
4. The factors that led to the slow growth of overall employment in India after 2004-
05 are discussed below.
5. In the 1st half of the 2000s i.e. between 1999-2000 and 2004-05,
a. Agriculture and allied activities such as fishing and forestry contributed 33%
(18.5 million of the 59.5 million) of all new jobs generated in India.
b. However, GDP growth in agriculture had been statistically insignificant.
c. In this time period farmer suicides had been reported from several regions of
the country.
d. Studies (in 2005-06) showed that the proportions of cultivator households
earning negative incomes from crop production were as high as 19% and 36%
respectively in selected villages in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh.
e. How could agricultural employment have revived during a period of general
stagnation in the growth of agricultural incomes?
The answer to the above puzzle perhaps lies in the fact that an overwhelming proportion
of all persons who joined the agricultural labour force in India between 1999-2000 and
2004-05 (16.9 million of 18.5 million) were self-employed females
Table 6: Net Increase in Employment in Agriculture and Related Activities in India, All Workers and Female
Workers (1999-2000 and 2009-10, numbers in millions)
Period Workers, All Female
by Statu Workers Workers
1999-2000 to 2004-05 All 18.5 14.4
workers
Self- 27.7 16.9
employed
workers
Casual -7.9 -2.4
workers
2004-05 to 2009-10 All -21.1 -21.8
workers
Self- -23.5 -19.0
employed
workers
Casual 2.7 -2.5
workers
1. Some scholars have argued that these rural women entered the agricultural labour
force to supplement the low household incomes, in response to distress
conditions in the countryside (Abraham 2009).
2. In the 2nd half of the 2000s,
a. There was only a marginal increase in overall employment in India.
b. This marginal increase was the result of two opposing trends in labour
absorption –
i. An absolute decline of 21.1 million workers engaged in agriculture
and related activities, and
ii. A modest increase of 22.3 million workers in the non-agricultural
sectors (see Table 2).
3. Explanation: Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, close to 22 million women left
agricultural work, of which 19 million were in the self-employed category (see
Table 6).
4. Between 1999-2000 and 2004-05, rural women who reported their economic
status as “attending to domestic duties only” declined in number, while self-
employed rural females grew in strength.
5. But this was reversed between 2004-05 and 2009-10. There was a sharp rise in the
numbers of rural females who were attending to domestic duties only and a fall in
the numbers of rural females who were self-employed in agriculture (see Table 8).
6. Just as the steep rise in female agricultural employment during the first half of the
2000s was linked to rural distress, its equally steep decline during the second half
of the 2000s was likely to be associated with some improvement in India’s rural
economy.
7. The growth of agricultural incomes in India showed acceleration during the second
half of the 2000s (see Table 5).
8. Question is, who benefited from this growth? Did agricultural labour benefit from
it?
9. There has been a clear upward shift in the growth of real wages in India, especially
in rural areas, since the mid-2000s (see Table 7). MGNREGA has produced a
substantial impact on rural employment and rural wages.
Table 7: Annual Average Rates of Growth of Daily Real Wages for Casual Workers(Aged 15-59 Years)
Engaged in Works Other Than Public Works in India
Period Rural Rural Urban Urban
Male Female Male Female
1993-94 to 1999- 3.8 3.4 3.1 4.2
2000
1999-2000 to 2.0 1.6 -0.5 -1.2
2004-05
2004-05 to 2009- 4.1 5.5 3.9 3.8
10
10. NSS data shows that the number of casual workers engaged in public works (as per
current weekly status) registered an increase of 5.8 million between 2004-05 and
2009-10.
11. Of this,
a. An increase of 2.5 million occurred due to public works carried out under
MGNREGA (see Table 4).
b. The real wages of female casual workers (who were employed in activities
other than public works) in rural areasgrew at
i. An average annual rate of 5.5% between 2004-05 and 2009-10
ii. Compared to 1.6% only between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 (see Table
7).
12. A related issue was found by Thorat and Dubey (2012). They noted acceleration in
the growth of consumption expenditure and in the reduction of poverty in rural
India between 2004-05 and 2009-10 across households belonging to various socio-
religious groups.
a. A possible reason for the movement of women back to household work
during the second half of the 2000s is the improvement in the availability of
income-earning opportunities for male members of the family.
b. A key feature of the above-referred shifts in activity status is that they
occurred for relatively poor as well as for relatively rich household groups
(see Table 8).
c. This implies that the distress-induced movement of rural females to self-
employment in agriculture during the first-half of the 2000s occurred even
among the better-off rural households.
