Brooklyn Technical-Novice-Starter-Aff-Fall Face-Off-Round1

Climate Refugees Aff / Neg – HJPV ‘18
Alex Baime – GBS
Suchetas Boklis – Alpharetta
Jordan Frese – GBS
Adrian Gushin – Rowland Hall
Sophia Hurst – Greenhill
Tanuj Koli – MBA
Suraj Peramanu – Chattahoochee
Shreya Ram – Wayzata
Sarah Waters – Niles West

Suggested 1ac
1ac – Climate Refugees Advantage
There will be 1.4B climate refugees by 2060
Tetrick 18 – research assistant and double major on environmental and political science at the University of Minnesota Morris (Steven,
“Climate Refugees: Establishing Legal Responses and U.S. Policy Possibilities”, June 2018,
https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=horizons)//abaime
There is a strong consensus in the scientific community that climate change is occurring. Climate change
is largely being caused by anthropogenic reasons and there are potential future harms from it
(Marquart-Pyatt, Shwom et al. 2011, 40). One of the most significant of these future harms is the
creation of climate refugees. “Climate Refugee” describes a person who is forced to leave their home or
community due to changes to the local environment, such as rising sea levels, drought, famine, or other
effects of climate change (National Geographic Society 2012). A climate refugee can migrate either
internally or internationally. Estimates of the amount of future climate refugees vary substantially due
to differing definitions of who constitutes a climate refugee, but according to a Cornell journal, at the
current rate of human fertility increase, populations in low-elevation coastal zones, land usage and
degradation, and CO2 emission rates, 1.4 billion people could become climate refugees by 2060
(Geisler and Currens 2017, 7).
Their numbers will grow exponentially – especially in developing countries and coastal
megacities
Climate change has been found to cause many issues that may lead to forced migration including:
drought, flooding due to changing rain patterns, rising sea levels, decrease in water quality from
flooding and worsening storms, loss of easily accessible portable water, increased temperatures, and
salination due to drought or sea water infiltration (Manou and Mihi 2017, 3-4). Without adequate policy,
forced migration may lead to an array of issues for humans including: overpopulation, conflict over
resources, cultural clashes and increased discrimination against migrants, decreased public health as a
result of overcrowding, inadequate services provided by the government, increased spread of diseases,
and increased political differences or disputes (2017, 5). Regardless of which issues will specifically
occur, the task of creating policy properly addressing climate refugees with its complex human rights
and political issues, is a challenging one.
Who and How Many?
“In Bangladesh alone, roughly 75 million people, or about 40% of its projected population for the year
2100, would be affected” (Byravan and Rajan 2015, 5). This is just one of many studies attempting to
predict how many people will become refugees if climate change continues to worsen at its current rate.
A commonly cited study by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 250
million people displaced from their homes due to climate change by 2050 (Funkhouser 2016). Although
some have said there have not been any “reliable global estimates of past and current migration flows”
in response to climate change (Wilkinson et. al 2016, 3), there have been many individual cases
documented. While there are many numbers of climate refugees that have been cited, without a proper
definition of what constitutes a climate refugee, none of these estimates portray the same results.
Currently, almost every study has differing classifications of who qualifies as a climate refugee.
Regardless of the terminology or definitions used, as will be discussed in a later section, the estimates of
people displaced by climate change are far greater than any historical numbers of refugees the
international community has experienced. The United Nations Human Rights Council annual report
found an estimated 65.6 million people forcibly displaced from their homes by the end of 2016, the
highest since WWII (Edwards 2017). Even at a current high point, previously cited numbers of 250
million-1.4 billion people displaced by climate change over the next 30-40 years surpass this number
greatly.
Despite the lack of specific numbers of climate refugees, researchers do have strong ideas of who will be
affected at greater rates. Due to historical settlements along coastlines, most of the world’s megacities
exist along the coast. “About 10 percent of the world’s population lives within a mile or so of the
shoreline and below 10 meters in elevation” (Byravan and Rajan 2015, 4). This, however, is not where
the majority of climate refugees are currently coming from. Those who are most at risk to become
climate refugees are from the developing world (Kane-Hartnett 2015). The effects of climate change
disproportionately impact developing nations (2015). For example, small island states see the effects of
rising sea levels first. The island nation of Kiribati will likely experience the first complete exodus of
people due to climate change (2015). Worsening droughts also impact developing nations at higher
rates, such as many African nations, due to climate change intensifying local weather. Another primary
reason the developing world is disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change is caused
by the development status of their nation. Developing nations generally have “limited resources, a
reliance on agricultural and maritime-based livelihoods, and generally weak governance structures”
(Kane-Hartnett 2015). Governments of developing nations do not have the ability or resources to
internally relocate citizens while maintaining their current standard of living and legal rights, as those
who live in developed nations, such as the United States do. There will of course be issues from internal
migration caused by climate change in the United States, but the people impacted will not have to face
the threats of homelessness, unemployment, or statelessness (2015). Current International
Governance of Climate Refugees
There are basically zero protections for those refugees – domestically and
internationally
These five grounds for protection do not include climate change as a reason one can seek refuge. In one case, a New
Zealand court rejected a Tuvaluan family claiming refugee status due to the effects of climate change, because their claim didn’t fit the 1951 Refugee Convention (Ferris 2017, 13). One reason
some refugee advocates and legal experts oppose expanding the five grounds for refugee status to include climate change refugees is the fear it will weaken the rights and overall status of
“refugee” (2017, 14). Others, primarily developed nations, have expressed concerns that if the Convention definition is expanded, it will lead to mass amounts of people attempting to move to
their land (2017, 15). In 2007, the UNHCR, which primarily deals with legal refugees, extended its activities to include internally displaced people (IDPs) and other groups outside of refugees.
IDPs refers to people who have fled within the borders of their nation, for any number of reasons, but are still under the protection of their government (Biermann and Boas 2010, 72). Under
the current regime, most climate refugees “could be conceptualized as internally displaced people,” which the UNHCR have created programs for, but according to Biermann and Boas, this is
The UNHCR also does not have the capabilities to

only a descriptive term and states are under no obligation to provide assistance to them (2010, 73).
deal with the number of people who could be classified as environmental IDPs that currently exist, let
alone the number of climate refugees that will arise in the near future. With responsibility to provide
protections to climate refugees resting primarily on their home nations, climate refugees, especially
those from developing nations, have little to no legal rights or protection under international law. One of
the first modern examples of climate refugees took place on the small Alaskan island of Sarichef. In 2004, all of the inhabitants of the island were forced to relocate to mainland when the
islands permafrost began to thaw due to rising temperatures and the island began to sink (Jerneck 2009). Despite such tangible events within the United
States, refugee policy has remained rigid and exclusionary. According to the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA], a
refugee is defined as “a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because
of a well-founded fear of persecution due to race, membership in a particular social group, political
opinion, religion, or national origin” (American Immigration Council 2015, 1). The president, in consultation with Congress, sets a ceiling
for the number of maximum refugees that will be granted admission for each fiscal year. President Trump set a ceiling of 45,000 for fiscal year 2018, down from
the 85,000 set in 2016 (Meckler 2018). In the first three months of the year, the US only admitted 5,000 refugees, which is on pace for admitting far less than the 45,000 maximum (2018).
The U.S. refugee program has three principal categories classifying refugees and their priority (American
Immigration Council 2015, 3). Priority one contains individuals those with the most compelling persecution needs with
no viable solutions. Priority two consists of groups of “special concern” to the United States, which are selected by
the Department of State. The current groups include “persons from the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Iraq, Iran, Burma, and Bhutan.” Priority three includes relatives of refugees who are
already within the United States (2015, 3). Refugees undergo extensive screening, interviewing, medical examinations, and other security clearances prior to the
Refugee Admissions Program determining placement for each refugee. The Department of State has cited the process taking an average of 18-24 months to complete, which was reduced
slightly by the Obama Administration by improving interagency coordinating, but many of the issues returned upon President Trump
taking office (2015, 4).
Climate migration is an existential threat and conflict multiplier – it should filter every
impact
Wennerstein and Robbins ‘18
[John and Denise. John R. Wennersten is a senior fellow at the National Museum of American History at
the Smithsonian Institution, and a member of the board of directors for the Anacostia Watershed
Society. He is a professor emeritus of environmental history at the University of Maryland. Denise
Robbins is a writer and communications expert on climate change issues in Washington, DC. A graduate
of Cornell University, she regularly publishes articles dealing with all aspects of global and national
environmental change, with a focus on regional politics. Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-
First Century. Indiana University Press. Available via GoogleBooks. //jv]
Extreme weather events in North Africa and elsewhere may become the norm rather than the
exception. Certainly desertification has put large populations on the move in search of water. livelihood,
and security. A rise in sea level will create serious situations considering that a quarter of the world’s
population lives on or near coasts and that the majority of our own megacities are situated in coastal
areas. A Pentagon memo notes: “Picture Japan’s coastal cities flooded, with theft freshwater supplies
contaminated. Envision Pakistan. India. and China—all nuclear powers—skirmishing at their borders
over access to shared rivers and arable land with older coastal areas now submerged under rising
seas.”26 It is often difficult to differentiate between those refugees driven by environmental factors and
those driven by other factors. Economics. politics, culture, and climate intertwine like some sociological
double helix. What refugees have in common, however, is that they are suffering, and often they are
impoverished by the environmental degradation of their homeland, affected by tsunamis,
desertification, water scarcity. and disease. There is considerable uncertainty as to where these
streams of global environmental refugees will flow. But it is a safe bet that they will lap up on the
shores of prosperous developed Western nations, which are afready becoming increasingly
xenophobic. The Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). with a lean staff
of ten thousand seven hundred workers, is already stressed by refugee crises of some twenty-one and
one-third million.2 Add millions of people displaced by climate change. and you have a crisis of
governance and management that will sorely tax the wisest solons at the UN and other governmental
agencies. It is not rocket science to conclude that as the century progresses there will be a glaring need
for more farms and farmers to feed the planet’s burgeoning population. Meanwhile, major countries
like China are buying farmland in whatever country they can find it. and food stocks on Wall Street such
as ConAgra and General Mills are soaring. Access to supplies like water and grain will become major
concerns to countries with diminished rainfall. By 2020, warns Chatham House in its Resources Futures
report, “yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by 50 percent” in some countries. The
highest rates of loss are expected to be in Africa, where reliance on rain-fed farming is greatest, but
agriculture in China, India. Pakistan. and Central Asia is also likely to be severely affected.2 Heat waves
will diminish the flow of rivers, which will mean diminishing supplies of water for irrigation and
hydroelectric power. Long range, in addition to setting waves of population miation in motion, a
changed environment in the future will transform infrastructures of government out of recognition
from their older patterns. Presently. in the safe, affluent confines of our homes. we watch on our
television or read in our newspapers or on the Internet of the relentless march of hundreds of
thousands of refugees out of Africa and the Middle East bound for the sanctuary and prosperity of
England and Western Europe. They are people who cannot hold on to a livelihood in their forsaken
homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification. floods, and war. They are desperate people
who are willing to risk the violence of nativist Europeans or drowning in a tempest of the
Mediterranean Sea. Unlike other refugees of yesteryear, these people have abandoned their homeland
with little hope of a foreseeable return. Environmental refugees are a problem of development policy
beyond the scope of a single country or agency. The problems are fraught with emotion, human agency,
and political controversy. How will people be relocated and settled? Is it possible to offer environmental
refugees temporary or permanent asylum? Will these refugees have any collective rights in the new
areas they inhabit? And who will pay the costs of all the affected countries during the process of
resettlement? Developed Western nations like the United States also have begun to feel the shock of
environmental stresses and catastrophes. A decade ago Hurricane Katrina put the proud Southern city
of New Orleans underwater, and more recently Hurricane Sandy decimated the Middle Atlantic coast
and flooded New York City. Today the Southwest languishes in one of the worst droughts in recent
memory while environmental historians point out similarities with the Dust Bowl of winds that roared
across the drought- ridden plains of Kansas, Texas. and Oklahoma in the 193 Os and covered distant
cities like Washington and Philadelphia in a choking mantle of dust and dirt. California worries about its
San Andreas Fault. and seismologists of the Pacific Northwest fear the coming of what they call “The Big
One”—sliding tectonic plates of the “Cascadian subduction zone” resulting in a major earthquake
followed by tsunamis whose impact will cover some 140,000 square miles, render seven million people
homeless, and destroy and flood Seattle, Tacoma. Eugene. and Salem. the capital of Oregon.
Comprehending the scale of our looming climate crisis is difficult. And absorbing climate refugees or
their war-tom brethren is burdensome and fraught with controversy. It is easy to welcome them at the
airport but more complex to provide them with sustenance and jobs. Thus, when we contemplate the
subject of refugees and the future, we might do well to look in a mirror and recognize that every one
of us is or could be a migrant.
It is causing accelerating, global eco collapse – it creates conflict, starvation, and

disease.
Agriculture has become the modem Agasthya. the mythical Indian giant who drank the seas dry.26
Unless careful provisions are made, the expansion of agriculture, with its immense need for irrigation
water, may gobble up what is left of the planet’s groundwater in virgin lands and wilderness. To deal
with “Agasthaya.” research into new crop yields that produce seeds tolerant of increasing temperatures
and water scarcity is increasingly a part of a survival agenda. One should mention, however, that the
technological innovations of the Green Revolution have largely run their course, and there is little
prospect in agricultural yields increasing at the exponential rate they have in the past as a result of new
farming techniques.h Despite manifold technological innovations, agriculture appears to have
plateaued. According to world climate expert Lester Brown, the world agricultural harvest in 1993 was
only 4.2 percent higher than that of 1984 while world population increased by 16 percent. During this
time, grain output per person declined by 11 percent. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations reports that about 793 million people were estimated to be chronically
undernourished in 2015.25 If projections of world population growing to 9.8 billion by 2050 come true,
farms will have to produce three times as many calories as today. Further. there are few new areas
remaining that can be opened up for agriculture around the globe. The problems are compounded in a
number of countries by inadequate government. As UN observers have said, in certain countries it is not
so much faulty as failed governments or no government. Only a few countries in this area seem capable
of remaining self-sufficient in food—Kenya. Botswana. and Zimbabwe. At present, droughts top the list
of worst global disasters. Since the beginning of the twentieth century. droughts have been responsible
for the deaths and uprooting of millions of people—China in 1907, with a toll of twenty-five million;
Ukraine in the Volga region of the Soviet Union in 1921—1922, 5 million; and droughts in India in 1965
caused a death toll of 1.5 million. In addition. storm surges in Bangladesh routinely kill thousands.
Throughout Africa. desertification has become so pervasive that whole villages and farms are overtaken
by sand. The 1982—1984 droughts in Africa, for example, left 184 million people in twenty-four African
countries on the brink of starvation. Ten million left their homes in search of food with two million
displaced persons winding up in refugee camps in five countries. Many who waited too long to migrate
died. As a result of these disasters owing to climate change, more people are being killed or displaced
by landslides, cyclones, and floods than ever before.29 The Stern Review, a British government report
on the economics of climate change warned: “As temperatures rise and conditions deteriorate
significantly, climate change will test the resilience of many societies around the world. Large numbers
of people will be compelled to leave theft homes when resources drop below a critical threshold. China,
for instance, could see three hundred million of its people suffer from the wholesale reduction in glacial
meltwater.”30 Landlessness derives from environmental factors as much as economic ones. Experts
point out that this problem is particularly acute in Mexico, Central America. Pakistan, India, and
Bangladesh. Where people own little or no land in agriculture communities. the productive value of
farmland is degraded, as too much pressure is placed on too little to obtain a livelihood. Meanwhile. the
United Nations estimates that we will have to feed an extra 1.3 billion people in this decade alone and
4.1 billion by 2050. In Malaysia and other countries, deforestation has resulted in a decline of rainfall,
with disastrous impact on local rice production. Recent studies have pointed out that the deforestation
of the Himalayan foothills has had a multibillion-dollar negative impact on agricultural systems in the
Ganges Välley of India.51 Whatever the cause of deforestation, it eliminates the homelands and
livelihoods of large numbers of people in the developing world. Desertification is now at work on over
one-third of the world’s surface— some forty-five million square kilometers drying out to a state of
severely depleted productivity. Desertification is leading to burgeoning catastrophe in sub-Saharan
Africa. a region with some of the world’s greatest population pressures. As early as the 1980s scientists
pointed to the Sahel region. the Horn of Africa. and a dry corridor from Namibia through Botswana and
Zimbabwe to southern Mozambique. By 1987 an estimated ten million people had become
environmental or climate retùgees in semiarid lands. Today a total of 900 million people are at risk in
areas undergoing desertification. At the same time. these areas also have populations growing at rates
of over 3 percent a year. Drought in Africa is now different. Areas in the Sahel. Somalia. and elsewhere
face untold calamities because there is less water and more people. Water shortages cause major
problems for health. agriculture, and industry. What is especially relevant is that in 90 percent of the
developing world there is a lack of clean water for domestic use. which results in various diseases and
maladies like cholera and intestinal parasites. Meanwhile, much of the region suffers from a food deficit.
The region’s hopes of purchasing food from outside are meager because of its adverse trade relations
and deficiencies in technological innovation and political will. In sum. United Nations experts believe
that sub-Saharan Africa’s outlook provides abundant scope for rapidly growing numbers of climate
refugees. Food shortages are already largely responsible for driving people out of Egypt and Tunisia.
Recently there has been a major falloff in Russian wheat harvests, because temperatures in the
heartland have risen to 1oo degrees Fahrenheit. Elsewhere, in another major grain belt. Australia’s
Murray River and Queensland areas. harvests have been severely diminished. The Murray River has
been plagued for years by crop-killing drought, and the recent floods in Queensland have severely
diminished Australia’s agricultural productivity. The Wall Street Journal summed up the problem:
“China’s farmers need water because China needs food. Production of rice, wheat, and corn topped out
at 441.4 million tons in 1998 and has not hit that level since. Seawater has leaked into depleted aquifers
in the north of China, threatening to turn land barren”33. Similar developments have already happened
on the Great Plains of the United States. Genetic research into more hardy grains for an uncertain future
proceeds apace with the problem. The real project ahead is to get people into actually valuing water in a
realistic manner, says water expert Peter Rogers. “We do not have to experience a water crisis,” said
Rogers. “but we could have a really serious one if we ignore the warning signs and do not provide the
leadership and the social determination required to avoid it.”34 Meanwhile. 2011 unfolded as a year
of food crisis. Prices for food reached record global levels, driven by increases in the price of wheat.
corn. sugar. and oils. Nobel Prize—winning economist Paul Krugman has argued that rising
concentrations of greenhouse gases are changing our global food system. Responding to assertions that
climate change has no bearing on the problem. he admits that changing pall ems of consumption and
population growth have their influence on high food prices. But with climate change he argues that this
is just a beginning. We may have had a few bad winters, but “don’t let the snow fool you.” In a
warming world. “there will be much more and much worse to come.”35
Resource wars are the greatest existential threat

Kinzer ‘14
Stephen Kinzer is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.
August 14, “ America’s next security threat: resource wars, Boston globe,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/08/30/america-next-security-threat-resource-
wars/qCqaar507gcYweKMVOOc3J/story.html
With so much scary upheaval shaking the world, it’s hard to say where Americans should focus our
attention. Just a few months ago, the worst things we had to worry about were a heavy-handed Russia,
a recalcitrant Iran, and an ambitious China. Today we face a fanatic mini-state in Mesopotamia, a
collapsing Libya, devastation in Gaza, a surge of child refugees from Central America, and an outbreak of
Ebola in Africa. Moments of seeming world crisis like this one present a hidden danger beneath the
turmoil we see. They rivet our attention so fully that we forget about our longer-term challenges.
Sudden new emergencies, however, should teach us the danger of being unprepared. That makes this
an ideal time to step back, reflect on what kind of “threat matrix” we will face in the future, and ask
what we can do to prevent the next explosions. For most of modern history, the principal threat to
states came from other states. State-versus-state conflict still happens, as Ukrainians can attest, but it is
increasingly rare. Today’s security threats come from “non-state actors”— supra-national forces that do
not concentrate on building regular armies, defending borders, or fighting set-piece battles. These
comprise the new challenge: Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, al-Shabab, and now the Islamic State, the
fundamentalist militia that has seized a swath of the Middle East as large as Jordan. We were slow to
recognize this latest threat, in part because it is easier to see the world through a familiar prism than
through a new one. Years or decades from now, the threats we now face will have faded. What will
replace them? Globalization and the increasing inter-dependence of nations have made territorial war
nearly obsolete. Today people fight over religion, as they have spasmodically through history, but that
phase too will pass. If wars are raging in the mid-21st century, they will probably be “resource wars” —
conflicts over access to food, water, and energy. Fighting over resources is hardly new, but wars like
these will become more common and more intense. The first reason has to do with rising standards of
living. As huge numbers of people emerge from poverty in Asia and Africa, they will want to live better,
which means consuming more. The second tectonic factor will be climate change, which may severely
disrupt networks on which humanity depends for food, water, and energy. Climate change will shape
the fate of nations. Its effects will inevitably turn some against others. From this clash arises the central
security challenge of our century: Growing demand for food, water, and energy coinciding with
shortages caused by climate change. How can we assure that, in this new world, Americans are not
dragged into “resource wars?” We could take some steps abroad, like re-imagining our food aid
programs so they help farmers in other countries rather than American agri-business and shipping firms.
The real key, though, lies at home. We — and other nations — will stand or fall according to our ability
to manage our sources of food, water, and energy. Reducing our reliance on foreign resources, and
more sustainably using those we have, are urgent security as well as environmental challenges. In the
last few years, Americans have learned that security threats now come more often from militias and
insurgents than from rival states. But it took too long for us to make that shift in mind-set. We did not
recognize the new threat until it was upon us. Now is the time to broaden our focus again and deal with
the threat that looms ahead. To imagine that resources rather than weapons will drive future conflicts
requires rethinking the nature of national security. Preparing for threats that do not seem imminent
runs counter to the American character and, perhaps, all of human psychology. Yet if we fail to address
the food-water-energy triangle now, we guarantee that our grandchildren will live in a world more
turbulent than any we have known.
Food wars cause extinction
John Castellaw 17, Teaching Fellow at the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of
Tennessee, on the National Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, former
Chief of Staff for the U.S. Central Command, Lieutenant General, Marine Corps (Ret.), 5/1/2017,
“Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security”, https://www.agri-
pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security
The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars
with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional
nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China
could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil
strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-
American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced
and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a
Food Security Strategy.¶ An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the
multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies
and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in
poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.¶ Food insecurity drives mass migration
around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring
populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic,
military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be
correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and
Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy
were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a
strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth,
broad-based development progress, and long-term stability.¶ The impact can be remarkable and far
reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to
changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from
American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture
exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.¶ Moving early to ensure stability in
strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To
combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the
entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to
prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of
instability before it occurs.¶ This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to
occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive
population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This
alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age
groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages
of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the
unemployed in Africa are young people. ¶ Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars
requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay
for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those
who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those
who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only
16% of our population. ¶ Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic
opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for
providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being.¶ Our active support for
food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years.
A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of
terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural
prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.
Pandemics risk extinction—no burnout, human transportation is reaching the tipping

point for global contagion
Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to
extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016),
http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition
Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct
leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the
hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens
die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–
7].¶ In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range
transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans,
like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2).¶ When we introduce
long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use
the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the
more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able
to survive and spread.¶ As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which
pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same
time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction
(Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such
a critical threshold.¶ In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for
pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease
that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only
because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached
population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens
will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world.¶
The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the
potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West
Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future
events.¶ A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems
stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to
increase.¶ So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out
before it happens.¶ While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of
cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped
or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities
who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated.¶ As
with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how
people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough
and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw
in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase.¶ Are people in western
countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed
networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be
“superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a
mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport
infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very
well prove unstoppable.
Global environmental collapse also causes extinction and warming doesn’t make it
inevitable
Torres, 16—affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (Phil, “Biodiversity
loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change,” http://thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-
existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329, dml)
Furthermore, there are myriad phenomena that are driving biodiversity loss in addition to climate
change. Other causes include ecosystem fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, oxygen depletion
caused by fertilizers running off into ponds and streams, overfishing, human overpopulation, and
overconsumption. All of these phenomena have a direct impact on the health of the biosphere, and all
would conceivably persist even if the problem of climate change were somehow immediately solved.
Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change, because the former has
been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect. Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental
crisis with its own unique syndrome of causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats,
creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”), and practicing sustainable agriculture.
The sixth extinction. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated
from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in
Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over
the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion
holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the
current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds,
reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone.
The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current
extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.”
Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago.
But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed
that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59
percent between 1970 and 2006.
The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the
population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing
population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of
freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying.
Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical
trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely
this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048.
Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary
tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that
scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized
ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a
2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping
point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for
civilization.
As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem
services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that
benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a
tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social
unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist
Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly
than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive.
Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will
exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors.
Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the
emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are
connected.)
The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth,
and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the
aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological
populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster
timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime.
The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As
such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most
significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
Climate refugees undergo human trafficking and other forms of unspeakable suffering
– you have an ethical obligation to vote affirmative
Gerrard 18 - Professor of Professional Practice and environmental law at Columbia Law School (Michael, “Climate Change and Human
Trafficking After the Paris Agreement”, University of Miami Law Review, Hein Online)//abaime
<People who are displaced from their homes endure extraordinary hardships in seeking a new place to
live. A total of 187,970 migrants crossed the Mediterranean into Europe in 2016, and 1,381 died in the
crossing, often on overcrowded vessels run by traffickers. 6 3 By "one estimate, at least 50,000 persons,
including thousands of children, have died in the past two decades while seeking to cross international
borders." 64 Many of those who survive the journey find themselves in refugee camps, which often have
horrible conditions. 6 5 The world's largest refugee camp is in Dadaab, Kenya; the government tried to
close the camp and repatriate about 260,000 Somali refugees, but in 2017, a court in Kenya blocked the
closure for now. 6 6 Women are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and to the
migration it can cause.67 In some of these camps, women frequently face sexual assault. The
International Organization of Migration conducts interviews of large numbers of people who have
crossed the Mediterranean into Europe. 6 9 From mid-February through May 2017, they held 2,769
interviews in Sicily and Apulia in the South of Italy, and Lombardy, Liguiria and Guilia, in the North of
Italy.Of these interviews, 79% of the interviewees answered "yes" to at least one of the four indicators
of human trafficking and other exploitative practices. In particular, 67% said they had been "held . . .
against their will during the[ir] journey[] by armed individuals or groups other than ... government
authorities"; 47% had worked without getting the expected payment; 36% were forced to work; 75%
suffered physical violence of some kind; and 0.3% were approached by someone with offers of an
arranged marriage. Human trafficking is a large phenomenon. The International Labour Office estimated
that in 2012, "20.9 million people [were] in forced labor globally" 73 -this is almost twice the number of
Africans who were forcibly taken to the Americas and Europe during the entire 350 years of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. 7 4 The vast majority were "exploited in the private economy[] by individuals or
enterprises."7 5 "Of these, 4.5 million . . . [were] victims of forced sexual exploitation, and 14.2 million ...
[were] victims of forced labor exploitation, primarily in agriculture, construction, domestic work,
manufacturing, mining and utilities."76 The same report estimated that profits from this forced labor
were $150.2 billion per year. The economics of modern slavery are much different than two centuries
ago. "An enslaved fieldworker [] cost the equivalent of [about $40,000] in 1850," but costs only about
$100 today.78 To the unscrupulous "employer," this makes them as disposable as a ballpoint pen. In the
words of Kevin Bales, [i]f slaves get ill, are injured, outlive their usefulness, or become troublesome to
the slaveholder, they are dumped-or worse. The young woman enslaved as a prostitute in Thailand is
thrown out on the street when she tests positive for HIV. The Brazilian man tricked and trapped into
slavery making charcoal is tossed out when the forest is razed and no trees are left to cut. It is well-
documented that displacement leads to a considerable increase in human trafficking. The U.N.
Environment Programme has indicated that trafficking may increase by 20-30% during disasters, and
"INTERPOL has warned that disasters or conflicts may increase the exposure of women to trafficking as
families are disrupted and livelihoods are lost."80 There are multiple instances in which trafficking has
been shown to increase in the aftermath of cyclones, flooding, earthquakes, and tsunamis, as well as
after civil and military conflict. Climate change and other forms of environmental degradation have also
been shown to lead to considerable increases in child labor83 and domestic abuse, 8 4 and contribute to
armed conflict between ethnic groups8 5 and violence over the exploitation of natural resources. 86
Corruption by officials handling international funds for refugee camps, by border crossing officials, and
others, makes matters all the worse and contributes to trafficking. Not only does environmental
degradation lead to more human exploitation-the causation has been shown to operate in the reverse
direction as well. Extremely cheap slave labor has been shown to contribute to deforestation and to
highly-polluting methods of shrimp farming, brick-making, and gold mining. Pope Francis' 2015
Encyclical Letter on the environment, Laudato Si', eloquently discussed the plight of those displaced
from their homes: There has been a tragic rise in the number of migrants seeking to flee from the
growing poverty caused by environmental degradation. They are not recognized by international
conventions as refugees; they bear the loss of the lives they have left behind, without enjoying any legal
protection whatsoever. Sadly, there is widespread indifference to such suffering, which is even now
taking place throughout our world. Our lack of response to these tragedies involving our brothers and
sisters points to the loss of that sense of responsibility for our fellow men and women upon which all
civil society is founded. 8>
1ac – Europe Advantage
Because the US won’t accept climate refugees, they are flooding the EU – the brink is
now
Miissirian and Schlenker 17 Anouch Missirian is a PhD in Sustainable Development at Columbia
University (Anouch and Wolfram, “Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations,” Science
Magazine, 12/22/17) // SR
The European Union (EU) has seen an unprecedented wave of immigration in 2015 (1) as part of a larger
surge in migration across the Mediterranean Sea that began in 2014. Many of the migrants flee war-torn
countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq, and there is an active debate as to whether a change in
climatic conditions has contributed to, and will amplify, such migration flows. For example, a 2015 study has shown that
the unrest in Syria was preceded by a record drought that led to lower agricultural yields and forced farmers to migrate to urban areas (2). Although that study does
not attribute the Syrian conflict to the drought, the authors argue that it added another stressor. These arguments have gained traction outside the academic
literature.
For instance, the Pentagon calls climate change a “threat multiplier”(3). However instead of
looking at individual countries, we take a step back and investigate the role of weather shocks in global
distressdriven migration to the EU in 2000–2014; i.e., preceding the recent crisis. Asylum applications to the EU from the 103 source
countries in our sample totaled 1.5 million in 2015; that is, more than 4 times the average in our sample. Previous studies had found a relationship between
weather variations and migration (4, 5, 6), but ours is the first to focus on distress-driven migration (as measured by asylum applications) on a global scale. Two
centuries ago, the “year without a summer” (1816), following the volcanic eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia, saw massive crop failures throughout the
Northern Hemisphere, caused by the aerosol-obscured atmosphere and unseasonal climate. It triggered sizeable migrations as peas ants deserted their fruitless
farms (7). Here
we provide quantified evidence of a similar phenomenon taking place in the present day,
whereby weather shocks on agricultural regions in 103 countries around the globe directly influence
emigration, now toward the EU. The relationship of international migration decisions to economic
situation in both the source and destination country has been extensively documented. Migration’s
response to income or wealth corresponds in an inverted U shape: Positive income shocks in the home
country enable individuals to overcome liquidity constraints and finance migration costs (8). Richer households
are not liquidity-constrained and show a negative migration-income relationship as improving conditions at home make it less desirable to leave (9). [See
supplementary text sections 1 and 2 for a more detailed review and discussion (10).] Migration barriers have been described as one of the biggest distortions in the
global economy (11). Causes of migration are not limited to the desire for better economic opportunities: humans flee persecution and war. We
investigate
how exogenous weather fluctuations affect one facet of migration: asylum applications, which equal
roughly 1 =10 of the overall migration flows over our sample frame. Our sample included the 103 non–
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) source countries that reported
asylum applications to the EU in each year between 2000 and 2014. It covered, on average, 351,000 asylum applications per
year, the majority (140,000) coming from the 31 Asian countries, including Afghanistan and Iraq, each of which supplied ~25,000 applicants. The 46 African and 11
non-EU countries in Europe accounted for ~100,000 applicants each, whereas 16 countries in the Americas accounted for the rest (tables S7 to S9). For example,
55,943 people from Serbia applied for asylum in the EU in 2000. Applications
from all source countries average 378,000 per
year—that is, our sample covered 93% of all applications to the EU. Recent research (12) suggests that,
in agricultural production areas, there should be a negative relationship between economic conditions
and conflict, which then translates into asylum applications. Our baseline regression links annual asylum applications from each
source country outside the OECD to any EU member state. We use a panel analysis with source-country and year fixed effects, which is equivalent to a joint
demeaning of all variables and accounting for common annual shocks. In other words, we link anomalies in log applications to weather anomalies once common
annual shocks are absorbed (e.g., the global financial crisis in 2008). Our specification examines whether hotter-than-normal temperatures will increase or decrease
asylum applications from a given source country. Because our dependent variable is in logs, we estimate relative impacts, which is preferable as the number of
applications differs greatly among source countries in absolute terms. We allow the effect to vary by the average weather variable: Hotter-than-usual temperatures
can reduce asylum applications for cold countries and increase them for hot countries. Our model includes both average temperature and precipitation. The
coefficients and standard errors are given in table S1. We
find a statistically significant relationship between fluctuations in
asylum applications and weather anomalies: Applications are lowest for average temperatures around
20°C and increase if the weather is too cold or too hot. We choose to focus here on the EU because it
receives the largest share of asylum application and, despite having a high rejection rate, remains a
major provider of international protection (13); other target ensembles are considered in the sensitivity checks. Colder countries
in Europe outside the EU are predicted to account for fewer asylum applications in a warming world,
whereas hotter countries, especially in Asia and Africa, are expected to see sizable increases in a warming world (tables S7 to S9). The coefficients on
temperature are displayed in Fig. 1. We show a quadratic response function (dashed brown line), as well as flexible restricted cubic splines (solid brown line). Both
use the contemporaneous average temperature in the source country, averaged over the maize growing area and season. These models correspond to columns (1a)
and (3a) of table S1, respectively. Each line gives the point estimate and is normalized so that the minimum of the response function is zero. We find a highly
significant relationship (P < 0.01 for joint significance) between logged asylum applications and average temperature over the maize growing area and season for
the 103 source countries in our sample. If we average the weather on the basis of population in a grid cell (table S2), the P value becomes 0.14 and the temperature
variables are no longer significant, which suggests that weather shocks over the agricultural area are the crucial channel. The use of different weather data sets
yields comparable results for seasonal averages (table S3). Including data on political conflicts as controls (table S4) produces important predictors of asylum
applications, but the estimated relationship with temperature only slightly weakens, suggesting that they either pick up other forms of aggression or persecution
In summary, we link
because our conflict measures are limited to certain continents and actors or that the conflict data has measurement error.
annual asylum applications received by the EU member states to average temperature over the maize
growing area and season in the source country and find a nonlinear relationship, especially for those
applications filed into the richer EU member states. Moderate temperatures around 20°C minimize asylum applications. Both colder
and hotter temperatures increase migration flows. Extrapolating those results, an increase in temperatures in source
countries is predicted to lead to an increase in asylum applications to the EU as well, following a highly
nonlinear response function. Our findings support the assessment that climate change, especially continued warming, will add another “threat
multiplier” that induces people to seek refuge abroad.
Europe overreacts and deports en masse – causes Middle East nuclear war
Kegl and Virtue ‘15
[Rob and Agnes. “Migrant crisis and Euro tensions threaten to trigger catastrophic conflict claim
experts” 9/23/15 http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607158/World-War-3-Experts-raise-fears-
migrant-crisis-could-lead-to-catastrophic-scenario //GBS-JV]
RISING tensions between central and east European countries over the escalating migrant crisis could
be the spark for a catastrophic world war, experts warned today. Both the Hungarian and Italian prime ministers have spoken of
huge dangers of unchecked floods of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East which have set
previously peacable EU nations against each other. The scenario - especially the one currently being played out in Serbia and
Hungary - is hauntingly similar to that which triggered the First World War. The problem has manifesting itself in
central Europe where Hungary is besieged by growing numbers of refugees passing through from Serbia
and Croatia, forcing its government to build fences to stem the influx. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán warned European life and its established laws
were under threat from huge numbers of people heading through the continent from war-torn states in the Middle East. In a defence against criticism of the
aggressive stance against refugees taken by the country , he said yesterday: "Our borders are in danger. Our way of life where we respect the law is in danger. "The
whole of Hungary and Europe is in danger. "The migrants are blitzing us." Hungary and Serbia have constantly been at
each others' throats over the issue, with Budapest urging its non-EU neighbours to do more to help tackle the growing neighbours
migrants. It is now sending troops armed with rubber bullets and tear gas to the border with Serbia to
protect the country's frontier. Pinter Bence, a Hungarian political journalist for the mandiner.hu website said the situation with growing tensions
between nations was reminiscent of the international scenario from just over 100 years ago. He said: " This is how the eve of the First World
War could have looked like: complete hesitancy, the termination of the usual channels of diplomacy, the
lack of solidarity, pressure to take a step and the countries issuing threats to each other are all
reminding us of that. It definitely doesn't look like a cooperating Europe. "Mr Orban is right in stating that it would only
worth to talk about quotas if we can control the registration of the migrants coming to Europe. And so far no country has any idea how to do that. "That's what the
Hungarian Government has done, though it risks projecting an image of inhumanity." He said reports of a Croatian train filled with 1,000 migrants illegally entering
Hungary last week, could easily be the sort of act that escalates the currently fraught situation. Politicians in Budapest described the train's unannounced arrival as a
"major, major incident". Mr Pinter said: "What did the Croatian government think when they sent a train with 40 fully armed police officers on it, crossing the
border at a red signal? In the worse cases an affair like this
can lead to an outbreak of a war." The escalating situation on the continent has
also drawn interest across the Atlantic Ocean. Like Mr Pinter, Gerald Celente, who is a trend forecaster in the United States, said the
current crisis
draws huge parallels with a previous global conflict - in this case the Second World War. He blames America's
attacks on Libya, Iraq and most recently Syria, for bringing "refugees of war" to Europe. Mr Celente said this
is going hand in hand with trade
wars, with China devaluing its currency to gain a global advantage, similar to what happened prior to the
Second World War. Considering the current situation in Syria, where America is bombing president Bashar al-Assad's regime while
Vladimir Putin's Russia is defending him by attacking ISIS, his warnings are all too clear. He said: "We're on the march to war.
History is repeating itself. "It's a repeat of the 1930s. The crash of 1929, the Great Depression, currency
wars, trade wars, world war. "We've got the panic of '08, the Great Recession, currency wars, trade wars and now we're seeing the refugees of war
sweeping on the shores of Europe." He said another big terror attack on society will see an emotional outpouring across
the Western world that will then transform into a catastrophic thirst for revenge. Mr Celente said: "They are
leading us to the next great war. All it is going to take is a terror attack and people will be tying yellow ribbons around everything that
doesn't move, waving American flags and we're off to what Einstein called the whole war scenario." US economist Dr Paul Craig Roberts, who served in the Reagan
administration, is another who predicts doom on the horizon. He spoke at an Occupy Peace event organised by Mr Celente at the weekend about rising tensions. Dr
Roberts remarked on the impact of a nuclear war under the currently tense climate, if countries such as Russia and China are
involved. He said the effects would be devastating, as there would be a "first-strike, pre-emptive force". He
added: "Armageddon could be at hand. "This is chilling. People should be scared to death." Running alongside the rising
tension between global superpowers is the threat emanating from Islamic State. Just weeks ago Italian prime minister Sergio Mattarella said the seeds of
a major conflict were being planted across the region, with religious-based terrorism at the root of it.
Speaking at a meeting of world leaders in Rimini, he said: "Terrorism, energised by a fanatical belief in God, aims to start a third world war in the Mediterranean, the
Middle East and Africa. Our duty is to stop it. "It is our responsibility to defuse the threat, because peace in the world will depend on the ability of the monotheistic
religions to talk with each other and to understand each other." He called for "intelligence" in dealing with migration to help tackle radicalism. But he also
called for refugees to be welcomed in Europe, which is at odds with many across continent, who fear ISIS is looking to exploit the migrant
crisis by sneaking jihadis into Europe with them.
Continued unsustainable refugee flows crater the European economy

Poddar, '16 – Researcher in economic policy working in collaboration with Derek Newberry (Professor
at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) (Shubham, "," The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, 2016,
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=
1&article=1046&context=sire)//SB
The general economic concerns among European nations are that the addition of large number of
refugees will weaken the economies by increasing unemployment, overloading the public budgets and
straining the infrastructural capacity. Even though the discussion on debt crisis has shifted to the
background due to the increasing emphasis on the refugee crisis, nations have neither escaped nor
recovered completely from the debt crisis and fear that the refugee crisis will add to their preexisting
economic problems.
Economic sustainability is an important issue for European nations whose economies are struggling with
the debt crisis (Dullien 2016). For example, Greece plays an important role in the refugee crisis as it is
one of the primary gateways to Europe from the Middle East. At the same time, Greece is struggling to
adhere to the demands of its bailout package as the government’s focus is on coping with the refugee
crisis and hence reforms are not being implemented. In order to assist Greece in managing the situation
and providing it with partial relief from its debt burden, loan packages have been extended by other
European nations as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such financial assistance only seems
to further delay Greece’s debt problems rather than solving them as its economy continues to be
stagnant and reform implementation remains slow.
In the process of accepting and integrating the refugees, the fiscal costs come before the fiscal benefits
for the host countries. Governments have to pay a significant amount of expenses related to receiving
the refugees, processing their application, providing them housing and meals, teaching them the
national language, identifying their skills and finally integrating them in the labor market. There are
additional costs related to processing asylum claims and then enforcing migrants who do not qualify for
asylum to return. The first-year cost of processing and including a refugee in the society can range from
€8000 to €12000 per application (Kern 2015). Based on 2015 figures, the IMF estimated that the cost of
refugee influx in EU will be approximately 0.1 percent to 0.2 percent of the European GDP (OECD
Migration Policy Debates 2015). However, this is a lower end estimate as it does not account for large
number of refugees that entered EU in 2016 and excludes the future expected expenses related to
training programs and integration initiatives. Given a total of 3.5 million refugees, the estimate for
actual expenses amount to nearly 0.5 percent of the European GDP (Dullien 2016). In view of the
economic instability due to Brexit and global financial downturn, rising number of Europeans feel that
this additional expenditure of tax payers’ money on migrants will put further stress on the already
strained economies (Kent 2015).
One other major claim by a section of the European population is that refugees would take away
employment opportunities from European people and hence create a wave of poverty. In a survey
conducted of 11,000 people across EU, 82 percent of the people from Hungary, 72 percent from Greece,
46 percent from United Kingdom and 31 percent from Germany claimed that the refugees would be a
burden on their economies as they would take away their jobs and social security benefits (Wike, Stokes
and Simmons 2016). Some Europeans have also raised concerns about the potential drop in wages due
to the increased labor supply in the market when the refugees get the right to work. If Europeans focus
on such notions of labor insecurity and prejudice, it would result in unhealthy competition between the
native population and refugees, making their integration in society even more difficult.
The response of the EU members to the refugee crisis has also been uncoordinated. While some nations
are being overburdened by the costs of the crisis, others are contributing relatively less due to the ad
hoc nature of the approach. Studies have suggested that the most practical way of combating the crisis
situation is by distributing the burden among all EU member states based on their economic capacities
(Lehne 2016). However, the European Commission has been unable to achieve this due to lack of
consensus among nations as a result of domestic political reasons. The two primary organizations that
should be managing the refugee crisis are Frontex, which is responsible for border control, and the
European Asylum Support Office. Both do not have considerable authority or funds to play a significant
role in this crisis situation (Nardelli 2015). There is also no substantial legal framework for dealing with
such large-scale migration and hence each member state prefers to maintain their autonomy in this
issue.
Nuclear war
Wright 12, Thomas, fellow with the Managing Global Order at the Brookings Institution, Summer
2012, “What if Europe Fails?” The Washington Quarterly,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf, Accessed 7/25/14
Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little
analysis of what the end of European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world.
This article does not predict that failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical
implications if it does. The severity and trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a
high-impact event with a non-trivial probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious
analysis. Failure is widely seen as an imminent danger.¶ Would the failure of the Euro really mean
the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe? Could the global economy survive without a
vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like after the end of European
integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the
international order has been primarily a Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would
the disintegration of the European Union or the Eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on
world politics in the coming decade?¶ Thinking through and prioritizing the consequences of a failed
Europe yield five of the utmost importance. First, the most immediate casualty of the failure of the
European project would be the global economy. A disorderly collapse (as opposed to an orderly
failure, which will be explained shortly) would probably trigger a new depression and could lead to
the unraveling of economic integration as countries introduce protectionist measures to limit
the contagion effects of a collapse. Bare survival would drag down Europe’s economy and would
generate increasing and dangerous levels of volatility in the international economic order.¶
Second, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis depend not just on the severity of the crisis
but also the geopolitical climate in which it occurs. Europe’s geopolitical climate is as healthy as can
be reasonably expected. This would prevent a simple repeat of the 1930s in Europe, which has been
one of the more alarming predictions from some observers, although certain new and fragile
democracies in Europe might come under pressure.¶ Third, failure would cement Germany’s rise
as the leading country in Europe and as an indispensable hub in the European Union and
Eurozone, if they continue to exist, but anti-Germanism would become a more potent force in
politics on the European periphery.¶ Fourth, economic downturn as a result of disintegration would
undermine political authority in those parts of the world where the legitimacy of governments is
shallow, and it would exacerbate international tensions where the geopolitical climate is
relatively malign. The places most at risk are the Middle East and China.¶ Fifth, disintegration
would weaken Europe on the world stage–it would severely damage the transatlantic alliance,
both by sapping its resources and by diverting Europe’s attention to its internal crisis–and would,
finally, undermine the multilateral order.¶ Taking these five implications in their totality, one thing is
clear. Failure will badly damage Europe and the international order, but some types of failure–
most notably a disorderly collapse–are worse than others. Currently, the pain is concentrated on the so-
called European periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland). Disorderly collapse would
affect all European countries, as well as North America and East Asia. If a solution to the Eurocrisis
is perceived as beyond reach, leaders of the major powers will shift their priorities to managing failure in
order to contain its effects. This will be strenuously resisted on the periphery, which is already
experiencing extremely high levels of pain and does not want to accept the permanence of the status
quo. Consequently, their electorates will become more risk-acceptant and will pressure Germany
and other core member states to accommodate them through financial transfers and assistance in
exchange for not deliberately triggering a break-up. This bitter split will divide and largely define a
failing Europe. Absent movement toward a solution, EU politics is about to take an ugly turn.
Also, populism is on the brink of taking over Europe -- Now is key to solve
Anderson 18 - deputy director for advisory with Oxford Analytica and writer/political risk consultant for Arab News (Kelly, “Populism’s
rise is bad news for the global system”, 11 March 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1263896)//abaime
<Europe and the US are experiencing a massive anti-establishment wave, which is mostly taking the
form of populist political movements. In Europe, populist movements in Hungary, Serbia, Austria,
Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands
and Sweden have all gained momentum in recent years, with varying degrees of success. In the US,
Donald Trump campaigned on a strong populist message, and his recent decision to impose new tariffs
on steel and aluminum imports demonstrates his populist and anti-globalist tendencies.
In 2018, it is less clear if populism has extensive appeal beyond the West, though it has historically
played a strong role in Latin American politics. However, there are some indications that it matters
today in other parts of the world, too. For example, some experts have suggested that Japan, India and
the Philippines are experiencing populist trends.
While there are multiple definitions of populism, typically it takes the form of a leader claiming to
represent “the people” against a corrupt and unrepresentative elite. There are multiple problems with
this, including big questions about exactly who “the people” the leader claims to represent are.
Nonetheless, populism’s siren song can feel magnetic in societies where many people feel left out or are
generally fed up with the current form of governance and economics. If you mix in significant
demographic change and fears about the loss of group identity, as is happening today in Europe and the
US, populism can be a potent potion.
Today, many Europeans and Americans are generally disenchanted with their governing and economic
systems, so the populist message of tearing it down and creating something new is appealing. The
problem is that people within the US and European countries are deeply divided about what they want
to replace their current systems with. This makes fixing the system or building a new, better functioning
one difficult and can be a recipe for ongoing political and economic instability.
Deep divisions within a society also provide fuel for populists, who often are good at drawing supporters
from different ideological or political groups. As Sam Wilkin, author of the forthcoming book “History
Repeating: Why Populists Rise and Governments Fall,” recently wrote, populists’ focus on railing against
the system allows them to “pick up support from people with very different views on politics and
policy.”
To put the populist wave in perspective, they are not fully taking over Europe, let alone the world. In
France in 2017, far-right populists gained a lot of momentum but then easily lost to centrist Emmanuel
Macron; importantly, Macron and his new party offered voters a non-populist alternative to the
traditional mainstream parties. Also in 2017, centrists in the Netherlands easily defeated the far-right
party of Geert Wilders in elections. In close 2016 Austrian presidential elections, an independent won
over a far-right candidate, but then the far-right party did very well in 2017 parliamentary elections.
Despite some losses for populists, they are clearly doing well politically in the West today.
Dissatisfaction with economic opportunities, fear of demographic change (especially immigration in the
US and the migrant crisis of recent years in Europe), and a sense that power is seeping out of the West
into the rest of the world and challenging traditional European and American identities are all
contributing to the appeal of populism. None of these drivers are likely to change, and the electoral
success of populism might prompt other politicians to try the same approach. With ebbs and flows,
populism is going to be a major trend for years.
This will pose major challenges to the future of the EU, but beyond that it also will pose challenges for
the continuation of the post-Second World War system and economic and political globalization. If the
major powers and economies that created the system and still drive much of it start turning their backs
on global trade, migration and the institutions that underpin the global system, it will be in serious
trouble.
That is bad news for the countries that built the system and bad news for the emerging powers and
economies that have learned how to benefit from it. However, it might provide incentives for those who
benefit from the modern global system to find ways to counter populism.>
Otherwise, populism carves up NATO

Schrank ‘18
[Phil. Phillip Gary Schrank is an instructor at Korea Military Academy. He is also a doctoral candidate at
Korea University’s Graduate School of International Studies. “The Rise of Populism and the Future of
NATO.” Global Politics Review, Vol 3 N2. 2018 pdf//jv]
There are some who believe that NATO must transform itself in order to stay relevant. This would not be
the first time NATO has been reinvented. After the end of the Cold War, many called for NATO to be
dissolved. The West had won. The old nemesis Soviet Union had ceased to exist. What purpose did
NATO have if they didn’t have an enemy to fight against? A quick scan of the NATO website will present
how NATO has transformed since the Cold War. It has expanded to as far east as Turkey and even has
strategic partners such as South Korea and Japan far from its physical base. NATO’s missions have
moved from border states to completely outside of Europe. It can be argued that NATO has over-
extended itself and expanded its role to areas outside its sphere of influence. This has diluted its core
mission of securing North Atlantic countries. The rise of populism in Europe and the United States has
led some to question the role of NATO in Europe. Marine Le Pen pushed for “French independence.”
She feels the previous ruling parties have failed to put France first and instead have put Europe first. In
the interview conducted by Foreign Affairs she questioned the assumption that the EU has helped bring
peace to Europe. Instead she argued that peace brought on the EU. When talking about potential French
isolation, Le Pen talks about French history of withdrawing from NATO; Le Pen recounts how General de
Gaulle pulled France from NATO and she feels the debate now is similar to what it was in 1966. 11
Donald Trump had campaigned on questioning the US role in NATO. The heart of the issue was countries
paying their fair share into NATO operations. He implied that US involvement in protecting NATO
countries would be conditional on those countries paying their obligations. 12 However, Trump recently
declared that the US would honor Article Five of NATO and unequivocally protect fellow member states.
It is this ambiguous policy position that has Europe worried about the resolve of the US in times of
trouble. One of the major issues in this era of populism is that each country is more likely to focus on its
own security issues. In Europe, Southern European countries along the Mediterranean will see the
threat coming from North Africa and the Middle East whereas Eastern European countries view Russia
as a threat. 13 According to Galeotti, many citizens of Europe view security threats as a country specific
problem.
NATO collapse causes extinction via Russia nuclear launch

Marriott ‘18
[Daniel. Foreign Policy Researcher at the UK Defense Journal. “An Essential Alliance: NATO and the
Nuclear Sharing Bond.” Feb 2018, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/essential-alliance-nato-nuclear-
sharing-bond/ //GBS-JV]
On the surface, NATO Nuclear Sharing arrangements play a negligible role in the nuclear security of the independently nuclear armed United
Kingdom but there’s more to it. At first glimpse the programme is designed to offer extended deterrence to non-
nuclear armed Alliance members, with the UK seemingly able to ensure its own nuclear security through its unilateral Trident system. But Nuclear
Sharing plays a key role in the security of the entire Alliance, including the UK. The programme involves the
United States stationing tactical nuclear weapons (specifically air-delivered gravity bombs) in the territory of various non-
nuclear armed European allies which are responsible for delivering the weapons in the event of their
hypothetical use. Of interest though is that despite the maintenance of an independent British nuclear deterrent, the Nuclear Sharing programme has been essential for British
nuclear security since the sweeping reforms to Western nuclear weapons postures after the end of the Cold War. In 1999 NATO unveiled a new Strategic Concept which exclaimed that
“[the Alliance]’s ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or… to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved”. In line with this new confidence after
the demise of the USSR, the Alliance implemented radical changes to its nuclear policy. Overall nuclear stocks both strategic and tactical were dramatically reduced. All US and UK nuclear
artillery and surface based tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the European continent, leaving the US air-delivered gravity bombs as part of Nuclear Sharing arrangements as the
only remaining tactical nuclear presence under NATO auspices. As part of this, the UK decommissioned all surface-vessel and air launched
weapons – effectively yielding its nuclear triad. It is because of this British withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons after the
end of the Cold War that Nuclear Sharing has become so important to not just wider European nuclear security but also
British nuclear security. Although British Trident missiles are capable of carrying small-yield warheads, the system remains nonetheless a principally
strategic one and the number of warheads with a yield which could be considered sub-strategic is
believed to be very low. It is this lack of a real tactical element to the British nuclear deterrent which
makes Nuclear Sharing so important to British security. The British reliance on NATO Nuclear Sharing arrangements is evident when one considers the decision
making policy makers and those with their fingers on the button would be faced with in the event of a potential nuclear exchange. Owing to the assurance of
mutual destruction and thus the total irrationality of a strategic retaliatory strike against a nuclear
armed aggressor which possesses a second-strike capability, any hypothetical use or threat to use
nuclear weapons first by NATO to respond to or deter a non-nuclear attack would plausibly be limited to
a tactical strike. This means that the retention of tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore by default NATO
Nuclear Sharing, is key to the maintenance of credibility to NATO nuclear deterrence and in turn to British nuclear
security. This has been true since the widespread withdrawal of NATO (specifically British) artillery and land based tactical nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, with Nuclear Sharing
Nuclear Sharing exists and will continue to be

arrangements maintaining the only NATO tactical nuclear presence in Europe. Essentially,
necessary so long as the Alliance retains the right to First Use and a de facto posture of Flexible
Response. But even if the Alliance and its nuclear members like Britain were to adopt a No First Use policy, Nuclear Sharing arrangements would likely continue or at the very least
some other form of tactical nuclear deterrence in Europe would be necessary to maintain European and British nuclear
security. This is because tactical weapons are logically not only necessary to ensure that ambiguous
threats of First Use are a credible deterrent to conventional invasion, but are also required to maintain a
credible deterrent to nuclear attack. Strategic weapons alone cannot conceivably be a credible
deterrent to a nuclear attack. If the Alliance unilaterally disarmed itself of all tactical weapons, it would possess less
means to credibly respond to and thus deter in the first place a tactical nuclear attack, as it is not
credible that the Alliance or any actor would respond to a tactical strike with a weapon of strategic yield,
thus escalating a conflict. As long as the Russian Federation possesses tactical nuclear weapons, it is
only logical to assume that NATO should retain its own tactical weapons, in this case in the form of Nuclear Sharing, lest the
Alliance be perceived to be self-deterred by the prospect of initiating a full scale strategic nuclear
exchange. Essentially, a programme of tactical weapons in the form of Nuclear Sharing or similar can (and likely would) remain even if NATO or its individual members embraced NFU,
but First Use ambiguity cannot exist credibly without tactical weapons. David S. Yost has addressed and convincingly criticised arguments that extended nuclear deterrence could potentially be
provided by the UK and France without the need for US tactical weapons provided by Nuclear Sharing, highlighting the fact that British and French nuclear arms are not sufficient in size to
provide the psychological comfort necessary to placate the concerns of non-nuclear allies. But in terms of real nuclear security, what is particularly important to bear in mind here is the
composition of, and the role played by, the nuclear weapons programmes of these two European nuclear powers. Although it is possible that British Trident missiles are capable of carrying
small-yield warheads, the system remains nonetheless a principally strategic one. This is significant when considering the aforementioned point on the necessity of arms of both a tactical and
strategic yield in providing credibility to not only the ambiguity of nuclear First Use deterrence but to nuclear deterrence in general. In regards to France, Paris’ continued operation of an
independent deterrent outside NATO auspices and its refusal to fully partake in the decision making processes of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group would no doubt not only cause non-nuclear
allies to question France’s commitment to Alliance wide extended deterrence should it assume such a responsibility, but would also hamper the credibility of the wider Alliance’s deterrent. Of
course hypothetically if NATO embraced a policy of No First Use and Russia agreed to totally disarm itself of tactical nuclear weapons (of which it possesses a far higher number than NATO) in
a reductions agreement then the need for Nuclear Sharing to underpin the credibility of general nuclear deterrence would abate and the withdrawal of US weapons from Europe would be
the central role Nuclear Sharing plays in providing credibility and utility to nuclear First Use
possible. But
ambiguity means that for as long as the Alliance (or at the very least certain members within it) believes that nuclear weapons
hold deterrent value to non-nuclear attack, and as long as Moscow sustains its retention of vast tactical
nuclear weapons stocks, such an event is unlikely and Nuclear Sharing will continue to play a central role in Europe’s
and indeed Britain’s nuclear security.
1ac – Solvency
Plan: the United States federal government should determine that environmentally-
displaced persons constitute ‘refugees’ as defined by the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965.
Enacting legislation that affords climate migrants the same rights as other refugee
categories solves the aff but doesn’t result in uncontrollable immigration flows
DeGenaro 15 Carey DeGenaro is the Attorney Advisor at Executive Office for Immigration Review
(Carey, “LOOKING INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND BEYOND,” University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 86, HeinOnline) // SR
The United States should enact domestic legislation that creates a legal status unique to climate
migrants for several reasons. In order to understand why this country must establish legal protection for
climate migrants, it is helpful to first examine who climate migrants are and the United States' role in
their displacement. Section A identifies who these climate migrants are and ultimately concludes that,
based on current migration trends and future predictions, the United States will soon face an
unprecedented influx of people displaced by climate change. 2 1 Section B posits that the United States
is obligated to address this large population. It explains that the United States' actions directly
contribute to climate change. This contribution, combined with the potential influx of climate migrants,
requires the United States to enact legislation that protects climate migrants. A. Facing the Realities of
Climate Change-Induced Migration The practical implications of climate-induced migration justify
enacting legislation to address the climate migrant dilemma. A massive influx of climate migrants into
the United States is perhaps the most obvious consequence. Examining current international migration
flows substantiates this probability, since these flows are the best indicia of future climate change-
related migration. 22 Whether or not the United States is prepared, it will experience increased
immigration rates as climate change displaces people around the globe. This should encourage the
government to consider how to address these new populations. This section demonstrates the potential
consequences of ignoring climate migrants, who will soon arrive in large numbers. Subsection 1
discusses various estimates of current and future climate change-induced migration rates. Subsection 2
then examines which populations commonly migrate to the United States and considers what this might
mean for the country as climate conditions in those regions worsen. Ultimately, the predictions of the
enormous number of climate migrants that may arrive in the United States should alarm legislators; the
undocumented population will swell and the country will have a large population of immigrants that it is
unprepared to accommodate or integrate into Amercian society. 1. The Numbers at a Glance The
estimates of how many people have already been displaced by climate change-and how many will be
displaced in the near future-vary. Some individuals and populations will strongly prefer to relocate
within the borders of their home countries. 23 Others will be unable to afford the costs of moving
internationally. 24 Thus, numerical estimates of climate migrants in the coming years are highly
uncertain. In making these estimates, scholars must take into account the adaptive capacities of
affected nations, 25 the possibility that climate change may occur more rapidly or slowly than
predicted,26 and the fact that so far there is no settled definition for climate migrants. 27 In 2007,
researchers Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas reviewed various estimates, including one prediction that
sea-level rise and drought will create 212 million climate migrants by 2050.28 Some scholars suggest
that this estimate is excessively high. 29 To sum up the wide range of estimates, the International
Organization for Migration reports that the numbers range from 25 million to 1 billion by 2050.30 Even
without an exact figure, the impacts of climate change on human migration are no longer merely
theoretical. Indeed, in recent years the effects of climate change have forced more and more people to
permanently relocate from their homes with no real hope of return. 31 The island nation of Tuvalu, for
example, has already lost large portions of its coastline and six of its atolls due to sea-level rise. 32
Tuvalu has initiated a series of high profile negotiations with New Zealand and Australia to create a
resettlement regime for its population in the event of complete inundation. 33 Other nations have not
approached the prospect of losing their land so directly. In those nations, lack of clean water, drought,
political turmoil, and loss of livelihood (for example, through loss or substantial degradation of arable
land) have caused those who can afford it to leave their homes in search of a more stable livelihood. 34
Therefore, it is clear that climate change is already forcing people out of their homes, and nations are
already considering how to address climate change-related, large-scale relocation. To extend the
appropriate protections while maintaining political feasibility, legal designation of climate migrants in
the United States must have certain key elements. 277 Any domestic legislation that seeks to address
climate migrants should establish a hybrid legal status that is based on asylum, conditional lawful status
as a stateless person, and TPS. This Comment proposes the following guidelines for legislation to address climate migrants: Congress's first
step should be to explicitly define "climate migrant," rather than to require climate migrants to be able
to demonstrate that they are no longer considered a national of any state. Next, it should eliminate the
discretionary nature of the applicable legal status. While this leaves room for substantial political
criticism, setting stringent requirements on who qualifies for this relief may help mitigate concerns of
excessive immigration rates. Finally, legislation addressing climate migrants must be available to
individuals that reside outside the United States. This Part concludes by offering an alternative proposal that contains these elements.
1. Narrowly Tailored Definition Policymakers in the United States can draw a definition for climate migrants from
the current discourse in international law. Since passing legislation to address climate migrants in the United States will be politically
challenging, any definition for climate migrants should be narrow in scope to respond to concerns that
creating legal status for this population would invite a flood of immigration. In considering issues of political feasibility,
Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas propose a narrowly tailored definition of climate migrants.278 They would define 'climate refugees' as
people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or
gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate
change: sealevel rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."279 This definition limits
legal relief to climate migrants fleeing only particular types of climate changeinduced natural disasters.
It also limits legal relief to those whose natural environment becomes so degraded that they have to
leave. Thus, it would not cover populations fleeing political or economic turmoil, nor would it cover people
who could remain in their own countries but choose not to. Adopting this definition, with some adjustments
for domestic implementation, offers a sufficiently narrow basis for reform. The definition proposed above is superior to
Senator Schatz's definition for several reasons. Senator Schatz's amendment similarly limited the element of causation in his definition of climate migrants, although
his definition was slightly more restrictive. 280 His amendment would have extended relief only to those whose states had been rendered completely uninhabitable
due to sea-level rise, or other environmental causes. 281 Limiting the definition as Senator Schatz proposed would necessarily have excluded many climate
migrants, although it would have covered those most in need of some legal status in a country that is not their own. Senator Schatz's proposal, however, would not
have included those climate migrants in need of temporary relocation. 282 If the definition were limited to only permanent climate migrants, then those who could
not convince the United States government that they were here to stay would be unreasonably excluded and might attempt to enter the country illegally. There are
at least two major challenges with adopting Biermann and Boas's definition. First, it may be difficult for individuals to prove that they meet the definition's
requirements. As with refugee status, relief may be granted or denied based solely on the whims of the official who reviews the application.283 However, many
forms of immigration relief under the INA mirror this procedure. 284 The system addresses this potential problem by creating a strict set of criteria for each form of
relief, and this approach could work for climate migrant legislation as well. The legislature could adopt Biermann and Boas's definition of climate migrant but define
each element in detail via law or regulation. If
the requirements are clear and strict, individual officials have less
discretion to act arbitrarily or out of bias. Creating a strict set of criteria would also solve the second
challenge. Some will argue that this definition is too expansive, and therefore that it is both unclear and not politically feasible. However, if the
legislation explicitly lists the definition's requirements, as the INA does with the requirements of refugee
status,285 this relief for climate migrants will be limited and clear. It will address the needs of climate
migrants while simultaneously addressing political concerns. 2. Mandatory Application If a climate migrant
meets her burden of proving she satisfies the required elements, the determination of her legal status
should be mandatory rather than discretionary. As with Senator Schatz's proposed legislation, an applicant for relief as a climate migrant
would still bear the burden of proving that she meets the statutory definition. However, once she does so, the DHS Secretary would
be required to grant lawful status on that basis. The Secretary should also be authorized to issue a
blanket grant of lawful status to climate migrants who are affected by a particular climate event. For
example, if sea-level rise rendered an island nation entirely uninhabitable, the Secretary could grant
lawful status to all island inhabitants as opposed to adjudicating each individual's application on a
caseby-case basis. Many critics will claim this protection goes too far, and that the Secretary should have
the authority to grant or deny relief at her discretion. This Comment acknowledges this political
difficulty; however, the provision would lose much of its value and force if relief for climate migrants
were discretionary. As with setting clear standards in implementing the definition of "climate migrant," making relief mandatory
would reduce the risk that individual officers could grant or deny relief without justification. To make
the mandatory nature of the legislation more politically palatable, however, the narrowly tailored
definition would sufficiently limit the number of people that would qualify for relief. 3. Complete Refugee Rights
As discussed above, it is also necessary for any proposal to explicitly grant the climate migrants all the
legal rights of refugees, including the right to work and the right to travel freely both within and outside
of the country.28 6 None of the existing forms of relief in immigration law extend such comprehensive rights to individuals who do not qualify as refugees
under the INA. However, climate migrants and refugees are similarly situated due to the difficulty for
individuals from either group to return to their home country. The creation of an entirely new legal
classification for this class of people would allow policymakers to tailor legislation to climate migrants'
unique circumstances and still provide the maximum amount of protection.28 7 Such a step is necessary
to integrate climate migrants into the United States. Ensuring that domestic climate migrant legislation
includes these key elements will help to prevent both illegal entry and the creation of second-class
citizens. 288 It provides a path to integration that will maximize the benefits to both the United States
and the incoming climate migrant populations. 289 Finally, it will decrease uncertainty for both climate
migrants and government officials, ensuring a smooth transition and minimizing political turmoil. Thus,
legislation that creates legal status for climate migrants should take the form of a new mechanism under
United States immigration law that would be a hybrid of existing protections for immigrants in dire
circumstances.
Only the United States can solve –we have the space and economic flexibility
Werz and Conley 12 Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress (Michael
and Laura, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict,” Center for American Progress, January 2012,
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/01/pdf/climate_migration.pdf) //
SR
The United States is today one of the few global powers capable and willing to act in the common
interest. In absolute terms the United States has never been more influential. Its defense spending is
unequalled by the next 20 countries combined. It spends the largest sum of official foreign-development
assistance, exceeding the total spending of the next two nations, France and Germany.73 And it sustains
the world’s most robust and ubiquitous diplomatic presence, boasting almost 12,000 Foreign Service
officers and over 260 diplomatic missions. The United States remains the world’s dominant economy,
too, with the world’s largest gross domestic product (the broadest measure of economic growth), of
more than $14 trillion—roughly three times that of China, the second largest. The United States also
attracts the largest flow of foreign direct investment, at more than $2.5 billion a year compared to half
that in France or the United Kingdom. Finally, the United States possesses the most sought-after
universities, drawing the best and brightest from around the globe.74 Yet the emergence of new and
significant regional powers around the world is altering the relative influence of the United States. This
so-called “rise of the rest” has prompted the United States to review its current capabilities and the way
it interacts with both the developed and developing world. What’s more, the global challenges are so
many and so complex that a new division of labor is necessary, especially when it comes to long-term
economic and social development that is effective and sustainable. The Obama administration is seeking
to transform U.S. global engagement to meet these new challenges in the 21st century. In early 2010
the administration released the congressionally mandated National Security Strategy75 and the Defense
Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review.76 Together, these texts begin to outline the emerging
strategic environment that the United States faces—the growing role of emerging countries and the
further diffusion of global political, economic, and military power. The two reports are complemented
by the administration’s first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,77 as well as by the
Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, which look to add cohesion to the proliferation of
government agencies that are involved in U.S. foreign and national security policy. All four of these
reviews acknowledge climate change as a major factor in planning global development and security
strategies. To meet this challenge the United States needs to provide a new brand of integrated 21st
century foreign, development, and security strategy in cooperation with partners around the world. The
Presidential Policy Directive is a first step in this direction. President Barack Obama noted in a speech to
the United Nations shortly after the directive was completed that this new policy is built on the ideas
that “dignity is a human right and global development is in our common interest.”78 While President
Bush placed increased emphasis on development, President Obama’s speech marked the first time that
the importance of global development was framed as a primary interest within the larger security
environment by a U.S. president. The climate, migration, and conflict nexus is one challenge that will
create both questions and opportunities for U.S. policymakers learning to navigate this new
environment. How they choose to address it will certainly have broader implications for the 21st
century strategic environment, and the ongoing institutional debate in Washington will define the tools
and resources available to policymakers confronting these issues. Europe’s role in global-capacity
development Europe finds itself in a particularly challenging position. Rising migration from Africa—
much of it illegal—is now a contentious domestic policy issue across the European Union and among
nations outside the European Union, such as Norway. The European Union has responded to this
increasing migration from Africa by partnering with the African Union (an association of 54 African
states to strengthen political and socio-economic integration) to enhance safety at sea and formalize
migration routes. The focus on better migratory coordination with the African Union is intended to
reduce illegal immigration while creating a strong system of integration and remittances. Yet these two
very unequal regional organizations have not made any serious efforts to tackle climate change,
migration, and conflict challenges on a region-to-region level. At the bilateral level, however, there is
more concrete action. For some time, the European Union has delegated the management of refugee
issues to countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. This policy, however, will not hold in
the long run and has already forced difficult compromises with regard to human-rights issues. Take
Spain: Although “irregular” African migrants (those who do not enter the country through legal
channels) began arriving in Spain in 1994, public perception and policy debates changed after a larger
number of boat refugees arrived in 2007. The Spanish government signed an agreement with a number
of nations to deter illegal migration, sent officials of its Interior Ministry to African countries, and began
establishing Spanish Consulates in sub-Saharan Africa at the same time. Currently, liaison Officers of the
Spanish Guardia Civil are cooperating with local police to discourage migrants from leaving via Senegal,
Guinea, Mali, Mauretania, or Cape Verdes. More progressive policies are now being tried as well. Spain
grants temporary working permits in small numbers (3,000 per year in the case of Senegal) for countries
that accept repatriation of illegal immigrants in turn. Another pilot project that began in 2007 included
the establishment of Spanish-run vocational schools in African countries so that younger potential
migrants would stay home.79 Belgium, Italy, and Spain—under the auspices of the European Union—
also partner with the Public Employment Services of Morocco, Tunisia, Benin, Cameroon, Mali, and
Senegal to offer vocational training which matches the labor needs of the region’s economies and to
provide migrants with alternative destinations.80 But these steps alone will not resolve the migratory
pressures on Europe. Javier Solana, the European Union’s former High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, points out that climate change threatens the entire multilateral system of
the international community. He went further to say, “the effects of climate change would promote a
policy of resentments between all those who are responsible for climate change and those who are its
worst victims.”81 This was a fairly transparent warning that climate migration might convert the
Mediterranean into a flashpoint between Europe and Africa. Despite the difficulties of aligning the
diverse interests of its member states into a broader regional approach, the European Union has taken
steps toward addressing the nexus of climate, migration, and security in the Mediterranean basin
affecting its planning and implementation of development assistance to northwest Africa. One of the
measures is the European Investment Bank’s regional focus on the Mediterranean Neighborhood,
meant to integrate EIB services to the region. A prime example is the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean
Investment and Partnership, or FEMIP, which allocates financing and technical help to projects designed
to promote sustainable economic growth in the nations of the basin. This allocation of financing has
been accompanied by a promising change in rhetoric and a process of institutional reform within the
European Union, with the establishment of bodies integrating environmental and migration concerns
with the process of development assistance and financing. The EIB’s 2009 establishment of the Marseille
Center for Mediterranean Integration, or MCMI, offers an example of these nascent changes. At the
opening, Christian Masset, general director of Globalization, Development and Partnerships for the
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs outlined the MCMI’s mission with an eye towards this
process: In the Mediterranean Basin, one of the most populated and arid regions, we need to look
together for the means to preserve the common space and public goods we are sharing in order to
ensure sustainability for the population of the region. This is indeed what the MCMI aims at, and the
meaning we seek to convey concerning ‘the Mediterranean integration.’82 The realization of the
region’s interdependence—and its shared environmental concerns—is an important step which,
accompanied by projects to promote sustainable development and increase employment in migrants’
countries of origin, represents the opening attempt to tackle the problems posed by the nexus of
climate, migration, and security. But there is undoubtedly a long way to go in integrating diverse
institutional bodies, fully appreciating the interplay of climate change with migration and security issues,
interfacing with other regional institutions, and expanding scope to other regions.
Affirmative
Solvency & Plans
Ext. Climate Refugees Coming Now
Rising sea-level, desertification, and water scarcity is displacing millions around the
world and will displace 17% of the global population by 2050
Mastor et al. 18- Roxana A. Mastor is a Senior Fellow on International Climate and Energy Law and Mackenzie
L. Landa and Emily Duff are former Research Associates with the Institute for Energy and the Environment (IEE) at
Vermont Law School. Currently Roxana A.Mastor works as a Programme Manager for Climate Strategies in London,
while Mackenzie L. Landa is a United States Congressional Aide, and Emily Duff is a State Policy Associate at Ceres.
Michael H. Dworkin is a professor at Vermont Law School, the Founder and former Director of the IEE, and former
Chairman of the Vermont Public Service Board. The IEE is a national and world energy policy resource with an
advanced energy law and policy curriculum focused on the energy policy of the future, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND
CLIMATE-REFUGEES”, THE ENERGY BAR ASSOCIATION, May 2nd 2018, 144-147, http://www.eba-
net.org/assets/1/6/Duff_Dworkin_Landa__Mastor_FINAL_(2).pdf, // Suraj P
The 2008 United Nations Human Development Report recognized climate change as the “defining
human development issue of our generation” and the IPCC Working Group II, in its fifth assessment
report in 2014, explicitly recognized that “[c]limate change over the 21st century is projected to increase
displacement of people.”16 Current data is already giving clear indications of this future.17 The climate
is projected to continue to warm.18 Although the international community is attempting to reduce
emissions and limit the level of global warming, “[a] certain amount of continued warming of the planet
is projected to occur . . . even if all emissions from human activities suddenly stopped.”19 As the planet
continues to warm, “new frameworks of law and ethics will be needed to govern our relationship to the
natural world and to each other.”20 Human displacement induced by climate change can be seen as a
response to two effects: climate processes and climate events. “Climate processes” take the form of
“slow-onset” events “such as sea-level rise, desertification, and growing water scarcity.”21 “Climate
events,” in contrast, are effects of climate change that are sudden, abrupt, natural disasters such as
storms, floods, forest fires, and droughts.22 Although some natural disasters occur regardless of climate
change, many natural disasters such as tropical cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts, and severe
storms are exacerbated by climate change and will increase in frequency and severity as the climate
warms.23 This distinction is real, but should not be perceived as contradicting the permanent character
of climate change and the permanent status of climate-refugees. This is because although some climate-
refugees may be sent back to their home country by the host nation, once the imminent threat has
passed, there will continue to be the possibility that they will once again be forced to flee their home
country.24 Thus, under either category, “climate change is a permanent phenomenon.”25 Although the
world is pushing towards “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels,” greenhouse gas emissions can remain in the atmosphere from a few years to
thousands of years, contributing to the long-lasting effects.26 Nevertheless, the transition from fossil
fuels to renewable energy will not happen overnight, and even if we speed up the process, many
nations, such as the small island developing states, will be under water irrespective of the progress. It
can, however, be difficult to pinpoint the direct cause for a refugee-triggering event because of the
multi-causal factors that create a situation in which people are forced to leave their home countries.
Scholars generally agree that climate change plays a role in human displacement, but the extent of its
contribution is less certain.27 In some cases, it is clear that climate change is the cause of displacement.
These are cases in which there is a direct link from the triggering event to the human displacement, such
as flooding due to sea level rise.28 In other situations, the underlying triggering event is less clear. For
example, resource scarcity due to climate change may be the root cause of violent conflict in already
politically unstable nations that can lead to displacement.29 Furthermore, climate change can “act as a
threat multiplier by exacerbating resource scarcity and existing vulnerabilities (i.e., scarce financial
resources, weak governments, and ineffective legal systems).”30 Indeed, already unstable political
regimes can find it difficult “to adapt to the effects of climate change and to resolve conflicts without
violence.”31 This is particularly true in situations where a nation’s government already struggles with
political instability or has limited resources to handle the effects of climate change.32 For example, in
Syria and Darfur, droughts, expansion of dry, arid areas due to climate change, and disputes over water
resources coupled with preexisting vulnerabilities led to mass migration, which then morphed into
widespread and long-lasting civil wars.33 It is vital to note that many persons displaced because of
climate change will have no home to return to and therefore will not be repatriated. Rising sea levels
due to climate change are already causing populations in nations such as Vanuatu and Fiji to migrate
inland or, in some cases, to evacuate their native country.34 As sea levels rise and more land becomes
flooded, internal migration will become a less viable option and affected residents will be forced to flee
across borders with no hope of returning to their home country.35 This differs from the traditional
assumption that refugee status is temporary (i.e., most refugees will return to their original homes). This
distinction from traditional refugee status is fundamental, shaping everything from initial decisions
about how much insulation to put in housing to operational matters such as vocational training and core
concepts about personal and cultural identity. The climate-refugee phenomenon will be a long-term
issue for individuals and a permanent one for many cultures. The magnitude of the problem speaks for
itself: the number of climate-refugees is predicted to be between hundreds of millions to billions.36 The
difficulty in attaining an exact prediction of the number of climate-refugees is due to the fact that in
most cases climate change is perceived as a “threat multiplier,” believed to be one of many factors and
not the one having the capacity to “inevitably result” in displacement.37 However, reality is already
trumping this perception. This is most obvious in the ‘sinking’ of small island developing states where
climate change will inevitably create climate-refugees, leaving many nationals without a state and
forcing them to relocate.38 These small island developing states, such as Kiribati and Fiji, are “the canary
in the coal mine — that is, they are an early indicator of what other states can expect from the impacts
of climate change.”39 But it is not small islands alone that face this threat; major populations are
already at risk in large low-lying areas such as Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, a nation in which half the
population lives less than 16.5 feet above sea level, rising sea levels have already left 500,000 people
homeless and scientists predict the country will lose 17% of its land by 2050 to flooding.40 This land
loss could cause up to 20 million people from Bangladesh to become climate-refugees.41 Also, even
where climate change is labeled as a secondary factor in comparison to persecution and conflicts, note
that most such conflicts are concentrated in ‘climate change hotspots’ around the world, and the fact
that already-vulnerable people are living in disaster-prone areas increases the risk of displacement.42
Thus, whether directly or indirectly, totally or incrementally, the reality is that climate change is creating
climate-refugees at an unprecedented scale with little or no chance of returning to their homes of
origin.43
Climate change magnifies precarious economic positions and displaces millions.

