Journal of Business Strategy

Why old tools won't work in the “new” knowledge economy

Norman T. Sheehan
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Norman T. Sheehan, (2005),"Why old tools won't work in the “new” knowledge economy", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 26 Iss 4 pp.
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 Why old tools won’t work in the ‘‘new’’
knowledge economy
Norman T. Sheehan
Norman T. Sheehan, B.Comm,
MBA, PhD, CMA is an Associate
Professor in the College of
Commerce at the University of
Saskatchewan. He teaches,
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publishes and advises in the
areas of strategy formulation,
strategy implementation/
performance measurement, and
management of knowledge-
intensive firms (Sheehan@
commerce.usask.ca).
DOI 10.1108/02756660510608567
Introduction
Firms in the knowledge economy are significant drivers of economic growth, both for the
clients they help and for themselves as witnessed by the fact that their revenues have
increased tenfold in the past twenty years. Despite the meteoric rise of knowledge-intensive
firms, we know very little about their business models and even less about how to improve
their profitability. While we have many tools to analyze and improve the performance of
industrial firms, we have few tools for knowledge-intensive firms. Porter’s (1998) strategy
tools[1] are intended for industrial firms, such as Ford Motor Company, Dell, Coca-Cola,
Caterpillar, Anheuser-Busch, and Nucor, not knowledge-intensive firms such as Accenture
and McKinsey in consulting, Deloitte and KPMG in auditing, Clifford Chance and Watchell
Lipton in legal, Kleiner Perkins and Bain Capital in venture capital, and BBDO Worldwide and
McCann Erickson in advertising. Although Porter’s tools may provide some strategic
insights, managers of knowledge economy firms run the risk of applying misleading advice.
If we want valid, trustworthy insights from Porter’s key strategy tools – five forces, generic
strategies, and value chain – they need to be sharpened and modified for use in
knowledge-intensive firms.
Many knowledge-intensive firms recently experienced shock in the aftermath of the dot.com
meltdown, 9/11, economic recession, and the implosion of Arthur Andersen. These events
left managers scrambling to unearth new ways of increasing their firm’s profitability. This
paper examines the business models of knowledge-intensive firms using a sharper lens and
offers three options to improve performance:
1. increase value capture by using insights from a modified five forces analysis;
2. improve value created by choosing a business model that best fits a firm’s
problem-solving expertise, clients targeted, and desired risk level; and
3. identify competitive niches by evaluating which problem-solving activities should be
performed in-house versus left to clients or outsourced.
Value capture in knowledge-intensive industries
Firms fight to retain and capture value from actors in and around their industry. Porter’s five
forces analysis tells a story of who captures the most value: Is it rivals, who by competing for
customers force the firm to reduce prices or incur additional expenses that increase the
value offered? Is it buyers with high bargaining power who force the firm to accept lower
prices? Is it suppliers with high bargaining power that cause the firm to pay higher prices for
inputs? Is it attractive substitutes who limit the price consumers will pay for the firm’s
product? Or is it potential new entrants who force the firm to reduce its price to discourage
their entry into the market (see Figure 1)?
VOL. 26 NO. 4 2005, pp. 53-60, Q Emerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 0275-6668 j JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY j PAGE 53
 Figure 1 Porter’s five forces for industrial firms