13. This is plausible because a substantial segment of even the top 40% (by
consumption expenditure) of households in rural India could be surviving just
above the subsistence levels.
14. Also, opportunities for self-employment in agriculture are likely to be better for
relatively rich households because of their likely possession of land and livestock.
15. To sum up:
a. A large part of the variation in employment in India during the 2000s
occurred due to the shifts in the activity status of rural females between
“attending to domestic duties only” (not part of the labour force) and self-
employment in agriculture.
b. The fall in female agricultural employment during the second half of the
2000s is possibly due to an improvement – and not a worsening – in the
economic conditions in rural India.
1. According to NSS data, there has been a steady increase in the ratio of students to
total population in India –
a. from 20.5% in 1993-94 to 24.3% in 2004-05,
b. and further to 26.6% in 2009-10.
2. Students as a proportion of the net increase in population (aged 4+) was 51.4%
between 2004-05 and 2009-10 compared to 42% only during 1999-2000 to 2004-05.
a. Expansion of primary and secondary school education in India’s rural areas
had, in fact, occurred during the first half of the 2000s itself.
b. During the second half of the 2000s, it appears that the country registered
substantial growth of education beyond the secondary level.
c. Among rural females in the age group of 15-19 years, 47% were students in
2009-10, up from 31.5% only in 2004-05 (see Table 9).
3. This obviously would mean less men and (especially) women will form part of the
labour force.
4. It is notable that, in absolute terms, the population of students pursuing education
beyond the secondary level is much higher in rural India than in urban India.
a. In 2009-10, the numbers of students aged 15 years and above were 52.5
million in rural and nearly 35 million in urban areas of India.
b. Among 52.5 million rural students aged 15 years and above, 20 million were
females (see Table 10).
5. Another positive aspect has been the reduction of disparity in access to education. Figure 2 shows
the ratio of students to population belonging to the age group of five to 24 across deciles of
households with varying consumption-expenditure levels. In 1999-2000, the difference in this ratio
between the richest and the poorest (in terms of consumption expenditure) deciles of households
was 22%. By 2009-10, this difference narrowed down to 7% (see Figure 2).
1. Despite the progress achieved in some areas discussed in the previous sections,
the modernisation of India’s labour market still has a long distance to cover.
2. The diversification of India’s employment structure has been limited and faces stiff
challenges.
a. Even in 2009-10, agriculture and allied activities continued to employ 52% of
the country’s total workforce (238 million of India’s 459 million workers).
b. The share of agriculture and allied activities in India’s GDP declined
considerably over the decades: from 51.0% in 1951-52 to 14.6% in 2009-10.
3. But internationally speaking
a. In 1978, both China and India had 71% of their workforce employed in
agriculture.
b. However, by 2004, Share of non-agricultural worker in workforce -
i. India: 43%
ii. China: 53%
iii. South Korea: 92%
4. An absolute fall in the numbers of persons engaged in agriculture and allied
activities was witnessed for the first time in India during the second half of the
2000s.
a. Over the longer period from 1993-94 to 2009-10, persons engaged in the
primary sector declined by 1.8 million even as the total employment in the
country increased by 84.7 million (Table 5).
b. Also, since the 1980s, the proportion of the workforce engaged in primary
sector activities in India declined by 16% (see Table 12).
5. International experience suggests that the movement of the workforce away from
agriculture could be triggered by the “push” of technological change in agriculture
(which limits labour absorption in that sector) or by the “pull” of non-agricultural
activities (Fei and Ranis 1975).
6. How much of the change in employment in India during the 2000s could be
attributed to the “pull” of non-agricultural activities?
16. The limited transformation of India’s employment structure was achieved by the
movement of workers into the services sectors – particularly so during recent
decades.
17. During the 1980s, close to 12 million new jobs were recorded in India under the broad category
“community, social and personal services” (see Table 5 and Appendix Table 3). “Public ad-
ministration and defence services” and “education, scientific and research services” fall within this
broad category, and they contributed 2.5 million and 1.8 million respectively to employment
addition during the 1980s.
18. Since the 1990s, considerable changes occurred in the nature of employment under the
community, social and personal services rubric.
19. There has been a net decline of jobs under public administration and defence services after 1993-
94.