Todd Miller 12-7-2017 -- Todd Miller is an author and journalist who has written on border and
immigration issues for The New York Times, Al Jazeera America, and the NACLA Report on the Americas.
["The United States Is Polluting the World and Locking Refugees Out", Accessible Online at:
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-is-polluting-the-world-and-locking-refugees-out/]
@ AG
For Central America, this was not an anomaly. Not only had the region been experiencing increasing
mid-summer droughts, but also, as the best climate-forecasting models predict, a “much greater
occurrence of very dry seasons” lies in its future. Central America is, in fact, “ground zero” for climate
change in the Americas, as University of Arizona hydrology and atmospheric sciences professor Chris
Castro told me. And on that isthmus, the scrambling of the seasons, an increasingly deadly combination
of drenching hurricanes and parching droughts, will hit people already living in the most precarious
economic and political situations. Across Honduras, for example, more than 76 percent of the
population lives in conditions of acute poverty. The coming climate breakdowns will only worsen that or
will, as Castro put it, be part of a global situation in which “the wet gets wetter, the dry gets drier, the
rich get richer, the poor get poorer. Everything gets more extreme.” Talking with those farmers in the
Tenosique train yard felt, in a way, like a scene from a sequel to the movie The Road in which a father
and son walk across a post-apocalyptic North America devastated by an unknown cataclysm. In reality,
though, I was just in a typical border zone of the Anthropocene, the proposed new geologic era
characterized by human activity as the dominant force on the climate and environment. And these
young, unarmed farmers with failing harvests are now facing the only welcome this planet presently has
to offer for such victims of climate change: expanding border regimes of surveillance, razor-wire walls,
guns, and incarceration centers. As they keep heading north, they will have to be on guard against ever
more army and police patrols, while enduring hunger and thirst as well as painful separations from their
families. They will have to evade endless roadside checkpoints, which Fray Tomás Tómas González
Castillo, director of a nearby shelter for migrants in Tenosique, told me were almost “impossible” to
avoid, at a time when, he noted, “organized crime” controls the trains. Such a predicament is hardly
unique to the Mexico-Guatemalan border region or even the US-Mexican version of the same. Think of
the maritime divide between North Africa and the European Union or the Jordanian border where
patrols now reportedly shoot at “anything that moves” coming from Syria—or so a Jordanian official
who prefers to remain anonymous told me. And Syria was just one of the places where the ever-
increasing impacts of climate change, migration, and tightly enforced border zones intersected. Now
homeland-security regimes are increasingly unleashing their wrath on the world’s growing numbers of
displaced people, sharpening the divide between the secure and the dispossessed. Whether in Mexico
or on the Mediterranean Sea, as ever more human beings find themselves uprooted from their homes
and desperate, such dynamics will only intensify in the decades to come. In the process, the geopolitics
and potentially the very geography of the globe will be reshaped. It’s not just Donald Trump.
Everywhere on Planet Earth, we seem to be entering the era of the wall. THE DISPLACED According to
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the “impact and threat of climate-related hazards”
displaced an average of 21.5 million people annually between 2008 and 2015. The growing impact of the
Anthropocene—of intensifying droughts, rising seas, and mega-storms—is already adding to a host of
other factors, including poverty, war, and persecution, that in these years have unsettled record
numbers of people. While many of the climate-displaced stay close to home, hoping to salvage both
their lives and livelihoods, ever more are crossing international borders in what many are now calling a
“refugee crisis.” “Catastrophic convergence” is the term sociologist Christian Parenti uses to describe
this 21st-century turmoil, since many of these factors combine to displace staggering numbers of
people. As Camila Minerva of Oxfam puts it, “The poorest and the most marginalized are five times
more likely to be displaced and to remain so for a longer time than people in higher income countries
and it is increasing with climate change.” Though the numbers are often debated, the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees suggests that climate breakdowns will displace 250 million people by
2050. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre suggests that those numbers could actually range
from 150 million to a staggering 350 million by that year. In reporting on how climate change is already
affecting Mexico City, Michael Kimmelman, the architecture critic of The New York Times, cited a report
suggesting that the number may be far higher than that, possibly reaching 700 million—and that, by
2050, 10 percent percent of all Mexicans between 15 and 65 might be heading north, thanks to rising
temperatures, droughts, and floods.
Demographic trends are undermining ecosystem health, causing surging levels of

forced migration
Wittbold et. al 18 (Brian, holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and an LL.M. in
International Law of the Sea, has joined UN Environment as Regional Humanitarian Affairs Officer
coordinating the Disasters and Conflicts sub-programme for Western Asia from the ROWA regional
office, Human mobility in the Anthropocene from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement
and Migration, pg. 415-416 //waters)
We live in an era of unprecedented human mobility: movement of ideas, values, money and,
increasingly, of people. Increased human mobility and migration in the twenty-first century is spurred
by, and also drives, economic growth and interdependency at the national, regional and global levels.
250 million people live and work outside the country of their birth, while 750 million people migrate
within their own countries (World Bank, 2015).
When properly managed, migration has immense potential as a driver of human development and
progress, spreading ideas and connecting the world. However, when migration is unmanaged and
people are forced from their homes as result of negligence, crisis or compulsion, the issue can become
politically divisive and societies forego the tremendous benefits that migration can otherwise offer.
Indeed, protracted violent conflicts, climatic pressures and meteorological disasters have contributed to
an upsurge in displacement and forced migration in recent years, adding urgency and complexity to the
current global discussion on migration and displacement.
By mid-2017, an unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world had been forced from their
homes, including nearly 21.3 million refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Fleeing from war, persecution and
unmitigated destitution in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and
elsewhere, affected populations have continued to surge as conflict and violence endure and new
crises emerge. Nearly 7 million new cases of internal displacement due to conflict were recorded 2016.
Analysis of civil wars over the past 70 years indicate that at least 40 per cent are linked to the contested
control or use of natural resources such as land, water, miner- als or oil (UNEP, 2009).The effects are not
limited to countries directly involved in conflicts, but reverberate across regions with destabilizing
consequences. Globally, the burden of hosting refugees is disproportionately shared, with a mere six
countries hosting over one-third of the world’s total refugee population.1
As the magnitude of conflict-induced displacement continued togrow at an unprecedented rate

between 2011 and 2015, annual displacement attributable to natural disasters now accounts for a far
greater proportion of the global caseload of people forced to leave their homes. Research shows that
since 2008, disasters have displaced an average of 26.4 million people each year – the equivalent to one
person per second (IFRC, 2016). In 2016 alone, some 24.2 million people were displaced by disasters
brought on by sudden-onset natural hazards in 118 countries and territories (IDMC, 2017: 31). While it is
increasingly difficult to determine the immediate causes of displacement and disentangle the various
social, political, environmental and economic drivers of conflicts and disasters, these staggering statistics
attest to the truly global scale of a challenge faced by developing and developed countries alike.
Indeed, recent demographic trends across the globe put humanity on a crash course with disasters that
will undoubtedly be accompanied by increased displacement. Rapid population growth and our
activities have upset ecological balances and pushed planetary boundaries so profoundly that scientists
now suggest that we have entered “the Anthropocene”, a new geological epoch that recognizes humans
as the dominant in uence on the climate and environment. With the human population predicted to
peak at more than 9 billion by the middle of this century, this new epoch is characterized by a state of
ecological disequilibrium that is likely to bear witness to the largest mass extinction of biodiversity since
the dinosaurs (WWF, 2016).
Human-caused environmental change and environmental degradation – desertification, deforestation,

land degradation, ocean acidi cation, climate change and water scarcity – are fundamentally redrawing
the map of our world.The health of terrestrial and marine ecosystems and the continued availability of
the critical services they provide affect where people are able to find sustenance and pursue livelihoods
to sustain themselves, and ultimately where they are able to live (UNEP 2017).Their degradation may
result in the collapse of fragile and complex life support systems, undermining self-suf ciency and
resilience. Indeed, it is increasingly recognized by policy makers that environmental degradation and
mismanagement can be root causes of populations’ deprivation, destitution and vulnerability,
ultimately contributing to the desperation that fuels forced migration.
The interlacing trends of climate change, population growth, rising consumption and environmental
degradation may lead to greater numbers of people displaced in the future. The most commonly cited
gure is that there could be as many as 200 million people displaced for environmental reasons by 2050.2
That would mean that, in a world of 9 billion people, 1 in 45 would have been forced from home for
environmental reasons.
Clearly, addressing such displacement could prove to be a defining environmental management

challenge of the twenty-first century. Having created the Anthropocene, humanity must now
acknowledge the imperative of responsible environmental stewardship, ensuring that we strive towards
a safe planet on which we can all live.
Relevance of migration and displacement to the UN Environment
The links between the environment and displacement are multi-directional and complex, but make a
compelling case for engagement from the United Nations Environment Programme (henceforth UN
Environment). Not only do environmental factors have the potential to contribute to migration and
displacement, but they also emerge as consequences of population movement.As such, the
environmental dimensions of migration and displacement may manifest themselves differently across
ecosystems and countries of origin, transit and destination.
UN Environment is the leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental
agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable
development within the United Nations system and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global
environment. UN Environment’s mission is “to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring
for the Environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality
of life without compromising that of future generations.”3
The number of climate refugees is increasing as escalating climate change poses more
severe risks
Elsheikh and Ayazi, '17 – * director of the Global Justice Program at the Haas Institute AND
**graduate research assistant at the Haas Institute (Elsadig and Hossein, "Moving Targets: An Analysis of
Global Forced Migration ," Global Justice Program at the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at
the UC Berkeley, 9-2017,
http://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haasinstitute_moving_targets_globalmigrationrepo
rt_publish_web.pdf)//SB
Along with the myriad socioeconomic and political dynamics, global climate change has contributed to
forced migration by way of abrupt environmental disasters as well as long-term, slowly occurring
environmental changes. The effects of climate change are most predominately affecting communities in
the Global South and are triggering new conflicts. We use the term “climate crisis” to describe both
environmental change and the hardship faced by certain communities because of such change. We
identify climate crisis as the third dynamic of forced migration, operating alongside and in conjunction
with neoliberalization and securitization.
Estimates of the extent of climate-induced migration vary significantly, but the numbers are staggering
by any measure. As of June 2011, according to the UNHCR, there were an estimated 42.3 million people
displaced by sudden-onset disasters caused by natural events in 2010.75 Furthermore, “since 2008 an
average of 26.4 million people a year have been displaced from their home by disasters brought by
natural hazards. This is equivalent to one person being displaced every second.”76
Researchers predict a larger increase in climate refugees not only due to more frequent and intense
weather events but also to rising sea levels, which are rising at an annual rate of 0.13 inches (3.2
millimeters) a year, roughly twice the average speed of the past 80 years.78 Most impacted are several
small island and coastal countries, which must grapple with the possibility of complete submersion.
Bangladesh is projected to lose 17 percent of its land by 2050, causing about 20 million people to seek
refuge elsewhere, and the Maldives could lose all of its 1,200 islands.79 People worldwide who depend
on the fishery industry are witnessing a decline in revenue as increasing fresh water from melted polar
caps drives saltwater fish away and harms ocean ecosystems. If current rates of ocean water
temperature continue to rise, for example, the ocean is projected to be too warm for coral reefs to
survive by 2050.80
Climate change also contributes to desertification, wherein a relatively dry land region becomes
increasingly arid and bodies of water, vegetation, and wildlife can no longer thrive.81 Desertification is
threatening the livelihoods of many communities by completely transforming the ecosystem and
diminishing, if not eliminating, the productivity of land.
200M more climate refugees by 2050
Micinski and Weiss, '17 – *Research and Editorial Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute for
International Studies and Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Graduate Center, City University of
New York AND ** Presidential Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center and Director
Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The City University of New York.
(Nicholas R. and Thomas G., "Global Migration Governance: Beyond Coordination and Crises," The
Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2017, G. Ziccardi Capaldo ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3180639)//SB
The first factor that supports cooperation is the dramatically increased number of vulnerable individuals:
refugees and asylum seekers from conflicts and humanitarian disasters, migrant laborers, victims of
human trafficking, and climate refugees. In 2017, UNHCR reported that 65.6 million people were
displaced, including 22.5 million refugees, 2.8 million asylum seekers, and 40.3 million internally
displaced persons (IDPs).37 The total number of displaced people grew from 33.9 million in 1997—
nearly doubling in two decades.38 This does not include the estimated 150.3 million39 migrant workers
or 9.1 million trafficked people.40 In addition, some predict that climate change might create an
additional 200 million displaced by 2050.41 These increases have highlighted some of the gaps in
international protection and put pressure on international institutions to take more effective actions.
Now key – Climate crisis could displace tens of millions of refugees, risks civil war
outbreaks
Taylor 17 – 11/2/2017, Matthew Taylor, Environmental Correspondent, Climate change ‘will create
world’s biggest refugee crisis,’ https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-
change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis//TK
Experts warn refugees could number tens of millions in the next decade, and call for a new legal
framework to protect the most vulnerable Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by
climate change in the next decade, creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen, according
to a new report. Senior US military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation
(EJF) study that the number of climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict,
bringing huge challenges to Europe. “If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait
20 years,” said retired US military corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when
climate change drives people out of Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re talking
now not just one or two million, but 10 or 20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are going
across the Mediterranean.” The study published on Thursday calls on governments to agree a new legal
framework to protect climate refugees and, ahead of next week’s climate summit in Germany, urges
leaders to do more to implement the targets set out in the Paris climate agreement. Sir David King, the
former chief scientific adviser to the UK government, told the EJF: “What we are talking about here is an
existential threat to our civilisation in the longer term. In the short term, it carries all sorts of risks as
well and it requires a human response on a scale that has never been achieved before.” The report
argues that climate change played a part in the build up to the Syrian war, with successive droughts
causing 1.5 million people to migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and 2011. Many of these
people then had no reliable access to food, water or jobs. “Climate change is the the unpredictable
ingredient that, when added to existing social, economic and political tensions, has the potential to
ignite violence and conflict with disastrous consequences,” said EJF executive director, Steve Trent. “In
our rapidly changing world climate change – and its potential to trigger both violent conflict and mass
migration – needs to be considered as an urgent priority for policymakers and business leaders alike.”
Although the report highlights to growing impact of climate change on people in the Middle East and
Africa, it says changing weather patterns – like the hurricanes that devastated parts of the US this year –
prove richer nations are not immune from climate change. But Trent said that although climate change
undoubtedly posed an “existential threat to our world” it was not to late to take decisive action. “By
taking strong ambitious steps now to phase out greenhouse gas emissions and building an international
legal mechanism to protect climate refugees we will protect the poorest and most vulnerable in our
global society, build resilience, reap massive economic benefits and build a safe and secure future for
our planet. Climate change will not wait. Neither can we. For climate refugees, tomorrow is too late.”
1ac – Plan – Expand the Definition
Plan: the United States federal government should determine that climate migrants
constitute ‘refugees’ as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.
Ext. S – Expand the Definition
Amending the definitions of persecution and refugee grant climate migrants legal
protections.
Breanne Compton 2012 -- J.D. at the University of Colorado Law School. ["The Rising Tide of
Environmental Migrants: Our National Responsibilities", Accessible Online at:
https://www.colorado.edu/law/sites/default/files/Compton%2025-2.pdf] @ AG
For the abovementioned reasons, environmental migration is a growing concern, especially with the
advent of climate change. The terms environmental refugee and climate refugee are evolving terms that
bring to light the reality that environmental factors are increasingly forcing people to emigrate.
Environmental refugees have few options when seeking refuge under the constraints of current
international and national refugee law. To cure this growing human rights dilemma, the United States
must recognize that environmental refugees are valid refugees and that they are fleeing legitimate
threats to their lives and livelihoods. This Note proffers several solutions that would amend the existing
infrastructure of the United States’ immigration systems to accommodate environmental refugees.
Environmental refugees have become an unavoidable part of our globalized world. The reasons people
are migrating today, where they are migrating from, and where they are headed, is a vastly broader
inquiry today than ever before. Due to the global scope of environmental degradation and the
connectivity of uninhabitable environments and shrinking resources, the treaty signed in 1951 no longer
offers adequate protection for the growing and diversified classes of refugees in our international
system.
One proposal to accommodate the plight of environmental refugees is to reform the internationally
accepted definition of “refugee” to include a broader and more realistic definition of who contemporary
refugees actually are. In Article I, the 1951 Convention endorses a single definition of the term refugee,
which excludes the contemporary classification of environmental refugees.171 When broken down into
segments, the 1951 Convention states that a refugee is (1) a person, (2) outside their country of
nationality, (3) who is unable or unwilling to return or to avail herself to the protections of that country,
(4) because of past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution, (5) on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion.172 In order for
environmental refugees to qualify under this definition, segments four and five need to be either
expanded or removed.
In addition to expanding the definition of refugee, other elements of the refugee definition could be
expanded or eliminated. For example, law professor Scott Rempell advocates for a broader definition of
persecution.173 While this expansion argument can be made in many creative ways, the point is that
the current definition of “refugee” under United States refugee law is inadequate and underinclusive.
Importantly, the United States has the power to redefine its own definition of refugee even if the
international community is unwilling to do so.174
Two regional bodies, the Organization of African Unity and the Cartagena Declaration, have managed to
expand the definition of refugee beyond the traditional confines.175 The Organization of African Unity
states that a refugee is “any person compelled to leave his/her country owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of
his country of origin or nationality.” 176
The Cartagena Declaration specifies that refugees are “[p]ersons who flee 5their countries because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal
conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed the
public order.” 177 Despite this expansion, both regional bodies failed to explicitly include environmental
refugees or to mention environmental triggers as a source of flight within the expanded definition of
refugee.178
While the purpose of the Organization of African Unity and the Cartagena Declaration was to protect
refugees fleeing “civil disturbances, widespread violence, and war,” 179 these two expanded definitions
are a step in the right direction for the plight of environmental refugees. Both definitions contain a
catch-all phrase legitimizing flight for events that “have seriously disturbed the public order.” 180
Unquestionably, the effects of climate change and natural disasters can be classified as events that
disturb the public order. Therefore, environmental refugees arguably can secure legal refugee
protection under these catch-all provisions.181 While this Note does not proffer a proposed
environmental refugee definition, at a minimum, the United States should expand its refugee definition
to include a similar catch-all provision where environmental refugees may be considered for legal
protections.
Law should be expanded to incld climate

Friedman et al 18 – Univerity of Washington Task Force Report, The Future of U.S. Migration
Policy: Addressing and Improving the Current System, Kathie Friedman, 2018,
https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Task-
Force_G_2018_Friedman.pdf//TK
While there are more refugees forced to flee based on environmental and geophysical factors than
political refugees fleeing wars and conflicts, the issue of climate refugee displacement is not treated
with the same reverence. Currently, there is no international law or U.S. legislation that provides a
transparent and secure ground for protection for communities forced to evacuate their homes as a
result of natural disasters, much less as a result of climate change. In devising mechanisms for the U.S. to offer a viable source
of protection for those displaced by climate change, several gaps in the United States’ current system on refugee
protection must be reconsidered. Firstly, refugee status is not granted to those whose claims are
interpreted as a case of “voluntary” migration rather than “forced” migration and because
environmental change is not one of the five protected grounds under the 1951 Refugee Convention,
“those displaced across international borders as a result of natural disasters are unlikely to be
protected.” In nearly any case of climate induced flight, there is no way to separate “voluntary” from “forced” or “involuntary”
movement. Experts at the Nansen Initiative suggest that instead of drawing a sharp distinction, that the motivation to flee certain regions due to climate change
should be recognized as “a continuum with “voluntary” at one end of the spectrum, in a gradual transition to “forced” at the other.” This gradient is a more accurate
model of how “voluntary” and “forced” should be discussed in political spheres because motivations to migrate are multifaceted and nearly impossible to neatly fit
inside the category of “voluntary” or “forced.” Secondly, it
is imperative for the U.S. to accept that cross-border movement is
nearly never monocausal and that environmental degradation also works in tandem with socioeconomic
factors to exacerbate displacement. In cases where lives are actively being threatened by the deprivation of
basic needs such as food, water, and shelter as a result of climate change – such as the aforementioned hot, island, and
dry regions – testing the habitability or possibility to stay should not determine the extension of aid. Instead, recognizing that catalysts to migration are
multidimensional is an important legal change that would offer more displaced persons safety. Lastly, compensation in the form of financial
foreign aid from the world’s largest polluters is not enough to make up for the loss of place that climate refugees experience. While
it is important that we provide foreign aid to nations suffering from natural disasters and resource scarcity, the
U.S. must consider resettling
those who are forced by safety concerns and threats caused by climate change. Subsidizing the cost of
adaptation through compensation is helpful but does not prevent the suffering and loss of life that
natural disasters frequently cause. The countries that are most liable for the destruction of climate stability are seldom the countries that are
paying for it in damage to their safety and livelihoods. Thus, it is “central to the protection of people displaced by natural disasters” that the U.S. implements a
systematic process, a “rights-based” disaster management framework that treat those “affected or displaced by natural disasters as rights-holders, not as
beneficiaries of disaster relief.
Although most of the displacement caused by climate change will be temporary and
within national borders, programs such as the Nansen Initiative demonstrate the clear necessity for
addressing long term or permanent cross-border flight due to habitat destruction. The United States
should seek to work with the Nansen Initiative’s signatories to foster international solidarity and cooperation in
solving the displacement crisis that human-induced climate change creates. Based on the model of the Nansen Initiative,
the United States’ administration should also support legislation that creates standards for the
treatment of forced migrants regarding their admission, stay, and status as well as a procedure of
actions that should be taken in the aftermath of a climate disaster. Because the magnitude of devastation and displacement
that climate change is projected to engender, we must do far more to ensure that early recovery measures are funded and
implemented as quickly as possible in the face of disasters where the community can quickly return.
Should expand legal rights to climate refugees

DeGenaro 15 (Carey, J.D. Candidate at the University of Colorado, Looking Inward: Domestic Policy for
Climate Change Refugees in the United States and Beyond, http://lawreview.colorado.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/11.-86.3-DeGenaro_Final.pdf//waters)
As discussed above, it is also necessary for any proposal to explicitly grant the climate migrants all the
legal rights of refugees, including the right to work and the right to travel freely both within and outside
of the country.286 None of the existing forms of relief in immigration law extend such comprehensive
rights to individuals who do not qualify as refugees under the INA. However, climate migrants and
refugees are similarly situated due to the difficulty for individuals from either group to return to their
home country. The creation of an entirely new legal classification for this class of people would allow
policymakers to tailor legislation to climate migrants’ unique circumstances and still provide the
maximum amount of protection.287 Such a step is necessary to integrate climate migrants into the
United States. Ensuring that domestic climate migrant legislation includes these key elements will help
to prevent both illegal entry and the creation of second-class citizens.288 It provides a path to
integration that will maximize the benefits to both the United States and the incoming climate migrant
populations.289 Finally, it will decrease uncertainty for both climate migrants and government officials,
ensuring a smooth transition and minimizing political turmoil. Thus, legislation that creates legal status
for climate migrants should take the form of a new mechanism under United States immigration law
that would be a hybrid of existing protections for immigrants in dire circumstances.
1ac – Plan – New Category
Plan: The United States federal government should create a new visa category for
climate migrants with an expanding annual quota.
Creating a new visa category for climate refugees is necessary and sufficient to solve
U.S. law needs to recognize climate change as a legitimate and separate reason to migrate and seek
refuge. Within the current Refugee Admissions Program, climate refugees would not be able to claim
refugee statue. Recognition of the effects of climate change as legitimate motivation to seek refugee
status is required prior to any policy implementation. Climate refugees should be recognized as
separate from the established reasons to seek refuge in order to avoid confliction with current policy.
3. The United States should establish a governmental body to ensure successful and efficient planning of
climate refugee policies. In order to develop the most effective climate refugee policy, the
establishment of a new governmental body is necessary. The issue of climate refugees is multifaceted
and would not fit within one existing body or agency. An intersectional body would allow for the most
knowledgeable individuals to work towards planning climate refugee policy on the national and
international levels to suggest to lawmakers. 4. The United States must establish a separate climate
refugee visa program that does not have such a limited quota ceiling set in place and has a significantly
reduced time of admission. The current refugee admission program has a multitude of issues that would
make dealing with the considerable amount of projected future climate refugees. The creation of a new
refugee policy will ensure current refugee policies are not weakened. The new visa program must allow
for a significantly higher quota of annual admission in order to properly keep up with and address the
issue of climate refugees. Reduced time for admission is also necessary to keep on this same pace.
These steps will benefit surrounding nations as well as the U.S by leading to greater cooperation and
ease at the regional level. 5. The climate refugee visa program must have a focus on planned relocation.
Planned relocation refers to the placement of climate refugees, assistance in moving, and providing the
ability for individuals to create new lives. This will allow for the ability to prevent climate refugees from
settling in already overpopulated cities, it will prioritize jobs for refugees, and have a set plans for the
resources needed in communities receiving individuals.
Ext. S – New Visa
Creating a new visa category and an exception for asylum seekers solves the aff.
A further option for the United States to consider is to create a new category of environmental refugee
visa or removal defense to exist within the structure of our nation’s immigration laws.185 This new
category could be crafted in many different ways. As to the visa, one option would be to establish an
environmental refugee visa for those who are fleeing slow onset environmental changes. As with other
visas, families could apply for it in advance from their country of origin in anticipation of their pending
migration. The number of available visas could be capped at a very low number, and would thus create
minimal administrative stress on our existing system.
In the removal realm, the environmental refugee defense could be crafted as an affirmative defense or
waiver. Additionally, asylum or withholding of removal within the United States’ immigration laws could
be amended to include an exception to grant coverage for environmental refugees.186 This exception
could be granted upon satisfying specific terms and conditions such as leaving one’s homeland because
of a changing environmental factor that made further habitation life threatening or impossible.187 The
other elements necessary to receive asylum or withholding could remain unchanged,188 and this
avenue of relief would essentially achieve the same purpose as the abovementioned environmental
refugee visa.
Ext. Lack Legal Protections
Climate refugee flows will exponentially increase – status quo solutions will lock them
out
While a majority of research on climate refugees focuses on global policy, migration to Europe, and
refugees from African, Asian, and Island nations, there have recently been those looking at how the
United States and Americas will be impacted. Todd Miller, an immigration and border journalist,
interviewed a group of Honduran men attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. When asked why
they were heading to the United States, they responded simply “there was no rain” (Miller 2017).
Extreme drought is rising throughout all of Central America and Mexico. For example, in 2015, around
400,000 people in a region of Honduras didn’t receive any rain and no crops grew, causing extreme
famine (2017). There have been many studies over the last ten years that portray an influx in
immigration directly correlated with drought, such as that done by Colunga and Rivera (2011). Their
study shows the increase in migration from Mexico to the United States in response to drought and the
lack of Mexican policy to assist the most vulnerable populations. Drought isn’t the only issue causing
people to migrate north. Extreme weather has been shown to increase with climate change and be a
major contributor to forced migration. One study estimates 470,000 Puerto Ricans, or 14% of the
population, will leave the island by 2019 due to increased damage from hurricanes and extreme
weather (Melendez and Hinojosa 2017, 1). Nearly all of these people are projected to move to the
United States. The primary response by the United States to this increase in immigration has been walls
and surveillance technology. Even before Donald Trump ran for office, there was 700 miles of border
walls constructed along the U.S.-Mexico border, with the number of Border Patrol agents increasing
exponentially (Miller 2017). Border walls are not only occurring in the United States as way to cope with
increased immigration. According to Elisabeth Vallet, there are 70 border walls around the world, up
from 15 in 1988 (2017). Border walls are showing how government officials view immigration and
climate refugees as a threat to national security. Rather than preparing policy and practices to provide
protections to future immigrants, the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. military view climate
change as a “threat multiplier” and are preparing for long-term security issues, with mass population
movements as one of the main sources of risk (2017). >
Status quo protections are insufficient for climate refugees – new legislation is key
To understand why the United States should enact legislation that protects climate migrants, 92 it is
necessary to examine the state of immigration law as it stands in January 2015. The United States has a
tumultuous immigration history with varying periods of high and low rates of migration from many
different parts of the world. 93 Immigration to the United States has caused much political turmoil; the
goals of immigration law are constantly in flux.94 Today, immigration law is generally immigrant-
exclusive, focused primarily on closing borders and deporting undocumented immigrants. 95 According
to the Pew Research Center, there were approximately 11.2 million undocumented immigrants in the
United States in 2012.96 The United States' legal system inadequately addresses this population, which
significantly impacts the country's economy and culture. 97 This population's status and rights are
unsettled: unlawfully present individuals generally do not qualify for public benefits such as in-state
tuition and driver's licenses, 98 employment laws do not protect undocumented and documented
workers equally, 99 and the policy surrounding who should be deported (as well as how to treat those
who are not prioritized for deportation) is muddled.100 The government has no comprehensive plan to
address these "Americans in waiting," and they consequently exist in a state of flux. 10 1 Although
immigration reform continues to be a topic of great importance in the United States' political system,
Congress continuously fails to pass a legislative overhaul.102 Additionally, while the Senate passed
another comprehensive immigration reform bill in 2013, the House did not adopt the proposal, and
Congress has not acted on immigration since then. 103 Nevertheless, it is essential for the United States
to develop and implement legislation to determine the legal status of climate migrants as they begin
arriving in the country. If scholars have correctly estimated the number of climate migrants that will
exist by 2050, the United States will face a rapidly increasing population of immigrants with no viable
path to legal status, and potentially no inhabitable country to which they can return. 10 4 The current
legal infrastructure, however, is inadequate to address even the existing immigrant population-let alone
an enormous influx of climate migrants. Thus, the country must pass legislation to avoid swelling the
ranks of undocumented immigrants whose illegal presence will contribute to costs and confusion in the
United States. Why does the current legal regime inadequately protect climate migrants? Section A will
discuss refugee law, the most well-known protection for immigrants in the United States, and explain
why it does not apply to climate migrants. Next, section B will discuss alternative legal protections that
may be available, but which ultimately are inappropriate to address the influx of climate-displaced
persons who lack legal status. A. Refugee Law and Asylum in the United States Refugee law in the United
States largely tracks that of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the Convention's corresponding 1967 Protocol. 10 5 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in
the United States, a "refugee" is defined as: any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion .... 106 The United States has not significantly altered this definition since the international
community established it in 1951.107 For an individual to show that she is a refugee, she must establish
(1) past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, (2) that is or was on account of one of
the protected grounds listed in the definition, and (3) that the applicant was unable or unwilling to enlist
government protection.108 If an alien establishes that she is a refugee, an immigration judge or asylum
officer may grant her application for asylum. 109 It is generally settled that the definition of "refugee" in
the United States does not apply to individuals or groups fleeing the environmental consequences of
climate change."10 The international community defined the term "refugee" and created the
Convention and Protocol in the wake of World War II to protect victims of political, religious, and social
upheaval.11' This is why establishing refugee status requires proof of past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution. 112 It is difficult to argue that scarce resources, degraded economic and
environmental conditions, or even increased political turmoil resulting from climate change, meet the
standards of persecution as defined by the statute. Even if an asylum-seeker can prove persecution,
she must also be able to show that it was "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." 113 Discrete climate events are naturally occurring, even if
those events subsequently contribute to the gradual degradation of environmental and economic
conditions inside a country. 11 4 Therefore, such degradation is not "on account of' any of the listed
factors. 115 To prove that she is a refugee, an applicant must also demonstrate that she is unable to
turn to her government for help."l6 The United States construes this requirement strictly, and is unlikely
to grant asylum if the applicant did not suffer persecution "imposed by the government or by groups
which the government is unable or unwilling to control." 117 Thus, the applicant must name some
identifiable actor as her persecutor. 118 Since neither climate change nor its consequences were
imposed upon individuals by their own government or by a group that the government was unable or
unwilling to control, it follows that these individuals will be unable to show that they are "refugees," as
defined by the statute. 119 Applicants for asylum in the United States face additional barriers beyond
meeting the legal definition of refugee. For example, entering the country in the first instance is
increasingly challenging, as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the right to refuse entry at
the border to any alien who does not claim persecution or request asylum. 1 20 In fact, since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the subsequent passage of the Patriot Act in 2001,121 and the
passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005,122 securing both entry and legal status in the United States has
become significantly more difficult. 123 Another restrictive act, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, 124 requires that an asylum applicant file within one year of arrival in the
country. 125 This timeline does not adequately account for the fact that many refugees do not know
how to apply or are unaware that they may qualify for this form of relief, and it imposes arbitrary
constraints on potentially meritorious claims. The one year deadline, increased difficulty of entry, and
the reduced number of applications granted post-9/11 have together caused the number of applications
filed to decrease substantially. 126 Most importantly, the United States grants asylum as a matter of
discretion on a case-by-case basis. 127 If the government finds that a particular applicant's case merits
both a finding of refugee status and an affirmative grant of asylum, that decision can be limited to her
unique situation. 128 The limit on the number of refugees the government will admit into the country
each year further challenges asylum applicants. 129 Given the expected estimates of climate migrants
that may come to the United States, refugee law in the United States is insufficient to handle the
impending influx.
Climate refugees are afforded zero legal protection

Lieberman, '15 – Immigration Specialist (Amy, "Where will the climate refugees go?," Al Jazeera, 12-
22-2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/11/climate-refugees-
151125093146088.html)//SB
New York, US - No one can be sure just how many people will be displaced by climate change by the
middle of this century. In fact, the estimates vary widely, with some putting the number at 25 million
and others suggesting it could hit the one billion mark.
What is clear, however, is that cementing a number is not the only hurdle facing those attempting to
decipher the practical ramifications of climate change. Terms such as "climate refugee" and
"environmental refugee" are still not classified as legal categorisations. And it's difficult to determine
whether a person is fleeing their home because of an environmental disaster, lack of work, or the
established, long-term impacts of climate issues like drought or rising sea levels.
However, one factor is increasingly clear: This amorphous, global population of refugees does not have
any international legal protection or agency upholding their basic human rights and helping to keep
them safe.
AT//Climate Change Isn’t Happening
Arguments against climate change rely on cherry-picked facts and flawed papers –
prefer reliable data
Pilkey et al. 16 Orrin H. Pilkey is a James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of Geology (Orrin H., Linda
Pilkey-Jarvis, Keith C Pilkey, “Retreat from a Rising Sea : Hard Choices in an Age of Climate Change,”
5/24/16, Columbia University Press) // SR
Arthur Robinson
In 1998, Arthur Robinson of the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine circulated in a mass mailing
what has become known as the “Oregon Petition.” Attached to it was an unpublished paper, by
Robinson with Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas, that looked like a publication of the National Academy of
Sciences. It used the same typeface and format as official NAS proceedings, along with a cover note
signed by its former president, Frederick Seitz. The petition urged the U.S. government to reject the
Kyoto Protocol or any similar proposals, stressing that the “proposed limits on greenhouse gasses would
harm the environment, hinder the advance of science and technology, and damage the health and
welfare of mankind.” It further argued:
There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of . . . greenhouse gasses is causing or will,
in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere and disruption of the
Earth’s climate. Moreover, there is substantial scientific evidence that increases in atmospheric carbon
dioxide produce many beneficial effects upon the natural plant and animal environments of the Earth
The petition quickly picked up 19,000 signatures (and was up to 31,487 by January 2010). The NAS did
issue a statement stressing that the “petition does not reflect the conclusions of expert reports of the
Academy.” This petition offers an excellent example of the climatechange deniers’ strategy. Express a
contrarian view in a non-peerreviewed format and then repeatedly promote the paper or, in this case,
talk up the signatures on a misleading document. Not only had the paper bypassed the traditional peer-
review process, but it was deceptively packaged to look like it was a peer-reviewed publication! David
McCandless, a journalist and blogger, and Helen Lawson Williams examined the backgrounds of the
signatories and concluded that 49 percent were engineers. We should note that contrarians often are
scientists or professionals whose areas of expertise lie outside the field of climatology. Scientists who
deny climate change and our role in it typically produce flawed papers with cherry-picked facts
published in non-peer-reviewed journals. The results are then trumpeted by right-wing think tanks,
websites, and news organizations like Fox News. These papers are eventually debunked in scientific
journals a year or so later, to much less fanfare, but nonetheless they have served their purpose of
creating doubt in the minds of the public.
Indeed, despite its deceptive format, the Oregon Petition served its purpose as a tool of doubt. For
instance, it allowed Diane Bast of the Heartland Institute, a prominent think tank and source of climate-
change-denier propaganda and funding, to proclaim that the debate over climate change was not
settled. In an article on the institute’s website, she stressed that more than 30,000 “American scientists
reject the assertion that global warming has reached a crisis stage or is caused by human activity.” With
regard to this “debate,” science historian Naomi Oreskes reviewed the abstracts of 928 papers on global
climate change published in scientific journals between 1993 and 2003 and found not a single one that
did not explicitly or implicitly accept the human role in climate change.
In their important 2010 book Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Erik Conway convincingly link Big
Tobacco with efforts to discredit science harmful to corporate interests, not just those of Big Tobacco,
but to other corporate interests such as the fossil-fuel industry. They took the title of their book from a
letter from the tobacco industry proclaiming, “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of
competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the best means
of establishing a controversy.” Oreskes and Conway detail the role of Frederick Seitz and others in the
creation of a systematic approach to combating science and government regulation. The tobacco
company Philip Morris may even have coined the term junk science for peer-reviewed studies that
might harm its industry, as opposed to sound science for studies that support its views. Steven Milloy,
operator of the junkscience.com website, has popularized the notion of junk science while making light
of the threat from climate change. Once employed as a lobbyist for a firm hired by Philip Morris to
downplay the dangers of secondhand smoke, Milloy was executive director of the Advancement for
Sound Science Center (formerly Coalition) (TASSC), a group that, Oreskes and Conway state, is dedicated
to discrediting, rather than advancing, science. A commentator for Fox News, Milloy is a well-positioned
cog in the climate-change-denial machinery.
AT//ILaw Protections
International law is insufficient to protect climate refugees
McDonnell 6/20 (Tim, reporter for National Public Radio, covering the environment, conflict and
related issues in sub-Saharan Africa, The Refugees The World Barely Pays Attention To,
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-
barely-pays-attention-to//waters)
This month, diplomats from around the world met in New York and Geneva to hash out a pair of new
global agreements that aim to lay out new guidelines for how countries should deal with an
unprecedented surge in the number of displaced people, which has now reached 65.6 million
worldwide. But there's one emerging category that seems to be getting short shrift in the conversation:
so-called "climate refugees," who currently lack any formal definition, recognition or protection under
international law even as the scope of their predicament becomes more clear. Since 2008, an average
of 24 million people have been displaced by catastrophic weather disasters each year. As climate change
worsens storms and droughts, climate scientists and migration experts expect that number to rise.
Meanwhile, climate impacts that unravel over time, like desert expansion and sea level rise, are also
forcing people from their homes: A World Bank report in March projects that within three of the most
vulnerable regions — sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America — 143 million people could be
displaced by these impacts by 2050. In Bangladesh, hundreds of thousands of people are routinely
uprooted by coastal flooding, many making a treacherous journey to the slums of the capital, Dhaka. In
West Africa, the almost total disappearance of Lake Chad because of desertification has empowered
terrorists and forced more than four million people into camps. It's a problem in the United States as
well. An estimated 2,300 Puerto Rican families displaced by Hurricane Maria are still looking for
permanent housing, while government officials have spent years working to preemptively relocate more
than a dozen small coastal communities in Alaska and Louisiana that are disappearing into the rising sea.
A December study by Columbia University climate researchers in the peer-reviewed journal Science
projected that if global temperatures continue their upward march, applications for asylum to the
European Union could increase 28 percent to nearly 450,000 per year by 2100. But so far, there's no
international agreement on who should qualify as a climate refugee — much less a plan to manage the
growing crisis. "These people fall through the cracks," says Erol Yayboke, a development expert at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies who helped author a May report on forced migration. "It's
hard for countries to come to a consensus on something like this." That difficulty took shape during the
second and third weeks of June in the latest round of negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration
and the Global Compact on Refugees, which are due to be adopted at the U.N. General Assembly this
fall. When the compacts were first proposed in 2016, there was some hope among migration
researchers and advocates that they could provide a platform for new international policies on climate
refugees, which had gained prominence since the 2015 Paris climate talks. But that hope was quashed in
March, when Louise Arbour, the U.N. official leading the migration compact — which, of the two
agreements, was considered the more likely venue for strong climate language — told the European
Unionthat the document would not grant "specific legal international protection to climate-induced
migrants." Both compacts do make some reference to the climate. The latest draft of the migration
compact calls on U.N. members to "better map, understand, predict and address migration movements,
including those resulting from sudden- and slow-onset natural disasters, environmental degradation, the
adverse effects of climate change" and "cooperate to identify, develop and strengthen solutions,
including planned relocation and visa options" for climate migrants. The refugee compact stops much
shorter, only mentioning climate as one of many factors that "may interact with the drivers of refugee
movements." Ideally, the compacts should encourage countries to create new legal processes to
document and manage climate migrants "so people can move before the water is literally lapping at
their feet," says Nina Hall, a migration expert at Johns Hopkins University. As an example, she cited a
plan in New Zealand to offer up to 100 special climate visas to Pacific Islanders — although that process
is still in development and isn't likely to open for several years, she said. But the language in the
compacts is too vague to spur much progress, she says, and in any case neither compact will be legally
binding. "We have to be up front that the global compacts are not going to transform the landscape for
climate migrants," Hall says. Climate refugees pose a number of unique challenges for international
policymakers compared to those displaced by persecution, the traditional driver recognized by the 1951
UN Refugee Convention. While some people, like the Puerto Ricans displaced by Maria, are affected by a
specific disaster, many others are forced to move because of slow-onset changes like sea level rise and
desertification, which can make it hard to identify them as climate refugees. Researchers are still
working to understand how climate change interacts with the panoply of other factors, including
national security and local economic trends, that might prompt a family to move. At the same time, the
majority of today's climate refugees are displaced within the borders of their own country, whereas the
new compacts focus exclusively on cross-border movement. And for Pacific island nations that face a
truly existential threat from sea level rise, there's no legal precedent to guide how they might relocate
to new territory in another country — if they even want to move. Even a comparatively simpler effort —
to relocate a community of fewer than 100 people in Louisiana whose island home, Isle de Jean Charles,
has lost 98 percent of its land to sea level rise since the 1950s, to a new town 40 miles inland — has
taken several years and cost $50 million and still faces setbacks, including complaints from the
predominantly Native American residents that the state government didn't adequately involve them in
the planning process. "The reality is there are tens of millions of these people, and we don't agree on
what we can do about them," Yayboke says. Meanwhile, the wave of nationalism and anti-immigrant
sentiment that has swept across Europe and the U.S. in recent years has made it a challenge for the U.N.
to even get governments to follow existing refugee protocol, let alone expand it to cover an entirely new
class of refugee, Hall says. "To get any progressive international policy, much less hard law, is almost
impossible in today's climate," she says. "We're not going to get any kind of binding convention on
displaced people due to climate change." The U.S. pulled out of the migration compact in December,
citing concernsthat it could impede the Trump administration's immigration agenda. While that means
the final agreement will be missing any commitment from the world's number-one migrant destination,
it does remove a potential roadblock to including climate-specific language, given Trump's disbelief in
climate change. In any case, the global compacts aren't the end of the issue. A different U.N. task force
that was established in the Paris climate agreement is set to deliver a new set of recommendations on
climate refugees around the same time the compacts are adopted. They will likely focus on measures
individual countries can take to prevent climate refugees from being displaced in the first place, says
Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, a climate expert at the U.N.'s International Organization for Migration.
"Most people don't actually want to migrate," she says. "They would rather stay where they are. But
they need the means to stay where they are." That could include programs to train and equip farmers
for drought tolerance, she says, raise homes out of flood plains, and other measures aimed at increasing
communities' resilience to climate shocks. Yayboke believes that development agencies need to step up
funding for climate adaptation programs, which can help prevent displacement and reduce government
spending on recovery from predictable natural disasters later on. "We are spending so much money on
this stuff, but we're being totally reactive," he says. "There are proactive things we can do that we're
just not doing." Few places are more illustrative of that problem than Bangladesh. According to the CSIS
report, up to 70 percent of the five million people living in Dhaka's slums were displaced from their
original home by environmental disasters. "The situation and scope of this problem is entirely new, and
of biblical proportions," says Steve Trent, executive director of the Environmental Justice Foundation,
which released its own report on Bangladesh in 2017. "It demands an entirely new legal convention. The
global compacts are a start, but it's clear that they're not enough."
AT//Not Everyone Emigrates
Remittances are key to develop resilience to climate disasters among family members
who stay behind
Veronis et al. 18 (Luisa, Associate Professor Geography, Environment and Geomatics Faculty of Arts,
University of Ottawa, Transnational approaches to remittances, risk reduction, and disaster relief from:
Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 271-272//waters)
Researchers have debated whether migrants’ remittances should be considered a successful or
sustainable form of development assistance as opposed to a form of conspicuous consumption (see
Castaneda 2013; de Haas 2005; Faist 2008). Others have suggested that remittances can play a role in
mitigating the environmental risk of family members who stay behind, thus aligning with those who see
remittances as contributing to more than conspicuous consumption. In Vietnam, for example, it was
found that because remittance income is generally not dependent on local environmental conditions,
receiving remittances could assist in livelihood stability and risk reduction (Adger 1999).A study in
Burkina Faso and Ghana found that households that receive international remittances have increased
resiliency during natural disasters because of home improvements and greater access to
communications (Mohapatra et al. 2012).
Our research similarly indicates that remittances sent from Canada to the Philippines during and after
Typhoon Haiyan were used for risk reduction, and moreover, were used in some cases as a means to
eliminate the need for the household to evacuate or relocate.We were able to identify specifically how
the relatives of Canadian Filipinos reacted to Typhoon Haiyan and how remittances from Canada were
used by individual recipient households. In many cases, family members and friends evacuated
temporarily to local public buildings, such as churches, while others traveled to Manila to shelter with
relatives; but virtually all quickly returned home to rebuild. Few considered moving away permanently.1
In these cases, for migrant households in the Philippines, remittances from family members play a role
in reducing their vulnerability to environmental events and in increasing their ability to return home and
rebuild afterward. For example, remittances from one of our participants allowed her relatives to build a
second floor on their house so that they could go somewhere safe during almost monthly ooding
incidents in their home. Whereas previously they had gone to a relative’s home on higher ground when
typhoons and ooding occurred, her remittances allowed the family to stay put. Now when it floods, she
says,“they’re OK . . . I tell them never mind the stuff, just go upstairs.”
While remittances can play a role in making home improvements that reduce environmental risk, the
literature is conflcting when it comes to the influence of land ownership; in some locations it increases
the possibility of migrating, and in others it does not (Obokata et al. 2014). Land ownership should
therefore not be considered a sole determinant of whether a household or individual migrates (whether
temporarily or permanently); other factors such as geographical context, education levels, and social
networks must also be taken into account. This is also the case when investigating the environmental
risk of remittance-receiving households who own land or property. Existing research shows that overall,
remittance-receiving households are better able to cope with environmental problems such as
flooding and natural disasters (Adger 1999; Mohapatra et al. 2012; Predo 2010), but it is important to
note that this ability is linked not only to the higher income provided by remittances, but also to factors
such as education levels. That is, financial capital can contribute to increasing households’ resilience
when combined with human capital. One example is Predo’s (2010) research in Ormoc, Philippines. He
found that the higher a household’s education level, annual income, and total landholding, the lower
the household’s vulnerability, which was in line with his predictions. However, contrary to expectation,
he also found that vulnerability to flooding actually increased with house size, and that those with larger
houses were those where one member of the family was working or living overseas (i.e., remittance-
receiving households). Although existing research suggests that being part of a migrant household leads
to risk reduction, this finding illuminates that this may only be the case insofar as having a family
member overseas correlates to raising a household’s level of education and annual income (or having
higher levels of each to begin with). Indeed, migrant households who invest in bigger houses may
potentially be increasing their exposure and vulnerability to extreme events.
AT//Any SQ Solves Argument
Trump is slashing climate aid programs – granting refugee status to EDPs is necessary
to pull people out of existential crises.
Alex Lenferna 3-15-2018 -- Alex Lenferna is an Endeavour Research Fellow at the University of New
South Wales’ Practical Justice Initiative and a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Washington. ["Don’t
Celebrate The U.S. For Protecting Climate ‘Refugees’ ", Accessible Online at:
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-lenferna-climate-
refugees_us_5aa92f40e4b001c8bf15db8f] @ AG
The Trump administration has been moving to dismantle climate adaptation programs, many designed
to aid communities being displaced by climate change. The administration’s actions, which are reckless
on their own, have also exposed a troubling reality: Though the media has declared them America’s
“first climate refugees,” individuals displaced by climate change ― both in the United States and abroad
― have not actually been granted the legal protections that come with refugee status.
One of the climate adaptation programs the administration is cutting is the Denali Commission, an
agency developing plans to safeguard or relocate dozens of Alaskan communities at risk from rising sea
levels, storms and melting sea ice. This commission was one of the few U.S. programs in place to help
communities displaced by climate change, and it helped ensure protection for 31 Alaskan communities
that, according to the Army Corps of Engineers, face “existential” threats from climate change.
As the Trump administration rescinds adaptation and relocation funding ― both at home and abroad ―
communities displaced by climate change see themselves in an increasingly precarious position, with
little legal recourse upon which to draw for support.
And the mainstream media, unfortunately, has played a problematic role in obscuring the reality of the
situation.
In 2016, media outlets across the globe clamored to tell the story of America’s “first climate refugees.”
They were referring to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw of Louisiana, a tribe the Obama administration
had committed to relocating after rising sea levels and fossil fuel extraction practices threatened to
displace their community.
Referring to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw as climate refugees was problematic for several reasons. For
one, many people displaced by climate change resist being called “refugees,” because it paints them as
victims, thus ignoring the remarkable agency many of them have displayed. They prefer phrases like
“migration with dignity” or “planned relocation.”
Such a label also misleadingly suggests that, just like refugees under the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee
Convention, individuals displaced by climate change obtain a legal status guaranteeing them a right to
safe asylum. The very term “refugee” refers to a specific legal designation that provides protections to
people displaced across international borders as a result of specific forms of persecution. However, this
designation and the protections that come with it do not currently apply to people displaced by climate
change or to internally displaced persons (people displaced within a country).
Many argue that people displaced by climate change deserve legal protection akin to other refugees;
however, that is currently not the case in the U.S. or internationally. Migration scholar Tracey Skillington
has said, “In lacking a full legal identity, the climate displaced are pushed into spaces beyond adequate
legal protection where their ‘irregular’ status forms the basis of a routine and publicly legitimated legal
violence against them.”
The Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw spent 17 years fighting for protection and ultimately had to enter a
competition to qualify for relocation assistance, exemplifying the precarious legal limbo that climate
change-displaced communities experience.
The program that ultimately provided support to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw did not specify that
they were being protected due to climate change displacement. And the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw
were certainly not the first U.S. community to be displaced by climate change. The Quinault Indian
Nation of the Pacific Northwest, currently in the process of relocating to higher land, and the Inupiat of
Kivalina, Alaska, whom the media also deemed America’s first climate refugees back in 2013, have long
been fighting for relocation assistance.
Furthermore, there’s an irony in mainstream media’s celebrating the U.S. for protecting its first climate
refugees. Even under President Barack Obama, the U.S. resisted efforts to protect climate change-
displaced persons under the United Nations ― even though the U.S. is the largest historical emitter of
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus arguably the country most morally responsible for assisting
individuals being harmed by climate change. More recently, the Trump administration took a large step
backward, withdrawing from a United Nations Agreement to establish rights for migrants and refugees
more broadly.
The injustice of the U.S. resisting such efforts is compounded by the fact that developing and least-
developed countries ― the countries least responsible for climate change ― are the ones suffering the
most because of it. As the number of people being displaced by climate change potentially climbs to 250
million by 2050, the global south is set to feel the brunt of the impact, and will likely continue to carry
the lion’s share of the responsibility for taking care of migrants and refugees.
Developing countries currently host 84 percent of all refugees; less than 1 percent are resettled in
Western nations. Far from recognizing their responsibility to take in climate change-displaced people,
rich, polluting, developed countries ― especially the United States and Australia ― are further
tightening border security and restricting immigration.
Climate change-related displacement existed well before Trump took office; however, instead of
working to fix these problems, his climate change-denying administration is causing further harm. As the
world’s largest historical carbon emitter, the U.S. has a moral responsibility to assist those dealing with
climate change displacement. It also has a responsibility to fund climate adaptation programs both at
home and abroad.
Having already contributed so much to the problem, U.S. legislators must provide solutions for those
who can no longer adapt to their changing surroundings. This includes welcoming displaced persons
through the country’s borders and supporting international efforts to protect them.
Until it acts responsibly to address climate change displacement, we should not be celebrating the U.S.
for protecting climate “refugees.” Instead, we should be castigating the U.S. for being the largest
contributor to climate change displacement.
Climate Refugees Advantage
Ext. State Failure / Resource Scarcity IL
Climate migration causes resource scarcity and water shortages in every corner of the
world while flooding Europe with too many refugees
At this writing, Europe is under siege by Syrian war refugees who represent one of the largest war-
induced migrations in history. The war has dragged on for over four years now, taking more than two
hundred thousand lives and causing untold destruction to the Syrian environment. Well over a million
refugees have entered Europe, adding a complex religious and cultural mix to the already complicated
issue of climate refugees. These streams of migrants may literally change the face of the continent in a
generation. Optimists hope that through resettlement and education the issues can be resolved. Others
believe that this might be the time when things begin to fall apart in our global system. At present,
while a dangerous situation unfolds, many world leaders have chosen paralysis and mutual
recrimination. At this juncture members of the EU nations of Europe are discussing ways to keep further
immigration limited to “documented” refugees. In 2009 only 30 percent of Americans believed that the
world climate was changing. By 2012, surveys revealed that 70 percent of the American people had
come to believe that greenhouse gases had altered the planet. A new age of environmental change—
and subsequently refugees—had dawned.2 Environmental refugees in an age of sectarian violence, civil
war. and economic recession are not a flashy public policy project. Most policy makers wish the subject
would go away. But in an age when the world is being forced to bear witness to the fact that millions are
fleeing their homes owing to sea rise. desertification, drought, unprecedented hurricanes. tsunamis. and
war. the topic is stubbornly resistant to the kinds of public amnesia so often in effect in the world
theater of nations. We do not know how soon reality will trump ideology. At present there are lots of
back-and-forth discus sions between national and international leaders that have not been very
productive. What is certain. however, is that climate change is not just changing the planet; it is
changing human lives. In a 2007 essay for the Financial Times, David Cameron points out that “as early
as 1971. Richard Falk [a professor of international law at Princeton University,] argued that
environmental change was a security issue and outlined what he called his ‘first law of ecological
politics’: the faster the rate of change. the less time to adapt, the more dangerous the impact will
be.”24 We are now living in an age of resource shocks. Unbridled world consumption of food and
water and other resources combined with the advent of climate change may produce a global
explosion writes Michael Klare in his book The Race for What& Left. Different nations are coming up
with different strategies on migration. Ultimately, climate refugees present us with a troublesome
issue of human rights in an age of climate change. violence. and technological transformation.
Climate change drives developing world state failure – accepting climate refugees is
key
The tunnel is part of a larger issue of the number of people illegally trying to get into Europe from the
Middle East and North Africa. Because of war and worsening environmental conditions. a constant flow
of humanity is coming across into Europe, and there is no sign that it will be slowing down. Whether
attempted by tunnel entry or in boats, which frequently capsize in the Mediterranean. this migration is
part of humanity’s distress call. Climate change is with us and we need to think about the next big,
disturbing idea—the potentially disastrous consequences of massive numbers of environmental
refugees at large on the planet. As early as 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
reported that “the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration with millions
of people displaced by shoreline erosion. coastal flooding, and agricultural disruption,” writes the United
Nations Development Program in its 2015 Human Development Report. These people will be left to
seek new homes in an era where “asylum” has increasingly become an unwelcome term. In a recent
book entitled Constant Battles. Steven LeBlanc of the Peabody Museum of Archeology argues that
environmental changes such as population growth, droughts. and crop failures in the ancient Middle
East resulted in higher levels of warfare. Anthropologist Jared Diamond describes similar developments
among the ancient Mayans of Mexico and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico in Collapse: How Societies
Choose to Fail or Succeed.3 In addition, as Michael Klare observes, “Many experts believe that the
fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by
competition among desert tribes for scarce water supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising
population levels.”4 University of Hawaii biogeographer Camilo Mora and colleagues have recently
published a disturbing analysis of what lies in the global future. They call it the era of “climate
departure,” a point at which, as Diane Toomey of Yale’s Environment 360 puts it, “the earth’s climate
begins to cease resembling what has come before and moves into a new state. one where heat records
are routinely shattered and what was once considered extreme will become the norm.”6 Mora and his
coauthors examined millions of data points from various regions to determine what climate departure
will mean for our planet. Interviewed by Toomey. Mora pegs the date of climate departure as 2047: “At
the broadest scale. we calculate that year. Under a business as usual scenario, is going to be 2047.
Basically, by the year 2047 the climate is going to move beyond something we’ve never seen in the last
150 years.” The scientific models cover 200-year periods from sixty thousand locations around the
world. The biggest climate changes, Mora’s team predicts, will actually occur sooner in the tropics,
where species have long adapted to a stable climate and will suffer dramatically if the average
temperature increases by just one or two degrees Celsius. This is already happening in some places in
the world’s oceans, with massive bleaching of coral reefs.8 What scares Mora as a scientist and as an
earth dweller is that changes are already happening around the world and that “people can’t appreciate
the magnitude of these changes until it is too late.” but “when we start damaging physical systems and
the carrying capacity of physical systems to produce food, people will react to this in a terrible way.”9
Climate departure will take place in a world of limited food. People need about two hectares each to
provide the food to sustain them. Since there are some seven billion people on earth at present, and
Mora’s team has estimated that the planet has only eleven billion hectares that can be sustainably
harvested. “every year we consume three billion hectares.” The only remedy for the future. Mora notes,
is to alert the public consciousness and embark on a concerted effort at reducing population growth.10
Most potential climate change consequences are described are in terms of weather extremes such as
heat waves, floods, and severe storms. If we can extrapolate Mora’s data well into the future, we can
anticipate greater and more damaging tropical storms and extreme heat waves that will transform
moderate climate zones in the hemispheres into tropical environments or deserts. According to a data
analysis published by the US Climate Change Science Program, there have been three distinct periods in
the twentieth century in which the average number of tropical storms increased and then continued at
“elevated levels.” The level of tropical storms globewide remained relatively stable until the close of the
century, but in the ten-year period from 1995 to 2005, the number of extreme cyclones and hurricanes
increased from an average of ten to fifteen: eight hurricanes and seven tropical storms.” And as the
Climate Institute notes. “It is important to consider that two of the driving forces behind hurricane
formation (sea surface temperature and humidity levels) have been influenced by climate change.”12
Heat waves are another extreme weather event that will increase in number as greenhouse gas
emissions continue, driving global temperatures caused by climate change increasingly higher. India and
a number of other countries have seen their summer temperatures increase to over one hundred
degrees Fahrenheit. The summer of 2003 saw one of the highest weather-related death tolls in
European history as fifty-two thousand people died as a result of heat extremes. With increased
temperatures comes increased capacity of the atmosphere to hold moisture. resulting in heavier
rainstorms. An increase in the intensity of floods in low-lying areas would be catastrophic around the
world. In Bangladesh. for example, over seventeen million people live in elevations of less than three
feet above sea level, and millions inhabit the flood plains and flat banks in the subcontinent along the
Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers.14 Environmental factors are almost invariably linked with economic
factors in the push and pull of everyday existence. In developing countries it is the impoverished who
often bear the brunt of the most environmental damage, which in turn sets off migration events.
Because people often become climate refugees as the result of multi-causal factors, it is not easy to
quantify their displacement as a social science problem. But it should also be recognized that sometimes
environmental decline has nothing to do with political economy. As Norman Myers has pointed out,
“Not all factors can be quantified in comprehensive detail, nor can all analyses be supported with
across-the-board documentation.”15 As we have seen. however, the links between climate and human
migration are not new. The droughts of the 1930s in the plains of the American Dust Bowl forced
hundreds of thousands of migrants toward California. and those that struck the Sahel region of Africa
between 1969 and 1974 displaced millions of farmers and nomads toward the cities.16 If future changes
in the climate continue to force mass levels of migration. it raises the question of when these victims
will be granted rights to a form of protection.
Climate refugees experience widespread inequality and exacerbate civil conflicts – the
plan is key
Faist 18 - Professor of Sociology of Transnationalization, Migration and Development at Malmo University (Thomas, “The Socio-Natural
Question: How Migration Reproduces Inequalities in an Age of Climate Change”, MIM Working Paper Series,
http://muep.mau.se/bitstream/handle/2043/24700/18-%202%20Final.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y,
2018)//abaime
As to inequalities resulting in migration, it is a well-established finding that class as a heterogeneity plays

a prominent role, since the poorest segments of the population are especially vulnerable to
environmental risks (for the following empirical claims, see the case studies in McLeman, Schade & Faist
2016). If at all, the poorer strata of groups usually have the option to move inside their countries,
although crossing internationally recognized borders may be the only option in the long run, especially
when island states become submerged. In such a constellation, resettlement may be the only option to
maintain a decent living; the inhabitants of the island Kiribati have all been resettled (Schade 2013).
However, costly resettlement programmes may backfire. For example, Inuits in Alaska were (re)settled
in areas which are now slowly disappearing in swamps (Bronen 2013). In general, the situation is
especially precarious for trapped populations who are neither able to engage in in-situ adaptation nor
migration as adaptation. Also, the intersection of class and gender, for example, constitutes an obvious
link: Women are especially vulnerable, also among the landless and poor, as they are eight times more
likely to be killed in natural disaster events compared with men (Adeniji 2011; IPCC 2014: chapter 11).
Those persons who are not destitute engage in migration mainly as a mechanism of opportunity
hoarding (Tilly 2005) which means the availability of a modicum of financial resources and/or social ties
which reduce the costs and risks of long-distance, international migration. Beyond well-known
heterogeneities, such as class, gender, age, religion, location/citizenship or ethnicity, it is spatial
heterogeneities which make a difference for coping with climate change induced risks. Populations in
urban areas tend to have more capacities to cope with climate change, those in the global North more
than in the global South, etc. Yet people often migrate in the wrong direction, toward areas endangered
by flooding, not away from them. This is the case for migration to urban areas in low-lying river deltas,
such as Dhaka or Shanghai (Lassailly-Jacob & Peyraut 2016). As to the opposite direction in the nexus,
from migration to inequalities, it is remittances which stand at the center of attention by researchers. It
is by a now a basic insight of research that financial (and social) remittances from international
migration often reproduce the class structures in the emigration locales. Moreover, there is a wealth of
evidence, for example from the Pacific Island States and Mexico that international remittances have
ambiguous effects in that they contribute to poverty reduction and exacerbate inequalities (see also
Aksakal & Schmidt 2015). In general, remittances are a mixed blessing because of the ubiquitous risks of
moral hazard on the scale of both states and households. State governments use financial remittances
to correct currency deficits and may even seek to avoid structural changes in the provision of social
protection, such as health and education. After all, much of the remittances are used for expenses in
these two areas. And on the household level, dependent family members may rely on income from
abroad instead of reconstituting the local sources of income (Horst et al. 2014). Legal status is another
heterogeneity which is tightly connected to inequalities in migration. It is crucial because it concerns the
politico-legal constitution of the category climate refugees. One of the fundamental scientific obstacles
– and it is here that the socionatural question becomes important again – is the difficulty of legally
codifying migrants in the context of climate change as refugees which would provide for their protection
(Kälin 2015). It is close to impossible to clearly assign singular natural hazards to the consequences of
climate change. Yet although no clear legal case can be made with respect to the causality between
climate changes and migration, there is abundant plausibility and thus social space for “norm
entrepreneurs” (Sunstein 1996). This category of entrepreneur has been active trying to establish
particular human rights for refugees in situations of climate-induced migration. One proposal seeks to
make planned relocation the corner stone of their proposal for a climate refugee regime (Bierman &
Boas 2008). The authors defined the term ‘climate refugee’ embracing only people who flee the direct
effects of climate change (within or across borders), that is, sea-level rise, extreme weather events,
droughts and water scarcity. The use of the term ‘refugee’ in this context became quite disputed,
however, because of its legal meaning under the Geneva Refugee Convention. Indeed, the United
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) – the United Nations (UN) refugee organisation – did
reject the use of the term “climate refugee” or “environmental refugee” and any attempts to broaden
the mandate of the Convention. For example, it was argued that “giving refugee status to environmental
refugees would only distort the definition and strain the desperately scarce resource of the international
refugee regime.” (Suhrke 1994: 492) This opposition might have been one of the reasons why the term
“environmental migration” and “climate migration” have since dominated in the debate and in research.
Obviously, there are additional arguments in the debate over the desirability of legal codes for climate-
induced migrants.Nullius in verba: The SocioNatural As this analysis suggests, the first generation of
scholarship on climate change and migration did, by using a mechanistic “nature” approach, seriously
underestimate the adaptive capacities of humans in the face of seminal ecological changes. The second
generation of scholarship focused on a particular kind of agency in light of “society”. The main
protagonist has been the resilient migrant who engages in successful adaptation to climate change. This
newer generation has propagated a mostly neoliberal version of mobility – a mobile and docile migrant
who acts in an anticipatory and preventative manner. Moreover, it has given insufficient attention to the
fact that the nexus between climate change and singular events cannot be proven, at least not by
natural science methods. Taking a combined “nature/society” lens (cf. Mooney, Duraiappah &
Larigauderie 2011), we see that migration leaves intact deeper structures of social inequalities and
reinforces exclusionary mechanisms (cf. Faist 2016). What is nonetheless interesting is that this hurdle
has not prevented norm entrepreneurs from scandalizing the dire fate of many migrants who engage in
or are even forced into climate-induced mobility. Research needs to be broadened to not only link
climate change and migration to inequalities but to also bring in civil violence. In most cases, climate
change and violence are treated as two independent threats, each of which potentially contribute to the
flow of migrants around the world. Recent work, however, suggest that climate change and civil violence
are, in fact, causally interrelated. Indeed, we already know that outbursts of civil violence are closely
tied to variations in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Hsiang, Meng, & Crane 2011). The
probability of a civil conflict erupting doubles during El Niño versus La Niña years, and the ENSO may
have been behind 21 per cent of all civil conflicts between 1950 and 2005. This is quite a remarkable
correlation and variance. Likewise, there is evidence suggesting a link between global warming and a
greater risk of civil violence in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Burke et al. 2009). Given the potential of
climate change to influence the frequency and severity of weather events such as El Niño, global
warming not only has the potential to generate migration directly through displacement but also
indirectly by triggering civil conflicts in affected areas throughout the world. Again, civil wars trigger
even more migration and refugee flows. With respect to changing perceptions of climate change,
migration needs to be placed in the context of general politico-economic transformations, the most
important of which is the mode of organizing economic life. Some analysts speak of a “metabolic rift”
(Foster 1999). This term refers to ecological crisis tendencies under capitalism. Already Karl Marx
theorized a rupture in the metabolic interaction between nature and society/culture which derives from
the mode of capitalist production and the growing rupture between urban and rural regions. He spoke
of an “irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism” (Marx 1981: 949). Marx held
this rift to be irreconcilable with any kind of sustainability (cf. Rosa et al. 2015) and the exploitation of
humans paralleling that of the soil. In a similar vein, another founding figure of sociology, Max Weber,
declared that industrial society would work “bis der letzte Zentner fossilen Brennstoffs verglüht ist”
(“until the last ton of fossil fuel has burnt to ashes”). However, in the meantime we have learned that,
while capitalism has remained a pervasive force, it is “local at all points” (Latour 1993: 117). It is exactly
on the local scale where conflicts over mitigation and adaptation to climate change have occurred over
the past years, before and after the Paris Climate summit, far away from spectacular but ultimately
inconsequential world gatherings. It has not been (global) climate governance but (local) climate
conflicts which have been propelling some progress in addressing rampant carbonization. What needs to
be determined in future research is the combination of responses to climate change which encompasses
both exit and voice.>
Climate change displaces millions, causes instability, and will only worsen with time
In 2009, Antonio Guterres, the then-U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, now the Secretary General of
the U.N., predicted that climate change would become the largest driver of population displacement,
both inside and across national borders.1 8 Climate change is already a major contributor to migration
and displacement, but the chain of causation is complex. 19 It is generally agreed that climate change is
seldom the sole cause of migration and displacement, but that it worsens existing economic, political,
and religious or ethnic tensions, and hits especially hard at populations that are already vulnerable. 2 0
As one report stated: [h]azard events such as floods and earthquakes create direct physical threats and
immediate impacts that trigger displacement. Drought contributes more indirectly to displacement risk,
largely through the erosion of food and livelihood security among vulnerable populations to the point
where fleeing their homes becomes a survival strategy, often of last resort. Some scholars have
attributed particular refugee crises in part to changes in regional climates (though not necessarily of
anthropogenic origin). One well-known study concluded that persistent drought forced as many as 1.5
million Syrian farmers to move to overcrowded cities, contributing to social turmoil and ultimately a civil
war that drove hundreds of thousands of people to attempt to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. 2 2
Drought, combined with ethnic tensions, government policies, and other factors, led to the crisis in the
Darfur of Sudan in the mid-2000s, though the importance of drought is contested. 2 3 Even the United
States has experienced massive internal migration as a result of climate disruption-the "dust bowl" of
the 1930s caused millions of people to flee the Great Plains(as unforgettably depicted in John
Steinbeck's 1939 novel The Grapes of Wrath).24 Climate change can cause displacement in multiple
ways. The most prominent are extreme flooding, and water shortages and desertification that threaten
food supplies and livelihoods. 2 5 Often, these conditions combine with existing poverty and political
instability, leading to worsened situations. The direct causal connection between climate change and
displacement is less difficult to establish for one particular impact: sea level rise. 2 7 If the seas have
risen above a location's land surface, its population has no choice but to move, except in those rare
places (such as the Netherlands) that can afford to build sea walls and other protections. Due to
uncertainties concerning the rate of climate change, the ability of different societies to cope with this
change, the availability of new homelands, and other factors, no reliable estimates exist of the number
of people who will be displaced partly or wholly by climate change. 2 9 However, several estimates put
the number of people in the hundreds of millions by the middle of this century. 3 0 One 2009 article
presented these estimates from various sources, using differing-and sometimes not fully disclosed-
methodologies: * People at risk of sea-level rise by 2050: 162 million * People at risk of droughts and
other climate change events by 2050: 50 million * People potentially at-risk of being displaced because
of desertification: 135 million * Refugees due to by climate change by 2050: 250 million[] * People
estimated to become permanently displaced 'climate refugees' by 2050: 200 million[]. A 2010 article,
after reviewing numerous available estimates, concluded, "[t]he total number of people at risk of
becoming climate refugees by 2050 could well be around or over 200 million, even though this number
is a rough estimate with a large margin of error." These, and all other estimates, involve considerable
degrees of speculation; the number of uncertainties and variables is daunting.3 3 However, even the
orders of magnitude involved are frightening. 3 4 One 2016 study examined how many people would
have to move and how far they would have to move if global mean temperatures rise by 2 0 C, and if
they would need to go to a place that has the approximate temperatures of today in order to maintain
similar agricultural patterns. 3 5 The study calculated that by the end of the century, about 12.5% of the
world's population (mostly in the tropical areas of Latin America, Africa, and South Asia) would have to
migrate more than 1000 km, and 33.9% would have to migrate more than 500 km.3 6 If, as the United
Nations estimates, world population in 2100 is about 11.2 billion, 3 7 the resulting numbers are jaw-
dropping. Of course, these numbers may be too high because many people could find ways to adapt to
the changing climate. On the other hand, the numbers may be too low because (as discussed below)
global temperatures in 2100 may well considerably exceed a 2 0 C rise. The country with the largest
number of people endangered by climate change is probably Bangladesh. 3 9 "A three-foot rise in sea
levels[, which seems likely by the end of the century,] would submerge almost 20[%] of the entire
country and displace more than 30 million people"; and if the rise is five to six feet, perhaps 50 million
people would be displaced. 4 0 Sea level rise is not the only climate-related threat facing Bangladesh;
the country also faces risks from extreme heat, river flooding, riverbank erosion, salinization of
groundwater resources, loss of water from the Himalayas and Hindu Kush glaciers, and decreased
agricultural productivity. All this means that by the end of the century, climate change could displace
several times the number of people who are currently displaced. Unless there are advance planning and
preparations, we can expect to see further international crises over where people fleeing uninhabitable
areas will go, as well as degrading and dangerous conditions in the inevitable refugee camps and
informal settlements.
Sea level rises from climate change leads to drought and death – complete relocation
is key
Pilkey et al 16 – professor of Earth and Ocean science at Duke, geologist in the State of Washington’s Department of Ecology, and
professor of mechanical engineering at Queen’s Univesity (Orrin, Linda, and Keith respectively, “Coastal Calamaties”, “Retreat from a rising
sea”, 2 May 2016)//abaime
Atolls are coral islands, whose origin Charles Darwin famously discerned in 1835. The coral reefs once
formed a ring around volcanic peaks that extended above the ocean surface. As the seafloor spread, the
volcanoes moved away from the mid-ocean ridge into deeper water to become submerged. The reefs,
however, continued building upward and maintained the ring shape that characterizes the atolls of
today. These ring-shaped islands surround an interior lagoon. Darwin got it all right, except he didn’t
know about the phenomenon of seafloor spreading, which was discovered 150 years after his
participation in the voyage of the Beagle. Because the offshore slope (the sides of the volcano) is steep,
storm surges there are small. But it takes only a small storm surge to flood a low-lying atoll. Typically on
the open-ocean side of the atoll’s rim is a continuous ridge 15 to 20 feet high, which is made up of coral
reef fragments and debris tossed up in storms. The ridge usually is not habitable because it is frequently
overwashed by storms. Rather, the living space is a flat area behind the ridge, typically 6 feet or so
above sea level. Table 6 lists some of the atoll island nations and communities in the Pacific Ocean. The
one exception is the Maldives atolls, which are in the Indian Ocean. All the numbers are approximate,
and the number of islands often includes small, uninhabited islands. The populations indicate the
number of environmental refugees who soon will need to be relocated in one way or another. In total,
more than a million people live on atolls or other low oceanic islands in both the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. Some of the atoll nations listed as independent have a semiformal relationship with a larger
country. For example, the Marshall Islands have a “free association” with the United States, which
provides defense and social services plus grants for infrastructure assistance. New Zealand also has
special relationships with some of the island nations. These free-association relationships are likely to be
a factor in funding future relocation. Perhaps the biggest single problem currently facing the people on
these islands is the precarious source of acceptable drinking water. The freshwater lens under the
islands floats on top of seawater in the reef-rock substrate. As the sea level rises, the freshwater lens
thins and, in some places, has disappeared altogether. That is, the contact or interface between
freshwater and saltwater moves upward as the sea level rises, contaminating wells. Not only is the
shrinking lens problematic, but pollution of this groundwater from surface contamination infiltration is a
frequent occurrence. An alternative source of drinking water is the collection of rainwater, but the
larger towns cannot depend on this source. In addition, the salty groundwater leads to the destruction
of food crops like coconuts and the root crops taro and pulaka. In some communities, people have taken
up planting in old oil drums because of the poor soil conditions caused by the intrusion of saltwater. The
growing number of unsanitary conditions on these small, shrinking islands, many with densely packed
populations, is adding to the problem. Some visitors report very poor sanitary conditions throughout
and around densely populated villages where trash and piles of dog, pig, and human excrement abound.
The problem is especially serious in the larger towns like Majuro in the Marshalls and Tarawa in Kiribati
(more in chapter 9). The atolls’ solution to sea-level rise must be more than retreat. It will be complete
abandonment and complete relocation, and not merely to another atoll. Relocation will mean moving
body and soul to new lands, usually the mainland, with strange vegetation, unfamiliar foods, and
unfamiliar customs. The islanders’ future will not be easy and brings into serious question the future
existence of island governments and culture.
Climate change in LDCs destroy water availability and food production and promote
regional tensions – migration is the only adaptive strategy
Nawrotzki 14 Raphael Nawrotzki is a postdoctoral associate for the University of Minnesota
Population Center on the Terra Populus project (Raphael, “Climate Migration and Moral Responsibility,”
4/2/14. NCBI, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5035111/) // SR
Climate change is likely to increase weather extremes across the globe (IPCC 2007). The nature and
strength of these weather events will vary between geographical locations. The following sections
present different effects of climate change on the livelihoods of rural households in less developed
countries (LDCs). It is a well established phenomenon that an increase in the global mean temperature
leads to the increase in atmospheric moisture content (Kundzewicz et al. 2010). Through this
mechanism, climate change has begun to alter the monsoon onset in south Asia, impacting the
magnitude, frequency, and duration of floods (Douglas 2009). These variations pose major problems to
the local livelihoods of farmers, because agriculture is highly sensitive to changes in the rainfall regime.
For example, the 1998 floods in Bangladesh led to a lower food intake alongside deteriorating human
health conditions especially among children (Del Ninno and Lundberg 2005). Sea level rise Sea-level rise
has the power to impact a large number of people (Nicholls 2004), based on the global tendency to
settle close to the ocean. For example, already in 2003, more than half of the world population lived
within 200 kilometers of a coastline (Creel 2003). Small island nations are particularly vulnerable to sea
level rise. The best known case is probably Tuvalu (Farbotko and McGregor 2010), a pacific island state,
which is in danger of inundation if the sea-level continues to rise, due to its low elevation (Dickinson
1999, Yamano et al. 2007). On other islands, such as the coral atolls of Micronesia, sea-level-rise events
have led to coastal erosion, shoreline inundation, and saltwater intrusion, resulting in crop losses and
contamination of freshwater sources, severely impacting local livelihoods (Keim 2010). Droughts and
decrease in rainfall It has been projected that climate change will cause an increase in droughts and
desertification (IPCC 2007). Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, these tendencies have received scientific
coverage. For example, Elagib (2009) found a trend towards intensifying and more recurrent droughts
over a time period of 34 years in Sudan. Zeng and Yoon (2009) used a coupled atmosphere-ocean-land
model to predict an expansion of the world’s major subtropical deserts by 34% at the end of the 21st
century. Droughts and an increase in desertification are likely to lead to food insecurity (Stringer 2009),
requiring people to respond with changes in livelihood strategies (Nielsen and Reenberg 2010). Water
shortage due to melting glaciers Global warming is impacting the water supply in countries like Nepal
and China. Through the ongoing retreat of major glaciers, which serve as giant water storage units, the
flow of rivers will gradually decrease (Shen 2010, Chalise et al. 2003). In addition, global warming has
begun to reduce annual snowfall. Both effects, will severely impact the water availability and food
production in areas such as the Karnali region of Western Nepal (Chalise et al. 2003). Tropical storms
Finally, climate change has been related to an increase in oceans’ water surface temperatures with a
trend toward more frequent and intense hurricanes (Webster et al. 2005). In May 2008, cyclone Nargis
hit Myanmar. It killed thousands of people and destroyed the majority of the rice fields. Survivors of the
cyclone faced a severe food shortage and tried to escape to bordering countries such as India and
Thailand, which created regional tension (Rice 2008) Listed above are only a few examples that
illustrate the range of impacts of climate change on LDCs. Its adverse impact will be felt most by the
rural poor who depend heavily on agriculture as the main source of household income. In the face of a
decline in livelihood options, migration becomes a significant adaptive strategy at the household level
(McLeman and Hunter 2010). Even though the IPCC stated as early as 1990 that human migration might
be the greatest single impact of climate change (Brown 2008), the link between climate change and
migration is an area of research that is only emerging slowly. Henry et al. (2004) broke ground in the
study of population environment interactions and proved a significant association between reduction in
rainfall and out-migration for Burkina Faso. Similarly, some other studies have linked migration to
droughts in Africa (Findley 1994, Nielsen and Reenberg 2010). In addition, a recent study undertaken in
Nepal provides evidence that environmental change increases migration, especially short-distance
moves (Massey et al. 2010).
Displaced climates refugees spur political instability and regional conflict through
mass energy consumption, environmental degradation, and depletion of local
economies in developing countries
In order to provide for their energy needs, refugees are reliant on the natural resources of the host
state, whose management is not a straightforward process in many situations.204 The lack of reliable
energy delivery has the capability to affect the surrounding environment and the local economies of
the respective country.205 Moreover, countries hosting a large number of refugees, already deal with
deforestation, resource stress, severe energy access challenges, fuel pollution and high fuel costs.206
The influx of refugees can result in environmental degradation, economic instability and, in some cases,
violent conflict due to exceeding the “‘carrying capacity of their environment[]’” and a governance
system that is no longer perceived “as effective and legitimate.”207 Refugees can often have disastrous
results on the environment which may include “deforestation, soil erosion, and depletion and pollution
of water resources.”208 The initial environmental damage caused by an influx of refugees begins in
the refugee camps where refugees rely on the surrounding natural resources to sustain
themselves.209 This reliance on local natural resources will continue throughout the period that
refugees spend in the camp, as there will always be some commodities that cannot be given by external
donors. An influx of refugees and their energy consumption and production patterns can also impact the
economic development of a host country.211 Refugees settled in camps are more dependent upon
“assistance from humanitarian agencies” than self-settled refugees.212 Therefore, the economic impact
of refugees settled in camps is not typically felt by the local population, while the impact of self-settled
refugees in urban areas, where refugees are usually more active in the economic structure and
dependent on the economic networks, is greater.213 An influx of refugees can decrease local wages
and put a substantial strain on the infrastructure and availability of land.214 As the majority of
refugees migrate to neighboring developing countries, the need to provide welfare services forces local
authorities to divert resources and manpower from local populations to assist refugees, which can delay
their own development.215 Although a sustainable energy intervention for refugees can result in
immeasurable economic benefits for both refugees and the host population — as explained above —
energy use and energy delivery in camps and outside of camps by refugees is conducted in an
unsustainable way.216 For example, even construction of an energy efficient settlement for refugees
could yield massive economic benefits on a longer time scale. Conflicts can erupt as refugees put a
strain on the host state’s environment, energy resources, economy, “and change the ethnic
composition of receiving areas.”217 Some studies indicate that “countries highly dependent on natural
resources, as well as those experiencing high rates of deforestation and soil degradation or low per
capita availability of arable land and freshwater, have higher than average risks of conflict.”218 As
refugees flee, mostly to developing countries, the security implications are more pronounced due to
the possible conditions in those host states, particularly poverty, political instability, already existing
conflict, limited resources, and “inadequate access to information or resources.”219 Additionally,
unanswered concerns of local communities regarding refugees’ environmental, energy, and economic
impacts on host states can cause friction and lead to possible conflicts.220 However, the impacts of
refugees’ energy use are not constricted to a particular area, community, or even to the present time.
They can have impacts that can affect generations to come. Future people have the right to enjoy an
environment undisturbed by the damage that the employed energy systems can inflict over time.
Decisions made today on the energy use patterns of refugees and the distribution of impacts will be
significant even decades from now. By addressing the procedural and distributive gaps for refugees, we
will not be only improving the living conditions of current refugees and host communities, but also of
future generations.
Climate change and refugees causes regional instability through additional stress on
developing countries—creates global conflict, risk of terrorism, and failed states
Stewart 14- Mark G. Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure
Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia. He is co-author of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment of Engineering Systems (Chapman & Hall, 1997, and Japanese edition in 2003), and has published
more than 400 technical papers and reports. He has 30 years of experience in probabilistic risk and vulnerability
assessment of infrastructure and security systems that are subject to man-made and natural hazards. Professor
Stewart has received extensive Australian Research Council support, including an Australian Professorial
Fellowship, to develop probabilistic risk-modelling techniques for infrastructure subject to military and terrorist
explosive blasts, and cost-benefit assessments of aviation security, policing, and counter-terrorism protective
measures for critical infrastructure, “Climate Change and National Security: Balancing the Costs and Benefits”,
January 2014, 146-148,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mark_Stewart8/publication/301293584_Climate_Change_and_National_Se
curity_Balancing_the_Costs_and_Benefits/links/5710466f08aefb6cadaaa7e9/Climate-Change-and-National-
Security-Balancing-the-Costs-and-Benefits.pdf, // Suraj P
It is argued that an increased likelihood of droughts, floods, famine, disease, loss of habitable land,
damage to housing and infrastructure, and other large-scale natural and humanitarian disasters will
place additional stress on communities and governments. If climate projections are accurate, that
increased stress could be a “threat multiplier,” leading to “widespread political instability” and “failed
states,” while fostering “the conditions for internal conflicts, extremism, and movement toward
authoritarianism and radical ideologies.” It is maintained that the logical outcomes of those dire
scenarios mean “the U.S. may be drawn more frequently into these situations . . . to help provide
stability before conditions worsen and are exploited by extremists” and “the U.S. and Europe may
experience mounting pressure to accept large numbers of immigrant and refugee populations.”53
Retired Admiral T. Joseph Lopez gloomily predicts that “climate change will provide the conditions that
will extend the war on terror.”54 That prediction, of course, assumes business as usual with no efforts to
mitigate CO2 emissions, to implement climate adaptation strategies, to develop new technologies, or to
achieve improvements in wealth creation and human capital. It also assumes that terrorism thrives in
“failed states.” Although that conclusion is true in some cases, a 2008 Congressional Research Service
report finds the opposite also holds true: “Terrorists have been known to exploit safe havens in non-
weak as well as weak states. The Political Instability Task Force, a research group commissioned by the
Central Intelligence Agency, found in a 2003 report that terrorists operate in both ‘caves’ (i.e., failed
states, where militant groups can exist with impunity) and ‘condos’ (i.e., states that have the
infrastructure to support the international flow of illicit people, funds, and information).”55 Moreover,
after the costly enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and its allies will likely resist the
temptation to get drawn into peacekeeping and stabilization missions to rescue “failed states.” As
former secretaries of state Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III attested in 2011: “We cannot be the
world’s policeman. We cannot use military force to meet every humanitarian challenge that may
arise.”56 Moreover, other foreign policy levers—such as financial aid for transformational development,
civilian stabilization, and reconstruction assistance; the fragile states strategy of the U.S. Agency for
International Development; and military, police, and counterterrorism assistance57—will typically
produce better outcomes than direct military intervention. There is additional concern about refugees.
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2011 there were 15.2 million refugees, 26.4
million internally displaced persons, and 895,000 applications for asylum. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Syria have added to those figures. Sea-level rise in river deltas has the potential to displace tens of
millions of inhabitants and might threaten the very existence of small island states. Maxine Burkett from
the East–West Center in Honolulu estimates a total of 200 million to 250 million climate migrants by
2050, although some of those projections are based on “heroic extrapolations.”58 Moreover, Jon
Barnett and Michael Webber from the University of Melbourne suggest “that social processes linked to
poverty and marginality as well as the treatment of migrants may be more important determinants of
the amount and consequences of migration than environmental change.”59 However, if intracountry
and intercountry migration accelerates because of climate change, it would most likely happen in a
gradual manner and not in any sudden exodus of refugees more commonly associated with war zones.
The populations of small island states are by definition small—fewer than 3 million people reside in
Pacific Islands, for example. More ethnic Pacific Islanders live abroad than reside in their home
countries; therefore, “the greatest concentrations of Pacific Islanders” are “in cities such as Auckland,
Sydney, Honolulu, and Los Angeles.”60 If all Pacific Islanders were to become “climate refugees”
because of rising sea levels over the next 30 to 50 years, and if they were all to be resettled in the
United States, Australia, and New Zealand, those countries would need to lift their existing immigration
levels by only 5 to 8 percent.61 Migration, whether voluntary or forced, is a perennial feature of life. The
International Organization for Migration estimates that the total number of migrants is about 1 billion
worldwide today.62 Australia, Canada, and the United States accepted nearly 70 million migrants in the
20th century, and today they welcome nearly 1.5 million new migrants each year.63 Europe accepted
1.7 million migrants in 2011. Immigration to the 34 member countries of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) totaled 5.3 million in 2011.64 Although climate change may
provide a tipping point for mass migration, it is unlikely to occur. Movement of people across borders
happens regularly on a large scale. Assuming Burkett’s upper figure of 250 million climate migrants over
the next 40 to 50 years, and further assuming that they were all to be resettled in just the OECD
member countries, then 5 million additional migrants per year could be accommodated by Australia,
Canada, Europe, the United States, and other OECD member countries by doubling their existing
migrant quotas. That might not be politically palatable to some, but it is not an insurmountable
problem. Moreover, issues of food and energy security, as well as mass migration, can be ameliorated
by funding climate adaptation measures in the developing world. Adaptation measures to reduce the
vulnerability of infrastructure, coastal zones, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and human health to
climate-change hazards would include (a) flood-control dikes and levees, (b) dams, (c) cyclone shelters,
(d) storm- and flood-resistant housing, (e) improved communications infrastructure, (f) resettlement of
populations to lower-risk zones, and (g) improved health care. In 2010, the World Bank estimated the
cost to the developing world of adapting to a world that is warmer by approximately four degrees
Fahrenheit by 2050 at about $75 billion per year.65 That figure represents less than 0.2 percent of world
GDP and 55 percent of official development assistance from OECD countries.66 U.S. foreign aid was
approximately $30 billion in 2011, or 23 percent of aid provided by OECD member countries. If the 55
percent increase in foreign aid is shared equally by all developed nations, the U.S. foreign aid
contribution would need to increase by roughly $16.5 billion per year, and aid from the rest of the
developed world would increase by $58.5 billion per year. Increasing foreign aid may be an overly
optimistic solution given the “sorry track record” of foreign aid where governance is poor,67 but
investing in targeted adaptation measures may have a better chance of success. Mitigating CO2
emissions and investing in research and development (R&D) of new technologies for emission reduction
and carbon sequestration are another option to ameliorate the effects of climate change. One study
suggests that a global investment of $18 billion per year in “R&D and mitigation” could halve “business
as usual” CO2 emissions by 2100, reducing the impact of climate change by at least 60 percent.68 If that
is true and if the burden of that investment were shared by OECD member countries in proportion to
their GDP, the U.S. contribution would be around $5 billion per year, equivalent to a tax of only $1 per
ton of CO2.
Climate refugees cause resource shortages and destabilize entire nations – empirics
Stevenson 18 - Associate Professor of International Relations at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Hayley, “Climate Conflicts: Myth or
Reality?”, 5 March 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/climate-conflicts-myth-or-reality)//abaime
The specter of water wars has long loomed large in political and popular imaginations. With the end of
the Cold War, fresh concerns emerged that future wars would be fought not over ideology but over
natural resources. The alliteratively appealing phrase of “water wars” began rolling off the tongue as
United Nations leaders and politicians made bold claims about the inevitable carnage that resource
scarcity would bring. Climate change heightens these concerns as the gap widens between what science
tells us is necessary and what politics tells us is feasible.
Climate change poses multiple risks with the potential to trigger tensions within and across nation-
states. In some places flooding and the rise of sea levels will threaten homes and essential
infrastructure; shrinking access to water for irrigation and consumption will undermine rural livelihoods,
especially in semi-arid areas; and warming, drought, flooding, and changes in rain patterns will disrupt
food systems and exacerbate food insecurity. The severity of these risks rises with higher global
temperatures. In other words, risks are directly related to the present scale of mitigation action. So what
can we expect in the years ahead? Are climate wars on the horizon, or do they largely lie in the realm of
cli-fi fantasy?
History can be a guide to the future, so what do past experiences tell us about the relationship between
environmental change and conflict? In the case of water, we see a mismatch between assumptions and
evidence. Common wisdom holds that states—and perhaps individuals—will resort to conflict to secure
their own access to scarce resources, like freshwater. Research by environmental scientist Peter Gleick
in the early 1990s was the first to back up this assumption with historical analysis. He predicted that
growth in population and demand, combined with uncertain supply, would increase the likelihood of
international military action to secure supplies.
The Middle East, as the world’s most water scarce region, provides numerous cases—both historic and
contemporary—to support the hypothesis. Fourteen centuries ago, the King of Assyria reportedly seized
water wells to weaken Arabia and gain strategic advantage. More recently, the Jordan River basin has
been a hot spot. Animosities in the region have run high since Israel was formed in 1948. But it was the
Arab countries’ attempt to divert headwaters of the Jordan River away from Israel in the 1960s that
pushed them towards violent conflict. In 1967, shortly before war broke out, the Israeli Prime Minister
warned that water is essential for the country’s survival and they would use “all means necessary” to
secure water flows. Over six days, Israel then bombed a Jordanian dam on an important tributary to the
Jordan River and seized large swathes of upstream territory; and in the process expanded its access to
freshwater.
But some scholars remained skeptical that examples from the Middle East reflected a more general
connection between resource scarcity and war. Studies out of Norway showed that most of the conflicts
Gleick identified were only verbal conflicts, threats of violence, or water-related violence in already-
occurring wars. In other words, they were not cases of water scarcity triggering armed conflict.
Furthermore, in most cases, water was only an instrument of war or a strategic target, not the objective
of fighting in the first place.
Further research at the University of Oregon categorized 2,000 international interactions over war and
found that cooperative actions were far more prominent than conflictual ones. Cooperative water
bodies have even survived conflict and war between water-sharing countries in various parts of Asia
(such as during the Vietnam War). It turns out that violent conflict specifically over water is a fairly rare
and isolated phenomenon. Democratic regimes, international trade relations, and membership of
cooperative international institutions all reduce the likelihood of conflict. This “democratic peace thesis”
should not prompt a Pollyanna vision of the future, but it should tame fears about the likelihood of
climate change driving conflict.
Of course, we cannot know that the future will reflect the past: irrespective of whether scarcity was a
driver of historical conflicts it may well be a driver of future ones. Water is non-substitutable in
agriculture, human wellbeing, and some manufacturing and electricity generation. The world population
is estimated to increase by 83 million people per year until 2100, when it will peak at roughly 11 billion.
So as long as demands increase, water will become ever scarcer and create conditions we haven’t seen
in the past. We also cannot rule out the potential for sub-national conflict, especially in areas where
ethnic and regional tensions are already high (such as along the Nile and Indus rivers), and where local
populations compete with multinational companies for dwindling resources. Mining companies are
profligate water users in arid and semi-arid countries, and this is likely to provoke further tensions in the
years ahead.
In Peru, melting glaciers and warming temperatures are reducing the water available for agriculture in
the Andean highlands. This provokes clashes with mining companies, which have privileged access to
water and a reputation for contaminating common water supplies. This problem is not unique to Peru.
As climate change threatens water supply and quality, we will likely see more intense debates about
how to use this resource, which in turn places greater pressure on states’ capacity to peacefully and
fairly manage competing demands. At the international level, multilateral institutions can promote
cooperation and stifle tensions, but these institutions are designed to manage relations among states,
not among sub-national groups, or among communities and firms.
Events in Syria have ignited fears about climate change driving civil war. In 2015, Time magazine
presented the “surge of migrants” crossing into Europe as foretelling a future crisis of climate refugees.
With everyone from Barack Obama to Prince Charles repeating the claim that unprecedented severe
drought in Syria triggered civil tension and ultimately civil war, it quickly became accepted wisdom. But
here too we should avoid hasty assumptions, as researchers from the United Kingdom and Germany
concluded that the “drought migration-civil war thesis” rests on weak evidence.
Of course, whether or not migration is fueled by conflict or other climate-related destitution, human
displacement is now inevitable in the years ahead. The scale of displacement will depend on the
mitigation and adaptation actions put in place now. The attention of the international policy community
should be directed to this question of “human security,” irrespective of the risk of climate conflicts in
the years ahead.
Ext. Disease IL
Unresolved climate migration exacerbates infectious disease, food insecurity, and
disruption of healthcare
Pilkey et. al 17 (Orrin H. Pilkey is James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Division of Earth and Ocean
Sciences, at Duke University. His books include A Celebration of the World's Barrier Islands and Useless
Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future, Linda Pilkey-Jarvis is a geologist at
the Washington State Department of Ecology, where she helps manage the state's oil-spills program.
She is the coauthor, with Orrin H. Pilkey, of Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't
Predict the Future, Keith C. Pilkey is an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration.
He has an undergraduate degree from Appalachian State University and a juris doctor from Wake Forest
University School of Law. He is coauthor, with Orrin H. Pilkey, of Global Climate Change: A Primer, Cities
on the Brink from Retreat from a Rising Sea, pg. 65-66//waters)
Extreme events in crowded urban areas will disrupt health care, public-health services and the
availablility of fresh food and waterthereby exacerbating underlying health conditions and the ability to
control infectious diseases. The rise in sea level and its associated floods will compromise food security
and increase malnutrition, spreading infectious diseases, causing food poisoning, and exposing people to
pathogens as sewage systems overflow. These changes will likely contribute to mental stress and post-
traumatic stress disor- der (PTSD). The impact in urban areas will be greater in those less wealthy
countries lacking adequate infrastructure and capacity in health services and public health. The 2014
World Health Organization’s “Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)” is the
fifth in a series of WHO reports on the effect of climate change on health. The report outlines with “high
confidence” the long-term risks to human health related to climate change and sea-level rise. In urban
areas, the most likely risks are (NIPCC). The NIPCC has countered by noting potentially positive
outcomes of climate change and sea-level rise, such as fewer cold weather–related deaths. But even this
group acknowledges that sea- level rise will make existing poverty-related health problems even worse.
According to the United Nations’ predictions in its 2013 “World Population Prospects” report, by 2050
one in six people will be age 65 or older, which is double the proportion today. Between 2010 and 2050,
this population in the United States is expected to increase by 111 percent, and by 181 percent in the
world (1.5 billion worldwide). About 54 percent of the world’s population, a number that is expected to
increase to 66 percent by 2050, now live in urban areas. Much of that expected growth will be in
developing countries. In a very thorough study for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Robert Nicholls and his colleagues compared the relative exposure of the world’s
largest port cities to flooding from rising seas and storm surges, both for today and projected into the
year 2070. (The OECD is an international organization whose member nations share information on
trade and economic growth.) The report ranks cities’ vulnerability to a once-in-a-100-years surge-
induced flood based on the economic value of their port and city assets (buildings, transportation, and
utility infrastructure). The OECD study doesn’t account for flood adaptations that could change the
impact of the future events. Using this lens, 60 percent of the world’s assets that are exposed to sea-
level rise and flooding are found in three wealthy, developed countries: the United States, Japan, and
the Netherlands (table 1). The report then projected how the top 10 ranked cities would change by the
year 2070. Over the coming decades, the growth and economic development of the largest cities in
Asia are key driving factors in how this list would change.
Ext. Impact Filter / Root Cause
It is empirically a threat multiplier that explains the root cause of global conflict
Sindico 17 – environmental law professor at the University of Strathclyde (Francesco, “Climate Change and Security”, The Inaugural Issue
a Decade Later, Hein Online, March 2018)//abaime
<The discussion in 2007 at the UNSC on climate change was not an isolated event. It was followed by a
meeting in 2011, two in 2015 and a further one in April 2017. These meetings have followed the Arria
formula, meant to encourage more informal discussions that do not necessarily lead to the adoption of
formal documents, hence giving countries more space to voice their positions and concerns. Stemming
from such discussions the UN General Assembly adopted in 2oo9 a Resolution on 'Climate change and
its possible security implications', 4 which man dated the Secretary General to submit a report on the
topic of climate change and security,5 which was published later the same year.6 Rather than providing
a clear indication as to whether climate change is indeed to be considered a threat to peace and
international security, and far from clarifying a potential role for the UNSC, these meetings have, over
the last decade, provided space for soft power and climate diplomacy to push climate change higher on
the UNSC agenda as a 'threat multiplier'. And that is precisely what climate change is and should be
considered. Climate change per se is no threat to peace and international security, but its negative
effects, when coupled with other factors that lead to conflicts and violence, can make a situation,
literally, explosive. An example of this approach comes from Lake Chad. The UNSC organised a visit to
the region in March 2017, which ended with a statement by Mr Rycroft, the UK President of the UNSC at
the time, who framed the causes of tension and conflict in the region in the following way: 'Those are
multifaceted, complex set of problems and require a holistic set of solutions.' Amongst these
multifaceted challenges 'drought and other environmental challenges' were singled out.7 That same
month, UNSC Resolution 2349 (2017) on the Lake Chad refers to climate change in the following terms:
Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the
stability of the region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and
food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management
strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors; 8 Only l0 years after the first
meeting discussing climate change before the UNSC, the latter has adopted a legally binding Resolution
where it did not shy away from mentioning climate change and its adverse effects as one of the 'roots
causes' of a conflict, in this case the tension and violence in the Lake Chad region. Interestingly, it does
not limit itself to stating that climate change is a threat multiplier, but it takes a further step and
encourages countries and the UN to step up its efforts in terms of 'risk assessment' and 'risk
management' strategies. I will show how this last recommendation may well be a potential link with the
current international climate change legal regime.
But before I get there, let us pause and reflect as to whether the past ten years have proved that climate
change is indeed a threat multiplier leading to threats to peace and international security. One of the
major conflicts of the last ten years has been increasingly linked to climate change. According to some
authors, the apparent sectarian and political nature of the Syrian conflict also hides causes directly
linked to climate change.9 In 2006, the worse drought in centuries paved the way for unrest in already
crowded cities. Water shortages and rise in food prices increased tensions and led to violence within the
cities where the unrest and the civil war started. Moving to the African continent, a UNEP report links
climate change to the violent conflict in Darfur. Water scarcity and crops decline in productivity were
hailed as many of the factors exacerbating the already existing tensions.10 Talking about the Darfur
conflict, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon referred to it in the following way: 'Amid the diverse
social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from
climate change.' And on the Arab peninsula, water and climate change have been said to be at the heart
of the ongoing conflict in Yemen.12 Further studies have highlighted the relationship between extreme
climatic conditions and unrest in countries and regions, such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Northern
Africa. The same study concludes by maintaining that 'natural disasters had the potential to amplify
already existing societal tensions and ... thus to further destabilise several of the world's most conflict
prone regions'.1 3 It would be difficult to argue that these past and current conflicts are directly linked
to climate change, but the past decade has proven that climate change and its negative effects, water
scarcity in particular, pose a considerable threat multiplier to countries that are already prone to tension
for other non-environmental reasons.
This short piece has showed that in the last ten years the UNSC has continued to address climate change
as a security issue and has recently even included it in a Resolution as one of the root factors of a
conflict. A brief overview of tensions and violence over the past decade, from Syria to Yemen and
beyond, confirms climate change as a threat multiplier. Notwithstanding these developments that seem
to align climate change with security, the role of the UNSC and the response it can take to deal with cli
mate change is still unclear. 14 It is hence necessary to better understand whether the securitisation of
the climate discourse has opened up new legal opportunities or raised new legal challenges outside of
the UNSC. I will briefly touch upon three of these legal questions: international litigation, climate
refugees, and loss and damage.>
Climate migration contributes to conflict in a variety of ways