If the industry is favorable, such as the pharmaceutical industry, then all firms in the
pharmaceutical industry will enjoy superior performance. If the industry is unfavorable, such
as the airline industry, then all firms suffer. For example, United and Delta are struggling due
to high industry rivalry, low cost entrants such as Jet Blue, high bargaining power of key
suppliers such as airline pilots, and an increasing attractiveness of substitutes such as
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videoconferencing.
Knowledge-intensive firms create value by solving their clients’ problems through the direct
application of knowledge. Whereas knowledge plays a role in all firms, its role is distinctive in
knowledge-intensive firms. Rather than being embodied in the process or product,
knowledge resides in experts and its application is customized in real time based on clients’
needs. The way knowledge-intensive firms create value critically impacts Porter’s story of
who captures the value in a number of ways: First, knowledge-intensive firms compete
differently – they fight vigorously to win the best experts and best projects (Maister, 1992)[2],
but thereafter cooperate with their rivals. Knowledge-intensive firms routinely refer projects
to rival firms better suited to solving the problem or they may even cooperate by sharing
work on larger projects. For example, law firms may refer clients to other law firms or
sub-contract work for large legal cases. Knowledge- intensive firms may also cooperate to
advance the professional or industry association through conferences, common training
programs, or setting common standards (see Figure 2).
Second, first-mover advantages play a decidedly smaller role in knowledge-intensive
industries due to the rapid commoditization of ideas and processes. Although the first firm to
introduce new ideas may ‘‘cream off’’ a disproportionate share of new business, the
advantage is typically temporary. In the early 1990s, CSC Index used its head start in
business process re-engineering to build a lead over its competitors, but as CSC Index soon
learned, this advantage was fleeting due to the ease with which their processes and
solutions were imitated by rivals.
Third, experts, who are the main suppliers to knowledge-intensive firms may have high
bargaining power if their clients are tied to the expert rather than to the firm. For example, if
clients approach the firm because they want specific consultants, then those consultants
have leverage that they may apply to appropriate higher salaries. However, if the client
approaches the firm and will take any qualified consultant, their bargaining power is muted.

‘‘ Knowledge-intensive firms compete differently – they fight

vigorously to win the best experts and best projects, but
thereafter cooperate with their rivals. ’’

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PAGE 54 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY VOL. 26 NO. 4 2005
 Figure 2 A modified five forces for knowledge-intensive industries

Fourth, the bargaining power of clients is reduced due to a knowledge gap between experts
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and their clients. Clients may not be able to view the problem-solving activities or the
contingencies experts operate under that often make it difficult for clients to ascertain the
quality of the solution, even after the fact (Løwendahl, 1997)[3]. In some cases, once the
solution is implemented it may be irreversible – think of a lawyer trying a legal case or knee
surgery. A client’s bargaining position is further weakened if the solution is very important to
the client. One reason some clients pay such a high price for expertise is that the cost of
ignorance may be even higher (Fjeldstad and Andersen, 2003).
Finally, while there is a minimal cost to set-up a new knowledge-intensive firm, reputation
acts as a deterrent. Established experts have an easier time if they are known to clients, but
new entrants are hindered by their newness – not having a track record makes it difficult to
win clients. Industrial firms can lure customers to try new products by reducing their prices,
but this is risky for knowledge-intensive firms because it may be seen as cutting quality.
Think whether you would be comfortable going to trial with a law firm that advertises ‘‘Boxing
Day divorce specials’’ or ‘‘Easter break-and-enter specials.’’
After completing a five forces analysis managers can try the following tactics to capture
more value: Reduce the bargaining power of its experts by tying clients to the firm instead of
to the expert. Accenture and McKinsey have a clear ‘‘one firm’’ policy, which is partially
intended to ‘‘tie’’ the client to the firm rather than to one particular consultant. If it is not
feasible (or desirable) to reduce ties between individual experts and clients, another way to
persuade experts to accept less than full market value for their services is to offer a menu of
(future) rewards such as competence building, enhanced legitimacy, and an opportunity to
become partner (Fjeldstad and Andersen, 2003). Some clients may try to reduce the
bargaining power of firms by hiring their own experts. Many corporations have in-house legal
counsel. Can managers of knowledge-intensive firms introduce flexible client arrangements
and pricing structures to make this option less attractive for current and potential clients?
Reputation plays a key role in deciding who hires your firm, who partners with your firm, and
who refers clients to your firm. Is there room to proactively improve the firm’s reputational
status by increasing involvement in the profession, monitoring and measuring reputation, or
partnering with firms with better reputations?

