REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA
Division

JOSE D. ONG
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-versus- C.A. CASE NO. 156146

NATALIE LEE

Respondent-Appellee.

x--------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM
OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT JOSE D. ONG

The plaintiff, Jose D. Ong (hereinafter “Jose”), through the

undersigned counsel, most respectfully submit this Memorandum to
the Honorable Court, in support of a ruling in his favor.

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. On 21 October 2016, Respondent-Appellee Natalie Lee (hereinafter

“Natalie”) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages and
preliminary injunction against Jose

2. On 24 November 2016, Jose filed his Answer.

3. On 6 December 2016, Natalie testified in support of her application

for a preliminary injunction.

4. On 20 February 2017, the Manila MeTC Branch 15 denied

plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction.

5. On 19 April 2017, after a failed JDR, the case was re-raffled to the
Honorable Court MeTC Branc 19 which set the case for
Preliminary Conference.
6. On 7 June 2017 Preliminary Conference was held and after trial
ensued, the parties were directed to file their Position Papers
dated 27 June 2017 for Jose and dated 3 July 2017 for Natalie

7. On 11 August 2017 the MeTC Branch 19 rendered its ruling

dismissing the case for lack of merit, said decision was appealed
by Natalie.

8. After another failed Judicial Dispute Resolution was conducted,

the case was finally raffled to RTC Branch 132 which is issued and
promulgated the “Assailed Decision”

9. While in the process of preparing the Petition for Review, Jose

received multiple Motions for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed
by Lee through counsel, one dated 1 June 2018 before the filing of
the instant Petition for Review and another dated 27 November
2018 (received on 10 December 2018)

10. On 4 December 2018, Jose, through counsel received a Resolution

from the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals directing the filing
of memoranda within 15 days from notice, hence this
memorandum.

II.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

11. Jose is the possessor and caretaker of a house located at No. 8847
Sampaloc Street Barangay San Antonio, Makati City (hereinafter
the “San Antonio House”), which was once owned by his brother,
Alfredo D. Ong (“Alfredo”)

12. When Alfredo died, none of his children lived in the San Antonio
House. Also, none of them answered for the maintenance
expenses of the property. Thus, to cover for these expenses, Ong
set up an eatery in front of the house and leased some of its
portions to (3) three tenants, all these with the consent and
approval of Alfredo’s daughter, Josephine Ong-Cabildo
(“Josephine”).

13. After Alfredo died, Josephine offered the San Antonio House to
plaintiff Lee as payment for a loan.
14. Initially, Josephine negotiated for an additional amount of One
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to be paid by Lee for the
San Antonio House. This amount was to cover the repair of the
house in Cebu Street, BF Homes, Paranaque City (“BF House”),
where Ong and his family were to transfer. Lee however refused
to shell out an additional PhP 1,500,000.00. By way of compromise,
Lee agreed to cause the repair of the BF House, at her expense, and
to answer for its maintenance.

15. However, after ownership of the San Antonio House was

transferred to Lee, she failed to comply with her obligation to
shoulder the maintenance expenses of the said property. Ong was
therefore constrained to continue leasing portions of the San
Antonio House to tenants to cover the maintenance expenses.
Otherwise, the house would have deteriorated.

16. Thus in January 2016, the parties entered into an Agreement

before the Punong Barangay of San Antonio, Makati, Restituto E.
Cajes, whereby Ong would vacated the San Antonio House on 30
April 2016 provided that Lee would repair the BF House to make
it livable.

17. In sum, the Agreement provided that:

a. The repair should cover the entire BF House1

b. The repair should make the BF House habitable2
c. The repair should conform to Mr. Ong’s standards of
habitability

18. Contrary to the Provisions of the Agreement, however, Natalie

proceeded to repair a different structure, a warehouse also located
in BF homes owned by Josephine.

19. Not only did this repair run contrary to the Agreement between
Natalie and Jose, the repair was not done in consultation with Mr.
Ong and as a result, the resulting structure was not habitable.

III.

1
Barangay Settlement Agreement
2
 ISSUES
THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE INSTANT
CASE IS AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE

THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IMPLICITLY ALLOWED NATALIE
TO CHANGE THE THEORY OF HER CASE FROM ONE OF
ENFORCEMENT OF A BARANGAY AGREEMENT TO ONE FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER

THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS RESCINDED DESPITE LEE BEING
NON-COMPLIANT

THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DEEMED LEE ENTITLED TO THE
REMEDY PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 2041 OF THE CIVIL CODE OR
IN SECTION 417 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS

PROPERLY AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE THE COURT A
QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER SINCE ONG’S RIGHT TO
POSSESS THE PROPERTY REMAINS LAWFUL UNTIL NATALIE
COMPLIES WITH HER OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS

PROPERLY AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE, THE COURT A
QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT AWARDED MONTHLY RENTALS, ATTORNEY’S FEES,
AND COSTS OF SUIT IN FAVOR OF LEE SINCE ONG’S RIGHT TO
POSSESS THE PROPERTY REMAINS LEGAL UNTIL LEE
COMPLIES WITH HER OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE BF HOUSE

IV.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION

20. Before going into our arguments we would like to respond to the
aspersions cast by the purported “Prefaratory Statement” in
Natalie’s comment.
21. Natalie would have this honorable court believe that just because
respondent possesses a parcel of land in Makati he is not “less in
life”. However they present no shred of evidence bolstering this
assertion other than their barenaked allegations

22. It begs well to note that nothing can be further from the truth. An
Affidavit of Indigency as well as a certification from his Barangay
and even from the Makati City Government3 that he is indeed an
indigent militate against this assertion.

23. Natalie would have this court believe that Jose seeks to take
advantage of her and wants nothing more than to take possession
of a property that is not his.

24. However at its core, what Jose wants from this petition is dignity
and a dignified standard of living which is no less than what he
deserves after all his faithful service taking care of the property
that his brother left behind.
Commented [L1]: Sir sorry wala tayong prefatory
statement eh not sure kung pwede to

THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE INSTANT
CASE IS AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE

THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IMPLICITLY ALLOWED
NATALIE TO CHANGE THE THEORY OF HER CASE FROM
ONE OF ENFORCEMENT OF A BARANGAY AGREEMENT TO
ONE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER

25. Since these two errors rely on interlocking legal concepts and
issues it is submitted that it would be proper to discuss both
simultaneously.

26. The ruling by the Court a quo reversed the findings of the MTC
which found that the allegations contained in the complaint make
out a case for the enforcement of the Barangay Settlement
Agreement pertinently4:

3
Annex “W” in the Petition for Review
4
MTC Decision dated 11 August 2017 Annex “B” of the Petition for Review
 “It bears emphasis that the plaintiff’s (Natalie) cause of
action in the complaint is the amicable settlement itself
which she allegedly executed with the defendant before
the barangay...

In her complaint, plaintiff categorically seeks the court to

order the defendant to “comply with all other
requirements in the Agreement.””

27. In ruling for the respondent, the court a quo reasoned that the
Respondent was able to allege all the requirements for a case for
unlawful detainer, an examination of the complaint would
nevertheless reveal otherwise.

28. Natalie asserts that a case for unlawful detainer is proper on the
theory that she merely tolerated the presence of Jose on the subject
property and now demands its return

29. However, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the

complaint militate against this assertion.

30. The complaint filed by respondent is replete with examples which

reveal the true intent of Natalie in filing her complaint.

31. Paragraph 55 of the complaint provides that:

i. “Having acquired ownership of the Property,
complainant negotiated to acquire physical
possession. Thus, last January 2016, complainant
and respondent entered into an agreement.

32. It begs well to further consider this statement; someone who has
already acquired ownership and possession would not need to
further negotiate for possession. If Natalie did indeed only tolerate
the possession of Jose, she would not have needed to negotiate for
the transfer of possession and should have asserted her rights in
the proper action.

33. In Paragraph 66, Natalie reiterates all the provisions as agreed

upon in the Barangay Settlement Agreement. This reiteration
implies that she considers the Agreement as valid and is therefore
seeking to enforce its provisions.

5
Complaint dated 11 October 2016 Annex “G” of the Petition for Review
6
Id at page 2
34. Furthermore in Paragraph 77 she again references the Barangay
Settlement Agreement mentioning how Jose “unequivocally
bound himself to leave the [San Antonio Property]” and how she
purportedly “complied with her obligation to repair the [BF
House]” in compliance with the Agreement.

35. The provisions of the argument however provide no such thing.

The agreement clearly provides that Jose will transfer residence to
the repaired house provided it is in livable condition.

36. However, since Natalie failed to provide a livable transfer

residence for Jose, he was constrained to stay in the San Antonio
Residence and keep on leasing it out to tenants in order to provide
for its upkeep.

37. Finally, Natalie’s prayer in her Complaint8 specifically prays for

the compliance of Jose with all the requirements in their
Agreement thereby implying that she does in fact consider it as a
valid and subsisting agreement by seeking to enforce its
provisions

38. In their Comment9 Natalie tries to brush away these contentions

by asserting that she did not have to negotiate with Jose and these
negotiations were merely an act of kindness.