Null and Herzer Risi 17 - Writer/Editor at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and enior Program Manager in
the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center (Schuyler and Lauren, ”Climate, migration, and conflict in a changing
world”, 9 October 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/climate-migration-and-conflict-in-a-
changing-world)//abaime
Record levels of displacement and accelerating climate change have prompted many to wonder if the
world is headed toward a more violent future. Whether a policymaker, practitioner, diplomat, or
peacebuilder, the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict is posing fundamental challenges in
myriad ways. The Wilson Center’s study, Navigating Complexity: Climate, Migration, and Conflict in a
Changing World, sets out to provide insights into these challenges and examine policy responses.
Climate change is expected to contribute to the movements of people through a variety of means. At
the same time, there is significant concern climate change may influence the form, type, and location of
violent conflict. Our understanding of these dynamics is evolving quickly and sometimes producing
surprising results. There are, in fact, considerable misconceptions about why people move, how many
move, and what effects they have. While not exhaustive, the authors give a sense of the major lines of
thinking and seek to help answer the following questions: What do we know (and not know) about the
links between climate change, migration, and violent conflict? And what can be done to maximize the
potential for constructive outcomes? Interwoven factors Experts generally agree that the risk of violent
conflict or instability related to climate change-induced migration is highly dependent on local context.
Climatic factors are very difficult to separate from other critical factors in decisions to move or engage in
armed conflict. These economic, political, and social factors will always be key parts of any analysis of
climate change, migration, and conflict. Nevertheless, climate change and large movements of people
clearly present major societal and governance challenges. Governments, international organizations,
and civil society are being asked to respond, whether they are prepared or not. The report provides a
background scan of relevant literature and an in-depth analysis of the high-profile cases of Darfur and
Syria to discern policy-relevant lessons. The study offers five major takeaways: 1) Labels such as “climate
refugees” are misleading, given the current underdevelopment of legal frameworks defining these
terms, lack of formal protections or status, and multiple causes of human mobility. 2) Because the vast
majority of migration and displacement occurs within national borders, strengthening local institutions,
including customary institutions, and encouraging flexibility in resource rights may help enable the
peaceful accommodation of new arrivals. The primacy of resource rights also suggests the principles of
environmental peacebuilding can help reduce vulnerability in areas prone to climate problems. 3)
Conflicts where climate change and displacement play substantial roles may begin at the communal
level but can quickly expand beyond. Related peace processes will therefore likely need to be carried out
at multiple spatial and political levels. 4) Movement in response to environmental change has a long
history, and migration can be a successful and peaceful means of climate adaptation if enabled by
smart policy. Although taking action is essential, simplistic analyses of climate’s impacts on migration,
displacement, and conflict can prompt misdirected responses. Political, economic, and social contexts
are as important to understanding vulnerability as exposure to the physical effects of climate change
itself. 5) Some mechanisms for coping with climate change are tenuous and susceptible to policy
change, as in the case of Darfur’s hakura land tenure system, which helped alleviate resource tensions
before it was dismantled. Indeed, climate change responses can contribute to the displacement of
people and social conflict. “Do no harm” should be the operating principle—though not “do nothing,” as
people will adjust to their situation, regardless of how prepared the policy environment is, potentially
turning to destructive responses if faced with few other option
Climate migration uniquely leads to conflict – many warrants

Reuveny 07 – professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University (Rafael, “Climate change-induced
migration and violent conflict”, 2007, https://ac-els-cdn-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/S0962629807000601/1-s2.0-
S0962629807000601-main.pdf?_tid=aab16bb6-e9eb-4df1-bbdb-
014f146dec85&acdnat=1530987099_20711cbcca36e607983242568dc62148)//abaime
This section argues that climate

change-induced migration can promote conflict in areas receiving migrants,
the intensity of which may vary across cases. The process leading from migration to conflict works through four channels,
which may act concurrently. In this conceptual model, conflict is more likely when two or more of the following channels work together facing
certain auxiliary conditions. Competition
The arrival of environmental migrants can burden the economic and
resource base of the receiving area, promoting native-emigrant contest over resources. Pressures are expected
to rise with the number of migrants and residents, particularly when resources are scarce in the receiving area and property rights are
underdeveloped. The excess demand for resources may also generate lateral pressure, expansion of
economic and political activities beyond the region’s or state’s borders in order to acquire resources,
which increases the risk of conflict. Ethnic tension When environmental migrants and residents belong
to different ethnic groups, the migration may promote tension. Residents may feel threatened, host
countries may fear separatism, migrants may attempt to reunify with their home country, and residents
may respond aggressively. Situations involving long-standing ethnic disputes between migrants and residents are likely to be
particularly prone to conflict. Distrust Environmental migration may generate distrust between the area of the
migration’s origin and host area. For example, the migrants’ origin country may suspect that the receiving country accepts migrants
in order to upset the ethnic balance in the origin. The receiving government may suspect that the origin seeks to
penetrate the host, while the origin side may resent actual or perceived mistreatment of migrants by the receiving side. Fault lines
The conflict may also follow existing socioeconomic fault lines. For example, migrant pastoralists and
resident farmers may compete over land, or migrants and residents may compete over jobs. Additionally,
migration from rural to urban areas another fault line presents competing effects. Rebels may mobilize poor and frustrated
rural migrants to challenge the state, which may respond with force. However, urban settings may offer
migrants more opportunities, defusing tensions. Auxiliary conditions Whereas developed economies can
absorb migrants in various sectors, underdeveloped economies, reliant on the environment for survival,
are limited in this regard, particularly if their resources are scarce. Therefore, they are more prone to
conflict due to the arrival of environmental migrants. Political instability and civil strife in the receiving
area also increase the likelihood of conflict. For example, migrants may join antagonizing groups or intensify the violence
through any of the above channels. R. Reuveny / Political Geography 26 (2007) 656e673 659 It is apparent that the logic of this model
applies to both climate change-induced and ordinary migration. What sets the former migration apart
from the latter is its scope and speed. When migration flows are small and slow, migrants can be
absorbed more smoothly, lessening the likelihood of conflict. Thus far, climate change has induced slow
changes, but its effects are expected to include evermore frequent and intense droughts and storms.
Quick changes of this type can push many to migrate quickly, especially when they depend on the environment for livelihood. In this case, the
forces promoting conflict in the receiving area may be stronger, ceteris paribus. It should also be recalled that while
causation in this model flows from migration to conflict, conflict itself can promote migration, including that from the receiving area itself. This
causal effect is not discussed here.>
Ext. Ethics Impact
Aiding in the climate refugee crisis reduces suffering and human trafficking – both are
an ethical obligation
Climate change represents one of the most profound injustices in today's society, for those who will
suffer the most, those displaced from their homes, are the poorest among us- those who contributed
the least to the excess energy use that is at the root of much of the climate problem. 1 28 There is an
urgent need for people, regardless of their faith, to heed the call of Laudato Si' to protect the
environment and reduce the suffering of the least fortunate. Lawyers have a particular responsibility to
act on this sentence in Paragraph 53 of the Encyclical: "[t]he establishment of a legal framework which
can set clear boundaries and ensure the protection of ecosystems has become indispensable, otherwise
the new power structures based on the techno-economic paradigm may overwhelm not only our politics
but also freedom and justice." .
Not all discussions are couched in terms of religion and morality. Elizabeth M. Wheaton and colleagues
wrote a paper, "Economics of Human Trafficking," in which they "envision human trafficking as a
monopolistically competitive industry in which traffickers act as intermediaries between vulnerable
individuals and employers by supplying differentiated products to employers. In the human trafficking
market, the consumers are employers of trafficked labour and the products are human beings." 130
They propose to reduce trafficking both by lowering the supply (making people less vulnerable) and
lowering the demand (by taking legal action against both the traffickers and the employers, and also by
publicizing to the downstream supply chain what goods are produced using trafficked labor).
The climate refugee crisis effects millions of the least fortunate – they should be
elevated and prioritized
Nawrotzki 14 - postdoctoral associate for the University of Minnesota Population Center (Raphael, “Climate Migration and Moral
Responsibility”, “Ethics, Policy, and Environment”, Taylor and Francis Online)//abaime
The high standard of living in all major industrialized societies depends on a large amount of fossil fuel
combustion. This has resulted in the emission of substantial amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere. The
increase in the atmospheric abundance of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) alters the energy
balance of the climate system, and causes a variety of natural phenomena such as increased
desertification, more severe droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, more frequent wildfires, rising sea levels
and melting glaciers. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, poor
people from developing countries will suffer earliest and most seriously from climate change even
though they have contributed the least to its emergence. A common strategy for humans to escape the
consequences of a changing climate—such as malnutrition, disease, or even death—is human migration.
The numbers of climate change migrants is likely to increase substantially later in the twenty-first
century, with estimations ranging from 50 million to 1 billion displaced people. Despite the significance
of the issue of climate migration, only a few articles have touched on its ethical implications.This article
sets out to begin filling this gap by using a justice claim approach rooted in the utilitarian school of
thought that highlights the causal link between anthropogenic climate change and migration.
Climate refugees become invisible in their suffering – legal refugee status via the plan
is key
The lack of a solid empirical foundation for the causal link between climate change and migration might
explain why environmentally displaced people are not recognized under international law, and are
therefore invisible Often, they fall through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policies.
A major obstacle to legal recognition is the lack of an officially accepted definition of who qualifies as a
climate migrant/refugee. However, some unofficial definitions are available: The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) defines environmental migrants as ‘persons or groups of persons who,
for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad’ Even stronger legal
protection would result from ascribing refugee status to environmentally displaced individuals. El-
Hinnawi described three major types of environmental refugee: (1) Those temporarily dislocated due to
disasters, whether natural or anthropogenic; (2) Those permanently displaced due to drastic
environmental changes, such as the construction of dams; (3) Those who migrate based on the gradual
deterioration of environmental conditions. Although theoretically appealing, this classification does not
allow distinguishing between migration for environmental reasons and migration for economic reasons,
especially for El-Hinnawi's third category. Adding to the complexity, environmental problems are
themselves caused by population-related factors. For example, unsustainable natural resource
extraction, as well as population growth and related increases in consumption patterns, are factors that
contribute to environmental degradation and may subsequently influence migration dynamics. As such,
economic considerations interact in complex ways with environmental factors and population growth,
leading to a certain migration outcome based on the specific cultural, historical, political, and geospatial
context.
Despite these complexities, some countries have established legal provisions to protect environmentally
motivated migrants and refugees. In member states of the European Union (EU), temporary protection
can be applicable in cases of environmental displacement under Article 2(c) of the Temporary Protection
Directive (TPD). In addition, the principle of non-refoulement under the Qualification Directive (Article
21, sub-paragraph 1) may provide some basic protection against returning refugees to an area where
their lives are under threat due to dangerous environmental conditions. However, these laws apply only
in cases of natural disasters, not for slow-onset hazards and degradation of peoples' livelihoods.
Although, a paradigm shift seems to take place at the office of the United Nations High Commissioner of
Refugees (UNHCR), which acknowledged in a recent policy document that ‘some movements likely to be
promoted by climate change could indeed fall within the traditional refugee law framework, bringing
them within the ambit of international or regional refugee instruments, or complementary forms of
protection, as well as within UNHCR's mandate. But at the same time, UNHCR cautions that further
empirical research is needed prior to possible legal changes.
Besides the lack of empirical research and a clear legal standing, the problem of climate migration has
received only superficial coverage in the philosophical literature. Thus, the remainder of this article
investigates the ethical issues of climate migration with a focus on causality.
Acknowledging climate refugees is key – millions would be saved

The question of climate migration is surely underemphasized in contemporary writings on

environmental philosophy, given its political and humanitarian importance. Millions of lives among the
poor in developing countries could be positively affected if climate migrants/refugees were to be
recognized under international law. Acknowledging the causal link between GHG emission in MDCs,
climate change induced livelihood destruction in LDCs, and climate migration might help in the
justification of greatly needed policies and programs to address the problem of climate
migrants/refugees.
This paper has used the historical principle to emphasize the importance of causality in arguing for the
admission of climate migrants into one's territory. Not taking causality into account constitutes a major
shortcoming in the current ethical debate surrounding immigration. To be clear, the intention was not to
argue for open borders, but rather to suggest revising current immigration policies to include
environmental factors and to ease immigration restrictions for climate migrants/refugees. This paper
appeals to countries to take responsibility for whatever harm their behavior has caused to citizens of
other countries. More research is needed to establish the causal link between climate change and
human migration in order to strengthen the empirical foundation of the advanced justice claims. In
addition, further work should aim to develop clear criteria and standards to distinguish climate change
induced displacement from other forms of migration.
Besides the development of clear standards to distinguish climate migrants, the paper recommends that
policy initiatives begin to focus on the development of sound climate migrant governance mechanisms
Ideally, the management of climate refugee/migration streams should be conducted by an international
authority that should be able to operate independently of country-specific party politics. This
international authority would determine whether the migrant has a legitimate reason for leaving their
own country, based on a set of sound environmental criteria. For eligible individuals, this agency would
then decide to which country the registered climate refugee/migrant should be assigned, taking into
account their own wishes, social relationships, language, occupation, and also the needs and
preferences of receiving countries. International governance of climate migration would have the
benefit of allowing for a more even distribution of migrants across receiving nations, facilitation of
migration as a coping strategy to deal with the adverse impacts of climate change and livelihood
insecurities, and would help decrease socioeconomic inequalities between MDCs and LDCs. As a final
advantage, an international governance system would provide the institutional platform to manage
claims of moral responsibility within a space devoid of the influence of power disparity between MDCs
and LDCs, and thus would help to increase global equality and justice.
Displaced Climate Refugee exponentially increase global emissions and suffer from
malnutrition and dire health consequences because they lack access to secure energy
services in host countries
Depending on where refugees are able to migrate, they are usually settled in organized settlements such
as camps or choose to be self-settled, migrating to urban areas, most often slums.180 One might
erroneously think that keeping refugees in camps can restrict their impact on the host state because
environmental damage would be contained to the respective area and refugees would be less likely to
use the resources from the local environment. Similarly, one might think that relief agencies can provide
refugees with all necessary resources, reducing the economic and cultural impact on the local
community, since they live separately from the host community and are less dependent on local
assistance.181 However, refugees cannot readily be restricted to camps or isolated from the
surrounding community and environment. For example, deforestation is a major problem around
refugee camps, as extensive areas of forest are used to power the refugee camps each year.182 As a
result of the extensive deforestation, more “families are forced ever further afield in search of firewood
in the absence of alternative sources of fuel,” a process that involves high costs and security risks.183
Factors like this contribute to the evolution and enhancement of the unsustainable pattern of energy
production and consumption affecting the environment, economy and security of the host state.184 At
the same time that camps have persisted and grown, a parallel trend has seen self-settled refugees in
urban areas as a result of the growing number of displaced persons.185 The impact of the self-settled
refugees is more difficult to measure, lacking in empirical studies, in comparison with the refugees who
reside in camps or organized settlements.186 However, the most important difference that we have to
take into consideration when discussing the refugees impacts is that “the pressure and demands
imposed by self-settled refugees on local resources are less concentrated and more widely distributed
throughout the receiving region,” which results in a faster “recovery rate[] of local resources . . . [and]
less overall degradation.”187 Many impacts of climate-refugees on host states will be similar regardless
of whether refugees reside in camps and organized settlements or are self-settled.188 Whether living in
organized settlements or self-settled, there are currently millions of refugees that “lack access to clean,
safe and secure energy services.”189 Energy services are an area of overlap between humanitarian and
development goals, “since many displaced people face challenges of poverty and energy access similar
to those encountered by local populations.”190 Hence, the majority of refugees have “minimal access to
energy, with high dependence on traditional biomass for cooking and no access to electricity,”
generating high emissions relative to the energy consumed, but nevertheless “represent a small
proportion of global emissions.”191 Food rations are usually the main source of income for the
majority of refugees.192 Thus, they “engage in coping strategies,” such as selling their food rations, in
order to afford cooking fuel, which potentially has dire health consequences such as malnutrition.193
Firewood and charcoal, the commonly used fuels in refugee camps, vary in cost between being free and
being unattainably expensive in camps as compared to fuel sources commonly provided to locals.194
For example, the majority of camps “in Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda rely on wood for cooking . . .
spend[ing] an average of 31 hours a month” to collect it, seldomly triggering conflicts with the host
community.195 Sometime, in camps, wood is the only available energy source, also being the most
familiar source of energy, while alternative energy sources, namely “coal, kerosene, liquid propane gas
and electricity, are used more” in cases of urban displacement rather than rural camps.196 However,
the demand for wood is influenced also by “the type of wood and stove used and . . . the climate.”197
The energy situation, particularly the “[l]ack of light and power” in refugee settlements, “drives
displaced people to deploy high-risk coping strategies such as power theft, with its risks of
electrocution.”198 Furthermore, in countries with harsh winters, the lack of insulation and proper
heating can lead to grave health risks.199 In the case of a handful of camps “connected to the electricity
grid, costs per kilowatt-hour (kWh) may be lower than those of diesel generation . . . [but] total costs
may well be higher as [a] more plentiful energy supply prompts higher consumption.”200 However, for
example in Zaatari, a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, refugees used to having electricity started
connecting informally to the camp’s street lights to power their homes and businesses, increasing
consumption and ultimately costing the UNHCR $8.7 million between 2014 and 2015.201 As a result,
some of the businesses returned to using diesel generators.202 Nevertheless, over the years UNHCR and
related partners have been employing several strategies, such as SAFE, Light Years Ahead, Ikea
Foundation’s Brighter Lives for Refugees Campaign, and the Moving Energy Initiative, adopting and
implementing measures to address the issues presented above, like “providing refugees with fuel-
efficient stoves, solar street lighting solar lanterns, and implementing environmental activities such as
land rehabilitation.”203 However, there is still more work to be done, as some of these projects are still
in their initial stage, reaching only a handful of refugee settlements, and facing project implementation
challenges such as lack of funding, technical expertise, and cultural awareness.
The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate immigrants – greenhouse gas

emissions prove
Despite disagreements over the details, scholars agree in predicting that there will be a large number of
climate migrants who will significantly impact immigrant-receiving nations. Moreover, as discussed
above, many climate migrants will choose to resettle in the United States. This raises some important
questions: Should the United States welcome this population? If so, why? This Section argues that the
United States is ethically obligated to assist climate migrants because its excessive greenhouse gas
emissions greatly contribute to climate change.
Proving the direct cause of climate change is a unique problem. The effects of different nations'
emissions cannot be differentiated from one another; rather, the impacts of all greenhouse gas
emissions are global. 64 Thus, some might argue that no one should be held responsible for particular
climate events since it is impossible in each instance to prove whose emissions caused them. 65 Scholars
address this dilemma by suggesting that the group of nations with the highest greenhouse gas emissions
should be collectively responsible for addressing the various effects of climate change, 66 including the
challenges faced by displaced populations. In keeping with this logic, developed nations bear a greater
responsibility to address the consequences of climate change. The United States and the European
Union have led the world in greenhouse gas emissions for decades. 67 These greenhouse gas emissions
have increased the temperature of the planet and caused severe disruption to the global ecosystem,
and continue to do so today.68 Developed nations' role in changing the global climate system gives rise
to an ethical obligation to shoulder the burden of solving the problem. 69 Thus, although it is impossible
to prove that United States emissions directly caused the climate events that displaced populations and
led them to resettle in the United States, justice and fair compensation demand that the country assist
those displaced persons seeking relief at its borders.
Scholars also argue that developed nations are obligated to help less developed nations address climate
change because they are in the best economic position to do so. 70 Indeed, members of the
international community codified the notion that developed nations bear greater responsibility for
mitigating climate change and assisting less developed nations in adapting to its impacts in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. 71 Moreover,
developed nations are economically advantaged largely because of their historical emissions. 72
Because they profited from the emissions that caused climate change, developed nations should assist
the populations of those nations that suffer from these emissions rather than profit from them. 73
If developed nations bear greater responsibility than less developed nations to reduce emissions and
mitigate climate change, then it is natural to extend this notion of common yet differentiated
responsibilities to the question of how to address the legal status of climate migrants. Although this
Comment focuses primarily on the practical reasons for adopting legislation governing climate migrants,
there are ethical reasons for doing so as well. 74 Many scholars suggest that the nations responsible for
causing climate change must deal with the way this global change impacts other people and nations. 75
They propose various solutions, including paying damages or restitution and welcoming climate
migrants. 76 Though individual proposals vary, this Comment agrees that the United States, as a highly
industrialized nation with high greenhouse gas emissions, should address climate change not merely by
reducing emissions and offering financial assistance to impacted nations, but by offering climate
migrants sanctuary-a new home to replace a lost home.
The European Union has taken a leadership role in addressing climate change and is a good model for
the United States. Not only did each of the individual nations which comprise the European Union sign
on to the Kyoto Protocol and accept obligations for emissions reductions, 77 they also implemented a
regional emissions trading program78 and signed on to the Doha Amendment in 2012 to establish a
second Kyoto Protocol commitment period-some of the only developed nations to do so. 79 Although
the European Union nations have not yet come to a consensus as to the proper legal status for climate
migrants, they have at least started this conversation and acknowledged their ethical obligations.80 For
example, at least in writing, Finnish and Swedish asylum law offer humanitarian protection on the basis
of environmental catastrophe or climate change.8 ' Belgium explicitly considered creating legal status
for "climate change refugees," and many other nations have forms of discretionary relief for climate
migrants.8 2 Although the United States is hesitant to acknowledge any obligations to assist climate
migrants, it is similarly situated to the European Union in terms of emissions.8 3 In fact, the United
States continues to be one of the top greenhouse gas emitters per capita; for total emissions, only China
exceeds the United States.84
Moreover, the UNFCCC requires the United States, as an Annex 1185 developed nation, to take on
certain obligations to mitigate and help others adapt to climate change.8 6 Although it does not
explicitly address the subject of climate migrants, the UNFCCC requires developed nations to assist less
developed nations in adapting to climate change in article four. 87 Since relocating one's home is one
form of adaptation,8 8 this article can be read to require developed nations to assist in such relocation.
89 One way for them to do so would be to provide safe haven within the United States for those who
are relocating. The UNFCCC also mandates that developed nations share technological advances that
make industry more efficient or cleaner. 90 So far, the United States has not met either of these legal
obligations. 9 1 The United States has not made meaningful efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
and it continues to ignore its international obligations. Therefore, at the very least, it must join the
conversation surrounding legal protection for climate migrants as an ethical matter
The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate migrants – migration is unavoidable,

but we can still prevent adverse climate impacts
The Ethics of Migration
Scholars hotly debate the issue of immigration in the ethical literature. Some strongly defend closed
borders (e.g., Meilaender 2001, Walzer 1984, Beck 1996, Wellman 2008), whereas others argue for less
stringent border protection or they are outright proponents for open borders (e.g., Dummett 2004,
Carens 1987, 2003, Exdell 2009, Huemer 2010, Hayter 2000). The debate follows either an egalitarian or
a libertarian line of arguments, but is generally focused on the rights and responsibilities of nation-
states. However, the issue of climate change induced migration warrants a different approach because it
deals with a global phenomenon in which causality extends beyond borders. The climatic changes that
destroy the livelihoods of individuals in less developed countries (LDCs) can be causally connected to
century long emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) in more developed countries (MDCs).
Due to the fact that the literature on the ethics of immigration gives only little attention to causality, this
paper borrows the evaluative principle from the broader literature on the ethics of climate change. The
body of this paper then attempts to justify the use of these principles on utilitarian ground, followed by
a discussion of major arguments made against immigration.
In order to make the ethical discussion more tangible, this paper will use Mexico as an example of an
LDC, with a high percentage of agriculturally dependent rural populations that are experiencing the full
impact of climate change, and the U.S. as an MDC that is mainly responsible for the emission of large
amounts of GHGs (Caney 2010), though most of my arguments apply equally well to other countries.
Migration from Mexico to the United States has a long history of public and political concern and has
been the subject of a number of studies (e.g., Riosmena 2009, Massey and Espinosa 1997). About 30
percent of U.S. legal immigrants and almost 60 percent of the unauthorized foreigners are from Mexico
(Martin and Midgley 2010, Passel and Cohn 2009). Political relevance is the reason why Mexico and the
U.S. have been used by other authors to discuss the ethical implications of migration (Carens 2003).
For the present ethical discussion of climate change induced migration, Mexico provides a useful case
study. Only 25 percent of Mexico’s 20 million hectares of cropland are irrigated (Leiva and Skees 2008).
The dependence on rain-fed agriculture makes rural Mexicans by default vulnerable to climatic changes
that impact rainfall regimes and adversely impact crop yields (Vasquez-Leon, West and Finan 2003,
Eakin 2005, Thomas and Twyman 2006). The inability to make a living from the land due to dry
conditions is then an important contributor to the decision of rural Mexican families to send a member
elsewhere (Schwartz and Notini 1994). Empirical evidence has begun to emerge which investigates the
impact of droughts and changes in rainfall patterns, associated with climate change, on Mexico-U.S.
migration. Munshi (2003) explored the impact of rainfall variability on migrant labor networks in the U.S.
and found that rainfall deficits reduced employment in Mexico and increased migration to the U.S. A
study by Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer (2010) observed at the state level that a decrease in crop
yields, as a result of climate change, was significantly associated with international out-migration to the
U.S. More recently, studies by Hunter, Murray and Riosmena (2011) and Nawrotzki, Riosmena, and
Hunter (2012) have used data from the Mexican Migration Project and the year 2000 census to model
the impact of state-level rainfall data on international out-migration from rural areas in Mexico.
Although using different methodologies (event history models, multilevel models), both studies
consistently demonstrate a positive association between a decrease in rainfall and Mexico-U.S.
migration. Similar relationships have been confirmed for a number of Latin American countries such as
Ecuador (Gray 2009, 2010) and El Salvador (Halliday 2006). Despite the significance of the observed
associations, most of these studies fail to provide details regarding the magnitude of the migration
stream. Although political and economic drivers likely displace larger numbers of people at present, the
share of climate migrants might increase substantially in the near future, especially if dense social
networks connect two countries and function as migration corridors (e.g., Bardsley and Hugo 2010).
However, it is important to stress that the ethical argument developed in this paper is independent of
the size of the actual migration stream, may it be large or small.
The Historical Principle
The following ethical discussion uses a principle that was introduced under the name “historical
principle” by Peter Singer (2010).1 At first, the paper establishes the principle in the abstract without
reference to a particular country, which allows a more general application. To discuss the practical
application and to address major concerns, illustrations will then be based extensively on the Mexican
case.
The historical principle is based on the “polluter pays” notion (Reuveny and Moore 2009:476). It takes
historical wrongs into account and bases justice claims not only on unfair distribution at the current
point in time but also on what has been done in past decades and centuries (Singer 2010). MDCs in
general and the U.S. in particular, have built their wealth and prosperity by means of fossil fuel
combustion and have enjoyed the benefits that these developments bring with them. LDCs, especially
poor rural populations, on the other hand, have largely not shared in these benefits and now have to
bear the costs in the form of crop failures and livelihood destruction. However, some residual
responsibility resides with LDCs. For example, many scholars consider rapid population growth
combined with increasing levels of natural resources consumption to be key drivers of global
environmental change, of which climate change is but one component (Liverman 2001, Meyer and
Turner 2002). The idea that human population growth can have adverse environmental consequences
dates back to influential work by scholars such as Thomas Malthus (1798) and Garrett Hardin (1968).
However, Ehrlich’s (1968) I=PAT formula, in which cumulative environmental impacts (I) are equal to the
product of population numbers (P), the level of consumption (A), and the technologies (T) used to
extract and consume resources, emphasizes that technological development, besides population
increase, is a major determinant of environmental impacts. As such, the bulk of present and past
atmospheric GHG emission that causes global warming can be empirically linked to the industrialization
process of MDCs (Hoehne and Blok 2005).
Given this fact, justice claims call for the producer of the problems to take responsibility. Or as Singer
(2010:190) puts it, “If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to
their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the
problem with the atmosphere.” This claim is far-reaching since even for powerful MDCs such as the U.S.,
fixing climate change may be a project beyond their technological and financial abilities. Thus, if
prevention is not possible, adaptation seems to be the only vital solution. At the very minimum MDCs
should help LDCs to adapt in a way that restores the livelihood conditions of LDCs to the state prior to
the adverse impact of climate change (Shue 2010a).2 The logical argument takes the following form.
Premise 1
a) The activities of country X cause a change in environmental conditions of country Y.
b) The change in environmental conditions of country Y destroys the livelihoods of some residents (e.g.,
rural farmers).
Therefore, country X’s activities cause livelihood destruction of some residents in country Y.
Premise 2
a) Country X’s activities cause livelihood destruction of some residents in country Y.
b) Destruction of livelihoods is a morally wrong action.
c) Morally wrong actions require restorative measures.
Therefore, country X’s action required restorative measures towards country Y.
Two different types of action could be considered as restorative measures. Either MDCs transfer some
of their wealth to LDCs in order to improve the livelihoods of poor rural populations, or MDCs allow the
worst-off, who have lost the means to make a living, to enter the more resource secure MDC territory
(cf. Wellman 2008). Some authors have argued in favor of sending financial aid to LDCs instead of
facilitating migration by pointing out that open borders would not help the very poor (Miller 2005, Brock
2009, Cavallero 2006). They point out that people most likely to move would be highly educated
individuals such as doctors, engineers, and other professionals but not the poorest of the poor (see
Bloom 2009 for an example of Somali migrants to the U.K). Thus, increasing out-migration would further
degrade the situation in the poor country through a process aptly termed “brain drain” (Tessema 2010).
On the other hand, studies (see Taylor et al. 1996 and references therein) find that migration may have
a very beneficial impact on migrant-sending households and communities since the additional income
through remittances may relieve financial constraints and encourage investment in new technologies
(e.g. drought resistant crops, rainwater harvest systems).
However, even if we assume that encouraging migration might not be the best way to address climate
change induced livelihood problems, a number of reasons suggest that migration is unavoidable, thus
requiring the ethical consideration of its implications: 1. Frequently, people have already lost their
livelihoods through harvest failure and increased desertification and have left their homes (McLeman
and Hunter 2010). For these migrants, long-term measures to improve livelihood situations in their
country of origin will not provide the help necessary to improve their current situation. Also, in the case
of sea level rise, where land completely disappears, adaptation “in place” is not an option (Shen and
Gemenne 2011). 2. It is unlikely that transfer of funds from MDCs will be large enough to prevent
livelihood destruction in all poor countries of the world and thus, outmigration is unavoidable. 3. A
further problem is that LDCs frequently constitute what has been called “failed states” (Di John 2010),
with highly corrupt or nonexistent governments. In such situations, it is difficult to ensure that funds for
adaptation measures reach the needy population. Henceforth, it appears to be important to develop
clear ethical standards to evaluate the issue of climate migration as a problematic, yet unavoidable
phenomenon.
Ext. State Failure Impact
Failed states cause multiple scenarios for extinction
Myers and Choi 6- Young-Jin Choi is the permanent representative of the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations, and Joanne Myers is Director of the Carnegie Council's Public Affairs Programs, “Terrorism, Failed States,
and Enlightened National Interest”, 12/12/2006, // Suraj P
The question arises now: Can we turn a blind eye to those failed states? The interdependence works
both ways. It works between strong nations through means of trade, but also it works between strong
and weak nations, the have's and have-not's. It works both ways. In other words, if we do not tend to
them, they will come to us. The failed states, if unattended, will become hotbeds of international
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental degradation, communicable diseases, and
overpopulation—all the transnational problems. And those problems do not recognize borders. They
will come to us in the end. We cannot turn a blind eye to those failed states for our own interests, not
for theirs. Not the traditional war and peace problem, but these transnational issues will become our
major concern in the future, the 21st century. So the question is how to deal with them. Are we
prepared to deal with newly emerging transnational issues? If you remember the headlines of
newspapers for the last two decades, there is hardly any mention about traditional war and peace
problems. No major wars broke out among nations. But the headlines are filled with transnational
problems: failed states, international terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. So transnational
issues will preoccupy human beings for the foreseeable future and we have to find a way to deal with
them in the 21st century. In dealing with the transnational issues, there is one thing that is absolutely
clear. That is, no nation, however powerful, can win the war against international terrorism alone; no
nation, however determined, can prevent nuclear proliferation alone; no nation, however advanced
scientifically, can avert the outbreak of communicable diseases alone; and no nation, however isolated
geographically, can prevent the global warming alone or other environmental degradation. So we have
to work together. We are bound to work together. There is no other way out. The problem is we do not
take into account this dramatically changed new international order or the environment of the 21st
century. In the current situation, how nations deal with those important traditional issues is really
discouraging. We are divided through the fault-line of have's and have-not's—in a way, the North/South
divide. This divide is the self-defeating dynamic of all the transnational issues. For example, on nuclear
proliferation, the have's want to focus only on nonproliferation. On the other hand, the have-not's want
to focus only on disarmament. The upshot is that for the last five years there has been not a single
agreement in the international affairs in terms of disarmament or nonproliferation. The disarmament
conferences in Geneva stopped working for the last five years. In 2005 the Nonproliferation Review
Committee produced not even a single sentence that was agreed upon. Nothing works on this front. The
same with all the other transnational issues. The North/South divide seems increasingly to replace the
East/West divide of the Cold War period, and this will be the dominant dynamic of the 21st century
governing international relations—North/South divide, have's and have-not's—this is the serious
situation we are facing now. Within this North/South divide, each nation is resorting to traditional
national interests. But suppose that within this shrunken global village each nation seeks to prevail on
their own national interests. What will happen to our planet? It will become uninhabitable. Each country
wants to have nuclear weapons. Each country does not care what happens with global warming. Each
country does not care what happens with overpopulation and communicable diseases. So national
interest does not work anymore. It works only in an open world, when we had unknown territories to
expand, to conquer, and to explore. But in this closed world of a global village, a small village, national
interest does not work. We have a precedent. With the advent of industrialization in the 18th century,
people didn't care about other people. Children under the age of four who were not rich had to work in
factories. The scavengers, the piecers, are the names we still remember. Four-year-old children were
scavengers, were piecers, in the factories. And women were not an exception. But as citizens within a
nation or national border became interdependent, more and more closely knit, they began to realize
that they are truly interdependent. Whenever these bad things are happening to other people, one
cannot truly prosper, one cannot be truly happy. That is why industrialized countries began to discover
the value of enlightened self-interest. We pay a high rate of taxes in the name of enlightened self-
interest. We take care of those failing or failed citizens inside our borders. The ill, the poor, the old,
children, the unemployed or unemployable, we take care of them. There is an element of altruism, but
also basically we are doing it for our own interest. So it is self-interest which saved us from this difficult
situation. This is the analogy we have to introduce to international relations now, because in a closed
world nations have become interdependent, the same way that citizens have become interdependent
inside a border. No nation can be truly happy, secure, or stable when there are many failed states out
there. This is not because we want to be altruistic, but this is because we want to ensure more fully our
own national interest. So, in a way, enlightened national interest is a better form of national self-
interest, and this is the way we have to go. Some may say that this is ethics, this is altruism, and by
definition is against national interest. No. Enlightened national interest encompasses traditional national
interest and wants to do more than the national interest. So those terms are not in opposition, but
enlightened national interest is encompassing the national interest. This is the larger concept which will
better ensure our survival in this interdependent world. But again, the situation is not encouraging.
During the Cold War period, all the developed countries tried to reach the target of 0.7 percent of ODA,
Official Development Assistance. Many countries were approaching that target. But, after the demise of
the Cold War, what we are witnessing is that instead of moving toward that target, countries are back-
stepping from that target. So most countries contribute less than they did in terms of assisting failed
states. This is another discouraging sign. This is a sign that we have not fully taken into account the
dramatic change, the historic paradigm shift, from raid to trade. This is a very serious matter we have to
take into account somehow. The major transnational issues are really, really serious. The problem these
transnational issues are posing is that, for the first time in history, they are irreversible. Global warming,
once it happens, cannot be turned back. Nuclear apocalypse, once it happens, cannot be undone. This
is a new situation in our history. It never happened in the past. Any wars of conquest, expansion,
massacre, could be healed. Not global warming, not nuclear apocalypse.
-- Impact AddOn – Global Refugee War
Absent the plan, climate change will create a refugee crisis that dwarfs the Syrian
conflict -- it's an existential threat to civilization
Taylor 17 (Matthew, environmental correspondent for The Guardian, Climate change 'will create the
world's biggest refugee crisis,' https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-
change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis//waters)
Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by climate change in the next decade,
creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen, according to a new report. Senior US
military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) study that the
number of climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges
to Europe. “If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait 20 years,” said retired US
military corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change drives people
out of Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re talking now not just one or two
million, but 10 or 20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are going across the
Mediterranean.” The study published on Thursday calls on governments to agree a new legal framework
to protect climate refugees and, ahead of next week’s climate summit in Germany, urges leaders to do
more to implement the targets set out in the Paris climate agreement. Sir David King, the former chief
scientific adviser to the UK government, told the EJF: “What we are talking about here is an existential
threat to our civilisation in the longer term. In the short term, it carries all sorts of risks as well and it
requires a human response on a scale that has never been achieved before.” The report argues that
climate change played a part in the build up to the Syrian war, with successive droughts causing 1.5
million people to migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and 2011. Many of these people then
had no reliable access to food, water or jobs. “Climate change is the the unpredictable ingredient that,
when added to existing social, economic and political tensions, has the potential to ignite violence and
conflict with disastrous consequences,” said EJF executive director, Steve Trent. “In our rapidly changing
world climate change – and its potential to trigger both violent conflict and mass migration – needs to
be considered as an urgent priority for policymakers and business leaders alike.” Although the report
highlights to growing impact of climate change on people in the Middle East and Africa, it says changing
weather patterns – like the hurricanes that devastated parts of the US this year – prove richer nations
are not immune from climate change. But Trent said that although climate change undoubtedly posed
an “existential threat to our world” it was not to late to take decisive action. “By taking strong ambitious
steps now to phase out greenhouse gas emissions and building an international legal mechanism to
protect climate refugees we will protect the poorest and most vulnerable in our global society, build
resilience, reap massive economic benefits and build a safe and secure future for our planet. Climate
change will not wait. Neither can we. For climate refugees, tomorrow is too late.”
-- Impact AddOn – Trade
Massive climate migration is certain and shreds interdependence
Lester Brown. in his book World on the Edge, writes that “over the longer term. rising-sea refugees will
likely dominate the flow of environmental refugees.”8 How far might sea levels rise? The most
conservative projections estimate between one and three feet. The ever-practical and forward-looking
Dutch, for planning purposes. are assuming a two-and-a-half-foot rise by 2050. Maybe the Dutch can
withstand two and a half feet, but this is enough to obliterate large portions of island nations like the
Maldives. Yet scientists now think we are locked in to a sea level rise of at least three feet, and that is
only with aggressive worldwide reduction of fossil fuels. Without climate action, sea levels could rise six
feet by the end of 2100 and as much as ten feet within two centuries. creating —places as diverse as
neighborhoods in Norfolk, Virginia; major parts of southern Louisiana; and island republics like Tuvalu
and the Maldives in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the Western Hemisphere. Americans may find
themselves struggling to resettle tens of millions forced to migrate because of rising tides along the Gulf
of Mexico, South Florida, and the East Coast, reaching nearly to New England. While scientists cannot
predict the details of short-term human history, there is little doubt that changes will be momentous.
Renowned climatologist James Hansen argues that China will have great difficulties despite its growing
economic power as “hundreds of millions of Chinese are displaced by rising seas. With the submersion
of Florida and coastal cities, the United States may be equally stressed.” With global interdependence,
he notes. “there may be a threat of collapse of economic and social systems.”11
Signal of protectionism causes nuclear war

Lieberthal and O’Hanlon ‘12
[Ken – Dir of the China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings. And Michael – Dir of
Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at Brookings. “The Real National Security Threat: America’s
Debt” The LA Times, 7/10/12 //GBS-JV]
Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national
political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United
States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear
of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our
quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society
benefited.¶ Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the
American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is
required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because
much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially
if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more
job losses.¶ Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries
sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more
widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take
actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our
commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will
sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods.
The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will
become more likely.¶ When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign
policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change,
dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear
weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there
is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really
possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.
-- Impact AddOn – China/India War
Climate migration flows cause China-India resource wars
When profound water shortages or ravaging floods put populations on the move, they must go
somewhere. and this migration can create conflict in the area receiving migrants. The arrival of migrants
to areas that already are experiencing water shortages, such as parts of India. can burden the economic
and resource base of the receiving area.22 And when these migrants belong to different ethnic or
religious groups, residents may feel threatened and respond aggressively. No matter how peaceful
climate refugees may be, in most cases their arrival will generate significant levels of public suspicion
and mistrust. As Rafael Reveny notes, sudden drastic environmental changes can push many people to
migrate quickly. The arrival of Bangladeshi climate refugees in India led to violence in the 1980s.23
Similarly. the absorption of Dust Bowl migrants in California during the 1930s depression had more than
its share of conflict. “Okies” from the Oklahoma plains faced slurs, discrimination. and beatings. Their
shacks were burned, and police manned the California border to block their entry into the state. The
main crisis to come, however, will be the water rivalry between India and China, which undoubtedly
will produce an anguished flow of climate refugees. China’s unique water power status stems from its
control of the headwaters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers that flow into India and other
Southeast Asian countries. As both China and India have nuclear weapons. hydrologists worry that
water conflicts between India and China may result in nuclear attacks on dams and other riparian
systems. China’s aggressive dam construction of India’s headwaters in the high Himalayas is a constant
irritant to India. As the Carnegie Foundation points out in its report, “A Crisis to Come,” China now has
hydrohegemony over key headwaters that flow into much of South Asia and more dams “than the rest
of the world combined,” yet has historically poor environmental practices over these waters. “which has
had devastating consequences for the environment”: Headwaters—China is the largest source of
transboundary river flows, including many, such as the Brahmaputra River. that flow from the Tibetan
plateau to much of South Asia. Dams—No country in history has built more dams than China, which has
built more dams than the rest of the world combined. Environmental practices—China’s use of rivers
has been ecologically unsafe, which has had devastating consequences for the environment. The
Carnegie Foundation offers this perspective: “After many years of denying plans to build a mega- dam
on the Brahmaputra River, one of the maj or rivers of Asia. China recently announced plans to begin
construction. This river is one of India’s and Bangladesh’s largest sources of water, and any water
diversion could be devastating to both countries.” Water conflict between China and its neighbors has
real national security implications, a problem that will only become worse.24 Water issues in this part
of the world involve the fate of the Tibetan Himalayan plateau and rivers that flow from there to serve
the water needs of a billion people. Currently. glaciers in Tibet are melting as a result of increased
temperatures. After an initial burst of too much water. there is going to be a shortage. Climate models
suggest “peak meltwater” could be reached by the 2050s, with major rivers losing up to 20 percent of
their flow. China will monopolize what’s left of the water resource, and that will lead to major
problems. With China and India attempting to store water for their combined four hundred dams, water
shortages will create instability in the region. Clashes along the border between Chinese and Indian
troops over the past five decades have resulted in deep mistrust on both sides. Both countries have
memories of a short but brutal war between them in 1962.2
The Tibetan Plateau is unique – key geopolitical hotspot that contains a wealth of
water and energy resources
Vidal ‘13
[“China and India 'water grab' dams put ecology of Himalayas in danger” The Guardian, 8/10/13 ln
//GBS-JV]
The future of the world's most famous mountain range could be endangered by a vast dam-building
project, as a risky regional race for water resources takes place in Asia. New academic research shows
that India, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan are engaged in a huge "water grab" in the Himalayas, as they
seek new sources of electricity to power their economies. Taken together, the countries have plans for
more than 400 hydro dams which, if built, could together provide more than 160,000MW of electricity –
three times more than the UK uses. In addition, China has plans for around 100 dams to generate a
similar amount of power from major rivers rising in Tibet. A further 60 or more dams are being planned
for the Mekong river which also rises in Tibet and flows south through south-east Asia. Most of the
Himalayan rivers have been relatively untouched by dams near their sources. Now the two great Asian
powers, India and China, are rushing to harness them as they cut through some of the world's deepest
valleys. Many of the proposed dams would be among the tallest in the world, able to generate more
than 4,000MW, as much as the Hoover dam on the Colorado river in the US. The result, over the next 20
years, "could be that the Himalayas become the most dammed region in the world", said Ed Grumbine,
visiting international scientist with the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Kunming. "India aims to
construct 292 dams … doubling current hydropower capacity and contributing 6% to projected national
energy needs. If all dams are constructed as proposed, in 28 of 32 major river valleys, the Indian
Himalayas would have one of the highest average dam densities in the world, with one dam for every
32km of river channel. Every neighbour of India with undeveloped hydropower sites is building or
planning to build multiple dams, totalling at minimum 129 projects," said Grumbine, author of a paper in
Science. China, which is building multiple dams on all the major rivers running off the Tibetan plateau, is
likely to emerge as the ultimate controller of water for nearly 40% of the world's population. "The
plateau is the source of the single largest collection of international rivers in the world, including the
Mekong, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse and the Yellow rivers. It is the headwater of rivers on which
nearly half the world depends. The net effect of the dam building could be disastrous. We just don't
know the consequences," said Tashi Tsering, a water resource researcher at the University of British
Columbia in Canada. "China is engaged in the greatest water grab in history. Not only is it damming the
rivers on the plateau, it is financing and building mega-dams in Pakistan, Laos, Burma and elsewhere and
making agreements to take the power," said Indian geopolitical analyst Brahma Chellaney. "China-India
disputes have shifted from land to water. Water is the new divide and is going centre stage in politics.
Only China has the capacity to build these mega-dams and the power to crush resistance. This is
effectively war without a shot being fired."
It escalates and independently tanks Himalayan biodiversity

Lehmann ‘13
[Jean-Pierre Lehmann, an emeritus professor of international political economy at IMD, in Lausanne,
Switzerland. He is currently a visiting professor on the Faculty of Business and Economics at Hong Kong
University. “Tibet and 21st Century Water Wars” 7/11/13 http://www.theglobalist.com/tibet-and-21st-
century-water-wars/ //GBS-JV]
The crucial global role that Asia will play in the 21st century cannot be underestimated. The pivot of
global economic power is shifting east. Asia represents the new arena for analysis, power and influence.
The narrative of the coming Asian century is dominated by a variety of factors — rising economic power,
demography, ecology, fierce resource competition, water and food supply and security, as well as
increasing military expenditure. In addition, Asia has the greatest number of geopolitical “hot spots”
and nuclear powers. In the latter context, the Tibetan Plateau stands out. Strategically located between
the two Asian giants, China and India, the Tibetan Plateau and its surroundings have come to represent
Asia’s most critical 21st century battleground. Potentially, they may also be the world’s battleground.
The narrative of this century and of Asia will be written, to a very large extent, in terms of what is the
“hottest geopolitical issue” — water security. The Tibetan Plateau extends from the Hindu Kush in
central Afghanistan, through Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and onto the borders of Myanmar. The
geopolitical significance of Tibet has been tremendous historically, too. It was invaded by Britain in
1904 for that reason. Forty-five years later China’s Liberation occurred and, almost immediately
afterwards, the People’s Liberation Army annexed Tibet in 1950-51. For Mao Zedong, the strategic
importance of Tibet was clear. It was fundamental to national security. The Tibetan Plateau acts as a
major buffer zone and provides China with leverage over almost the entire Eurasian continent. From a
national security point of view, the vast barriers of the Tibetan Plateau shield China’s internal populace
in the east from military aggression originating from the west. This strategic importance was clearly
manifested in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 — the only war in which the People’s Liberation Army has
been successful so far! Losing Tibet would be seen as greatly weakening China strategically and a
national humiliation. Apart from its strategic location, the renewed importance of Tibet for China lies in
its water riches. China has long been eyeing the water reserves of Tibet, especially during and since the
period of Mao (1949-1976). Located at a high altitude on an average of 4,500 meters, it is richly
endowed with fresh water contained in its oxygen deprived vast glaciers and huge underground
reservoirs. It is in fact the largest repository of freshwater after the two poles, Arctic and Antarctic, thus
claiming the sobriquet, the “third pole.” Many of the world’s greatest rivers flow out of the Tibetan
Plateau — the Yellow River, Yangtze Kiang, Mekong, Salween, Sutlej and the Brahmaputra. More
important, in terms of human geography, almost half of the global population currently lives in the
watershed of the Tibetan Plateau. This explains the enormous importance of Tibetan freshwater for
China. China, on the whole, is an extremely arid country. One quarter of the country consists of deserts.
China has severe water shortage challenges. At the same time, most of its rivers are either too polluted
or are too silted to quench the thirst of 1.3 billion people. The basic internal issue for China regarding
water security is to transfer fresh water from the Tibetan Plateau in the country’s west to its industrial
and populated corners in its north and east. This has resulted in a spree of building dams, canals,
irrigation systems, pipelines and water diversion projects. As Brahma Chellaney points out in his seminal
work, “Water: Asia’s Next Battleground,” China has created more dams in the last five decades than the
rest of the world combined, largely in order to divert the flow of rivers from the south to its north and
east corners. The end result was the diversion of routes of various rivers originating in the Tibetan
Plateau. China considers such diversions to be an internal security matter. But these inter-basin and
inter-river water transfer projects in the Tibetan Plateau have tremendous consequences on other
downstream countries that draw water from those rivers. Thus, what was seen as a national concern for
China in reality has vast external ramifications. Chinese policy so far has been to seek to minimize issues
to be negotiated with its neighbors. But diversion of rivers could boil into a hot conflict in the near
future. Water wars could largely destabilize not just the wider Tibetan region, but also all of Asia. Based
on current trends, the question is not “how” and “why” such conflicts would arise, but “when”? Today,
countries surrounding the Tibetan Plateau in Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and, of course,
China are scrambling to build “mountains of concrete.” For now, they are addicted to dam building for
the purposes of power generation, water security, food security, livelihoods and national identity. To
give but one example, at present the biggest source of income to the economies of Nepal and Bhutan
comes from hydropower development. That reflects their strategic upstream location. However, the
country that has been most aggressive in this dam-building trend has been China. China utilizes the
rivers originating upstream in the Tibetan Plateau to build as many as 60 new dams to augment its
demand for energy. Electricity originating from these dams from the Tibetan Plateau finds its way to
China’s large metropolises of Shanghai, Chongqing and Guangzhou. However, China’s action to promote
and preserve its national interest can have severe economic, social, political and environmental
consequences in the downstream countries. These represent the most populous regions of the world.
The construction of dams on rivers originating in the Tibetan Plateau may seriously interrupt the water
supply in downstream countries. In addition, these constructions pose a grave threat to the regions’
biodiversity and environment. Located in a highly seismic zone, dam building also increases risks of
catastrophic earthquakes affecting hundreds of millions. Even though China claims to have the interests
of these countries in consideration, it remains one of the only nations without any institutionalized
water sharing agreement with downstream countries. Lack of information sharing, transparency in
building projects and data sharing with the affected states downstream remain a constant source of
tension. For instance, China is building three large hydropower dams on the upstream Yarlung Tsangpo
River (in Tibet, which China has renamed the River Yarluzangbu). Further downstream, it flows as the
Brahmaputra into densely populated areas of India and Bangladesh. The great consequences of these
dams are clear for all to see. These dams could well interrupt the fresh water supply to northeastern
India and Bangladesh. This is also a region where most of the people depend on the fresh water supply
for livelihoods, agriculture and food. India’s and Bangladesh’s combined population of over 1.3 billion is
already edging past China’s. India alone is expected to surpass China’s population in just over a decade.
Whatever the merits of the current South-North Water Diversion Project, China’s multi-decade river
rerouting plan at a cost of $62 billion, it will have severe environmental and water security
consequences for its neighbors. The Chinese ambition to go forward with such projects in the Tibetan
Plateau is fueled by its “success” with the controversial Three Gorges Dam. And it is part of the legacy
left behind by its past President Hu Jintao, a hydrological engineer by training. Engineering pride aside,
that project connected two of China’s most chronic problems — water and Tibet. The northward
rerouting of the Brahmaputra River to join the fast drying Yellow River with the construction of three
dams in the Great Bend is bound to have significant geopolitical ramifications well beyond the typical
issues in Sino-India relations. Together, the pair represents around 40% of the global population.
Although India has more arable land than China, the Tibetan Plateau is the source of origin for most
Indian rivers. There has been a long lull in Sino-Indian tensions since the 1962 war between the two
Asian giants. Today the two have “re-emerged” as relatively amicable great powers. Their conflict
potential has now shifted from territorial dispute to water security. That is not a reason for optimism.
Countries in Southeast Asia are also affected by China’s dam-building projects. China has built dams
upstream on the Mekong River, whose water is shared downstream by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and
Vietnam. Almost 60 million people in these countries depend on the Mekong River for fresh water, food
income, health and, most important, for their national identity. Any interruptions in their water supply
could pose catastrophic threats to food security and greatly affect their rich biodiversity. Such
consequences could result in tens of millions of environmental refugees. All of which makes plain why
the Tibetan Plateau is a global strategic epicenter. It may well determine whether the “Asian century”
emerges as a variation on an earlier European theme or it traces its own peaceful trajectory.
Indo-China border dispute goes nuclear

Goswami ‘13
[Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow
at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute
essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant
economies of Asia. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose
economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major
global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will
soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border
dispute appears intractable. Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are
still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the
"Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations
held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be
repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the
Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the
eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border
with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six
divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with
24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-
India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A
five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern
sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two
Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process
of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. Given this overt militarization of the
China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on
the regional strategic stability of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and
India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. Through the
China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than
300 nuclear weapons, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them,
will fight a future war. This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global
peace and prosperity. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their
populations if war occurs. Security analysts have argued that internal problems within India and China
would create large disincentives for conflict. However, despite such constraints, wars have broken out
between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. Therefore, the border
conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of
Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work
toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it
is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political
tensions over land can lead to conflict, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects.
As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a
particular level is inevitable, both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to
continue Asia's path to prosperity. Hence, managing and resolving the border issue peacefully in the
next five years is something worth seriously working for.
Tibetan biodiversity collapse is also an existential risk

ICT ‘14
[The Intl Campaign for Tibet. Updated 2014. “The Crucial Nature of the Tibet Environment”
https://www.savetibet.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Crucial_Tibet_Environment.pdf //GBS-JV]
FROM A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, few places in the world are as important as the
Tibetan plateau. Encompassing an area of over 2.5 million square kilometers, the Tibetan plateau is the
largest and highest elevation region on the earth. With an average elevation of 4,500 meters above sea
level, Tibet is encircled by high moun tains the Himalaya to the south, the Karakorum in the west and
the Kunlun across the north. There are over 46,000 glaciers on the Tibetan plateau; the largest area of
ice outside the polar regions. Tibet, often referred to as the ‘roof of the world’ or the ‘world’s third
pole’ because it contains the biggest ice fields outside of the Arctic and Antarctic, is threatened by
melting glaciers and other extreme weather phenomena. Scientists believe that the Tibetan plateau
offers an early warning of climate change and it is therefore a critical global climate barometer.
Because Tibet plays a prominent role in the Asian monsoon system, the consequences will affect the
lives of millions of people downstream as well as those on the high plateau. The plateau is the source of
many of Asia’s greatest rivers: the Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Ganges and Indus Rivers all
originate here, and the water they provide is critical to the survival of millions of people downstream.
What happens in Tibet has profound implications for hundreds of million of people, not only in China
itself, but in neighboring countries. A number of biodiversity ‘hotspots’ and eco-regions are located on
the Tibetan plateau. With their distinctive species, ecological processes, and evolutionary phenomena,
these areas are some of the most important areas on earth for conserving biodiversity. The Tibetan
plateau also includes the most intact example of mountain rangelands in Asia with a relatively intact
vertebrate fauna, and is one of the largest remaining terrestrial wilderness regions left in the world. The
region supports rare and endangered wildlife species such as the wild yak, Tibetan wild ass, Tibetan
antelope, Tibetan argali and snow leopard. Due to extensive resource extraction, poaching and
unsustainable development, Tibetan ecosystems and many of their species are now endangered.
Conserving these animals and their habitat is an important priority for the global community. The
Tibetan plateau is one of the earth’s important grazing ecosystems, encompassing about i.6s million
square kilometers of grazing land. It contains the highest grasslands in the world and with a severe
climate, it is one of the world’s harshest grazing environments, yet these pastures supply forage for an
estimated 12 million yaks and 30 million sheep and goats and provide livelihood for about million
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. More than 8o% of Tibetans live in rural areas, and for centuries, the
majority have sustained themselves through a nomadic herder lifestyle, uniquely adapted to the harsh
conditions and fragile ecosystem of the Tibetan plateau. The implementation of Chinese government
policies to settle Tibetan nomads and to resettle Tibetans in towns is now threatening the livelihoods of
hundreds of thousands of people and imperilling the Tibetan landscape. These policies, based on an
urban industrial model and imposed by planners in Beijing, are counterproductive: they have made
nomads poorer and degraded Tibet’s vast grasslands. Scientific research has established that the
mobility of the herds keeps the grasslands healthy, that taking nomads off the land does not help
conserve water resources, and that herdspeople denied their livelihood become demoralized and
dependent. One of the last examples of sustainable nomadic pastoralism on this planet faces extinction
unless this policy is soon changed. Tibet’s precious high-altitude environment is increasingly endangered
by Chinese government policies. Conserving the environment of the Tibetan plateau requires a better
under standing of its unique ecology and the collaboration of all of the people who have a stake in the
future of Tibet.
Europe Advantage
Ext. Europe L / Economy IL
The climate refugee crisis will become unmanageable for Europe – the plan is key
Taylor 17 - environment correspondent for the Guardian (Matthew, “Climate change 'will create world's biggest refugee crisis'”, 2
November 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-
worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis)//abaime
<Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by climate change in the next decade,
creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen, according to a new report. Senior US military
and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) study that the number of
climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges to Europe.
“If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait 20 years,” said retired US military
corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change drives people out of
Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re talking now not just one or two million, but
10 or 20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are going across the Mediterranean.” The
study published on Thursday calls on governments to agree a new legal framework to protect climate
refugees and, ahead of next week’s climate summit in Germany, urges leaders to do more to implement
the targets set out in the Paris climate agreement. Sir David King, the former chief scientific adviser to
the UK government, told the EJF: “What we are talking about here is an existential threat to our
civilisation in the longer term. In the short term, it carries all sorts of risks as well and it requires a
human response on a scale that has never been achieved before.” The report argues that climate
change played a part in the build up to the Syrian war, with successive droughts causing 1.5 million
people to migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and 2011. Many of these people then had no
reliable access to food, water or jobs. “Climate change is the the unpredictable ingredient that, when
added to existing social, economic and political tensions, has the potential to ignite violence and conflict
with disastrous consequences,” said EJF executive director, Steve Trent. “In our rapidly changing world
climate change – and its potential to trigger both violent conflict and mass migration – needs to be
considered as an urgent priority for policymakers and business leaders alike.” Although the report
highlights to growing impact of climate change on people in the Middle East and Africa, it says changing
weather patterns – like the hurricanes that devastated parts of the US this year – prove richer nations
are not immune from climate change.>
Climate immigrants lack protection internationally – they are going to the EU now
Sengupta, '17 – International Climate Reporter and Specialist (Somini, "Climate Change Is Driving
People From Home. So Why Don’t They Count as Refugees?," New York Times, 12-21-2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/climate/climate-refugees.html)//SB
UNITED NATIONS — More than 65 million people are displaced from their homes, the largest number
since the Second World War, and nearly 25 million of them are refugees and asylum seekers living
outside their own country.
But that number doesn’t include people displaced by climate change.
Under international law, only those who have fled their countries because of war or persecution are
entitled to refugee status. People forced to leave home because of climate change, or who leave
because climate change has made it harder for them to make a living, don’t qualify.
The law doesn’t offer them much protection at all unless they can show they are fleeing a war zone or
face a fear of persecution if they are returned home.
Is a legal definition outdated?
That’s not surprising, perhaps: The treaty that defines the status of refugees was written at the end of
World War II.
A research paper, published Thursday in Science magazine, suggests that weather shocks are spurring
people to seek asylum in the European Union. The researchers found that over a 15-year period, asylum
applications in Europe increased along with “hotter-than-normal temperatures” in the countries where
the asylum seekers had come from.
They predict that many more people will seek asylum in Europe as temperatures in their home
countries are projected to rise.
The paper, by Anouch Missirian and Wolfram Schlenker, looks at weather patterns in the countries of
origin for asylum applicants between 2000 and 2014. It found that ”weather shocks on agricultural
regions in 103 countries around the globe directly influence emigration” to Europe.
“Part of the flow,” said Dr. Schlenker, a professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at
Columbia University and a co-author of the study, “we can explain by what happens to the weather in
the source country.”
Climate refugees are going to the EU – results in a substantial influx of refugees –

hurts their economy
Greshko, '17 – Science Specialist and Writer (Michael, "Future Warming Could Worsen Europe's
Refugee Crisis," National Geographic News, 12-21-2017,
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-migrants-refugees-european-union-
environment/)//SB
In recent years, a refugee crisis has gripped the European Union, as unrest in Syria and elsewhere has
sent hundreds of thousands of migrants to Europe’s shores, seeking safe harbor.
Now, a new study says that if all else were to remain equal—a necessary but major if—the stresses of
climate change could drive more migrants into the European Union in future years.
As warming worsens, these influxes would accelerate. Under one scenario where warming stabilizes by
2100, asylum applications could increase by some 28 percent. But in a scenario with “business-as-usual”
warming, applications could nearly triple, to more than a million asylum seekers per year.
That said, these forecasts assume that applicants’ home countries do not adapt to a changing climate.
“This is an incredibly important study,” Solomon Hsiang, a researcher at the University of California,
Berkeley, who models climate change’s social impacts, said by email. He wasn’t involved with the study.
“This work layers on top [of existing research] new evidence that populations try to escape these
deteriorating conditions by applying for asylum in safer countries.”
The findings, published in Science on Thursday, are the latest to show how Earth’s changing climate
could exacerbate global conflict.
A growing body of research suggests that climate change can sow chaos within individual countries. One
2015 study found that human activity increased the odds of the extreme drought that gripped Syria and
Jordan from 2007 to 2010. Some argue that this drought helped displace Syria’s farmers, contributing to
the instability that triggered Syria’s civil war.
Fewer studies, however, have zoomed out to see whether Earth’s changing climate might shape
relationships among many countries.
“Even though the consequences of climate change may not be felt or seen in a given country, the
interconnections between that country and all the countries of the world will be felt at home,” says
study coauthor Anouch Missirian, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University’s School of International and
Public Affairs.
Trouble on the Farm
To tease out this interconnectedness, Missirian and Columbia University economist Wolfram Schlenker
looked at 103 countries that had sent asylum applications to the EU each year from 2000 to 2014. The
researchers then compared these application counts against the countries’ weather data.
After crunching the numbers, Missirian and Schlenker found a U-shaped relationship between the
number of asylum seekers from a given country and average annual temperatures. Overall, applications
reached their lowest when temperatures swung near 20 degrees Celsius (68 degrees Fahrenheit), a
temperature associated with high crop yields. But when countries saw hotter or colder swings, asylum
applications increased.
Political scientist Jan Selby of the University of Sussex, who has criticized the claims that climate change
was connected to Syria’s civil war, dismisses this relationship as coincidental.
“It’s not really surprising that the paper finds a statistical relationship… since, as is well known, the
period since 2000 has seen both increased civil conflict and refugee flows and, independently, significant
temperature increases and weather shocks,” he said by email. “The key question is whether this
correlation tells us anything about causation. I would venture that it doesn’t.”
Missirian and Schlenker disagree. For one, they note that their study accounts for how weather affects a
given country’s agricultural land—and finds that asylum applications vary with changes in weather over
these areas in particular. Their analysis also accounted for shocks that all countries shared, such as the
2008 global financial crisis.
And since short-term fluctuations in weather are random, Schlenker says, their effects on migration
wouldn’t correlate with other factors, such as whether a country was a democracy. Similarly,
randomized trials let drug companies tell whether medicines outperform placebos, even though many
factors determine someone’s health.
“I’m pretty much willing to go to bat that the relationship between weather shocks and asylum
applications we observed from 2000 to 2014 is causal,” says Schlenker.
An Evolving Landscape
To tease out climate change’s contribution, the study assumes that the 2000-2014 relationship between
temperature and migration will hold through the end of the century. But Schlenker and Missirian readily
acknowledge that this might not be the case.
“You have to be very careful when you make these kinds of extrapolations, because you can expect that
there will be adaptation to climate change—maybe better-suited crops, or just a reallocation of
populations within a country,” says Missirian.
“It could go either way,” she adds. “The effect of temperature could be felt much more vividly, or
[depending on] our capacity to adapt, much milder.”
Caitlin Werrell, the president of the Center for Climate and Security, a non-partisan think tank focused
on climate change’s security risks, agrees that governance plays a critical role.
Ext. Populism IL
The refugee crisis exacerbates the populist crisis in Europe – the US is key
Postelnicescu 16 – (Claudia, “Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of Nationalism”, 31 May 2016,
https://ejop.psychopen.eu/article/view/1191/html)//abaime
The refugee crisis, with its millions of people fleeing war and conflicts, let aside the ones migrating to
Europe for economic reasons, triggered the acceleration of an underlying conflict of visions among the
European member states and even states outside the European Union, such as Iceland who dropped the
plan of joining the European Union. There is suddenly a sense of urgency in dealing with all kinds of
pressures inside the EU: some of those are old issues with new developing patterns, others are new: the
inapplicability of the Dublin III agreement that underlined the minimal common rules on asylum-seekers
and migrants failed implementation in several EU states in the summer of 2015, the financial crisis, the
Greek debt crisis, the Crimeea/Ukraine crisis, the Brexit crisis, the terrorism crisis, with attacks or threats
in Brussels, Paris or anywhere else in Europe. On the other side there is the rise of extremist parties in
many European countries; the radicalization among European citizens who are becoming foreign
terrorist fighters; the rise of hybrid terrorism and cyber terrorism; the end of Schengen area and the
future of a more integrated EU. The debate over these pre-existing aspects acquired more heat in the
refugee crisis, when Angela Merkel went forward with an open gate approach, while other European
countries refused to follow suit. The most prominent opponent of Germany’s vision is Hungary, through
its prime-minister Viktor Orban, who refused any solidarity and proclaimed the demise of Schengen. The
gap between Germany and other European States is widening also on a number of other issues, such as
the Greek debt crisis and the Euro zone. The failure to narrow this gap might mean the disintegration of
EU. At the same time, the incapacity of the European leaders to prove solidarity by voluntarily taking in
refugees generated a huge amount of pressure on the few countries that had no other choice. Greece
and Italy are some of the main entry points in the EU and were put in the impossibility of facing the
waves of refugees alone; in fact Greece did not manage to keep the Dublin requirements in place and
large numbers of people went unregistered across Europe giving rise to criticism and anti-immigration
phobias. From here to a full revival of nationalism and extreme right parties was only a step further.
What do all these new leaders claim? They justify the return to the nation state and the national identity
and the rejection of the union. What Europe claims? Divided visions, no common European identity and
going from a crisis to another with no rational solution in sight. The situation is rapidly deteriorating
with the success of nationalist leaders riding the wave of instability and fear of the future among huge
migrants’ waves and imported terrorism in Europe via ISIL. In the background looms also the
involvement of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, who is more than happy to see the European Union
crumbling into pieces.
Ext. NATO IL
European populism unravels NATO
Schrank ‘18
[Phil. Phillip Gary Schrank is an instructor at Korea Military Academy. He is also a doctoral candidate at
Korea University’s Graduate School of International Studies. “The Rise of Populism and the Future of
NATO.” Global Politics Review, Vol 3 N2. 2018 pdf//jv]
Populism in Europe has surged since the early 2000s. According to some scholars, populism was
widespread in Europe. At that time, entrepreneurs like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Simeon II in Bulgaria
took advantage of large reserves of cash and innovative marketing schemes. 1 At that time, no one
speculated that the rise of populism would call the basic tenets of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to question. The rise of populism in the last five years in both the United States
and Europe has led some to question the power of NATO. During his campaign, President Trump stated,
“We will no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state
remains the true foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions that tie
us up and bring America down.” 2 Since he has made that statement, Trump has also called NATO
irrelevant and called on US’s Asian allies to pay more for US support. In the short period he has been
president, Trump has scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), criticized NATO, NAFTA, the WTO,
and most bilateral relationships the US has fostered since the end of World War II. In Europe, Marine Le
Pen, former French presidential candidate associated with the National Front, has praised Trump for
calling NATO ‘obsolete’ and criticized him for his subsequent backtracking on that statement. 3 Similar
to Trump being skeptical to international organizations, Geert Wilders, former presidential candidate in
the Netherlands wanted to “liberate” the Netherlands and pull the country out of the EU and NATO.
Canada Advantage
1ac
Trump has slashed TPS protections for thousands fleeing environmental devastation –
this triggers a surge of immigration to Canada.
Byjessica Corbett 11-22-2017 -- Jessica Corbett is a staff writer for Common Dreams. ["Trump's
Treatment of Haitians Portends Brutal Future for World's Climate Refugees", Accessible Online at:
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/11/22/naomi-klein-trumps-treatment-haitians-portends-
brutal-future-worlds-climate-refugees] @ AG
Following an announcement this week from the Trump administration that it is terminating temporary
protections for some 59,000 Haitians who fled to the United States after a devastating 2010
earthquake—a highly anticipated move that has motivated thousands of Haitians to cross the border
into Canada to seek asylum over the past year—journalist Naomi Klein warns decisions by the U.S. and
Canadian governments indicate how wealthy nations may handle climate refugees in the years to come.
Amid growing fears that the Trump administration would not renew their Temporary Protected Status
(TPS)—a federal program that allows foreign nationals from a select list of countries to live and work in
the United States, due to conditions such as civil war or environmental disaster—thousands of Haitian
refugees have fled to Canada in recent months, overwhelming its government's resources to a degree
that up to a quarter of those who make it across the border reportedly could be deported.
Writing for The Intercept, Klein details the experiences of multiple Haitian immigrants who have lived in
the United States for several years, but have recently made the journey to Canada, crossing over into
the country at remote locations in spite of treacherous weather conditions. Though they share heart-
wrenching tales, Klein argues "there is a bigger picture to be seen here"—"the climate connection."
The thousands of Haitian refugees who came to the United States under TPS were not fleeing what was
seen as a permanently unlivable island, and the Trump administration is claiming—despite arguments to
the contrary—that conditions on the island have improved enough that such protections are no longer
warranted. However, as the planet continues to warm, in large part because of major greenhouse gas
emitters like the United States, island nations such as Haiti will face increasing threats from rising sea
levels and natural disasters that are intensified by warmer oceans.
Klein writes:
Because TPS—which singles out "environmental disaster" as one of the key reasons a country would
receive this designation—is currently the most significant policy tool available to the U.S. government to
bring a modicum of relief to the countless people worldwide who are already being displaced as a result
of climate change-related crises, with many more on the way. Little wonder, then, that Trump officials
are rushing to slam this policy door shut....
As the only U.S. immigration program that grants legal rights to migrants in response to environmental
disasters, the fate of the program should be seen as a de facto test case for how the world's wealthiest
country, and its largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases, is going treat the coming waves of
climate refugees.
It creates a surge in Canadian populism
Cindy Carcamo 1-29-2018 – Reporter for the LA Times. ["Worried about Trump-stoked exodus of
immigrants, Canada discourages illegal crossings", Accessible Online at:
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-canadian-envoy-tps-20180129-story.html] @ AG
In a private dining room at Zov's restaurant in Tustin, a Canadian envoy made his pitch to about a dozen
immigration attorneys and immigrant rights leaders.
Pablo Rodriguez, a member of Parliament, leaned over from his seat in the middle of the table and
asked everyone to spread the word: Please do not cross into Canada illegally.
"Get the facts and make a decision based on the right facts, before leaving your jobs and taking your
children out of school and going up there hoping to stay there forever," Rodriguez said. "Because if you
don't qualify … you will be returned and in this case not to the United States. You will have lost your
status and would be returned to your country of origin."
Worried that anti-immigrant rhetoric and decisions from the Trump administration could drive more
people across its border, the Canadian government is trying to nip that in the bud.
The whip for the majority Liberal Party in Parliament, Rodriguez arrived in the U.S. a few days after
President Trump announced his decision to end temporary protected status of an estimated 200,000
Salvadorans in the country.
His message was not that different from immigration hardliners in the U.S. But it was delivered with a
nicer Canadian soft sell.
Rodriguez was a young boy when he arrived in Canada as a political refugee from Argentina. He said he
can empathize with those looking north.
He said that Canada is "an open country" and a nation of immigrants. But, he stressed, immigrating to
the country needs to be done legally.
"You can't just come to Canada and cross the border and stay there the rest of your life," he said. "We
want to avoid a humanitarian crisis along the border."
The Canadian government, Rodriguez said, wants to avoid a repeat of what happened last summer
when thousands of Haitians crossed Canada's southern border "irregularly" after losing temporary
protected status in the U.S.
The influx created a massive backlog of refugee claimants.
Last week was Rodriguez's fourth outreach visit to the U.S. since the fall.
Rodriguez is one of several lawmakers and dignitaries Canada has sent in recent months to combat
misinformation about gaining asylum in Canada. Recently, Canadian representatives traveled to Haitian
communities in Miami and a Somalian enclave in Minneapolis.
During the meeting in Orange County, Rodriquez wore an infectious smile and an easygoing demeanor
as he engaged in what he called a "friendly conversation" with immigration attorneys and immigrant
community leaders.
It's unclear how effective he was.
Some of those at the meeting said Canada seemed awfully hospitable compared to the countries some
immigrants had left behind.
Countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and parts of Mexico are among the most dangerous
places in the Western Hemisphere.
"If you are facing certain death in your country … Canada seems like a very excellent option," said
George W. Abbes, an immigration attorney.
Rodriguez said that so far there isn't any indication that more Latin Americans are crossing the border
from the U.S. to Canada.
But the Canadian government wants to be proactive, he said. Rodriguez said officials wanted to counter
false reports in Latin American media that suggest migrating to Canada is an easy way to find
immigration relief.
"We want to have an honest, transparent conversation," Rodriguez said. "Canada is a very open country
but there are rules."
The meeting comes at a time of considerable anxiety for immigrants in the U.S. illegally, with rumors
about huge raids in Northern California, the impending ending of protective status for many Salvadoran
immigrants and tough talk from the White House.
First impact is the Canada Economy: climate refugee inflows devastate Canada’s
growth
Immigration Watch Canada 11-22-2015 – Canadian news source reporting on immigration issues.
["Unjustified Immigration Levels Against Public's Wishes", Accessible Online at:
http://immigrationwatchcanada.org/2015/11/22/unjustified-immigration-levels-against-publics-
wishes/] @ AG
The reality is that Canada’s average 250,000 per year immigration intake since 1990 has been far too
high. In fact, Canada’s intake is the highest per capita in the world. And it has obviously been destructive
and senseless. What are some examples of the destruction and senselessness? First, our high intake has
had major negative economic consequences for a minimum of 1.5 million Canadians who are looking for
work. At the very least, it has forced many of them to compete (through Canada’s so-called
“Employment Equity for Visible Minorities” programme and others) with immigrants for a limited
number of jobs. Second, relentless high immigration has caused two results : (1) relentless demand for a
basic human need such as housing and (2) relentless increases in house prices. The urban area which is
the best example of this is Metro Vancouver where house prices are now the second highest in the
world. (Metro Toronto has also been seriously affected.) Much of Metro Vancouver’s population can no
longer afford house ownership. In cases where the existing population has bought housing, they have
had to take on huge mortgages. UBC Geography Professor David Ley has clearly shown the connection
between immigration and Metro Vancouver house prices.
Canadian innovation key to mediate the AI tech race
Kim 04/17 – Post-Graduate Research Fellow at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Dongwoo, “The
Artificial Divide: Canada’s Role in the East-West Clash Over Machine Intelligence,” Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada, 04/17/18, https://www.asiapacific.ca/blog/artificial-divide-canadas-role-east-
west-clash-over-machine)//SI
Just a few years ago, conversations about artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and policy were limited to a
very specific community of academics and enthusiasts, and perhaps a marginal few in the circle of avant
garde policy-makers. Today, with rapid advancements in the field and a growing awareness of the
potential impacts – including disruptions in the labour market and the potential development of
autonomous ‘killer robots’ – AI has become a topic of a larger and more urgent discussion.
From the perspective of government, the technology cuts across different sectors and raises
unprecedented policy questions that require comprehensive, co-ordinated responses. AI – commonly
defined as the capacity of a computer to perform operations analogous to learning and decision-making
in humans – has increasingly become an arena for international competitiveness, and governments
around the world have begun engaging in earnest.
While an existential clash of cultures may be an exaggerated assessment, a ‘fracture’ along the East-
West divide has become increasingly evident and raises concerns about a growing schism between
nations in approaching such powerful technology, which permeates borders. East Asian and Western
states have demonstrated starkly differing approaches to AI, underscoring existing differences in terms
of values and governance. This fracture could further the deterioration of the existing global order.
In the West, discussions about AI ethics and policy have been steeped in a broader debate about the
nature of democracy and the future of the liberal order. The European Union has been proactive in
promoting a co-ordinated response among its member states, with plans to develop a comprehensive AI
strategy in the coming months. A report on AI by the European Group on Ethics in Science and
Technologies entitled Ethical Principles and Democratic Prerequisites states that “key decisions on the
regulation of AI development and application should be the result of democratic debate and public
engagement.” It further states that the “rule of law, access to justice and the right to redress and a fair
trial provide the necessary framework for ensuring the observance of human rights standards and
potential AI-specific regulations.”
French President Emmanuel Macron, in his interview with Wired magazine on France's newly launched
national AI initiative, highlighted the impact of AI on democratic processes, asserting that Europe has a
responsibility to implement policies that protect democratic values. “Europe is the place where the DNA
of democracy was shaped, and therefore I think Europe has to get to grips with what could become a big
challenge for democracies,” he said.
Similarly, discussions on AI in Canada increasingly underscore the threats to democratic and liberal
values. Université de Montréal has been running a series of public consultations in developing the
Montreal Declaration of Responsible AI. The Declaration lists “democracy” as one of its seven principles,
stating that “the development of AI should promote informed participation in public life, co-operation,
and democratic debate.” Meanwhile, discussions at the Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI), which has been running essays by Canada’s leading experts on AI and data policy, feature
democracy quite prominently.
AI governance is a relatively new topic, limited mostly to wealthier, Western states with AI research and
development (R&D) and deployment capabilities. As such, while conversations on AI governance have
started to proliferate, they primarily arise in Western-dominated settings: the OECD recently launched
the Going Digital project, in which AI ethics and governance feature prominently, and the G7 will host a
conference in Canada in the fall of 2018 to discuss a common vision for AI technology. However, the
problem with these current initiatives is that they exclude China, a global AI player, and the
particularities of East Asian states generally may be lost in these predominantly Western fora.
China, Japan, and South Korea all feature strong AI R&D industries, buttressed by co-ordinated
government science and technology policies and highly-educated workforces. Coupled with the
projected economic growth in the region, East Asia’s AI industries stand to emerge as much more
relevant and influential players on the international stage.
China, along with the U.S., is expected to hold a ‘duopoly’ on AI. With the availability of massive capital
and big data capacity, along with the support of the central government that views AI as a key strategic
sector for development and global influence, China is already shaping up to be an ‘AI superpower.’
According to its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, China is positioning itself to
become the world leader in AI R&D by 2030. However, the application of AI for military technology and
civilian surveillance à la the popular TV series Black Mirror has raised concerns in the West, and possibly
nudged conversations towards the twin topics of democracy and liberalism.
While not as uncompromising as China, the debates and policy initiatives in South Korea and Japan
suggest that both Asian democracies are taking approaches that diverge from their Western peers when
it comes to AI. Both governments have launched comprehensive roadmaps for AI development and
deployment that cover a wide range of sectors – from R&D to welfare reform – but unlike in the
Western discourse, the keyword “democracy” is missing. The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence’s
Ethical Guidelines, for instance, does not mention anything about AI’s intersection with governance.
This divergence from the Western discourse may be explained by differences in social and political
culture, or by historically-formed policy-making processes. East Asian states are, for instance, generally
able to implement more centralized, co-ordinated policies due to the existence of strong bureaucracies
that emerged alongside the developmental state model that prioritizes economic growth. Regardless of
the underlying drivers of these divergent policy environments, it is increasingly clear that states with
strong AI capabilities do not necessarily share similar views on its development, deployment and
ongoing governance, which without proactive measures may have far-reaching implications for the
prospects of a shared future.
In this context, Canada has a positive role to play in bringing together East and West.
Canada’s strengths in AI R&D and its reputation as a responsible, multilateral player on the
international stage only bolster its credibility. While the U.S. is perceived as a ‘rival’ to China, and the
EU increasingly presents itself as the global headmaster of a euro-centric interpretation of liberal,
democratic values, Canada, with its historic role as a ‘trusted mediator’ between all parties, may be in
the perfect position to facilitate dialogues between the competing paradigms. More specifically, while
Canada is part of the Western bloc, it also has historical credibility as a reasonable middle power.
As government-to-government discussions on this key technology remain insulated within the Western
circle, Canada, as it did during the Cold War, is in a position to engage with East Asian states to shape
a truly global norm on responsible, accountable use of this disruptive technology – and exercise
leadership in mitigating the risk to an increasingly precarious global order.
Otherwise, it escalates – AI weaponization is an existential threat