20. Although, community, social and personal services recorded a jump in employment growth during
the first half of the 2000s (6.7 million jobs during these five years), a substantial part of the new
jobs created were for female workers employed as domestic help
21. During the 1990s (1993-94 to 1999-2000), trade, hotels, transport and communication together
generated 13.4 million jobs, or close to 60% of the net increase in non-agricultural employment
during that decade.
22. Since the 2000s, construction became the major source of employment generation in the country.
Persons employed in construction increased by only 5.3 million during the 10 years between 1983
and 1993-94, but by 18.1 million during the five-year period from 2004-05 to 2009-10 (Table 5 and
Appendix Table 3).
23. During the second half of the 2000s, the construction sector accounted for almost all of the new
employment opportunities that emerged in India’s rural areas, even as rural jobs were being lost in
some other sectors, mainly manufacturing (see Appendix Table 5, p 51).
24. The chief source of services sector employment in India shifted from community,
social and personal services during the 1980s, to trade during the 1990s, and to
construction during the 2000s.
25. These changes were accompanied by a decline in the productivity and, possibly,
quality of new employment generated.
26. There has been a growing dissociation in the country between sectors that
generate GDP and sectors that generate employment (see Table 14).
27. For example if we look at Construction sector (see Table below which is based on
Table 14). During the 1980s, the construction sector contributed a little over 7% each to total
GDP growth and to total employment growth in the Indian economy. During the post-1990 years,
the contribution made by construction to India’s GDP growth hardly changed: 8.6% only even
between 2004-05 and 2009-10.
28. On the other hand, construction accounted for 38% of all new employment created in India
between 1993-94 and 2009-10, and 81% of all new non-agricultural employment generated
between 2004-05 and 2009-10.
29. It is clear that the services-led economic growth in India is facing increasingly
bigger hurdles in employment generation. The growth of GDP in every sub-sector
of the Indian economy accelerated during the second half of the 2000s, compared
to the first half of the decade. However, employment growth in each of these sub-
sectors except construction decelerated during the second half of the 2000s,
compared to the first half (see Table 5).
30. If not for the massive expansion of construction jobs, the employment record of
the 2000s would have appeared far less impressive.
1. According to Arthur Lewis (1954: 404), “the transfer of women’s work from the
household to commercial employment is one of the most notable features of
economic development” (quoted in Amsden 1989: 203).
2. However, this is one aspect of labour market modernisation in which India’s
record has been strikingly dismal. A low female LPR is indeed the factor that
pushes India’s overall LPR to the bottom ranks.
a. Out of 184 countries for which data were available in 2008, India was ranked
42nd in male LPR (in descending order of LPR), but 165th in female LPR and
and 143rdoverall LPR respectively.
b. India’s female LPR is considerably lower than what is predicted by the per
capita income in the country (Figure 4).
3. The contrast with east Asia is quite marked. Even Bangaladesh and Nepal have
high female LPRs.
4. In 2008, female LPR (age 15+) was
India 33%
China 68%
Vietnam 68%
Pakistan 21%
Sri Lanka 35%
Bangladesh 63%
Nepal 58%.
6. In 2009-10, 34.7% of all rural females and 46.5% of all urban females in India were
attending to domestic duties (Table 15).
7. Social factors play a significant role in reducing women’s labour participation in
India.
a. These include the restrictions imposed on women’s movements outside the
household as also discouragement by the family members especially after
marriage.
b. However, it is striking that the proportion of females attending to domestic
duties is relatively high in urban areas and among the better educated – the
very segments of the female population that are likely to face less social
constraints on labour participation.
8. In 2009-10, among urban females with graduate degrees, those who were
reported to be attending to domestic duties was close to 60%, which was almost
twice the corresponding proportion for rural females with primary or middle-
school education (see Figure 5).
9. There are powerful economic factors, too, that tend to reduce female LPR.
a. In India as elsewhere, women face various forms of discrimination at the
workplace, particularly in terms of wages (Srivastava and Srivastava 2010).
Bardhan (1989) found significant differences between female and male
wages.
b. In this context, it is to be noted that female wages have been considerably
lower than male wages in east Asian countries, such as South Korea and
Japan, as well.Despite such disparities, female LPR is relatively high in these
countries, unlike the case in India.