Business models for knowledge-intensive firms

Business models for knowledge-intensive firms should outline a strategy in terms of which
clients they will target, what problems they will solve, and how they plan to do this efficiently
and effectively. In making these strategic choices, knowledge-intensive firms face a different

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VOL. 26 NO. 4 2005 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY PAGE 55
 competitive landscape from industrial firms. For example, knowledge-intensive firms focus
more on value enhancement than cost reduction, ‘‘Cars, despite heroic attempts at
branding, are still more or less interchangeable and sold on price – hence the car industry’s
fixation on costs. But each new class of drug is usually unlike anything else that came before.
Moreover, few patients will buy second-best heart pills just to save a few dollars . . . ’’ (The
Economist, 1998). Cost is important in knowledge-intensive firms, but it is not the defining
characteristic – the defining characteristic is adding the most value by healing the sickest
patients, winning the toughest court cases or designing the most aesthetically pleasing
buildings. Further, competing on being the lowest cost/lowest price in any segment is risky
because it may be equated with being low quality in the clients’ mind. This is not to say firms
cannot offer lower priced services – knowledge-intensive firms routinely target
price-sensitive clients with lower priced services. EDS’ own consultants sell projects to
mid- and lower-end clients, while AT Kearney targets high-end clients who can afford
higher-priced engagements. But competing with a lowest price strategy is less appealing for
knowledge-intensive firms because in the absence of other information clients may
associate price paid with the quality of the solution.
Aside from the potentially damaging signal a low cost/low price strategy may send,
knowledge-intensive firms also face significant challenges implementing a low cost strategy
due to their cost structures. Expert salaries are typically a knowledge-intensive firm’s largest
expense item and there is less room to reduce salaries. Knowledge-intensive firms also lack
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scale economies. Larger scale may allow a firm to offer services to global clients, to solve
‘‘larger’’ problems, and to provide additional opportunities to balance the workload of
experts (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998; Starbuck, 1992)[4]. However, these advantages are
more than offset by the costs associated with coordinating experts and the need to
reconfigure for unique cases. Although some larger firms such as McKinsey enjoy success,
smaller knowledge-intensive firms typically earn higher revenues per expert than larger
firms.
Porter argues that the only way for firms to achieve above average profitability is by basing
their business model on being lowest cost or differentiated. However, a low cost strategy is
not strategically attractive for knowledge-intensive firms. Instead we suggest that a key
trade-off for knowledge-intensive firms is the breadth of their problem domain, which defines
problems to be solved and clients targeted by the firm (Fjeldstad and Haanes, 2001;
Løwendahl et al., 2001; Stabell, 2001)[5]. Knowledge-intensive firms can choose to be
generalists and solve a broad range of problems or they may choose to be specialists by
focusing on a narrow range of problems.
A second key positioning choice for knowledge-intensive firms is the level of knowledge
re-use (Hansen et al., 1999; Løwendahl et al., 2001; Maister, 1993; Mintzberg, 1979), given
that expertise directly impacts client value and firm cost (see Table I). At one end of the
knowledge re-use spectrum, firms such as Deloitte Consulting and Accenture sell mainly
pre-packaged or ‘‘off the shelf’’ solutions. These firms are efficient, as they have solved these
types of problems before, but they may be less effective if new problems do not call for old
solutions. Maister (1993)[6] labels this type of firm ‘‘grey hairs’’, which is appropriate as it
implies depth of knowledge but less adaptability in its application. At the other end of the
knowledge re-use spectrum, we see firms that sell tailor-made solutions such as Deka, which
invented the Segway. These firms typically approach each problem as a blank sheet of
paper with the aim of arriving at a customized solution and are more effective solving client
problems but less efficient.
Placing the two dimensions together gives a range of business models for
knowledge-intensive firms (see Table I).
Managers need to analyze their firm’s knowledge re-use and desired risk levels before
picking a business model that best fits their expertise, target clients, and aspirations.
Knowledge-intensive firms choosing a broad problem domain and ‘‘off the shelf’’ solutions,
which we label General Stores, typically earn lower client fees but incur lower expenses in
solving their problems. Their main risk is that their expertise becomes obsolete, although by

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PAGE 56 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY VOL. 26 NO. 4 2005
 Table I Business models for knowledge-intensive firms
Sells packaged solutions Sells tailor-made solutions