Poovanna 17 – Scholar, research fellow, engineer and writer (Pete, “We Must Stop The Artificial
Intelligence Arms Race At Any Cost,” Huffington Post, 08/21/17, https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/pete-
poovanna/we-must-prevent-an-artificial-intelligence-arms-race-at-any-cost_a_23117234/)//SI
Recent advances in science and technology have made nuclear bombs more powerful than ever, and
one can imagine how devastating it could be to the world. These advances in science and technology
have also created many unprecedented and still unresolved global security challenges for policy makers
and the public.
Many AI experts fear that a terrifying AI arms race may already be under way.
It is hard to imagine any one technology that will transform the global security more than artificial
intelligence (AI), and it is going to have the biggest impact on humanity that has ever been. The Global
Risks Report 2017 by the World Economic Forum places AI as one of the top five factors exacerbating
geopolitical risks. One sector that saw the huge disruptive potential of AI from an early stage is the
military. AI-based weaponization will represent a paradigm shift in the way wars are fought, with
profound consequences for global security.
Major investment in AI-based weapons has already begun. According to a WEF report, a terrifying AI
arms race may already be underway. To ensure a continued military edge over China and Russia, the
Pentagon requested around US$15 billion for AI-based weaponry for the 2017 budget. However, the
U.S. doesn't have the exclusive control over AI.
Whichever country develops viable AI weaponry first will completely take over the military landscape
as AI-based machines have the capacity to be much more intense and devastating than a nuclear
bomb. If any one country has a machine that can hack into enemy defence systems, that country will
have such a distinct advantage over any other world government.
Without proper regulation, AI-based weapons could go out of control and they may be used
indiscriminately, create a greater risk to civilians, and more easily fall into the hands of dictators and
terrorists. Imagine if North Korea developed an AI capable of military action — that could very quickly
destabilize the entire world. According to an UNOG report, two major concerns of AI based weapons
are: (i) the inability to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and (ii) the inability to
ensure a proportionate response in which the military advantage will outweigh civilian casualties
My visit to Japan is also marked by concerns in the region about the possibility of nuclear missile strikes,
particularly after U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatened each
other with shows of force. As Elon Musk said, "If you're not concerned about AI safety, you should be.
[There is] vastly more risk than North Korea."
Students type on laptop computers during a cyber-defence programming class in the "War Room" at
Korea University in Seoul, South Korea, on Nov. 26, 2015.
AI technology is growing in a similar fashion as the push for nuclear technology. I don't know if there is a
reasonable analogy between the nuclear research and AI research. Nuclear research was supposed to
bring an unlimited supply of energy to the power-starved countries of the world. However, it was also
harnessed for nuclear weapons.
A similar push is now been given to AI technology as well. AI might have great potential to help
humanity in profound ways; however, it's very important to regulate it. Starting an AI arms race is very
bad for the world, and should be prevented by banning all AI-based weapons beyond meaningful
human control.
In 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the government's Pan-Canadian AI strategy, which
aims to put Canada at the center of an emerging gold rush of innovation. So, what does this actually
mean for the AI arms race that is well underway?
We are living in an age of revolutionary changes brought about by the advance of AI technology. I am
not sure there lies any hope for the world, but certainly there is a danger of sudden death. I think we
are on a brink of an AI arms race. It should be prevented at any cost. No matter how long and how
difficult the road will be, it is the responsibility of all leaders who live in the present to continue to make
efforts.
Second impact is Populism – more refugees will leave Canada vulnerable to populist
backlash – it destroys their global cred
Gilmore, '17 – former diplomat and social entrepreneur (Scott, "Does Canada have too many
immigrants?," Macleans.ca, 3-7-2017, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/how-populism-is-
taking-over-the-world/)//SB
Which brings us to Canada. Will we see a similar rise in populism here? When I sat down to write this
column, my instinctive answer was “no.” I agreed with many of the arguments made by my colleague
John Geddes, who sees systemic and political barriers to Canadian populism. My thinking was that the
apparent growth in global populism is because we are focused on Trump and starting to pay attention.
But where I could find data, it didn’t support my conclusion. One study from Harvard, for example,
found that support for populist parties on both the left and the right has grown undeniably and steadily
since the 1960s, doubling its support since then. But it was another study completed late last year by a
group of academics from the U.S., Europe and Japan that left me especially troubled. They looked at a
dozen European countries to see if there was a correlation between the relative size of the immigrant
population and the support for right-wing populist movements. The researchers found that there was a
direct connection, and that support grew at an increasing rate as the size of the immigrant population
grew. And what is more, their data suggested there was a “tipping point” in western societies: when
immigrants comprised 22 per cent of the population, support for anti-immigrant parties approached a
political majority. If a country takes in too many immigrants, a populist backlash may be unavoidable. In
Canada, our foreign-born population is already at 20 per cent and growing. This is far higher than in the
United States and (except for Luxembourg and Switzerland, where there are large numbers of itinerant
professional residents like bankers) it is far higher than in any other European nation. And it’s getting
bigger. Statistics Canada just released a report that projected Canada’s immigrant population will
increase to between 26 per cent and 30 per cent within two decades. This puts Canada well beyond the
theoretical 22 per cent threshold in the European study. It makes sense that countries become unstable
with too many foreigners. I have first-hand experience in places like Pakistan and Timor Leste, where
sudden massive influxes of refugees can pull a country apart at the seams. But is it possible that even
when immigrants arrive gradually and they are integrated successfully, it can still destabilize a country?
Perhaps a populist backlash is inevitable in Western democracies when the immigrant population grows
to a certain size. This is not because the newcomers bring crime or undermine our democratic
institutions (they do neither), but because the native citizens, whether they are Canadians or Austrians
or Americans, instinctively feel threatened by newcomers. Perhaps the experiences add up—new faces
on TV, new clothes in the street, new music on the radio—until the average person reaches a tipping
point and pushes back. After all, a fear of strangers is wired into our brains, an instinct that kept us alive
in our tribal past. If this is true, it upends a lot of assumptions that this country is built on regarding
multiculturalism, pluralism and immigration. Canada may be facing larger global forces, tectonic shifts
which are are not felt until it’s too late and a populist earthquake shatters our carefully built house of
peace, order and good government.
Canada’s standing as a middle power is a controlling impact – necessary to mediate

otherwise-inevitable great power conflict
Bothwell ‘11
[Alice. International Studies at Univ of Stellenbosch. “Can Canada Still be Considered a Middle Power?”
March 2011 http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6698//Jv]
Robert Cox in his 1989 article “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order” poses a¶ valid
question “what is the essence of the middle power’s functional relationship to the world¶ order?” (Cox,
1989:825). Before delving into the theory behind middle powers it is important to¶ understand why
they are so important in the world. Middle powers have acted as a stabiliser and¶ neutraliser, especially
during the Cold War, middle power countries acted within the interests of¶ their bloc to neutralise the
tension, “or urging restraint on the alliance leader, or resisting renewed¶ 21¶ tendencies towards
isolationism on the part of the bloc leader”(Cooper et al. 1993:20). “The¶ middle-power role is to affirm
the principle of adherence to acceptable rules of conduct by all¶ powers, great and small” (Cox,
1989:834). Middle powers are able to affirm this world order¶ through various international institutions
based on a post- Westphalian political structure and a¶ decentralization of global hegemony (Cox,
1989:835).¶ In the era after the Second World War when the Great Powers had been decimated a new
grouping¶ of powers began to emerge. A country like Canada who was very involved in the war through¶
industry, finance, technology and manpower came out on the other side with a new place in the¶ global
order. No longer was Canada a former colony or a nation pretending to be its own country;¶ rather, as a
nation Canada had an important impact. Perhaps most importantly, the Canadian¶ economy was
stronger than ever at the end of the war. Since Canada was not a ‘great power’ like¶ the United States
or Britain but was no longer a small power a new place in the world order needed¶ to be sought out.
This is where the evolution of middle powers began.¶ After the Cold War ended there were new
opportunities for middle powers. They were not needed¶ to try and keep a stable world order; there
were new initiatives they were able to participate in.¶ Since the Soviet Union and the United States
were no longer caught in a constant power struggle¶ and there was no longer the same divide between
east and west and as a result, “middle powers had¶ greater freedom of action thrust upon them in
terms of their diplomacy” (Cooper et al.1993: 21).¶ Middle powers have the ability to come together
through multi-lateral bodies such as NATO and¶ the UN to uphold “the norms and rules of the
international system and perform certain tasks to¶ maintain and strengthen that system” (Cooper et
al. 1993: 21). Throughout the 1980s with the¶ United States’ declining resources middle powers were
poised to take on a more active role in the¶ international arena (Cooper et al.1993: 21).
Canadian softpower’s key to navigate tensions on the subcontinent

Clark ‘12
[Campbell. Foreign Affairs Writer for the Globe and Mail. “Canada must help strengthen Pakistan's
civilian rule” 9/10/12 http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-must-help-strengthen-
pakistans-civilian-rule/article625838/?service=mobile //Jv]
Even after combat in Kandahar, Canada, like the rest of the world, has an interest in seeing that this
dangerous dynamic doesn't heat up. Pakistan and its uncontrolled army intelligence agency, which has
already frustrated the United States, is at the centre of the question.¶ Immigration Minister Jason
Kenney said Canada supports India in its fight against terrorists. "We've seen a similar attack in a similar
way not long ago," he said.¶ He was referring to the 2008 attacks in Mumbai that killed 164, and were
traced to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant Pakistan-based group backed by elements of Pakistan's intelligence
agency. They, and the homegrown Indian Mujahedeen, who also are believed to have been helped by
the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, are immediate suspects in India this time.¶ An immediate danger
is that the attacks could derail India-Pakistan talks aimed at cooling tensions. The bombings may have, in
fact, been a spoiler attempt, said Daniel Markey, senior fellow for India and Pakistan at the Council on
Foreign Relations in Washington.¶ Tensions between India and Pakistan have a larger effect in the
region. Pakistan, especially its powerful army, sees India as its overriding adversary and has sponsored
groups such as the LeT as strategic assets. It backed the Taliban in Afghanistan in a proxy battle with
India for influence.¶ That doesn't seem to be the policy of Pakistan's civilian government now, but it isn't
really in control. The army is dominant, and inside the army, the intelligence service, the ISI, is
powerful.¶ It's hard to tell how much of the army or the government supports terror groups or
insurgents. "Parts of the ISI very clearly still support LeT. It's dangerous to go beyond that," Mr. Markey
added.¶ Many Canadian officials have held the same view about support for the Afghan Taliban. Former
Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan Chris Alexander, now a Conservative MP, last year accused
Pakistan's army of "complicity."¶ Some wanted Ottawa to out that role with criticism, others wanted to
try to change it. Carleton University professor Eliot Tepper argues that India, Pakistan and Afghanistan
should be treated as one "security complex" and Canada should adopt a broader aid and trade policy
to strengthen Pakistan's civilian elements.¶ There was an international wave to do that two years ago,
led by late U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke. Pushing India to reduce troops on the border would make
Pakistan feel more secure and would stop support for insurgents, it was argued. But Mr. Markey said
that ran into a "buzzsaw" with India, which wouldn't make security compromises that, it argued,
wouldn't change Pakistan's behaviour anyway.¶ Now the United States is frustrated with engagement in
Pakistan. Osama bin Laden was found there, and then-CIA chief Leon Panetta reportedly confronted the
ISI over leaks that allowed insurgents to slip away. Since then, Washington has decided to withhold
$800-million in military aid to Islamabad.¶ That alone won't change Pakistan, Mr. Markey argued;
another step is to quietly convince others with influence, such as China and Saudi Arabia, that the
"increasingly unmanageable" ISI must be cleaned up, for their interests, too.¶ Canadian criticism won't
move Pakistan, either. But Canada does have a smaller part: Encouraging India to keep talks going,
looking for ways to foster civilian government in Pakistan and pressing the world to see its intelligence
agency as a global problem.
South Asian war causes extinction – other conflicts do not

Robock and Toon ‘10
[Dr. Alan Robock is a professor of climatology in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers
University and the associate director of its Center for Environmental Prediction. Prof. Robock has been a
researcher in the area of climate change for more than 30 years. His current research focuses on soil
moisture variations, the effects of volcanic eruptions on climate, effects of nuclear war on climate, and
regional atmosphere/hydrology modeling. He has served as Editor of climate journals, including the
Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology and the Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres. He
has published more than 250 articles on his research, including more than 150 peer-reviewed papers
and Owen Brian Toon is professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory
for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado, received his Ph.D. from Cornell
University – From the January 20 10 Scientific American Magazine –
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf]
By deploying modern computers and modern climate models, the two of us and our colleagues have
shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years,
much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now
possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our calculations the oceans and the entire
atmosphere— also only now possible—we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would
be heated and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to
block sunlight and to cool the earth. India and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear
weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nuclear conflict today. But other
countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the
U.K. have hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran
may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich
Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investigations, to begin
evaluating what the global environmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our
test case an engagement between India and Pakistan. The latest estimates by David Albright of the
Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense
Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that
Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to increase their arsenals. Indian and Pakistani
nuclear weapons tests indicate that the yield of the warheads would be similar to the 15-kiloton
explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima. Toon and
Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, modeled what
would happen if 50 Hiroshima-size bombs were dropped across the highest population-density targets
in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across India. Some people maintain that nuclear
weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken
communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt leaders would limit attacks in
any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be quickly
overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. La voy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for example, has
analyzed the ways in which a conflict between India and Pakistan might occur and argues that Pakistan
could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with
traditional forces. Obviously, we hope the number of nuclear targets in any future war will be zero, but
policy makers and voters should know what is possible. Toon and Turco found that more than 20 million
people in the two countries could die from the blasts, fires and radioactivity—a horrible slaughter. But
the investigators were shocked to discover that a tremendous amount of smoke would be generated,
given the megacities in the two countries, assuming each fire would burn the same area that actually did
burn in Hiroshima and assuming an amount of burnable material per person based on various studies.
They calculated that the 50 bombs exploded in Pakistan would produce three teragrams of smoke, and
the 50 bombs hitting India would generate four (one teragram equals a million metric tons). Satellite
observations of actual forest fires have shown that smoke can be lofted up through the troposphere
(the bottom layer of the atmosphere) and sometimes then into the lower stratosphere (the layer just
above, extending to about 30 miles). Toon and Turco also did some “back of the envelope” calculations
of the possible climate impact of the smoke should it enter the stratosphere. The large magnitude of
such effects made them realize they needed help from a climate modeler. It turned out that one of us
(Robock) was already working with Luke Oman, now at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, who was
finishing his Ph.D. at Rutgers University on the climatic effects of volcanic eruptions, and with Georgiy L.
Stenchikov, also at Rutgers and an author of the first Russian work on nuclear winter. They developed a
climate model that could be used fairly easily for the nuclear blast calculations. Robock and his
colleagues, being conservative, put five teragrams of smoke into their modeled upper troposphere over
India and Pakistan on an imaginary May 15. The model calculated how winds would blow the smoke
around the world and how the smoke particles would settle out from the atmosphere. The smoke
covered all the continents within two weeks. The black, sooty smoke absorbed sunlight, warmed and
rose into the stratosphere. Rain never falls there, so the air is never cleansed by precipitation; particles
very slowly settle out by falling, with air resisting them. Soot particles are small, with an average
diameter of only 0.1 micron (μm), and so drift down very slowly. They also rise during the daytime as
they are heated by the sun, repeatedly delaying their elimination. The calculations showed that the
smoke would reach far higher into the upper stratosphere than the sulfate particles that are produced
by episodic volcanic eruptions. Sulfate particles are transparent and absorb much less sunlight than soot
and are also bigger, typically 0.5 μm. The volcanic particles remain airborne for about two years, but
smoke from nuclear fires would last a decade. Killing Frosts in Summer The climatic response to the
smoke was surprising. Sunlight was immediately reduced, cooling the planet to temperatures lower than
any experienced for the past 1,000 years. The global average cooling, of about 1.25 degrees Celsius (2.3
degrees Fahrenheit), lasted for several years, and even after 10 years the temperature was still 0.5
degree C colder than normal. The models also showed a 10 percent reduction in precipitation
worldwide. Precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased because blocking sunlight reduces
evaporation and weakens the hydrologic cycle. Drought was largely concentrated in the lower latitudes,
however, because global cooling would retard the Hadley air circulation pattern in the tropics, which
produces a large fraction of global precipitation. In critical areas such as the Asian monsoon regions,
rainfall dropped by as much as 40 percent. The cooling might not seem like much, but even a small dip
can cause severe consequences. Cooling and diminished sunlight would, for example, shorten growing
seasons in the midlatitudes. More insight into the effects of cooling came from analyses of the
aftermaths of massive volcanic eruptions. Every once in a while such eruptions produce temporary
cooling for a year or two. The largest of the past 500 years, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia,
blotted the sun and produced global cooling of about 0.5 degree C for a year; 1816 became known as
“The Year without a Summer” or “Eighteen Hundred and Froze to Death.” In New England, although the
average summer temperature was lowered only a few degrees, crop-killing frosts occurred in every
month. After the first frost, farmers replanted crops, only to see them killed by the next frost. The price
of grain skyrocketed, the price of livestock plummeted as farmers sold the animals they could not feed,
and a mass migration began from New England to the Midwest, as people followed reports of fertile
land there. In Europe the weather was so cold and gloomy that the stock market collapsed, widespread
famines occurred and 18-year-old Mary Shelley was inspired to write Frankenstein. Certain strains of
crops, such as winter wheat, can withstand lower temperatures, but a lack of sunlight inhibits their
ability to grow. In our scenario, daylight would filter through the high smoky haze, but on the ground
every day would seem to be fully overcast. Agronomists and farmers could not develop the necessary
seeds or adjust agricultural practices for the radically different conditions unless they knew ahead of
time what to expect. In addition to the cooling, drying and darkness, extensive ozone depletion would
result as the smoke heated the stratosphere; reactions that create and destroy ozone are temperature-
dependent. Michael J. Mills of the University of Colorado at Boulder ran a completely separate climate
model from Robock’s but found similar results for smoke lofting and stratospheric temperature changes.
He concluded that although surface temperatures would cool by a small amount, the stratosphere
would be heated by more than 50 degrees C, because the black smoke particles absorb sunlight. This
heating, in turn, would modify winds in the stratosphere, which would carry ozone-destroying nitrogen
oxides into its upper reaches. Together the high temperatures and nitrogen oxides would reduce ozone
to the same dangerous levels we now experience below the ozone hole above Antarctica every spring.
Ultraviolet radiation on the ground would increase significantly because of the diminished ozone. Less
sunlight and precipitation, cold spells, shorter growing seasons and more ultraviolet radiation would all
reduce or eliminate agricultural production. Notably, cooling and ozone loss would be most profound in
middle and high latitudes in both hemispheres, whereas precipitation declines would be greatest in the
tropics. The specific damage inflicted by each of these environmental changes would depend on partic-
ular crops, soils, agricultural practices and regional weather patterns, and no researchers have
completed detailed analyses of such agricultural responses. Even in normal times, however, feeding the
growing human population depends on transferring food across the globe to make up for regional
farming deficiencies caused by drought and seasonal weather changes. The total amount of grain stored
on the planet today would feed the earth’s population for only about two months [see “Could Food
Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” by Lester R. Brown; Scientific American, May]. Most cities and
countries have stockpiled food supplies for just a very short period, and food shortages (as well as rising
prices) have increased in recent years. A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at
once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global agricultural trading system to a halt, with severe
shortages in many places. Around one billion people worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies
would be directly threatened with starvation by a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between
other regional nuclear powers. Independent Evidence Needed Typically scientists test models and
theories by doing experiments, but we obviously cannot experiment in this case. Thus, we look for ana-
logues that can verify our models. Burned cities. Unfortunately, firestorms created by intense releases of
energy have pumped vast quantities of smoke into the upper atmosphere. San Francisco burned as a
result of the 1906 earthquake, and whole cities were incinerated during World War II, including
Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events confirm that smoke from intense
urban fires rises into the upper atmosphere. The seasonal cycle. In actual winter the climate is cooler
because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense; the simple change of seasons helps us quantify
the effects of less solar radiation. Our climate models re-create the seasonal cycle well, confirming that
they properly reflect changes in sunlight. Eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of
Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in 1883 and Pinatubo in 1991 provide several lessons. The resulting sulfate
aerosol clouds that formed in the stratosphere were transported around the world by winds. The
surface temperature plummeted after each eruption in proportion to the thickness of the particulate
cloud. After the Pinatubo eruption, the global average surface temperature dropped by about 0.25
degree C. Global precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased. Our models reproduce these
effects. Forest fires. Smoke from large forest fires sometimes is injected into the troposphere and lower
stratosphere and is transported great distances, producing cooling. Our models perform well against
these effects, too. Extinction of the dinosaurs. An asteroid smashed into Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula 65
million years ago. The resulting dust cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked the Sun, killing the
dinosaurs. Massive volcanism in India at the same time may have exacerbated the effects. The events
teach us that large amounts of aerosols in the earth’s atmosphere can change climate drastically enough
to kill robust species.
Canadian populism risks Quebec secession

E.B. Schmitt 7-9-2018 – Reporter for Politisme. ["The rise of the Canadian populism", Accessible
Online at: https://politisme.com/2018/06/09/the-rise-of-the-canadian-populism/] @ AG
With the Doug Ford’s victory in Ontario, the possibility that François Legault winning the next general
election in Quebec, and the very right-wing positions of federal Conservatives leading by Andrew
Scheer (a pro-christian and pro-choice advocate), Canada – at every level of governance – seems
moving to populism. If the comparison of those political leaders with Donald Trump is tempting, this
article postulates this populism is a local adaptation of a new conservatism’s world tendency.
Columnists are often traped by political discourses. In discourses, the French President Emmanuel
Macron pretends to be a liberal, a world citizen. Nevertheless, his recent immigration bill was voted with
the far-right support, condamned as the most coercitive immigration law of French Republic history by
academics, NGOs and refugees activists. This example tries to explain there is a gap between political
discourses and political actions, not because « all politiciens are liars », neither political discourses are
related to ideology whereas political actions depended of power experiment. This gap is the
consequence of a simple but efficient catch-all communication strategy in which a political leader
presents himself/herself with manifold faces. In fact, the French President doesn’t pretend be
something, but – depending of few buzz words and a little bit of marketing – ideological and sociological
biases of columnists rewrite his discourses as liberal ones, while other people listen it differently.
Thus, Politics is a question of interpretation : every part of population find in a single discourse its own
moto.
Populism is not an ideology, but a political practice which constits to grow the gap between range of
interpretations. Populists don’t speak to the people as whole or to a specific group of individuals, but
speak about the people as whole for the exclusive benefit of a specific group of individuals. In other
words, populism tries to monopolize the concept of « people » by reducing it in very few aspects
depending of the specific group of individuals. Among them, some are parts of the system or elites.
However, not sure that critique of the system and elites of Donald Trump, Doug Ford or François Legault
targets capitalism or social hierarchies, but social-democracy and intellectual elites. That’s the reason
why every anti-system or anti-elite discourses are not populist, but populism is necessarly anti-system or
anti-elite.
There are many common characteristics between Donald Trump, Doug Ford and François Legault : same
profile, same style, same discourses about economics, political institutions, immigration, etc.
Nevertheless, Canadian populist leaders adapt their political perspectives in a Canadian context of equal
society, a society less violent than US, a society without racial conflicts. Immigration, identity of the
majoritarian group and the Canadian social modele are serious and controversial stakes, but – once
again – they are not so conflictual. Even Canadian populists are agreed of a minimum social protection
or the necessity of immigrants for Canada economy. Obviously, their vision of society is rooted to
conservative tradition, with sometimes a certain indulgence for far-right orientations.
In brief, Canadian populism is an evolution of Canadian conservatism. In my opinion, it reflects a new

elective strategy rather than an ideological change. That’s the reason why not Doug Ford nor François
Legault are outsiders like Trump, but insiders.
Quebec secessionism causes Russia to first-strike the US

Lamont ‘94
Lansing Lamont, Time Correspondent and President of American Trust for the British Library, 1994,
Breakup, p. 236
It might choose to believe that through its control of territory crucial to the Western alliance, plus its
vital natural resources, it could continue to wield disproportionate influence on international and
continental security planning. More likely, if Ottawa continued to stint on its defense spending and
became increasingly unable to patrol or secure its own borders, the United States would feel compelled
to step in and do the job itself. In that event America would rekindle all the deepest passions about
Canadian sovereignty, especially in the Arctic. Its development in the late 1980s proved a signal advance
in continental security, although some Canadians believed that new radar technology would render the
network obsolete by the end of the century. Others feared it would draw Canada further into the Star
Wars strategizing of Pentagon planners. Paved Paws did not assuage the larger fear of military analysts
that by the early 1990s, after the START Treaty had been signed by the United States and Russia, Canada
the front line of any nuclear attack on North America, stood to face an expanded armory of Russian
cruise missile which could be launched southward from the Arcctic through Canadian airspace. A
provision in the treaty to rescue both superpowers nuclear stockpiles ironically permitted the Russians,
as part of a trade-off to increase their cruise missiles arsenal by nearly half. Thus, instead of landbased
ICBMs, easier to track and shoot down with their predictable trajectories, Canada now faces the
possibility of some day having to track one or more cigar shaped cruises streaking at tree level over
Canadian territory toward a designated target. That prospect, however dim at the moment, could take
on sharper tones in the context of these possible developments: Quebec's separation and the
emergence to America's north of a fragmented Canada, neither event enhancing the continent's
security; Canada's military inadequacies and an erosion of Canada-U.S. relations, which might send
signals inviting aggression by the Western alliance's adversaries; or a political upheaval in the former
Soviet Union, which would precipitate an international crisis. Any prolonged crisis, as security analysts
know, involves not only heightened tensions and escalating suspicions but a shift in emphasis to
preparing for a very rapid response if hostilities erupt. In such situations the usual safeguards are
sometimes apt to be disregarded or even removed.
Ext. Canada AI IL
Canada is key to serve as a middle power in the AI tech race
Kim 04/17 – Post-Graduate Research Fellow at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Dongwoo, “The
Artificial Divide: Canada’s Role in the East-West Clash Over Machine Intelligence,” Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada, 04/17/18, https://www.asiapacific.ca/blog/artificial-divide-canadas-role-east-
west-clash-over-machine)//SI
Just a few years ago, conversations about artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and policy were limited to a
very specific community of academics and enthusiasts, and perhaps a marginal few in the circle of avant
garde policy-makers. Today, with rapid advancements in the field and a growing awareness of the
potential impacts – including disruptions in the labour market and the potential development of
autonomous ‘killer robots’ – AI has become a topic of a larger and more urgent discussion. From the
perspective of government, the technology cuts across different sectors and raises unprecedented
policy questions that require comprehensive, co-ordinated responses. AI – commonly defined as the
capacity of a computer to perform operations analogous to learning and decision-making in humans –
has increasingly become an arena for international competitiveness, and governments around the world
have begun engaging in earnest. While an existential clash of cultures may be an exaggerated
assessment, a ‘fracture’ along the East-West divide has become increasingly evident and raises concerns
about a growing schism between nations in approaching such powerful technology, which permeates
borders. East Asian and Western states have demonstrated starkly differing approaches to AI,
underscoring existing differences in terms of values and governance. This fracture could further the
deterioration of the existing global order. In the West, discussions about AI ethics and policy have been
steeped in a broader debate about the nature of democracy and the future of the liberal order. The
European Union has been proactive in promoting a co-ordinated response among its member states,
with plans to develop a comprehensive AI strategy in the coming months. A report on AI by the
European Group on Ethics in Science and Technologies entitled Ethical Principles and Democratic
Prerequisites states that “key decisions on the regulation of AI development and application should be
the result of democratic debate and public engagement.” It further states that the “rule of law, access to
justice and the right to redress and a fair trial provide the necessary framework for ensuring the
observance of human rights standards and potential AI-specific regulations.” French President
Emmanuel Macron, in his interview with Wired magazine on France's newly launched national AI
initiative, highlighted the impact of AI on democratic processes, asserting that Europe has a
responsibility to implement policies that protect democratic values. “Europe is the place where the DNA
of democracy was shaped, and therefore I think Europe has to get to grips with what could become a big
challenge for democracies,” he said. Similarly, discussions on AI in Canada increasingly underscore the
threats to democratic and liberal values. Université de Montréal has been running a series of public
consultations in developing the Montreal Declaration of Responsible AI. The Declaration lists
“democracy” as one of its seven principles, stating that “the development of AI should promote
informed participation in public life, co-operation, and democratic debate.” Meanwhile, discussions at
the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), which has been running essays by Canada’s
leading experts on AI and data policy, feature democracy quite prominently. AI governance is a relatively
new topic, limited mostly to wealthier, Western states with AI research and development (R&D) and
deployment capabilities. As such, while conversations on AI governance have started to proliferate, they
primarily arise in Western-dominated settings: the OECD recently launched the Going Digital project, in
which AI ethics and governance feature prominently, and the G7 will host a conference in Canada in the
fall of 2018 to discuss a common vision for AI technology. However, the problem with these current
initiatives is that they exclude China, a global AI player, and the particularities of East Asian states
generally may be lost in these predominantly Western fora. China, Japan, and South Korea all feature
strong AI R&D industries, buttressed by co-ordinated government science and technology policies and
highly-educated workforces. Coupled with the projected economic growth in the region, East Asia’s AI
industries stand to emerge as much more relevant and influential players on the international stage.
China, along with the U.S., is expected to hold a ‘duopoly’ on AI. With the availability of massive capital
and big data capacity, along with the support of the central government that views AI as a key strategic
sector for development and global influence, China is already shaping up to be an ‘AI superpower.’
According to its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, China is positioning itself to
become the world leader in AI R&D by 2030. However, the application of AI for military technology and
civilian surveillance à la the popular TV series Black Mirror has raised concerns in the West, and possibly
nudged conversations towards the twin topics of democracy and liberalism. While not as
uncompromising as China, the debates and policy initiatives in South Korea and Japan suggest that both
Asian democracies are taking approaches that diverge from their Western peers when it comes to AI.
Both governments have launched comprehensive roadmaps for AI development and deployment that
cover a wide range of sectors – from R&D to welfare reform – but unlike in the Western discourse, the
keyword “democracy” is missing. The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence’s Ethical Guidelines, for
instance, does not mention anything about AI’s intersection with governance. This divergence from the
Western discourse may be explained by differences in social and political culture, or by historically-
formed policy-making processes. East Asian states are, for instance, generally able to implement more
centralized, co-ordinated policies due to the existence of strong bureaucracies that emerged alongside
the developmental state model that prioritizes economic growth. Regardless of the underlying drivers of
these divergent policy environments, it is increasingly clear that states with strong AI capabilities do not
necessarily share similar views on its development, deployment and ongoing governance, which without
proactive measures may have far-reaching implications for the prospects of a shared future. In this
context, Canada has a positive role to play in bringing together East and West. Canada’s strengths in
AI R&D and its reputation as a responsible, multilateral player on the international stage only bolster
its credibility. While the U.S. is perceived as a ‘rival’ to China, and the EU increasingly presents itself as
the global headmaster of a euro-centric interpretation of liberal, democratic values, Canada, with its
historic role as a ‘trusted mediator’ between all parties, may be in the perfect position to facilitate
dialogues between the competing paradigms. More specifically, while Canada is part of the Western
bloc, it also has historical credibility as a reasonable middle power. As government-to-government
discussions on this key technology remain insulated within the Western circle, Canada, as it did during
the Cold War, is in a position to engage with East Asian states to shape a truly global norm on
responsible, accountable use of this disruptive technology – and exercise leadership in mitigating the
risk to an increasingly precarious global order.
Ext. AI Impact
Extensive study shows that AI makes nuclear war more likely
Irving 18 – Communications Analyst at RAND (Doug, “How Artificial Intelligence Could Increase the Risk
of Nuclear War,” RAND Corporations, 04/24/18, https://www.rand.org/blog/articles/2018/04/how-
artificial-intelligence-could-increase-the-risk.html)//SI
Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov settled into the commander's chair in a secret bunker outside Moscow. His job
that night was simple: Monitor the computers that were sifting through satellite data, watching the
United States for any sign of a missile launch. It was just after midnight, Sept. 26, 1983. A siren clanged
off the bunker walls. A single word flashed on the screen in front of him. "Launch." The fear that
computers, by mistake or malice, might lead humanity to the brink of nuclear annihilation has haunted
imaginations since the earliest days of the Cold War. The danger might soon be more science than
fiction. Stunning advances in AI have created machines that can learn and think, provoking a new arms
race among the world's major nuclear powers. It's not the killer robots of Hollywood blockbusters that
we need to worry about; it's how computers might challenge the basic rules of nuclear deterrence and
lead humans into making devastating decisions. That's the premise behind a new paper from RAND
Corporation, How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? It's part of a special
project within RAND, known as Security 2040, to look over the horizon and anticipate coming threats.
"This isn't just a movie scenario," said Andrew Lohn, an engineer at RAND who coauthored the paper
and whose experience with AI includes using it to route drones, identify whale calls, and predict the
outcomes of NBA games. "Things that are relatively simple can raise tensions and lead us to some
dangerous places if we are not careful." Petrov would say later that his chair felt like a frying pan. He
knew the computer system had glitches. The Soviets, worried that they were falling behind in the arms
race with the United States, had rushed it into service only months earlier. Its screen now read “high
reliability,” but Petrov's gut said otherwise. He picked up the phone to his duty officer. “False alarm,” he
said. Suddenly, the system flashed with new warnings: another launch, and then another, and then
another. The words on the screen glowed red: "Missile attack." To understand how intelligent
computers could raise the risk of nuclear war, you have to understand a little about why the Cold War
never went nuclear hot. There are many theories, but “assured retaliation” has always been one of the
cornerstones. In the simplest terms, it means: If you punch me, I'll punch you back. With nuclear
weapons in play, that counterpunch could wipe out whole cities, a loss neither side was ever willing to
risk. Autonomous systems don't need to kill people to undermine stability and make catastrophic war
more likely. That theory leads to some seemingly counterintuitive conclusions. If both sides have
weapons that can survive a first strike and hit back, then the situation is stable. Neither side will risk
throwing that first punch. The situation gets more dangerous and uncertain if one side loses its ability to
strike back or even just thinks it might lose that ability. It might respond by creating new weapons to
regain its edge. Or it might decide it needs to throw its punches early, before it gets hit first. That's
where the real danger of AI might lie. Computers can already scan thousands of surveillance photos,
looking for patterns that a human eye would never see. It doesn't take much imagination to envision a
more advanced system taking in drone feeds, satellite data, and even social media posts to develop a
complete picture of an adversary's weapons and defenses. A system that can be everywhere and see
everything might convince an adversary that it is vulnerable to a disarming first strike—that it might
lose its counterpunch. That adversary would scramble to find new ways to level the field again, by
whatever means necessary. That road leads closer to nuclear war. "Autonomous systems don't need to
kill people to undermine stability and make catastrophic war more likely," said Edward Geist, an
associate policy researcher at RAND, a specialist in nuclear security, and co-author of the new paper.
"New AI capabilities might make people think they're going to lose if they hesitate. That could give them
itchier trigger fingers. At that point, AI will be making war more likely even though the humans are still
quote-unquote in control." A Gut Feeling Petrov's computer screen now showed five missiles rocketing
toward the Soviet Union. Sirens wailed. Petrov held the phone to the duty officer in one hand, an
intercom to the computer room in the other. The technicians there were telling him they could not find
the missiles on their radar screens or telescopes. It didn't make any sense. Why would the United States
start a nuclear war with only five missiles? Petrov raised the phone and said again: False alarm.
Computers can now teach themselves to walk—stumbling, falling, but learning until they get it right.
Their neural networks mimic the architecture of the brain. A computer recently beat one of the world's
best players at the ancient strategy game of Go with a move that was so alien, yet so effective, that the
human player stood up, left the room, and then needed 15 minutes to make his next move. The military
potential of such superintelligence has not gone unnoticed by the world's major nuclear powers. The
United States has experimented with autonomous boats that could track an enemy submarine for
thousands of miles. China has demonstrated “swarm intelligence” algorithms that can enable drones to
hunt in packs. And Russia recently announced plans for an underwater doomsday drone that could
guide itself across oceans to deliver a nuclear warhead powerful enough to vaporize a major city.
Whoever wins the race for AI superiority, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said, "will become the
ruler of the world." Tesla founder Elon Musk had a different take: The race for AI superiority, he
warned, is the most likely cause of World War III. The Moment of Truth For a few terrifying moments,
Stanislav Petrov stood at the precipice of nuclear war. By mid-1983, the Soviet Union was convinced that
the United States was preparing a nuclear attack. The computer system flashing red in front of him was
its insurance policy, an effort to make sure that if the United States struck, the Soviet Union would have
time to strike back. But on that night, it had misread sunlight glinting off cloud tops. "False alarm." The
duty officer didn't ask for an explanation. He relayed Petrov's message up the chain of command. The
next generation of AI will have "significant potential" to undermine the foundations of nuclear security,
the researchers concluded. The time for international dialogue is now. Keeping the nuclear peace in a
time of such technological advances will require the cooperation of every nuclear power. It will require
new global institutions and agreements; new understandings among rival states; and new technological,
diplomatic, and military safeguards. It's possible that a future AI system could prove so reliable, so coldly
rational, that it winds back the hands of the nuclear doomsday clock. To err is human, after all. A
machine that makes no mistakes, feels no pressure, and has no personal bias could provide a level of
stability that the Atomic Age has never known. That moment is still far in the future, the researchers
concluded, but the years between now and then will be especially dangerous. More nuclear-armed
nations and an increased reliance on AI, especially before it is technologically mature, could lead to
catastrophic miscalculations. And at that point, it might be too late for a lieutenant colonel working the
night shift to stop the machinery of war. The story of Stanislav Petrov's brush with nuclear disaster puts
a new generation on notice about the responsibilities of ushering in profound, and potentially
destabilizing, technological change. Petrov, who died in 2017, put it simply: "We are wiser than the
computers," he said. "We created them." PERSPECTIVE ONE Skepticism About the Technology Many of
the AI experts were skeptical that the technology will have come far enough by that time to play a
significant role in nuclear decisions. It would have to overcome its vulnerability to hacking, as well as
adversarial efforts to poison its training data—for example, by behaving in unusual ways to set false
precedents. PERSPECTIVE TWO Nuclear Tensions Will Rise But an AI system wouldn't need to work
perfectly to raise nuclear tensions, the nuclear strategists responded. An adversary would only need to
think it does and respond accordingly. The result would be a new era of competition and distrust among
nuclear-armed rivals. PERSPECTIVE THREE AI Learns the Winning Move Is to

Not Play Some of the experts held out hope that AI could some day, far in the future, become
so reliable that it averts the threat of nuclear war. It could be used to track nuclear development and
make sure that countries are abiding by nonproliferation agreements, for example. Or it could rescue
humans from mistakes and bad decisions made under the pressure of a nuclear standoff. As one expert
said, a future AI might conclude, like the computer in the 1983 movie " WarGames,"
that the only winning move in nuclear war is not to play.
Ext. Populism IL
Surges of immigration spur Canadian populism.
Mack Lamoureux 6-26-2017 – Author for Vice. ["Turns Out Canada is Ripe for Populism, Too",
Accessible Online at: https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/43ykdg/turns-out-canada-is-ripe-for-
populism-too] @ AG
The time is right for a little populism in the Great White North.
At least that's what a recent EKOS/Canadian Press poll is telling us. The poll, released on June 24,
surveyed around 5,500 Canadians and indicates that in regards to the question of populism in Canada
the "answer appears to be – somewhat surprisingly – yes."
"The continued denial and dismissal of this new force among the more comfortable and educated
portions of society is both empirically wrong and a force fuelling the very phenomenon they seem to
despise," the poll reads.
In a rather disheartening response, around 71% said they believe it is coming to Canada and only 33% of
those surveyed say that a possible rise of Canadian populism is a bad thing. EKOS operationalized the
term populism as "a rejection of elite authority and as a wariness of immigration, trade, and
globalisation." If you're wondering about what this means in real world terms, well, you only have to
look south to President Trump who clumsy surfed into the White House on a wave of the stuff or the
Brexit vote in the UK.
"While the most common response was one of ambivalence, uncertainty, or conditional 'wait-and-see',
it is striking that two-thirds of Canadians either think it's a good thing or aren't sure," reads the poll.
Unsurprisingly, the economic situation of the respondents plays strongly into the their opinion of
populism—a common trope in history is a turning to populism by those who have been left behind by
politicians or the changing world—in the survey only 29% of respondants thought their economic
situation would be better in five years.
Populism can rise from either side of the political spectrum but, within Canada, it seems Conservative
voters are also more likely to support populism. Again, this isn't the most surprising thing in the world as
only two years ago a decade of Conservative rule was toppled by Justin Trudeau's Liberals. Other things
you would expect is that the majority of those in favour are male and that populism is most popular in
the conservative heartland of Alberta.
All that said, there are some things out of the ordinary—the fact that it's not, to quote Stephen Harper,
"old-stock Canadians" who are in favour of it being the most prominent.
"Quite strikingly, positive attitudes to populism are stronger among new Canadians and, by corollary,
weaker among traditional, 'born in Canada' citizens," reads the poll. "If Trump populism is rooted in the
white working class, that explicitly does not appear to be the case in Canada."
Furthermore, Canadian supporters of populists tend to support—most likely to the ire of some of the
far-right in the country—globalization. Over 80% are in support of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, however, they are more likely to support President Trump and small government. With the
oddities in mind, those behind the poll conclude that all this points to a "new class conflict" being the
well behind the spring of populist support in Canada.
Incoming climate migrants strain Canada politically and generate backlash.

Kim Mackrael 7-7-2018 -- Reporter, The Wall Street Journal. ["New Migrant Surge Tests Canada’s
Welcoming Stance ", Accessible Online at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-migrant-surge-tests-
canadas-welcoming-stance-1526376601] @ AG
PERRY MILLS, N.Y.—A small group of people from Nigeria and Mali stepped off a shuttle bus here on a
recent evening and lugged suitcases and backpacks along a country road toward the border with
Canada. A Canadian police officer was waiting there to arrest them.
The group is part of a fresh wave of asylum seekers flooding into Canada in recent weeks, undeterred by
the threat of arrest and posing the latest test for Canada's immigration-friendly stance.
Roughly 2,600 people used unofficial border crossings like this one to enter the country in April,
according to Canadian police data. That marked the latest surge following the crossing last summer of
some 8,500 asylum seekers.
People breaching the border is a new challenge for Canada. The country's geographic isolation has
traditionally allowed it to maintain a highly selective immigration and refugee system, as migrants from
Africa and the Middle East have poured into Europe in recent years and the U.S. has grappled with illegal
immigration from Mexico and Central America.
"It forces Canadians, who have always patted themselves on the back for being very open to
immigration, very welcoming, to deal with the kinds of challenges Italy, Greece and others have been
facing and to realize it's not so easy," said Irene Bloemraad, a migration expert and the chair of Canadian
studies at University of California, Berkeley.
Canada's Liberal government has faced heated criticism over its handling of the influx. The opposition
Conservatives want the government to shut down unofficial border crossings, saying the asylum seekers
using them are sapping resources normally devoted to processing applicants from other immigration
and refugee streams. The Immigration and Refugee Board, which decides on asylum claims, has a
backlog of 53,000 cases, and the labor union representing Canada's border officers has said that staffing
is insufficient to deal with the added pressure of asylum seekers.
"They risk turning Canadian support away from our once compassionate and orderly immigration
system," Conservative lawmaker Michelle Rempel said in a press conference last week.
The province of Quebec complained publicly last month that it wasn't receiving enough support from
the federal government to deal with the new spike in asylum seekers. In response, officials have
promised to come up with a plan for moving more asylum seekers into English-speaking provinces.
Last year, facing the arrival of thousands of Haitians who feared losing their temporary protected status
in the U.S., Canadian officials began a campaign to dissuade them from turning up at the border and
seeking asylum. The effort included targeted advertising and visits to Haitian and Central American
communities to dispel rumors that Canada granted automatic residency.
For a while, the efforts appeared to be working, and asylum claims at the border fell sharply. But those
earlier arrivals have been replaced by others, mostly from Nigeria, officials said, illustrating the
challenge Canadian officials face in identifying and preventing the next big influx.
Officials say the Nigerians have been turning up at the Canadian border after obtaining visas that allow
them to travel to the U.S.
Last week, Canada Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen said the U.S. and Canada are studying a 14-year-
old treaty called the Safe Third Country Agreement that requires asylum seekers to make their claims in
whichever country they arrive first.
There is an exception if they enter Canada illegally, making routes like the one used from upstate New
York into Quebec popular because it allows asylum seekers to get around the deal. Canada says it isn't
practical to apply the agreement to the entire border, in part because much of the border isn't staffed
by guards.
Unless police believe they represent a threat to Canada, asylum seekers are released after their arrest
and don't face criminal charges.
The response in Canada to the wave of asylum seekers has been mixed. A Quebec-based organization
called Bridges Not Borders has sent delegations to the border to greet incoming migrants and is lobbying
Canadian officials to allow asylum seekers to use official points of entry. But last year, the arrival of
thousands of Haitians in the French-speaking province triggered several anti-immigration rallies.
Another Quebec group is planning a protest at the border with New York state later this month. The
group wants asylum seekers turned back if they approach at unofficial crossings.
Mr. Hussen and other officials are concerned shutting down unofficial crossings would push migrants to
use more dangerous routes and sneak into the country undetected. Instead, they are trying head off a
big wave of claimants ahead of summer. The minister met with Nigeria's high commissioner to Canada
last month to discuss the rise in the number of Nigerians using U.S. visas to enter Canada and then claim
asylum. His department has also sent officers to Nigeria to communicate with U.S. embassy officials
about abuse of travel visas; Mr. Hussen is in Nigeria this week. The Canadian government also aims to
send officials to Nigerian churches in the U.S. to dispel myths of easy entry to Canada.
Immigration fuels populism in Canada.

Eli Yufest 4-18-2017 -- Eli Yufest is the CEO of Campaign Research. ["One half think Canada admits too
many immigrants and/or refugees", Accessible Online at: https://www.campaignresearch.ca/single-
post/2017/04/18/One-half-think-Canada-admits-too-many-immigrants-andor-refugees-One-tenth-or-
fewer-think-too-few-are-admitted-One-third-find-number-admitted-about-right] @ AG
In the third wave of the Campaign Research Poll, an online omnibus opinion survey conducted among
1970 Canadian voters, one half believe Canada admits too many immigrants (49%), while just more than
4 in 10 (43%) think the number admitted is too few (7%) or about right (36%). Thinking too many
immigrants are coming to Canada is common to Gen X (45 to 54 - 58%), Albertans (56%), federal
Conservatives (69%) and Bloc Quebecois voters (62%) and the less wealthy ($20K to $40K - 54%).
One half think too many refugees are allowed into Canada
One half of Canadian voters also believe too many refugees are allowed into the country (49%), while,
again, just more than 4 in 10 (42%) think the number is too few (10%) or about right (32%). Those who
think there are too many refugees are similar to those who hold the same view about immigrants.
“These findings suggest that many people draw no distinction between immigrants, those who have
legally moved to this country, and refugees who are here illegally because they have nowhere else to
go. While the two groups are dissimilar, they seem to evoke the same sentiments“. said Eli Yufest, CEO
of Campaign Research.
-- Canada Populism U
Massive migrant surges spur populist violence in Quebec and encourage secession
Canadian Press 2017—Canadian Newspaper. ["Tensions run high in Quebec during pro and anti-
immigrant rallies", Accessible Online at: http://www.iheartradio.ca/max-104-9/news/tensions-run-high-
in-quebec-during-pro-and-anti-immigrant-rallies-1.3150964] @ AG
Tensions boiled over in Quebec City as police were pelted by beer bottles and smoke bombs set off in
garbage cans in an ugly end to a weekend of pro and anti-immigrant rallies.
The far right group Quebec group La Meute called for a rally Sunday to protest the federal and
provincial government's handling of the recent flood of border crossers, but ended up having its
members pinned inside a garage while counter-protesters demonstrated outside.
Once the counter-protesters turned violent, police declared the protest illegal and at least one protester
was arrested.
The protests in the Quebec capital were far more tense than Saturday's rally in Vancouver where
thousands of people peacefully demonstrated.
The rallies sprung up in the wake of last week's deadly events in Charlottesville, Virginia in which one
person was killed when a vehicle plowed into anti-racism protesters.
When asked Sunday if the unprecedented number of border crossers was stoking anti-immigrant
sentiments, Prime Minister Justin said he stood with millions of Canadians ``who reject the hateful,
harmful, heinous ideologies'' that have sprouted across the country.
Canadian populism rising now – polling proves.

Stephanie Levitzthe 1-22-2018 – Reporter for the Canadian Press. ["Fewer than half of Canadians hold
an open view of the world, poll on populism finds", Accessible Online at:
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/01/22/fewer-than-half-of-canadians-hold-open-view-of-
the-world-poll-on-populism-finds.html] @ AG
OTTAWA—Canada’s reputation as a nation with an open and optimistic world view that flies in the face
of rising pessimism and nationalism elsewhere is being challenged by new research suggesting many
Canadians hold views acutely in line with some of those darker forces.
Fewer than half of Canadians appear on the “open” side of an index devised by EKOS Research and The
Canadian Press to gauge populist sentiment here, and the remainder either have a closed-off view of the
world or are on the fence — a potentially volatile swing group.
The research aggregated polls involving 12,604 people to explore to what extent Canadians’ views are in
line with voters who backed two of the most surprising manifestations of 21st century populism in
recent years — Donald Trump’s campaign for U.S. president and the exit of Britain from the European
Union.
Both were understood to be the results of rising discontent among those side-swiped by technological,
cultural and economic transformation and seeking to regain some measure of control by eschewing the
political status quo in favour of a dramatic new approach.
Whether Canada could be facing a similar issue has been a question ever since.
The results of the study suggest 46 per cent of Canadians are open-minded towards the world and each
other, with the highest numbers found in B.C. and the Atlantic Provinces.
But 30 per cent report feeling economically and culturally insecure, a sentiment found in the largest
numbers in Alberta and Saskatchewan. The remainder — roughly 25 per cent — have a mixed view.
To gauge where Canadians sit, EKOS Research and The Canadian Press aggregated responses to
questions posed in two telephone polls between June and December about people’s perceptions of
their economic outlook, class mobility, ethnic fluency and tolerance. Pollsters also asked whether they
believed such movements were good or not.
The results were in turn plotted on a spectrum from “open” to “ordered” — a new way of classifying
people’s political viewpoints that goes beyond the traditional right-versus-left.
The old partisan markers are driven by fiscal and social philosophies and are less a part of today’s
political debate that broader opinions about how the world should be run, said EKOS President Frank
Graves.
“The left-right has mutated under these pressures into this ‘ordered-open’ and it brings along some of
the traditional left-right, but it brings along a lot of new divisions,” Graves said.
“The questions now are: Do you want to pull up the drawbridge? What do you think about people who
don’t have the same skin colour as you? What do you think about the importance of tolerating dissent
or having a more-ordered versus a more-chaotic or creative society?”
The telephone polls had a margin of error of 0.9 per cent, 19 times out of 20.
OPEN: The Atlantic region
The research reveals the complex nature of what EKOS has called “northern populism.’
For example, 50 per cent of those surveyed in the Atlantic region hold an “open” view. That means they
feel positive about their economic future and class mobility and have a perception of the ethnic makeup
of the country that most closely mirrors reality. They’re also the least likely to view populism as a
positive force.
Yet, in the Atlantic, the population is older, less diverse and somewhat less educated that other regions.
Those are all factors understood to underpin a more closed-minded view of the world: supporters of
Britain’s exit from the EU were more likely to have lower incomes than those who voted to stay, and
lower levels of education as well.
Graves pointed out that the region’s dependence on immigration to sustain its fiscal future likely
influences the rankings there, and also a coastal culture that literally provides a more open view of the
world.
ORDERED: Oshawa, Ont.

The economy of Oshawa — despite the precarious state of the auto industry — is growing, median
income levels are high and so are the numbers of people with post-secondary degrees. Yet, 38 per cent
of those polled in that city skewed toward having a more ordered view of the world. No city had more
people on that side of the spectrum.
“Where you live is instructive, and the collective economic experiences and the demographic is also
important. But they are by no means deterministic,” Graves said.
“It means that communities can choose to take different routes.”
Many people have held up the diversity of Canada’s major centres as a reason why a populism rooted in
anti-immigrant sentiment that was part of both Trump’s victory and Brexit could never take hold here.
The research suggests however that in the suburbs of those centres, some of which feature
exceptionally high concentrations of single ethnic groups, people can be just as much in search of a
more traditional order as those in the rural pockets of the country.
“Canadian populism shares more with southern American populism than people think, but there are
some important and distinct differences,” Graves said.
“One of the most important is that populism in Canada is not rooted in just the white population; in fact
there isn’t any significant difference across white and non-white portions of the population in Canada.”
MIXED: a prime political target
Questions about class and inequality are top of mind this week as world leaders meet in Davos,
Switzerland for the annual World Economic Forum. Among them is Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and an
entourage of Liberal cabinet ministers.
“We must have the full and equal participation of all to have economies that work for everyone and a
future that is fairer, more inclusive, and more compassionate,” Trudeau said in a statement ahead of the
trip.
It’s a message that the 25 per cent of Canadians who fall into the “mixed” category in the study are
meant to hear, suggested Graves.
“That’s a swing group,” Graves said.
“They are probably people who were on the ‘open’ side 10 years ago. You can argue that if you can’t
produce a sense that there is a hopeful future then this problem is going to get bigger (rather) than
smaller.”
Canadian populism coming now – the influx of new immigrants spurs nativism.
Teresa Wright 4-17-2018 – Reporter for the Canadian Press. ["Canada far from immune to populism
despite Justin Trudeau’s progressive rhetoric: experts", Accessible Online at:
https://globalnews.ca/news/4151378/canada-populism-justin-trudeau-progressive-rhetoric/] @ AG
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau might see his country as a beacon of hope in a roiling sea of polarization
and angry nationalist sentiment, but Canada is far from immune, experts warn.
Just as he did Tuesday at the French National Assembly, Trudeau likes to portray Canada as a place
where progressive values flourish – free trade, ethic diversity, immigration, environmental protection
and gender equality.
“At a time when the political movements exploit the real anxiety of their citizens, Canada has chosen to
be against cynicism and embrace audacity and ambition,” he said.
A sizable proportion of the Canadian public believes otherwise, research suggests.
Ekos Research and The Canadian Press teamed up earlier this year to gauge populist sentiment in
Canada. Fewer than half of respondents – 46 per cent – expressed views that reflected an open-minded
perspective of the world and each other, while 30 per cent landed in the “ordered” category, which
means feeling economically and culturally insecure. 25 per cent expressed “mixed” views.
The survey, an aggregation of polls conducted with more than 12,000 Canadians, carried a margin of
error of plus or minus 0.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20. Its results suggested there is indeed
fertile ground in Canada for a populist movement to take hold.
Canada has largely staved off the negative politics of pessimism and xenophobia that are major areas of
concern in the U.S. and parts of Europe, said Ekos president Frank Graves. But that doesn’t mean
populist sentiment isn’t brewing north of the border.
“Those forces are very much at work,” Graves said, noting the icy reaction to Trudeau’s remarks from
right-wing National Front leader Marine Le Pen.
“Those forces are by no means extinguished in France and we see them definitely evident in Canada as
well.”
Graves cited Ontario Conservative Leader Doug Ford as an example of a political leader who speaks the
language of the ordered, populist view, with campaign rhetoric that blames his Liberal rivals for the
economic insecurity plaguing those who are struggling.
Graves also mentioned recent electoral victories in Hungary and Italy by polarizing populist parties that
show populism is on the march.
“Canada did seem to be picking a different path on things like xenophobia and trade and immigration,”
he said of his findings.
“However, there was still a very sizable, very engaged portion of the public that were not buying into
this at all… this is by no means a settled issue yet.”
University of Amsterdam researcher Mike Medeiros, who specializes in ethnopolitics, political behaviour
and political psychology, pointed to immigration as an issue that could become a flashpoint in Canada.
Spurred in part by fear of a crackdown from U.S. President Donald Trump, illegal migrants have been
streaming over the border into Ontario and Quebec in hopes of seeking asylum in Canada.
All it would take is a charismatic leader to come along and exploit such issues to bring nativist
sentiment in Canada to a boil, he said.
“If (Trudeau) is expressing simply that Canada is different, fine, that’s fair, because Canada is different –
or at least it has been so far,” Medeiros said.
“But if he is expressing that, ‘We do not have these concerns,’ that is not accurate.”
Populism is on the rise in Canada

Toronto Sun, '17 – (Postmedia Network, "Of course populism on the rise in Canada," Toronto Sun, 6-
26-2017, https://torontosun.com/2017/06/26/of-course-populism-on-the-rise-in-
canada/wcm/93f0eb89-0b4b-4689-b5ba-3cddc5923944)//SB
A recent poll commissioned by The Canadian Press reveals the public believes there’s a “northern
populism” movement growing in Canada.
The elites predictably will react with fear and alarm to this story and inevitably try to convince regular
Canadians into thinking that’s a bad thing.
It’s what they do every time their agenda is threatened.
Populism is a dirty word to those who lost their minds when Donald Trump got elected, or who saw the
sky falling after the Brexit vote in Britain.
The reality is Canadians are losing confidence in their institutions because increasingly those
institutions fail to serve or reflect their priorities.
Our public school boards, universities, unions and government, and its many agencies, increasingly are
driven by ideological agendas, often ones that reflect the narrow interests of disgruntled activists.
They are out of touch with regular people, who care about making the world a better place but rightly
worry more about jobs and putting their kids through school.
The CP survey reveals three-quarters of Canadians believe some version of populism is on the rise here,
either to a moderate or high degree.
And it shows “22 percent of people who weren’t born here thought populism was a good thing,
compared to 18.5 per cent of those whose parents were both born here.”
So new immigrants like populism slightly more than other Canadians! Who would’ve thought?
But if you view populism as paying attention to the thoughts and needs of regular people over the elite
sentiments coming from self-interested institutions – which is how we define it – then this shouldn’t be
a shocker.
People come to Canada from all over the world to seek a better place for their families. They don’t want
to be oppressively taxed. They don’t want to be turned into guinea pigs for the latest progressive
agenda. They don’t want the nanny state telling them how to raise their kids.
The elites aren’t just out of step with common sense Canadians. They’re out of touch with new
immigrants as well.
Every time the conversation of populism in Canada comes up, the usual suspects start wringing their
hands. This threatens their privilege.
Good. Let them dwell on it. Maybe it’ll force them back to reality.
Populism, at face value, seems almost healthy. Or at least to me it does. I was raised in Alberta, a
populist heartland. It was accepted as a fact that the government chronically ignores “the people.” Men
like Ralph Klein, who drank in a rundown pub and boasted about his lack of education did well there.
Ralph, as he was universally known, painted himself as an outsider, the only one looking out for the
roughnecks and the farmhands. And we ate it up.
But after I moved overseas, it didn’t take me long to realize populism isn’t just backslapping good ol’
boys. I found that from Indonesia to England, “rule by the people” almost always ends up undermining
democracy.
At the heart of every populist movement is the idea that the establishment has to go. There is no grand
theory of economics or social policy. There is the idea that the people are being hurt by the powers that
be—and that makes the establishment illegitimate. Therefore, the only legitimate candidate is the
populist. He or she is on the same side as the people, and electing him or her means the people will be
back in charge. As Trump himself explained during his inaugural address: “Jan. 20, 2017, will be
remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.”
Because the current way of doing politics is illegitimate, populists scorn it by acting out. Their supporters
love the “honesty” of their transgressions, sexual escapades and illicit opinions. This erodes the political
system. Consider the United States. In the next election cycle, will voters see sexual assault or tax
evasion as a disqualifier?
The populist is the avatar of the people, the embodiment of their will. If somehow they lose the
election, then the people’s will was subverted; the election was corrupt, or there was a conspiracy to
stop them. Spreading doubt about the electoral system further erodes democracy and the public’s trust
in institutions.
Even after taking power, a populist still needs an opponent. This means attacking the bureaucrats,
policies and systems that were in place when he arrived. The battle against the establishment is
constant, and success is a zero-sum game, measured by how much the other guys lose. In the end, the
greatest casualties are actually the institutions that keep a democracy relatively stable.
There is one other foil that populists almost always target: immigrants, minorities and foreigners. In
France, the populists blame Muslims (8 per cent of the population). In Indonesia, it’s the Chinese (1 per
cent). In the United Kingdom, it’s the Jews (0.5 per cent). It doesn’t matter how small or powerless these
groups are, they are held responsible for any setback or failure suffered by a populist government or
movement.
Right now, it feels like populism is surging globally. In the U.K., we have seen the rise of the anti-
immigrant UKIP party and the success in the Brexit vote to leave the European Union. Across the
channel, the polls are predicting the anti-Muslim, anti-European Union party of Geert Wilders may form
the largest party in the Netherlands’ parliament. Similarly, in France, the Front National’s Marine Le Pen
is being boosted by her ability to blend centrist policies with strong anti-immigration messages.
In Hungary, the anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban gave a speech this week calling for more
“ethnic homogeneity.” Not surprisingly, he also wants closer ties to Russia. There, Vladimir Putin is the
most influential populist in the world. At home, he has pushed an agenda of nationalism, while
energetically subverting elections. Abroad, Russia has actively supported populist movements
everywhere: money to Le Pen in France, leaked emails for Trump and clandestine support for the Brexit
campaign in the U.K.
Another new friend of Russia is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He has become increasingly
populist while greatly expanding his powers. Further south, in Africa, the past decade has seen a marked
increase in populist movements in countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cameroon and Equatorial
Guinea. In Asia, the Philippines elected an anti-intellectual strongman who boasts about breaking the
law. And in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power railing against a corrupt and ineffectual
status quo and making abusive comments against the Muslim minority.
Populism rising and and is popular – Quebec proves.
Mike Medeiros 1-8-2018 -- Mike Medeiros is an assistant professor in the department of political
science at the University of Amsterdam. ["The populism risk in English Canada", Accessible Online at:
http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2018/the-populism-risk-in-english-canada/] @ AG
The Quebec government’s Bill 62 — “An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in
particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain
bodies” — is a response to a lingering collective concern among Quebecers regarding religious diversity
and the integration of immigrants. The law, which came into effect in mid-October, provoked outrage
among political and media elites in the Rest of Canada (ROC). But the indignation that targeted Quebec
does not represent the attitudes of regular Canadians.
Bill 62 seeks to prevent individuals whose face is covered from providing or receiving public services.
While the law was widely attacked by opposition politicians in the National Assembly and by Quebec
media pundits for being confusing (notably due to Justice Minister Stéphanie Vallée’s inability to explain
how it would be applied and to her changing the interpretative limits of its proscriptions), the principle
behind the law — that public services should be given and received with an uncovered face — is quite
popular in the province. According to polls, a large majority of Quebecers support it, as do many
members of the political and journalistic class.
The reaction has been different in the ROC. Although media pundits were not unanimous in their
opinions, the vast majority were strongly against Quebec’s attempt to ban individuals who cover their
face from providing and, especially, receiving public services. The reaction was even more uniform
among politicians in English Canada, who strongly condemned the Quebec government’s attempt to
regulate religious expression.
While this split of opinion may seem to be a manifestation of Canada’s “two solitudes,” the reality is
quite different. Foreigners who happened to read the reactions to Bill 62 from politicians and pundits in
English Canada might conclude that English Canada is strongly against a ban on people with covered
faces giving and receiving public services. However, they would be wrong.
A number of polls that have been published since Bill 62 was voted into law have shown that the
opinions of Canadians in the ROC on this issue are aligned with those of Quebecers.
Restrictions on face coverings receive support among a majority of English Canadians. This should not be
surprising. At the heart of such a ban are negative attitudes toward the niqab and the burqa, and the
perceived symbolic changes that they represent to a Western society. While Quebecers have often been
labelled as being hypersensitive to the perceived social changes brought on by immigration, the cultural
sensitivities of English Canadians have been somewhat overlooked. I explored this issue, in a recently
published article in Ethnic and Racial Studies, and found that anglophone Canadians are just as sensitive
to perceived cultural threats as francophone Quebecers. My findings are in line with those from an
article recently published in Policy Options. Érick Lachapelle and his colleagues present findings from an
original survey that show that Quebec is not distinct in its level of support for restricting religious garb;
in fact, Quebecers are not even the most supportive of such a restriction.
While anglophones in the ROC clearly manifest discomfort related to issues of immigration and
integration, these attitudes are seldom voiced by their political representatives.
The disconnect between elites and citizens in English Canada with regard to cultural sensitivity leads to
two major sociopolitical dilemmas. First, there is a problem of democratic representation. While
anglophones in the ROC clearly manifest discomfort related to issues of immigration and integration,
these attitudes are seldom voiced by their political representatives. The example of restrictions on face
coverings being strongly supported by citizens yet demonized by their elites demonstrates a gap in
political representation. At the very least, these attitudes, widely shared by citizens in English Canada,
should be brought forth and debated by political elites.
While English Canada has avoided the rise of movements similar to those credited with leading to Brexit
and to the Trump presidency, it is not immune to this trend.
Second, this gap provides a fertile ground for a populist and nativist movement to take hold in English
Canada. The recent rise of populist movements in Western liberal democracies underlines a
dissatisfaction of citizens with elites. The rhetoric from populist politicians has placed the concerns of a
hard-working citizenry in opposition to the policies of a disconnected, self-centred elite. While English
Canada has avoided the rise of movements similar to those credited with leading to Brexit and to the
Trump presidency, it is not immune to this trend. You don’t have to be very old to remember the
success of the Reform Party, which built its electoral base in part by pitting western Canadians and their
concerns against an unrepresentative political elite in Ottawa.
Although nativism differs conceptually from populism, it has often featured in the rhetoric of populist
movements. Changes to society, and notably to culture, brought on by immigration can be rife with
emotion. Therefore, sensitivities related to the perceived social changes induced by immigration are an
easy, yet potentially powerful, tool to garner political attention.
Nevertheless, if these cultural sensitivities are not addressed, they can fester and become even more
ripe for exploitation by calculating political actors, leading to the overt bigotry seen in many countries
today. It is not unimaginable that a more charismatic politician than Conservative MP Kellie Leitch, with
more sophisticated tactics, could use English Canadians’ discomfort with social diversity to garner
political support.
The disconnect concerning cultural sensitivity in English Canada needs to be addressed. Elites in English
Canada should stop focusing on Quebec, often in a negative light, look at their own backyard, and start
to take seriously the cultural insecurity felt by their citizens. While cultural sensitivity caused by social
diversity is a delicate issue, and one that sometimes leads to an escalation of political rhetoric, it cannot
simply be ignored or, worse, undermined. A mature democratic society should be able to discuss and
debate responsibly the most uncomfortable of issues affecting its population.
English Canada’s political elites need to be more courageous and more representative of their citizenry’s
perception that there is a threat to their culture. If not, a populist and nativist movement that seeks to
represent the “unrepresented” might become a serious political force in English Canada.
AT//Canada Populism Inevitable
Canadian populism is at a low now but could increase due to an influx of immigration
– expert studies prove populist sentiment is on the rise
Wright ’18 – 4/17/18, Teresa Wright is an award-winning reporter for the Canadian Press with a
Master’s from Holland College and expertise in ethics, populism, and immigration, The Canadian Press,
“Experts warn Canada not immune to populism, despite Trudeau’s progressive rhetoric,”
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/04/17/experts-warn-canada-not-immune-to-populism-
despite-trudeaus-progressive-rhetoric.html // shurst
“At a time when the political movements exploit the real anxiety of their citizens, Canada has chosen to
be against cynicism and embrace audacity and ambition,” he said. A sizable proportion of the Canadian
public believes otherwise, research suggests. Ekos Research and The Canadian Press teamed up earlier
this year to gauge populist sentiment in Canada. Fewer than half of respondents — 46 per cent —
expressed views that reflected an open-minded perspective of the world and each other, while 30 per
cent landed in the “ordered” category, which means feeling economically and culturally insecure. 25 per
cent expressed “mixed” views. The survey, an aggregation of polls conducted with more than 12,000
Canadians, carried a margin of error of plus or minus 0.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20. Its
results suggested there is indeed fertile ground in Canada for a populist movement to take hold.
Canada has largely staved off the negative politics of pessimism and xenophobia that are major areas of
concern in the United States and parts of Europe, said Ekos president Frank Graves. But that doesn’t
mean populist sentiment isn’t brewing north of the border. “Those forces are very much at work,”
Graves said, noting the icy reaction to Trudeau’s remarks from right-wing National Front leader Marine
Le Pen. “Those forces are by no means extinguished in France and we see them definitely evident in
Canada as well.” Graves cited Ontario Conservative Leader Doug Ford as an example of a political leader
who speaks the language of the ordered, populist view, with campaign rhetoric that blames his Liberal
rivals for the economic insecurity plaguing those who are struggling. You might be interested in Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau — posing Friday with participants in Toronto’s Caribbean Carnival — has made a
policy virtue out of zero tolerance for sexual harassment. Justin Trudeau, the virtuous feminist, has
painted himself into a corner Trump is now up to 1,929 false claims for the first 528 days of his
presidency, an overall average of 3.7 per day. Donald Trump makes 100 false claims for second
consecutive week Hamilton’s first shipping container home rises on Arkledun Avenue Hamilton’s first
shipping container home rises on Arkledun Avenue Graves also mentioned recent electoral victories in
Hungary and Italy by polarizing populist parties that show populism is on the march. “Canada did seem
to be picking a different path on things like xenophobia and trade and immigration,” he said of his
findings. “However, there was still a very sizable, very engaged portion of the public that were not
buying into this at all ... this is by no means a settled issue yet.” University of Amsterdam researcher
Mike Medeiros, who specializes in ethnopolitics, political behaviour and political psychology, pointed to
immigration as an issue that could become a flashpoint in Canada. Spurred in part by fear of a
crackdown from U.S. President Donald Trump, illegal migrants have been streaming over the border into
Ontario and Quebec in hopes of seeking asylum in Canada. All it would take is a charismatic leader to
come along and exploit such issues to bring nativist sentiment in Canada to a boil, he said. “If [Trudeau]
is expressing simply that Canada is different, fine, that’s fair, because Canada is different — or at least it
has been so far,” Medeiros said. “But if he is expressing that, ‘We do not have these concerns,’ that is
not accurate.”
Populism in Canada is suppressed and unforeseen – assumes their evidence
Milke ’18 – 3/19/18, Mark Milke is a senior fellow at the Fraser Institute with a PhD in political science
from the University of Calgary, “Why People Never See Populism Coming,”
https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/why-people-never-see-populism-coming/ // shurst
When some pundits, professors and politicians write or speak of populism, they often do so with a sneer
and the assumption that populist voters are knuckle-dragging reactionaries with genetic stock firmly
planted in the evolutionary Neanderthal period. You know the arguments and the attitude: a new
politician cobbles together a coalition or platform defined by someone as populist and out come the
rhetorical knives and eye-rolls. Politicians in the past and present endured this treatment: Tommy
Douglas, W.A.C. Bennett (his critics called him “wacky”), Ralph Klein, Mike Harris, Preston Manning and,
more recently, Rob Ford and now Doug Ford. Internationally, the politicians most associated with
populism include Juan and Eva Peron in Argentina in the 1950s and 1970s, the American president
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, and the La Pen father-and-daughter National Front tag team in France over
the last few decades. Many of the newer political parties in other European countries including
European Union diktat-resisting parties in Hungary and Poland are categorized in such a manner.
Populists include the left and right in Great Britain as represented by Jeremy Corbyn and the Brexit
movement. As of 2015 in the United States, the list includes the rise of Bernie Sanders who almost
upended Hillary Clinton in the Democratic party primaries and Donald Trump who did topple “his”
party’s assumed favourites and then became president. In other words, the new populists are like the
old populists: They act as divining rods and sometimes take power if established politicians ignore
concerns on the ground. Populism from “left” to “right” and beyond The list of names should give us
pause. They range from those who in economic terms might be labelled left-wing (Douglas, Corbyn and
Sanders) or right-wing (Ronald Reagan, Mike Harris and Ralph Klein). Plenty of others defy such
stereotypes. Economic pigeon-holes skip over, for example, cultural and social issues. But the latter
more helpfully explain the rise of the new European parties, Brexit and Trump. As with any new
movement and the politicians and parties that later surf on populism to power, there is often no
coherent or consistent program, economic or otherwise. There instead exists a mishmash of concerns
that should be taken seriously—early, rather than, as is often the case, dismissed. I’m not arguing that
each of the above-named personalities is always correct on policy. But we should see populism for what
it is: An expression of an under-represented or unheard chunk of the public. As one example, today’s
anxieties in Europe, the United States and Canada include whether new immigrants are successfully
integrating into the norms of Western nations, such as the equality of women and the freedom to
criticize others’ gods. These concerns ought to be frankly discussed and addressed, not least because in
a virtually connected world where people can retain their tribal identities and fail to integrate into the
modern liberal democratic Western nation-state, such realities pose a threat to stable, functioning
societies and to traditional Western freedoms—I can criticize your god and if you dislike it, you do not
get to silence me via the law or even not-so-subtle shaming or threats. That’s just one example where a
so-called populist impulse (about immigration over time and integration) is a valid, non-xenophobic
concern. I can think of other issues: The rise of identity politics, native Canadian and minority carve-outs
in policy preferences, higher education and employment. Populism in Canada: Repressed One reason
why populism—average Canadians who buck elite preferences—surprises the self-referencing classes
when a populist shows up at the top of a political party (Doug Ford and his Ontario PC leadership win) is
because there are few ways for Canadians to adequately and regularly express their preferences. I don’t
mean every four or five years in an election. Elections are an obvious, necessary part of a liberal
democracy but never enough to set complicated issues on the path to smart and workable remedies.
That is because elections often turn on personalities (“Sunny ways and socks”– Justin Trudeau versus
the dour Stephen Harper) and rarely on issues. One remedy is a greater use of referendums, including
citizen-initiated versions just in case politicians and governments are resistant to chronic public
irritations. But Canada’s political system is mostly devoid of such populist safety valves. That is unlike
Europe and the United States where they are widespread and in many cases, required. (The Swiss have
multiple referendums on often contentious issues ranging from minimum wage to abolishing the
military and no one thinks they are less civilized for doing so.) Referendums are helpful to honest debate
and provide clearer results on what actually matters to the voting or protesting public. The other reason
populism in Canada is rarely spotted until it hits the top of a political party is because our parties
routinely make it more and not less difficult to run against an incumbent or the leader’s favourite. For
example, the party leader is usually the one to sign off on a candidate’s nomination papers. (Patrick
Brown practiced this top-down approach in spades before he was toppled and chased out of the Ontario
PC party.) This allows incumbents and existing party favourites to more easily shield themselves from
challenges that may result from a populist wave. That further delays addressing core concerns. In
addition, through gag laws on free expression, governments across Canada thwart populist sentiment
that might arise come from citizen’s groups—so-called “third parties” in the lead-up to and during
elections. Such gag laws are yet another sign the chattering classes and those with political power don’t
want their carefully-planned writ periods disturbed by voters who might actually care to discuss and
promote idea debates, and not personalities. The snobby reaction is blinding to understanding Back to
Ford: Is he tapping into something? Yes. Do people know in detail what his policies are? Not yet. But
Ford is obviously signalling at least some Ontarians’ angst on power bills, parental rights on educational
matters and the general annoyance with the Wynne government’s pay-the-debt forward approach to
everyone’s great-grandchildren’s finances. Which is to say this: Here’s another way to look at populism:
As reflective of democratic urges that are often ignored by those currently in power, and thus often
entirely legitimate. In fact, that’s the Oxford definition of populism: “A political approach that strives to
appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups.” For
those ensconced in the safe space of an ivory tower, newsroom or political office, it might help to get
out a bit more –and listen to people very unlike you. And some advice: After you do that, don’t follow it
up with a snide lecture.
Ext. Canada Middle Power Impact
Canada’s middle power legitimacy is vital to global stability (also AT: Canada no longer
relevant & AT: theory outdated)
Bothwell ‘11
March 2011 http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6698//Cal-JV]
Tracing the development of traditional middle powers gives insight into the importance of the world¶
order. It shows how relatively ‘neutral’ nations are integral to maintain the peace and mediate¶
through crises. As the global order is constantly shifting it is important to be able to classify¶ emerging
middle powers in the same manner as traditional middle powers like Canada, Australia¶ and Sweden. As
in 1945, the world is recognising the distinct differences between the not great and¶ the great countries
but perhaps on a more specific scale. New and more accepting categories are¶ developing to keep up
with the constant change in the world order. Some of the frameworks¶ discussed cannot keep up with
the shifting global landscape. The hierarchical model is dated and is¶ based on an out of date way of
quantifying power based on population and military capabilities. On¶ the opposite end of the spectrum,
the behavioural model is too flexible and can classify some states¶ as middle powers when they only act
like a middle power, but are not necessarily a middle power¶ through and through.¶ After examining
the various types of middle power analysis it is clear that Jordaan presents the best¶ framework.
Inspired by Cox and Gramsci, Jordaan highlights characteristics essential to both¶ emerging and
traditional middle powers while applying them to relevant examples. Furthermore,¶ Jordaan has also
created a strong distinction between emerging and traditional middle powers,¶ showing how the theory
is flexible and can keep up with the shifting global order.
Canada is key to the rest of the world’s middle powers – otherwise, bipolar conflict
Bothwell ‘11
March 2011 http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6698//Cal-JV]
The postwar era was ideal for Canada to make a name for itself externally as a middle power. It¶ has
acted as legitimiser, peacekeeper, proponent of conflict reduction and supporter of multilateral¶
solutions with like-minded states. From the outset there are some elements of middle powermanship¶
which are more obvious than others. Jordaan presents many attributes necessary for a nation to be¶
considered a middle power. Some of these characteristics are easily applied when examining¶ Canada’s
middle power status of the past including: regional significance, identity, foreign policy¶ participation in
multi-lateral bodies and leadership. Since Canada has an “inability… to unilaterally¶ and single handily
shape global outcomes in any direct manner” it is essential for them to¶ participate in multi-lateral
bodies and have a strong foreign policy (Jordaan, 2003:169). As a result,¶ Canada has acted as a
legitimising force to the current world order upholding the middle power¶ reputation.
Ext. Quebec Secessionism IL
Failed foreign policy causes Canadian populism – prefer empirics
Rioux and Hay ’99 – Jean-François Rioux has a PhD in political science from St. Paul University and
Robert Hay is a Parliamentary Affairs Advisor at Senate of Canada, “Canadian foreign policy From
internationalism to isolationism?” // shurst
Nevertheless, retrenchment and 'Canada First' attitudes, which have intermittently existed in Canada (in
Quebec nationalism and in western populism of bygone eras, for instance), have reappeared since the
end of the cold war but especially in the last few years, born of economic and budgetary concerns and
preoccupation with the constitutional issue. They have been bolstered by widespread disappointment
over failed multilateral actions in which Canada participated, made worse by the scandalous behaviour
of some members of the armed forces, most notably in Somalia. Such attitudes are not the exclusive
preserve of the right in Canada, but tend to straddle the political divide. For instance, while Robert
White, the president of the Canadi an Labour Congress, advocates spending on foreign aid, the United
Nations, and peacekeeping, he also calls for withdrawal from NATO because 'Canada's foreign policy
should be grounded in Canadian realities. Our priorities should start with our relations with the United
States and Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region and our Arctic neighbours. This is not to exclude other
parts of the world, but to simply acknowledge and reflect the priority of our self-interest in these
regions.'9 CANADIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1990S: THE EROSION OF
INTERNATIONALISM Clearly the end of the cold war and of a forty-year nuclear standoff that for many
observers posed an imminent threat to existence has had an impact on Canadian foreign policy. For
policy-makers the most immediate effect of the end of the cold war was the removal - in theory, if not in
practice - of the only serious military threat challenging Canadian security. This not only eased Canada's
retreat - at least militarily - from NATO, which had served as a pillar of Canadian foreign policy since the
Second World War, but it also heralded a turn from Europe and the rise of selective internationalism,
made easier by the redefinition of security.
Ext. Quebec Impact
Quebec secession causes US-Russia miscalc
Lamont ‘94
Breakup, p. 238-239
That is why, with Canada's and Russia's future in doubt today, it is possible to imagine this scenario in
the wake of Quebec's secession: Economic reform has collapsed throughout Russia. Widespread despair
over soaring prices, injured pride over Russia's loss of stature, and disgust with Moscow's leadership boil
over. A cabal of so-called "Reds" and "Browns"-unreconstructed former Communist officials and neo-
Fascist militarists-sweeps the Yeltsin reformers from office. In the name of restoring social order and
averting total economic ruin, the leaders of the coup establish an authoritarian provisional government
backed by key elements of the disaffected military. The new government resents the Western Alliance
for its Cold War triumph and humiliation of the Soviet Union, resents the infatuation with Western
culture and consumer products. It especially resents the United States for having won the arms race and
reduced Russia to a beggar nation, then acting niggardly in its response to Russian requests for massive
economic aid. The Russians, who have always regarded Canada as a less vehemently anti-Soviet balance
against the United States in the continental partnership, particularly resent Canada's fracturing after
Quebec's separation and the prospect of its pieces eventually attaching to the U.S. empire. Russian-
North .American relations move from tepid to subfreezing. The new hardliners running the Kremlin
reassess Russia's arsenal of Bear and Blackjack long-range bombers, its nearly 1,200 air-launchable
cruise missiles. They reanalyze the strategic value of the Arctic, whose jigsawed desert of ice conceals
not only an estimated 500 billion barrels of oil but lurking nuclear-armed submarines. Then, the Russians
order a sequence of air-borne reconnaissance missions to hard-probe the Arctic and North American
defenses. Somewhere on the eastern end of the Beaufort Sea, 30,000 feet above the approaching Parry
Islands, a Russian Bear-H intercontinental bomber prepares to enter North American airspace
clandestinely. The turboprop bomber, a bright red star on its side, has averaged 400 miles per hour since
it left its base in Siberia and headed over the polar icecap. It carries inside its bulky frame eight AS-X-15
cruise missiles, each a little over 20 feet long, each packing a nuclear warhead with more than five times
the power of the Hiroshima bomb. As it wings over Canadian territory, high enough so that air resistance
is minimal, the Bear approximates the flight mode of a glider, moving silently through the ether except for
short irregular bursts of acceleration from its engines. The bomber is some 200 miles off Canada's Arctic
coast when the ultrasensitive radars of the North Warning System's CAM-M site at Cambridge Bay pick it
up. CAM-M instantaneously relays the raw data on the unknown aircraft or "bogie" to NORAD' s Region
Operations Control Center (ROCC) at North Bay. In the operations room of the center's subterranean
complex, 600 feet deep in a Laurentian mountain, the "ass opers" (Air Surveil-lance Operators) start a
31/2-minute sequence to establish whether the bogie is a military or civil aircraft, friend or foe, and the
nature of its flight path and probable destination. The Bear does not respond to ROCC requests to identify
itself. The ass opers within seconds have established some basic information on the bogie: military,
unfriendly, Bear-Hotel class, and on a flight path pointing generally toward Winnipeg and Minneapolis.
What the ass opers do not know is whether the Bear is carrying nuclear weapons, its intentions, and
whether it is the vanguard of a possibly larger attack force. At the command post on the floor above the
oper-ations room, the commanding major general and two deputies quickly assess the ass opers' data
and order fighter-interceptors to scramble from an airfield at Paved Paws' nearest Forward Operation
Location. They also notify NORAD' s central U.S. command post in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. A pair
of CF-18 Hornets, attached to the Alouettes, the 425th Tactical Fighter Squadron based in Bagotville,
Quebec, race into the skies and somewhere above Victoria Island lock their radars onto the approaching
Bear. One of the jets springs a fuel leak and turns back. The other, armed with six AIM-9 Sidewinder
missiles and a 20-millimeter rapid-fire can-non, intercepts the intruder and buzzes it at close range. The
young francophone pilot gets no response to his repeated demands that the Russians confirm whether
they are carrying a nuclear payload. He frantically radios his base command for instructions and zooms in
for a closer look at the bomber, narrowly avoiding the Bear's tail on the pass. The Bear's pilot takes
immediate evasive action, banking his plane steeply at the same time he finally identifies himself and his
payload in angry, almost threatening tones. For one fearful moment intruder and interceptor seem
transfixed in uncertainty, hovering above the icy barrens of Victoria Island. The Hornet pilot prepares to
respond with a warning burst from his cannon. The fuming pilot of the'Bear considers activating the
ejector cartridges that would thrust a single silvery cruise into the blue, streaking along its computer
programmed flight path toward a NORAD target. Then discipline and cold sense reassert themselves.
The Bear makes a shuddering 180-degree turn and heads homeward. The Hornet lingers several minutes
to track the Bear's retreat before it, too, swings back toward its base. In a dangerously unpredictable,
post-Cold War world, some arms experts believe the chances of a fatal miscalculation happening in the
near future are better than 50 percent.
It also renders NORAD inoperable – Russia first strike