Figure 5: Percentage of Rural Females (RF) and Urban Females (UF) attending to Domestic Duties or
Employed
1. In India, it is likely that the factor that restricts female LPR the most is the sheer
absence of suitable employment opportunities. Females accounted for only a
small share of the relatively high quality jobs generated in India in recent years
(see Appendix Table 3).
a. Only 20% of the new jobs created in financing, real estate and business
services in India during the 2000s went to females (9,00,000 out of a total of
5.2 million).
b. In the case of computer and related activities, the female share of new jobs
created during the second half of the 2000s was only 10% (only 1,00,000 of
the total 9,80,000)
c. In manufacturing, women find employment increasingly as temporary or
contract workers, and as shown in the previous section, women workers
constituted the majority of manufacturing workers who lost jobs in India
since the mid-2000s.
2. Given the absence of adequate numbers of gainful employment opportunities,
females tend to withdraw from the labour force, especially so with rising
household incomes. As Figure 6 shows, the proportion of females attending to
domestic duties increases with household consumption expenditures, particularly
in the urban areas.
3. In 2009-10, the number of women attending to domestic duties in India was 216
million, which was even larger than the entire population of Brazil. Of these, the
number of women with secondary or higher-secondary school education was 37
million – little more than the population of Canada. Women with graduate degrees
or above and attending to domestic duties numbered 12.7 million in India in 2009-
10, which was more than twice the population of Singapore (all population figures
in 2010) (see Table 16).
4. Clearly, the wastage of talent and the opportunity cost involved in such a massive
withdrawal of women from the labour force is enormous and without parallel.
5 CONCLUSIONS
1. NSS data indicates a sharp slowdown in the net increase in employment in India –
from 59.5 million during the first half of the 2000s to 1.25 million during the
second half.
2. However, this paper argues that the “jobless growth” in India during the second
half of the 2000s was partly triggered by some positive changes, especially in rural
India.
3. First is the absolute decline in the number of workers engaged in agriculture and
related activities.
a. The distress-driven entry of rural females into self-employment in agriculture
had contributed almost 33% of the net increase in employment in India
during the first half of the 2000s.
b. On the other hand, rural females exited the labour force in equally large
numbers during the second half of the 2000s. At least a part of this shift
could be ascribed to a revival in India’s rural economy after 2004-05, which
appears to have benefited from some of the government initiatives.
4. Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, casual employment in public works increased by
an impressive 5.8 million, including 2.5 million jobs created due to MGNREGA.
There was a clear improvement in rural wages during the second half of the 2000s,
as compared to the first half.
5. Second, a sharp rise in the population of students also contributed to the
slowdown in employment growth in India. The second half of the 2000s witnessed
an expansion of higher education in the country particularly among rural females,
and a noticeable reduction of disparity in access to education.
a. During the second half of the 2000s, the number of illiterate workers in India
declined by 33.6 million, and employment opportunities grew slowly for
workers with primary or middle school education.
b. On the other hand, the opportunities for better educated workers (with at
least secondary school education) were higher during the second half of the
2000s as compared to the first half.
6. Despite the progress achieved in some areas, the limited numbers and narrow
(sector-wise) range of jobs generated in the non-agricultural sectors remain a huge
challenge for labour market modernisation in India.
7. The new employment opportunities created in India during the second half of the
2000s were predominantly in rural construction, and were also largely casual in
nature. A significant part of these new jobs were in UP, Rajasthan and Bihar, states
that are generally considered development laggards.
8. Thirdly, At the same time, India’s manufacturing employment declined by 3.7
million during the second half of the 2000s.
a. Export-oriented industries such as textiles, garments and diamond-cutting
were the ones to suffer massive job losses during this period.
b. Manufacturing jobs were lost in most Indian states including Tamil Nadu and
Gujarat.
c. Women workers were the worst hit due to manufacturing job losses.
9. Fourthly, tall hurdle for labour market modernisation in India is the extremely low
rate of female labour participation.
10. The numbers of ‘missing women’ in India – women who withdraw from labour
force and engage only in domestic duties – was a staggering 216 million in 2009-
10, almost as large as the population of a country like Brazil.
11. The sheer absence of gainful employment opportunities is likely to be the factor
most constraining female participation in the workforce.
12. Recent changes in India’s labour market highlight the important role that
government interventions (such as MGNREGA) can play in improving the living
conditions of India’s rural poor.
13. At the same time, it is increasingly clear that India’s services-led economic growth
is facing severe challenges on the employment front.
14. The goal of decent work and living for the millions of poor Indians, and especially
females, can be achieved only with a significant revival in manufacturing growth,
particularly in rural areas.