Quezon City Government vs.

Fulgencio Dacara
Gabeto vs. Araneta
Urbano vs. IAC
Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals
Subido vs. Custodio
Bataclan vs. Medina
Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo
Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co.
McKee vs. IAC
Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo
Teague vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON, Petitioners, vs. FULGENCIO
DACARA, Respondent

Principle:

Proximate cause is any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate
cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.

Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the
attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is
the degree of care required to be observed.

Remote cause as Distinguished from Proximate case

G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921

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CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her three children, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant.

Principle:

Mere act of stopping the horse will not make a person liable. The act of stopping he horse is too remote
from the accident to be considered as the proximate cause. By getting off and taking his post at the
head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal.
Evidence shows that the bridle of the horse was old and the leather is weak and easily broken.

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Principle:

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A.
LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.

Principle:

It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other
than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it
being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the

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causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury
and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Concurrent Cause

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A.
LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.

Principle:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other
than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it
being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted
in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

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G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966

PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners, vs. CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY
CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Principle

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either
is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or
the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.

Tests of Proximate Cause

“BUT FOR” Test

G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARIANO MEDINA

Principle
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence. It is as follows:
'That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively,
'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.’
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on
fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger
is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not
the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to

4
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with
a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in
part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.

Substantial Factor Test

G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., respondents.

Principle

The carrier is presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso fortuito or that he has observed extra-
ordinary diligence as provided in Articles 1733,55-56. Last clear chance cannot be applied where a
passenger demands responsibility under culpa contractual. A negligent driver and its owner cannot be
exempted on the ground that the other party was likewise guilty of negligence. The substantial factor
test is testing whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. The
fact that the actor neither foresaw, nor should have foreseen the extent of harm or manner in which the
event occurred does not prevent his liability. However, this test does not apply. The court does not fault
Reyes for not having avoided such since no other options are available to him. The other lane even
though empty was narrow and covered with tall grass. The wheels of the bus were also clear of the
roadways except the other left that hit the jeep. This clearly shows the attempt to hit the jeep. Inability
to avoid the jeep must have been due to the limitations of options.

Cause and Condition

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.

Principle:

Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact
of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have
gone before.

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The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much
to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may
still be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional
mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any
validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have
come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it
is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause.

G.R. No. L-8328 May 18, 1956

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian
of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all
surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
Principle

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

G.R. No. L-15688 November 19, 1921

REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-
appellant.

Principle:

Whether or not the fire may have been communicated through Rodrigueza’s house, or directly from the
locomotive is immaterial. With regards to the position of Rodrigueza’s house, there is no proof that
Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon the railroad’s property in the act of building his house. Rodrigueza
may have assumed the risk of loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant’s
locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the
risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligent acts of Manila Railroad. Nobody is
bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. The circumstances
cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action because, a) that
condition was not created by himself, b) his house remained on the ground by toleration and therefore

6
with the consent of the Railroad co., and c) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact
would not justify the defendant company in negligently destroying it.

Efficient Intervening Cause

G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME
TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.

Principle

Under what is known as the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence." Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial
act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening cause, the negligent act of the truck driver, which
was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the
collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim
for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who
had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.

G.R. No. L-8328 May 18, 1956

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian
of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all
surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
Principle

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition

7
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973

MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.

Principle

The panic and stampede cannot be considered efficient intervening causes. The non-compliance with
the ordinance was ahead and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was
contemporaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger
to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened
was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.