Lamont ‘94
Breakup, p. 236
America’s foremost concern, however, would be the impact of a diminished Canada on continental
security, the fact that Washington regards uninhibited access to Canadian territory, airspace, and waters
as critical to U.S. defense. An independent, territorially sensitive Quebec could seriously complicate
continental security arrangements affecting the use of its airspace, landing, and refueling privileges, the
status of NORAD francophone units in Quebec, and the free flow of international shipping through the
Quebec end of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The disbanding and relocation to Canada of its Armed Forces
based in Quebec, for instance, would cause considerable disarray in Canada’s operational effectiveness
and its ability to meet its NORAD obligations. A compromised tripartite NORAD command, including
Quebec, would hardly appeal to the Pentagon, but remains a distinct possibility. Of graver import would
be the will and capability of Canada itself to continue supporting the North American defense structure.
With its ongoing debt crisis, its traditional aversion to U.S. military initiatives, and the fading of the
Soviet threat, Canada might reduce even further its NORAD and NATO commitments.
AT//Quebec Secession Impact Defense
There is a perennial risk of Quebec secession – and it’s as high as it has been in
decades because of Catalonia and the Liberal Party of Quebec
Johnson ‘17
[William. Staffer, National Post. “Quebec's fantastical reactions to Catalonia's secession attempts” The
National Post, 11/13/17 ln//jv]
Reacting to Catalonia’s reckless attempt at unilateral secession, Quebecers have displayed their own
confusion about how secession could or could not be achieved in Quebec. Here, ambiguity reigns. Louis
Bernard, the former chief of staff to separatist Premier René Lévesque, published an article in Le Devoir
recently in which he claimed that, in Canada, unlike in Spain, victory in a referendum would lead
seamlessly to an independent Quebec. “Comparing the situation of Quebec with that of Catalonia, the
commentators have emphasized how fortunate it is that the right of Québec to choose democratically
its constitutional status is recognized both by Canada and the rest of the world,” he said. Meanwhile,
Parti Québécois leader Jean-François Lisée put all the blame for the violence that is now occurring
between Spanish police and citizens on the Spanish government. Lisée praised the democratic character
of the Catalan referendum, and denounced Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for not speaking out against
the violence. Lisée has proposed a motion in Quebec’s National Assembly to denounce the violence and
urge international mediation, thus echoing the call of Catalan President Carles Puigdemont. Quebecers
have displayed confusion about how secession could be achieved in Quebec. Other separatist leaders
followed the same line. Bloc Québécois leader Martine Ouellet, who was in Barcelona for the
referendum, tweeted her disgust at the “deafening silence” of the Canadian government. Her party tried
unsuccessfully to introduce a motion in the House of Commons to condemn the Spanish government’s
“violent repression.” And the left-wing separatist party Québec Solidaire tried to introduce a motion in
the National Assembly that would have recognized Catalonia’s eventual independence. It failed to get
sufficient votes to be accepted for debate. And what about the “federalist” Liberal Party of Quebec, led
by Premier Philippe Couillard? He chooses federalism, yet maintains that Quebec has an unfettered
right to secede should Quebecers so choose, because Quebec is a nation. Couillard refuses to recognize
the legitimacy of the 1982 Constitution Act On June 1, 2017, with great fanfare, the premier released a
177-page document detailing his party’s new constitutional policy. Titled Quebecers: Our way of being
Canadian, it contained three passages that claimed Quebec is free to choose any status. It notes, for
instance, that “Quebec is free to make its choices and able to take control of its destiny and its
development. Quebec possesses all the characteristics of a nation and recognizes itself as such.” The
document also refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the 1982 Constitution Act, which patriated
Canada’s constitution and entrenched the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That act, which
was supported by nine provinces and fulfilled the conditions set out by the Supreme Court of Canada,
was rejected at the time by premier René Lévesque, and has been rejected by every Quebec premier
since. Keeping with this tradition, Couillard’s document affirms the Quebec government’s continued
opposition to the Constitution Act of 1982.
Climate Leadership AddOn
Climate Leadership AddOn – 2ac
Trump has ruined US climate leadership – but it’s not too late – the plan revives it
Alice Thomas 6-1-2018 – Author for Refugees International. ["Moving Forward to Tackle Climate
Displacement after the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Accord", Accessible Online at:
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/usabsencefromtheparisaccord] @ AG
One year ago today, the Trump administration made its ill-advised decision to withdraw the United
States from the historic Paris Climate Accord. The decision effectively sidelined the United States on this
critical issue, moving the country from a position of international leadership on the climate crisis and
undermining global efforts to establish a cleaner, more stable world. But the good news is that despite
the absence of U.S. presidential leadership on climate policy, other countries – along with states, cities,
and communities within the United States and around the globe – are moving forward. Important
progress is being made including with respect to the impacts of climate change on forced displacement.
Last week, I joined almost 100 representatives of national governments, UN agencies, leading academic
institutions, civil society organizations, and the private sector at a stakeholders’ meeting with the Task
Force on Displacement (TFD) established under the Paris Accord. The mandate of the TFD is to develop
integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of
climate change. During the meeting, participants identified solutions and provided concrete input into
the TFD’s recommendations, which will be reported to countries in December 2018 at the next round of
climate change negotiations in Katowice, Poland. Refugees International’s written submission stressed
the importance of acting on opportunities to minimize forced displacement from extreme weather
events like hurricanes through improved risk management, thereby avoiding the protracted
displacement we are seeing in Puerto Rico and other parts of the United States and the Caribbean which
were slammed by last year’s wave of powerful hurricanes. And this coming Monday, June 5, I will head
back up to UN headquarters in New York where UN member states are meeting for the fifth round of
negotiations on a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration. Unsurprisingly, the Trump
administration also decided to sit this one out. The United States refused to join the negotiations which
seek to improve international cooperative efforts to address the enormous challenges and human
catastrophe resulting from disorderly and unsafe migration, which is playing out around the world and
at our own borders today. Significantly, the latest draft of the migration compact includes commitments
by countries to enhance protection and assistance for vulnerable communities that are uprooted by
disasters brought on by extreme weather as well as slower-onset climate change adverse effects such as
sea level rise. This commitment marks significant and critical progress in efforts to protect millions of at-
risk communities around the globe who at present, lack legal protection under the 1951 Refugees
Convention and its Protocol. Refugees International has urged states to act on this opportunity to
enhance protection and promote the human rights for persons uprooted by disasters and climate
change in the migration compact and its sister compact, the UN global compact on refugees. Given that
it will take several more years for the United States to formally withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord,
there is still time for the Trump administration and Members of Congress to get on board and show
leadership and global stewardship. But not doing so won’t stop the rest of us from striving to move the
forward toward a cleaner, safer, and more prosperous planet.
Alternative’s extinction
Schlanger 17 – Zoë Schlanger, Environment Reporter for Quartz and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist
with Quartz, “It’s Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement”,
Quartz, https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/
Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, we decided to
show you what almost could have been. Here’s our story, written both ways. US president Donald
Trump announced today (June 1) he’s decided to withdraw the country from the Paris climate
agreement. The US emits about one-sixth of the planet’s total greenhouse gas emissions, making it the
second-largest emitter in the world. The decision removes the US from its commitments to international
efforts to reduce fossil-fuel emissions and thereby avoid levels of global temperature rise that imperil
the future viability of human life on Earth . The US joins Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries to
reject the Paris agreement. Notably, Nicaragua refused to join because its leadership felt the agreement
did not go far enough. Syria, meanwhile, has since 2011 been mired in one of the globe’s most violent
civil conflicts. Not leaving means Trump will have to respect the US’s commitments to reduce emissions.
Trump will abide by the structure laid out in the agreement, which means it could take the US up to
four years to actually leave. So the real question of whether the country stays in the Paris climate
agreement may be decided by voters in 2020 the presidential election. Trump, who reportedly was
undecided as recently as last evening, ultimately listened to ignored the voices of energy industry giants
like ExxonMobil and Shell, coal company Cloud Peak, and Rex Tillerson, his own secretary of state, not to
mention some of his most trusted advisors, daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner. He
thus ignored instead listened to the climate-denying faction of his inner-circle, including Environmental
Protection Agency administrator Scott Pruitt, chief strategist Steve Bannon, and a coterie of 22
Republican senators who sent a letter to the president urging him to back out. (Those senators have
collectively received $10 million in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry since 2012.) The
pledge made by the Obama administration to the Paris agreement is was not legally binding, but
symbolically important. It offers offered an assurance to other nations that the country would take
responsibility for its own share of global emissions. Within weeks of Trump taking office, however, his
administration began the process of rolling back key federal emissions standards, making clear that it
had no intention of working towards meeting the US’s commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by
2025 to about a third of the country’s 2005 emission levels. Without the US, the total number of
countries that have formally pledged emissions reductions remains 147 drops to 146, in total accounting
for roughly 80% 65% of the planet’s emissions. As the US vacates its seat at the bargaining table, it has
partners in it cedes climate leadership to India, China, and the EU, all of which have publicly pledged to
strengthen their commitments to mutually reduce emissions. Still, without US participation during
what scientists agree are critical years, the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change
slips farther away.
Ext. Climate Leadership L
Plan bolsters US cred and immediacy is key
Through these six recommendations, lawmakers will create the most comprehensive strategy dealing
with climate refugees in the world, making the United States an international leader in the area. This
would also strengthen the status of the United States in the international community, which leads to
stronger international relationships and economic benefits. At the core of climate refugees is an issue
of justice. Individuals who come from developing nations that have contributed to climate change at
insignificant rates compared to the United States are those who fear statelessness. It is the duty and
best interest of the lawmakers in the United States to create comprehensive policy providing legal
protections to climate refugees. Waiting until the effects of climate change worsen and the projected
250 million individuals are forced to leave their home communities will only cause greater issues and
strain U.S. resources. The discussion of climate refugee policy in the United States needs to begin
immediately in order to mitigate and protect individuals and communities.
The plan is independent of international gridlock on climate refuge and sets a

precedent globally
The review of literature and policy options shows the complexity of issues and options to address
climate refugees. As the international debate will not likely be solved in the near future, the United
States is able to move forward with the implementation of climate refugee policy and, in doing so, set
a precedent for how other nations may implement such a policy and motivate others to take similar
actions. Based on the literature review, policy options review, and overall assessment of mechanisms
pertaining to climate refugees, the following set of recommendations is put forth to the U.S.
government with the intention of providing legal protections to climate refugees in a practical manner.
US inaction on climate refugees decks climate cred broadly – the plan overcomes the
signal sent by Paris Withdrawal
Yet also significant is the fact that it officially considers mass migration as one such effect of climate
change. Specifically, the Paris climate accord calls for developing recommendations “to avert, minimize
and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.” This explicit
acknowledgment of the dangers of migration was one that some of the poorest of the 195 countries
involved in the talks had sought to include in the text, for estimates state that by 2050, about 200
million people—primarily from the Global South—may be permanently displaced. Significantly,
wealthier nations acknowledged the perils of climate change with regard to forced migration.
During the September 2016 ratification then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that “[e]ach day
the planet is on this course, it becomes more dangerous…[i]f anyone doubted the science, all they have
to do is watch, sense, feel what is happening in the world today. High temperatures are already having
consequences, people are dying in the heat, people lack water, we already have climate refugees.”
Regardless, after U.S. negotiators demanded the exclusion of language that could allow the agreement
to be used to claim legal liability for climate change, critics said the agreement would still condemn
hundreds of millions of people living in low-lying coastal areas and small islands to a precarious future.
Even further, in June 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S.— the world’s second
largest emitter of greenhouse gases—will withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement stating that the
agreement is “less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a financial advantage over
the United States." The announcement undermines ongoing efforts toward climate mitigation,
adaptation, and finance, in and outside the agreement. Further, it undermines more expansive accounts
of the climate crisis itself that had begun to surface in recent year, including acknowledgement of its
effects with regard to mass migration.
Ext. Climate Leadership Impact
US climate leadership solves a laundry list of existential threats
Klarevas 9 – Professor of Global Affairs
Louis, Professor at the Center for Global Affairs – New York University, “Securing American Primacy
While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony”, Huffington Post, 12-15,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html
By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an
opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this,
though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown.
Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to
outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international
system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however,
seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often,
the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats
pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive
Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and
liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount
environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates
relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India,
and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very
well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews
narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials
whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both
sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually
bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at
the same time, securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent
itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are
countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis,
establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that
result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the
United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required
resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed
for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed
by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and
current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from
America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The
liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like
Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of
American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks
smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous
commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the
impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to
address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively
and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities
between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and
China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum
contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which
threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national
economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global
economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much
as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more
devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global
competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming
will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious
energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this
century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power.
Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What
Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's
first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in
energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice,
committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently
being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will
assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel
standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind
power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that
can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective
photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only
provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If
the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap,
those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a
tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be
employed to keep potential foes in check.
Kiribati Addon
Kiribati – 2ac
Climate change will erase the people of Kiribati
Siddle 14 – February 3, 2018, Julian Siddle, “Kiribati: Tiny island’s struggle with overpopulation,”
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-26017336//TK
The Pacific island chain of Kiribati is one of the most densely settled places on Earth. The BBC's Julian
Siddle investigates how the island is dealing with its overpopulation problem. Kiribati is perhaps best
known as one of the countries most likely to disappear due to climate change. Most people who live on
Kiribati's main island - South Tarawa - rely on the surrounding seas for their livelihoods. The ocean is
also the greatest threat to their future survival: No land on this island sits more than 2m (6ft 6in) above
sea level, so rising seas could prove devastating. We have contamination from housing, agriculture, from
people holding pigs, the sanitation practices Peter Sinclair, Secretariat of the Pacific Community But
that's not the only challenge facing this Pacific nation. Stretching over 3.5 million sq km (1.35 million sq
mi) of the ocean, Kiribati consists of several islands spread across a territory of similar size to India, but
most of the population is concentrated on South Tarawa. This tiny crescent of land is home to around
50,000 people - it's overcrowded, with a population density similar to Tokyo or Hong Kong. "We've a
relatively stable climate at the moment, but a shift in weather patterns, that pushes us into the
hurricane belt, that could wipe us out," Kiribati's President Anote Tong told the BBC World Service
programme Discovery. He has long campaigned on the international stage to fund the development of
Kiribati to help it resist climate change - and to resettle the population elsewhere, should rising seas
engulf the islands. However, while the effects of climate change may seem distant, the impact of so
many people concentrated in such a small space is immediate. The key issues are those facing many
developing nations - providing enough food, water and adequate sanitation. South Tarawa Image
caption The island can look like a tropical paradise... Beach strewn with rubbish Image caption ...but in
other areas, the illusion is broken when the tide goes out While it does rain here with predicable
regularity, tanks needed to collect rain water are in short supply. Much of the population relies on
underground aquifers, a series of natural horizontal channels which fill up with rainwater. These are
located under the widest section of the island at Bonriki, around the airport. Two related scientific
projects are currently looking at ways to ensure this precious water store is protected. "We've put 15
oceanographic instruments around the reef to better understand the wave transformation, measuring
wave height, current strength, water level," says Herve Damlamian, a coastal numerical modeller with
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). Local people report that drinking water now tastes
increasingly salty. Herve's project, the Bonriki inundation vulnerability assessment, is trying to assess the
risk of flooding: if a king tide (an especially high one) overtops the island, sending waves crashing from
one side to another, this could fill the underground system with undrinkable sea water. On the reserve
itself, Peter Sinclair, water resources adviser at the SPC, heads a team measuring the quality of
underground drinking water. Artan Rajit, deputy Mayor of Abaiang Image caption Artan Rajit says
people on the island of Abaiang want the amenities people enjoy on South Tarawa "If the seawater
came in over the top, it would have an immediate and catastrophic effect, causing salination for 15
months to two years - this could make the water undrinkable," he says. However, population pressure is
an issue in this discussion too, Mr Sinclair explains. "As long as we get rainfall, the system will replenish,
but the population pressure encroaches on the reserve and also affects the bacterial content in the
water - we have contamination from housing, agriculture, from people holding pigs, the sanitation
practices," he says. "Elsewhere, water is very contaminated, especially where people live over the top of
their wells." Nearer the islands' centres of population, the beaches are covered in all manner of waste
from litter to excrement. "When the tide is up, it does look like a paradise. When the tide goes out, you
see the horrible degradation because of humans," says Cliff Julerat, a coastal engineer with the Kiribati
ministry of works. One way to deal with the problems created by increasing populations may be a return
to the old way of life, suggests Tabao Awaerika, secretary to Kiribati's president. Water tank Image
caption A shortage of water tanks means that many have to rely on underground stores "It's like taking a
step back into our history - but it's very difficult to do that," he explains. "We had this thought of getting
people to eat babai, it's a local food crop like taro, but it takes about four hours to cook. Breadfruit is
about an hour - rice is easier to cook, nicer and cheaper. So why do it? "We need a total change of
mindset. To encourage sustainable activity on outer islands so they don't need to come to Tarawa."
However, persuading more people not to come could be difficult. Artan Rajit, the deputy mayor of
nearby Abaiang - a greener, more spacious island with a population of under 10,000 - says simply: "We
want what they have in Tarawa." For people enduring a near subsistence lifestyle on Kiribati's outer
islands, accepting the overcrowding and polluted environment seems a worthwhile price to pay for the
vibrancy of South Tarawa, with its few shops, access to imported food, tinned meat and rice and medical
centres. Despite the pot-holed road and decrepit vehicles, there is also the potential for paid
employment - though only around 20% of the population have full-time, paid jobs.
Cultural erasure should be prioritized

Clech-Lam 2k
[Maivan. Assc Prof of Law @ American University. At the Edge of the State: Indigenous Peoples and Self-
Determination, 2000, Pg 205//JVOSS]
Nevertheless, as anthropologists know, ethnicity is both an enabling and an inescapable condition of

human existence. It is a collective system of meaning that generates social energy which can be put to
constructive and destructive uses equally. Stavenhagen writes: Cultures are complex patterns of social
relationships, material objects, and spiritual values that give meaning and identity to community life and
are a resource for solving the problems of everyday life. That some very ugly campaigns in modern
history, usually unleashed by the destructive economic and military policies of the world’s powerful
states, have tapped, frighteningly successfully, into ethnic energy is undeniable. But it is just as
undeniable that knowledge—of the universe, of a specific part of it, of workable social relationships, of
human nature—that is crucial to the project of human survival remains separately encoded in the
distinctive cultures of ethnic groups. No human community or ethnic group can construct an informed
and meaningful future if it is cut off from its cultural past. And alienation from meaning, as much as
exploited meaning, can lead to violence.
Ext. Kiribati L
Kiribati catastrophe is all but certain
Doane 17 – Ausgust 21, 2017, Seth Doane, CBS, Behind the Lens: Climate Refugees,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/behind-the-lens-climate-refugees-kiribati-cbsn-on-assignment//TK
Kiribati is on the frontier. On a map, this tiny island nation looks like a little speck in the middle of the
South Pacific. Just over the international date line from America, it's one of the first countries in the
world to see a new day and scientists say it'll be among the first to feel catastrophic effects of climate
change. When I think about our shoot in Kiribati, one of the images that sticks in my mind was bumping
along a rutted, dirt coastal road on an outer-lying island. We were in the back of an open truck (one of
the few large vehicles on the island) with our camera equipment while most residents were riding
bicycles or little mopeds or walking. Through the palm trees and tropical plants lining the road, we'd see
the most stunning vistas and glimpse lives that seemed to be trapped in time. Folks live in simple huts
with thatched roofs made from palm trees. We could see families cooking on open fires or drying
coconut in the sun. Fisherman would be stitching together fishing nets. Most didn't have cars, running
water or what we'd consider "the basics." FULL REPORT: Click here to explore more about Kiribati Their
"carbon footprints" are among the lowest in the world. These are not people who travel by air or drive
gas-guzzling vehicles. For many, on this remote island in Kiribati, electricity is a luxury. They're not the
big carbon polluters but they're the ones who'll be among the first to have their lives disrupted by
climate change through rising sea levels and extreme weather. cbsn-oa-kiribati-6.jpg The turquoise
Kiribati sea is central to the lives of Kiribati residents, and an ever-increasing threat to the future of their
homeland. CBS NEWS We met many folks who already had to leave homes as the seawater encroached
and contaminated groundwater and crops or, in some cases, pulled homes into the ocean. Some told us
how they've contemplated relocating. Kiribati purchased land in Fiji as a "back-up" plan in case huge
numbers of people had to flee. The water that we'd see at every turn was always changing colors. At
points it was turquoise sea green, or sometimes a brilliant, deep purple. For generations in Kiribati the
sea has been at the center of life, but now, that beautiful, stunning water threatens their very existence.
One man we interviewed told us that the idea of moving away from these islands was overwhelming.
Here in Kiribati, he explained, nature had always provided what they needed: they could climb a tree
and pick a coconut to eat or could pick up his fishing spear and catch dinner. See more stories from
"CBSN: On Assignment" I've visited parts of the U.S., like New Orleans, where technology (and money)
allows entire neighborhoods to exist below sea level. I've traveled around The Netherlands where a
significant portion of its land mass would be below water were it not for advanced engineering. But
those are places with money and resources. Kiribati's development index is one of the lowest in the
world and fancy engineering is -- at least now -- out of reach. While many in Kiribati are forced to deal
with the possibilities of sea level rise, extreme weather exacerbated by climate change, they were not
the ones who caused it. One woman told us they were looking toward the "big" countries. They caused
the problem, she said, "now when will they help?"
LDC AddOn
LDC AddOn – 2ac
Climate change devastates developing economies – giving them an outlet is key
Vulnerability to climate change—and the manifold resource conflicts climate change triggers and
exacerbates—is disproportionately experienced in the Global South across key eco-regions. These
regions include areas commonly affected by storms, particularly in Central America and Southeast Asia; communities
in arid environments and in close proximity to a desert, such as those around the Sahara Desert; and coastal cities
and low-lying island-states, such as the Maldives.85 Additionally, the impact on such communities is expected to
worsen given, for example, that coastal populations are burgeoning in developing countries in particular.
Over the past three decades coastal populations have increased globally from 1.6 billion to over 2.5 billion and in 2007, with over 1.9 billion in
developing countries in particular.86 Hence, ameter increase in sea levels and a 10 percent intensification of storm
surges could cause flooding affecting 31 million people in developing countries and would broaden the
areas of exposure from 7 percent to 12.6 percent.87 Such acute vulnerability to climate change experienced by many across the Global
South also occurs as a fact of the predominance of natural resource-based economies. For example, countries and communities
with large economic contributions from agriculture and a large number of subsistence-level households
are more vulnerable to a changing climate. In addition to disasters, climate change causes unpredictable
weather patterns that place pressure on already fragile low-income rural economies. Climate change
manifests in hotter days, drier seasons, more flooding, and shorter growing seasons, which reduces
yields and increases poverty.88 According to the United Nations, the largest segment of the world’s poor live in
rural environments: “these are the subsistence farmers and herders, the fishers and migrant workers.”89
In 2010 about 34 percent of the total rural population of developing countries was classified as extremely poor and about 80 percent of rural
households engaged in farm activities of some sort.90 As such, a
large majority of the world’s poor depend on moderate
seasonal changes to produce their food, yet such communities are losing one of their few assets, one which
is essential for their livelihoods: knowing when to sow and harvest.91
The collapse of developing economies decimates global growth

Drezner ‘16
professor of international politics at Tufts and Senior Fellow at Brookings (Daniel, “Five Known
Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy” May,
http://www.anamnesis.info/sites/default/files/D_Drezner_2016.pdf
The erosion of the trade and demographic drivers puts even more pressure on technological innovation
to be the engine of economic growth in the developed world. As one McKinsey analysis concluded, “For
economic growth to match its historical rates, virtually all of it must come from increases in labor
productivity.”78 Growth in labor productivity is partially a function of capital investment, but
mostly a function of technological innovation. The key question is whether the
pace of technological innovation will sustain itself.
This remains a known unknown. The pace of innovation relative to global population has slowed
dramatically over the past fifty years.79 Consider that the developed world still relies on the same
general purpose technologies of modern society that were originally invented 50-100 years ago: the
automobile, airplane, telephone, refrigerator, and computer. To be sure, all of these technologies have
improved in recent decades, in some cases dramatically. But nothing new has replaced them. And even
these improvements have not necessarily had dramatic systemic effects. For example, the average
speed on a passenger aircraft has actually fallen since the introduction of the Boeing 707 in 1958,
because of the need to conserve fuel. For all of the talk of “disruptive innovations,” the effect of these
disruptions on both the business world and aggregate economic growth have been exaggerated.80
At present, many of the fields that seem promising for innovation—nanotechnology, green energy, and
so forth—require massive fixed investments. Only large institutions, like research universities,
multinational corporations and government entities, can play in that kind of game. Joseph Schumpeter
warned that once large organizations became the primary engine of innovation, the pace of change
would naturally slow down. Because large organizations are inherently bureaucratic and conservative,
they will be less able to imagine radical innovations.81 What if the “secular stagnation” debate is really
just a harbinger of a deeper debate about a return to pre-19th century growth levels?
An obvious counter to this argument is that the pace of technological innovation in laptops, smart
phones, tablets, and the Internet of things has accelerated. This is undeniably true—but the problem is
that the gains in utility have not been, strictly speaking, economic. Most of the important innovations
that we think about with respect to the Internet—Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube and so forth
—are free technologies for consumers. As Tyler Cowen argues, “The big technological gains are coming
in revenue-deficient sectors.”82 They generate lots of enjoyment but little employment. The largest and
most dynamic information technology firms, like Google and Apple, hire only a fraction of the people
who worked for General Motors in its heyday. At the same time, Internet-based content has eroded the
financial viability of other parts of the economy. Content-providing sectors—such as music,
entertainment, and journalism—have suffered directly. The growth of “sharing economy” firms like
Uber and Airbnb that develop peer-to-peer markets are causing similar levels of creative disruption to
the travel and tourism sectors.83 The rapid acceleration of automation is also leading to debates about
whether the “lump of labor” fallacy remains a fallacy—in other words, whether displaced workers will
be able to find new employment.84
A slow-growth economic trajectory also creates policy problems that increase the likelihood of even
slower growth. Higher growth is a political palliative that makes structural reforms easier. For
example, Germany prides itself on the “Hartz reforms” to its labor markets last decade, and has
advocated similar policies for the rest of the Eurozone since the start of the 2008 financial crisis. But the
Hartz reforms were accomplished during a global economic upswing, boosting German exports and
cushioning the shortterm cost of the reforms themselves. In a low-growth world, other economies will
be understandably reluctant to engage in such reforms.
It is possible that concerns about a radical growth slowdown are exaggerated. In 1987, Robert Solow
famously said, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”85 A decade
later, the late 1990s productivity surge was in full bloom. Economists are furiously debating whether the
visible innovations in the information sector are leading to productivity advances that are simply going
undetected in the current productivity statistics.86 Google’s chief economist Hal Varian, echoing Solow
from a generation ago, asserts that “there is a lack of appreciation for what’s happening in Silicon Valley,
because we don’t have a good way to measure it.”87 It is also possible that current innovations will only
lead to gains in labor productivity a decade from now. The OECD argues that the productivity problem
resides in firms far from the leading edge failing to adopt new technologies and systems.88 There are
plenty of sectors, such as health or education, in which technological innovations can yield significant
productivity gains. It would foolhardy to predict the end of radical innovations.
But the possibility of a technological slowdown is a significant “known unknown.” And if such a
slowdown occurs, it would have catastrophic effects on the public finances of the OECD economies.
Most of the developed world will have to support disproportionately large numbers of pensioners by
2036; slower-growing economies will worsen the debt-to-GDP ratios of most of these economies,
causing further macroeconomic stresses—and, potentially, political unrest from increasingly stringent
budget constraints.89
2. Are there hard constraints on the ability of the developing world to converge to developed-country
living standards?
One of the common predictions made for the next generation economy is that China will displace the
United States as the world’s biggest economy. This is a synecdoche of the deeper forecast that per
capita incomes in developing countries will slowly converge towards the living standards of the advance
industrialized democracies. The OECD’s Looking to 2060 report is based on “a tendency of GDP per
capita to converge across countries” even if that convergence is slow-moving. The EIU’s long-term
macroeconomic forecast predicts that China’s per capita income will approximate Japan’s by 2050.90
The Carnegie Endowment’s World Order in 2050 report presumes that total factor productivity gains in
the developing world will be significantly higher than countries on the technological frontier. Looking at
the previous twenty years of economic growth, Kemal Dervis posited that by 2030, “The rather stark
division of the world into ‘advanced’ and ‘poor’ economies that began with the industrial revolution will
end, ceding to a much more differentiated and multipolar world economy.”91
Intuitively, this seems rational. The theory is that developing countries have lower incomes primarily
because they are capital-deficient and because their economies operate further away from
technological frontier. The gains from physical and human capital investment in the developing world
should be greater than in the developed world. From Alexander Gerschenkron forward, development
economists have presumed that there are some growth advantages to “economic backwardness”92
This intuitive logic, however, is somewhat contradicted by the “middle income trap.” Barry Eichengreen,
Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin have argued in a series of papers that as an economy’s GDP per capita
hits close to $10,000, and then again at $16,000, growth slowdowns commence.93 This makes it very
difficult for these economies to converge towards the per capita income levels of the advanced
industrialized states. History bears this out. There is a powerful correlation between a country’s GDP per
capita in 1960 and that country’s per capita income in 2008. In fact, more countries that were middle
income in 1960 had become relatively poorer than had joined the ranks of the rich economies. To be
sure, there have been success stories, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Israel. But other success
stories, such as Greece, look increasingly fragile. Lant Prichett and Lawrence Summers conclude that
“past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Regression to the mean is the single most
robust and empirical relevant fact about cross-national growth rates.”94
Post-2008 growth performance of the established and emerging markets matches this assessment.
While most of the developing world experienced rapid growth in the previous decade, the BRICS have
run into roadblocks. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these economies are looking less likely to
converge with the developed world. During the Great Recession, the non-Chinese BRICS—India, Russia,
Brazil, and South Africa—have not seen their relative share of the global economy increase at all.95
China’s growth has also slowed down dramatically over the past few years. Recent and massive outflows
of capital suggests that the Chinese economy is headed for a significant market correction. The collapse
of commodity prices removed another source of economic growth in the developing world. By 2015, the
gap between developing country growth and developed country growth had narrowed to its lowest
level in the 21st century.96
What explains the middle income trap? Eichengreen, Park and Shin suggest that “slowdowns coincide
with the point in the growth process where it is no longer possible to boost productivity by shifting
additional workers from agriculture to industry and where the gains from importing foreign technology
diminish.”97 But that is insufficient to explain why the slowdowns in growth have been so dramatic and
widespread.
There are multiple candidate explanations. One argument, consistent with Paul Krugman’s
deconstruction of the previous East Asia “miracle,”98 is that much of this growth was based on
unsustainable levels of ill-conceived capital investment. Economies that allocate large shares of GDP to
investment can generate high growth rates, particularly in capital-deficient countries. The sustainability
of those growth rates depends on whether the investments are productive or unproductive. For
example, high levels of Soviet economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s masked the degree to which this
capital was misallocated. As Krugman noted, a lesser though similar phenomenon took place in the
Asian tigers in the 1990s. It is plausible that China has been experiencing the same illusory growth-from-
bad-investment problem. Reports of overinvestment in infrastructure and “ghost cities” are rampant;
according to two Chinese government researchers, the country wasted an estimated $6.8 trillion in
“ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2013 alone.99
A political explanation would be rooted in the fact that many emerging markets lack the political and
institutional capabilities to sustain continued growth. Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson argue that
modern economies are based on either “extractive institutions” or “inclusive institutions.”100
Governments based on extractive institutions can generate higher rates of growth than governments
without any effective structures. It is not surprising, for example, that post-Maoist Chinese economic
growth has far outstripped Maoist-era rates of growth. Inclusive institutions are open to a wider array of
citizens, and therefore more democratic. Acemoğlu and Robinson argue that economies based on
inclusive institutions will outperform those based on extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions are less
likely to be prone to corruption, more able to credibly commit to the rule of law, and more likely to
invest in the necessary public goods for broad-based economic growth. Similarly, Pritchett and Summers
conclude that institutional quality has a powerful and long-lasting effect on economic growth—and that
“salient characteristics of China—high levels of state control and corruption along with high measures of
authoritarian rule—make a discontinuous decline in growth even more likely than general experience
would suggest.”101
A more forward-looking explanation is that the changing nature of manufacturing has badly disrupted
the 20th century pathway for economic development. For decades, the principal blueprint for
developing economies to become developed was to specialize in industrial sectors where low-cost labor
offered a comparative advantage. The resulting growth from export promotion would then spill over
into upstream and downstream sectors, creating new job-creating sectors. Globalization, however, has
already generated tremendous productivity gains in manufacturing—to the point where industrial
sectors do not create the same amount of employment opportunities that they used to.102 Like
agriculture in the developed world, manufacturing has become so productive that it does not need that
many workers. As a result, many developing economies suffer from what Dani Rodrik labels “premature
deindustrialization.” If Rodrik is correct, then going forward, manufacturing will fail to jump-start
developing economies into higher growth trajectories—and the political effects that have traditionally
come with industrialization will also be stunted.103
Both the middle-income trap and the regression to the mean observation are empirical observations
about the past. There is no guaranteeing that these empirical regularities will hold for the future.
Indeed, China’s astonishing growth rate over the past 30 years is a direct contradiction of the regression
to the mean phenomenon. It is possible that over time the convergence hypothesis swamps the myriad
explanations listed above for continued divergence. But in sketching out the next generation global
economy, the implications of whether regression to the mean will dominate the convergence hypothesis
are massive. Looking at China and India alone, the gap in projections between a continuation of past
growth trends and regression to the mean is equivalent to $42 trillion—more than half of global
economic output in 2015.104 This gap is significant enough to matter not just to China and India, but to
the world economy.
As with the developed world, a growth slowdown in the developing world can have a feedback effect
that makes more growth-friendly reforms more difficult to accomplish. As Chinese economic growth has
slowed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economic reform plans have stalled out in favor of more political
repression. Follows the recent playbook of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has added
diversionary war as another distracting tactic from negative economic growth. Short-term steps towards
political repression will make politically risky steps towards economic reform that less palatable in the
future. Instead, the advanced developing economies seem set to double down on strategies that yield
less economic growth over time.
3. Will geopolitical rivalries or technological innovation alter the patterns of economic interdependence?
Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The
Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border
trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial
interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is
straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a
powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in
time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This
creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more
that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to
raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in
minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of
force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital.
Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies
through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would
otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has
emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these
odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything
approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has
tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two
decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new
kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme
event—such as a great power war—from taking place.
Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—
democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests
that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some
international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that
interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization
exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112
A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008,
for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still
considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend.
Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In
the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade
grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a
percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of
interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that
the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115
If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline,
thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit
why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded
goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments
into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these
steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are
developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116
A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade
across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user
markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from
the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component
parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin
notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from
specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the
direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply,
transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology
improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly
declines.119
Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have
territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has
attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is
possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over
economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from
interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power
bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will
wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the
likelihood of great power conflict going forward.
Economic collapse risks nuclear war

Mann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic
and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant
for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently
responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of
South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC
DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014,
https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf)
The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can
figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues
with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and
change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows
that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within
global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states
new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the
proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the
case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline
and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security
guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of
strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states
and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar
international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor
security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North
Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and
how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a
trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global
financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the
current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and
perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing
diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade,
or engaging financial warfare against the United States.
Ext. LDC L
Climate refugees migrate to less developed and fragile economies, which drives
resource scarcity and overpopulation
Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi 2013-- Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa in Cedar
Falls. ["Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Human Security: A Comparative Analysis",
Accessible Online at: https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/7958155] @ AG
However, neither these documents nor the UNFCCC provides explicit mechanisms for accommodating
large-scale movements of populations displaced by climate change, highlighting wider normative
questions about whether migration constitutes a viable adaptation strategy. Chap- ter 17 of the IPCC’s
Fourth Assessment Report (Adger et al., 2007: 736), for instance, suggests that migration leading to the
permanent abandonment of land and livelihood is not a desirable adaptation option. Moreover, as
noted earlier, national governments and international institutions are often strongly predisposed against
the idea of accommodating new populations displaced (either permanently or temporarily) as a result of
environmental and non-environmental factors. Moreover, there is still a lack of consensus about what
adaptation means, and how it should be applied to existing decisions about future vulnerability and
risk (cf. Burton 2004 [2009]; Huq and Reid 2004 [2009]; Moench 2007 [2009]; Peskett et al., 2009; Ayers
and Huq, 2009; Brooks et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2009).8 Although the UNFCCC provides a number of
Articles (4.1, 4.4, 4.8 and 4.9) that identify the ways in which parties to the Conven- tion may be
expected to support adaptation, the Convention lacks a precise definition that can be operationalized
through the UNFCCC (Burton, 2004 [2009]). Similarly, although the GEF has responsibility for assisting
developing countries in the preparation of NAPA documents, neither its website nor its brochure
“Linking Adaptation to Development” (GEF 2007) provides a precise definition of what adaptation may
entail. To understand the ways in which migration has been defined and supported through the
UNFCCC, a content analysis of the forty-seven NAPAs currently listed on the UNFCCC website was used
to establish: whether specific reference is made to migration in the NAPA documents; whether
migration is considered a form of adaptation; whether it is associated with “positive” or “negative”
policy outcomes, including for instance, urbanization, over-population and resource degradation; and
whether there is a specific policy statement in the NAPA aiming to support migration. Table 4.1 presents
the results of the survey, which reveal that of the forty- seven NAPAs currently eligible for LDC funding,
only two (Sao Tome and Principe and Tanzania) describe migration in positive terms. Twelve NAPAs
(including, surprisingly, the Maldives) make absolutely no reference to migration; the remaining thirty-
three describe migration in terms of the threat it poses to resource scarcity, urban crowding, agrarian
conflicts (involving primarily herders and farmers) and social stability. Among many of the NAPAs, a
common concern is that climate change will exacerbate resource scarcities and population pressures,
thereby fueling a vicious cycle in which migration leads to additional resource degradation, chronic
poverty, and ultimately some form of social breakdown. The following quotation from Uganda’s NAPA
(2007: 37) captures the essence of this concern: If affected communities have no option for coping with
climate-induced stress, especially in drought-prone areas then, victims migrate to urban areas or
resource-endowed neighbourhoods . . . In the protected areas such as the national parks and game
reserves, these negative aspects of the strategy are more pronounced . . . In the pastoral communities
where livestock is the major source of food, migration of the men (family leaders) with the livestock
herds in search of water and pasture often leaves the family behind more vulnerable to famine.
Similarly, Sudan (2007: 45) highlights the problems that can arise when . . . local farmers are unable to
harvest during the rainy season but equally unable to harvest during summers where climate variability
produces drought, many are forced to migrate to find more suitable land, resulting in tribal
confrontation over land resources and internal displacement.9 In almost every instance migration is
being conceptualized in terms of the threats and vulnerabilities it poses to societies, ecosystems, and
migrants themselves. In almost no instances is it characterized as a means of diversifying or improving
livelihoods and income sources, understat- ing dramatically the very large literature that now exists on
migration, remittances, and poverty reduction (cf. de Haan 1999; Perch-Nielson et al., 2008; de
Sherbinin et al., 2008; Barnett and Webber 2010).=
Ext. Impact
Economic decline leads to nuclear war
Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace
program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International
Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311
Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current
understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and
economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions
can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and
drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or
unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars
among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14,
437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an
inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and
the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries
could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three
main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated
economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014;
Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act
on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by
foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic
development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic
begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external
dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or
credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or
prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the
instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.
Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are
unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count
on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a
territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy
alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail
to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result,
interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist
emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence
remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could
lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or
conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view
to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Economic decline threatens US credibility and economic leadership, makes war likely
Haass 2017 – President of CFR
Richard, A World in Disarray, Penguin Press, p. conclusion
The strategic consequences of growing indebtedness are many and worrisome. The need to finance the
debt will absorb an ever-increasing number of dollars and an ever-increasing share of the U.S. budget.
This will mean that proportionately fewer resources will be available for national security, including
defense, intelligence, homeland security, and foreign assistance. There will as well be fewer dollars
available for discretionary domestic programs ranging from education and infrastructure modernization
to scientific research and law enforcement. What this portends is an increasingly sharp and destructive
debate over guns versus butter while the two fastest-growing parts of the budget, debt service and
entitlements, remain largely off-limits.
Mounting debt will raise questions around the world about the United States. U.S. inability to deal with
its debt challenge will detract from the appeal of the American political and economic model. It will
make others less likely to want to emulate the United States and more wary of depending on it as it will
raise questions about this country’s ability to come together and take difficult decisions. The result will
be a world less democratic and increasingly less deferential to U.S. concerns in matters of security. To
some extent this is already happening; U.S. failure to deal with its debt promises to accelerate a
worrisome evolution.
Mounting debt will leave the United States more vulnerable than it should be to the whims of markets
and the machinations of governments. Already nearly half of U.S. public debt is held by foreigners, with
China one of the two largest lenders. It is of course possible that China will be constrained by its stake in
not seeing its own huge pool of dollars lose its value and by its need for the United States to continue to
buy its exports. The result, according to this line of thinking, is the financial equivalent of nuclear
deterrence. This may be true, but I for one am not sanguine that China would not decide to slow or stop
accumulating U.S. debt as a signal of displeasure or even to sell debt amid, say, a crisis over Taiwan or
one involving its claims in the South or East China seas. In such circumstances, Chinese leaders might
well judge it to be worth paying a financial price to protect what they viewed as their vital national
interests. Interestingly, it was American threats aimed at the pound sterling that more than anything
else persuaded a British government that was fearful of the need to devalue its currency to back off its
ill-fated venture to regain control of the Suez Canal in 1956.
Mounting debt could absorb funds that could otherwise be usefully invested at home or abroad. This
will in turn depress already modest levels of economic growth. Making matters worse is that high levels
of debt and debt financing will increase concerns about the government’s willingness to maintain the
dollar’s value or, worse yet, meet its obligations. This will cause foreigners in particular to demand high
returns on their loans, something that will increase the cost of debt financing and further crowd out
other spending and depress growth. This is a vicious, not a virtuous, cycle.
Mounting debt limits American flexibility and resilience. There is no way of stating in the abstract what
constitutes the right level of debt for the country or knowing with precision what level is sustainable.
But the United States does not want to make high levels of debt the new normal, if only because it
removes flexibility if, for example, there were to be another financial crisis that required large-scale
fiscal stimulus or a major national security challenge that demanded a costly response. Keeping debt
levels low enough to allow for a surge without triggering a debt crisis seems to be a prudent hedge and,
as is the case with preventive medicine or insurance, worth paying a reasonable premium for.
Let me just add one more prediction. Mounting debt will hasten the demise of the dollar as the world’s
reserve currency. This will happen due to loss of confidence in U.S. financial management and the
related concern that what the United States will need to do to finance its debt will be at odds with what
it should be doing to manage the domestic and, indirectly, world economy. It is possible that such a
move away from the dollar would have happened were it not for the EU’s problems and China not being
prepared to free up the yuan. Granted, there is no alternative to the dollar on the immediate horizon,
but the United States cannot depend forever on the weaknesses and errors of others, and a postdollar
world will be both more costly (as it will require the United States to move in and out of other
currencies) and one of less leverage when it comes to imposing dollar-related sanctions.
-- Impact – Ethics
LDC economic collapse is a self-replicating exploitation of wealth disparity that must
be rejected
Karan et al 16 (Abraar Karan, Daniel DeUgarte, and Michele Barry, July 2016, Dr. Abraar Karan is an
internal medicine resident at the Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Daniel
DeUgarte, MD, is Co-Director of the Global Health Education Programs at the UCLA Center for World
Health. He is an Associate Clinical Professor of Surgery in the Division of Pediatric Surgery at the David
Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Michele Barry is SENIOR ASSOCIATE DEAN, GLOBAL HEALTH,
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH, PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE (PRIMARY CARE &
POPULATION HEALTH), SENIOR FELLOW AT THE WOODS INSTITUTE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND AT
THE FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE, “Medical “Brain Drain” and Health Care Worker Shortages: How
Should International Training Programs Respond?”, http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/07/ecas1-
1607.html) MKIM
To contextualize the importance of the problem, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates
that 23 health care workers per 10,000 people is the minimum ratio needed to maintain
a health system—and as of 2013, 80 countries worldwide fell short of this threshold level of
care [3]. The disparity is most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to 14 percent of
the world’s population but only 3 percent of its health care professionals [3]. A study of the world’s
medical schools found that the majority of countries with the greatest need for physicians (almost all of
which were in sub-Saharan Africa) had only one medical school [4]. Perhaps the most concerning
aspect of medical brain drain is its self-reinforcing impact on health care systems that are
already weak: as a health care system weakens, bright physicians and health care workers tend
to leave; the more who leave, the more the health care system is weakened. A number of
studies have quantified factors that propel physician migration from source countries: access to better
training opportunities, higher salaries, need to escape political instability and corruption, poor quality of
facilities and equipment, and plans for raising children [5-8]. Conversely, factors that influence physician
retention in the destination countries include strong and robust health systems and political stability,
which tend to facilitate improved lifestyles and opportunities for physicians and their families.
Presumably, Dr. R’s US-based training program invests in him to improve his surgical skills not only for
his individual benefit but also for the benefit of his home community and his country. As part of his
participation in the program, there might be an expectation, if not an obligation, that he will transfer his
medical skill acquisition to other surgeons and surgeon assistants in Nigeria. Sub-Saharan Africa is
currently afflicted by a significant dearth of surgeons, which is exacerbated by surgeons’
emigration and the limited training capacity for surgeons who stay in the region [5]. An analysis by
Tankwanchi et al. using the 2011 American Medical Association Physician Masterfile of residency and
graduation data from all US trainees found an increase in physician emigration to the United States from
every sub-Saharan African country except South Africa [9]. Figure 1 shows the number of physicians per
100,000 people worldwide, based on data from the WHO’s 2006 report [10]. Given this evidence of
disparities in access to physicians, one might argue that the investment of Dr. R’s home country
in his training suggests an obligation, both contractual and ethical, on the part of Dr. R. not to
exacerbate that disparity. However, Dr. R’s case is not quite as straightforward as that of an
individual obliged to a particular program or community. Although Dr. R might have applied to
participate in the program with an intention to return and practice in Nigeria, we cannot ignore the
impact that his experience in the United States could have on his perceptions of his professional
potential. After being exposed to a health system with many opportunities, advanced technologies, high
salaries, and fair patient burden, Dr. R’s vision for his own career might reasonably shift. If the training
experience contributes to his possibly changing personal and professional goals, might we consider
those goal changes to be ethically fraught? This is another important question in the case. Medical Brain
Drain as Exploitation of Wealth Disparities Particularly problematic is that public investment in
health care professionals in resource-poor countries tends to be greater than in wealthier
ones, probably due to the relative cost of educating each individual physician. A study in Kenya
estimated that the total cost of educating a physician from primary school until earning a medical
degree was nearly $66,000 USD and the loss of return on investments if the physician did not
return to the source area to practice was over $517,000 USD [12]. Estimates suggest that, annually,
emigration of health care workers from sub-Saharan Africa costs the region $2.17 billion USD [13]. While
it is important to account for the remittances that are sent back to the source country by emigrants, it is
difficult to quantify how much of this money is recirculated in the home economy [13]. By contrast, the
areas to which these doctors move are spared the cost of their medical education, benefiting instead by
the influx of an educated health care workforce. These consequences suggest that medical brain
drain is an important kind of exploitation of wealth disparity and a source of ethical
and justice-based concerns [14].
Answering Counterplans
AT//CPs that Solve Warming
Can’t stop warming and there are all sorts of other factors that cause climate refugee
inflows
Migration is driven by a number of factors that are interrelated and often conjoined with the problems
of social and economic privilege. Listed below are the principal drivers of climate refugee populations
[are]: 1. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and droughts. 2. Development
projects that involve changes in the environment. Specifically, this refers to dam and irrigation projects,
nuclear power plants, and industrial accidents. 3. Environmental problems caused by population growth.
4. Slow climate changes: agricultural failure, deforestation, and desertification. 5. Conflicts or wars
caused by environmental change. 6. Economic distress.
AT//Temporary/Parole CP
TPS fails for climate refugees – it fails to achieve certainty and allows the Trump
administration to track and deport migrants
Barrett 18- Sarah Elizabeth Barrett is a global health research assistant for the University of Vermont which is
comprised of acting as a liaison between refugee-focused healthcare providers in the Burlington area and
undergraduate students at UVM, facilitating Service-Learning partnerships between these service providers and
students, working to catalog and produce informational guides on best practices for students interested in
engaging in work related to refugees, migrants, and New Americans, and researching global health issues affecting
refugees and displaced persons. “Seeking Asylum Across the International Boundary: Legal Terms and Geopolitical
Conditions of Irregular Border Crossing and Asylum Seeking between the United States and Canada, 2016 – 2018”,
April 18, 2018, Global and Regional Studies Program, http://spatializingmigration.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Barett_Thesis.pdf, 43-46 // Suraj P
Because TPS does not confer any form of citizenship, permanent residency, or any right to ongoing
immigration status, these populations revert to their prior immigration status upon the expiry of their
program (Messick & Bergeron, 2014). Herein is the production of populations in need of protection
noted earlier in this chapter. While these former TPS recipients have a vested interest in continuing their
lives in the US, the impending risk of detention or deportation can act to motivate these populations to
cross the border into Canada. This is in part because life in Canada may retain some degree of normalcy
for these former beneficiaries and their children when compared to the alternative of return to a
developing country of origin -- either through self-deportation or deportation by USCIS. Voluntary
repatriation is presented by the US government as the natural next step for former beneficiaries upon
termination of their TPS status. This proposal, however, is impractical for a number of reasons. Perhaps
most notable, in consideration of pragmatic decision-making on the part of these former beneficiaries, is
the nature of their strong personal, familial, and economic ties to the US. Between six to ten percent of
TPS recipients are married to a legal resident of the US. TPS beneficiaries who have lived in the US for
over 20 years as well as those who arrived as children themselves are closely linked and tightly
embedded in the US, presumably more so than they are to their countries of origin because these
beneficiaries have spent the better part of their lives establishing social and familial ties to the US. The
statistical portrait of TPS beneficiaries reveals a hard-working population who are deeply embedded
in the US (Warren & Kerwin, 2017; Menjívar, 2017). In addition to social and familial connections, TPS
beneficiaries have substantial economic ties and obligations in the US. The labor force participation rate
for TPS populations ranges from 81-88 percent (well above the rate for the total US population [63
percent] and the foreign-born population [66 percent]). About 27,100 of those in the labor force are
self-employed and have created jobs for both themselves and others. TPS recipients live in over 206,000
households, almost one-half of which have mortgages. More than one-half of TPS beneficiaries have
health insurance in the US (Warren & Kerwin, 2017). Families and individuals who have built lives for
themselves in the US over the past ten to twenty years are simply not likely to return themselves to a
resource constrained state. This is especially valid in consideration of the high proportion of TPS
recipients who are the parents of US citizen children. A return to their country of origin would almost
certainly represent the splitting of tens of thousands of families as these children have evidently better
prospects for education and employment should they remain in the US. While TPS termination notices
from the DHS delay the effective date of termination to “provide time for individuals with TPS to arrange
for their departure or to seek an alternative lawful immigration status in the US, if eligible” (Nielsen
Announcement on El Salvador, 2018), the latter proves very difficult for beneficiaries of TPS (Chishti et
al., 2017). As TPS itself is a provisional protection against deportation, many TPS beneficiaries entered
the US illegally. This fact limits all legal avenues towards an alternative legal status and negates most
options for adjustment of immigration status (Chishti et al., 2017). This issue was taken to court in
February 2018 when the AIC, NIRP, and several TPS holders filed a class action lawsuit against officials at
the DHS and USCIS challenging “the government’s unlawful practice of depriving [TPS beneficiaries] …
from becoming lawful permanent residents” (AIC, 2018; Moreno v. Nielsen 2018). For the majority of
TPS recipients who entered the US unlawfully, the ineligibility to seek an alternative lawful immigration
status in the US leaves few options available. For many, migrating to a third country is a more feasible
option than either remaining in the US illegally or returning to their country of origin (Chishti et al.,
2017). Herein is the push factor driving these populations across the border in search of protection.
Fleeing to Canada in search of asylum proves a more feasible option than remaining in the US given the
limited legal avenues to adjust to an alternative legal status. Remaining in the US as an undocumented
immigrant is a high risk option for three key reasons. First, TPS recipients’ work authorization has been
publically revoked through the widely televised TPS termination reports; second, arrests and
deportations of undocumented immigrants from the interior of the US are rising under the Trump
administration (Sacchetti [Washington Post], 2017); and third, TPS recipients are registered with USCIS,
meaning that their personal information could easily be used for purposes of tracking and arrest.
President Trump campaigned on a platform prioritizing a legislative crackdown on illegal immigration.
While the Trump administration’s stated chief goal is to deport criminals, it is arresting and deporting
significant numbers of people who never committed any crimes beyond entering the US without the
proper documentation for a legal arrival. From January to September 9, 2017, ICE deported a total of
142,818 immigrants from the border and the U.S. interior, including 59,564 of these noncriminal
noncitizens (Sacchetti [Washington Post], 2017). When asked about the deportation of these
undocumented but otherwise law-abiding immigrants, Thomas Homan, President Trump’s nominee for
director of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), made his position clear: “I get asked a lot
why we arrest somebody that’s not a criminal, [but] those who do enter the country illegally … violate
the law. That is a criminal act” (Bendix [The Atlantic], 2017). While levels of deportation rose under the
Obama administration, this enforcement targeted criminals convicted of what the DHS defines as
“serious crimes” and the deportation of unauthorized border crossers who had recently entered the US
(Chishti et al., 2017). Now, however, the enforcement policies of the Trump administration focus instead
on the interior, putting former TPS recipients at high risk of detention or deportation upon the end-date
of their status. While this social and political environment puts any and all undocumented immigrants at
high risk of arrest or deportation, former-TPS beneficiaries are at an intensely increased risk because
the DHS has all of their personal data on-file. As such these populations will be very easy to track for
purposes of arrest, detention, and deportation at the whim of the current administration. Coupled with
the politically charged and public nature of the TPS terminations, populations formerly protected by TPS
may either risk remaining in the US as undocumented immigrants or migrate to a third country to seek
asylum. In consideration of geographic and socioeconomic limits, Canada is the only safe third country
accessible to these populations.
Temporary admission doesn’t solve certainty and is subject to legal challenges
Gauthier 16 (Matthew, law student at the University of North Carolina, Climate Refugees and
International Law: Legal Frameworks and Proposals in the US and Abroad,
http://studentorgs.law.unc.edu/documents/elp/2016/m_gauthier.pdf//waters)
As discussed above, any international agreement would have a limited effect on the United States
unless it is adopted and implemented at the national level. Furthermore, some have argued that even if
the United States adopted an international regime, it would not be likely to have the full desired
effect.18 Some argue that for the United States to have any affect on the environmental migration
situation, it would need to adopt its own protocol.19 Without any legislative action, the United States
has several methods of allowing increased environmental migration.20 These include, but are not
limited to: (1) temporary protected status granted by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security;21 (2) prosecutorial discretion by the executive branch not to pursue cases against
environmental migrants;22 (3) parole granted by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
or executive branch allowing environmental migrants to remain in the United States;23 and, (4)
withholding of removal, preventing the return of an individual to another sovereign nation where they
may be persecuted.24 The downsides of mechanisms such as granting parole is that they are largely
temporary and not without various legal challenges.25 Thus, at this point, environmental refugees are
left with limited options in the United States.26 Absent a legal claim to refugee status grounded in the
existing UN Convention, climate refugees have only limited options in the United States for refugee or
asylum claims. Moreover, measures like prosecutorial discretion are not without legal challenges. For
example, in 2014 President Obama announced a program to use prosecutorial discretion to not
prosecute individuals who had unlawfully migrated to the US as minors as well as undocumented
parents of U.S. citizens and legal residents.27 In just over a year, legal challenges to the use of
prosecutorial discretion have arisen around the country, with courts conflicted on the legality of
deferred action.28 Given that the Obama Administration’s use of prosecutorial discretion has currently
been enjoined29 pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, any attempt to expand it would need to
overcome existing hurdles as well as likely novel challenges. There is one final important characteristic
of US immigration law to consider. The US (as well as other nations) could unilaterally change its
definition of “refugee” to include climate refugees.30 With or without the international community,
the US could choose to allow climate refugees under its existing immigration framework. This option will
become more viable if the movement toward an international framework continues to falter. Of course,
this would likely require legislative action by Congress.31 Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii attempted to
add a climate refugee amendment to a comprehensive immigration reform bill Congress considered in
2013.32 This amendment would have allowed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
designate certain climate refuges as stateless persons, thus entitling those persons to conditional lawful
status while applying for permanent resident status.33 However, Congress did not adopt this reform
bill.34 At this point, any further change in US policy on climate migration is unlikely35
Temporary status fails – uncertainty, withheld public benefits

One option for climate migrants who move to the United States is temporary protected status (TPS).
Under TPS, the Secretary of DHS 134 may grant temporary legal status and work authorization to
immigrants for a predetermined period of time. 135 The Secretary may extend this period so long as the
conditions that initially led to the designation persist. 136 Since TPS designation applies explicitly in
cases of natural disasters, it would appear to be the ideal tool to grant climate migrants legal status in
the United States. 137 In fact, the United States extended TPS to Haitians who lived in the United States
after the devastating earthquake of 2010.138 However, TPS has many shortcomings and limitations
that render it insufficient for climate migrants' particular circumstances. The most obvious limitation is
that TPS only applies to individuals already present in the United States. 139 TPS would not cover
someone attempting to enter the country at the border after fleeing her home in the wake of a severe
or continuous climate event. 140 Thus, by definition, this legal status does not extend to climate
migrants. However, even climate migrants already in the country will find fault with this form of relief.
The Secretary may affirmatively grant TPS status to nations or groups of citizens from those nations that
are suffering hardship after a significant climate event. 141 The Secretary may deem it appropriate to
designate a country eligible for TPS pursuant to section 244 of the INA, but she is not required to do so,
and a country may not affirmatively apply for TPS.142 Further, the Secretary has explicit authority to
decline to designate a country under section 244, even if it is suffering severe and adverse effects from
climate change. 143 Even if a certain nation receives TPS designation under INA section 244, it still
leaves permanently displaced climate migrants, such as nationals of inundated island nations, insecure
because TPS status may be revoked as a discretionary matter. 144 TPS has a number of other
limitations as well. First, while aliens are designated under TPS, they may not travel freely outside the
country, they are not considered to be permanently residing in the United States under color of law,
and states may choose to withhold public benefits from them. 145 Second, the initial designation of TPS
for any nation lasts between six and eighteen months, although the Secretary may extend this period if
country conditions persist. 146 The Secretary may revoke this status at any time upon a finding that
country conditions no longer call for a designation under Section 244.147 Finally, Congress may choose
to extend lawful permanent residence to TPS beneficiaries upon the expiration of their status, but this
requires a supermajority of the Senate. 148 As a result, climate migrants would remain uncertain of
the duration of their work authorization and legal status in this country. Because of its temporary,
discretionary nature and limited scope, TPS is insufficient to address the potentially large and diverse
influx of climate migrants.
Parole is insufficient -- no benefits and is subject to Congressional discretion

DeGenaro 15 (Carey, J.D. Candidate at the University of Colorado, Looking Inward: Domestic Policy for
Climate Change Refugees in the United States and Beyond, http://lawreview.colorado.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/11.-86.3-DeGenaro_Final.pdf//waters)
Parole is a legal fiction whereby aliens who are already present in the United States unlawfully are
allowed to remain, and are treated as if they crossed the border lawfully.159 The DHS Secretary may
grant parole to individuals who do not meet the definition of a refugee if there is a “compelling reason
in the public interest” to do so, or for urgent humanitarian reasons.160 The executive branch may also
use parole to admit otherwise ineligible immigrants, though Congress has attempted to limit this
authority with language requiring a compelling reason for granting parole.161 For climate migrants,
parole suffers from many of the same downfalls as TPS and prosecutorial discretion. Not only is it
temporary, it is discretionary and does not confer on a beneficiary the same rights to which a lawful
permanent resident or citizen would be entitled.162 This form of relief is not widely granted, and is
typically limited to exceptional circumstances.163 Notably, even if the President grants parole to an
entire population, Congress retains the authority to grant or withhold that population’s adjustment of
status to lawful permanent residents.164 If Congress chooses not to pass legislation allowing for
adjustment, the grant expires once the humanitarian crisis or purpose of the parole has subsided.165
Additionally, since parole is at its core a form of prosecutorial discretion, any challenge to the
executive’s authority to favor certain groups over others using this legal tool will cast its legitimacy into
doubt.166 Therefore, parole is also insufficient to address incoming climate migrants in a consistent,
efficient, and certain manner.
Parole fails – discretionary, limited benefits, no legal status

3. Parole
Parole is a legal fiction whereby aliens who are already present in the United States unlawfully are
allowed to remain, and are treated as if they crossed the border lawfully. 159 The DHS Secretary may
grant parole to individuals who do not meet the definition of a refugee if there is a "compelling reason
in the public interest" to do so, or for urgent humanitarian reasons.160 The executive branch may also
use parole to admit otherwise ineligible immigrants, though Congress has attempted to limit this
authority with language requiring a compelling reason for granting parole. 161 For climate migrants,
parole suffers from many of the same downfalls as TPS and prosecutorial discretion. Not only is it
temporary, it is discretionary and does not confer on a beneficiary the same rights to which a lawful
permanent resident or citizen would be entitled. 162 This form of relief is not widely granted, and is
typically limited to exceptional circumstances. 163 Notably, even if the President grants parole to an
entire population, Congress retains the authority to grant or withhold that population's adjustment of
status to lawful permanent residents. 164 If Congress chooses not to pass legislation allowing for
adjustment, the grant expires once the humanitarian crisis or purpose of the parole has subsided. 165
Additionally, since parole is at its core a form of prosecutorial discretion, any challenge to the
executive's authority to favor certain groups over others using this legal tool will cast its legitimacy into
doubt. 166 Therefore, parole is also insufficient to address incoming climate migrants in a consistent,
efficient, and certain manner.
AT//Prosecutorial Discretion CP
Prosecutorial discretion doesn’t solve – uncertainty, fear of deportation
Prosecutorial discretion is a decision on the part of the executive branch not to target certain unlawful
aliens for removal if a substantial interest will not be served by pursuing the case. 149 In both 2011 and
2012, DHS issued memos calling for prosecutorial discretion on the part of immigration officers. 1 50
President Obama used this legal tool in 2012 to offer relief from deportation to undocumented aliens
who were brought into the country at a young age and met certain criteria.1 51 As with President
Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, an explicit grant of prosecutorial discretion acts as the
executive branch's promise not to deport an individual. 152 A grant of prosecutorial discretion affords
an alien work authorization, either automatically or after she submits an application. 153 While
prosecutorial discretion has many benefits, there are major challenges to using this legal mechanism to
solve the plight of climate migrants. First, like TPS, it is temporary in nature. 154 The executive branch's
application of prosecutorial discretion is subject to judicial challenge based on political differences
between the legislative and executive branches of government. 155 Second, this form of relief is a policy
but not a law; the government does not guarantee that an individual will be safe from deportation.
156 Finally, aliens receive limited legal rights under prosecutorial discretion. 157 The memo that
outlined the President's deferred action program explicitly acknowledged that it does not grant legal
status. 158 Although it may be used to benefit a large group of aliens-unlike refugee law which is applied
case-by-case-it nevertheless fails to adequately address climate migrants' legal status. Therefore,
prosecutorial discretion is both fleeting and uncertain.
AT//Withhold Removal CP
Withholding of removal doesn’t encompass climate migrants – places unnecessarily
high burdens
4. Withholding of Removal
Another option, withholding of removal, is related to refugee law's principle of nonrefoulement, which
suggests that a sovereign nation must not return an individual to another sovereign nation if she is likely
to suffer persecution. 167 Withholding of removal requires the applicant to show that it is "more likely
than not" that she will suffer persecution upon return to her home country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 168 This is a higher burden than
an applicant for asylum must meet, and therefore involves overcoming the same challenges for climate
change refugees. 169 As discussed above, refugee and asylum law are unlikely to apply to climate
migrants. Thus, withholding of removal is also an inadequate legal tool for climate migrants. Ultimately,
the suite of immigration tools available today does not encompass climate migrants. These individuals
do not clearly fall under any legal status in the United States. Although individuals may be able to use
refugee law or parole to enter the country on a case-by-case basis, the current legal framework offers
little flexibility to address large populations of climate migrants forced to leave their homes. The next
question, then, is why and how the country must change its piecemeal approach to climate migrants
and what elements it should consider in drafting domestic legislation.
AT//Intl CPs – General “US Key”
The US is key – they can harness the effectiveness of RCM member states
The United States must continue to work with the RCM and lead the effort to create a new RCM Guide
that offers protections for climate refugees. As a majority of climate refugees coming to the United
States will be arriving from the Americas, utilizing regional agreements will be in the best interest of all
RCM member countries and the United States. With the previously mentioned climate refugee visa
program, the United States can utilize their membership as an RCM country to strengthen relationships
with other member countries. This will allow the U.S. to assist in establishing programs in other member
countries to review climate refugees’ cases and expedite the time for admission in new countries. The
United States can also work with other member countries to actually reduce the amount of individuals
who are seeking refuge within the United States itself. The United States can provide resources and
information to other member countries to improve their infrastructure, which can combat some of the
effects of climate change. They can also assist countries that to not currently have the resources or
structures to support large amount of climate refugees, such as Mexico, in establishing new programs
and policies. This will allow for more climate refugees settling in other nations and less of a direct
reliance on the United States to provide all support. In order to maximize this regional body, the
United States must lead the effort to create a legally binding document that will thoroughly address all
aspect of providing legal protections to climate refugees in the Americas. This type of legally binding
regional document will also reduce the amount of climate refugees migrating to the United States, as
other regions around the world may be stimulated to adapt similar policy allowing for less reliance on
the United States alone.
Multilateral treaties fail – political hurdles, lack of complexity

Warren 16 Phillip Dane Warren is a JD Candidate at Columbia Law School (Phillip Dane, “FORCED
MIGRATION AFTER PARIS COP21: EVALUATING THE “CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT COORDINATION
FACILITY” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 116, No. 8) // SR
B. MULTILATERAL TREATY PROPOSALS
Having discussed and dismissed an amending Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, this next
section explores another possibility: a multilateral treaty. Various commenters have discussed the
possibility of drafting such a treaty to address climate migration, though at present there seems to be
little international momentum to do so.162 This section evaluates the prospects of a multilateral
treaty.163
1. Leading Multilateral Treaty Proposals. — Similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention, one could imagine a
multilateral treaty (independent of the UNFCCC) to address climate change migration.164 A multilateral
treaty, defined as an agreement “between three or more states,”165 could bridge the existing legal
gaps by providing protected rights for climate change migrants (presumably mirroring the provisions in
the 1951 Refugee Convention’s grant of nonrefoulement protection and providing basic human rights,
such as access to the judiciary and public education).166 A new multilateral treaty could be specifically
tailored to climate change migrants and avoid conflict with the existing refugee community.
Very early discussions in this area advocated for a cap-and-trade mech--anism that would allow
countries to trade allocations of displaced people.167 Although the most developed treaty proposals
discussed below abandon that approach, the concept of a cap-and-trade mechanism in this area is not
particularly surprising—cap-and-trade is commonly discussed as a possible strategy to cut emissions.168
More recently, some have suggested that a treaty could allocate climate migrants based on historical
emissions,169 mirroring the concept of “common but
differentiated responsibilities” found in the UNFCCC.170
Professors Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas,171 Professors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini,172 and
Professor David Hodgkinson et al.173 have developed the most comprehensive multilateral treaty
proposals in the literature,174 but none provide the right combination of feasibility and
comprehensiveness to adequately protect climate change migrants, and none of these commenters
wrote with the benefit of current trends.
Professors Biermann and Boas focus primarily on what Professor Katrina Wyman calls the “funding gap”
by emphasizing internal displace-ment funding.175 Professors Biermann and Boas treat the issue as
primarily one of development policy, focusing their proposed protocol on providing financial assistance
to domestic resettlement programs in the form of a “Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement
Fund.”176 While the proposal carefully reasons through the importance of providing funding for those
displaced, by treating the issue as one of devel-opment policy and financial support alone, Biermann and
Boas do not address the principle of nonrefoulement or cross-border displace-ment to any substantial
degree. Their proposal defines the group in question underinclusively and then focuses primarily on
funding domestic resettlement.177
In contrast, Professors Docherty and Giannini and Professor Hodgkinson et al. support a rights-based
approach with expansive protections for climate migrants. Both approaches argue for a binding
multilateral agreement that would provide nonrefoulement protection for those displaced by climate
change (modeled after the 1951 Convention),178 with rights expanding over time.179
While both focus primarily on extending rights to those displaced, the two proposals do contain a few
marked differences. Professors Docherty and Giannini explicitly limit their focus to cross-border
dis-place-ment,180 while Professor Hodgkinson et al. recognize that the majority of displacement will
remain internal and envision a “Climate Change Displacement Fund” to support internally displaced
persons.181 Professors Docherty and Giannini argue broadly for the creation of a new international
agency to protect the human rights of those displaced by climate change, modeled after the UNHCR.182
Professor Hodgkinson et al. more explicitly develop the institutional structure of their newly min-ted
“Climate Change Displacement Organization.”183 Finally, Professor Hodgkinson et al. recognize the
special position of small island states and suggest that these nations could negotiate bilateral
agreements with neighboring countries based on proximity, self-determination, and cul-ture.184 While
both treaty proposals admirably attempt to create broad, rights-based protections for migrants, both
would likely fail due to feasibility issues and lack of comprehensiveness.
2. Evaluation of Multilateral Treaty Options. — An independent multilateral treaty that creates rights
and funding protections for climate change migrants would likely fail for a number of reasons. First,
such a treaty would prove difficult (if not impossible) to negotiate, and nego-tiations would likely move
incredibly slowly.185 Climate-related migration is sufficiently imminent that those who will be displaced
(at least in part) by climate change cannot wait for the development of a complex international
architecture with rights-based protections.186 Second, multilateral treaties often provide only the
“lowest common denominator” solution to a problem.187 Given both time and political constraints,
efforts to secure the full scope of refugee-like rights for climate migrants would likely fail. Third, a rights-
based treaty would encounter substantial (and likely insurmountable) political hurdles in the United
States.188 Instead, this Note argues for a regional approach to the problem, coordinated by an existing
international architecture, that would provide the optimal protection for migrants.
Additionally, the incredibly complex causation problems in climate migration would likely prove far too
much for a massive multilateral instrument to manage. In order for someone to attain “refugee-like”
status under such an agreement, a decisionmaker would have the impos-sible task of determining that
climate change caused a specific event and then pinning an individual migrant’s decision to move on
that specific event (in a situation in which poverty and other factors likely played a role).189 Defining a
workable “status” under a multilateral treaty might require narrowing the scope of those covered to
cross-border displace-ment or disappearing states, for example. Narrowing the scope in this way would
inevitably fail to provide adequate protection for all those affected by climate change displacement, as
most of those displaced will move internally, at least at first.190
Due to the feasibility and comprehensiveness concerns discussed above, a multilateral treaty that
focuses on expansive rights protections (like the 1951 Refugee Convention) would not fully protect
climate migrants. Instead, this Note argues for a regional approach to the problem, coordinated through
the existing structure of the United Nations, that would provide the optimal protection for climate
change migrants.
The next two cards are for a potential counterplan
International treaties fail and hinder process – the US must take immediate action on
climate migrants
A. An International Treaty?
Some scholars argue that climate migrants should be protected under an international treaty. A treaty
would require signatories to resolve a number of issues, including how to define climate migrants, and
what type of international mechanism would best address the issues they face. These international
debates help inform the national discussion. Accordingly, this Comment discusses them briefly below.
1. Finding a Workable Definition

The international treaty discussion includes a debate over how to define climate migrants that could be
very useful in the United States. The notion of an "environmental refugee" is generally credited to Essam
El-Hinnawi of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).204 El-Hinnawi proposed the
following definition:
[T]hose people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently,
because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized
their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]. By 'environmental disruption' in
this definition is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or the
resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life. 205
Although El-Hinnawi's was the first definition of its kind, it has not settled the debate over who should
be included.20 6 Scholars point to at least five broad points of debate: (1) whether relocation is forced
or voluntary,207 (2) whether relocation is temporary or permanent, 20 8 (3) whether the relocation is
within the home country or crosses national borders, 20 9 (4) whether the environmental harm causing
the migration was anthropogenic or not,210 and (5) whether the environmental harm was gradual or
sudden. 211 There is no consensus on how nations should resolve these issues. Notably, the
international community has not reached a consensus regarding even the proper term to use to
describe individuals and populations that relocate as a result of climate change. 212 This question has
framed the international debate over who should receive protection as a climate migrant, and it will also
frame the debate in the United States.
2. Proposals Under International Refugee Law
As in domestic law, refugee law is an area of international law that may be a useful tool for climate
migrants. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
outline the law on international refugees.21 3 The Convention defines a refugee as someone who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.214
The Convention also specifies the basic rights of refugees and the obligations of host nations.215 These
include access to education, the right to travel freely with travel documents issued by the host nation,
access to the judicial system, and the right to work.216 Additionally, host nations agree not to expel or
return refugees to their home country. 217 Despite the issues with refugee law as a solution for climate
migrants in the United States discussed in Part II, at least one proposal suggests that the rights of
climate change refugees should be outlined as a protocol under the United Nations Refugee Convention
of 1951 or perhaps added as an amendment to the 1967 Protocol. 218
3. Proposals Under International Environmental Law
Scholars have also considered basing protection for climate migrants on the international environmental
law regime. The leading proposal would adopt a protocol under the UNFCCC. 219 Yet another proposal
calls for a distinct United Nations International Convention.220 Most environmental-law-based
proposals share several features.22 1 First, they presuppose that a top-down agreement set up and
enforced by an organization rather than by individual nations according to their own standards, or a
treaty with international participation is the best way to approach climate change.222 Second, they
recognize that a working definition of climate change refugees must be settled on in order to move
forward in this process. 223 Third, the proposals have a sense of urgency, suggesting that scholars
believe mass migration will occur, and that it will happen soon.224 Last, most scholars insist that
participation by individual sovereign nations, which have failed to implement domestic precautionary
measures, is essential to the development of a comprehensive legal regime that protects the rights of
climate migrants.225
B. The Failure of International Solutions
The Montreal Protocol's success in eliminating ozonedepleting substances convinced many that an
international treaty would be the best way to solve climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.226
As Professor William Boyd explained in his article exploring the evolution of environmental law, both the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were modeled off the Montreal Protocol, and most scholars believed
that they would be similarly successful in reducing emissions across the planet.227 But the major issues
with creating a legal regime based upon international law are that the process is slow and
cumbersome, consensus is elusive, and enforcement is difficult. The international climate regime is
composed of individual sovereign nations, each with its own goals and agenda. 228 For this reason,
international climate governance since the Montreal Protocol has failed to address the biggest issues of
environmental law.229 Professor Boyd argues that despite the global nature of climate change, a global
solution with a top-down climate change framework is unrealistic and unattainable. 230 Rather,
problem solving in environmental governance should consist of "multiple actors coordinating through a
variety of organizational forms. '231 National regulatory systems thus fit nicely into such a cross
jurisdictional system, making it possible to solve a global problem where it might otherwise be
impossible. 232
Although Professor Boyd's article assessed the structure of global environmental law in the context of
emissions rather than migration, it provides a useful lens through which to view new patterns of climate
change-induced migration. An international, treaty-based system is likely unattainable in the near
future, despite the imminent increase in substantial climate-induced migration. 233 One important
question to ask is, "What examples of national, sovereign state law, bilateral agreements, and regional
instruments could provide a roadmap for developing interlocking systems of complementary and
temporary protections? ' 234 This approach, like Professor Boyd's, recognized that the international
community may not be able to craft and implement a timely solution to challenges such as climate
migrants. 235 As Professor Jane McAdam suggested, focusing too narrowly on establishing a global
treaty may allow difficult conversations-such as what the treaty would look like and who should bear the
greatest responsibilities-to impede progress. 236 This would, in turn, shift the focus away from
implementing alternative, more immediate solutions.237 Professor McAdam points to the complexity
and unsettled nature of the nexus between climate change and human migration as one of the major
impediments to creating a comprehensive international mechanism to deal with this problem.238
Some scholars continue to argue that an international treaty is the best mechanism to address climate
migrants. 239 For example, Professors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini from Harvard Law School
called for a new climate change refugee convention.240 They rejected a climate-migrant solution based
on existing international treaties, arguing that these treaties were not created for the purpose of
addressing climate migrants and therefore would not adequately fit their needs.241 They emphasized
that a new convention was needed because it could be interdisciplinary, bring attention to the problem,
and promote the involvement of many actors in creating a flexible solution to fit the problem. 242 While
their argument successfully identified the failures of other proposals, it failed to take into account the
political challenges and long lag-time of implementing an international treaty in a fractured global
community with competing interests. Negotiating a new treaty takes a substantial amount of time.
Additionally, to reach an agreement, the parties might have to concede issues or take on obligations
that they oppose. This could put their compliance with those obligations at risk. On the other hand, a
variety of interlocking bilateral and multilateral agreements would be more flexible and give each party
a sense of ownership over its own obligations.
Thus, because the process is lengthy and cumbersome, the United States cannot wait for the
international community to reach consensus on climate migrants. Moreover, because they do not
sufficiently address domestic conditions and politics, the United States cannot rely on international
treaties to solve this problem. For these reasons, the United States must take responsibility and create
its own solution for climate migrants.
They’ll migrate to the US no matter what – the plan allows the US to get out in front of
it
Although exact numbers are difficult to predict, many who voluntarily or involuntarily relocate outside
of national borders will choose to make the United States their final destination. Predicting the
number of climate migrants that will come to the United States is difficult since most scholars have
focused on predicting global estimates of migration. 35 The United States has long been a destination
for immigrants from around the world. According to the Migration Policy Institute, about one in five
immigrants resided in the United States in 2014.36 However, the United States will receive even more
immigrants from certain nations as a result of climate change. Historical ties and geographic proximity
render it likely that Mexican climate migrants will migrate to the United States. There are already signs
that cross-border migration from Mexico is increasing as climate change begins to impact crop yields. 37
Researcher Shuaizhang Feng and his colleagues, acknowledging that there are many factors unique to
the Mexican-American relationship driving migration from the former to the latter, estimate that the
effects of climate change will cause 5.5 to 6.7 million Mexicans to migrate to the United States by
2080.38 This would be a substantial increase, yet it represents just a fraction of climate migrants
worldwide. Although immigration rates from Mexico to the United States have decreased since 2001, 3
9 Mexico nevertheless produced the most migrants to the United States of any country in the world as
recently as 2010.40 The United States will also see substantial immigration from Asia, both because of
the sheer size of the region's population, and because the United States has historically been a receiving
nation for this population. 4 1 The Asian Development Bank published a report in 2012 on expected
climate change-induced migration patterns from Asia and the Pacific. 42 The study noted that
international migration to the United States from certain countries in the Asia Pacific region would
substantially increase in the coming years. 43 Due to historic migration patterns, both Micronesia and
Polynesia have strong ties to North America and the United States, and migrants from those countries
tend to settle abroad permanently. 44 The study also predicted that environmental stress in Bangladesh
would lead to large-scale permanent relocation of Bangladeshis to "traditional immigrant-receiving
countries," a category that includes the United States. 45 Sealevel rise will cause approximately 26
million climate migrants to leave Bangladesh by 2050.46 Anywhere between 39 and 812 million people
(a "worst case scenario" estimate) in South Asia alone will be at risk of water stress resulting from
temperature rise by the year 2085. 4 7 Sea-level rise has already begun to disrupt the livelihood of many
living along the GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna River Delta.48 Many small island nations also have social
and political ties to the United States that will cause climate migrants to resettle there as climate events
become more common. Climate change-related weather patterns have already begun to displace
people from island nations in the Pacific region.49 In 2005, sea-level rise caused the government of
Papua New Guinea to relocate 2,600 residents of the Carteret Islands, one of its groups of atolls, to a
nearby island-should sea-level rise affect the nation's larger islands, there will be no nearby island and
many residents will relocate to the United States instead. 50 Additionally, the Asian Development Bank
noted that tropical cyclones and storm-tide swells have displaced people in Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall
Islands, the Solomon Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia, all countries whose citizens also
tend to migrate to the United States. 51 Moreover, extreme weather events will likely affect these
regions even more frequently in the future. 52 The United States is, and will continue to be, a common
destination for the population of climate migrants that will be displaced by these weather events. 53
The Philippines is another island nation that will likely produce a substantial number of climate migrants.
The United States has a special relationship with the Philippines, stemming from its colonial authority
over the island nation that lasted from 1898 to 1946. 54 For this reason, many Filipino climate migrants
will migrate to the United States. In 2010, the Philippines produced the tenth highest number of
international migrants to the United States. 55 Moreover, the effects of climate change on the region
are already apparent. Typhoon Haiyan, a record-making violent storm, devastated the Philippines in
2013.56 Manila, the nation's capital, was already sinking and was therefore at heightened risk of
inundation. 57 Nationwide, the typhoon rendered an estimated 600,000 Filipinos homeless and affected
as many as 11 million by damaging property, farms, roads, and other essential infrastructure. 58 As
storms like Typhoon Haiyan increase in frequency, those with the resources to do so will relocate to
safer, less weather-prone regions; many Filipinos will choose the United States. The United States can
also expect climate migrants from Haiti. Haiti has a strong diaspora community in the United States, and
the 2010 earthquake is one of many instances of substantial Haitian immigration to the United States.
59 The 2010 earthquake left over 200,000 dead and at least 1 million people homeless, and the country
continues to struggle with inadequate housing, waterborne disease, food scarcity, and deforestation
that increases the risks of flooding. 60 After the earthquake, the United States extended relief from
deportation to 100,000 Haitians living in the United States illegally, and 30,000 Haitians that had already
been ordered deported. 61 As climate change exacerbates the impacts of occurrences such as the 2010
earthquake, residents will likely leave the island in increasing numbers. Although many Haitians will
migrate to other destinations, 62 many others will join friends and family in the United States. 63 In
sum, this country faces an influx of climate migrants in the coming years.
International cooperation fails – divergent interests, asymmetric power relations,

conflicting ideas, sovereignty, and public opinion
Barriers to cooperation
The traditional barriers to cooperation identified by political scientists apply to migration governance:
conflicts over divergent interests, asymmetrical power, and conflicting ideas are rife in negotiations
for cooperation on migration.20 As described, states from the North and Global South often have
different interests and motivations for cooperation. For example, migrant sending states often try to
maintain strong connections with their diasporas in order to encourage and facilitate remittances; but
migrant receiving states emphasize a need to integrate with local communities and invest resources in
local migrant institutions.21 Such disparate interests render cooperation an arduous if not impossible
task.
The second barrier to cooperation is asymmetrical power relations between migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving states. Among the latter are often rich, developed countries in the North America or
Western Europe that can exert their power system to set visa regimes, border security standards, or
fund humanitarian stop-gaps. Such initiatives are led by wealthy, industrialized states and reflect their
interests, making international cooperation on issues important to migrant-sending states less likely.
Asymmetrical power relations do not necessarily lead to lack of cooperation; more powerful and
certainly hegemonic states can provide important leadership in migration governance. For example,
Germany accepted more than a million asylum seekers in 2015-16, setting a precedent for other EU
countries to accept more as well. Germany continues to exert its leverage within the EU to push
cooperation on new EU-wide relocation and resettlement schemes.22
A third barrier is the conflicting ideas about what kind of migration and what type of cooperation are
most beneficial, and for whom. States have different understandings of how migration can help or hurt
their economies and communities. For example, those in North Africa consider circular migration (when
migrant repeatedly move between host and home countries for a temporary period, usually for seasonal
work) a historical pattern and crucial to their economies. In contrast, European states sometimes view
circular migration as a threat to domestic labor markets and a source of transient populations that
threaten the cohesion of local communities. While issue linking and cross-issue persuasion may reduce
this barrier, conflicting understandings of ideas about migration are a persistent obstacle in global
migration governance.
One manifestation of a conflicting conceptualization with significant impact is the ongoing and
seemingly endless debate over the difference between refugees and migrants. International refugee law
provides rights for refugees but not economic migrants. In this respect, the refugee definition recognizes
that they were forced to flee in order to seek protection, but implies that migrants choose of their own
volition to move for economic opportunities. While the law is clear about this division, the actual
motivations and real-world situations that push and pull people to move are more complex and less
stark. Betts argues that people who move in order to stay alive because of hunger, extreme poverty, or
widespread violence—what he deems “survival migration”—require similar protection to refugees
fleeing political persecution.23 As discussed, states in Africa and Latin America have recognized an
expanded definition of refugees, but they clash with European or North American ideas of asylum.
Further, global cooperation on migration may be unnecessary if regional cooperation is effective.
Regional institutions use more appropriate responses for specific migration issues in their area of the
world, especially because most refugees flee to contiguous countries. Regional cooperation has the
potential to relieve pressure from global institutions and break an impasse in global cooperation
because states can find common areas of cooperation within other states in the region, even if a few
states refuse to participate at the global level.
A fourth barrier to cooperation is sovereignty: many states understand migration policy as a reflection
of the core competency of national governments. They seek to prevent global institutions from
encroaching on their power to set policy on who enters or works in their territory. States are even
hesitant to relinquish authority to regional institutions. The European Union has both successes and
barriers to regional cooperation on migration. The EU’s Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is a
set of directives agreeing on a minimum set of standards and principles for asylum, reception,
qualifications, and return. While the CEAS attempts to harmonize asylum processes across all EU
member states, it has not been successful in forcing implementation by them all. In 2016, for instance,
the Visograd countries (Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary) refused to participate in the EU-wide
refugee relocation schemes, citing national sovereignty; and asylum acceptance rates for refugees from
the same country vary widely across the EU.
A fifth barrier is opposition in the domestic public opinion to migration and cooperation on migration
issues.24 There are strong anti-immigrant trends worldwide: in Europe, 59 percent of those polled in
2016 were concerned that more refugees could lead to more terrorism, 25 and less than 30 percent
thought that diversity made their country a better place to live.26 In Africa, 40 percent of people polled
thought immigration should be decreased; in South America, 39 percent wanted a decrease; in Asia,
only 29 percent wanted a decrease.27 In the United States, public opinion is more complex: 63
percent28 believed immigrants strengthened the country, but a majority believed immigrants from
Africa or the Middle East have a negative impact.29 These beliefs influence how politicians position
themselves with local audiences on international 7 cooperation for migration. Often, politicians are
eager to cooperate on border controls, increased technology, and deportation; but they are less
enthusiastic about refugee resettlement, labor mobility, or family reunification.
Trump himself scuttles the CP