39. It is our position that the true act of kindness in this case would be
to repair a livable transfer of residence for the Petitioner. For all
their harping on their supposed compliance with the Barangay
Settlement Agreement, Natalie has not produced a shred of
evidence to counter Jose’s allegations of the state of the property
she allegedly repaired.10

40. It is a basic principle of law that jurisdiction on courts is based on

nature of the action pleaded, as appearing from the allegations
provided in the complaint.11 The MTC was right in ruling for Jose
that a summary ejectment case against him was improper and that
the Complaint filed should have been one for the enforcement of
the Barangay Settlement Agreement.

7
Id.
8
Id at page 3-4
9
Comment dated 6 July 2018
10
Annex E-F of the Complaint
11
Padlan v Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013
 THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS RESCINDED DESPITE LEE BEING
NON-COMPLIANT

THE COURT A QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DEEMED LEE ENTITLED TO THE
REMEDY PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 2041 OF THE CIVIL CODE OR
IN SECTION 417 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

41. Since the foregoing issues are interrelated it is submitted that the
Honorable court would be better served if they were discussed
together.

42. In ruling for the Natalie, the court a quo reasoned that Natalie was
correct in deeming as rescinded the Barangay Settlement
Agreement entered into by her and Jose because of non-
compliance. They relied on Article 417 of the Local Government
Code and Article 2041 of the Civil Code to buttress their position.

43. However it is submitted that the remedies provided under these

Articles are only available to parties who are in good faith which
Natalie clearly is not.

44. The provision of the Barangay Settlement is clear12

a. “Mrs. Natalie Lee will repair the house at BF Home

owned by Josephine Ong Cabildo where he will transfer
residence.”

A cursory reading of the provision would show that Jose will

transfer to the house undertaken to be repaired by Natalie.
45. It is therefore unreasonable and premature for Natalie to insist on
the transfer of Jose without complying in good faith with her
obligation to repair the BF house to a livable condition.
46. As earlier stated other than their bare allegations, not once has
Respondent provided a shred of evidence evidencing her good
faith compliance with the Agreement.

47. In their comment however Natalie misrepresents our position and

calls our petition “the height of insult”13 since she entered into the
agreement allegedly “in good faith”14 and “as a courtesy to him”15.

48. None of these assertions however, are a ground to vitiate her

consent to enter in the Barangay Settlement Agreement as a
Contract with the “force and effect of a court judgment”16

49. Despite this however, she seems to be of the position that it is Jose
who is in violation of the Barangay Settlement Agreement which
she can therefore unilaterally rescind.

50. Natalie is mistaken.

51. She focuses on the deadline provided in the final provisions

specifically paragraph 5:

a. Tenants of Mr. Ong will vacate the place on August 30

2016, after the closing of the school year 2015.

52. A cursory reading of the paragraph will show that it is the tenants
of Mr. Ong who are bound by the deadline and from the
Agreement and not Jose (Mr. Ong).

53. It is our position that Natalie’s demands are unreasonable for she
has not complied with her own obligations under the agreement.
Jose cannot therefore be in breach as the agreement clearly
provides for her obligation to be complied with before Jose can
comply with his obligation

54. In fact by not complying with her obligations under the

Agreement, it is Jose who has the option to go to court to either
enforce the original agreement or rescind and insist on the original
agreement.

13
Comment on Page 16
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Miguel v Montanez G.R. 191366 (2012)
55. Jose’s vigorous defense and assertion of the provisions of the
Barangay Agreement in this case clearly implies that he is seeking
the enforcement of the original agreement.

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS

PROPERLY AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE THE COURT A
QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER SINCE ONG’S RIGHT TO
POSSESS THE PROPERTY REMAINS LAWFUL UNTIL NATALIE
COMPLIES WITH HER OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE BF HOUSE

56. Natalie further17 asserts in her comment that what she really
intended to file was an unlawful detainer case despite all the
allegations to the contrary.

57. She further asserts that the disclosure of the Barangay Settlement
Agreement was done only to avoid concealing any essential facts
to the Court.

58. While it is acknowledged that Natalie is now the named owner of

the lot it is nevertheless reiterated that her dispossession of the
property is entirely her fault.

59. She freely and voluntarily entered into the Barangay Settlement
Agreement with Jose. The provisions in said agreement clearly
provide that she is obligated to repair a house for the transfer of
Jose.

60. She cannot, after her non-compliance with the Barangay

Settlement Agreement, disown her consent to it and insist on the
possession of the property to the detriment of Jose who relied in
good faith in their Agreement. After all, it is a legal truism that one
cannot come to court with unclean hands.18

61. Natalie is also mistaken in her comment she initially asserts that
“Ultimately, the right of possession stems primarily from
ownership” and then immediately turns 180 degrees and says that
“It may be passed on to parties other than the owner by lease,
usufruct or other similar agreements.”

17
Comment on page 11
18
62. She thereafter misrepresents position stating that we are claiming
that the subject Agreement is effectively at the same level as a
Lease agreement in granting a right to exclude the current owner
from possessing the property.19

63. However, it is submitted that contracts have the force of law

between their parties and that parties to a contract may agree on
any terms within the contract as long as they are not contrary to
law, custom, public morals, or public policy.