Broad problem domain General stores (Deloitte Consulting, IBM Idea labs (Boston Consulting Group, Dean
Consulting) Kamen’s firm – DEKA)
Narrow problem domain Specialty shop (Balanced Scorecard Boutiques (Gary Hamel’s Innovation Lab)
Collaborative, Marakon)

diversifying into a broad range of problems they have a lower obsolescence risk compared
to firms such as Specialty Shops, which have narrower specializations. Specialty Shops are
experts at solving one type of problem. They typically charge lower fees, but should be
efficient as long as clients’ projects fit their expertise profile. Firms that choose broad
problem domains and customization, which we label Idea Labs, typically earn higher fees
but run the risk of having costs exceed revenues due to an unclear problem definition and
scope. Firms with narrow problem domains and customization, which we label Boutiques,
earn higher fees but also face obsolescence and efficiency issues. On the positive side,
though, Boutiques and Specialty Shops have reduced their complexity and thus risk by
focusing on narrower problem domains (Løwendahl and Revang, 2004). Lastly, Boutiques
and Idea Labs face a longer-term risk: as they gain a reputation for successfully solving
certain types of problems, new clients may request old solutions. While profitable in the short
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term, this may gradually lead to a ‘‘success trap’’[7] as their old knowledge loses its market
relevance.

Activity scope for knowledge-intensive firms

Firms can use activities as an analytical tool to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
their operations. Porter argues we cannot understand a firm’s competitive potential by
looking at the firm as a whole; rather its competitive position is determined by the activities it
undertakes, such as receiving, manufacturing, storing, transporting, hiring, training,
purchasing, and marketing (Porter, 1998)[8]. To assist managers to understand and
implement a low cost or differentiation strategy using activities, Porter outlines the value
chain (see Figure 3). The value chain is a generic activity template that can be used to
decompose the firm into the individual activities it undertakes to create value for the
customer.

Knowledge-intensive firms create value by solving problems in contrast to industrial firms,

which create value by transforming inputs into outputs. This different value-creating logic
demands a new activity framework. Stabell and Fjeldstad propose a value shop activity
template as a tool to model value creation in knowledge-intensive firms (Stabell and
Fjeldstad, 1998)[9].
Knowledge-intensive firms create value for their clients by performing one or more of the
generic problem-solving activities:
B problem finding, which includes acquiring clients and defining their problems;
B problem solving, which includes alternative generation and evaluation;

Figure 3 The value chain

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VOL. 26 NO. 4 2005 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY PAGE 57
 B choice of an alternative;
B implementation of an alternative; and
B follow up and control to see if the alternative selected resolves the problem.

In the graphic model for the value shop, the primary problem-solving activities, rather than
being linear as in the value chain, are shown as ‘‘wheels within wheels’’ in order to
emphasize a cyclical and iterative value creation logic (see Figure 4). As with the value
chain, the value shop has a corresponding set of support activities that play an indirect role
in creating value for their clients. The main difference is that senior experts typically perform
training and technology development activities along with their primary problem-solving
activities.
Once the knowledge-intensive firm has been divided into its key value-creating activities,
managers can pursue two lines of strategic analysis: They can compare their activity set to
that of competitors – are they performing them better or differently? This analysis usually
provides insights into areas that need to be improved. For example, are all activities creating
value in the clients’ eyes? Can we eliminate or reduce some activities? Are competitors
undertaking different activities and adding more value at lower cost? A second line of inquiry
focuses on the scope of the business model – which activities should be completed
in-house versus having the client perform them.
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A general building contractor is an example of a knowledge-intensive firm that performs only

the first activity, problem finding. A general contractor wins the engagement and then
contracts the actual construction work out to various trades. However, it is more common that
knowledge-intensive firms, such as consultants and architects, perform problem finding and
problem defining activities. These firms win the engagement, outline a set of
recommendations, and then leave the remaining activities (choosing the solution,
implementation, and follow up) in the hands of the client. Some knowledge-intensive
firms, such as cosmetic surgeons and lawyers, complete the full cycle of activities. They win
the work, recommend and choose a solution, implement by doing the surgery or trying the
case, and then follow up. On the other hand, some knowledge-intensive firms perform only
implementation and follow-up activities, relying on referrals from other knowledge-intensive
firms for their clients.
Focusing on activities provides managers with another lens to differentiate themselves.
Choosing different activity sets leads to the formation and (potentially) domination of new