Sengupta, '17 – International Climate Reporter and Specialist (Somini, "Climate Change Is Driving
People From Home. So Why Don’t They Count as Refugees?," New York Times, 12-21-2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/climate/climate-refugees.html)//SB
Why isn’t anyone proposing a new law?
For starters, refugee advocates fear that if the 1951 refugee treaty were opened for renegotiation,
politicians in various countries would try to weaken the protections that exist now. That includes the
Trump administration, which has barred people from eight countries — including refugees from war-
torn Syria and Yemen — from coming into the country altogether.
A group of academics and advocates has spent the last two years proposing an entirely new treaty, with
new categories to cover those who are forcibly displaced, including by the ravages of climate change.
Michael W. Doyle, a Columbia professor leading the effort to draft a new treaty, said he didn’t expect a
new treaty to be embraced anytime soon, but insisted that those conversations should start as record
numbers of people leave their home countries and end up displaced in others, often without legal
status.
“In the modern world,” Dr. Doyle said, “people are fleeing for their lives for a variety of reasons.”
Trial balloons have been floated
A New Zealand lawmaker recently proposed a special visa category for people displaced by climate
change. “One of the options is a special humanitarian visa to allow people who are forced to migrate
because of climate change,” the minister, James Shaw, said in an interview from a global climate summit
in Bonn, Germany, in November.
Mr. Shaw has said nothing since then about when legislation might be proposed, and it’s far from clear
whether it would pass.
Several countries have offered humanitarian visas in the aftermath of calamitous natural disasters,
including the United States after hurricanes and earthquakes, including in Haiti in 2010. (The Trump
administration ended that so-called protected status for Haitians in November.)
There’s a bigger problem
As Elizabeth Ferris, a professor at Georgetown University, points out, most people whose lands and
livelihoods are ravaged by either natural disaster or the slow burn of climate change aren’t likely to
leave their countries. Many more will move somewhere else within their own country — from the
countryside to cities, for instance, or from low-lying areas prone to flooding to higher elevation.
Indeed, natural disasters forced an estimated 24 million people to be displaced within the borders of
their own country in 2016, according to the latest report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Center.
AT//United Nations CP
Regardless of mechanism – the cplan’s a bandaid for a bullet wound
Refugee literature often distinguishes between “temporary” or “permanent” migrations, but these
distinctions provide little help in the aftermath of environmental disaster. International support is
required in all disaster situations whether the displaced climate exiles are permanent or not. As
Biermann and Boas note, the main institution dealing with refugees is the United Nations, acting
through the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.1 The UN is restricted to helping individual political refugees who flee theft
countries because of state-led persecution. and this does not cover climate refugees. At best, the UN
refers to climate refugees as “internally displaced persons” and offers some programs for them under
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. But it is more of a Band-Aid program than a
major corrective. The current international regime embodied in the United Nations provides only
marginal protection. with no specific mandate. to climate refugees. This is a problem that strikes at the
core of Western development policy toward poorer nations, especially the very poorest. Nothing
positive can happen with United Nations leadership until an independent regime for the protection
and resettlement of climate refugees is established.
The UN can't do it -- too contentious and member states wouldn't all approve
Gauthier 16 (Matthew, law student at the University of North Carolina, Climate Refugees and
International Law: Legal Frameworks and Proposals in the US and Abroad,
http://studentorgs.law.unc.edu/documents/elp/2016/m_gauthier.pdf//waters)
III. Proposals for New Frameworks to Manage Environmental Migration A. Updating the Current
Definition of “Refugee” Within the Existing UN Framework to Include Environmental Refugees One
proposal for creating a legal means to address environmental migrants has been to simply reform the
current definition of “refugee” within the existing UN Convention and protocols. Proponents argue that
environmental migration is already occurring and migrants have a right to a legal solution.36 Proposals
to redefine the term “refugee” have commonly suggested redefining or eliminating the persecution
element as well as expanding or eliminating the protected grounds.37 This proposal, while on its face
straightforward, would drastically change the current refugee regime and would likely be quite
controversial. Another suggestion is to simply add environmental migrants as a class of people protected
by the existing UN Convention.38 While both of these proposals appear to be simple, scholars have
already identified five points of contention.39 What this shows is that even simply expanding the
current definition is not free from dispute;40 framing the debate as a simple issue of definitions, while
perhaps the most straightforward option, is not without debate. At this point, the debate centers
around: (1) the causes of relocation, (2) the permanence of relocation, (3) whether or not the relocation
is international, (4) the influence of the environmental harm, and (5) the suddenness of the
environmental harm.41 This serves to illustrate the difficulty of enacting a comprehensive international
definition to the existing UN Convention.
B. Adopting a New Comprehensive Legal Framework for Environmental Migrants With the absence of
consensus on adding environmental migrants to existing refugee frameworks, some have advocated for
creating a new, comprehensive structure for environmental migration. This could potentially look like
either an environmental migration protocol adopted by the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change or an entirely new and distinct United Nations protocol.42 There are a number of characteristics
common to these proposals. First, while it will be created at the international level, it will depend on the
adoption and cooperation of sovereign nations.43 Additionally, rights and definitions of environmental
migrants must still be agreed upon.44
UN definitions of ‘refugee’ don’t include climate as a grounds for assistance – CP

doesn’t solve
Barrett 18- Sarah Elizabeth Barrett is a global health research assistant for the University of Vermont which is
comprised of acting as a liaison between refugee-focused healthcare providers in the Burlington area and
undergraduate students at UVM, facilitating Service-Learning partnerships between these service providers and
students, working to catalog and produce informational guides on best practices for students interested in
engaging in work related to refugees, migrants, and New Americans, and researching global health issues affecting
refugees and displaced persons. “Seeking Asylum Across the International Boundary: Legal Terms and Geopolitical
Conditions of Irregular Border Crossing and Asylum Seeking between the United States and Canada, 2016 – 2018”,
April 18, 2018, Global and Regional Studies Program, http://spatializingmigration.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Barett_Thesis.pdf, 35-38 // Suraj P
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Convention defines a refugee is a person who is “unwilling or unable to
return to his country of nationality or habitual residence because of a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”
(UNHCR, 1967). The basis of the definition of a “Convention refugee” rests on the protection of persons
from political or identity-based persecution that affects an individual personally. This often includes
conditions of war or conflict and, “[e]xcept in contexts of conflicts and persecution, there is no lead UN
agency that has at its core the protection of people forced to flee owning to disasters, including those
triggered by climate change, and which could coordinate an international response” (UN News, 2014).
Thus because the legal definition of a refugee requires that a person claiming such status must
experience a form of persecution, persons affected by EID are some of the most vulnerable
populations in the world. This includes those affected by the earthquakes in El Salvador and Haiti as
well as the hurricanes in Honduras and Nicaragua that led to the designations of these populations for
TPS. The Convention also mandates a claimant for status as a refugee must have fled beyond the
borders of their own state in that they are “unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin” and
as such a person may only make a claim for refugee status from a country other than their own (UNHCR,
1967). This renders internally displaced persons (IDPs) ineligible for a claim of refugee status.
Environmental displacement often produces large numbers of IDPs and, as such, these displaced
persons are “not protected by international law or eligible to receive many types of aid” (UNHCR, 2018).
This is because they remain within the borders of their own country and thus legally remain under the
protection of their own government. Such narrow delineations in the definition of a Convention refugee
necessitate additional programs of protection -- such as TPS -- for forcibly displaced populations that do
not meet these particular legal qualifications. Until the current annulment of the program, TPS provided
vital protection for those dislocated by EID. In global context, EID is a growing concern in relation to
forced displacement around the world. Climate change and its related environmental disasters,
displacement and development are a significant concern for expanding global displacement. Millions of
people have already been forcibly uprooted by worsening environmental conditions (UNHCR, 2018). It is
estimated that there has been an average of 25.4 million new displacements associated with disasters
each year since 2008; most of those affected are IDPs. This is more than twice as many displacements
caused by conflict and violence (IDMC, 2016). In 2010, an estimated 42 million people worldwide were
displaced from their homes as the result of immediate and long-term changes in the physical
environment (Yonetani [IDMC], 2011). This estimate is roughly equal to the number of people displaced
by war and persecution during the same period (UNHCR, 2010). The UNHCR (2015) warns that
“increasing incidence and changing intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change will lead
directly to the risk of increased levels of displacement.” Such extreme weather events that render a
place uninhabitable and cause large-scale forced displacement include those experienced by El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti. While the term “environmental refugee” is first attributed to Essam El-
Hinnawi, a United Nations Environment Programme researcher, in 1985, this term is misleading because
international law (as articulated in the the Convention) defines a “refugee” as a person who is (1) fleeing
persecution, and (2) has crossed an international border. El-Hinnawi describes an environmental refugee
as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently,
because of a marked environmental disruption […] that jeopardized their existence and/or serious
affected their quality of life” (El-Hinnawi, 1985 qtd in Bose & Lunstrum, 2014, p. 6). This definition,
however, is criticized for being “so wide as to render the concept virtually meaningless” (Suhrke &
Visentin qtd in Bose & Lunstrum, 2014, p. 6). The legal application of the term and concept of
“environmental refugees” has sparked considerable debate. For example, Bose & Lunstrum (2014, p. 6)
explain that the UNHCR “‘has serious reservations with respect to the terminology and notion of
environmental or climate refugees.’” The UNHCR has itself noted: “[T]he terminology and notion of
environmental or climate refugees … have no basis in international law … UNHCR is actually of the
opinion that use of such terminology could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the
protection of refugees whose rights and obligations are quite clearly defined and understood … UNHCR
considers that any initiative to modify this definition would risk a renegotiation of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, which could not be justified by actual needs [emphasis added]” (UNHCR qtd in Bose &
Lunstrum, 2014, p. 6). This leaves those displaced and affected by natural disasters ‘out in the cold’ as
they lack legal recognition under the international standards of protection that govern the asylum
systems of both the US and Canada as well as the global refugee determination regime at large. While
TPS offered safe haven for those affected by EID from El Salvador, Nicaragua and Haiti, the termination
of this protection renders these vulnerable populations without access to protection or legal status in
the US. This will be discussed further in subsection II of this chapter.
-- AT//Soft Law / UNGA Mechanism
That fails – it cannot induce members to help and does not generate enough funds
Mayer 11 (Benoit, LL.M. (McGill), Master of Political Sciences (Sciences Po), Bachelor of Law
(Sorbonne), is a PhD candidate at the National University of Singapore, The International Legal
Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration: Proposal for an International Legal Framework,
https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/colenvlp22&div=20&start_page=357&collectio
n=journals&set_as_cursor=6&men_tab=srchresults#//waters)
A fourth mode of action consists of a resolution adopted either by the Security Council or the UNGA. The
Security Council already addressed climate change in a debate on April 17, 2007.249 However, it did not
adopt a resolution but instead concluded that the Security Council is not the correct institution to deal
with climate change migration. In any case, the Security Council's responsibility for "maintenance of
international peace and security" 250 would exclude any general approach. This seems to undermine
the triggering effect that a resolution by the Security Council may have if the resolution decides that a
well-known international issue calls for an immediate international answer. For this reason, a group of
Pacific Small Island Developing States is currently pushing the Security Council to address this issue again
and to adopt a resolution as the start to a lobbying effort.25 ' The UNGA, which has already adopted
Resolution 63/281 on climate migration,252 may be a more appropriate forum for a decision because its
procedures to adopt a resolution are less demanding and its general competence allows it to adopt a
global approach to climate- induced migration. A resolution by the UNGA may press states to negotiate
a global, concerted, early, and sustainable response to this phenomenon, which would implement the
guiding principles of burden- sharing, subsidiarity, and respect for collective, as well as individual, rights.
More concretely, a resolution may also recommend that existing fundamental rights of climate migrants
be respected, including the right to life and the right not to be submitted to inhuman or degrading
treatment. A right to resettlement may also be deduced from existing fundamental rights. Eventually,
the UNGA may encourage states or international organizations to take some measures to protect
climate migrants. Eventually, it may recommend that states ratify a convention. Soft law would have a
highly symbolic importance and may define universal norms that should be applied by states. Obviously,
its main pitfall stems from the absence of an obligation of states to cooperate in a compulsory funding
instrument, although a fund such as the UNHCR's can be opened to voluntary contributions.
Furthermore, contrary to a treaty, because a resolution does not have to be ratified, it would not raise
national debate and public awareness. Overall, one can hardly imagine that a UNGA resolution would
be sufficient to push states to recognize the rights of climate migrants. Therefore, a resolution is
probably a starting point, but it will in no case be sufficient to deal with climate-induced migration.
-- AT//Expand UNHCR Mechanism
Changing the definition of ‘refugee’ to include environmental displacement doesn’t
solve and exacerbates refugee flows more broadly
Biermann and Boas 10- Frank Biermann is Professor of Political Science and of Environmental Policy at VU
University Amsterdam and Visiting Professor of Earth System Governance at Lund University, Sweden, Ingrid Boas
is Assistant Professor in Climate Governance at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University, the
Netherlands. Her research particularly focusses on the topic of climate change-induced migration and climate
security, “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees”, Vol.
10 No. 1, Global Environmental Politics,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Biermann/publication/227627225_Preparing_for_a_Warmer_World
_Towards_a_Global_Governance_System_to_Protect_Climate_Refugees/links/5422bc260cf238c6ea6b866f/Prepar
ing-for-a-Warmer-World-Towards-a-Global-Governance-System-to-Protect-Climate-Refugees.pdf, // Suraj P
To what extent is the current global governance system able to deal with the crisis that may emerge in
the decades to come? The main global institution dealing with refugees is the regime provided for by
the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. These institutions are restricted to individual political refugees who ºee their
countries because of state-led persecution, and thus do not cover climate refugees.47 A broader
definition of refugees has been adopted in two regional conventions, the 1969 Organization of African
Unity Convention Governing the Speciªc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees (concerning refugees from Central America, Mexico and Panama).48 Both
regional conventions cover also people seeing from events seriously disturbing public order,49 and the
African convention applies to groups too.50 Even though the extension of protection to people affected
by a seriously disturbed public order and to groups may open the two regional conventions—which
happen to cover regions most severely affected by future climate change—to include climate refugees,
both conventions were originally not intended to protect these types of refugees.51 The main agency
in the United Nations system for the protection of refugees is the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). Its primary focus is (political) refugees protected under the Geneva Convention and
the Protocol of 1967,52 and thus it does not cover environmental or climate refugees. By the end of
2007, 11.4 million refugees fell under the formal mandate of the UNHCR.53 Given the restrictive
definition of political refugee under the Geneva convention, the executive committee of UNHCR and the
UN General Assembly permitted the agency to extend its activities towards other groups, such as former
refugees who have returned to their homeland, internally displaced people, and people who are
stateless or whose nationality is disputed, even though these people have a different legal status and
are formally not referred to as “refugees.”54 In total, by the end of 2006 the UNHCR dealt with 32.9
million people and by the end of 2007 with 31.7 million,55 including “refugees, asylum seekers,
returnees, stateless people and a portion of the world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs).”56 In the
current regime, most climate refugees could be conceptualized as internally displaced persons. The
UNHCR has a variety of programs for such people, even though the High Commissioner maintains not to
have a specific mandate over them.57 Environmentally internally displaced persons also fall under the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.58
However, the concept of “environmentally internally displaced person” serves, according to Keane,
only “as a descriptive term, not as a status that confers obligations on states.”59 The Guiding
Principles state for example that the primary duty to provide protection and humanitarian assistance
lays with national authorities,60 and the 2006 Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural
Disasters “Protecting Persons Affected By Natural Disasters” from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
directed to internally displaced people, places primary responsibility on national authorities of affected
countries with assistance of humanitarian agencies.61 No duties or obligations of other states are
mentioned. In sum, the current legal regime on refugees provides only marginal protection, with no
specific mandate, to climate refugees. The main responsibility is placed with their home countries,
which contradicts the global responsibility for the victims of climate change. In addition, the maximum
number of persons the UNHCR can currently deal with is merely a small fraction of the additional
number of climate refugees that many studies predict for 2050. It is doubtful whether these governance
arrangements can cope with the looming climate refugee crisis.62 One reform option within the present
institutional setting could be to extend the mandate of the 1951 Geneva Convention and of the UNHCR
to cover also “climate refugees.” This has been proposed recently by the Republic of the Maldives,63
but does not and much support in the literature.64 Politically it would seem unlikely that donor
countries would allow the current refugee regime with its fixed set of refugee rights to be extended to
cover a group of refugees that is 20 times larger than that which is currently covered. Related to this,
such extension could produce a trade-off between climate refugees and the (political) refugees that
are protected under the Geneva Convention. Most importantly, however, climate refugees require a
different kind of protection. Most climate refugees will not leave their home countries, and will still be
able to enjoy protection of their governments. Also, many potentially affected population centers—
notably low-lying coasts and islands—can be predicted within limits. Climate-related migrations can
therefore be planned and organized with the support of their governments and public agencies, exactly
the opposite of the political or religious persecution faced by political refugees. In sum, the problem of
climate refugees is at its core a problem of development policy. It requires institutions that take account
of this special character.
The UNCHR lacks enforcement capacity

Economist, '18 – Economics and Policy News Source (Economist, "Why climate migrants do not have
refugee status," 3-6-2018, The Economist, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2018/03/06/why-climate-migrants-do-not-have-refugee-status)//SB
On the surface, the problem is bureaucratic. Environmental migrants are not covered by the 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is designed to protect those fleeing
persecution, war or violence. The UN agencies most involved in refugee rights, the UN Refugee Agency
(UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme, agree that the term “climate refugee” should not be
used to describe those displaced for environmental reasons. The UNHCR already struggles to provide
adequate support for the world’s 22.5m refugees (from war and persecution). During the Syrian refugee
crisis, it admitted to being “stretched to the limit”. If the UNHCR broadens its definition of “refugee” to
support an entirely new category, it is unclear if the political appetite exists to provide the necessary
funding.
Multiple reasons the counterplan fails
McAdam, '17 – scientia professor of law and director of the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee
Law at UNSW (Jane, "The Sydney Morning Herald: The UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include
“Climate Refugees”," Yale University’s YaleGlobal, 6-15-2017,
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/sydney-morning-herald-un-refugee-convention-should-not-include-
climate-refugees)//SB
Critics of the United Nations Refugee Convention tend to fall into two camps. In one camp are those
who think the treaty is too old to respond to the displacement challenges of the 21st century, such as
climate change and disasters. In the other camp are those who think the treaty is too generous and
somehow responsible for the large numbers of refugees we see around the world today.
Curiously, the convention is somehow too narrow and too broad at the same time; simultaneously
blocking yet facilitating access to protection.
The convention remains the most comprehensive statement we have of the rights and obligations of
refugees, supplemented by international human rights law.
It doesn't provide a "blank cheque", but carefully balances the needs of refugees and governments. It
also contains exclusion clauses to keep out people who are suspected of committing very serious crimes,
such as murder or terrorism.
Indeed, the drafters were well aware that refugee protection was not a way to bypass migration
controls – on the contrary, refugee status determination exposes people to the most extreme vetting
imaginable.
Although drafted in the 1950s, the convention's definition of a refugee has proven itself capable of a
dynamic interpretation over time. For instance, gender-related persecution is now accepted as founding
a refugee claim.
To be fair, the convention does not protect every displaced person in the world – but nor was it
designed to. For instance, it doesn't extend to the millions of people displaced within their own
countries.
Recently, people displaced by the impacts of disasters and climate change have been identified as
another group in need of protection. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many have leapt to the assumption that
we need to extend the convention to these so-called "climate refugees".
There are at least seven reasons why this assumption is flawed.
First, the vast majority of disaster displacement will occur within countries, not across international
borders.
Second, a lot of movement will be gradual as conditions deteriorate over time, rather than in the nature
of refugee "flight".
Third, climate change and disasters alone do not cause movement. Rather, they are the straw that
breaks the camel's back, overlaying existing drivers like conflict, human rights abuses, poverty and poor
governance. This causal complexity would be difficult to reflect in a treaty definition.
Fourth, some have questioned why protection should be extended to those affected by "climate
change" or "disasters", rather than for instance "abject poverty", which may be equally attributable to
global structural inequities. As experts have noted, focusing on a single cause can distort and
oversimplify the context, and impede the identification of appropriate solutions.
Fifth, there is little political appetite at the moment to expand the Refugee Convention. Opening it up
for renegotiation would most likely result in a far weaker protection framework, with less protection for
all – including those it currently protects.
Sixth, a treaty needs to be implemented and enforced to have any meaning in practice; 148 countries
have signed up to the Refugee Convention, and yet there are more refugees in the world now than at
any other time since World War. The problem is not an absence of law, but an absence of political will
to implement the law.
That's why – seventh – we need to think more creatively about pre-emptive responses to displacement
linked to the impacts of climate change and disasters. Right now, governments could do so much to
avoid the risk of future displacement, such as implementing disaster risk reduction and climate change
adaptation measures; enhancing voluntary migration opportunities; developing humanitarian visas; and
potentially even undertaking planned relocations, in full consultation with affected communities.
So, when returning to the objections levelled at the Refugee Convention, we need to be cautious about
misdiagnosis. The convention provides a principled, predictable, universal, and solutions-oriented
system. It remains fit for the purpose for which it was created. It just needs political will to be able to do
its job.
AT//Localized Adaptive Measures CPs
Localized adaptive mechanisms fail
Marshall 15 Nicole Marshall is a PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta
(Nicole, “Environmental Migration in an Era of Accelerated Climate Change: Proposing a Normative
Framework for International Migrant Rights and Domestic Migration,” University of Alberta,
https://era.library.ualberta.ca/items/46a0b9dd-e055-4afd-82e1-6009da437ff6/view/c5b1c266-2794-
4776-853b-72a7a57fb0e8/Marshall_Nicole_M_201508_PhD.pdf) // SR
Indeed, the 21st century has seen a renewed interest in peoples who feel compelled to migrate as a
result of environmental issues. In many ways, today, people who are seeking to avoid difficult climates
face complications that were not experienced by our ancestors. As climate change increases the
frequency, strength, and impact of storms and related weather events, environmental migration is
increasingly associated with large-scale displacement and immediate loss of life. Moreover, many of
those who need to migrate to obtain a stable food supply are crippled by systemic poverty, which often
effectively eliminates migration from their range of possible adaptation strategies. And so the
complications of modern climate migration begin to compile. With an increased potential for loss of life,
and desperate populations who are unable to legally migrate, it is clear that there are new faces of
forced environmental migration: ones that urgently demand particular and appropriate responses from
policymakers and the international community. Of course, it also must be recognized that migration is
but one of a list of adaptation strategies, and many of the populations threatened by the effects of
climate change have been very clear that they are not primarily seeking migration as an adaptive option.
For example, the peoples of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, and the Maldives have been
particularly vocal about this point (see Threatened Island Nations Conference proceedings 2011).
Instead, many populations would rather employ local environmental adaptation strategies such as the
construction of seawalls to keep out rising tides, or dike systems to manage increasing groundwater, to
extend the habitability of their homelands. The primary challenge with these localized adaptive
mechanisms, however, is that they are quite costly and the communities and states that would most
benefit from them do not typically have the financial resources to develop and implement the required
infrastructure (for example, the Republic of the Marshall Islands: see Johnson 2010). To do so
successfully, these states would require significant international assistance – assistance that is not
readily available in today’s international political climate (see discussion in Chapter Five and Six). For
example, Republic of the the Marshall Islands has faced particular challenges in meeting the costs of
constructing sufficient seawalls, where these would make a substantial difference in keeping salinized
water away from crops and protecting the stability of roadways, houses, and other infrastructure from
flood-related deterioration. In 2010, the United Nations launched a plea for US$20 million in aid, meant
to finance the construction of three seawalls in the most vulnerable areas of the island chain (Johnson
2010). While billions of dollars were pledged to assist with climate change adaptation since 2008,
according to the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ United Nations Ambassador, Phillip Muller, “not much
of this pledged money has flowed to countries [like his] that need it” (in Johnson 2010). Moreover,
evidence is mounting to suggest that the possible success of these and other adaptation strategies is
declining as we move forward in time. Without sufficient funding and technological advances, these
island-based societies may find themselves out of adaptation options beyond international migration as
sea levels continue to rise and local habitability declines. Indeed, today’s increasingly volatile and
unpredictably changing global climate sees, on average, more than 25 million Environmentally Displaced
Persons sitting in a condition of displacement each year (UNHCR 2013; also see Myers 1997, 2001). As
the number of environmental migrants increases, the makeup of these migrants is also becoming more
complex. Many forced migrants cannot afford safe migration, and all international migrants face the
further challenge of securitized state borders that impede access to a full range of available migration
options. Clearly, there are a number of new challenges associated with this longstanding problem, and
this often leaves modern environmental migrants deeply challenged to fully and effectively adapt to
local and regional changes in climate, even in instances where their ancestors may have succeeded.
AT//Canada CP
Immigrants earn more and assimilate better in the US
Neeraj Kaushal et al 2016 -- Neeraj Kaushal is a Professor of Social Policy at the University of New
York, Yao Lu is an Associate Professor of Sociology, and faculty affiliate of the Columbia Population
Research Center, Nicole Denier is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Sociology at Colby College, Julia Shu-Huah
Wang is an Assistant Professor at the University of Hong Kong, and Stephen J. Trejo is a Professor of
Economics at the University of Texas at Austin. ["Immigrant employment and earnings growth in Canada
and the USA: evidence from longitudinal data", Accessible Online at:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5270643/] @ AG
Our analysis has three main findings: One, on average immigrant men (pooled across cohorts) in Canada
do not experience significant relative growth in the three labor market outcomes compared to men born
in Canada. Immigrant men in the U.S., by contrast, experience positive annual growth in all three
domains relative to U.S. born men. Further analysis shows that this difference is largely driven by low-
educated immigrant men, who experienced faster or longer duration of relative growth in all three
outcomes in the U.S. than in Canada. We attribute this in part to the differences in the structures of
labor market and welfare institutions in the two countries that incentivize or necessitate faster
economic assimilation in the U.S. The earnings trajectories of recent high-educated immigrant men in
both countries are identical, but high-educated immigrant men living in Canada for more than 20 years
experience negative employment and wage assimilation, which is not the case for immigrants in the U.S.
We think the last finding could also be related to some extent to Canada’s more generous welfare
system (employment and health insurance) that works to depress labor market engagement, especially
for those getting close to retirement age. Indeed, estimates stratified by age suggest that the results are
less robust for younger immigrants in Canada. Two, as expected, on all three domains, recent immigrant
men in both countries experience some form of economic assimilation. However, the relative positive
growth in employment, hours worked, and real wages begins to taper off for groups who have been in
the host countries for a longer period, and in the case of Canadian immigrants there is evidence of early
retirement among those who are in the country for more than 20 years. Our findings differ somewhat
from Antecol et al. (2006), which used repeated cross-sections of data. They too concluded that
immigrant men in both countries experienced positive earnings growth, and that U.S. immigrants
experienced higher earnings assimilation than Canadian immigrants. But in their estimates, earnings
growth remained robust for earlier arrivals, which is contrary to our finding. They also find that in the
U.S. employment growth mostly happened in the first few years after arrival, but for Canadian
immigrants it continued into later years as well, which is contrary to our finding. The difference in our
findings could be on account of the difference in data and methodologies or due to the difference in
period under study (they focus on the 1980s, whereas our study period is from 1996–2008). We also
estimated synthetic cohort models using multiple panels of SIPP and SLID data. Similar to Antecol et al.,
our cross-sectional analysis also shows that wage growth is robust for earlier arrivals in both countries,
and in fact, for immigrants in Canada, the cross-sectional estimates suggest that almost all the wage
growth is confined to immigrants who are in the country for at least 10 years (11–20 years and 20+
years). Comparing this with the short-term earnings trajectories based on longitudinal data leads us to
conclude that the cross-sectional trajectories over-estimate the wage assimilation of earlier arrivals in
both countries. Our findings are similar to those of previous research that have used longitudinal data in
the U.S. (see e.g. Lubotsky, 2007), but differs from similar research in Canada (e.g. Picot and Pitaino,
2013).32 Finally, we find that recent immigrant women in the U.S. also experience economic
assimilation on all three domains, and recent immigrant women in Canada experience economic
assimilation in work effort – employment as well as hours worked, but not in wages. In both countries
earlier arrivals (in the host country for more than 20 years) experienced a decline in relative earnings,
which might be an indicator of limited long term wage growth opportunities in the occupations (low-end
service occupations) or locations (e.g. ethnic enclaves) where a majority of immigrant women, especially
the earlier arrivals, work in the two countries. It is also possible that earlier arrivals among immigrant
women in both countries seek more flexible jobs that come with lower wages to take care of children or
grandchildren. To sum up, our estimates suggest a faster economic assimilation of immigrants in the
U.S. than in Canada. The difference in immigrant labor market trajectories that we observe could be on
account of the positive selection of immigrants to the U.S. (compared to Canada) in terms of unobserved
attributes (after adjusting for observed attributes) or they could be due to differences in labor market
and welfare institutions that, as we hypothesize, incentivize or necessitate greater labor market
assimilation in the U.S. than in Canada. It could also be associated with the differences in immigration
policies paired with country-specific labor market regulations. Observed outcomes for immigrants in
these countries could also differ as a result of differences in macroeconomic conditions. In our paper,
we include controls for native trajectories. But this is a potential source of difference if macroeconomic
conditions affect immigrants and natives differently in the two countries. Further, differences in services
provided to immigrants could be an additional source of difference in their trajectories.
Canadian refugee acceptance causes backlogs and bankrupts the Canadian economy
Levin ’17 – October 19, 2017, Dan Levin is a foreign correspondent for The New York Times who
specializes in Canada coverage, “Canada Welcomed Refugees, but Now Struggles With Backlog,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/world/canada/canada-refugees-immigration.html // shurst
A wave of asylum seekers entering Canada this year has exacerbated a backlog of refugee claims that
the government is struggling to manage, leaving tens of thousands of people stuck in bureaucratic limbo
even as they try to build new lives. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board says it has a backlog of
40,700 cases. More than 10,000 asylum seekers have crossed illegally into Quebec from the United
States since July alone. But the board has the money and staff to process just 24,000 cases a year,
meaning that many people will have to wait around 16 months for their case to be heard. “The strain on
the organization to handle this many people’s hearings is enormous,” Shereen Benzvy Miller, the head
of the board’s refugee protection division, told a parliamentary immigrations committee this month.
“The math is clear,” she added. “Unless you put more resources to this problem, then it takes longer
time to schedule, so there will be longer wait times.” The delay also increases the amount of money
Canada spends on asylum seekers’ medical care, education and public assistance, said Richard Kurland,
a former national chairman of the Canadian Bar Association’s citizenship and immigration section. “The
longer they stay, the more Canadians pay,” he said. The immigration board set up a special task force in
August to respond to the influx of asylum seekers who crossed illegally into Quebec. By the end of
September, the task force had finalized around 300 claims, rejecting about 50 percent of them. That
acceptance rate is below the national norm of 65 percent, which could bode poorly for migrants who
came to Canada on the basis of economic opportunity rather than a well-founded fear of persecution, as
is legally required for refugee protection. The board hopes to pick up its pace of reviewing claims, and
expects the task force to hear 1,500 claims by the end of November, Ms. Benzvy Miller said. Yet more
people keep coming in, about 1,400 a month since April. And a government review of the asylum
processing procedures, begun in June, will not be completed until next summer. Most of the 8,500
asylum seekers who walked into Quebec from New York State in July and August were Haitians fearing
deportation from the United States and seeking to benefit from a loophole in a treaty between the two
countries that allows people to make refugee claims in Canada if they do not arrive at legal ports of
entry. As daily arrivals soared into the hundreds, the Quebec provincial government turned the
Montreal Olympic Stadium into a temporary shelter with space for 1,500 beds. Once asylum seekers
have been screened for security risks and make a refugee claim, they are given a monthly stipend and a
work permit, and their children are allowed to enroll in school. But this gives many a false sense of
security, immigration lawyers say. With civil war raging in his native Yemen and his Saudi Arabian
residency expiring after 16 years, Sami Alromi, 40, a clothing salesman, made a desperate decision to fly
to the United States with his pregnant wife and daughter in February, leaving behind three other
children. Just weeks earlier, President Trump had tried to introduce a travel ban on people from Yemen,
which Mr. Alromi said left his family with only one option: Canada. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of
Canada had recently tweeted, “Those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you,
regardless of your faith,” so the Alromi family crossed on foot into Quebec in March and made refugee
claims. But their hearing was indefinitely postponed in April. Mr. Alromi’s wife gave birth in Canada, and
ever since their hearing postponement they have been consumed by fear that their other children,
whose Saudi Arabian residency permits have expired, will be deported to Yemen, where teenagers are
used as soldiers and diseases like cholera are rife. “Being here I can’t do anything for my kids over
there,” Mr. Alromi said in a phone interview from Montreal, adding that his wife had become so
depressed over their plight that she had to go to the hospital and take medication. “If they are deported
to Yemen, I don’t know what I’m going to do.” This month, the immigration board sent word that Mr.
Alromi’s claim would go through expedited processing under a new policy that allows the authorities to
review claims without a hearing for people from Yemen and several other countries. But Mr. Alromi
doesn’t know whether his claim will be accepted. “Waiting is very hard,” he said.
AT// “Climate Refugee” Word PIC
AT: climate refugee word pic – it is the correct term
1. The United States should utilize the term “climate refugee” over other terms such as “environmental
migrant.” The arguments made against utilize “climate refugee” are overall unconvincing. One of the
primary arguments made against “refugee” is that it does not fit within the existing legal framework and
will weaken refugee law. This can easily be disputed, as law can evolve over time to adapt to new
circumstances that did not exist at the time of enactment. Climate refugee does not have to fit within
the same category or follow the exact established refugee convention. The other commonly cited
argument against “climate refugee” is the negative connotations associated with the term “refugee.”
Although these negative connotations do exist, these thinkers do not acknowledge the positive
connotations or negative connotations associated with the term “migrant.” The term “refugee” has the
implication that there is no other option available, whereas “migrant” implies a choice. Whether an
individual is forced to migrate due to their home community being destroyed by rising sea levels, severe
droughts preventing the growth of crops, or any other known impact of climate change, they are doing
so in order to seek “refuge.” To deny an individual the right to claim refuge, despite being unable to
return to their home community, is inherently wrong.
Only the term 'climate refugee' ensures displaced groups receive legitimacy and
protection
Biermann & Boas 10 (Frank Biermann is Professor of Political Science and of Environmental Policy at
VU UniversityAmsterdam and Visiting Professor of Earth System Governance at Lund University,
Sweden. Ingrid Boas is Assistant Professor in Climate Governance at the Environmental Policy Group at
Wageningen University, the Netherlands. Her research particularly focusses on the topic of climate
change-induced migration and climate security. "Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees," https://www-mitpressjournals-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.60//waters)
Some intergovernmental agencies—such as the International Organization for Migration and the Oface
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—prefer the term “environmentally displaced
persons.”15 They reject the term environmental or climate “refugee” because of the legal rights that the
intergovernmental system currently bestows upon “refugees,” that is, persons who cannot avail of the
protection of their home state for fear of (political) persecution. On the other hand, it was an
intergovernmental agency—UNEP— that popularized the term “environmental refugee” in the 1980s.16
In 1992, Agenda 21—the inouential intergovernmental program of action agreed upon by almost all
governments at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environ- ment and Development—also used
the term “environmental refugees” repeatedly.17 The notion of “climate refugees” appears to and
acceptance in some national political debates too. For example, when in opposition, Australia’s Labor
Party proposed an international coalition to accept climate refugees from the Paciac18 in response to
the Australian government’s position that rejected the notion of climate refugees.19 And in 2007
Australia’s Green Party even tabled a Migration Amendment (Climate Refugees) Bill.20 We support the
use of the term climate “refugee” for two main reasons. First, the distinction between transboundary
and internal flight that is a core element of the traditional “refugee” concept does not help much since
climate change will cause both transnational and internal flight. Some island nations will effectively
cease to exist, and some countries, especially those affected by drought, will be overburdened by the
scope of the national predicament. These people will have to findnd refuge outside of their home
country. Some climate refugees might thus cross borders while most will stay within their country. It
seems difficult to argue that a global governance mechanism for their protection should bestow a
different status, and a different term, depending on whether they have crossed a border. Second, we
see no convincing reason to reserve the stronger term “refugee” for a category of people that stood at
the centre of attention after 1945, and to invent less appropriate terms—such as “climate-related
environmentally displaced persons”—for new categories of people who are forced to leave their homes
now, with similar grim consequences. The term refugee has strong moral connotations of societal
protection in most world cultures and religions. By using this term, the protection of climate refugees
will receive the legitimacy and urgency it deserves. In sum, we propose for both the emerging research
program and the political discourse on climate-related migration to define “climate refugees” as people
who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual
alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-
level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity. This deanition covers climate
refugees in both industrialized and developing countries. However, in practical terms only climate
refugees in poorer developing countries will be an issue of international concern, cooperation and
assistance. It is people in developing countries who are most likely to be compelled to leave their homes
and communities, owing to low adaptive capacities, their often vulnerable location vis-à -vis climate
change events, often high population densities, pre-existing hunger and health problems, low level of
per capita income, often weak governance structures, political instability and other factors.21 The
following analysis is thus restricted to climate refugees in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania.
There’s admittedly disagreement about the correct term – but it all basically means
the same thing and debates about the terminology trade off with practical solutions
Due to the lack of legal rights under international law, as well as the fact that concept of climate
refugees has only emerged within the last 30 years, the terminology, narratives, and definitions
surrounding climate refugees is one that is highly discussed. The discussion around “environmental
refugees” primarily began in 1985 with the publication of a paper by El-Hinnawi (Berchin, et al. 2017).
He defined environmental refugees as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional
habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or
triggered by people) that jeopardize their existence and/or seriously affects the quality of their life”
(2017, 148). Throughout the years, multiple authors, such as Renaud et al. in 2007, have proposed three
categories of environmental migration in attempt to create stronger typology (Kraler et al. 2011, 32).
The first category is “environmental emergency migrants.” This includes people who are forced to flee
rapidly in avoidance of an environmental event such as natural disasters. These people typically remain
within their country or are able to return for those who move across borders (2011, 32). The second
category is “environmentally forced migrants.” This category is most strongly relates to climate
refugees, as it refers to people who don’t have an option but to leave their home nation, but typically as
a slower pace than the first category. The y cannot return to their home nation for various reasons such
as rising sea levels, extreme soil degradation, or socio-economic factors (2011, 32). The third category is
“environmentally motivated migrants,” which includes people who preemptively leave their home
nation because of a “constantly deteriorating environment,” but is not necessarily the last option
available to them. This category could be associated with the concept “migration as adaptation” and is
most often driven by socio-economic factors (Kraler et al. 2011, 33). The second and third categories
above are what has been the subject of most discussion in the field. One of the most debated and
critiqued concepts is the usage of the term “refugee” when discussing forced migration. Many claim the
term climate refugee is flawed and adds to socio-political inequality and injustice. Bettini et al. a rgue
that using climate refugee undermines human mobility, is not identifiable because of an inability to
single out an environmental stressor as the cause of a migration, and is not practical within the existing
legal systems (Bettini et al. 2016, 351). Others focusing on legality argue refugee is a “legal misnomer”
that will weaken refugee law if used in this way. The connotations already associated with the term
refugee are also seen as a threat by some thinkers. The conversation around policy could turn to “they”
are dangerous, or “we” are developed (Mayer 2014, 30). The cause of migration does not matter; it’s
the increased number of seeking refuge, which leads to xenophobia and racialization (2014, 31). Kraler
et al. state that for the simple reason of the term refugee being challenged in academic and political
debate, we should adopt a more general term of “environmentally induced migration” (Kraler et al.
2011, 33). In contrast, “climate refugee” has its proponents. Mayer disputes the “legal misnomer”
calling it “a misunderstanding of law as an immutable set of given norms” (Mayer 2014, 30). The 1951
Convention does not claim the exclusive definition of refugee. Legal notions and the interpretations of
different laws are always open to \negotiation. There are so many challenges with creating new
categories of international legal protections, let alone those associated with determining the
environmental causes of migration. The use of refugee would at the very least reduce the many
barriers that would occur before proper legal protections are put in place (2014, 30 -32). Biermann and
Boas also support the term “climate refugee” for similar reasons. As the effects of climate change
become increasingly apparent, such as island nations ceasing to exist, peopl e will have to find refuge
outside of their homes. Seeking refuge already has global mechanisms attached to it and creating new
terminology or statuses for these instances would be inefficient and difficult (Biermann and Boas
2010, 64).
Answering DAs
AT//Wages/Economy DAs
Climate refugees are good for the economy and offset costs – many warrants
Legrain 17 - nior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics' European Institute and founder of OPEN, “Refugees are a Great
Investment”, 3 February 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/03/refugees-are-a-great-
investment/)//abaime
<Refugees are a tiny proportion of the U.S. population — some 3.3 million have been admitted since
1975 — but they have had an outsized impact. Google co-founder Sergey Brin was a child refugee from
the Soviet Union; Google’s parent company, Alphabet, is now America’s second-most valuable firm, with
a market capitalization of $553 billion. WhatsApp co-founder Jan Koum and PayPal co-founder Max
Levchin were refugees from Ukraine. The late Andy Grove, who helped start and was later CEO of Intel,
fled from communist Hungary. So, too, did hedge-fund manager and philanthropist George Soros;
Thomas Peterffy, the founder of Interactive Brokers Group; and Steven Udvar-Hazy, the founder of Air
Lease Corp.
Yet nobody could have guessed when they arrived in the United States that those refugees would be so
successful. Had they been denied entry, nobody would have realized the opportunity that America had
missed. So just imagine what some of the brave Syrians fleeing the barbarism of the Islamic State,
President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime, and the bombing raids ordered by Russian President Vladimir
Putin could go on to achieve in the United States. After all, the biological father of the late Steve Jobs,
the co-founder and legendary CEO of Apple, America’s most valuable company, was a Syrian who fled
his country for political reasons.
People originating from the seven countries on Trump’s blacklist already have contributed a lot to
America. eBay was founded by an Iranian-American, Pierre Omidyar. Its market capitalization of $36.1
billion dwarfs the value of Trump’s unlisted business holdings, while Omidyar’s self-made $8.2 billion
fortune is more than twice as big as Trump’s partly inherited one. Oracle Corp., a software giant worth
$162.2 billion, was co-founded by the late Bob Miner, who was also Iranian-American. While the
communities from the other countries are much smaller and generally more recent, one notable Somali-
American is author and activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, an outspoken critic of both Islamic extremism and
Trump’s anti-Muslim policies.
Of course, not all refugees and immigrants turn out to be exceptionally successful. But prejudice is a
poor predictor of how they will fare. When Vietnamese “boat people” fled their country in the late
1970s and sought refuge elsewhere, they were seen as undesirable and often turned away. Eventually,
many were allowed to settle in America. Most arrived speaking little or no English, with few assets or
relevant job skills. Yet Vietnamese refugees in the United States are now more likely to be employed
than people born in America and have higher average incomes.Vietnamese refugees in the United States
are now more likely to be employed than people born in America and have higher average incomes.
They have also played a key role in building trade and investment links with Vietnam. One notable
entrepreneur is David Tran, who founded Huy Fong Foods. Its main product is Sriracha chili sauce, that
big red bottle you see in every Vietnamese restaurant. Most of what he makes is exported to Asia,
something that Trump ought to approve of, given his obsession with America’s trade balance.
Refugees contribute to the economy in many ways: as workers, entrepreneurs, innovators, taxpayers,
consumers, and investors. Their efforts can help create jobs; raise the productivity and wages of
American workers; increase capital returns; stimulate international trade and investment; and boost
innovation, enterprise, and growth.
Some do low-skilled jobs that Americans spurn, such as working on farms, cleaning offices, and caring
for the elderly. Contrary to fears that they steal jobs, studies show that refugees enable Americans to do
better-paying jobs that they prefer.
Higher-skilled refugees — and their highly educated children — provide valuable talent and boost the
productivity and wages of Americans with complementary skills. For instance, Syrian nurses can help
American doctors provide better care to more patients. Some 28 percent of refugees have a bachelor’s
or advanced degree, the same proportion as people born in the United States. Among the immigrants
on Trump’s banned list, those from Iran, Libya, Syria, and Sudan are more likely to have a degree than
the U.S. average. Many work for leading U.S. businesses, notably in the technology sector, that are now
up in arms about the travel ban.
Whatever their skill level, refugees tend to be highly motivated and work hard to rebuild their lives. At
Chobani, the company that makes America’s leading brand of Greek yogurt, three in 10 employees are
refugees. Chobani founder Hamdi Ulukaya doesn’t just employ them to do good; it also turns out to be
good for the bottom line. Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz’s admirable announcement that the company
plans to hire 10,000 refugees worldwide in the next five years is likely to be financially rewarding, too.
Enterprising refugees start businesses that create wealth, employ locals, boost growth, and stimulate
trade and investment. Like migration itself, starting a business is a risky venture that takes hard work to
make it pay off. For those who arrive in America without contacts or a conventional career, it is a natural
way to get ahead. A study by the Kauffman Foundation found that in 2012, immigrants to the United
States were almost twice as likely to start businesses as people born in America.
Last but not least, newcomers and their children can help spark new ideas and technologies that make
all Americans better off. People uprooted from one culture and exposed to another tend to be more
creative. Moreover, groups with diverse perspectives and experiences — such as refugees and people
born in the United States sparking off each other — tend to outperform like-minded experts at problem
solving, which is what most work these days consists of.
Overall, refugees have a higher employment rate than people born in America. While Iraqis and Somalis
have lower employment rates, they are mostly recent arrivals, and employment rates tend to rise
sharply over time. Refugees who have been in the United States for 20 or more years also have higher
median household incomes than people born in America.
A study by Kalena Cortes of Texas A&M University found that among immigrants who arrived in the
United States between 1975 and 1980, refugees integrated faster than “economic migrants.” Whereas
refugees earned 6 percent less and worked 14 percent fewer hours than economic migrants in 1980, by
1990 they were earning 20 percent more and working 4 percent more hours, notably because in general
they improved their English, skills, and education faster over that period.
Of course, welcoming refugees costs money upfront. But it’s a drop in the ocean: Out of the $3.3 trillion
federal budget in fiscal year 2015, the budget for the refugee resettlement program was $609 million.
That money tends to be spent on local goods and services, benefiting businesses and creating jobs. And
like providing public education to American teenagers, it’s an investment that yields further dividends
once refugees start working.
In fact, investing one dollar in helping refugees get started can yield nearly two dollars in economic
benefits within five years.In fact, investing one dollar in helping refugees get started can yield nearly two
dollars in economic benefits within five years. That’s the key finding of my recent study for OPEN, an
international think tank focused on refugee and other openness issues that I founded, and the Tent
Foundation, whose mission is to help forcibly displaced people.
A study of greater Cleveland found that while $4.8 million was spent on refugee services in 2012,
spending by refugees, refugee-owned businesses, and refugee service organizations boosted the local
economy by $48 million, creating 650 jobs and providing $2.7 million in tax revenues to local and state
governments.
Refugees’ reliance on public assistance declines sharply over time, although it tends to remain higher
than the general population. Even so, refugees tend to be net contributors to public finances over their
lifetimes: Two-thirds of new arrivals are of working age (and thus schooled abroad), on average they are
in their mid-20s (and thus have a full working life ahead of them), and their taxes help service the huge
public debt incurred by the existing U.S. population.>
Leaving climate migrants unaddressed spurs anti-immigration policies and degrades
wages and conditions for unskilled jobs
C. Avoiding "Business as Usual" in the United States
Aside from human rights, there are significant practical justifications for the United States to enact
domestic legislation to address the arrival of climate-displaced populations. First, the country already
has a large population of undocumented immigrants. 170 This has created domestic political turmoil, as
well as a large population that exists without legal rights or protection. 171 The country does not have
the economic resources to process and deport climate migrants if they arrive in numbers approximating
scholarly predictions. 1 72 Next, the fact that climate migrants may be fleeing completely uninhabitable
countries means there may be no logical return country. 173 The subsections that follow will discuss
these justifications for why the United States should enact legislation addressing the legal status of
climate migrants before they arrive.
1. The Undocumented Population and its Impacts
Undocumented climate migrants will cause political and economic disruption in the same manner as
other undocumented immigrants, but on a much larger scale due to their much larger numbers. As
discussed above, the United States immigration policy 1 74 typically tracks periods of domestic
economic conditions and immigration rates. 175 If history provides an accurate model for the future,
large numbers of climate migrants arriving in the United States will significantly impact the country as a
whole, as well as local communities. This may, in turn, spur anti-immigration policies that marginalize
climate migrants. 1 76
The government should try to integrate undocumented immigrants, including climate migrants, for
many reasons. Marginalization imposes costs on the entire economy. The presence of a large,
undocumented labor force in this country tends to degrade wages and conditions for unskilled jobs.
177 This hurts both United States citizens and immigrant populations. On the other hand, studies show
that where immigrants are legally present, their participation in the economy has historically provided
concrete economic benefits for the receiving country. 178 Additionally, although immigrants are often
accused of taking citizens' tax dollars in the form of public welfare benefits, empirical evidence shows
that they do not consume those resources at greater rates than citizens. 179 In fact, Professor Kevin
Johnson points to the European welfare state to suggest that "[r]elatively easy access to benefits for
immigrants in Europe... has not caused unduly negative fiscal impacts." 180 Moreover, access to public
benefits in the United States is often limited to citizens. 181 Thus, the fears that cause the country to
close its borders are misplaced, and the benefits of opening them go unrecognized.
If there are costs to having open borders, there are also substantial costs associated with enforcing
restrictive immigration laws. 182 DHS, charged with enforcing immigration law in the United States,
receives limited financial resources. 183 In fact, President Barack Obama cited budget constraints to
justify exercising prosecutorial discretion for undocumented immigrants that came to the country as
children. 184 An influx of climate migrants that far exceeds current rates of immigration has the
potential to overwhelm the immigration enforcement system. Failing to economically and socially
integrate undocumented immigrants is also likely to impose both economic and social costs by
fracturing communities and creating a "shadow population" of unlawful aliens. 1 85 Society as a whole
suffers the consequences of the existence of this population.18 6 In sum, creating some legal
mechanism to integrate climate migrants before they arrive in the United States will maximize economic
and social benefits to the country while minimizing costs.
2. Dealing with Disappearing Nations
Assuming that the United States declines to enact legislation for climate migrants and continues to rely
on existing immigration law to address this problem, it will face the practical challenge of how to treat
individuals whose homes become uninhabitable due to sea-level rise or other environmental disasters.
18 7 In many cases, the United States will have no logical country to which it could deport climate
migrants. 188 It would be challenging to decide the meaning of "uninhabitable" in this instance. This
Comment would grant Congress that responsibility by suggesting that it should define climate migrant
narrowly and technically. 189 Focusing on an individual or population obviates the need to determine
whether a nation itself is uninhabitable. If these populations benefitted from targeted prosecutorial
discretion or one of the country's other alternatives to refugee status, 190 they would still be subject to
the potential issues outlined in Part II, including the temporary nature of the relief, the lack of access to
public benefits and travel, and the legal hurdle of entering the United States. 191
Moreover, dealing with climate migrants on a case-by-case basis would divide them into several
different legal categories. The resulting complicated, piecemeal approach would lead to confusion for
government officials, employers, and climate migrants themselves as to their legal status, rights, and
obligations. Deporting climate migrants on a case-by-case basis comes with its own problems. Not only
would the United States need to find receiving nations for deportees, but such an approach would
subject it to international human rights criticism. 192 Finally, the government is unlikely to have the
resources to deport climate migrants in large numbers; those who are granted temporary relief would
swell the ranks of an already-large population of undocumented immigrants. 1 93
Moral claims of justice and equal distribution of costs trump nonquantifiable impacts
on wages – economic effects of immigration are negligible
Argument 2
Another common argument against immigration is that immigrants cause economic hardship for existing
citizens in that they take jobs away, depress wages, and cause higher marketplace competition to drive
up prices (Beck 1996). Also, applying the historical principle here sheds a different light on the situation.
Since MDCs have generated their wealth and technological status through fossil fuel combustion, the
whole economy has been financed without taking the entire costs into account. LDCs carry much of
these externalities in the form of destroyed livelihoods resulting from the impacts of climate change. It
appears to be fair to redistribute the externalized costs to the causal agents (MDC markets). The
redistribution process might take the form of slightly increased prices and depressed wages through
higher market competition. This argument does not falsify Beck’s (1996) objection of a potentially
negative economic impact of immigration; rather, his objection is overridden by a more pressing moral
claim of justice and equal distribution of costs, which trumps non-essential economic interests of
citizens.3
Instead of looking at the issue from an egalitarian perspective, proposing the fair redistribution of costs,
we can take a rights based approach. To this end, this paper modifies an interesting scenario originally
presented by Huemer (2010):
Pedro is in desperate need of food since a large swarm of locusts has destroyed his harvest. The locusts
have (noticed or unnoticed) escaped Sam’s barn, who is breeding locusts for sale as food for snakes and
other reptiles to the local zoo. Fortunately, Pedro has a plan to remedy his food problem: he will walk to
the local marketplace, where he will buy bread. Sam is aware of all this and is watching Pedro. Due to his
economic circumstances, Pedro will have to buy the cheapest bread available at the market. Sam’s
daughter, however, also plans to go to the market, slightly later in the day, to buy some of this same
bread. This bread is often in short supply, so that the vendor may run out after Pedro’s purchase. Sam’s
daughter could buy more expensive bread, but she would prefer not to. Knowing all this, Sam fears that
if Pedro is allowed to go to the market, his daughter will be forced to pay a slightly higher price for
bread. To prevent this from happening, he accosts Pedro and physically restrains him from traveling to
the market. Pedro returns home empty-handed, where he dies of starvation.
In this scenario the marketplace is the territory of the U.S. The main actors are Pedro, the poor Mexican
farmer who has lost his livelihood, and Sam, representing the U.S. population and government. Pedro’s
livelihood destruction results from an environmental force (the locusts) representing climate change
which can be causally linked to the economic activities of Sam. Sam’s action of actively preventing Pedro
from entering the marketplace is exemplary of strict U.S. border control. Even without the causal link to
Pedro’s harvest failure, Huemer (2010:432) concludes that Sam’s behavior is extremely wrong since it
constitutes “harmful coercion.” The causal link to Pedro’s plight makes the case even stronger. But could
Sam’s action be excused, since it was necessary to protect his daughter from economic disadvantage?
Certainly not! Slight economic disadvantages can never justify preventing Pedro from reaching a place of
livelihood security, especially if Sam is responsible for Pedro’s livelihood insecurity.4
In addition to this moral argument, there is some ambiguity regarding immigrants’ economic impact.
While some authors have argued that immigration might reduce labor market opportunities of less
skilled natives (e.g., Borjas 2001), the general opinion among migration scholars seems to be that the
overall economic effects of immigration are negligible (Simon 1999, Card 2004, Hanson 2009, Holzer
2011).
AT//USCIS DA
Link-turn—deporting climate migrants causes clog—the aff reverses that
DeGanaro 15- Cary DeGanaro- Executive Office for Immigration Review, University of Colorado School of Law,
“LOOKING INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND”,
2015, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ucollr86&id=1073, // Suraj P
Assuming that the United States declines to enact legislation for climate migrants and continues to rely
on existing immigration law to address this problem, it will face the practical challenge of how to treat
individuals whose homes become uninhabitable due to sea-level rise or other environmental disasters.
18 7 In many cases, the United States will have no logical country to which it could deport climate
migrants. 188 It would be challenging to decide the meaning of "uninhabitable" in this instance. This
Comment would grant Congress that responsibility by suggesting that it should define climate migrant
narrowly and technically. 189 Focusing on an individual or population obviates the need to determine
whether a nation itself is uninhabitable. If these populations benefitted from targeted prosecutorial
discretion or one of the country's other alternatives to refugee status, 190 they would still be subject to
the potential issues outlined in Part II, including the temporary nature of the relief, the lack of access to
public benefits and travel, and the legal hurdle of entering the United States. 191 Moreover, dealing
with climate migrants on a case-by-case basis would divide them into several different legal categories.
The resulting complicated, piecemeal approach would lead to confusion for government officials,
employers, and climate migrants themselves as to their legal status, rights, and obligations. Deporting
climate migrants on a case-by-case basis comes with its own problems. Not only would the United
States need to find receiving nations for deportees, but such an approach would subject it to
international human rights criticism. 192 Finally, the government is unlikely to have the resources to
deport climate migrants in large numbers; those who are granted temporary relief would swell the ranks
of an already-large population of undocumented immigrants.
Answering Critiques
No Root Cause
There is no single explanation for climate migration – totalizing assertions are
reductionist and close doors on victims
Hall ’17 – Shane Donnelly is a doctoral candidate from the University of Oregon in Environmental
Science and English-Focalization, “War by Other Means: Environmental Violence in the 21st Century,”
ProQuest Dissertation Publishing // shurst
The construct of the forced climate migrant, or the closely-affiliated notion of the climate refugee, is a
paradigmatic and prominent figure within climate change discourses. Such a claim requires a few
terminological caveats in the service of clarity and concision before I proceed to describe what
paradigms climate migrants instantiate. Strictly speaking, there are no climate refugees. A refugee is
someone with or seeking a legal protection governed by the 1951 Geneva Convention. Under the UN’s
definition, a refugee is “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution,
war, or violence” (“What is a Refugee?”). Someone who flees their country of origin due to changing
climate conditions in that country (or less commented on, conditions within the country being migrated
to) are not currently recognized as refugees. As the one report of the UN Secretary General on the
security implications of climate change unequivocally states: “Although terms such as “environmental
refugee” or “climate change refugee” are commonly used, they have no legal basis” (UN Secretary
General 2009). Beyond legalistic ambiguity, there is wide uncertainty within academic literature
regarding the actual number of climate migrants, and even the ontology of climate migrants and
refugees. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report estimates anywhere 157 between 50 and 350 million
people may be displaced by climate change in 2050, while Richard Black, an analyst for the UNHCR,
published a report on the 51st anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention lambasting the focus of
policymakers on environmental refugees as a category of migrants in need of additional legal
protections. Regarding the existence of climate migrants, Black writes, “despite the breadth of examples
provided in the literature, the strength of the academic case put forward is often depressingly weak” (2).
There are so many complex forces that cause people to move, it is perhaps too difficult or too reductive
to single out environmental change as the dominant cause of mass migrations. Black’s analysis,
however, is confined to studies of more contemporary cases of mass migrations; Takeyyuki Tsuda and
Brenda Baker synthesize numerous studies in archeology and bioarcheology to argue that
environmental disruptions have powered human migration for millennia, and that contemporary
migrations are also motivated or hindered by environmental change, a position endorsed by the UN
Secretary General (297-298, 2009). Andrew Baldwin separates the academic literature of climate
migrants into the “maximalists” and the “minimalists,” two camps that take generally opposing positions
on the phenomenon of climate migration. In general, the maximalists see climate change or other
environmental changes as major contributors or direct catalysts of international migration and the
creation of internally displaced peoples (IDPs), while the minimalists see climate change as a relatively
minor contributor within a larger collection of “push” and “pull” factors governing migration in and
between nation states (Baldwin “Securitizing climate migration…” 121-122). Like Black and Baldwin, I
place myself in the minimalist camp, yet nonetheless argue that climate migrants as constructs, as
figures in climate narratives, carry forward major weight not 158 only in UN refugee policy circles, but
also in climate discourse and security discourse more broadly.45
Permutation
Failure to accept climate migrants is a form of western securitization and
neoliberalism against “inferior” nations – the aff reverses this
Dalby ’15 – Simon Dalby is an academic and CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at
the Balsillie School of International Affairs, July 2015, “Climate geopolitics: Securing the global
economy,” https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1057/ip.2015.3 // shurst
Indeed it is the failure to respond effectively and the increasingly alarming projections from climate
sciences concerning what is coming that have made security agencies pay attention to climate matters
(Anderson and Bows, 2011). Faced with long-term changes and required to think about strategic threats
to the integrity of states, security planners have been generating technical reports and projection of the
risks to states and directly to military infrastructure too over the last few years. The focus on climate has
revived the earlier discussions of environmental security (Dalby, 2002) and added an immediacy and
urgency to addressing these issues (Floyd and Matthew, 2013). Dalby 438 © 2015 Macmillan Publishers
Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 52, 4, 426–444 Once again the arguments were that political
instability in the global South would be caused by environmental change, and fear of hordes of refugees
in motion to the North were assumed to present crises that the military might be called upon to ‘solve’.
Much of this discussion in the US was focused on tropes of national security, asking questions about
what climate change would do to American interests and how the American military would be called
on to act (Chalecki, 2013). The danger here is that traditional rhetoric of national security will be
invoked to specify poor, marginal and endangered populations as a threat to stability that requires
military interventions to stop migration or deal with local violence deemed a security threat. Insecurity
‘over there’ might spill over boundaries and disrupt trade or threaten regimes unable to handle the
influx. Climate migration is on the policy agenda (White, 2011). It is important to emphasize that there
is little serious research that suggests that environmental scarcities will lead to war, whatever social
vulnerabilities might occur and however frequently neo-Malthusian fears are reproduced in media
accounts of imminent catastrophe (Theisen et al, 2011)! Dealing with humanitarian crises, especially in
the Asia-Pacific theater, is a growing concern for Pentagon planners (Briggs, 2012), given the
vulnerability of many island states to both rising sea levels and increased typhoon intensity. These
events might cause political instabilities that generate conflict too. But in the case of many island states
their inundation is a problem that needs urgent attention, and migration is going to continue to be
necessary; this is an existential threat to island states but one that has not generated much international
sympathy despite repeated calls to understand this as a security threat. This is a matter of survival for
low lying atoll states, a new matter of ‘national’ security as states face the prospect of obliteration by
rising sea water.
Negative
Note
The aff admits to the United States millions of refugees without any regard to their skill level or anything
else. DA links, K links, CP solvency arguments from case negatives to affirmatives that are similarly silent
on immigrant qualifications (travel ban, open borders, etc.) all apply here as well. If preparing your own
case negative against this aff, I would recommend starting with the materials below but supplementing
them with evidence from other files.
Case
Squo Solves
There are sufficient global legal protections for refugees – US not key
Zeghbib 18 Hocine Zeghbib is a Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Montpellier (Hocine,
“What protection is there for ‘climate refugees’?” 2/5/18, https://progressivepost.eu/protection-
climate-refugees/) // SR
Global warming and environmental degradation are leading to the forced relocation of millions of
people, which, for ease of reference we shall refer to as ‘climate refugees’. Should substantive law,
which is unsuitable to protect them, be amended, be totally reconstructed or replaced with pragmatic
solutions?
Proven inapplicability of international law
The Geneva Convention on refugees is not applicable to the situation involving ‘climate refugees’, as
demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 2015. As such, is it appropriate
for the Convention to be amended, as argued by certain NGOs and as was reiterated without success at
COP 23? That would amount to opening Pandora’s box. So is the solution to prepare a specific
convention? If a specific convention is deemed appropriate how should the scope of such an instrument
be defined? Do we refer to the people as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘environmentally displaced persons’? In
short, the United Nations and their partners around the world now favour a regional approach to the
issue and are abandoning the purely legal approach. The New York Declaration that has been weakened
by the recent U-turn by the United States is an illustration of this.
Collaborative Research Solutions
The Nansen Initiative, strongly supported by the European Commission, seeks to meet the basic needs
of ‘refugees’ by guaranteeing the right to personal integrity and to the family unit; the rights of the
child; the reconstitution of civil status; the qualifications of people, etc. The 2015 agenda established,
inter alia, mechanisms for cooperation between states within the same region, encouraged the
development of emergency planning, the relocation of populations, the issuance of appropriate
movement (travel) visas and temporary residence permits. Limits: non-binding text applicable only to
persons crossing at least one border.
The Kampala Convention, offers a unique solution that aims to prevent and prepare for displacement in
Africa: the Convention seeks to create and implement early warning systems, disaster risk reduction
strategies, contingency measures and disaster management plans. The Convention is binding and
encompasses all known causes of forced displacement including armed conflicts. Its limitation is that
only internally displaced persons are referred to in the Convention.
On the European side, a motion for a resolution has been put forward that requires the Commission to
draft “criteria that clearly defines climate refugee status”. The own-initiative report that would trigger
the required procedure before Parliament is still missing.
Unilateral Research Solutions

Norway, Sweden, Finland: a secondary protection may be granted to persons resident overseas in
circumstances where they are unable to return to their country of residence due to an environmental
catastrophe. Denmark provides the same protection for women. These measures are rarely applied.
In the United States, the “Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) provides protection for residents and
nationals of countries affected by wars, conflict or natural disasters, including Sudan, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Somalia, Haiti and provides them with said protection until such time as they can
return to their country of residence. As a unique protection specific to “climate refugees”, the TPS has
faced criticism from the Trump administration and has already been revoked for nationals from Haiti,
and will in time be revoked for nationals from Honduras (2018) and Nicaragua (2019).
New Zealand which has previously developed bilateral agreements with Tuvalu on quota-based
immigration is now considering creating a specific visa for ‘climate refugees’. Is this a real breakthrough
or simply a rediscovery of the ‘humanitarian visa’?
Forced displacement and relocation of millions of people; inadequate legal protection; regional
solutions which prove to be ineffectual and unable to cope: “…significant reparations can be achieved by
the law: we, or more accurately, our children should have hope, for the future is not forbidden to
anyone” (L. Gambetta), even less so to ‘climate refugees’.
Status Quo solves – New Zealand will act as a model to other countries
Adele Peters, 11-8-2017, a staff writer at Fast Company who focuses on solutions to some of the
world's largest problems, from climate change to homelessness, There Will Soon Be Floods of Climate
Refugees: Will They Get Asylum? Fast Company, https://www.fastcompany.com/40491897/there-will-
soon-be-floods-of-climate-refugees-will-they-get-asylum //Frese
In 2012, a migrant worker from the tiny, low-lying Pacific island nation of Kiribati tried to become a
refugee in New Zealand, arguing that he and his family were afraid to go home because of the impacts
of rising sea levels. The courts didn’t accept that the dangers were imminent–or that they were due to
reasons of persecution that are outlined in the international refugee convention–and rejected his claim.
But people fleeing the effects of climate change on Pacific islands may soon have a new option: New
Zealand’s new climate change minister hopes to create an experimental humanitarian visa for “climate
refugees.”
“There’s a conversation just beginning in New Zealand, with the change of government, that makes lots
of things that didn’t feel possible before now at least open for discussion,” says Vivien Maidaborn,
executive director of UNICEF New Zealand, who has advocated for support for people in neighboring
countries who may soon be forced to move.
If implemented, the new visa category could give up to 100 people a year admission to New Zealand
because of climate change. (Because the potential visa is in the early stages of planning, it’s not yet clear
what the requirements will be to get one.) It’s an early attempt to begin to address migration that will
soon happen on a much larger scale. In Kiribati alone, climate change is likely to cause problems not
only because some villages are submerged; saltwater is already affecting drinking water supplies and the
ability to grow food. As ocean water acidifies, local coral reefs could suffer, affecting the supply of fish.
Diseases, like dengue fever, could become more common. Similar problems will play out across other
island countries.
By 2050 hundreds of millions of people around the world–or, by some estimates, as many as 1 billion–
could be displaced because of environmental problems, such as drought and flooding, that are made
worse by climate change. Some people will move within countries. In the U.S., for example, an entire
community living on an island in Southern Louisiana is being relocated to higher ground within the state.
But many will be forced to cross borders.
It may be unlikely that people forced to move because of climate change will ever be recognized as
refugees under international law, which requires someone to prove persecution based on politics,
religion, or other aspects of identity (though people who are official refugees aren’t afforded particularly
good treatment, either). Climate change is indiscriminate. But a growing number of countries may do
something similar to New Zealand.
New Zealand’s possible new visa isn’t completely unprecedented; some other countries already have
“humanitarian visa” categories that have been used to respond to particular disasters. After the 2010
earthquake in Haiti, Brazil created a policy to temporarily accept Haitian immigrants. Argentina and
Peru have created similar categories for people affected by disasters.
“This notion of humanitarian visas, legal pathways, and temporary protection are policy options that we
are encouraging states to use,” says Atle Solberg, head of the coordination unit of the international
Platform on Disaster Displacement.
There are challenges, at least with the policies that have existed to date in places like Brazil. “These
categories are not really designed for the long haul, and for durable, lasting solutions,” he says. “That is
particularly relevant if you think of some of the more negative effects in developing states. Let’s say it
won’t be possible to return, and people will need to permanently leave some of these areas–then these
tools may come up short in terms of the need for permanent solutions.” But if multiple countries create
new pathways for migration, and begin to coordinate regionally, Solberg says that he thinks “it would go
a long way” to help both in short-term crises and in the longer term.
In New Zealand, Maidaborn argues that the country could benefit from letting more people migrate. “I
don’t want to fall into the trap of thinking that people from Pacific nations who are really threatened by
climate change are victims,” she says. “A lot of world leadership has gone on from the Pacific around
climate action . . . I think there’s lot of expertise, a lot of thinking and development and action, that’s
gone on in the Pacific because it’s had to have gone on, and all that learning can be very applicable
here.”
She believes that more countries will follow New Zealand’s example. “I think as a world, we’re going to
see in much more material terms that our earth is a closed system . . . We sort of pretended that they’re
all separate systems, and we’re coming very much face-to-face with the idea that it’s all connected. The
solution will resolve us to act in an interconnected way.”
Status quo solves – international cooperation on migration is on the rise
Momentum has accelerated for enhanced international cooperation on migration. In September 2016,
the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which
affirmed the human rights of migrants and refugees, condemning xenophobia, and committing to a new
framework for comprehensive refugee responses.18 The General Assembly also agreed to bring the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) into the UN system, which previously had lacked a
designated agency for migration, although an opportunity was missed because IOM was denied a norm-
setting role in the rights of migrants.19 The New York Declaration also committed to a two-year
negotiation process for a Global Compact for Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees.
Alt Causes / Climate Change not Key
There are many alt-causes to migration – price, political issues, language, ethnicity,
religion and education
Hildegard Bedarff and Cord Jakobeit, 5/2017, Center for Research on the Environment and
Development, University of Hamburg Faculty of Business Economics and Social Sciences, The University
of Hamburg, https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/20170524-greenpeace-
studie-climate-change-migration-displacement-engl.pdf //Frese
2.2. Households and individuals decide whether to stay or leave
The reasons for flight and migration are complex. Researchers have shown that migration is usually
based on decisions made by households and individuals who are influenced in turn by many (often
interconnected) push and pull factors.16 These decisions are often not voluntary, but attempts to
ensure survival, escape extreme poverty, to live in dignity, or flee from violence, persecution and war. In
some African states, entire villages will pool the means for travel and decide together which member of
the village should migrate to later support the community with remittances, invitations for visa
applications, and the like. It is almost impossible for the individuals selected to oppose this collective
decision because they and their families would otherwise become isolated in the community.
The diagram illustrates the complexity of decisions regarding migration. Factors on three different levels
influence the decision to stay or leave. At the macro-level, changes in politics, economics, society,
environment, demographics and land use, as well as conflicts and war, play a role. Although each of
these factors can be the most important driver of migration, people often decide to leave their home or
stay when changes in several of these areas coincide. Changes in one area affect other areas, potentially
causing the overall situation of inhabitants to greatly deteriorate (or improve). If climate change
continues to advance, worsening or even destroying the livelihoods of more and more people, it will
become a more significant factor. Of key importance, of course, is whether the targeted region or
country will even permit entry and residence.
Specific contexts (meso-level in the diagram) also contribute to decisions on migration. Social networks
in the homeland and in the diaspora can act both as drivers or inhibitors of migration. Agencies for
recruiting workers outside the region simplify migration. Measures to adapt to climate change, such as
local protection programs against hurricanes/cyclones or floods, and aid for post-disaster construction,
can persuade people to stay or return. Not least, the costs of migration are crucial for deciding whether
people can undertake the journey at all.
Poverty can be a driver of, or an obstacle to migration. The search for better livelihoods motivates
people to migrate, but poor people in particular do not often have the financial means to do so. On the
micro-level, it is not only prosperity/poverty and individual goals that play a role, but many other factors
as well, such as language, ethnicity, religion, age, gender and education. The extent to which decision
makers are informed about dangers, risks and opportunities is also of great importance. Many migrants
and communities sending off a village member do not seem to know how dangerous it is to cross the
Sahara and the Mediterranean, and how radically Europe is closing its doors to refugees. Research based
on interviews has shown that island inhabitants in the South Pacific are not necessarily well-informed
about the consequences of climate change. To be able to plan their lives, it is essential that islanders be
aware that sea levels will continue to rise. To fill this gap in knowledge, Fiji has now introduced climate
change as a subject at school.
Climate changes doesn’t correlate with more refugees – political stability is the
primary reason
Mark Maslin, 6-12-2018, A Professor ff Earth System Science At University College London And
Founding Director Of Rezatec Ltd, A U.K.-Based Geospatial Data Analytics Company, Undark,
https://undark.org/article/climate-change-migrations-conflict/ //Frese
THE DARFUR CONFLICT began as an ecological crisis”, wrote the then-UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon
back in 2007, about an ongoing war which arose, he said, “at least in part from climate change.” Since
then the idea that climate change has caused and will cause human conflict and mass migrations has
become more and more accepted — just look at the claimed effects of droughts in Syria and Ethiopia.
The media has even started using terms such as “climate refugees” and “environmental migrants” to
describe people fleeing their homes from these climate-driven conflicts. But it isn’t clear whether there
is much evidence for this link between climate change and conflict — there certainly seems to be no
consensus within the academic literature.
In our recent paper, my student Erin Owain and I decided to test the climate-conflict hypothesis, using
East Africa as our focus. The region is already very hot and very poor, making it especially vulnerable to
climate change (in fact neighbouring Chad is by some measures the single most vulnerable country in
the world).
As the planet warms, East Africa’s seasonal rains are expected to become much more unpredictable.
This is a particular problem as recent economic development has been concentrated in agriculture, a
highly climate-sensitive sector that accounts for more than half of the entire economy in countries like
Ethiopia or Sudan. One study led by the European Commission found that declining rainfall over the past
century may have reduced GDP across Africa by 15-40 percent compared with the rest of the developing
world.
East Africa also has a long history of conflict and human displacement, which persists in some countries
to this day, such as the civil wars in Sudan and Somalia. The UN Refugee Agency reports there were
more than 20 million displaced people in Africa in 2016 — a third of the world’s total. The World Bank
predicts this could rise up to 86 million by 2050 due to climate change.
To test the climate-conflict hypothesis, Erin and I therefore focused on the 10 main countries in East
Africa. We used a new database that records major episodes of political violence and number of total
displaced people for the past 50 years for each of the 10 countries. We then statistically compared these
records both at a country and a regional level with the appropriate climatic, economic, and political
indicators.
We found that climate variations such as regional drought and global temperature did not significantly
impact the level of regional conflict or the number of total displaced people. The major driving forces
on conflict were rapid population growth, reduced or negative economic growth and instability of
political regimes. Numbers of total displaced people were linked to rapid population growth and low or
stagnating economic growth.
The evidence from East Africa is that no single factor can fully explain conflict and the displacement of
people. Instead, conflict seems to be linked primarily to long-term population growth, short-term
economic recessions and extreme political instability. Halvard Buhaug, a professor at the Peace
Research Institute Oslo, looked at the same questions in 2015 and his study reached much the same
conclusion: sociopolitical factors were more important than climate change.
Things were different for “refugees,” however — those displaced people who were forced to cross
borders between countries. Refugee numbers were related to the usual demographic and socio-
economic factors. But in contrast to total displaced people and occurrence of conflict, variations in
refugee numbers were found to be related significantly to the incidence of severe regional droughts.
And these droughts can in turn be linked to a long-term drying trend ascribed to anthropogenic climate
change.
However, it is important to consider the counterfactual: had there been slower population growth,
stronger economies and more stable political regimes, would these droughts still have led to more
refugees? That’s beyond the scope of our study, which may not be a definitive test of the links between
climate change and conflict. But the occurrence of peaks in both conflict and displaced people in the
1980s and 1990s across East Africa suggest that decolonization and the end of the Cold War could have
been key issues.
Nonetheless, while conflict has decreased across the region since the end of the Cold War, the number
of displaced people remains high. We argue that with good stable governance there is no reason why
climate change should lead to greater conflict or displacement of people, despite the World Bank’s dire
predictions. Water provides one reason to be optimistic. The UN reports that, over the past 50 years,
there have been 150 international water resource treaties signed compared to 37 disputes that involved
violence.
What our study suggests is the failure of political systems is the primary cause of conflict and
displacement of large numbers of people. We also demonstrate that within socially and geopolitically
fragile systems, climate change may potentially exacerbate the situation particularly with regards to
enforced migration.
Climate change doesn’t cause conflict

Kita et. al 18 (Stern Mwakalimi, Research student in Geography at the University of Sussex,
Environmental migration and international political security from: Routledge Handbook of
Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 358-359//waters)
Using similar datasets from similar geographical locations, other scholars have found no link between
environmental change and conflict. Using an event coincidence analysis, Schleussnera et al. (2016)
found that 23% of outbreaks of conflicts in countries with highly fractionalised ethnic groups coincide
robustly with climatic disasters such as heat waves and droughts. They also found a 9% global coincident
rate of armed conflict outbreak and occurrence of natural disasters. However, it is important to note
that their study does not show any evidence of armed conflicts being directly triggered by climate-
related disasters, but simply an occasional and infrequent temporal coincidence. In a study on the link
between environmental scarcity and conflict in 39 Sub-Saharan countries, Bell and Keys (2016) identified
three socio-political conditions that explain the link between environmental scarcity and civil conflict:
social vulnerability, unequal resource distribution and the capacity of the state. Noteworthy is that the
study found no evidence that drought increases the risk of armed conflict in fragile states, even those
where socio-political conditions favour conflict outbreak. A study by Hegre et al. (2016) found no
significant effect of temperature anomalies on the risk of conflict, but the authors did suggest that
climate change may lead to low socioeconomic growth that may lead to further conflict. This could also
affect investment in climate change adaptation and mitigation, especially in low-income countries. In a
study on Sub-Saharan Africa, Buhaug et al. (2015) analysed data on climate variability, food production
and conflict over a 50-year period and found no effect of food production shocks on the likelihood of
conflict, dispelling the position that harvest failure and bad weather conditions contribute to violence in
Africa. They argue that political and socioeconomic factors such as corruption, market failures and
government policies better explain occurrence of civil unrest in times of food crisis. Investigating the
possibility that climate affects conflict risk through economic challenges, van Weezel (2013) studied
rainfall and conflict patterns between 1981 and 2010 in Sub- Saharan Africa and concluded that there is
no robust link between rainfall failure, an important determinant of crop failure in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and conflict onset, directly or indirectly. A study by Ayana et al. (2016) focused on pastoralists in East
Africa, and found that livelihood stresses due to rainfall and forage yields fail to predict the occurrence
and location of conflicts. Bergholt and Lujala (2012) have demonstrated that even the indirect link
between climate change and conflict is suspect. The authors used historical data for the period 1980–
2007 to show that severe and frequent climate-induced disasters create income shocks and affect Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth of affected countries, but do not lead to conflict outbreaks directly or
indirectly. Many studies result in counterclaims by other scholars, with the ensuing debates often
centering on data and methods. For example, when Burke et al. (2009) claimed that Sub-Saharan African
temperature increases contributed to conflict outbreak in the region, Buhaug (2010) questioned the
veracity of such claims given the restricted time period used in the study by Burke and colleagues (the
years 1981–2002), and suggested that the study used a purposefully narrow definition of conflicts, and
other methodological oddities. Buhaug therefore reached an opposite conclusion: climate change and
variability are poor predictors of conflicts in Africa. After recalibrating their models, Burke and
colleagues found that the purported relationship vanished, and accepted that their earlier results were
wrong (Aldhous, 2010). In another study, Hsiang and Burke (2014: 42) examined 50 quantitative studies
and found “strong support for a causal association between climatological changes and conflict across a
range of geographies, a range of different time periods, a range of spatial scales and across climatic
events of different duration.”This led them to presume that the ‘climate security’ was firmly based in
evidence. In response, Buhaug et al. (2014) identified three challenges with the study: across-study
independence, causal homogeneity and sample representativeness. They employed the same method,
but were not able to replicate the original results on climate change and conflicts using the same cases
used by Hsiang and Burke (2014).
Solvency Takeouts
The US doesn’t solve – hurricanes and poor infrastructure mean EDPs will be affected
here too.
Orrin H. Pilkey et al. November 2017-- Orrin H. Pilkey is James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Division of
Earth and Ocean Sciences, at Duke University. Linda Pilkey-Jarvis is a geologist at the Washington State
Department of Ecology, where she helps manage the state's oil-spills program. Keith C. Pilkey is an
administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. ["Retreat from a Rising Sea", Accessible
Online at: https://cup.columbia.edu/book/retreat-from-a-rising-sea/9780231168441] @ AG
What is to be done with the many hundreds of miles of high-rises jammed up against the sea around the
world, most spectacularly in Florida? To move all these buildings is not economically feasible, but even if
they could be moved, a suitable place for them would be difficult to find. One could build seawalls that
would have to enclose the islands completely and grow bigger and higher with time, but these would
destroy the very beaches that drew the construction in the first place. Preserving beaches for future
generations is a compelling reason to retreat in response to sea-level rise. As former Florida governor
Bob Graham asserted, “This generation doesn’t have the right to destroy the next generation’s
beaches.” So for the sake of our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, we don’t have the right to build
beach-destroying seawalls to save our beachfront buildings from sea-level rise.
We can’t begin to replenish (i.e., pump or truck in new sand) all of Florida’s beaches. Furthermore, much
of Florida’s beachfront development is on permeable rock through which water will rise and flood
behind seawalls or levees. Replacing cars with small boats might work until the waves from big storms
roll through the community. Demol- ishing the high-rises would cost a fortune and produce a vast
amount of water pollution, although modern demolition techniques could salvage and recycle large
portions of the building materials. Thus, by the latter half of this century, much of the beachfront high-
rise problem will be in our laps to solve.
We humans find it hard to grasp the magnitude of changes that are under way, especially when the
deniers try to confuse us. Sea- level rise is at the forefront of the expected changes, and if the higher
estimates of sea-level rise rates are valid, a true global human catastrophe by the end of this century is
in the offing. Our perception of what is permanent or lasting will be challenged, even though nothing is
happening with regard to the sea level that hasn’t happened before in the geologic past. The recent
disasters intensified by rising seas are not random events without underlying causes. Indeed, climate
changes, including the frequency of extreme events, have advanced to the point that we can no longer
predict future events based partly on what has happened in the past.
Even events on the scale of Hurricane Sandy rarely result in immediate significant changes in coastal
development patterns. In the 1980s, many coastal planners and scientists were saying that if just one
more hurricane hit, surely things would change, and we would start moving back from the beachfront
and prohibit further construction in these extremely dangerous areas. Then along came Hurricane
Hugo in 1989, and the idea of responding sensibly to the storm to prevent damage from the next
inevitable storm was tabled.
At the time, South Carolina had a law that any beach house destroyed in a storm could not be replaced.
This law was perhaps the most merciful and politically least controversial way to begin a retreat from
the beach. But influential citizens with damaged houses howled, and the rules were changed so that if
you could find the roof of your house, you could rebuild! When the dust cleared, Hurricane Hugo had
become an urban-renewal project with many mom-and-pop cottages replaced by “McMansions” and
even some high-rise condos. Several other post-Hugo hurricanes in the southeastern United States also
proved to be urban-renewal projects when they should have been opportunities to retreat. These
urban-renewal projects also have effectively priced out lower-income residents from the coast.
The aff fails – not quick enough, broadening refugees undermines funding and allow
renegotiation to dilute obligations
W. H. 3-6-2018, writer for the Economist, Why climate migrants do not have refugee status,
Economist, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/06/why-climate-migrants-
do-not-have-refugee-status //Frese
EACH morning, as the tide recedes, the people of the Marshall Islands check the walls that protect their
homes from the sea. Sea levels in this part of the western Pacific are rising by 12mm a year—four times
the global average—and countering them with sandbags, concrete and metal is a Sisyphean task. Eight
islands in nearby Micronesia have been swallowed by the ocean in recent decades, and most of the
Marshall Islands could follow by the end of the century. Here and elsewhere on the world’s fringes, the
apocalyptic consequences of climate change have become reality. Many people will be forced to find
new places to live. Forecasts vary, but one widely cited study, from the United Nations University,
suggests that there will be 200m environmental migrants by 2050. Both migrants fleeing environmental
disaster and those escaping war will be constrained in their choices. But currently only the latter may
seek refugee status, and with it the right to safe asylum. Why?
On the surface, the problem is bureaucratic. Environmental migrants are not covered by the 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is designed to protect those fleeing
persecution, war or violence. The UN agencies most involved in refugee rights, the UN Refugee Agency
(UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme, agree that the term “climate refugee” should not be
used to describe those displaced for environmental reasons. The UNHCR already struggles to provide
adequate support for the world’s 22.5m refugees (from war and persecution). During the Syrian refugee
crisis, it admitted to being “stretched to the limit”. If the UNHCR broadens its definition of “refugee” to
support an entirely new category, it is unclear if the political appetite exists to provide the necessary
funding.
Nina Birkeland, senior adviser for disasters and climate change at the Norwegian Refugee Council, says
that the process of renegotiating the existing refugee treaty or creating a new one could take decades.
Experts also worry that political opportunists, who regard the current refugee convention as being too
generous, would use its renegotiation as an opportunity to dilute current obligations. Perhaps more
importantly, some of those affected do not want to be called “refugees”. The former president of the
central Pacific nation of Kiribati, Anote Tong, resisted the label, stressing that his people wished to
“migrate with dignity”. Slowly unfolding disasters brought about by rising sea levels, desertification and
droughts result in complex and often gradual patterns of movement. Their victims resist easy
classification.
At the same time, New Zealand is set to become the first country to recognise the impact of climate
change as grounds for a claim of asylum. The prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, has plans to create a
special visa for Pacific Islanders forced to relocate because of rising sea levels. Though the scheme will
only offer 100 visas annually, it sets a precedent. Indeed state-led solutions offer the best hope for such
refugees. The Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), launched in 2016 by a coalition of national
governments, will encourage countries to assist these migrants despite the lack of legal recognition of
their plight. It builds on a “Protection Agenda” that 109 countries endorsed in 2015, and aims to
integrate its principles into national laws. The PDD’s reach is more limited than that of the UN agencies.
It cannot create new global legal standards. But supporters argue that it provides the most effective way
to organise the necessary resources. With climate change set to cause new waves of migration, states
cannot implement new rules quickly enough.
The US has it’s own climate issues – the plan would exacerbate them
Pilkey et al 16 – professor of Earth and Ocean science at Duke, geologist in the State of Washington’s Department of Ecology, and
professor of mechanical engineering at Queen’s Univesity (Orrin, Linda, and Keith respectively, “Coastal Calamaties”, “Retreat from a rising
sea”, 2 May 2016)//abaime
Other flat, low-lying stretches of land next to the sea include the northeastern corner of mainland North
Carolina, which is one of three areas in the lower 48 states most threatened by sea-level rise. The
Mississippi Delta and South Florida are the other two areas with this distinction. The mainland behind
the Outer Banks of North Carolina is a broad, flat, swampy area (including the Great Dismal Swamp)
surrounding Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. Compared with the residents of the barrier islands facing
the sea, the mainland folks are, on average, less prosperous, less visible, less educated, and less
influential in the North Carolina political scene. Probably more than 100 small towns, some consisting of
a few houses and usually a church, are located there, and many have an elevation of less than 5 feet.
Some of the larger towns include Manteo (population 1,340), Manns Harbor (821), Elizabeth City
(18,470), Swan Quarter (324), Bath (247), Aurora (520), Washington (9,744), Columbia (863), and
Plymouth (4,107). In 2011, the Category 1 Hurricane Irene affected much of the area, flooding the lower
portions of most of these towns and inundating almost all of Manteo. As usual, the news media in North
Carolina concentrated on Irene’s damage to the buildings on the barrier islands on the Outer Banks and
almost ignored the detrimental effects on the mainland villages. In 2010, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) gave North Carolina a $5 million grant to map the northeastern corner of
the state, including maps of the predicted storm-surge levels with various sea-level rise scenarios of 1.5
feet, 3 feet, and 5 feet likely to occur by the year 2100. This kind of information is critical to community
planners, to individuals building or buying houses with the hope of eventually leaving them to their
children, and also to industry scouts seeking new locations for businesses and factories. Unfortunately,
fearing the impact on real-estate prices and local economies, the state government prohibited the
publication of the storm-surge maps, which now sit in a drawer in a cabinet in someone’s office. This
reckless, irresponsible act by the state government lost it a critical opportunity to begin considering its
options, including planning a gradual retreat from one of North America’s areas most threatened by sea-
level rise.
Climate refugees are impossible to define -- other factors contribute to migration