64. Natalie insists however that she is entitled to the possession of the
property since Jose is merely a caretaker and she is the named
owner.

65. To further buttress her position respondent cites Barrientos v

Rapal20 and applied that ruling in this case. In the case of
Barrientos v Rapal, Barrientos, since 1993, was a caretaker of a
property owned by Rapal which Rapal bought in 1988. He was
thereafter ordered to vacate since his stay was merely due to the
tolerance of Rapal the owner.

66. However it is submitted that the facts in that case do not fall
squarely in this case to quote a part of the case emphasized by
Natalie in her Comment21

a. Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent clearly

makes out a case for unlawful detainer, since petitioner's
occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance.
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them

67. There was no contract governing the relations of Barrientos and

Rapal in their case, however the same is not true for this case.

19
Id at Page 16
20
G.R. No. 169594 July 20, 2011
21
Comment at Page 17
68. It is submitted that there IS a contract between Natalie and Jose
and that contract is the Barangay Settlement Agreement. Since the
Barangay Settlement Agreement is a contract with the force and
effect of a court judgement22 which, it is submitted, falls within the
meaning of

69. Anent the allegations of estafa in their Comment23 it begs well to

note that Jose was constrained to lease out the property to tenants
in order to answer for the necessary and useful expenses of the
property to keep it habitable and in good condition and was never
for personal gain.

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS

PROPERLY AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE, THE COURT A
QUO COMMITED GRAVE, MANIFEST, AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT AWARDED MONTHLY RENTALS, ATTORNEY’S FEES,
AND COSTS OF SUIT IN FAVOR OF LEE SINCE ONG’S RIGHT TO
POSSESS THE PROPERTY REMAINS LEGAL UNTIL LEE
COMPLIES WITH HER OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE BF HOUSE

70. While it is acknowledged that the Court a quo did indeed have the
authority to fix reasonable rent for the continued use of the San
Antonio house, such authority is not unlimited however.

71. In their Comment, Natalie relies on the same jurisprudence,

Catungal v Hao24 to assert the authority of the court to take
judicial notice of rental rates in the surrounding vicinity.

72. What Natalie fails to appreciate in her quoted jurisprudence is the

fact that in that case, there was evidence on record in that case to
prove the rents fixed by the court pertinently25:

The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the

leased property subject of the case at bench based on its
location and the commercial viability. The above quoted
assessment by the RTC of the Baclaran area, where the
subject property is located, is fairly grounded.

22
Supra note 16
23
Id at Page
24
G.R. No. 134972, March 22, 2001
25
Id
 Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving
at the said conclusion, the same being based on
testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker
Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal. (Emphasis
ours)

73. In this case however, there was no evidence presented to provide

a basis for the claim of damages of Natalie.

74. In any case, it is nevertheless reiterated that Jose was the rightful
possessor of the property for the period wherein rent is supposed
to be collected, Natalie’s claims should therefore be denied.

RELIEF

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court

that the honorable Court issue a ruling:

a. GIVING DUE COURSE to the Petition for Review

b. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Assailed Decision of the

Court a quo

c. REINSTATING the 23 August 2017 Decision of the MTC

Branch 19, DISMISSING the complaint for unlawful detainer
for utter lack of merit.

Other reliefs, just and equitable, under the premises are

likewise prayed for.

Makati City for Manila December 18, 2018.

ATENEO LEGAL SERVICES CENTER

Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant
Room 108, Ground Floor
Ateneo Professional Schools Building
Rockwell Center, Makati City 1200
Tel. No.: (632) 8997691 loc. 211
Fax No.: (632) 8994342
Email: alsc.law@ateneo.edu

By:
 LEO ANGELO MIGUEL R. AÑONUEVO
Roll of Attorneys No. 59106
IBP Lifetime No. LRN-015543
PTR No. 5523058/ 01/03/2018; Quezon City
MCLE Compliance No. V-0015754
Mobile No. +639178317757
Email: lanonuevo@ateneo.edu

COPIES FURNISHED:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

MAKATI CITY BRANCH 132
Respondent
No. 1170-B Chino Roces Avenue
Makati City

Ms. NATALIE LEE

Respondent
No. 1170-B Chino Roces Avenue
Makati City

ARITAO & ARITAO LAW OFFICES

Counsel for Respondent
Unit 2011 Tower 2
Cityland 10 Condominiums
H.V. Dela Costa Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City

EXPLANATION

Due to lack of sufficient messengers, personal service is not

practicable. Thus, this Memorandum is served on the other party by
registered mail in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.

LEO ANGELO MIGUEL R. AÑONUEVO