Figure 4 The value shop

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PAGE 58 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY VOL. 26 NO. 4 2005
 ‘‘ Business models for knowledge-intensive firms should
outline a strategy in terms of which clients they will target,
what problems they will solve, and how they plan to do this
efficiently and effectively. ’’

competitive niches: Accenture found a new strategic niche in this manner. Once a pure
problem finder and definer, Accenture now performs implementation and follow-up activities
for clients (i.e. back office procedures like payroll and accounting). Some architectural firms
are moving beyond delivering drawings to managing the construction of buildings they have
designed.
Maister suggests a new business model for consulting firms (The Economist, 2001), which
he labels ‘‘prime contractors’’. He proposes that these firms should act as general
contractors by coordinating the work of boutique and specialty shops, which are hired
because they are the ‘‘best of breed.’’
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Keywords:
Knowledge organizations, Summary
Performance measures, Applying ‘‘old’’ tools to ‘‘new’’ knowledge-intensive firms seldom provides the strategic edge
Business excellence, managers are looking for. Managers of knowledge-intensive firms need to use the old tools in
Knowledge management, new ways, if they are to improve their business models and ultimately increase their
Activity based management profitability.

Notes
1. Discusses five forces analysis, generic strategies and the value chain.
2. Discusses how professional service firms compete for professional talent and client projects.
3. Discusses how information issues impact professional service firms.
4. Discusses scale economies in knowledge-intensive firms.
5. Discusses how the scope of the problem domain is a key strategic choice.

6. Discusses ‘‘grey hairs’’ in professional service firms.

7. Mintzberg (1979) was first to note this risk, but see also Fjeldstad and Haanes (2001) who build on
Jim March’s work on exploration versus exploitation.
8. Describes how to use activities to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
9. Discusses the strategic implications of the value shop.

References
(The) Economist (1998), ‘‘New drugs for rare diseases’’, The Economist, 28 May, p. 78.
(The) Economist (2001), ‘‘Spoilt for choice’’, The Economist, 7 July, p. 66.
Fjeldstad, Ø. and Andersen, E. (2003), ‘‘Casting off the chains: value shops and value networks’’,
European Business Forum, Vol. 14, pp. 47-53.
Fjeldstad, Ø. and Haanes, K. (2001), ‘‘Strategy tradeoffs in the knowledge and network economy’’,
Business Strategy Review, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-10.
Hansen, M., Nohria, N. and Tierney, T. (1999), ‘‘What’s your strategy for managing knowledge’’, Harvard
Business Review, March/April, pp. 2-12.

Løwendahl, B. (1997), Strategic Management of the Professional Service Firm, Handelshøjskolens

Forlag, Copenhagen.

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 Løwendahl, B. and Revang, Ø. (2004), ‘‘Achieving results in an after modern context: thoughts on the
role of strategizing and organizing’’, European Management Review, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 49-54.
Løwendahl, B., Revang, Ø. and Fosstenløkken, S. (2001), ‘‘Knowledge and value creation in
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Maister, D. (1993), Managing the Professional Service Firm, The Free Press, New York, NY.
Mintzberg, H. (1979), The Structure of Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Porter, M. (1998), Competitive Advantage, The Free Press, New York, NY.
Stabell, C. (2001), ‘‘New models for value creation and competitive advantage in the petroleum
industry’’, research report 1/2001, Norwegian School of Management, Oslo.
Stabell, C. and Fjeldstad, Ø. (1998), ‘‘Configuring value for competitive advantage: on chains, shops
and networks’’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19 No. 5, pp. 413-37.
Starbuck, W. (1992), ‘‘Learning by knowledge-intensive firms’’, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 29
No. 6, pp. 713-40.
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