Wyman 13 (Katrina Miriam, Professor of Law at NYU School of Law, Responses to Climate Migration,
https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/helr37&id=211, pg. 200-
202//waters)
In addition to the moral qualms that we may have about designing a new binding legal instrument to
assist solely climate migrants, any proposal for such an instrument also presents practical problems. As
mentioned above, it may be difficult in practice to identify persons who migrate due to climate change
because migration decisions are typically the result of several factors. 66 While the environment may
influence migration decisions, environmental considerations are rarely the sole factor determining the
decision to migrate. The multi- migration to climate change.'67 Setting to the side the prevailing multi-
factorial understanding of migration decisions, B&B, D&G, and HEA recommend definitions intended to
confine the beneficiaries of their proposals to climate refugees or climate change displaced persons.'68
It is questionable whether the proposals' definitions would cover all people migrating because of climate
change while excluding people migrating for other reasons, assuming, as the proposals must, that it is
possible to identify people moving because of climate change. B&B propose to "restrict the notion of
climate refugees to the victims of a set of three direct, largely undisputed climate change impacts: sea-
level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."' 61 9 In addition, B&B propose to
differentiate the level of funding available from their Climate Refu- gee Protection and Resettlement
Fund based on the extent to which the eligible impact can be causally linked with climate change. Full
reimbursement would be available for the incremental costs due to sea-level rise on the basis that
"general causality with climate change is undisputed" while only "additional funding" would be available
for migration due to the other climate impacts on the basis that climate might be "only one causal factor
to account for environmental degradation."' However, if the goal is to assist climate migrants, B&B's
highly specific definition of climate refugee might be under-inclusive. As D&G argue, B&B's decision to
restrict eligibility to persons moving due to three types of climate impact "does not take into account
the possibility that advances in science could enable more accurate determination of which events are
caused by climate change."'' Thus B&B's restrictive list of impacts risks excluding from coverage
persons who are displaced due to impacts that future science suggests are climate impacts. In addition,
B&B's definition includes a number of exclusions that could be questioned. The definition excludes
persons who migrate for reasons that B&B deem indirectly related to climate change, "such as
international or national conflicts over diminishing natural resources."'172 For example, while B&B
would cover refugees from drought, they would not cover persons who flee conflicts triggered by the
same drought.173 B&B also would exclude persons who migrate due to efforts to mitigate and adapt
to climate change, such 1 74 as the building of dams or planting of "biofuels crops."' There is a smaller
risk that B&B's definition also could be over-inclusive. Future science might suggest that components of
the three types of impacts that B&B would cover should not be attributed to climate change. Also, as
B&B acknowledge, extreme weather events, drought, and water scarcity generally may be linked to
climate change, but climate change also might be only one factor contributing to them. B&B's effort to
address this multi-causality by limiting the funding for migration due to these environmental impacts to
"additional" funding begs the question of how the Climate Refugee and Resettle- ment Fund would
ensure it reimburses only for the portion attributable to climate change.'75 If the Fund paid for more
than the migration due to climate- related drought damage, it would overpay in B&B's terms.
Conversely, it would underpay if it paid for less than the migration due to climate-related drought. D&G
limit the beneficiaries of their proposal by defining a "climate change refugee as an individual who is
forced to flee his or her home and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as
the resultof a sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to
which humans more likely than not contributed."176 D&G envisage that a "body of scientific experts"
created by their proposed convention would define the disruptions that the convention would cover and
periodically review whether disruptions should be incorporated into or removed from the 177 eligible
list. HEA largely follow D&G in attempting to circumscribe the beneficiaries of their proposal by limiting
them to persons moving due to events that are "consistent with climate change and to which humans
very likely contributed," rather than itemizing a list of covered climate change impacts. 78 However, HEA
argue that their "'very likely' standard" would make it harder than D&G's "'more likely than not'
standard" to gain coverage, and accordingly their standard would better target resources to assist
persons moving due to assist policymakers in applying the definition. Is0 The open-endedness of the
definitions of D&G and HEA may detract from their efforts to assist climate migrants but only such
migrants. D&G and HEA emphasize that the IPCC has been able to identify impacts "as 'consistent with"'
climate change."'1 They also are confident in the ability of science to indicate whether environmental
disruptions consistent with climate change are related to human actions, based again on the work of the
IPCC.82 However, in characterizing a type of disruption as consistent with climate change or related to
human activity, scientists will likely be making judgments amid uncertainty. Moreover, they presumably
will be doing so with the knowledge that their characterizations of disruptions may influence
policymakers' determinations about eligibility for protection under the climate migration instrument." 3
If the scientists are apt to err on the side of over-inclusion in the face of uncertainty, eligibility might be
extended beyond the limits that D&G and HEA envisage. On the other hand, if the scientists are inclined
to err on the side of under- inclusion in the face of uncertainty, eligibility might be overly constrained.
The open-ended definitions of D&G and HEA carry the danger of de facto delegating their conventions'
breadth of coverage to a body of scientists. Despite the difficulties with each proposal's definition of the
intended beneficiaries, it may be possible to devise a definition that in principle would protect climate
migrants and only those migrants. Nonetheless, the difficulties underscore that it will not be easy to
craft such a definition. Moreover, because of the multiplicity of factors influencing migration, it may
not be possible in practice to ascribe many migration decisions to climate change.
Canada – AT//Populism IL
No backlash against immigrants – Canadian opinion is high.
Stephen Smith 3-22-2018 – Reporter for the Canada Immigration Newsletter. ["Majority of Canadians
remain in favour of immigration, new study finds", Accessible Online at:
https://www.cicnews.com/2018/03/majority-of-canadians-remain-in-favour-of-immigration-new-study-
finds-0310368.html] @ AG
A majority of Canadians continue to hold positive views about immigration and its impact on Canada’s
economy, a new public opinion survey has found.
Conducted in February, the annual Focus Canada survey by the Environics Institute and the Canadian
Race Relations Foundation interviewed 2,000 Canadians over the age of 18.
Despite the hardening of views against immigrants in the United States and Europe, the study found
that most Canadians continue to view immigration in a mainly positive light.
This chart shows responses in favour or against the statement ‘Overall, there is too much immigration to
Canada.’ Source: Environics Institute
“Canadians as a whole continue to be more positive than negative about the current levels of
immigrants coming to this country, and with the legitimacy of refugees who have been arriving,” the
study says, noting that “worldwide, Canadians are among the most accepting of immigrants in their
country.”
Overall, 60 per cent of those surveyed expressed a favourable view of immigration. This jumped to 80
per cent who see immigration having a positive impact on Canada’s economy. Only 16 per cent of
Canadians disagreed with this view.
“The positive impact of immigration is the majority view across the population, and the upward shift is
evident across across most groups but especially in Quebec and the western provinces, while holding
steady in the Atlantic provinces and Ontario,” the study notes.
The survey results were published on the same day Statistics Canada revealed that international
migration was the main driver of an increase in the country’s population in the last quarter of 2017. It
also follows a report on Canada’s Atlantic provinces that says the retention of immigrants to the region
is crucial for its economic survival.
To find out if you are eligible for any Canadian immigration programs, fill out a FREE assessment form.
Integration concerns waning
The positive view of immigration was balanced by the fact 51 per cent of those surveyed said too many
immigrants are not adopting Canadian values. This percentage, however, was the lowest since the
survey began asking Canadians about this issue in 1993.
Across Canada, positive opinions on immigration and refugees are more widespread in the province of
British Columbia, where 66 per cent disagreed with the view that “overall, there is too much
immigration in Canada.” The same percentage of Canadians aged 18 to 29 and second-generation
Canadians also disagreed, as did 69 per cent of Canadians with a university degree.
Negative views of immigration and refugees were more widespread in the province of Alberta, among
Canadians above the age of 60 and those with only a high school education.
Alberta also led Canadian provinces in the number of respondents who believed too few immigrants
were adopting Canadian values (62 per cent). This view, meanwhile, was lowest in British Columbia and
Manitoba / Saskatchewan, where 46 per cent of respondents shared this view.
Attitude toward refugees remains positive
The admission of 40,000 Syrian refugees since 2015 and the arrival of nearly 50,000 asylum seekers in
Canada last year has not dampened Canadian support for refugees.
Of those surveyed, 45 per cent said they believe most people claiming to be refugees are legitimate
compared to 38 per cent who believe they’re not. Environics said uncertainty has replaced some of the
more strongly held views on the issue that it found in 2017, with 17 per cent now saying they have no
clear opinion on the legitimacy of refugee claims, an increase of seven points.
“This softening trend is evident across much of the population, but is most noticeable in Ontario,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan,” the study says, adding this was also the case in Quebec, which was the
focus of the asylum seeker influx in 2017.
Negative perceptions of refugees tend to increase with age, decrease with socio-economic status, and
are more prevalent among men and immigrants.
90% of Canadians feel their city is good for immigrants
Environics also shared the findings of the 2017 Gallup World Poll, which is conducted each year in 140
countries. This study found Canadians holding some of the most positive views about their cities as a
welcoming place for immigrants.
This chart shows the percentage of Canadians who believe their city is a good place for immigrants to
live. Source: Environics Institute
More than nine in 10 Canadians (92 per cent) said the city or area where they live is “a good place” for
immigrants. This is an increase of four points over 2016.
“Canadian public opinion on their community as a place for immigrants is significantly more positive
than for all other 34 OECD countries (where the average is 65 per cent), and has been consistently so
since 2006,” the study says.
Overall, Canada was ranked third by Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index, which measures comfort levels
and attitudes to immigrants. Only Iceland and New Zealand outranked Canada.
These findings mirror the recently released World Happiness Report, which surveys immigrants about
their sense of well-being in their adopted countries. Canada ranked seventh in the world in terms of
immigrant happiness, which Environics said parallels that of native-born Canadians.
Canada is resilient to populism – the political system is designed to minimize
extremism.
Amanda Taub 6-27-2017 – Reporter for the New York Times. ["Canada’s Secret to Resisting the West’s
Populist Wave", Accessible Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/canada/canadas-
secret-to-resisting-the-wests-populist-wave.html] @ AG
A Different Kind of Identity
In other Western countries, right-wing populism has emerged as a politics of us-versus-them. It pits
members of white majorities against immigrants and minorities, driven by a sense that cohesive national
identities are under threat. In France, for instance, it is common to hear that immigration dilutes French
identity, and that allowing minority groups to keep their own cultures erodes vital elements of
Frenchness.
Identity works differently in Canada. Both whites and nonwhites see Canadian identity as something
that not only can accommodate outsiders, but is enhanced by the inclusion of many different kinds of
people.
Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot, several people told me — a place that celebrates different
backgrounds rather than demanding assimilation.
“Lots of immigrants, they come with their culture, and Canadians like that,” said Ilya Bolotine, an
information technology worker from Russia, whom I met at a large park on the Lake Ontario waterfront.
“They like variety. They like diversity.”
Identity rarely works this way. Around the world, people tend to identify with their race, religion or at
least language. Even in the United States, an immigrant nation, politics have long clustered around
demographic in-groups.
Canada’s multicultural identity is largely the result of political maneuvering.
A Liberal Party worker distributed signs commemorating Canada’s 150th anniversary in Toronto’s Little
Italy on June 17.CreditCole Burston for The New York Times
In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau faced a crisis amid the rise of French Canadian separatism in
Quebec. His party was losing support, and his country seemed at risk of splitting in two.
Mr. Trudeau’s solution was a policy of official multiculturalism and widespread immigration. This would
resolve the conflict over whether Canadian identity was more Anglophone or Francophone — it would
be neither, with a range of diversity wide enough to trivialize the old divisions.
It would also provide a base of immigrant voters to shore up Mr. Trudeau’s Liberal Party.
Then, in the early 2000s, another politician’s shrewd calculation changed the dynamics of ethnic politics,
cementing multiculturalism across all parties.
Jason Kenney, then a Conservative member of Parliament, convinced Prime Minister Stephen Harper
that the party should court immigrants, who — thanks to Mr. Trudeau’s efforts — had long backed the
Liberal Party.
“I said the only way we’d ever build a governing coalition was with the support of new Canadians, given
changing demography,” Mr. Kenney said.
He succeeded. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, the Conservatives won a higher share of the vote among
immigrants than it did among native-born citizens.
The result is a broad political consensus around immigrants’ place in Canada’s national identity.
That creates a virtuous cycle. All parties rely on and compete for minority voters, so none has an
incentive to cater to anti-immigrant backlash. That, in turn, keeps anti-immigrant sentiment from
becoming a point of political conflict, which makes it less important to voters.
In Britain, among white voters who say they want less immigration, about 40 percent also say that
limiting immigration is the most important issue to them. In the United States, that figure is about 20
percent. In Canada, according to a 2011 study, it was only 0.34 percent.
Courting Ethnic Groups
Even as politicians engineered a pro-diversity consensus, immigrant and minority groups have
organized, unapologetic about asserting their interests.
In Canada, because all parties compete for all ethnic blocs, minorities do not tend to polarize into just
one party. That leaves little incentive for tribalism, even as minority groups feel empowered to
champion their ethnic or religious identity.
“We say, ‘Look, where do you stand on particular issues of importance to us?’” said Kulvir Singh Gill, a
member of Toronto’s powerful Sikh community. “And on the basis of that, we’ll be selective in our
support.”
This month, Mr. Gill helped organize a fund-raiser dinner for Seva Food Bank, a Sikh-led charity he co-
founded
The event was crawling with politicians. Senior members of Canada’s three main parties were present,
as were several members of Parliament and the provincial premier, Ontario’s equivalent of governor.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Pierre Trudeau’s son) had recorded a video to open the dinner.
All were seeking support from Canada’s Sikhs — but all were going to have to work for it.
Mr. Gill attributed this to “a real maturation in the community,” with Sikhs cultivating ties to all three
parties, ensuring that the Sikh voice would be represented no matter who holds office.
Other minority groups have pursued this strategy, too. As a result, while minorities in other countries
feel pressure to assimilate, in Canada they do best when they retain a strong group identity.
Political science research suggests that this dynamic may have also made Canada resistant to political
extremism and the polarization plaguing other Western countries.
Lilliana Mason, a professor at the University of Maryland, has found that when group identity and
partisan identity overlaps, that deepens partisan polarization and intolerance against the opposing
party.
But because Canadian politics accounts for diversity without polarizing across ethnic or religious lines, it
is more resilient. Everyone, including whites, becomes less likely to see politics as a game of us versus
them.
Canada won’t become a populist nation

John Geddes, 3-7-2017, Ottawa bureau chief at Maclean's and has covered federal politics and policy
for more than two decades, Canada's last lines of defence against populism Macleans.ca
https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/canadas-last-lines-of-defence-against-populism/ //Frese
A week after Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States last Nov. 8, Conservative MP Ted
Falk rose in the House of Commons during the time set aside for “members’ statements,” which falls just
before question period and is, as a rule, politely ignored. Falk represents the Manitoba riding of
Provencher, hard by the windswept Minnesota border, and he spoke briefly of the “special relationship
we have with our long-time friends and neighbours” to the south. Then he finished up with, “May God
continue to bless America—God bless Donald Trump.”
That last part raised eyebrows among the many who take it for granted that Canadians had recoiled en
masse at Trump’s win. But back home in southeastern Manitoba, often referred to as the province’s
Bible belt, Falk’s words weren’t controversial. His constituency is largely evangelical Christian, reliably
conservative and shares a lot in common with the American voters who made Trump president. (Falk
declined to be interviewed for this story.)
In fact, Canadian conservatives in general tended to welcome Trump’s win. An Ekos Research poll,
which happened to be released on the day Falk rose in the House, found that while only 30 per cent of
Canadians approved of Trump, fully 57 per cent of declared Conservative supporters viewed the new
president favourably.
The populist energy stored in that reservoir of pro-Trump sentiment has to be taken seriously by
Canadian Conservatives, especially those now vying for the federal party’s leadership. From the Liberal
perspective, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has lately reaffirmed his old warning of a populist backlash
unless government policy reduces economic inequality. And, further left, MP Charlie Angus launched a
bid for the NDP leadership last month by urging his party to redefine itself in opposition to Trump-style
populism.
All this attention to populism takes on a real-world urgency in light of what’s been happening—among
other places on the Canada-U.S. border—along that stretch of the 49th parallel separating Manitoba
from Minnesota, mentioned in the House by Falk. It’s there, as most Canadians have heard in news
reports, that undocumented migrants have been crossing by the dozen—often trekking for hours across
snowy fields in bitter cold—to leave Trump’s America behind and take their chances with Canada’s
refugee process, maybe after warming up first over coffee at Little Jay’s Café in Emerson, Man. (pop.
700).
The prospect of a growing number of asylum-seekers slipping into Manitoba—and Quebec and British
Columbia—is shaping up as an early test of Canada’s mood in the Trump era. Will the phenomenon
ultimately benefit the Liberals, highlighting again Trudeau’s welcoming embrace of newcomers? Or will
a perceived challenge the migrants pose to law and order reward a sterner rhetorical response from
Conservatives, as it has in the U.S. and Europe, and help spark what is routinely labelled a “populist”
upsurge on the right?
Exactly what’s meant by populist isn’t always easy to pin down. Broadly speaking, though, the term is
used most often these days to capture what happens when politicians on the right tap anxieties over
mass migrations, linking those fears with underlying discontent over scarce jobs and stagnant wages for
less-educated workers. In other words, populism means Trump’s rise in the U.S., the Brexit referendum
vote to pull Britain out of the European Union and the serious challenges various right-wing parties pose
in a string of European elections set for this year.
Could that same recipe be cooked up in Canada? Trudeau’s election triumph in 2015, followed by his
celebrated welcome of more than 40,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, had many observers portraying
Canada as almost uniquely immune to the inward-turning instinct behind Trump and Brexit.
Yet Frank Graves, the veteran Ekos pollster, has tracked and quantified similar strong currents coursing
through Canadian conservatism. “The idea that a populist leader couldn’t win in Canada, that we
couldn’t have an analogue to Trump, is I think nonsense,” Graves says.
His public opinion research shows pessimism about the economic outlook and misgivings about
diversity. For instance, Ekos polling found back in 1995 that 81 per cent of Canadians agreed that
“cultural diversity” contributed positively to Canadian identity. Asked the same question early last year,
only 66 per cent rated diversity as having a positive impact.
Then there’s economic unease. According to Ekos, the percentage of Canadians who view themselves as
middle-class has plummeted from nearly 70 per cent around 2002 to below 50 per cent last year. Few
adult Canadians think the next generation will fare better economically than theirs has. And presented
with the statement “If the current patterns of stagnation among all except those at the very top
continue, I would not be surprised to see the emergence of violent class conflicts,” Ekos found that 57
per cent of Canadians agreed.
Combine hopelessness about economic prospects with a magnified sense of the risks out there in the
world, and Graves says the result is, among some Canadians, a growing hankering for more order—even
a tendency to accept authoritarianism.
“That type of outlook is much more receptive to the idea that we need a strongman who’s going to
make decisive government actions to deal with this,” he says. “So he’s going to build a wall, or he’s going
to deport illegal immigrants, or he’s going to bomb enemies.”
Graves is careful to stress that being primed to accept right-wing populist messages isn’t a majority
mindset in Canada. These tendencies are, not surprisingly, by far most pronounced among avowed
Conservative voters, and particularly in places like Alberta. Which raises the question of how the
Conservative party—and its 14 aspiring leaders—might adjust in the Trump era.
Other researchers also point to Canadian attitudes that appear receptive to a Trump-like message. For a
recent McGill Institute for the Study of Canada conference in Montreal, University of Toronto political
science professor Michael Donnelly analyzed an online survey of 1,522 Canadians conducted by the
polling firm Ipsos and found scant evidence that Canada is particularly big-hearted when it comes to
outsiders who want in.
Donnelly reported that when Canadians were asked how much they agree or disagree with the
statement “The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status,”
their tendency to be generous ranked a middling ninth out of 22 countries. Canadian generosity only
outranked Britain’s by a notch, and was just modestly ahead of Germany—both countries widely
regarded as having struggled to accept immigrants. “Whatever is driving Canada’s exceptionally positive
history of immigration and integration over the past half century,” Donnelly concluded, “it does not
appear to be an exceptionally tolerant public.”
Note that he didn’t say, however, that Canada’s world-famous reputation for integrating newcomers is
undeserved—only that it can’t be chalked up mainly to national niceness. Perhaps the most persuasive
case for why Canada really does better than the U.S. and most European countries when it comes to
fostering diversity has come from researchers who focus not on Canadians’ attitudes, but on Canada’s
immigration policies and the political system.
It starts with the demographic clout of Canada’s foreign-born voters. They made up 20.6 per cent of the
total population in the 2011 census, the highest proportion among the G8 countries, far higher than the
roughly 13 per cent in both the U.S. and Germany. It also matters that the vast majority of Canadian
immigrants choose to live in big cities in Ontario, B.C., Quebec and Alberta.
University of Toronto political science professor Phil Triadafilopoulos stresses how immigrants to Canada
become voting citizens more quickly than in other Western democracies, and how potent their votes
have become in Canadian elections. “They don’t remain outsiders,” Triadafilopoulos says. “Politically,
they become insiders very quickly.”
In an influential 2013 paper entitled “Immigration, Citizenship and Canada’s New Conservative Party,”
Triadafilopoulos and two co-authors, McMaster University’s Inder Marwah and Carleton University’s
Stephen White, note that 84 per cent of eligible immigrants in Canada become citizens, compared to
just 75 per cent in Australia, 56 per cent in Britain, and a mere 40 per cent in the U.S.
They emphasize research showing that voting among immigrant Canadians roughly matches turnout
rates among native-born Canadians, and that immigrants are more likely than voters born here to pay
attention to election news, including watching televised leaders’ debates.
Even more crucially, immigrants in Canada tend to cluster in Toronto and Vancouver, in what most
political party election strategists view as key ridings. “To alienate large numbers of immigrant voters in
dozens of federal ridings would almost certainly mean surrendering those ridings to other parties,”
Triadafilopoulos, Marwah and White write.
Still, they point to “grassroots conservative opinion” that often seems resistant to high levels of
immigration and policies promoting multiculturalism. That leads to what Triadafilopoulos, Marwah and
White dub a “populist’s paradox” facing right-of-centre Canadian political leaders, who must find ways
to speak to their base while also broadening their “ethnic” appeal.
It’s a dilemma that’s familiar to Preston Manning. He remembers coping with anti-immigrant bigots
when he was leader of the upstart Reform party in the 1990s. “We had wild meetings,” Manning
recalled in a recent interview. “Our first week in the ’97 campaign, we had ‘Let the People Speak.’ It was
like Russian roulette. I would get up there and say, ‘Rather than us telling you what this election is
about, you’re going to tell us what it’s about.’ There would be some good, ordinary people, but there
would always be some nutcase who’d get up.”
Manning says he would try to politely disavow the nutcase’s anti-immigrant (or sometimes anti-Quebec)
ideas without denouncing the individual. He now heads the Calgary-based Manning Centre, which trains
Conservative political operatives, conducts research and holds a key annual gathering of the Canadian
right in Ottawa.
At this year’s conference, held in late February, Manning urged Conservatives to try to harness the
energy of Trump-era populism, rather than only “denounce and decry” its dark side. Talking of
grassroots Conservatives who worry that multiculturalism and immigration threaten “Canada’s national
values and identity,” Manning advised against “contemptuously dismissing [their] concerns.”
But allowing anti-immigrant views any room to breathe has proven strategically risky. Former Tory
prime minister Stephen Harper laboured hard to make inroads among immigrant voters, relying largely
on tireless outreach efforts by Jason Kenney (who has left federal politics and is now seeking the Alberta
Progressive Conservative leadership). It paid off big in the Conservatives’ 2011 majority election win,
which netted the Tories 32 of 47 seats in Toronto and its suburbs, where immigrants made up about half
the population.
Then came the 2015 election reversal. Facing Trudeau’s challenge, the Conservatives stoked the part of
their base that was alarmed by Islamic extremism or fundamentalism by proposing a ban on face veils
during citizenship ceremonies, which Harper even said he would consider broadening to the federal
public service. The Conservatives would also strip the Canadian citizenship of dual nationals convicted of
terrorist offences and set up a “barbaric practices tip line.”
Chris Alexander, the former Conservative immigration minister who lost his Toronto-area seat in the
2015 election, later admitted that non-Muslim immigrant communities he didn’t anticipate would feel
directly threatened by these controversial policies found them deeply unsettling. Those immigrant-
heavy ridings swung almost entirely back to the Liberals.
“It was clear to me, and it’s even clearer in retrospect, that in urban Canada we were already in danger
of being perceived as somehow an unwelcoming party,” Alexander, who is now running for the federal
Tory leadership, said in an interview. “That was, in my view, undeserved. But in political terms, it was a
disaster.”
Are Conservatives inclined to flirt with the same disaster again? Among the federal party’s 14 current
leadership aspirants, Kellie Leitch, who proposes subjecting would-be immigrants to a Canadian “values
test,” is clearly taking that gamble. She seems to be an outlier, though. Kevin O’Leary, seen by many as
the race’s front-runner—and whose business and reality-TV resumé, and promises to slash taxes, invite
Trump comparisons—shows zero inclination to mimic the president’s identity-politics blustering.
Tom Flanagan, a University of Calgary professor emeritus of political science and former Reform and
Conservative campaign manager, says the Canadian way of selecting party leaders would likely frustrate
an insurgency like Trump’s anyway. The U.S. primary system allows any American to vote for
presidential nominees, so Trump was able to court votes from a broad, disaffected public. Canada’s next
Conservative leader will be picked only by paid-up party members, which Flanagan says is a harder
group for a risk-taking populist outsider to win over.
In any case, there’s just no Tory leadership aspirant who has the makings of a Canadian version of the
current occupant of the White House. “Kellie Leitch is a very pallid imitation of Trump,” Flanagan says.
“Kevin O’Leary isn’t even interested in the same kind of issues.”
If the Canadian election map makes taking an anti-immigrant line a losing proposition, and the Canadian
way of choosing party leaders makes it hard for a populist outsider to win, there’s still the possibility
that the Conservatives might try to activate the economic side of populism.
Even there, though, the formula behind Trump and Brexit doesn’t look like a natural fit in Canada.
Trump blended his anti-immigrant rhetoric with promises to scrap or overhaul free-trade agreements.
The Brexit forces linked discomfort with foreigners to resentment of the EU free-trading order. But in
Canada, liberalized trade enjoys broad buy-in—particularly on the political right, and notably in the
Conservatives’ resource-exporting western strongholds.
So echoing Trump and the Brexiters in railing against unfair foreign competition is a non-starter for
Canadian Conservatives. That leaves, perhaps, finding a way to give voice to the anxieties of that broad
swath of Canadians who, as Graves portrays them, fear that the middle class is shrinking and that
opportunities for their children and grandchildren are dwindling.
But the Tories would find themselves playing catch-up with the Liberals when it comes to tailoring a
populist message for those worried voters. Trudeau has been arguing since 2014 that failure to push
income growth down from high-earners to middle-class families would eventually prompt a dangerous
backlash. His answer, or at least part of it, came in last year’s budget, in the forms of a modest middle-
income tax cut, an upper-income tax hike and a significant boost in federal payments to parents.
Is more policy in the same vein coming in next month’s 2017 budget? In a significant recent speech in
Germany, at Hamburg’s annual St. Matthew’s Day Banquet, Trudeau strongly suggested he isn’t done
trying salve that middle-class sense of grievance. “With the pace of globalization and technological
change,” he said, “there is a very real fear out there that our kids will be worse off than we are.”
Adopting his own version of the populist line, Trudeau took direct aim at corporations that post record
profits but somehow can’t afford to offer job security to their workers. “Increasing inequality has made
citizens distrust their governments, distrust their employers,” he added. “It turns into ‘us vs. them.’ ”
From the sounds of his Hamburg speech, Trudeau doesn’t intend to leave the next Conservative leader
any easy opening to outdo him when it comes to giving voice to the disquiet of Canadians who believe
the economic order is stacked against their families. It remains to be seen what additional policies the
Liberals unveil in the upcoming budget to back up that rhetoric.
If Trudeau fails to deliver, a right-leaning populist might seize the chance to try to fill the vacuum.
Overall, though, the prospects for a right-of-centre populist movement in Canada look dim, even
though opinion in Canada, according to pollsters like Graves and academics like Donnelly, contains
plenty of the same mix of fear and pessimism that fuelled Trump and Brexit.
There’s no shortage of Canadians who, if they’d heard Ted Falk wishing God’s blessing for Donald
Trump, might well have said, “Amen.” But if they’re hoping that Trump-style populism will slip across
the border and succeed in Canadian politics, they’re likely to discover that Canada’s welcoming
reputation has its limits.
Double bind – either Canadian populism is inevitable or it won’t happen
Scott Gilmore, 3-7-2017, a former diplomat and social entrepreneur who works in (and writes about)
the United States, Africa and Asia, Does Canada have too many immigrants? Macleans.ca
https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/how-populism-is-taking-over-the-world/ //Frese
Populism, at face value, seems almost healthy. Or at least to me it does. I was raised in Alberta, a
populist heartland. It was accepted as a fact that the government chronically ignores “the people.” Men
like Ralph Klein, who drank in a rundown pub and boasted about his lack of education did well there.
Ralph, as he was universally known, painted himself as an outsider, the only one looking out for the
roughnecks and the farmhands. And we ate it up.
But after I moved overseas, it didn’t take me long to realize populism isn’t just backslapping good ol’
boys. I found that from Indonesia to England, “rule by the people” almost always ends up undermining
democracy.
At the heart of every populist movement is the idea that the establishment has to go. There is no grand
theory of economics or social policy. There is the idea that the people are being hurt by the powers that
be—and that makes the establishment illegitimate. Therefore, the only legitimate candidate is the
populist. He or she is on the same side as the people, and electing him or her means the people will be
back in charge. As Trump himself explained during his inaugural address: “Jan. 20, 2017, will be
remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.”
Because the current way of doing politics is illegitimate, populists scorn it by acting out. Their supporters
love the “honesty” of their transgressions, sexual escapades and illicit opinions. This erodes the political
system. Consider the United States. In the next election cycle, will voters see sexual assault or tax
evasion as a disqualifier?
The populist is the avatar of the people, the embodiment of their will. If somehow they lose the
election, then the people’s will was subverted; the election was corrupt, or there was a conspiracy to
stop them. Spreading doubt about the electoral system further erodes democracy and the public’s trust
in institutions.
Even after taking power, a populist still needs an opponent. This means attacking the bureaucrats,
policies and systems that were in place when he arrived. The battle against the establishment is
constant, and success is a zero-sum game, measured by how much the other guys lose. In the end, the
greatest casualties are actually the institutions that keep a democracy relatively stable.
There is one other foil that populists almost always target: immigrants, minorities and foreigners. In
France, the populists blame Muslims (8 per cent of the population). In Indonesia, it’s the Chinese (1 per
cent). In the United Kingdom, it’s the Jews (0.5 per cent). It doesn’t matter how small or powerless these
groups are, they are held responsible for any setback or failure suffered by a populist government or
movement.
Right now, it feels like populism is surging globally. In the U.K., we have seen the rise of the anti-
immigrant UKIP party and the success in the Brexit vote to leave the European Union. Across the
channel, the polls are predicting the anti-Muslim, anti-European Union party of Geert Wilders may form
the largest party in the Netherlands’ parliament. Similarly, in France, the Front National’s Marine Le Pen
is being boosted by her ability to blend centrist policies with strong anti-immigration messages.
In Hungary, the anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban gave a speech this week calling for more
“ethnic homogeneity.” Not surprisingly, he also wants closer ties to Russia. There, Vladimir Putin is the
most influential populist in the world. At home, he has pushed an agenda of nationalism, while
energetically subverting elections. Abroad, Russia has actively supported populist movements
everywhere: money to Le Pen in France, leaked emails for Trump and clandestine support for the Brexit
campaign in the U.K.
Another new friend of Russia is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He has become increasingly
populist while greatly expanding his powers. Further south, in Africa, the past decade has seen a marked
increase in populist movements in countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cameroon and Equatorial
Guinea. In Asia, the Philippines elected an anti-intellectual strongman who boasts about breaking the
law. And in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power railing against a corrupt and ineffectual
status quo and making abusive comments against the Muslim minority.
Which brings us to Canada. Will we see a similar rise in populism here? When I sat down to write this
column, my instinctive answer was “no.” I agreed with many of the arguments made by my colleague
John Geddes, who sees systemic and political barriers to Canadian populism. My thinking was that the
apparent growth in global populism is because we are focused on Trump and starting to pay attention.
But where I could find data, it didn’t support my conclusion. One study from Harvard, for example,
found that support for populist parties on both the left and the right has grown undeniably and steadily
since the 1960s, doubling its support since then.
But it was another study completed late last year by a group of academics from the U.S., Europe and
Japan that left me especially troubled. They looked at a dozen European countries to see if there was a
correlation between the relative size of the immigrant population and the support for right-wing
populist movements. The researchers found that there was a direct connection, and that support grew
at an increasing rate as the size of the immigrant population grew. And what is more, their data
suggested there was a “tipping point” in western societies: when immigrants comprised 22 per cent of
the population, support for anti-immigrant parties approached a political majority. If a country takes in
too many immigrants, a populist backlash may be unavoidable.
In Canada, our foreign-born population is already at 20 per cent and growing. This is far higher than in
the United States and (except for Luxembourg and Switzerland, where there are large numbers of
itinerant professional residents like bankers) it is far higher than in any other European nation. And it’s
getting bigger. Statistics Canada just released a report that projected Canada’s immigrant population
will increase to between 26 per cent and 30 per cent within two decades. This puts Canada well beyond
the theoretical 22 per cent threshold in the European study.
It makes sense that countries become unstable with too many foreigners. I have first-hand experience in
places like Pakistan and Timor Leste, where sudden massive influxes of refugees can pull a country
apart at the seams. But is it possible that even when immigrants arrive gradually and they are
integrated successfully, it can still destabilize a country? Perhaps a populist backlash is inevitable in
Western democracies when the immigrant population grows to a certain size.
This is not because the newcomers bring crime or undermine our democratic institutions (they do
neither), but because the native citizens, whether they are Canadians or Austrians or Americans,
instinctively feel threatened by newcomers. Perhaps the experiences add up—new faces on TV, new
clothes in the street, new music on the radio—until the average person reaches a tipping point and
pushes back. After all, a fear of strangers is wired into our brains, an instinct that kept us alive in our
tribal past.
If this is true, it upends a lot of assumptions that this country is built on regarding multiculturalism,
pluralism and immigration. Canada may be facing larger global forces, tectonic shifts which are are not
felt until it’s too late and a populist earthquake shatters our carefully built house of peace, order and
good government.
Canadia won’t become populist – there are many checks

Amanda Taub, 6-27-2017, Former human rights lawyer, now covering foreign policy, human rights, and
shetland ponies, Canada’s Secret to Resisting the West’s Populist Wave, The New York Time,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/canada/canadas-secret-to-resisting-the-wests-populist-
wave.html //Frese
TORONTO — As right-wing populism has roiled elections and upended politics across the West, there is
one country where populists have largely failed to break through: Canada.
The raw ingredients are present. A white ethnic majority that is losing its demographic dominance. A
sharp rise in immigration that is changing culture and communities. News media and political
personalities who bet big on white backlash.
Yet Canada’s politics remain stable. Its centrist liberal establishment is popular. Not only have the
politics of white backlash failed, but immigration and racial diversity are sources of national pride. And
when anti-establishment outsiders have run the populist playbook, they have found defeat.
Outsiders might assume this is because Canada is simply more liberal, but they would be wrong. Rather,
Canada has resisted the populist wave through a set of strategic decisions, powerful institutional
incentives, strong minority coalitions and idiosyncratic circumstances.
While there is no magic answer to populism, Canada’s experience offers unexpected lessons for other
nations.
A Different Kind of Identity
In other Western countries, right-wing populism has emerged as a politics of us-versus-them. It pits
members of white majorities against immigrants and minorities, driven by a sense that cohesive national
identities are under threat. In France, for instance, it is common to hear that immigration dilutes French
identity, and that allowing minority groups to keep their own cultures erodes vital elements of
Frenchness.
Identity works differently in Canada. Both whites and nonwhites see Canadian identity as something
that not only can accommodate outsiders, but is enhanced by the inclusion of many different kinds of
people.
Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot, several people told me — a place that celebrates
different backgrounds rather than demanding assimilation.
“Lots of immigrants, they come with their culture, and Canadians like that,” said Ilya Bolotine, an
information technology worker from Russia, whom I met at a large park on the Lake Ontario waterfront.
“They like variety. They like diversity.”
Identity rarely works this way. Around the world, people tend to identify with their race, religion or at
least language. Even in the United States, an immigrant nation, politics have long clustered around
demographic in-groups.
Canada’s multicultural identity is largely the result of political maneuvering.
In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau faced a crisis amid the rise of French Canadian separatism in
Quebec. His party was losing support, and his country seemed at risk of splitting in two.
Mr. Trudeau’s solution was a policy of official multiculturalism and widespread immigration. This would
resolve the conflict over whether Canadian identity was more Anglophone or Francophone — it would
be neither, with a range of diversity wide enough to trivialize the old divisions.
It would also provide a base of immigrant voters to shore up Mr. Trudeau’s Liberal Party.
Then, in the early 2000s, another politician’s shrewd calculation changed the dynamics of ethnic politics,
cementing multiculturalism across all parties.
Jason Kenney, then a Conservative member of Parliament, convinced Prime Minister Stephen Harper
that the party should court immigrants, who — thanks to Mr. Trudeau’s efforts — had long backed the
Liberal Party.
“I said the only way we’d ever build a governing coalition was with the support of new Canadians, given
changing demography,” Mr. Kenney said.
He succeeded. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, the Conservatives won a higher share of the vote among
immigrants than it did among native-born citizens.
The result is a broad political consensus around immigrants’ place in Canada’s national identity.
That creates a virtuous cycle. All parties rely on and compete for minority voters, so none has an
incentive to cater to anti-immigrant backlash. That, in turn, keeps anti-immigrant sentiment from
becoming a point of political conflict, which makes it less important to voters.
In Britain, among white voters who say they want less immigration, about 40 percent also say that
limiting immigration is the most important issue to them. In the United States, that figure is about 20
percent. In Canada, according to a 2011 study, it was only 0.34 percent.
Courting Ethnic Groups
Even as politicians engineered a pro-diversity consensus, immigrant and minority groups have
organized, unapologetic about asserting their interests.
In Canada, because all parties compete for all ethnic blocs, minorities do not tend to polarize into just
one party. That leaves little incentive for tribalism, even as minority groups feel empowered to
champion their ethnic or religious identity.
“We say, ‘Look, where do you stand on particular issues of importance to us?’” said Kulvir Singh Gill, a
member of Toronto’s powerful Sikh community. “And on the basis of that, we’ll be selective in our
support.”
This month, Mr. Gill helped organize a fund-raiser dinner for Seva Food Bank, a Sikh-led charity he co-
founded.
The event was crawling with politicians. Senior members of Canada’s three main parties were present,
as were several members of Parliament and the provincial premier, Ontario’s equivalent of governor.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Pierre Trudeau’s son) had recorded a video to open the dinner.
All were seeking support from Canada’s Sikhs — but all were going to have to work for it.
Mr. Gill attributed this to “a real maturation in the community,” with Sikhs cultivating ties to all three
parties, ensuring that the Sikh voice would be represented no matter who holds office.
Other minority groups have pursued this strategy, too. As a result, while minorities in other countries
feel pressure to assimilate, in Canada they do best when they retain a strong group identity.
Political science research suggests that this dynamic may have also made Canada resistant to political
extremism and the polarization plaguing other Western countries.
Lilliana Mason, a professor at the University of Maryland, has found that when group identity and
partisan identity overlaps, that deepens partisan polarization and intolerance against the opposing
party.
But because Canadian politics accounts for diversity without polarizing across ethnic or religious lines, it
is more resilient. Everyone, including whites, becomes less likely to see politics as a game of us versus
them.
“We’re an articulation of that Canadian dream, the Sikh Canadian dream, of living our values and putting
them into action,” Mr. Gill said.
Making Mass Immigration Work
Rapid changes in demographics tend to spur anti-immigrant sentiment within the dominant group,
experts say, bolstering far-right politicians who promise harsh tactics against outsiders.
But although Canada’s high immigration rates have transformed the country in just a few decades, the
public has mostly been calm and accepting.
One reason may be Canada’s unusual immigration policies. A sponsorship system, in which Canadian
families host newcomers, allows communities to feel they are a part of the country’s refugee
resettlement program.
And a points system, which favors migrants who are thought to contribute economically, makes
immigration feel like something that benefits everyone.
As a result, immigration is broadly accepted as positive, closing off a major avenue of populist
mobilization.
Ahmed Hussen, the federal immigration minister, said “the luck of geography” had also helped make
immigration feel less threatening.
Virtually every immigrant to Canada is brought here deliberately. Research suggests that uncontrolled
immigration, for example the mass arrival of refugees in Europe, can trigger a populist backlash,
regardless of whether those arrivals pose a threat.
“We have the luxury of being surrounded by oceans on three sides, and then by the U.S. border,” Mr.
Hussen said. “Which, relative to your southern border, doesn’t have the same amount of irregular
migration.”
Immo Fritsche, a professor at the University of Leipzig, in Germany, has found that when people feel a
loss of control, they cling more closely to racial and national identities. And they desire leaders who
promise to reassert control.
European populists have run on such promises, and by accusing political establishments of selling out
their countries to migrants. President Trump’s promise to build a border wall is, at its core, a promise of
control.
But Canada’s points- and sponsorship-based systems, along with its geographic position, help
communities feel a sense of control over immigration so that, even as new arrivals change politics and
society, backlash has been minimal.
The Face of Canadian Populism
The result is a system tilted heavily against populist outsiders.
Although some have found local success, particularly in Quebec, they have not managed to get national
traction. At the end of my time in Toronto, I attended a conference held by The Rebel, an online news
media channel that is often called “Breitbart North” and once seemed like Canada’s populist vanguard.
Like the American outlet Breitbart News, it has risen on dark warnings about Shariah law and nefarious
elites.
Last year, as the populist wave rose worldwide, The Rebel threw tacit support to a handful of politicians.
One, Kellie Leitch, received airtime and praise as she sought to push populism into the mainstream.
But this year, when Ms. Leitch ran for the leadership of the Conservative Party, a major test of
populism’s appeal in Canada, she won less than 8 percent of the vote, placing sixth.
When I attended The Rebel’s daylong conference in Toronto, I saw no politicians drumming up support
— a sharp contrast to the Seva gala the night before.
Tara Cox, a yoga teacher, said she had some concerns about Shariah law, but quickly added that “a
Syrian family moved to our small town, and everyone has rallied around them.”
When a speaker warned of Muslim no-go zones in “every hamlet, every village” in Britain, saying that
the same could happen in Canada, there were no bellows of rage from the audience, only courteous
murmurs of concern.
This was the face of Canadian populism. As their counterparts fan out across Europe and the United
States, flexing their political muscle against frightened establishments, here was a listless, modestly
sized crowd, whose members seemed aware that they had underperformed but unable to explain why.
Canadian populism won’t happen – many checks and it won’t be driven by

immigration
Tom Flanagan, 11-17-2016, professor emeritus of political science and a distinguished fellow at the
School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, The political context in the US and Europe is very different
from that in Canada; the next Canadian populist movement will be a new political party, Policy Options
Politiques, http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2016/could-a-populist-wave-also-sweep-
canada/ //Frese
Many observers see similarities among Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential election, the
Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, and right-wing populist or conservative-nationalist parties in Europe;
for example, the National Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria, and Jobbik in Hungary. Is any of
this relevant to Canada?
Left-leaning Canadian politicians are already condemning anything they don’t like as Trumpism, recalling
the days of Bush Derangement Syndrome, when Canadian conservatives were automatically labelled
“clones of Dubya.” And indeed, some Conservative politicians are echoing selected Trumpian themes,
as in Kellie Leitch’s misguided call for a values-test for would-be immigrants to Canada (I fear I would be
among the first immigrants to be deported!). But there will be no full-fledged New Right in Canada,
because the conditions driving these developments elsewhere are largely absent here.
A major factor behind the rise of the New Right in Europe is the confrontation with political Islam.
Europe is close to North Africa and the Middle East, where political convulsions are producing millions of
refugees. Many refuges seek safety in Europe, even though they may have little desire to assimilate into
Europe’s Christian or post-Christian secular civilization. Major cities such as Brussels have no-go areas,
into which even the police are reluctant to enter except with overwhelming force. Spectacular terrorist
incidents are common. European nations, from Spain to Austria and Poland to Bulgaria, have historical
memories of fending off invasions from the Moors and the Turks. It is thus no surprise that many voters
are turning to political parties that promise a stronger stand against the threat of Islamism.
In the United States, the confrontation with radical Islam takes a somewhat different form. Islamic
refugees are not close at hand, but the international role of the United States has involved it in endless
wars and proxy conflicts in Islamic territory — under both Republican and Democratic administrations —
such as Somalia, Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. In addition to that, there is the
problem of 11 million illegal immigrants, who have mostly come across the long and porous border with
Mexico.
None of these conditions apply to Canada, which is located far from the trouble spots of the Middle
East and Latin America. We annually admit a large number of immigrants relative to the size of our
population, but the majority are selected through the point system or come through family
reunification. We even get to choose many of the refugees who resettle here. Illegal immigrants are a
minor problem of law enforcement, not a serious social issue. We have no common border with a
major source of refugees or economic migrants. Our cities do not have no-go zones of Muslims or any
other immigrant group. Episodes of Islamic terrorism have occurred, but on a much smaller scale than
in other Western countries.
No major Canadian political party in recent decades has taken an anti-immigrant position. Of course,
there are debates over immigration policy, such as the weighting of economic vs. humanitarian
considerations, or how to manage refugee flows, but all parties support the concept of large-scale
immigration and actively compete to win the support of immigrant voters. Internationally, we have
participated in some of the Middle Eastern wars, but never as major combatants.
In the United Kingdom, the surrender of sovereign authority to the European Union produced a
backlash, which led to the Brexit referendum. (Fans of the “Yes, Minister” TV series will remember Jim
Hacker’s defence of the British sausage.) But again, this has no relevance to Canada. NAFTA is a trade
agreement with the United States and Mexico. It does not involve surrendering sovereignty and it did
not create a North American machinery of government.
Finally, Donald Trump’s success in the United States was partially driven by growing income inequality.
His margin of victory came from states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, which have
been particularly hard hit by de-industrialization and job loss. The phenomenon is real enough, even if
unfair trade agreements are not the real cause. Canada, however, is different. The Gini index of
inequality rose in Canada during the 1990s but stabilized in the 21st century, while American indicators
of inequality have kept on rising. We are closer to European social democracies than to the United
States in levels of poverty, concentration of wealth in the hands of the “1 percenters,” and overall
income distribution. Thus there is not the same basis for a political movement based on economic
ressentiment as there is south of the border.
For all these reasons, the wave of populist politics taking place in the United States and many European
countries is not likely to wash up in Canada. But over a longer time frame, Canada has a powerful
tradition of populism extending back about a century, which includes the Progressive Party, the Social
Credit League, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The most recent large-scale
manifestation was Preston Manning’s Reform Party, founded in 1987. Reform’s success was due to the
inability of the Laurentian elites to control runaway deficit spending and to put up effective resistance to
Quebec separatism. The Reform Party subsequently entered mainstream politics through Stephen
Harper’s merger with the Progressive Conservative remnant; but, as Manning once said, when populist
movements die, “the seeds go back into the ground.”
One thing is reasonably certain: the next Canadian populist movement, when it does emerge, will take
the form of a new political party. A Trump-style takeover of an existing party is almost inconceivable
in Canada, because party members choose the leader; there is no primary system that would allow an
outsider like Trump to surge to the forefront. Unlike an American president, a Canadian prime minister
is not elected as an individual but is the leader of a party with a dominant number of seats in the House
of Commons. There is nothing like the American primary system that allowed Trump to run for president
under the banner of a major party.
Party discipline has proved to be essential to parliamentary government, but every public opinion poll
shows that voters dislike it. Thus, political mavericks frequently attempt to found new parties
representing views that can’t get a fair hearing in the major parties. Most such attempts fail, but
talented leaders such as William Aberhart, Tommy Douglas, Preston Manning and Lucien Bouchard
occasionally manage to upset the applecart of conventional wisdom. Populist rebellions are the main
source of creativity in Canadian political history, but the Laurentian elites always condemn them, unless
and until they can co-opt them. Instead of fear-mongering about the falling sky and the end of
civilization as we know it, elites here and abroad would be better advised to seek to understand how
their own failures give rise to these populist movements.
Canada will keep the populist forces at bay

Neuman and Adams, '17 – *executive director at the Environics Institute for Survey Research AND
**founder and president of the Environics Institute (Keith and Michael, "Canada keeps the populist
forces at bay," Globe and Mail, 7-3-2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/canada-keeps-
the-populist-forces-at-bay/article35526134/)//SB
The results of this research could not be clearer.
The Canadian public's level of confidence in its country's democracy and system of government has
remained remarkably stable since 2014, and largely consistent with results dating back to at least 2010.
Across more than three dozen measures, public trust levels have either held steady or showed modest
improvement in comparison with three years ago. For instance, eight in 10 (79 per cent) Canadians now
say they are very, if not somewhat, satisfied with the way democracy works in this country, continuing a
small but noticeable upward trend dating back to 2010, when 70 per cent expressed this view. Four in
10 (41 per cent) now have a lot of trust in the way elections are held in this country, up 20 percentage
points from 2014, when public controversy swirled around robocalls influencing the previous federal
election.
Further, we find no evidence of growing anti-government feelings or populist aspirations. And

polarized views between those on the left and the right of the political spectrum have actually
diminished noticeably, mostly because progressive Canadians are now much more comfortable with the
current federal government than they were in 2014, when Stephen Harper was in charge.
It is hardly the case that Canadians give a full vote of confidence, as few have strong trust in such
institutions as Parliament (19 per cent), political parties (10 per cent) and the mass media (16 per cent).
But the public has long expressed skepticism about these institutions and such opinions have shown
modest improvement over the past three years. What's more, it is among the youngest cohort of voting-
age adults (of ages 18 to 29) where engagement and confidence in the country's institutions has
strengthened most noticeably since 2014, reversing or erasing a previous generation gap.
Canada may be avoiding the downward spiral affecting other Western countries because our economy
and middle class are holding firm. Survey results show Canadians are feeling more confident about the
national economy and their own household finances, compared with three years ago. Income inequality
is a reality in this country, but has yet to produce a growing divide between income classes when it
comes to opinions about the country's democracy and institutions. We have yet to see an emerging
segment of people feeling economically and politically alienated, which might fuel the kind of backlash
now spreading in other countries.
Of course, public sentiments can change. A major economic downturn or a significant terrorist attack on
our home soil, if combined with a charismatic populist leader, could shift the public mood toward
xenophobic populism and away from our democratic and inclusive traditions. But so far, it is not
happening here and we would do well to properly recognize this as we celebrate 150 years in this place
(or 15,000 if you are Indigenous); and to figure out how peace, order and good government can
continue to be secured.
Trudeau will ensure that Canada resists populism

Reich and Marsden, '17 – *Former U.S. Labor Secretary; professor of public policy at the University
of California at Berkeley AND **political strategist (Robert and Rachel, "Rachel Marsden: Why Canada
has resisted populism," chicagotribune, 2-7-2017,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/sns-201702071330--tms--amvoicesctnav-b20170207-
20170207-column.html)//SB
PARIS -- In the run-up to the recent U.S. presidential election, a lot of conservatives began using the
term "cuck" to describe "cuckolded" males beholden to leftist policies. Lately, some conservatives have
been applying that rather unflattering term to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, one of the few
Western leaders staying the globalist course while other countries opt for a greater degree of national
security.
When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a 90-day immigration ban on refugees and visa holders
from certain Muslim-majority nations, Trudeau responded on Twitter: "To those fleeing persecution,
terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength
#WelcomeToCanada."
The tweet was celebrated by open-borders activists worldwide.

What was much less reported than Trudeau's welcome to refugees was the fact that Canada has actually
capped private sponsorship of Syrian and Iraqi refugees for this year at 1,000.
So that's good news for Canadians worried about national security, right? Don't worry about Trudeau's
tweet, because the government is putting a tight cap on refugee sponsorship.
Except that it's the much greater number of government-sponsored Syrian refugees that isn't being
capped so strictly.
Canada has taken in 39,671 Syrian refugees since November 2015. According to the government's own
data, most of them are unskilled, lack higher education and don't speak either English or French. A
recent survey by the Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia noted that only about 17 percent of
B.C.'s government-sponsored refugees are actually working. Most of those who have found jobs are
working in retail, hospitality, manufacturing and construction -- relatively unskilled sectors that pit them
against locals for employment. Many of those among the first wave of refugees are now complaining
about their one-year resettlement assistance money running out.
Trudeau consistently leverages discrepancies between image and reality -- illusions that can be used to
appease both the left and right sides of the political spectrum.
Take Trudeau's repeated declarations about the importance of climate change, which have helped him
win over environmental activists. Trudeau nonetheless applauded Trump's recent revival of the
Keystone XL pipeline despite the project being at the top of environmentalists' hit list in both Canada
and the U.S.
It's not a foolish strategy that Trudeau is employing. It's difficult to convince people to rebel against a
leader who appeases potential opponents by saying all the things they want to hear. Voters tend to pay
attention to sound bites and proclamations, which are a lot more compelling than parliamentary votes.
To illustrate yet another blurring of image and reality: Canada is now the second-largest arms exporter
to the Middle East (behind the United States), according to IHS Jane's, which tracks military spending. In
2014, under then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada landed a $15 billion deal to provide combat
vehicles to Saudi Arabia -- the foremost sponsor of the Islamic State, which is responsible for flooding
Western nations with migrants. The "humanitarian" Trudeau government approved the export permits
for those vehicles.
A recent Ipsos survey suggests that Canadians are less concerned about external threats than
Americans, with only 39 percent of Canadian respondents agreeing that the country needs to "take
more steps to protect itself from today's world" (versus 47 percent of the Americans surveyed).
Canadians generally like their government to leave them alone and not to muck around too much, lest
the politicians screw something up.
The manner in which a country's citizens react to the adverse effects of globalization can be significantly
attributed to that country's history. Canada doesn't have the revolutionary history of the United States
or France, and Canadians tend to pride themselves on diplomatic thoughtfulness over brute force in
response to challenges. Canadians usually just "vote the buggers out" long before protests spill into the
streets.
Trudeau benefits from the fact that Canada never fully bought into globalism. The country has had the
good sense to avoid donning the economic straightjacket that Europe got itself into, favoring the sort of
balanced trade agreements that the United Kingdom is now seeking in the wake of the Brexit vote.
Canada also benefits from having a lot of space and an ocean separating it from the cultural tsunami
that Europe is currently experiencing.
Canada doesn't have the same sense of urgency that other Western nations have in this era of anti-
globalist backlash. The two-faced approach currently being taken by Trudeau and the Canadian
government mostly has citizens blissfully ignorant or confused. Fog of war isn't a bad strategy as long as
people don't notice a negative change in their daily lives -- and the Canadian government has yet to see
what happens when people do.
Canada’s refugee policy explicitly excludes climate refugees – they wouldn’t go to

Canada anyways absent the plan
Musampa ’17 – November 17, 2017, Benjamin Musampa holds an MA in International Law and
International Politics from Universite de Sherbrooke, “How will Canada handle climate refugees?”
https://cusjc.ca/bootcamp/o-zone/how-will-canada-handle-climate-refugees/ // shurst
Abdul Kadir arrived in Canada in 2007 after spending three years in a Kenyan refugee camp. Political
instability and recurrent armed conflicts were the primary reasons Kadir, now 55, left his country. But
there was another, less obvious factor forcing him to flee: environmental disasters caused by human
and natural forces. “Food scarcity, the lack of infrastructure and the absence of rain falling … made my
daily life very miserable and difficult to survive,” Kadir said. Abdul Kadir sits in his office at Ottawa’s
Somali Centre for Family Services. Kadir requested that his face not be shown in any photos. According
to a report released by Oxfam, nearly 11 million people like Kadir living around the Horn of Africa face
severe hunger this year due to increased droughts caused by climate change and political conflict.
International bodies such as the United Nations have warned that the number of environmental
migrants is likely to rise worldwide due to climate change. Political instability and the inefficiency of
national and subnational institutions in Somalia has resulted in a slow response to drought-related
issues. The ministries of forestry, livestock, health and social services have all been reported as corrupt
and dysfunctional. Because these institutions are ill-equipped to tackle Somalia’s chronic vulnerabilities
to floods, droughts and food insecurity, many citizens find themselves without clean water and other
vital resources. Luisa Veronis, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa, has studied the
environmental influences on African migration to Canada. She said that the depletion of Somalia’s
natural resources as a result of climate change and political conflict is worse than in any other African
country. University of Ottawa professor Luisa Veronis addresses environmental issues in immigration
policy Somali participants in her study identified deforestation as a major environmental concern in
their home country. Wood is needed for cooking and for charcoal production, and deforestation has led
to competition between pastoralists attempting to grab any remaining vegetation to feed their animals
during droughts. Often Somalis have no choice but to abandon everything and escape these precarious
conditions, hoping to reach one of the refugee camps located in neighbouring countries like Kenya.
“While living in a refugee camp in Kenya, life was harsh, very hard, no water, no shelter, no sanitations,”
Kadir recalled. Kadir was very happy to begin his new life in Canada after he was accepted as a political
refugee. He quickly found a well-established Somali community in the Ottawa-Gatineau region. Somalis
are the largest community among African-descent immigrants living in Ottawa with 11,000 people. But
not all those seeking to escape Somalia will have a chance to settle in Canada. Earlier this month, the
Canadian government unveiled a new immigration plan which aims to bring in an additional one million
people over the next three years. However, there is nothing in the policy to help people fleeing
environmental challenges in countries like Somalia. “People in Somalia who suffer from these ongoing
problems simply do not have access to Canada’s immigration system unless they are fortunate enough
to have a close family member or other potential sponsor already established there,” Veronis said. If
they don’t meet the requirements for immigration, people like Kadir might think to turn to the refugee
system, which is designed as humanitarian relief for those fleeing persecution or war. He succeeded in
getting to Canada on political grounds. But the Canadian refugee program does not currently recognize
environmental migrants as a distinct category. In February, the Refugee Research Network and the
Centre for Refugee Studies at York University issued a policy brief calling for the development of a
national policy in the area of international environment migration. So far, that has not happened. Abdul
Kadir may have been able to escape his life in Somalia and come to Canada, but there are many like him
who cannot under the current immigration and refugee system.
Canada – AT//Quebec Impact
The threat of secession is gone.
Reg Whitaker, adjunct professor at the University of Victoria and a Distinguished Research Professor
Emeritus at York University, August 24, 2002, Toronto Star
Chretien will no doubt be ranked as one of Canada's more successful prime ministers. His legacy, not yet
over by any means, with an ambitious agenda ahead for his last year and a half, is a positive one. The
country is in better shape fiscally and economically than when he came into office. The threat of Quebec
secession has receded. Political tempers, which had reached boiling point under Mulroney, have
moderated considerably. But this legacy is not his alone. Paul Martin has shared in it, as has the Liberal
party. When it appeared that Chretien was growing unaccountable, the party called him to account.
Europe – AT//Economy Impact
No impact—Eurozone growth is steady and resilient, and ECB policy solves
Heise 15 - Michael Heise is Chief Economist of the Allianz SE. He advises the Allianz SE Board on economic and strategic issues and is responsible for analysis
and forecasts of the German and world economy and financial markets and risk analysis. (“How resilient is the eurozone?” http://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-
finance/opinion/how-resilient-is-the-eurozone/ 4/17/2015) STRYKER
The worst of the eurozone crisis is behind us – or so many observers claimed last year. Today, with Greece and its eurozone
partners constantly at the verge of showdown, analysts and politicians once again fear that the single currency area could be fraying.
However, if we turn our attention from shrill political rhetoric to economic fundamentals, we find that the
eurozone economy as a whole today is more resilient than in 2012, the last time that Grexit risk was being discussed. We
measure the underlying stability of the euro area by looking at the sustainability of public finances,
private and foreign debt levels as well as developments in employment, productivity and
competitiveness. By collating such numbers into a single indicator, we get an early warning signal for macroeconomic imbalances in the eurozone. At
the moment, our warning indictor is not flashing red – at least not if we look at the eurozone as a
whole. Although stability indicators have not returned to pre-crisis levels, it seems unlikely that a
contained flare-up caused by Greece could plunge the entire currency union into economic turmoil. Over
the last year, all 18 eurozone countries have moved towards more balanced economic growth. This
includes Greece, although in that country, hard-won macro-economic stability is today endangered by political developments. None of the other
eurozone countries today fall below the score that we define as the danger zone of economic
vulnerability. The eurozone as a whole has made most headway in the area external competitiveness.
Several euro countries that used to have gaping external deficits now run current-account surpluses. Importantly, improvements on the external
front are increasingly driven by genuine competitiveness gains: a favorable unit labor cost trend and
gradually recovering domestic demand are evidence that external surpluses are not solely the result of
demand compression but that structural reforms are bearing fruit. Progress has also been notable in the
area of debt. Debt ratios have declined for governments, private households and non-financial
enterprises – although the absolute stock of debt remains very high. On the other hand, our ratings are abysmal when it comes to unemployment, which still
stands at 11.6% across the eurozone. We also worry about the fact that eurozone exports, on average, are not gaining global market shares. This is a reminder that
measures of economic stability can differ markedly from those of economic dynamism. While the eurozone as a whole looks more resilient, there are, of course, big
differences between the member countries. There is still a noticeable split between what economists have come to refer to as the core and the periphery of the
eurozone. Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Estonia and Latvia look very balanced. They tend to have stable public finances, low private debt, few external
imbalances and they mostly manage to defend their shares in global markets. The (former) program countries, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, all have some
way to catch up. Greece still brings up the rear in our ranking (only Cyprus scores even worse). Greece has cut its budget deficit and regained competitiveness, but it
remains vulnerable because of its mountainous debts, mass unemployment and rigid labor and product markets. Although other peripheral countries are on the
right track, they still have their own problems. Portugal, for example, is struggling with the highest interest rate burden in the eurozone, while Spain’s
unemployment rate is still 24%. Both factors make it harder to get debt and deficits under control. Fiscal policy is also Italy’s Achilles’ heel. Public debt stands at over
130% of GDP and although the Italian government borrows more cheaply these days than the US Treasury, this might leave the country vulnerable to a sudden
deterioration in market sentiment. Italy’s debt burden looks particularly daunting, given its low scores on employment, productivity and competitiveness. Although
France’s economic malaise has been much discussed, in terms of economic stability, the country ranks in mid-field – disappointing but not overly vulnerable. Fiscal
indicators look steady but have not improved. France’s ongoing loss of world market share stores up trouble for the future. To
assess the resilience of
the eurozone, we do not look only at how solid individual member countries are. The broader
framework also matters. Over the last five years, the Europeans have made much headway in strengthening the
institutional architecture of the euro – including banking union, bail-out funds and more meticulous monitoring – that should help them
manage crises better. The European Central Bank has proven that it is willing to interpret its mandate to include
propping up markets if and when confidence fails. It is the interplay between a more solid eurozone
framework and the steady progress that literally all eurozone countries are making towards more
balanced growth that renders the single currency more resilient. And it is this underlying resilience
which allows European governments to engage in sometimes shrill rhetoric and political brinkmanship.
Growth during and after the Paris attacks prove underlying resilience
Soergel 15 - Andrew Soergel is an Economy Reporter at U.S. News. (“Eurozone Economy Resilient Through Adversity,”
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/11/23/eurozone-economy-resilient-despite-paris-attacks-refugee-crisis 11/23/2015) STRYKER
In one of the most emotionally trying months the eurozone has weathered in recent history, European
businesses thus far in November reported the steepest business activity growth rates the region has seen in 4
1/2 years, according to a report issued Monday by statistics firm Markit. Manufacturing orders from the region climbed to a 19-
month high, while the service sector employment posted its biggest monthly gain in five years. "The
improved performance in terms of economic growth and job creation seen in November are all the
more impressive given last weekend's tragic events in Paris, which subdued economic activity in France
– especially in the service sector," Chris Williamson, Markit's chief economist, said in a statement accompanying Monday's report. A Markit index
measuring activity in the French service sector dipped to a three-month low this month, and the accompanying report noted that "some service providers reported
that the terrorist attacks in Paris had negatively impacted" business. That said, the
component of the index measuring French
manufacturing climbed to a 19-month high. Overall new business growth reached a five-month high,
and business expectations for the next 12 months remained relatively unchanged – which is notable in
and of itself, considering most analysts expected the tragedy in Paris to weigh heavily on consumer
sentiment.
Alt causes to European growth—China, low inflation, and geopolitics

McHugh and Pylas ‘16 - David McHugh and Pan Pylas (“Europe's top economic authorities warn of risks to growth,”
http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/top-news/ecbs-draghi-dont-wait-to-act-against-low-inflation/nqJh8/ 2/4/2016) STRYKER
FRANKFURT, Germany — Europe's top economic authorities warned Thursday of the dangers to the region from
the slowdown in China, weak inflation and heightened geopolitical uncertainties. Mario Draghi, the head of the
European Central Bank, said it was imperative that policymakers act swiftly to deal with low inflation, while the
European Union downgraded its growth forecast for the 19-country eurozone this year and warned of
further reductions. All eyes are on the ECB ahead of its next policy meeting on March 10. There's a growing
consensus in the markets that the bank will follow up last December's stimulus boost with a further package of measures to help nudge up eurozone inflation,
which is way below target at an annual 0.4 percent rate. The bank's aim is to have inflation just below 2 percent.
Europe – AT//Middle East Impact
Tensions in the Middle East will never escalate
Omidi 15- Ali, associate professor of international relations, Five reasons why Iran-Saudi conflict won't
escalate, (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/five-reasons-iran-saudi-cold-war-turn-
hot.html#) JB
In 2011, as the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East, the wall of mistrust between Tehran and
Riyadh grew thicker. The civil wars in Syria and Yemen pushed the two sides into indirect military
confrontations. Riyadh’s Jan. 2 execution of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, amid Tehran’s
protestations, brought the worsening tension to a head. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut ties with
Iran after its diplomatic facilities were stormed by Iranian protesters, with countries such as Sudan,
Somalia, Bahrain and Djibouti soon following suit, brought about a novel state in the Iranian-Saudi
relationship. In this atmosphere, media pundits are asking whether it is possible that Tehran and Riyadh
may enter direct military confrontation. The answer is clear: There will not be a war between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, for five main reasons. First, the administration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is
pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with the world — which is what Iranians elected him for in
2013. In Iran’s complicated political system, the executive and legislative branches are elected by
popular vote, though the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates makes the elections process not
entirely free. Within this political system, making a decision to engage in war is not an easy task.
Therefore, while some Saudi leaders may beat the drums of escalation, the possibility of outright war
depends on factors such as whether there is political will for such action and how the two countries
choose to handle the crisis in their relations. In sum, engaging in war is not something that can be done
by one side alone. Moreover, Iran’s government has no incentive to increase tensions, as evidenced by
the condemnation of the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by the triangle of power in Iranian
foreign policy, meaning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Rouhani and Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif. In a goodwill effort, Iran has also announced that it will continue to send
pilgrims to Saudi Arabia for the hajj this year. Thus, if Saudi Arabia intends to initiate war, the Iranian
public — seeing themselves as victims of a violation — will mobilize, and also gain the sympathy of the
international community. Second, the majority of Iran’s current leaders were involved in the destructive
war with Iraq and are fully aware of its costs. Rouhani held several military positions during the conflict,
while Zarif and his deputies also remember the hardships of that era in their capacity as diplomats.
Khamenei, who was president at that time, also served as chairman of the Supreme Defense Council,
while Rafsanjani served as the de facto commander-in-chief of the Iranian military. Even Iran’s
parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, served as a commander with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC). Larijani’s brothers, including incumbent judiciary chief Sadegh Larijani, were also involved in the
conflict. Many other influential Iranian figures, including a great number of parliamentarians and Friday
prayer leaders, also have bitter memories of war, some of them as war veterans. Moreover, although
the IRGC at times seems to favor showdowns — such as in the cases of the recent detention of US
sailors or its surveillance of the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman in the Persian Gulf — it is not
empowered to take arbitrary actions. Third, the very nature of the current crisis makes war unlikely.
According to Charles Hermann, a renowned analyst of issues related to US foreign policy, crisis
management and decision-making, what defines a crisis are the three elements of threat, time and
surprise. Whether the situation threatens the vital interests of a state allows only a short time for
decision-making, and whether it occurs as a surprise to policymakers must all be considered. When it
comes to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the nature of their crisis does not meet this criteria. In fact, Saudi
Arabia’s tone against Iran has even softened in recent weeks. Indeed, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and
Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud recently told The Economist, “Whoever is pushing
toward [war with Iran] is somebody who is not in their right mind.” Fourth, on the international level,
Saudi Arabia believes that in the event of a military confrontation with Iran, the United States and the
rest of the West may side with the Islamic Republic. Riyadh’s decision to cut ties with Tehran has
received virtually no international support aside from some African countries that play no significant
role in international power equations. Even US Secretary of State John Kerry has urged calm following
the breakdown in the Saudi-Iranian relationship. There may have been a time when, because of Saudi
Arabia’s oil or its position, Washington would have gone out of its way to serve the interests of Riyadh.
However, now, even some US elites view Saudi Arabia as a slightly more civilized version of the Islamic
State. Last but not least, victory is uncertain in a potential Iranian-Saudi war. Saudi Arabia and Iran may
take destructive blows from each other, but both know that neither has the ability to destroy the other
side or impose regime change. Saudi Arabia has more warplanes and modern military equipment, while
Iran has better missile capabilities and military personnel. Riyadh’s involvement in the Yemen war is
another factor that reduces the motivation for war with Tehran. Moreover, the population in Saudi
Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province is mainly Shiite and has the potential to revolt — an advantage for
Tehran that Riyadh cannot easily create for itself in Iran. Lastly, Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz,
through which Saudi Arabia conducts much of its trade, is a further preventative factor, since war would
necessitate redirecting all that trade to the Red Sea, which in the short run is just not possible.
Water scarcity makes violence and instability inevitable

Ahmed 15- Nafeez, bestselling author, investigative journalist and international security scholar, New
Age Of Water Wars Portends ‘Bleak Future’ For The Middle East, (http://www.mintpressnews.com/new-
age-of-water-wars-portends-bleak-future-for-the-middle-east/203712/) JB
Behind the escalating violence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as well as the epidemic of civil unrest across the
wider region, is a growing shortage of water. New peer-reviewed research published by the American
Water Works Association (AWWA) shows that water scarcity linked to climate change is now a global
problem playing a direct role in aggravating major conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa.
Numerous cities in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia are facing “short
and declining water supplies per capita,” which is impacting “worldwide” on food production, urban
shortages, and even power generation. In this month’s issue of the Journal of the AWWA, US water
management expert Roger Patrick assesses the state of the scientific literature on water scarcity in all
the world’s main regions, finding that local water shortages are now having “more globalised impacts”.
He highlights the examples of “political instability in the Middle East and the potential for the same in
other countries” as illustrating the increasing “global interconnectedness” of water scarcity at local and
regional levels. In 2012, a US intelligence report based on a classified National Intelligence Estimate on
water security, commissioned by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, concluded that after 2022,
droughts, floods and freshwater depletion would increase the likelihood of water being used as a
weapon or war, or a tool of terrorism. The new study in the Journal of the AWWA, however, shows that
the US intelligence community is still playing catch-up with facts on the ground. Countries like Iraq, Syria
and Yemen, where US counter-terrorism operations are in full swing, are right now facing accelerating
instability from terrorism due to the destabilising impacts of unprecedented water shortages.
Europe – AT//NATO Impact
No impact—NATO and other alliances only risk conflict, and there aren’t any threats
anyway
Bandow 15 - Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and served as a Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is a columnist with
Forbes online and frequent contributor to National Interest online and American Spectator online. (“Allies Are Not Like Facebook Friends: US Should Drop Useless
and Dangerous Alliances,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/allies-are-not-like-faceb_b_7142408.html 6/25/2015) STRYKER
If America ends up at war, it almost certainly will be on behalf of one ally or another. Washington collects allies like
most people collect Facebook "friends." The vast majority of U.S. allies are security liabilities, tripwires for conflict and
war. Perhaps even worse, American officials constantly abase themselves, determined to reassure the very countries which the U.S. is defending at great cost and
risk. Indeed, America's most hawkish politicians, who routinely posture like reincarnations of Winston Churchill, routinely talk of sacrificing U.S. lives, wealth, and
security for the benefit of other nations. For instance, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fl.) recently worried, "What ally around the world can feel safe in their alliance with us?"
The more relevant question should be with what ally can America feel safe? Instead of relentlessly collecting more international dependents, Washington
policymakers should drop Allies In Name Only (AINOs). The U.S. should return to a more traditional standard for alliances:
Join with other nations only when doing so advances American security. Alas, that rarely is the case
today. Indeed, contra the scare-mongering of hawkish politicians such as Sen. Rubio and his GOP compatriots, the strategic environment today is remarkably
benign for the U.S. The world is messy, to be sure, but that's always been the case. The number of big conflicts is down. More important,
America faces no hegemonic threat or peer competitor and is allied with every major industrialized state other than China and
Russia. All of Washington's recent wars have been over -- from America's standpoint -- unimportant, indeed,
sometimes frivolous stakes. The Islamic State, Libya and Iraq were regional problems for U.S. allies with
minimal impact on America. Iran and North Korea are ugly actors, but mostly for Washington's
dependents. The two would face destruction if they attacked America. The latest crisis du jour, Yemen, worries Riyadh but
is not even a speed bump for the globe's sole superpower. Yet Washington now is involved in another sectarian proxy war through its totalitarian "ally" Saudi
Arabia. Terrorism remains a genuine threat, but falls far short of the sort of existential danger posed by the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Worse, terrorism typically is a response to foreign intervention and occupation. Washington has inadvertently encouraged
terrorism by backing authoritarian regimes, joining foreign conflicts, and creating enemies overseas. America has done some of the worst
damage to itself when protecting the interests of allies -- fighting their wars, killing their enemies,
backing their campaigns, advancing their interests. Adding unnecessary allies obviously makes this
problem worse. In Ukraine, for instance, the Obama administration is under pressure to treat a non-ally as an ally -- arming and/or defending Russia's
neighbor -- which would yield a proxy war with Russia, a nuclear-armed state which considers border security a vital interest. Bringing Ukraine (and Georgia) into
NATO would be even more dangerous, inviting a geopolitical game of chicken over minimal stakes. Neither country has ever been considered even a marginal
security concern of America. In contrast, both were long ruled by Moscow, which sees their links to the West as a form of encirclement, capping the extension of
NATO up to Russia's borders. Of course, both nations have been treated unfairly and badly by Moscow. But that doesn't justify a military alliance with the U.S.
Alliances should be based on interest, not charity. They should not be an end, an independent security interest, but a means to an end,
to protect America. Adding troubled states with limited military capabilities and unresolved conflicts turns the purpose of alliances on their head. The U.S. long
eschewed alliances and other "foreign entanglements," against which George Washington had warned. Even in World War I, a foolish imperial slugfest of no
concern to America, Woodrow Wilson brought in the U.S. only as an "associated power." Popular and congressional opposition then prevented Wilson from
guaranteeing the allied powers' post-war territorial seizures. Nevertheless, Washington's involvement was a catastrophic mistake, making possible the Versailles
Treaty, which turned out to be only a generational truce before the combatants returned to fight a second and far bloodier round. The extraordinary circumstances
of World War II led to a genuine and justifiable alliance. During the Cold War the U.S. created what were intended to be temporary alliances. This policy was
justified by the vulnerability of America's war-ravaged friends and hostility of the great communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. But even Dwight
Eisenhower warned against turning the Europeans into permanent dependents. It makes no sense for Washington to retain responsibility for defending a continent
with a larger economy and population than America -- and vastly greater resources than its only serious potential threat, Russia. Much the same has happened in
Asia, which Washington filled with allies after World War II. Even as Japan became the world's second economic power Tokyo relied on the American military. South
Korea now has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, yet Washington is responsible for the South's defense. The problem is not just wasted
resources, but tripwires for war. Alliances deter, but they also ensure involvement if deterrence fails, as it often does. And lending smaller states the services of a
superpower's military changes their behavior, causing them to be more confrontational, even reckless. America and China aren't likely to come to blows over, say,
Hawaii, which Beijing has no intention of attacking. But conflict could erupt over irrelevant allied territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku Islands and Scarborough
Reef, claimed by Japan and the Philippines, respectively, and China. Unfortunately, commitments to marginal allies determine basic U.S. defense strategy. Should
America be prepared to fight one, one and a half, two, or more wars at once? These prospective conflicts invariably involve allies, not America directly. After all,
what state can actually harm the U.S.? Other than Russia (and to a much more limited degree China) with its ICBMs, there is none. If war comes, it will involve
Korea, Japan, the Persian Gulf, or Europe. The greater the number of dependent allies, the larger the number of possible wars. But when the interests involved are
unimportant and the nations involved are capable of defending themselves, why is Washington sacrificing its people's lives and wealth for other states? The U.S.
should start defenestrating AINOs. Most of these nations would remain close. With all of them commerce should be free, culture should be shared, people should
be friends, and governments should cooperate. In some cases military coordination may be called for, when the U.S. and other nations share vital objectives.
However, Washington should stop defending South Korea. With an overwhelming resource advantage, the South should deter North Korean adventurism and build
cooperative regional relationships to preserve security in Northeast Asia. Despite historic tensions, Seoul should build ties with Japan, another American dependent
which should transcend the past and create a military sufficient constrain a growing China. Washington should base relationships on equality rather than
dependence. The
U.S. also should end its European defense dole. Today, NATO is effectively North America
and the Others. Yet the Europeans collectively are wealthier and more populous than the U.S. They
should take over NATO or set up their own alliance. No doubt there still would be important occasions for Washington to work
militarily with these nations, which share history and values. But they, not America, should secure Europe.
NATO fails—the alliance is in shambles

Grady ‘16 - John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His
reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and
USNI News. (“Atlantic Council Report: NATO Alliance at Risk,” http://news.usni.org/2016/02/29/atlantic-council-report-nato-alliance-at-risk 2/29/2016) STRYKER
In Europe, “you find a kind of the perfect storm”—a resurgent Russia in the east, thousands of refugees
and migrants arriving daily in the south, terrorist attacks in Paris, the rise of nationalist parties and economies
flailing skewing political debates—that NATO is trying to weather. Those simultaneous crises were at the heart of Friday
forum on a new Atlantic Council report looking at six nations in NATO and the challenges they and the alliance face and what can be done to meet them. In answer
to a question, Julianne Smith of the Center for a New American Security said the time is ripe for closer cooperation between the alliance and the European Union in
meeting those challenges and other threats, such as cyber and communications. “We need the capabilities that both institutions can bring to bear.” But what
is
happening is that NATO is becoming even more a “two-tiered alliance” with the eastern members
looking at Moscow’s willingness to battle Georgia over breakaway provinces, its seizure of Crimea, and
continuing military support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine as a serious military threat— while
southern members confront a rising flood of refugees and migrants fleeing wars in the Middle East and
poverty there, in North and sub-Saharan Africa. Smith said, “There is no longer the level of solidarity we once saw ” in NATO
and the European Union and a growing feeling on the continent that the two are not responsive to the
public’s needs to meet these challenges. As a sign of that fraying, she said later that although sanctions against Russia will likely be extended
later this year some alliance and union “countries are really feeling the pain” and looking for relief of their own. “The threats against Portugal are not the same” as
those Lithuania faces, said Andras Simonyi, a retired Hungarian diplomat now with Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced and International Studies. The
idea that the United States will always rise to the occasion in meeting the continent’s security needs
“made Europe complacent” ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the alliance expanded
eastward, he added. What has happened in their harvesting of the “peace dividend” is that “ many militaries in the alliance are in pretty
bad shape,” he said. As an example of reduced readiness, even among nations presumed to have strong
militaries, Jorge Benitez of the Atlantic Council noted that the United Kingdom had great difficulty fielding a
combat-ready armored brigade to a recent exercise in Poland, having to draw on equipment it had in Canada for training. While
the report and panel members agreed that alliance members on the continent needed to do more to provide for their own security, there is “no
consensus in Europe that a permanent presence [by the United States or NATO in the Baltics, for
example] is a good idea,” Smith said. To many, “a persistent presence is good enough for us.” The author of the United Kingdom’s section of the
report, however, recommended stationing a corps-sized headquarters and three brigades in the Baltics to deter Russian aggression in that part of Europe. All
agreed that simply spending 2 percent on defense was not the right approach to enhancing continental
security. The money needs to be spent in a coordinated way and forces stationed where needed, not where it is easiest to send them, Simonyi said. Benitez said
the European Union needed to be more flexible in allowing nations to spend more to meet internal
security challenges. He noted the union only allowed France one year of increased spending in response of the two terrorist attacks in Paris during 2015
and the same for Italy and Greece to cope with the continuing refugee/migrant crisis.
Defense experts agree—NATO is underfunded and unprepared

Sputnik ‘16 - (“NATO Defense Experts Slam Alliance’s Military Readiness,” http://sputniknews.com/world/20160226/1035373693/nato-military-
readiness.html 2/26/2016) STRYKER
NATO’s current combat readiness would fail at protecting the Alliance’s eastern borders, according to
the North Atlantic Council's experts report to be published Friday. MOSCOW (Sputnik) – The expert group comprising six
defense officials, including former NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, warned of "chronic underfunding"
and "critical deficiencies" of the Alliance's member states, according to the report, as quoted by the Financial Times newspaper.
The NATO report revealed that only 10 of 31 German Tiger helicopters and some three quarters of 406 Marder
armored infantry vehicles were usable. "The deployment of a brigade, let alone a division at credible
readiness, would be a major challenge [for the United Kingdom]," the report reads.
Counterplans
CP Solvency – Temporary/Parole
Expanding TPS to climate migrants solves the aff.
A third proposal for granting legal protections to environmentally displaced persons includes
broadening TPS. There are several ways in which TPS could be broadened that would be beneficial to
environmental migrants. Although granting TPS is not a permanent solution for any migrant, it is a
temporary safe-zone, and any effort to acknowledge and protect environmental refugees is
exponentially better than the current international regime that offers no protections and/or rights. The
first way TPS could be broadened would be for TPS to cover more countries that are facing serious and
imminent environmental degradation. This could be countries such as the Maldives or Tuvalu that will
eventually disappear due to rising sea levels182 or countries in the horn of Africa that are drying up due
to lack of water and desertification.183 TPS could even be subdivided regionally to acknowledge that
refugees from a specific geographical region are in need of protection—irrespective of internationally
recognized national borders. The categorical breadth of TPS also could be expanded to include
environmental degradation beyond natural disasters. While in no way does this argument mean to
devalue the severity of natural disasters, the devastation that results from slow-onset environmental
change such as desertification and drought can give rise to comparable destruction and suffering.184
The second way TPS could be broadened would be to extend its duration to allow those who are victims
of environmental change to stay longer in the United States. An increase in duration would allow people
who are fleeing slow-onset environmental degradation more time to consider possible permanent
relocation options and would allow the home country time to address the environmental issue.
Realistically, extending the time allowed in a host country is not a permanent, long-term solution. This
extended grant of time may result in environmental refugees overstaying their TPS status as well as
refugees being suspended longer in limbo, which hinders their rehabilitation.
Temporary CP Solves
Olsson 15- Louise Olsson, B.A of legal science at Örebro University, “ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW An assessment of protection gaps and solutions”, September 2015, http://www.diva-
portal.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smash/get/diva2:861312/FULLTEXT01.pdf, // Suraj P
The contemporary system of Temporary Protected Status is not adequate to completely cover
environmentally induced migration.172 However, it might have the potential of developing into a
system more adequate of protecting at least those migrating as a result of rapid onset climate events.
Today, the system does not provide a strong, legal obligation to protect the individuals migrating due
to environmental factors. It is rather an optional measure that is discretionary granted nationals of a
certain state.173 The contemporary system in the US is further inadequate as it is an agreement
between the US and a state affected by a crisis, rather than a duty to the individual. Also, a major
concern with the US system of Temporary Protected Status is that it is only available to designated
nationals already in the US at the time of the disaster, and not to those fleeing subsequent to an
environmental event.174 Therefore, the contemporary system would have little relevance to citizens of
many affected countries. The system does not offer protection to citizens of countries such as Kiribati,
Tuvalu, the Maldives and Bangladesh,175 that would be part of a pre-emptive migration due to slow
onset events. Neither does the system offer protection to those migrating as a result of rapid onset
events such as storms or floods, as they would be present in the state of origin at the time of the
disaster. Thus, in order for the system to at least be capable of protecting people migrating due to rapid
onset events, the prerequisite that the person must be present in the receiving state already, at the time
when the environmental disaster occur, must be erased. Further, the contemporary system in the EU is
inadequate as it requires a qualified majority of the council to vote for the decision that an
environmental disaster requires the invoking of the Temporary Protection Directive mechanisms.
Additionally, the unconditional linking of Temporary Protected Status to ‘mass influx’ is a tremendous
weakness of the EU system if it aims at protecting displaced individuals. An individual might be in just as
much need of protection even though that person is not part of a ‘mass influx’. Additionally, Temporary
Protected Status may provide some protection for certain groups but does not meet the needs of
people who need to stay longer or permanently. That is one of the reasons why the system ought to be
developed to serve the needs of people migrating due to rapid onset events. People migrating as a
result of slow onset events are more probable of requiring permanent protection as desertification,
drought, or sea level rise for example is most probably permanent procedures. Despite its many
weaknesses, the system of Temporary Protected Status has a great potential of covering people
migrating due to rapid onset climate events. It provides an opportunity to protect people fleeing due to
environmental disasters, which is a broad term capable of being interpreted differently and thus adapt
to a diversity of situations and needs, and it has in fact proven to be flexible in the past. It has the
potential of granting protection to people in need, who does not have the opportunity to return to his
or her state of origin for different reasons. A great advantage, which also to some extent can be found in
the refugee regime, is that the regime is forward-looking in its assessment of who should be granted
protection. Rather than focusing on the question of why people moved, a more relevant approach in the
context of environmentally induced displacement is the focus on whether the migrants has the
opportunity to return to the state of origin or if there is a need to stay where they have relocated. With
regard to the assessment of the capability of return, such assessment should concern the determining of
the extent to which the area that the migrant left are habitable, whether any sustainable source of
livelihood remains, the extent to which national and local governments continue to function effectively,
whether their rights would be protected at home, and other similar issues. If these prerequisites are
replied in the negative, there is an apparent need for the migrant in question to stay where relocated,
and this need should also mirror a right to do so until the time that this changes. This focus might
eliminate some of the difficulties of assessing slow onset disasters, including the voluntary-forced
continuum. The system of Temporary Protected Status also lack the prerequisite of persecution, which
is a requirement that is not met by environmental migrants, unless they have been exposed to
persecution in addition to the environmental push factor that caused the migration. However, under the
contemporary system of Temporary Protected Status, there is a widespread discretion concerning who
receives protection and who does not. The system consequently needs to develop into a more reliable
system under which people fleeing rapid onset environmental events unquestionable are granted
protection. To accomplish this, there must be legal obligations requiring states to offer Temporary
Protected Status to those in need. One option might be the construction of a new convention,
alternatively a soft law instrument that provides guidelines on the subject. Accordingly, the current
system of Temporary Protected Status has a vast amount of gaps in its protection of environmental
migrants under EU legislation, domestic legislation, and state practice respectively. However, the system
would most probably be capable of covering those displaced due to rapid onset events if it would be
developed into a more comprehensive system with clear obligations for the receiving states. As the
contemporary system has been shown to be discretionary and vary significantly, there is a great need to
address this issue at a regional and global level. A more systematic approach to Temporary Protected
Status such as a binding international framework is first and foremost envisaged, though it would
require concerted action and political will among States. However, it would most probably be difficult to
establish consensus concerning a hard law instrument in the context, especially since this study has
revealed that there is a vast amount of different approaches and practice regarding the offering of
protection to people migrating due to rapid onset climate events. A soft law approach might therefore
be more viable. A soft law approach might also be more appropriate because there are factual
uncertainties in the context of environmental migration, and such instrument is often more flexible and
would thus be capable of adapting to the diversity of environmental factors that might induce migration.
A first step might be limited to systematic Temporary Protected Status for nationals of countries
recently affected by natural disasters who are already present in a given country, which is comparable
to the system already existing in the US, despite the fact that the US system has proven to be rather
discretionary than systematic. However, the international community should in the long run aim for a
more ambitious approach that would include the granting of systematic Temporary Protected Status
also to those arriving at national borders following natural disaster in their home countries.
CP – Geoengineering – 1nc
Text: The United States federal government should increase its funding
geoengineering to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
CP solves better – geoengineering is key to reduce emissions that create displaced
populations in the first place
Murray 10 – Sheila Murray has a B.A. from Ryerson University, "Environmental Migrants and Canada’s
Refugee Policy," Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees // shurst
Any Canadian refugee policy that recognizes environmental migrants will have acknowledged the direct
link between climate change and migration. International obligations would form around the
responsibility of the industrialized world—which has benefited from carbon emissions—to the
developing world, which is least able to adapt to new climate environments. Much of the prevailing
political reluctance is justified using the work of scholars such as Richard Black who say that no pristine
cause of migration can be identified. Even if the world manages to slow climate change to arguably
manageable levels by reductions in greenhouse gas emissions or through geoengineering,19 there will
continue to be those who are displaced or who have their daily access to sustenance threatened by
climate change. Emissions that exist in the atmosphere today can persist for decades and will continue
to aff ect the global climate. According to the UNHCR, “Nine out of every ten natural disasters today are
climate-related [and] … as many as 20 million people may have been displaced by climate-induced
sudden-onset natural disasters in 2008 alone.”20 In May 2009, a United Nations University report made
several fundamental observations that are supported by a variety of studies worldwide: It found that
migration due to climate change is already under way, and that climate change can cause the “collapse
of social safety nets,” which in turn fuels conflict and violence. It also observed that people who migrate
because of “gradually deteriorating living conditions” are regarded as economic migrants, and as such
have no recourse to any of the international instruments that differentially protect the rights of
internally displaced people, asylum seekers, and refugees.21 In addition, migrant populations place
enormous strain on the environments in which they settle. This in turn can accelerate degradation
already precipitated by climate change.
CP – Fund Adaptation – 1nc
Counterplan: The United States federal government should increase efforts to reduce
greenhouse emissions and support adaptation assistance to environmentally
displaced persons.
That solves the aff.
Nicole Marshall 2015 – PhD Candidate in the department of political science at the University of
Alberta ["Environmental Migration in an Era of Accelerated Climate Change: Proposing a Normative
Framework for International Migrant Rights and Domestic Migration Policy ", Accessible Online at:
https://era.library.ualberta.ca/items/46a0b9dd-e055-4afd-82e1-6009da437ff6/view/c5b1c266-2794-
4776-853b-72a7a57fb0e8/Marshall_Nicole_M_201508_PhD.pdf] @ AG
Where Chapter Four came from a place of significant theoretical analysis which could be critiqued as
being disconnected from the realities faced by EDPs (see, for example, similar critiques from Black 2001
and McAdam 2012), Chapters Five and Six sought to bring praxis to the project in a meaningful way. In
particular, Chapter Five examined the current state of international law as it relates to Environmentally
Displaced Persons and their rights by reviewing key international legal instruments that relate to the
conditions of sovereignty and statehood, the rights of stateless persons, refugees, and those who are
internally displaced, as well as some of the agreements that shed light on the status of climate change
and adaptation as it is understood in international law. Its analysis was detailed, revealing that while
there is space for positive growth, the current state of international law is not one that can easily
accommodate special recognition or rights for people who are displaced primarily by environmental
events. Part of the reason for this incapacity, it argued, is due to the lack of a clear definition of EDPs, as
Chapter Two clarified; but, perhaps its larger challenge might stem from what Chapter Four has argued
is an inherent flaw in the international system: that it cannot adequately guarantee positive, or pre-
emptive rights.
Recognizing the necessarily central role of the state in securing access to human rights (following
Hannah Arendt’s 1968[1951] poignant analysis that to be stateless is to be vulnerable to the point of
extinction, as well as the arguments of Chapter Four) under a human rights regime that is confined to its
Westphalian expression, Chapter Six offered a critical overview of the current state of domestic policy
that relates, or could relate, to Environmentally Displaced Peoples. Its regional organization was
reflective of the geographic nature of climate change in that certain regions are more susceptible to
certain types of environmental events, and thus tend to produce certain types of EDPs. For example,
North America tends to see more Temporary Environmental Migrants resulting from severe storm
events – especially hurricanes – where Europe tends to see more Pressured Environmental Migrants
given its proximity to Africa and the prominence of drought and resulting periods of famine there.
Oceania, on the other hand has most closely considered the experience of what this dissertation has
labeled Imperative Environmental Migration (IEM), given its proximity to the ‘sinking’ islands of the
South Pacific. While the chapter is clear that these regional trends are just that – trends – and not
illustrative of any sort of exclusivity on the part of climate change (indeed, we have seen extreme storm
events and slow-moving but devastatingly persistent processes of climate change occur worldwide: for
example, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, recent floods in Bangladesh, or the melting of the Polar
Regions), a clear regional pattern has emerged in terms of offering protection to the varied experiences
of environmental displacement. From a universal human rights perspective, the overlapping nature of
these policy regimes offers some protection, where different types of EDPs can received some
protection in different regions; however, when applied in the context of the realities of the international
community, policies like the Third Safe Country policy have substantially diminish its value. Together,
then, Chapters Five and Six revealed that while advancements have been made relating to the status
and recognition of EDPs and their rights in both the legal and policy fields, these fall short of providing a
clear set of rights or recognition, or even a sufficient overlapping human rights regime (unlike that
argued for by McAdam 2012), from an ethical perspective. In response, Chapter Seven sought to draw
together the substantial policies and laws that exist in the international regime in a way that is
meaningful to the 299 ethical concerns presented in Chapter Three. Ultimately, it argued that in order to
guarantee the full range of EDP rights that are called for by this dissertation, the Westphalian system
cannot be upheld as it currently stands. Yet, the dismantling of the regime need not be the first dramatic
step: instead, the project argued for a nested approach that would see immediate global efforts to
reduce greenhouse gases; to support adaptation assistance wherever possible; to maximize migration
schemes; and to fully incorporate civil society in all future adaptation and migration responses.
However, it also argued that these efforts would need to be coupled with a longer-term strategy to
address some of the deeper, systemic shortcomings of the international political community. Chapter
Seven suggested that one possible route to resolution might see the implementation of a non-optional
adaptation assistance program, an end of the traditional Westphalian system of political governance and
an opening of bborders – especially for EDPs if not for everyone – and an ontological reframing of the
human rights regime to more carefully acknowledge our common human experiences and
responsibilities, beyond borders. This last shift, as the project suggested throughout, should be coupled
with an ethico-political framing of the challenge of forced environmental migration itself, if we are to
fully conceptualize the complexity and nuances of its nature. While this second set of demands was
substantial, it was also presented as necessary, following the conclusions of Chapters Three through Six.
Fundamentally, the project revealed that the experiences of forced environmental migration have
shifted the political and ethical realities of the international community. Deep-rooted changes must be
made if we are to keep pace in an ethically meaningful way.
Ext. Fund Adaptation
Funding adaptation and insuring against climate change rebuilds lost property and
mitigates the risk of climate migration
Keating 17 – international policy reporter for DW, “Is the World Prepared for Climate Refugees?”, 11 March 2017,
https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-world-prepared-for-climate-refugees/a-41227964)//abaime
Insurance against climate change-related weather events already exists. In 2015 at a summit in Elmau,
Germany, the G7 group of wealthy countries set up an initiative on climate risk insurance for vulnerable
areas of the world, covering around 400 million people. The objective is to stimulate the creation of
effective climate risk insurance markets that could function on their own.
InsuResilience, an initiative of the German development agency GIZ, based in Bonn, is carrying out the
G7's plan. It is running programs to establish climate risk insurance markets across the world.
The insurance would help people rebuild after climate-change realted weather events that result in loss
of life, livelihood and assets. The goal is to make sure those people stay put and do not become climate
refugees. Rapid emergency assistance and reconstruction is provided by the schemes.
Germany wants to push for global climate risk insurance programs at the Bonn summit
Opportunities in Bonn
The German government has been a leader in pushing for these programs. Last year the German
Development Ministry invested around €2.8 billion in international climate protection and adaptation.
A spokesperson for the ministry told DW that during the Bonn climate summit, Germany will push for a
global partnership for climate risk insurance.
"Increasingly, climate change will also influence flight movements," said Gerd Müller, Germany's
minister for economic cooperation and development. "Because where grass can no longer grow ... or
where the rising sea level has flooded coastal areas, people will have to find a new home."
Although the COP23 summit is not being held in Fiji (the Fijian government is presiding over the
meeting, which is being held in Bonn for logistical reasons), the country intends to leave its mark on this
year's summit by stoking the idea of climate risk insurance.
The new testimonials from military experts may convince other delegations that the time has come to
establish more such schemes.
CP – Word PIC – “Climate Refugee” – 1nc
Text:
The term “climate refugee” is bad – leads to discrimination and loss of dignity
Randall 14 - Climate and migration programme manager at Oxfam(Alex, “Don't call them 'refugees': why climate-change victims need a
different label”, 18 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/vital-signs/2014/sep/18/refugee-camps-
climate-change-victims-migration-pacific-islands)//abaime
<There are a number of reasons why “climate refugee” status does not make sense for people who
might have to move.
Legally, the idea of a “climate refugee” is contentious. It currently has no standing in international law.
And even if it did, the concept would be fraught with problems.
When people move because of the impacts of climate change, they tend to move within their own
country. This is clear from testimonies of people fleeing recent disasters in the Philippines:
“I lost one of my grandchildren and my younger sister. Early the next morning, rescue workers came
with boats and they took us to an evacuation centre.” – ShelterBox / Reuters
“We were trapped in the house for two days until someone came and rescued us in a boat, and we were
taken to the local gymnasium which was being used as an evacuation centre. We stayed there for a
week but it was so crowded that we decided to leave and go back to the ruins of our house.” –
ReliefWeb
These testimonies are a good illustration of the evidence on movement during disasters. People move
very short distances, without crossing international borders and often return to their homes as soon as
possible. A modified Refugee Convention would be of no use to them.
Slowly unfolding disasters like droughts, changing rainfall and desertification create different patterns of
movement. It is often internal, and often from the countryside to cities. When people do cross a border,
it is often to find work. Although climate change might be among the factors causing their movement,
their primary motivator is employment. For many this can be a vital escape route. Though many see the
situation in cities as being equally desperate to the situations they are fleeing. Take this testimony is
from a Colombian farmer affected by changing rainfall patterns:
Rains recently have been very intense – very intense… We don’t want to leave our land: here are our
past, our memories, our ancestors. We don’t want to move to other parts, we don’t know what to do
there. We would turn into delinquents. We’d enter into a cycle of poverty which happens in the cities.
Protecting these people means two things: making sure they can move to find work legally if they want
to, and making sure the places and work are safe. In these requirements lie a much bigger question of
urban development that cannot be fixed by altering the Refugee Convention.
Rightly or wrongly the term “refugee” conjures powerful images. Tended camps; people moving in
urgent distress; leaving their homes and walking huge distances. Powerful photos of the Za’arti refugee
camp in Syria spring to mind when you say the word “refugee.” In the Pacific, it also brings to mind
images of people making desperate ocean crossing to gain entry to Australia. The media is awash with
photos of people huddled in small boats. The desperation and drama is inescapable.
Across the world, refugees encounter racism and discrimination. Host governments often do little to
challenge this. In the UK, we continue to imprison people seeking asylum. The rise of far-right parties
across developed countries has fueled anti-refugee sentiment. In the Pacific, the Australian government
has drawn sharp criticism from human rights campaigners and academics over its treatment of refugees
and asylum seekers.
So the prospect of becoming a refugee comes with a lot of baggage. This is a tragic reality. But it explains
why many people do not like the term “climate refugee” and why they do not see the creation of
climate-refugee status as a good solution.
So what is the answer? Many civil society groups within the Pacific talk about migration with dignity. In
practice, this can mean a number of things. It could involve planned relocation, where entire
communities move together. Cultural practices, family connections and customs are maintained and the
community is reestablished in a safer location. Or it can mean migration bit by bit and integration into
new communities. Many people from Pacific island nations are already working and studying abroad.
Some see the continuation of this trend as the solution.>
Ext. “Climate Refugee” PIC
The term “climate refugee” is legally wrong
Margolis 17 – economic and political reporter/correspondent for PRI (Jason, “Immigration attorneys warn against using
the term 'climate refugee’”, 22 September 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-22/immigration-
attorneys-warn-against-using-term-climate-refugee)//abaime
<With so much destruction from this season's hurricanes in the Caribbean, there are going to be a lot of
people on the move — looking to start their lives in new places. We’ve already seen mass movements of
people from areas plagued by drought, floods or storms. Many casually refer to these people as “climate
refugees.”
But the problem with the term climate refugee starts with the word “refugee.”
“The term refugee has some very serious legal consequences, and it’s a very rigid legal definition. It’s
usually an individual determination based on a person’s fear of persecution,” explains Mara Kimmel, an
immigration attorney in Anchorage, Alaska.
The legal definition of refugee goes back to the years following World War II when the United Nations
defined a refugee as an individual outside of his or her own country, someone who can’t return because
of a well-founded fear of persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership
in a social group.
“I don’t think that’s necessarily translatable to a situation where whole communities are being forced to
flee and to relocate because of climate change,” says Kimmel.
“The whole idea of refugee is that you can’t rely on your national government to provide that
protection,” says attorney Robin Bronen, the executive director of the Alaska Institute for Justice in
Anchorage. “And in the context of climate change, we should expect that our national governments are
going to protect us.”
Many countries are already trying to do that, from Pacific island states to the Netherlands. They’re
trying to keep people from having to relocate. But, an untold number of people are already on the move
due to climate change.>
Use of “climate refugee” is problematic – 3 warrants
Dabelko 07 - director of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center (Geoff, “It’s sometimes
problematic to attribute migration specifically to climate change”, 25 July 2007, https://grist.org/article/a-word-of-caution-on-
climate-change-and-refugees/)//abaime
<Scholars, policy analysts, and even military officers are breaking down climate change’s impacts into
what they hope are more manageable topics for examination. The migration that climate change could
cause is one such topic. For instance, the Center for American Progress recently posted a piece entitled
“Climate Refugees: Global Warming will Spur Migration.” The International Peace Academy analyzed
“Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link” (PDF) in a May 2007 Coping With Crisis working
paper. Climate change-induced migration also figured prominently in the security perspective offered by
the CNA Corporation’s Military Advisory Board in its report, “National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change.”
In many respects, these pieces are careful in their discussion of the topic. But allow me a few words of
caution on climate change and migration, based on what we learned from a series of programs on the
topic in the late 1990s here at the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson
Center.
First, the use of the term “refugee” is convenient but problematic.
In order to achieve refugee status, people must be fleeing persecution or violence and must cross a
national border. Countries are then obligated by international law to admit them, provide shelter, and
so forth. Notably, then, the definition of “refugee” is based on political boundaries and has nothing to
offer internally displaced persons. It also does nothing for people who are "pulled" for economic reasons
or "pushed" for environmental reasons. Because not all people displaced by climate change will be
fleeing violence or crossing a national border, it is critical to avoid referring to them as refugees if one
wants to be taken seriously by the UN, lawyers, academics, and governments. Governments, in
particular, have a fairly strong interest in keeping the definition narrow because of the obligations they
have to refugees. For this reason, the “knee-jerk” reaction for most of them will be to resist granting
refugee status to a new large group of people.
The second problem is that the motivations for migration are multiple, and distinguishing between
economic pulls and environmental pushes is very difficult. A farmer suffering from prolonged drought is
both pushed to move from his land and pulled to an urban area or to more fertile ground by the promise
of greater economic opportunity. This is self-evident, of course, but when the situation is reduced to
"climate migrants" versus "economic migrants," the response from climate change skeptics will always
be: "They are just economic refugees." One can easily see this classification problem with Mexican
migrants coming across the border to the United States to work. Are they climate migrants because
their homes have experienced prolonged drought that may have been exacerbated by climate change?
Or are they economic migrants who are "just coming for our jobs"? The multicausality of the
motivations for moving makes labeling a migrant with any single adjective (political, economic,
environmental, climate, etc.) problematic.
The third difficulty — which follows from the challenge of multicausality — is that it is extraordinarily
difficult to develop and defend a methodology for calculating the number of climate migrants. A
prominent biologist who spoke at the Wilson Center in the mid-1990s claimed that the number of
climate refugees could be in the tens of millions. When one participant asked him how he determined
who was in and who was out of his total, his response was basically: I read a lot of reports and this is my
best guess. Naturally, the air went out of the room, and we might as well have ended the meeting right
then. This is the danger of asserting that there are millions more climate migrants than political refugees
from war or persecution. For starters, is the number of climate migrants being compared with the legal
category of refugees, or does the comparison also factor in the millions of war-induced internally
displaced persons? If this kind of comparative analysis isn’t done carefully, some will believe that the
climate-change migration numbers have been exaggerated by a flawed methodology. This issue will
then be in danger of being unfairly marginalized.
I say “unfairly” because I believe climate change could have a tremendous effect on human migration.
Even though we cannot parse out a single cause, climate changes are still critical pushes that cause
people to move. Migration — like conflict and other social phenomena — is by definition multicausal.
Just as "environmental conflict" theories that privileged environmental scarcity as the explanation for
civil conflict were criticized, so too is the "climate refugee" argument open to critique.>
Theory: A precise definition is crucial in debates regarding climate migration

The notion of environmental refugees includes climate refugees,9 although its breadth makes it
impossible to specify or quantify climate-related migration. In fact, there does not seem to exist a clear
definition of “climate refugees” as of yet. Many studies leave the term undefined or, while purporting to
analyze “climate refugees,” still implicitly rely on broader concepts. For instance, Derek Bell, while
focusing in his work “on one cause of environmental disruptions, namely, global climate change,” seems
to draw on the much broader UNEP concept of environmental refugees without further
differentiation.10 Other studies offer overly complex deanitions that are difacult to operationalize in
practice. Not least, the very term “refugee” is—implicitly or explicitly—disputed, and several authors
and intergovernmental bodies instead suggest terms such as “migrants” or “displaced persons.” In sum,
there is no consensus deanition of “climate refugees.” In this section, we develop a first approximation.
Our definition is based on practical needs to (a) assist in the development of quantiaed assessments and
scenarios in order to gain insights in expected numbers and origins of climate-related refugees; and (b)
assist in the development of political responses and global governance mechanisms for the recognition,
protection and resettlement of climate refugees, which would need to build on a precise
characterization of persons covered by such a protection regime. Both needs are not necessarily
compatible since definitional needs of scenario-builders and of political decision-makers might not
overlap. However, we believe that the definition advanced in this section is able to fulfill all the needs of
both communities. The definition of climate refugees needs to address (a) the cause of migration,
namely the type of environmental harm or climate-change impact that would create this category of
climate refugees; and (b) the type of migration, namely whether it is voluntarily or “forced,” temporary
or permanent, and transnational or internal; and, related to this, (c) the appropriate terminology, that is,
whether the term “refugee” is justiaed in the first place.
CP – Sui Generis – 1nc
Text: The United Nations General Assembly should establish a sui generis regime for
the recognition, protection, and resettlement of climate refugees. This regime should
be appropriately financed and supported by the international community.
For these reasons, we argue against the extension of the definition of refugees in the Geneva
Convention to cover climate refugees. Instead, we argue for a sui generis regime for the recognition,
protection, and resettlement of climate refugees. This sui generis regime must be tailored to the needs
of the climate refugees, and it must be appropriately financed and supported by the international
community. This section lays out the central elements of such a regime. We adress (1) its core governing
principles, (2) its legal-institutional character, and (3) its organizational setting. The following section will
address financial support and compensation. Principles A sui generis regime for the recognition,
protection, and resettlement of climate refugees must build on a set of core principles tailored for the
specific problem, including its political, legal, and ethical dimensions. We suggest five principles to serve
as a basis for the institutional development of the regime: (1) The Principle of Planned Relocation and
Resettlement. Even though climate change impacts will eventually manifest themselves in unpredictable
singular events—such as storms, floods or droughts—the increase in magnitude and frequency of such
events can be predicted, and the consequential need for local populations to leave regions that suffer
from increased risk can be foreseen. The governance of climate refugees can thus be better organized
and planned than in the case of victims of political turmoil or war, and can be carried out in planned,
voluntary relocation and resettlement programs—sometimes over many years and decades. Thus, at the
core of a regime on climate refugees is not programs on emergency response and disaster relief, but
instead, planned and voluntary resettlement over longer periods of time. (2) The Principle of
Resettlement Instead of Temporary Asylum. Over the long term, most climate refugees—especially
victims of sea-level rise—will not be able to return to their homes. Thus, the underlying assumption in
current refugee governance that refugees may return once state-led persecution in their home
countries has ended, needs to be replaced by an institutional design that conceives of (most) climate
refugees as permanent immigrants to the regions or countries that accept them. (3) The Principle of
Collective Rights for Local Populations. The Geneva Convention is based on individual persecution. This
has included quasi-collective titles—for example when entire ethnic or religious groups in a country are
judged as being persecuted—but essentially the regime is designed for individual state-based
persecution. A climate refugee regime, however, would need to be tailored for collectives of people,
such as populations of certain villages, cities, regions, provinces or—as in the case of small island
states— of entire nations. (4) The Principle of International Assistance for Domestic Measures. Climate
refugees enjoy in principle the protection of their own countries, and in many cases, serious climate
change impacts will affect only parts of a country. Thus, an international regime for climate refugees will
focus less on the protection of persons outside their states than on supporting governments, local com-
munities, and support agencies to protect people within their own territory. The governance challenge
of protecting and resettling climate refugees is thus essentially about international assistance and
funding for the domestic support and resettlement programs of affected countries that have requested
such support. (5) The Principle of International Burden-sharing. Climate change is a global problem in
causation and consequences, and the industrialized countries bear most of the moral responsibility for
its victims. This suggests also for the protection of climate refugees the adoption of institutional
elements from existing agreements on climate or from similar areas. These could include: the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (which suggests that richer
countries have to bear higher costs for the protection of climate refugees); the principle of
reimbursement of full incremental costs of affected countries incurred through resettlement of climate
refugees; and the principle of double-weighted decision-making procedures, which would give both
developing and industrialized countries equal clout in a new institution on climate refugees.
Ext. International Cooperation Solves
Multilateral cooperation solves the aff – and unilateral action fails.
No individual actor in present international system can singlehandedly clean up the environment, and
thus, positively contribute to people’s health. Instead, this enormous task requires the effort of state
and nonstate actors alike including intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
and private entities. And just as no single entity can solve global health and environmental problems,
there is no single solution to these complex issues. In the above discussion I have attempted to put
forward two potential solutions that can simultaneously help us generate a cleaner environment and
healthier people. At the core of this argument is an acknowledgement that multilateral cooperation can
generate global public goods of the health and environment sort. More specifically, the discussion has
attempted to demonstrate that international treaties and international institutions can aid the global
community in meeting the health and environmental needs of present and future generations.
However, neither treaties nor institutions are foolproof, and there are unfortunately many of these
entities in existence that have failed to meet their mandate. This is problematic in and of itself and also
because failed attempts at multilateral cooperation can generate mistrust for such entities and sour
individual and state attitudes regarding future attempts. An examination of the of the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Kyoto Protocol indicates that treaty structure is of
utmost importance. The Montreal Protocol’s permanent emissions limits, effective carrots and sticks
approach, attempts to prevent leakage, and common-but-differentiated responsibility mechanisms have
made the MP a relative success by lessening the use of ozone depleting substances and thus the related
health problems, such as cataracts and skin cancer, that ODS produce. In other words, the MP is a model
environmental treaty that future treaties should emulate. By contrast, the KP’s failure to fully
incorporate effective incentives in a timely manner, extreme approach to sticks/punishments, inability
to prevent leakage, and its limited emissions time frame (2008–2012/2012–2020), have restricted the
effectiveness of the KP. As KP negotiators look forward to renegotiating the Kyoto Protocol in 2015 (for
a 2020 implementation date), they would do well to reexamine the lessons learned from Montreal.
International institutions can also aid states and nonstate actors seeking to invest in a cleaner
environment and the positive health externalities that this process generates. A brief investigation into
the newly formed International Renewable Energy Agency demonstrates that institutional structure is a
critical factor that can dictate the success or failure of an institution. IRENA’s success, as measured by its
ability to attract one hundred and four members (with fifty-five additional states in the ratification
process) in fewer than three years, can be attributed to a number of factors. The most important factor,
however, rests in IRENA’s ability to cater to the self-interest of state and nonstate actors that seek to
diversify their energy sources and increase foreign direct investment. By connecting states seeking to
diversify their energy dependencies with companies that can assist them in this process, IRENA
simultaneously meets the needs of states in the global North and global South as well as energy
corporations and other UN intergovernmental organizations. In contrast to realist claims that
institutions either do not matter or are merely puppets of the great powers, this investigation suggests
that institutions can enable the global community to meet the environmental and health needs of
developed and developing states when properly structured. The complex relationship between health
and the environment will require new and innovative thinking if we are to provide for the needs of
current and future generations. With this in mind, one final suggestion is warranted. The complex
United Nations system, with myriad intergovernmental programs and specialized agencies, has
recognized the intricate link between health and the environment. UN entities including the World
Health Organization and UN Environment Program continue to stress the interconnection between
health and the environment, but now more than ever, we need to see greater interagency cooperation
between these like entities to generate novel, pioneering, and practical solutions to climate change and
the resultant health issues that stem from a hotter, erratic, and less predictable global environment. A
failure to do so would be very unhealthy.
Only international cooperation solves

Martin et. al 18 (Susan F., Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emeritus in International Migration at
Georgetown University, Environmental change and human mobility from: Routledge Handbook of
Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 410//waters)
In terms of research, several World Bank reports provide insights into the environmental change-
mobility nexus. The “Turn Down the Heat” Series (World Bank 2012, 2014; PIK 2013) showed that the
Middle East and North Africa will likely face accelerated migration flows to urban areas and social
conflict because of climate change. Latin America and the Caribbean will experience climate impacts
that can trigger displacement and migration from agricultural communities, while Southeast Asia will see
significant coastal impacts on natural resources that put pressures on coastal cities.The Shock Waves
report (Hallegatte et al. 2015) showed that migration and remittances can play a key role in managing
shocks. Yet migration requires resources and assets that the poorest lack, and remittances tend to
benefit non-poor people more than poor people.The “High and Dry” study (World Bank 2016f: 19)
explored the “thirsty origins of migration and conflict” due to increases in water variability and
expanding water deficits with climate change. It showed that a 1 percent reduction in precipitation is
associated with a 0.59 percent increase in the urbanization rate.The “Confronting Drought in Africa’s
Drylands” report (Cervigni & Morris 2016) found that investments in drylands can only secure resilient
livelihoods for about half of the people in their place of habitual residence in the region. Another recent
report investigated the impact of natural disasters on the poor and showed that increasing resilience of
affected populations “is good economics” over the long-term (Hallegatte et al. 2017: 11).Work is
underway at the World Bank to characterize how much, where, and when internal migration patterns
could be influenced by slow-onset climate change impacts, in an effort to inform upstream dialogue and
the longer-term planning for climate resilient development.
KNOMAD’s activities are embedded in the broader World Bank actions on climate change and
development. KNOMAD’s thematic working group on environmental change and migration has focused
its work on several dimensions of the nexus, including the determinants of movements and the impacts
of mobility on those who move, those who are left behind and those in host communities. It has been
investing in its three objectives, namely a) increasing understanding of the impact of environmental
change on migration through a combination of stock taking of the literature, expert consultation,
research and stakeholder dialogue; b) increasing policy-relevant knowledge and information on
environmental change and migration; and c) ensuring that knowledge on the relationship between
environmental change and migration is available to policy-makers within the World Bank, other
international organizations, governments and nongovernmental organizations.
Action on climate refugees can't be done by the U.S. alone -- interstate dialogue is key
Chazalnoel et al. 18 (Mariam Traore, Associate Expert in the Migration, Environment and Climate
Change program of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In this capacity, she has
coordinated IOM’s global inputs to the UNFCCC process for COP20 and COP21 and led trainings, side
events, press conferences and exhibitions related to migration in a changing climate. A moment of
opportunity to define the global governance of environmental migration from: Routledge Handbook of
Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 428//waters)
The global policy landscape is at a crossroads, with the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement
on climate change, the development of the first intergovernmental agreement on migration within the
United Nations (i.e. the Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration) and the Global
Sustainable Development Goals agenda, which together encompass many different dimensions of
environmental migration. There is thus an urgent need to encourage the consideration of environmental
migration issues in a “mirror” process (i.e. to include migration in climate and environmental policy
tracks and to include climate and environmental questions in migration policy tracks) within each of
these in order to achieve meaningful global governance of environmental migration to be achieved.
However, it is important to remember that both environmental issues and migration questions are
highly politically sensitive topics, as they touch upon national sovereignty of states. At the same time,
such challenges cannot be solved by states in isolation, and so these political sensitivities should not be
allowed to become an obstacle to constructive interstate dialogue.
In a context where states’ interest and opinions do not necessarily align, both the Global Compact for
Migration and the work undertaken within the UNFCCC negotiations process offer an important window
of opportunity for states to analyze, compare and understand existing knowledge, practices and possible
ways forward in non-binding spaces; and to do so not only at the global level, but also through regional,
national and local consultations. Doing so offers states the opportunity to propose actionable
commitments as well as means of implementation and follow-up frameworks, while simultaneously
acknowledging formally the necessity to address environmental drivers of migration and offering
guidance on how to do so, including on ways to maximize potential benefits. Achievements made at the
global policy level would, in turn, increase legitimacy and generate additional financial means to address
environmental migration on the long term at the national level.
AT//No Enforcement
Yes enforcement -- implementing agencies solve
Dealing with the resettlement of millions of climate refugees over the course of the century will require
not only a new legal regime, but also one or several international agencies to deal with this task. Given
different causes of climate- related flight that range from extreme weather events to water scarcity and
drought, it is unlikely that one single agency could be assigned the exclusive, or main, task of dealing
with climate refugees. Instead, a more appropriate and likely model will be the designation of a network
of agencies that serve as “implementing agencies,” under the authority of the meeting of the parties to
the climate refugee protocol, in their respective area of expertise and depending on type and
circumstances of populations in need of assistance and relocation. A crucial role might lie with the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, both of which could serve as implementing
agencies for the climate refugee protocol. UNEP, even though it lacks a strong operational mandate,
may provide invaluable further assistance in terms of scientiac research and synthesis, information
dissemination, strategic legal and political advice, and other core functions of this program.70 A small
coordinating secretariat to the protocol on climate refugees would be needed, possibly as a subdivision
of the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn. In addition, the UNHCR will play a role, even though it would be
unlikely to be the main agency given the special characteristics of the climate refugee crisis. Yet the
expertise of the High Com- missioner in view of emergencies, as well as its legal and technical expertise
in dealing with refugee crises, will be indispensable also for the protection of climate refugees.71
CP – UNFCCC – 1nc
Text: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should create and
sufficiently maintain a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility.
The CP solves – UNFCC is best suited to address climate change migration
C. EXISTING BODIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Having concluded that an expansion of the existing Refugee Convention or a rights-based multilateral
treaty will not sufficiently protect climate change migrants, this section explores the potential role of
various U.N. bodies in addressing climate migration.191
1. General Assembly. — While the General Assembly represents the primary democratic body within the
U.N., it is ill suited to address climate migration within its narrow mandate.192 Despite its limited role,
one scholar has argued that the General Assembly should take a lead role in addressing climate
migration.193 Professor Benoit Mayer argues that the Security Council should pass a resolution
“recognizing the security challenge posed by climate-induced migration and the necessity for
international action.”194 Then, according to Mayer, the General Assembly could create a global fund,
agency, and panel dedicated to the issue.195 While it is true that the General Assembly has the
authority to create subsidiary bodies,196 such bodies are often tasked with implementing specific
treaties or providing support to governments.197
The traditionally limited scope of the General Assembly makes such an expansive role unlikely. No other
scholar has suggested a sizable role for the U.N. General Assembly, likely due to its traditionally passive
role.198 It is true that a General Assembly–led program presents some democratic advantages, since
resolutions require a majority vote,199 but the UNFCCC has similar democratic advantages and already
addresses climate change.200
2. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. — While the UNHCR currently protects refugees
from conflict and political oppres-sion, it cannot actively protect climate change migrants under its
mandate to implement the 1951 Refugee Convention.201 Moreover, the UNHCR itself seems unwilling
to directly tackle climate migration; a Senior Policy Advisor at the UNHCR recently stated as much in an
interview with the International Bar Association.202
While climate change displacement clearly has human rights impli-cations and conjures up images of
traditional refugees, it does not necessarily follow that human rights and refugee law should address
climate-related displacement, as this would further fragment the re-sponse of the international
community to climate change. Given the real and persuasive arguments against associating climate
change displace-ment directly with existing refugee law,203 this Note argues that the issue should be
dealt with through the UNFCCC process.
3. UNFCCC. — The UNFCCC is best suited to address climate change migration through the newly
proposed (but not yet fully considered) Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility.204 The
UNFCCC represents the primary international mechanism for addres-sing climate change:205 It
operates as the framework Convention under which all other climate change agreements are
situated.206 As noted above, most commenters who have considered this issue have argued for one of
two things: adapting the 1951 Refugee Convention or negotiating a new multilateral treaty.207 This is
likely because most authorities believed that the UNFCCC process could not handle this issue given the
historical failure of the UNFCCC system to properly address emissions. Further, commenters have
correctly noted that the Framework Convention was never intended to handle human rights issues of
this scope. As Professors Docherty and Giannini put it, “[T]he UNFCCC primarily concerns state-to-state
relations; it does not discuss duties that states have to individuals or communities, such as those laid out
in human rights or refugee law” and “is also preventive in nature and less focused on the remedial
actions . . . needed in a refugee context.”208
While Professors Docherty and Giannini were correct at the time of writing, recent developments make
clear that the UNFCCC considered a “Climate Change Coordination Facility” at the 2015 Paris COP21.209
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement focused primarily on emissions limits (through the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions process) and Loss and Damage; it left displacement for future
consideration.210 However, given the current international momentum, the UNFCCC is best suited to
address climate migration.
First, by treating displacement as a climate change issue, the UNFCCC has essential institutional capital
that would aid negotiations.211 Further, by situating displacement within the UNFCCC, countries can
negotiate emissions targets and other climate-related issues in one place, providing maximum
negotiation flexibility.212 Finally, while the UNFCCC has not historically addressed human rights
issues,213 the UNFCCC has begun to tackle Loss and Damage and the fact that displacement was on the
agenda suggests the global community is moving in that direction.214 Given the timing of these
developments in Paris, no commenter has explored what a Displacement Facility might look like in
practice215 —that is precisely what this Note seeks to do.
4. U.N. Security Council. — Given its expansive role in the international system to protect “peace and
security,” the Security Council could play a role in addressing climate displacement.216 Various
commenters have addressed the Council’s role in tackling climate change, though all of them focus
exclusively on reducing emissions.217 First, the Council could clearly address discrete security threats
caused (to whatever degree) by climate change displacement, just as it would in dealing with any other
global crisis that threatens peace and security.218 A few commenters have argued that the Council
could go further and act as a compliance arm of the UNFCCC to enforce emissions targets, or perhaps
create entirely new emissions targets independent of the UNFCCC.219 Importantly, any Security Council
action would first require a finding that climate change represents a threat to peace and security,220 a
step the Council has yet to take. However, the Council has already “expressed concern” that instability
and sea level rise could create peace and security issues221 and migration has sparked Security Council
action in the past.222
Political difficulties notwithstanding, the Security Council could play a substantial backstop or
enforcement role in addressing climate change displacement. As the previous analysis shows, practical
and legal difficulties abound in amending the 1951 Refugee Convention or negotiating a rights-based
multilateral treaty modeled after existing refugee law; neither would adequately protect climate change
migrants given the scope of climate migration on the horizon. Part III provides a way forward through a
cooperative UNFCCC solution.
Ext. UNFCCC S
The UNFCCC can solve climate migration – it must be expanded
I. SCOPE OF DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Though some scientific uncertainty exists at the margins, the factual link between human activity and
climate change is now widely accepted.22 This Part reviews the scientific connection between human
activity, climate change, and the predicted scope of forced migration. Section I.A discusses the
relationship between climate science and migration, with a particular focus on climate change
“migrants” and current predictions for the scope of the migration problem.23 Section I.B examines
existing refugee law, namely the 1951 Refugee Convention.24 Section I.C intro-duces the framework for
entities in the U.N. system that could address climate migration. In sum, Part I provides the backdrop,
both in terms of climate change migration and the existing legal landscape, that informs the solution
proposed in Part III.
A. CLIMATE SCIENCE AND THE PREDICTED SCOPE OF CLIMATE MIGRATION
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) determined that it is “extremely likely” (defined
as a likelihood of ninety-five- to one-hundred- percent) that human activity is the primary cause of
climate change.25 This section introduces essential climate science to underscore the scope of forced
migration, discusses definitional issues, and underscores numerical estimates of forced migration.26
While the definitional debate might seem semantic, pinning down an exact definition is crucial to
defining the scope of the solution.27
1. Climate Science and Forced Migration. — Climate change, as defined by the IPCC, refers to any
identifiable change in climate over time, “whether due to natural variability or as a result of human
activity.”28 Nearly all reputable scientists believe that climate change is both occur-ring and caused by
humans.29 However, accepting that greenhouse gas emissions represent the “dominant cause of the
observed warming since the mid-20th Century,” as the IPCC found,30 is not necessarily the linchpin of
the analysis. Even if climate change was caused by natural variations in climate,31 which the IPCC
resolutely disputes, the world would still face a migration crisis.32
In the most recent IPCC report on adaptation to climate change, the panel noted two types of forced
migration that will occur: migration as a response to extreme weather events (likely to increase due to
climate change33 ) and migration due to “longer-term climate variability and change” (presumably from
sea level rise) that will envelop small island nations.34 Climate change can create instability in other
ways, including changing precipitation patterns (leading to desertification), melting polar ice caps, and
increasing the frequency of extreme weather events (including storms, heat waves, droughts, etc.).35
Some have even argued that forced migration due (in part) to climate change has already occurred,
specifically in Somalia in the 1990s36 and in Syria during the fall of 2015.37 The cause of these events
remains hotly contested,38 which highlights complex causation issues associated with pinning a
particular weather event on climate change39 or singling out an individual’s choice to migrate.40 In
sum, even if climate change is not the sole or primary cause of instability following a weather event, it
makes bad situations much worse and will undoubtedly lead to migration of startling magnitude. This is
precisely the problem that this Note seeks to address.
2. Defining Climate Migrants and the Academic Terminology Debate. — Providing a clear definition for
those displaced by climate change has proven surprisingly difficult,41 due in large part to causation
issues.42 This Note adopts the terminology “Climate Change Migrants,”43 which refers to “those
whose movement is triggered” in substantial part “by the effects of climate change.”44 This broad
definition is meant to capture both internal and external climate migrants, as well as movement
occurring due to slow-onset impacts (such as sea level rise), sudden environmental disasters, and
resource scarcity or conflict stemming in part from climate change. However, the definition is limited to
capture those who move due to the effects of climate change, as opposed to all environmental
disasters, primarily in order to cabin the issue within the confines of the UNFCCC.45 While tedious
discussion of defining the group affected by climate migration might seem overly pedantic, the
definition delineates the substantive scope of the solution.
As the definition adopted herein includes internal displacement, it is key to recognize the distinction
between internal and external displacement. “Internally displaced people,” or those who move within
their own country, will likely make up a large majority of climate-related displacement, at least at
first.46 This definitional choice improves the utility of the proposal by including the majority of early
migrants but nevertheless confines the issue to climate change migration in the interest of political
feasibility. Currently, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement indicate that
“[n]ational authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.”47 That is, if people were forced to
relocate within Bangladesh, Bangladesh would bear the primary responsibility for protecting their
human rights.48 Defining the group to include all environmental migration could be perceived as
infringing on domestic law by attempting to control how countries address a broad scope of internal
displacement (rather than displacement caused primarily by climate change). While the nonbinding
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement cover internal displacement,49 nothing comparable exists
for cross-border climate migration.50
To avoid encroaching on the role of states in addressing internal displacement,51 some commenters
have defined climate change migrants narrowly to focus only on cross-border displacement. For
instance, the Nansen Initiative, created by Norway and Switzerland, focuses exclusively on cross-border
climate change migration.52 It attempts to form a nonbinding coalition of states and develop best
practices (a “soft-law approach”53 ) to protect cross-border climate migrants.54 Similarly, Prof-essors
Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini define the group narrowly to include cross-border migration from
“sudden or gradual environmental disruption . . . consistent with climate change.”55 Since the vast
majority of displacement will likely be internal (at least in the short term),56 such a definition
eliminates a sizable percentage of the affected group. Furthermore, focusing exclusively on cross-border
displacement limits the scope “implicitly within the preoccupations of the ‘developed’ world, with all of
the attendant security concerns—and perhaps even the xenophobic reactions—that such a stance
entails.”57
Having defined the scope broadly, this section now briefly turns to terminology issues. Authors have
used a variety of terms to describe the affected group, including “climate refugees,”58 “environmental
refugees,”59 “climate change migrants,”60 etc. While various commenters have advocated for the
term “climate refugees,”61 the term has received substantial pushback. Using the term “refugee” could
cement and ossify an outdated term, as has occurred with the 1951 Refugee Convention,62 and
unintentionally water down the already tenuous rights of existing refugees.63 Instead, this Note uses
the term “climate change migrants,”64 which more accurately describes the situation both legally and
practically. Legally, using the term “refugee” implies rights and privileges under international law that
simply do not exist—nearly all climate migrants will not qualify for traditional refugee status.65
Practically, since the majority of displacement will remain internal,66 using the term “refugee” could
unnecessarily confuse the matter.67 Finally, the multicausal nature of climate change disasters and
individual migration decisions cautions against using the term “refugee.”68
3. Numerical Estimates of Climate Change Migration. — While exact estimates of the number of people
displaced by climate change vary considerably, the numbers will prove staggering if one includes
internal migration.69 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that “between 50 and
200 million people may move by the middle of the century, either within their countries or across
borders, on a permanent or temporary basis.”70 Earlier estimates ranged from 200 to 250 million
people by the middle of the century.71 Importantly, the majority of those displaced will likely move
gradually and internally, and causation remains difficult to pin down.72 Even climate change scholar
Professor Jane McAdam calls these “alarmist figures,” noting the complex causation issues associated
with giving a clear estimate.73 For example, suppose a family lives on a small island in the Pacific Ocean
and ocean water rises high enough to make the groundwater undrinkable.74 That family might first
move inland multiple times before finally leaving the country entirely.75 And when that family moves
permanently, the process of displacement will prove gradual and sporadic.76
The use of a broad and inclusive definition to capture internal displacement allows for causation
uncertainty. Just as causation issues abound in defining the group of climate change migrants,77
causation makes estimating the precise group likely to be displaced nearly impos-sible.78 The decision
to abandon one’s home is often complicated and multifaceted, except perhaps when sea level rise
makes an island nation completely uninhabitable.79
B. INTRODUCING THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: LIMITED COVERAGE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
MIGRANTS
While some climate migrants will move across borders (similar to traditional refugees), the vast majority
of them will not receive protection under existing law.80 This section introduces sources of
international law and explores existing refugee law. Major sources of international law typically include
customary law or a treaty,81 which is defined as “an international agreement concluded between states
in written form and governed by international law.”82 A convention, like the UNFCCC,83 typically
refers to a large multilateral treaty84 that addresses a specific topic—like climate change in the case of
the UNFCCC—and often involves international bodies and modifying protocols.85 Soft law, which plays
a large role in this Note, “is generally used to describe international instruments that their makers
recognize are not treaties.”86 In other words, soft law refers to nonbinding “pledges,” rather than
binding treaties or “contracts.”87 Soft-law mechanisms include things like guiding principles, such as
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement88 and the Nansen Initiative.89
The primary international mechanism that protects the legal rights of displaced persons is the 1951
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention” or “1951 Convention”),90 which
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carries out.91 The 1951 Convention defines
refugees as:Any person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country . . . .92
Generally speaking, the 1951 Convention grants those defined as refugees access to the judicial system,
public education, and a right to work.93 Perhaps most importantly, the 1951 Convention includes
non-refoulement protection, which provides that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.”94 These five protected statuses (race, religion, nationality, and membership
of a social group or political opin-ion) derive from the foundational Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.95
The vast majority of climate change migrants will have no recourse under international law. Under
Article I, refugees must have a “well-founded fear” of persecution coming from their own government
on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”96 This would prove problematic, as climate change affects all people in a nation regardless of
these factors.97 Climate migrants from less-developed nations will also have a difficult time proving
that persecution came from within their nation,98 especially because those nations most likely to bear
the burden of sea level rise will be those that did not cause the bulk of emissions driving climate change
in the first place.99 The original treaty was drafted just after World War II to address refugees fleeing
into Europe;100 the original drafters did not contemplate climate change or environmental
displacement.101 Finally, the 1951 Convention focused entirely on refugees that flee one country for
another, making it inapplicable to internal displacement that will make up the bulk of early climate
migration.102
A small subset of climate migrants could fall under the 1951 Convention, but these cases will prove few
and far between. In the event of a natural disaster, victims might flee if “their government has
consciously withheld or obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalize them on one of the five
grounds” associated with establishing refugee status.103 They might also find protection if a natural
disaster or other climate-related event (such as drought or resource scarcity) causes violent social
conflict.104 In both instances, though, the 1951 Convention would only apply to climate migrants
because the circumstances created violent conflict or oppression, on its own terms, with no relation to
climate-related disasters.C. RELEVANT BODIES OF THE U.N. SYSTEM AND THEIR MANDATES
Various bodies of the U.N. system could potentially address forced climate migration, though none of
them can do so effectively without a dramatic change to current law. These U.N. bodies receive their
mandates from the U.N. Charter (for example, the General Assembly and Security Council), treaty law
(UNFCCC and UNHCR), and even General Assembly Resolutions (UNHCR, in part). This section briefly
sketches the mandates of these U.N. bodies.
1. General Assembly. — The General Assembly functions as the primary democratic body of the United
Nations, but its role remains functionally limited by its narrow mandate in the U.N. Charter. Under the
Charter, the General Assembly may discuss and make recom-mendations (to Members of the United
Nations or the Security Council) on any matter within the scope of the Charter or related to international
peace and security.105 Thus, whereas the Security Council has a far larger role in the international
system,106 the General Assembly is often functionally limited to making recommendations and
initiating studies.107
2. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. — While some climate change migrants will move
across borders, the UNHRC has limited capacity to help them.108 The UNHCR is primarily responsible for
“providing international protection” for refugees, as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention.109 For
the UNHCR to address climate migration completely, those displaced by climate change would have to
qualify as refugees under the Refugee Convention,110 which is almost certainly not the case.111
3. UNFCCC. — The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,112 implemented by the
Conference of the Parties, represents the primary international legal text devoted to combatting climate
change. The UNFCCC is a framework convention under which future agreements are signed (for
example, the Kyoto Protocol113 ). In December 2015, the UNFCCC parties met for COP21 in Paris,
setting a goal of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius over preindustrial temperatures (with
surprising aspirational language seeking to limit warming to one-and-one-half degrees Celsius).114 The
agreement also includes provisions on Loss and Damage, which refers to damage caused by the adverse
effects of climate change, by extending the Warsaw Mechanism.115 The agreement only mentions
displacement in passing; the Coordination Facility was left for another day.116
4. U.N. Security Council. — The U.N. Security Council is primarily responsible for maintaining
international peace and security, which could arguably apply to climate migration.117 The Council
includes fifteen voting member states, including five permanent member states that retain veto power
over all Security Council actions.118 Although the U.N. Charter ostensibly limits the Security Council to
maintaining international peace and security, the Council itself determines what falls within its
purview.119 The Charter provides that the Security Council must act within the “Purpose and Principles
of the United Nations,”120 but most commenters agree that the Council enjoys nearly unlimited
discretion to make an Article 39 determination.121 Thus, if the Security Council found that climate
migration represents a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”122 it may then
employ Chapter VII powers, including economic sanctions (Article 41) and potentially the use of force
(Article 42).123
The Security Council has considered climate change on a few different occasions, including two formal
debates (in 2007 and 2011) and two “Arria-Formula” meetings.124 During nearly all of the debates, the
Council has found itself divided—the United States, United Kingdom, and France have all supported an
expanded role for the Council; Russia and China (backed by much of the developing world) oppose such
action.125 To date, the Security Council has taken no direct action on climate change apart from a 2011
Presidential Statement, which reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the primary body addressing climate
change.126 The Statement also expressed concern both “over the possible adverse effects of climate
change that may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security”
and for “possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise may
arise, in particular in small low-lying island States.”127 This understanding could pave the way for
future Security Council action.
As the foregoing analysis shows, current refugee law and the existing U.N. system are incapable of
addressing climate change migration in their present form. Part II presents and analyzes various (though
ultimately flawed) academic proposals for addressing this pressing issue.
Args against the UN assume the UNHCR – that’s not the CP
II. FINDING A WAY FORWARD: PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION
Given the wealth of scientific evidence supporting anthropogenic climate change and displacement
estimates, the world is staring down a migration crisis of unfathomable scope;128 yet the existing
international law protections remain inadequate. Section II.A investigates the existing refugee laws and
the possibility of amending the 1951 Refugee Convention to include those displaced by climate change,
concluding in large part that this option is wrongheaded.129 Section II.B considers the scholarly
literature recommending a new multilateral treaty to address climate migration,130 including
expanding migrants’ rights and funding.131 Given the glacial pace of climate talks on mitigation,132
section II.C delves into existing U.N. bodies and their mandates to flesh out a potential role for the
current structure of the United Nations,133 concluding that the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties is
best posi-tioned to address climate change migration.
A. THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: CURRENT INADEQUACY AND POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS
The 1951 Refugee Convention represents the seminal international legal mechanism protecting
refugees, providing them with access to the judicial system, public education, a right to work, and
protection against nonrefoulement.134 This section first illustrates the inadequacy of tra-ditional
refugee law in protecting climate change migrants before addressing the possibility of amending the
1951 Convention.
1. Existing Refugee Law and a Legal Gap for Climate Change Migrants. — Despite a few potential (very
narrow) scenarios,135 the vast majority of climate change migrants will almost certainly not fit the 1951
Refugee Convention’s definition, which requires that applicants have a “well-founded fear” of
persecution coming from their own government on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, or
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”136
While a small subset of commenters suggests that climate migrants fit under existing law,137 the
majority of commenters reject this view.138 In fact, the New Zealand High Court recently held that a
Kiribati man fleeing to New Zealand could not claim refugee status under the 1951 Convention,139
finding the claims “novel” but “unconvincing.”140 While this decision would not bind other courts,141
it reflects the majority opinion. Some commenters have argued that the simplest solution to the climate
migration issue would be to amend the existing 1951 Convention,142 which has been amended
previously to account for changing global consensus. In 1967, the parties to the 1951 Convention
amended the agreement to eliminate a temporal limitation that only covered persecution prior to 1951
but left the core elements of the refugee definition unchanged.143 However, such an action has run
into staunch criticism144 and might prove just as difficult as negotiating an entirely new treaty.145
In lieu of a global solution, regional organizations could expand the 1951 Refugee Convention’s
definition on a local basis, although such an expansion would be limited in application. Two regional
bodies have taken this path. The African Union146 has expanded the definition to include those leaving
their country of origin “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously
disturbing the public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.”147
Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration, a nonbinding declaration adopted by nations in Central America,
expands the refugee definition to include “persons who have fled their country because their lives,
safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts,
massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public
order.”148 Under either expanded definition, a natural disaster could arguably constitute a
circumstance that “disturb[s] the public order,”149 but neither was explicitly intended to cover
environmental displacement.150
Despite this, neither of the above expansions ultimately provides a silver bullet. Unhelpfully, both of
these frameworks only apply regionally (to Africa and Central America, respectively), not to Small Island
Developing States. And although the African Union definition is binding on signatory states, the
Cartagena Declaration is not. These regional mechanisms aside, the text of the 1951 Convention and the
majority view of the academic literature suggest climate migrants will find little protection in existing
law.
2. Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention. — One logical option for protecting climate change migrants
is simply to expand the existing definition to include those displaced by climate change.151 The 1951
Refugee Convention protects individuals forced to flee from their home country due to “well-founded
fear” of persecution on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.”152 As discussed above, this definition is unlikely to cover climate change migrants
in its current form.153
On first glance, amending the existing treaty might appear to present the path of least resistance. The
1951 Convention already has a well-developed system protecting refugees that provides for access to
the judicial system, public education, the right to work, and nonrefoule-ment.154 Further, countries
already have domestic law implementing these provisions.155 Additionally, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, which protects those displaced by war or conflict, could provide the same
support to those displaced by climate change.156 One could even argue that the massive causation
issues associated with climate migration actually lend support to a more inclusive definition of refugees,
similar to the one used in the African Union, which would in-clude a broader array of people beyond
even climate change migrants.157
Despite these perceived advantages, amending the existing 1951 Convention will likely run into
staunch criticism. First, many fear that amending the existing treaty “would devalue the current
protection for refugees.”158 Amending the Convention to include a broad and inclusive definition
could also open up the floodgates and overwhelm an already over-stretched system.159 Indeed, the
Office of the U.N. High Commis-sioner for Refugees has already spoken out against expanding the 1951
definition.160 While not controlling, the UNHCR’s position arguably serves as a fair voice of the refugee
community. Amending the treaty would also provide protection only for a very narrow subset of
migrants—those who move across borders—as the vast majority of migration will initially remain
internal.161 Amending the 1951 Convention, then, would face an uphill battle and if successful, would
only protect a small number of migrants.
While some perceived advantages could inure from placing climate migrants within the existing refugee
system, such a decision would likely prove both too much and too little. It would prove too much
because causation issues and pushback from the human rights community would stifle any attempt at
an amendment; it would prove too little because it would provide only marginal relief by focusing solely
on cross-border displacement. For both reasons, the vital protection of climate change migrants must
come from outside the 1951 Convention.
The UNFCC solves best and doesn’t cause conservative backlash

III: A REASONED SOLUTION: UNFCCC, REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Early negotiation documents for the Paris COP21 discussed a “Climate Change Displacement
Coordination Facility,” housed within the UNFCCC, to protect the rights of those displaced by climate
change. This Part builds on the broad strokes from these early discussions to illustrate how a
Displacement Coordination Facility would operate in practice to best protect the rights of migrants.223
The negotiation docu-ments represent the inspiration for this work, but no details were provided in the
documents and no commenter has developed an insti-tutional framework around this issue.
Section III.A advances the argument in favor of a regional approach to cross-border displacement, with a
particular focus on the importance of self-determination. Section III.B outlines the short-term vision for
the Facility, which would focus on soft-law approaches, funding internal displacement through the
Green Climate Fund, and long-term displace-ment research. Section III.C embraces the long-term goal:
allowing the Facility to act as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements (and potentially to
evolve into a more formal refugee system as necessary). Finally, section III.C also outlines a role for the
U.N. Security Council to address climate change displacement. This Part concludes that soft-law and
regional/bilateral agreements would best protect the rights of climate change migrants in a politically
feasible way.
A. THE CASE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR CROSS-BORDER

DISPLACEMENT
Before addressing the structure and purpose of the Coordination Facility, including funding mechanisms
to address internal displacement, this section introduces a key aspect of the proposal related to cross-
border displacement: regional self-determination. Regional agreements, as opposed to a large-scale
multilateral agreement, would grease the wheels of negotiation and avoid the lowest-common-
denominator solu-tion that occurs in international negotiations.224
Regional agreements, rather than a large multilateral agreement based on common but differentiated
responsibilities,225 would allow displaced persons a chance to retain some level of cultural integrity.
While common but differentiated responsibilities should certainly play a role, those displaced from small
island nations should have some say (at least through their government) in their ultimate relocation in
order to preserve their cultural integrity.226 Some might argue that cultural identity and integrity
represent an idealistic (bordering on naïve) benchmark and that climate migrants will ignore such
considerations when they are faced with the realities of mass displacement. However, these background
principles of international law should not be so readily discarded. The concept of self-determination
remains a central tenet of international law—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”227 The
Coordination Facility should honor this by fostering regional or bilateral agreements that allow for self-
determination.228
Detractors would argue that under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, those
most responsible for climate change should bear the largest burden in addressing its adverse effects.229
Under such a formulation, the United States, for instance, should perhaps accept the most refugees
based on historical emissions.230 Some have even argued for a type of cap-and-trade for refugee
quotas.231 Pigeon-holing climate change migrants into certain parts of the world based on quotas
(perhaps based on historical emissions) could satisfy one’s sense of fairness, but it might not represent
the preferences of those actually displaced, which ought to remain a primary concern.232 This has been
underscored by commenters such as Professor Jane McAdam, who notes that “a protection-like
response may not necessarily respond to communities’ human rights concerns, especially those relating
to cultural integrity, self-determination and statehood.”233
Any international effort to help those displaced by climate change should encompass the option for
regional and bilateral treaties to allow migration of populations within SIDS to move en masse to
another territory. Admittedly, the concept of en masse migration presents difficulties associated with
retaining nationality and whether en masse migration would then allow for some quasi-statehood
designation.234 Analysis of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this Note. But the core point
nonetheless remains: Those living on SIDS should have the option to negotiate regional or bilateral
agreements that would allow people to retain their cultural identity. En masse migration certainly
presents feasibility concerns, but self-determination and preserving cultural heritage are goals the
international community should not readily abandon at the first sign of difficulty.
Countries like the United States, presumably hoping to avoid an influx of immigrants, might attempt to
eschew responsibility for accepting displaced people by providing funds to the Green Climate Fund to
aid migration (either internal or external) instead of accepting migrants through a bilateral treaty. This
type of xenophobia is admittedly a concern, and a regional approach clearly relies on negotiation of
regional and bilateral mechanisms that may ultimately require a backstop.235 This also raises the
question of self-determination for those accepting migrants and whether state and local governments
would have a say in the matter.236 Political concerns aside, cultural integrity should represent the
underpinning of the Coordination Facility’s work, and supporting regional and bilateral agreements
would allow individual small island nations to guide their own paths.
B. SHORT TERM: REGIONAL COOPERATION AND “SOFT-LAW” APPROACHES
This section addresses the short-term work of the Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility,
which should focus primarily on a few key goals. First, the Facility should work with the Nansen
Initiative to support regional soft-law agreements to address early displacement.237 This would also
include providing support to negotiating states in the form of guiding principles, which could involve
combining existing mechanisms (for example, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the
Nansen Initiative’s Cross-Border Displacement Principles). The Facility should also conduct studies on
which areas are most suitable for accepting displaced climate change migrants to allow for en masse
migration. Finally, the Facility should use existing UNFCCC mechanisms to address internal
displacement by filling the funding gap through the Green Climate Fund.
Even if a Coordination Facility is created, some migration may begin to occur before binding regional or
bilateral treaties are negotiated between states. In the event that this occurs, the Facility should act as a
co-ordi-nation body, in conjunction with the Nansen Initiative,238 to promote a “soft-law” approach to
addressing climate change displace-ment.239 Since the Nansen Initiative has created substantial
institutional structure, including guiding principles,240 starting from scratch would prove superfluous.
The Facility should build on these existing structures, adopting identical or similar guiding principles
when necessary, and work with the Nansen Initiative to support those displaced by climate change in
the early stages. Since the Nansen Initiative is a nongovernmental organization,241 a cooperative
relationship between the Nansen Initiative and the UNFCCC’s Climate Change Displacement
Coordination Facility would enhance the legitimacy and scope of both operations. Since the Facility
would ideally encourage en masse migra-tion to retain cultural integrity, the Facility should begin early
research on which areas are suitable for accepting large populations (i.e., those with adequate land and
water resources without too many current residents).
While one might argue that the UNFCCC should not actively address climate change displacement since
it was never designed to handle human rights issues of this scale,242 this ignores the political reality of
the current situation. While the Paris Agreement essentially agrees to continue discussing Loss and
Damage,243 global leaders seem to be honing in on a one-stop international body to address all
climate-related issues, which would include displacement and other adaptation problems.244 Further,
the Paris negotiations recently demonstrated the value of allowing parties to compromise on adaptation
issues for con-cessions on emissions mitigation.245
Additionally, the Coordination Facility would not simply replace or supplement the Nansen Initiative.
The Nansen Initiative, which is a nongovernmental organization, focuses entirely on cross-border
displace-ment. This “soft-law” method could combine the Nansen Initiative’s approach to cross-border
displacement with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement246 to create a holistic set of
guiding principles to address climate displacement. Finally, the Coordination Facility could operate as
the clearinghouse under which nonbinding agreements are negotiated to ensure that climate change
migrants are adequately protected. A clearinghouse structure would provide states with self-
determination and an institutional structure to support negotiations and protect the rights of migrants.
Since most migration will begin internally, the Facility initially should focus on addressing funding issues
associated with internal displacement. The funding gap could potentially be met through existing
UNFCCC mechanisms, namely the Green Climate Fund, which was designed (in part) to help vulnerable
communities adapt to climate change.247 While the Green Climate Fund has been inadequately funded
thus far,248 it represents the primary UNFCCC mechanism designed to handle adaptation issues. While
the Paris Agreement’s Loss and Damage provisions “[do] not involve or provide a basis for any liability or
compensation,”249 developed countries seem willing to discuss adaptation measures like Loss and
Damage (so long as it does not expressly create international legal liability).250 Finally, the UNFCCC has
thus far acted mainly in the mitigation context to reduce emissions.251 Instead of wait-ing for a natural
disaster to occur or the seas to rise, the Coordination Facility should proactively strengthen local
communities where displace-ment is likely to occur by improving resilience and planned
migration/disaster response to avoid some displacement altogether.252
Further, domestic U.S. politics make it extremely unlikely that a top-down, rights-based treaty that
requires acceptance of climate change migrants will be ratified, at least in the near future. The United
States is currently in the midst of a wave of anti-immigration sentiment,253 which arguably borders
on racism and xenophobia.254 Additionally, many of those who staunchly oppose accepting refugees
from war-torn Syria also deny climate change.255 At best this combination creates an additional barrier
to a rights-based approach; at worst it represents a source of cli-mate change denial. Whatever
underlies these positions (and whatever their merit), it is unimaginable that the U.S. Senate would
provide advice and consent on a treaty that requires acceptance of climate migrants.256 Accordingly,
the Facility should narrow its short-term focus to studying the viability of certain areas for resettlement,
along with supporting soft-law and regional/bilateral negotiation support. This approach might even find
favor with those who are dubious of U.S. participation in climate change negotiations.257 The solution
proposed herein attempts to protect climate change migrants from having to flee to the United States
without a right to enter an already overburdened immigration system. The proposed solution creates no
obligation to accept large populations of climate change migrants, at least in the short term, and would
thus prove more politically palatable to conservative factions in the United States.
C. LONG TERM: REGIONAL AND BILATERAL TREATIES AND A ROLE FOR THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
This section explores a long-term role for the Displacement Coordination Facility. First, the UNFCCC’s
Facility should act as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements to address cross-border
displacement. Second, the Facility should lay the groundwork for a potential expansion to a rights-based
treaty if regional agreements do not develop quickly enough. Lastly, the UNFCCC’s Coordination Facility
could act in concert with the U.N. Security Council to serve as a stopgap and enforcement wing to
protect the rights of displaced people.
1. Long-Term Strategy: Binding Regional Agreements. — In the long term, the UNFCCC should act as the
primary umbrella organization under which regional and bilateral agreements between states are
negotiated to address climate change displacement.258 Further, the UNFCCC could even establish a
panel of member states to review and approve regional or bilateral agreements for the protection of
those involved.259 Regional agreements provide the most flexibility for those displaced by climate
change, including ways for them to retain their cultural identity,260 but the Facility must provide some
additional assurance that a regional or bilateral agreement guarantees the rights of displaced migrants.
The solution should be informed by current failures to protect the rights of displaced migrants. For
instance, Australia has utilized the controversial practice of intercepting migrants coming into the
country by boat and paying nearby countries to accept them into asylum camps.261 The conditions at
these camps have been widely criticized, supporting the notion that the Facility should play some role in
protecting climate change migrants on the ground where necessary.262
The primary critique of this regional/bilateral approach is that it relies essentially on states to volunteer
to accept entire large groups of climate change migrants. Admittedly, without an international treaty
creating this obligation explicitly, as the 1951 Refugee Convention does, this approach assumes a lot.263
However, the benefits of autonomy and cultural integrity necessitate that the global community gives
countries an opportunity, within a structured UNFCCC environment, to negotiate regional agreements.
In addition to the benefits of a regional approach, the political environment likely would not support a
top-down multi-lateral treaty like the 1951 Refugee Convention.264 Moreover, the Facility could lay the
proper groundwork for a potential expansion. The Facility could study which areas are most suitable for
large-scale migration and support regional and bilateral agreements before shifting toward a more
difficult-to-negotiate rights-based agreement.
Solves the aff by resettling climate-refugees and providing a strategy to combat
climate change
There are others that believe another possible course of action to be a Protocol negotiated under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) on the Recognition, Protection,
and Resettlement of Climate-refugees, based on the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities” and respective capabilities (“CBDR–RC”).143 Their position is considered to be more
advantageous than the creation of a new treaty, because the principle of CBDR–RC and full incremental
costs are already included in the UNFCCC, thus another protocol would not need to establish a
completely new legal basis.144 They believe that the Protocol should include a strict definition of
climate-refugees that could, in turn, lead to a more international acceptance, and specific “visa
requirements” that would allow climate-refugees to migrate with dignity.145 It should also provide for
a duty to take action and prevent a person from becoming a climate-refugee, involving a burden-
sharing mechanism, recognition of the causal relationship between climate change and statelessness,
and if the case, the grant of citizenship for stateless climate-refugees by the host nations.146
Moreover, affected countries should be under an obligation to implement adaptation measures, while
the biggest emitters and wealthiest countries provide financial aid and expertise.147 The distribution of
financial resources should be regulated under a newly established fund called the “‘Climate Refugee
Protection and Resettlement Fund’ which should be financed by the parties to the UNFCCC and be based
on the principle of full incremental costs.” 148 Having in place a binding instrument and a legal status
for climate-refugees will impose obligations and award rights for host countries, climate-refugees,
countries of origins, and the international community, especially through the principle of responsibility
for the largest GHG emitters. Climate-refugees will not be left behind, according to the commitment
“leave no one behind” made by the international community during the World Humanitarian Summit
held in Istanbul in 2016.149 Also, it could help tackle some of the key challenges present in UNHCR
humanitarian operations as they relate to the energy access and environmental management for the
affected population, namely funds and technical expertise (i.e., a cooperation between energy experts
and humanitarian experts). “from the protection of nearly 25 million refugees and IDPs to hundreds of
millions of internal or international climate migrants,” there are other actors in place that can assist and
help UNHCR in its reorganization process.150 As such, besides UNHCR, there will be other existing
institutions that can play an important role in protecting climate-refugees, such as but not limited to
United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”), World Bank, United Nations Environment Program
(“UNEP”) and UNFCCC.151 Even though UNHCR lacks the technical expertise and funds to deal with
energy access and implementation of sustainable energy projects for refugees, in the case of climate-
refugees this divide can be filled, as new technical expertise and funds can be made accessible from the
new actors involved.
The CP is a long-term solution that can prevent future climate refugees by developing
an avenue to prevent global climate change from accelerating
Although climate change is a global phenomenon, its consequences “are not equally distributed
among” nations.221 For example, sea level rise and ocean warming will predominantly affect low-lying
coastal areas and islands, “[t]he Arctic region is warming twice as fast as any other region” and China is
more “threatened by rising seas and flood waters” than any other nation.222 Moreover, climate
change will disproportionately impact developing countries, which “have onethird of the world’s
residents and yet contribute only 7% of total global emissions.”223 Developing countries also lack the
necessary means to address the devastating impacts of climate change.224 This is an example where
energy justice can help inform policy choices. Additionally, “[c]limate change is gradually divorcing us
from our land and eroding our subsistence way of life,” forcing people to migrate and seek refuge
elsewhere.225 Climate-refugees originate from and typically migrate to the poorer regions and
countries, those that have contributed less to the effects of climate change, with most of the migration
occurring within the respective borders and only sometimes occurring cross-border or
internationally.226 When crossing an international border, climate-refugees have been more likely to
migrate to developing countries than to developed ones.227 The developing nations also bear the
burden of providing for them, in spite of the fact that they “are heavily dependent on agriculture,
lacking resources and possibilities to prevent further environmental crisis,” and are therefore unfit to
accommodate the increasing number of climaterefugees.228 Additionally, the capacity of developing
nations to accommodate climate-refugees is affected by poor government policy, increasing
population, excessive exploitation of natural resources, and a lack of community adaptation
mechanisms to natural disasters.229 Not only is climate change induced displacement a long-term
phenomenon that will continue to produce climate-refugees, it has the capacity to degrade or to
contribute to an already unstable environment in many host states. Questions of energy justice help us
understand the vital intergenerational equities. For example, a painful irony is that “infrastructure
decisions made today may still be important decades from now.”230 Additionally, as ethicist Henry Shue
has argued, “future generations will be more severely damaged by climate change than present
generations – indeed, they will be its greatest victims, especially in the relatively near future before
physical and psychological adaptations can set in for the lucky.”231 If this is true, an image of the
autonomy of each human, present or future, will lead us on a path that favors mitigations over
adaptation; an image that discounts the worth or happiness of future humans will lead us to favor
adaptation and put less effort into mitigation work. The international community, therefore, has a moral
responsibility and duty “to ensure that today’s children and future generations inherit a global
environment at least no worse than the one we received from our predecessors – and that responsibility
extends to preventing climate change and making strategic investments in something known as
‘adaptation’ to increase the . . . resilience of our communities.”232 For example, in terms of host
countries, some adaptation measures, as small as “introduction of improved cookstoves and basic solar
lanterns . . . and solar photovoltaic (PV) mini-grids” can help reduce emissions, costs, environmental
degradation, deforestation, and resource tensions with local communities.233 Additionally, “[e]nergy
investments help integrate displaced populations and provide a legacy asset for local communities.”234
Despite the energy projects employed by the international community, it is becoming clearer that these
projects can present a long-term solution only with the support of the host countries and governments
– in what is being referred to as a quid pro quo match. Thus, host countries that do not have a legal
obligation to provide for climate-refugees may agree to take a different approach when their
“ambitions to increase the sustainability of their energy systems and . . . energy access for their own
populations” are met.235 Another option is to give refugees a larger role in decision making and invite
them to be partners instead of mere recipients in the path towards achieving sustainable energy. For
example, UNHCR has worked with refugees from Dollo Ado, Ethiopia in designing and producing fuel-
efficient cook-stoves.236 Moreover, we cannot talk about achieving energy justice for climate-refugees
without also addressing climate justice, namely how energy “access is to be achieved.”237 In other
words, “how does the international community ensure access to clean energy for the poorest residents
of the poorest nations?”238 In this context, there is little argument against the belief that developed
nations should take the leadership role in combating climate change and increase the energy access in
developing nations.239 Nonetheless, in achieving both climate justice and energy justice, the
international emphasis should turn on “clean energy technology that addresses the needs of
developing economies and the energy poor.”240 Alleviating deprivation — whether energy, economic,
poverty, etc. — in some parts of the world, would in turn be for the benefit of all nations, as “the world
is a far smaller place than once it was.”241 A global approach to climate change induced displacement
will respond to both equity concerns – as the nations responsible for climate change will pay for its
consequences – and efficiency concerns, including both the developed North together with the affected
nations and most of the global South.242 Moreover, a global approach for climate change induced
displacement should be adopted in sync with climate change mitigation strategies, opening the path
towards the creation of an international fund that is comprised by national contributions based on
“the level of emissions of greenhouse gases and/or on the reduction of these emissions.”243 These
beliefs can also be sustained by the principle of CBDR–RC, as also discussed in the previous section,
demanding that states “address the consequences of climate change together, while still differentiating
between states in different situations.”244 In the same time, the CBDR–RC principle requires that “[t]he
special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the leastdeveloped and those most
environmentally vulnerable” be given “special priority.”245 Two interpretations of the CBDR–RC have
been advanced, namely “whether differentiation of responsibility may be based either on historical
emissions, or on financial capabilities.”246 The one based on historical emission is similar to the
“Polluter-Pays Principle” and would serve as an incentive to reduce pollution, while the financial
capability interpretation as “solidarity or generosity” — being voluntary by nature — could weaken the
“moral sense implied by the notion of ‘responsibility.’”247 Nonetheless, climate-refugees provide us
with the certainty that “the future will probably be as messy as the past, and all predictions are likely to
be wrong, but one thing is clear: there is no return to the neat idea of closed-off nation-states with
homogenous national communities.”248 It is time to accept, adapt and take responsibility of the new
reality.
Past international treaties have failed because countries have different agendas—the
plan fiats out of it through a new convention that is in terms with each country
DeGanaro 15- Cary DeGanaro- Executive Office for Immigration Review, University of Colorado School of Law,
“LOOKING INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND”,
2015, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ucollr86&id=1073, // Suraj P
The Montreal Protocol's success in eliminating ozonedepleting substances convinced many that an
international treaty would be the best way to solve climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.226
As Professor William Boyd explained in his article exploring the evolution of environmental law, both the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were modeled off the Montreal Protocol, and most scholars believed
that they would be similarly successful in reducing emissions across the planet. 227 But the major issues
with creating a legal regime based upon international law are that the process is slow and cumbersome,
consensus is elusive, and enforcement is difficult. The international climate regime is composed of
individual sovereign nations, each with its own goals and agenda. 228 For this reason, international
climate governance since the Montreal Protocol has failed to address the biggest issues of
environmental law. 229 Professor Boyd argues that despite the global nature of climate change, a global
solution with a top-down climate change framework is unrealistic and unattainable. 230 Rather,
problem solving in environmental governance should consist of "multiple actors coordinating through a
variety of organizational forms. '231 National regulatory systems thus fit nicely into such a
crossjurisdictional system, making it possible to solve a global problem where it might otherwise be
impossible. 232 Although Professor Boyd's article assessed the structure of global environmental law in
the context of emissions rather than migration, it provides a useful lens through which to view new
patterns of climate change-induced migration. An international, treaty-based system is likely
unattainable in the near future, despite the imminent increase in substantial climate-induced migration.
233 One important question to ask is, "What examples of national, sovereign state law, bilateral
agreements, and regional instruments could provide a roadmap for developing interlocking systems of
complementary and temporary protections? ' 234 This approach, like Professor Boyd's, recognized that
the international community may not be able to craft and implement a timely solution to challenges
such as climate migrants. 235 As Professor Jane McAdam suggested, focusing too narrowly on
establishing a global treaty may allow difficult conversations-such as what the treaty would look like and
who should bear the greatest responsibilities-to impede progress. 236 This would, in turn, shift the focus
away from implementing alternative, more immediate solutions. 237 Professor McAdam points to the
complexity and unsettled nature of the nexus between climate change and human migration as one of
the major impediments to creating a comprehensive international mechanism to deal with this problem.
238 Some scholars continue to argue that an international treaty is the best mechanism to address
climate migrants. 239 For example, Professors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini from Harvard Law
School called for a new climate change refugee convention. 240 They rejected a climate-migrant
solution based on existing international treaties, arguing that these treaties were not created for the
purpose of addressing climate migrants and therefore would not adequately fit their needs.241 They
emphasized that a new convention was needed because it could be interdisciplinary, bring attention to
the problem, and promote the involvement of many actors in creating a flexible solution to fit the
problem. 242 While their argument successfully identified the failures of other proposals, it failed to
take into account the political challenges and long lag-time of implementing an international treaty in a
fractured global community with competing interests. Negotiating a new treaty takes a substantial
amount of time. Additionally, to reach an agreement, the parties might have to concede issues or take
on obligations that they oppose. This could put their compliance with those obligations at risk. On the
other hand, a variety of interlocking bilateral and multilateral agreements would be more flexible and
give each party a sense of ownership over its own obligations. Thus, because the process is lengthy and
cumbersome, the United States cannot wait for the international community to reach consensus on
climate migrants. Moreover, because they do not sufficiently address domestic conditions and politics,
the United States cannot rely on international treaties to solve this problem. For these reasons, the
United States must take responsibility and create its own solution for climate migrants.
Only by addressing climate refugees internationally grants international funding,

technical expertise, and operational treatment that the aff can’t—solves better
CLIMATE-REFUGEES”, THE ENERGY BAR ASSOCIATION, May 2nd 2018, 172, http://www.eba-
Often, the strength of nativist, nationalistic fears cannot be ignored and will not disappear if
disregarded. However, accommodating climate-refugees in the international legal and natural order and
stemming their growth is in the self-interest of all nations because of the serious threat that doing
nothing poses to world stability. Therefore, we stress that concepts of energy justice can help fill and
address the legal gaps and substantive needs faced by climate-refugees, as those concepts offer a
platform, a vocabulary and a history of shared values while at the same time suggesting necessary key
solutions. Starting from the argument that climate change and climate change induced displacement are
permanent phenomena and the recognition that many of today’s refugees are also climate-refugees, an
amendment or a new legal framework is already needed to reflect the reality and afford legal
recognition to this new emerging type of refugees. As the home countries of climate-refugees become
uninhabitable, their status becomes that of stateless persons. A fundamental fact is that the GHG
emissions causing climate change have already been and are still being emitted by the energy systems
of the leading members of that international community. Considerations of energy justice require
creating an opportunity to offset those emissions by recognizing a status and correlative rights and
obligations under international law. Procedural justice provides the right tools to address the
international decision-making process, emphasizing the climate change role of bridging the divide
between energy and humanitarian framework for refugees. Adding climate change as a recognized
cause of forced displacement may unlock further benefits, such as funding, technical expertise,
operational treatment, because it connects better than ever different sectors and actors, brought
together for the benefit of the humanitarian sector — long in need of a reform. On the other hand,
distributive justice brings attention to the current and future unjust and unequal distribution of energy
services and impacts of climate change, urging us to have a discussion that for far too long has been
postponed, because of the short term technical vision of our energy system. Climate-refugees need to
be put in their rightful place as a global issue that would spur global involvement and
acknowledgment. Climate-refugees may well become the wake-up call that the humanitarian system
needs.
CP – Solvency – for Either UN CP
The UN has the expertise and capacity to create and enforce reform
Finally, a fifth encouraging factor for global migration governance is the deepening of expertise and
capacity in migration management within UN organizations. Significant progress has been made through
“mixed migration task forces” established in Somalia, Yemen, Kenya, and North Africa jointly by UN
organizations or UN country teams to pool expertise and resources. These task forces acknowledge the
“mixed” nature of migration flows (i.e., that influxes include economic migrants, refugees, and other
types of migrants) and identifies specific actions by different organizations. In addition, the combined
annual budgets of UNHCR and IOM increased from $1.15 billion in 2000 to $4.84 billion in 2015.48 Such
resources enabled both organizations to deepen their policy work and operations in crises. The result is
that both UNHCR and IOM are active participants in negotiations on the global stage, providing concept
notes, background reports, and recommendations at most major forums and consultations. Their
influence is discussed below by examining their roles in the Global Migration Group and the New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.
UN convention definition should be expanded

One narrative that has informed some of the legal-normative writing about the rights of “climate
refugees” is the idea of using the existing international refugee regime to protect populations displaced
as a result of climate change. According to the UN High Commisssion for Refugees, a refugee is defined
as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.” (CSR, Art. 1.A.2).11 Kolmannskog (2008) and Westra (2009) identify a number of conditions
under which environmental factors may be used as grounds for protection under the Convention. One
is the principle of non-refoulement, which holds that people cannot be returned to places where their
lives or freedoms are under threat. In theory, returning populations to homelands that have been
rendered effectively uninhabitable would violate non-refoulement, thereby creating obligations on the
part of national governments (Kolmannskog 2008). A second concerns the nature of persecution, where
it can be established that environmental degradation (e.g., draining of marshlands, etc.) is being
intentionally used to harm populations on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion,” such groups may conceivably claim protection on the
grounds of political persecution (Kol- mannskog 2008; Westra 2009).
The Convention therefore provides some scope for protecting populations whose homelands have
been rendered permanently uninhabitable, but these provisions apply only to individuals seeking
refugee status, which effectively precludes efforts to encourage voluntary resettlement in advance of
displacement (cf. Biermann and Boas 2008a). Moreover, the idea of revising the Convention to include
new categories of refugee raises difficult ethical and political questions about the rights of populations
currently recognized under the 1951 Convention (i.e., those facing persecution) and about the terms on
which national governments may be expected to grant new rights of citizenship and asylum
(Kolmannnskog 2008; Biermann and Boas 2008a).
International action solves

Srilakshmi, '18 – 4th year law student at the NALSAR University of Law (Patruni, "Moving towards the
recognition and protection of climate change refugees under international human rights law," OHRH, 4-
9-2018, http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/moving-towards-the-recognition-and-protection-of-climate-change-
refugees-under-international-human-rights-law/)//SB
The recent hurricanes that hit the coast of the Caribbean have renewed the fears of a global climate
refugee crisis. However, there is a lack of clarity on who exactly constitutes a climate refugee and what
human rights protections they are entitled to. The UNHRC has stated that almost 36 million people have
been displaced by environment and climate related disasters in 2009, the number is expected to reach
50 million by 2050. Most reports have referred to the displaced persons as ‘environmental refugees’.
Unfortunately, the main convention dealing with the plight of refugees, the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Protocol, restrict the meaning of refugees to those displaced by political crises and war.
However, there exists international law instruments which recognise and protect climate change
refugees. The Organization of African Unity Convention provides comprehensive human rights
protection to internally displaced persons, this includes those who have been displaced by climate
change. In addition, the 1984 Cartagena Protocol on Refugees also has a wide definition of refugees, it
includes those people whose livelihood, health and security is affected by circumstances beyond their
control, causing disturbance in public order. Unfortunately, both these instruments only have a regional
application. In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the human rights of persons
to security in case of a lack of livelihood due to circumstances beyond her control under Article 25.
However, the UDHR does not expressly protect climate refugees and would also be difficult to enforce.
There have been other positive moves towards the recognition and protection of environmental
refugees. In 2008, the Human Rights Council recognized that the human being is the centre of
sustainable development and the right to development must be viewed in the context of fulfilling the
needs of future generations. A year later, backed by a study by the OHCHR, the council adopted another
resolution where it acknowledged the impact of climate change on human rights. In this particular
resolution, the council noted the challenges that climate change poses to the fulfilment of Millennium
Development Goals and the eradication of poverty. It pointed out that climate change impacts rights
such as the right to life and the right to adequate food, especially of the most vulnerable people of the
society. During the 50th Anniversary of the Statelessness Convention in an expert meeting a Bellagio,
the UNHCR focussed on the same issue. These endeavours led the debate to resurface during the
Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st century at Oslo.
Some states have been more activist in protecting climate change refugees. Recently, New Zealand
proposed an exclusive ‘visa’ for climate refugees on humanitarian grounds. In 2014, two cases refused
the allowing of climate refugees. These decisions were overruled by the New Zealand immigration
tribunal on the basis of the humanitarian ground (the situation in Tuvalu) provided for under New
Zealand’s Immigration Act as opposed to a climate change threat. Unfortunately, there is lack of
political will on the part of some states to expand the definition of ‘refugees’. In its draft form, the Paris
Agreement included the recommendation of a ‘climate change displacement coordination facility’ for
planned relocation of those affected by climate change. But this proposal was vehemently opposed by
Australia. The US and the European community have also been slow in giving out compensation and
funds for disaster relief and clean technology.
Despite some of the positive steps in regional instruments, the possibility of using the UDHR as well as
some positive steps from jurisdictions such as New Zealand, there remains an imminent need to draw
up a new treaty providing comprehensive protection to climate refugees by fixing responsibility on the
larger states who are historically responsible for climate change. Apart from such treaty, larger states
like the US, Australia should enter into bilateral agreements with small island states providing for a rule
based humanitarian protection for refugees. Another option would be to extend the definition of
refugee in the Refugee Convention to include climate refugees. Countries should also come together to
promote sustainable practices of traditional communities and contribute to climate resilient
infrastructures and ways of life in these states.
Building up upon a structured environmental and human rights framework is key

Geboers et al. 17- Lotte Geboers holds an interdisciplinary bachelor’s in liberal arts and Sciences from
Utrecht University, with a specialization in International & Conflict studies, Matijn Straatsma has a Bachelor’s
degree in Liberal Arts and Sciences from Utrecht University, Ayşe Wijmenga has a B.A in Liberal Arts and Sciences
from Utrecht University, “Protecting and preventing climate refugees An interdisciplinary study on climate refugee
issues and the United Nations”, January 2017, // Suraj P
The aim of the present interdisciplinary study has been to identify what role the United Nations can play
concerning climate refugee issues. The UN is a promising candidate in dealing with climate refugee
issues, because it has played a key role in the development of both the environmental and human
rights framework, and because it comes closest to a form of global governance. We have tried to get a
picture of what various sub-organizations of the UN can do to solve these issues. It is clear that all these
organizations may play a significant role in solving climate refugee issues, but that collaboration
between them is needed. The present situation thus necessitates a more comprehensive understanding
of climate refugee issues. This study provides such an understanding. While collaboration between
suborganizations of the UN has taken place, they have not been able to integrate and complement each
other’s mandates, but mainly collaborated by working separately on the same project. Nonetheless,
they do not exclude each other: there is room for more intensive cooperation. This can be done in
several ways. Connecting the UN human rights framework to the UN climate change convention
framework explicitly relates the quality of the environment to an individual’s enjoyment of human
rights. Furthermore, allowing for the FAO to attend and take place in climate change conferences can
bring the attention of Member-states to the importance of damage control to adapt to climate change.
There are also rewarding possibilities for collaborations on the ground. The OHCHR and UNHCR can
collaborate with the FAO to prevent individuals from being displaced by environmental degradation -
which is in itself a human right. These are only a few suggestions on how the sub-organizations could
collaborate. A global problem such as climate change asks for global approaches to refugee protection
and enforcement mechanisms to ensure this protection. However, before it is possible to design
effective protection instruments, a consensus should be reached on how to define the climate refugee,
what his or her legal rights are and what the role of the international society is to protect and prevent
climate refugee flows. The most important international agreement that UN Member-states should
comply with, is to reduce emissions to safer levels, to prevent an intensification of climate change. The
UN as intergovernmental, overarching organization should take the lead in preventing climate change
and climate refugees. Consequently, the debate on how to adapt and mitigate to climate change needs
to continue.
Disadvantages
Link – Population DA / Base DA / Any Signal Arg
The plan exacerbates already-scarce resources
While the number of people fleeing their homes due to environmental crises grows, they continue to be
denied refugee status. This is particularly challenging as, for many countries, the effects of climate
change are generally felt across large geographic areas and have forced many to migrate regionally and
internationally. For example, residents of the Horn of Africa, primarily from Somalia, have temporarily
settled in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia; citizens of island states, such as Tuvalu, Nauru, and
Kiribati, in the South Pacific Ocean have tried to relocate to Australia and New Zealand; and
Bangladeshis have migrated to India and Nepal.94 All of these migrants are not granted legal status and
are either eventually deported or remain as undocumented immigrants. Additionally, there is evidence
to suggest that internal migration due to climate change may ultimately create more economic and
political refugees. The former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Gutierrez, stated that
“climate refugees can enhance the competition for resources—water, food, grazing lands—and that
competition can trigger conflict.”95 Hence, climate change migration can cause population pressures,
landlessness, rapid urbanization, and unemployment, which put refugees in danger of backlash and
worsen existing urban struggles.
The plan triggers massive fears tied to xenophobia and resource shortages
There is considerable uncertainty as to where these streams of global environmental refugees will flow.
But it is a safe bet that they will lap up on the shores of prosperous developed Western nations. which
are already becoming increasingly xenophobic. The UNHCR, with a lean staff of 7600 workers, is already
stressed by refugee crises of some 37 million in Africa and the Middle East. Add millions of people
displaced by climate change, and you have a crisis of governance and management that will sorely tax
the wisest solons at the UN and other governmental agencies. Already Western nations are feeling the
pain of including refugee populations in their midst. Australian immigration minister Philip Ruddock
urged the fiftieth-anniversary meeting of the UNHCR to curtail the rights of those seeking asylum
because of either political or environmental causes.9 Ruddock and others have pointed out the
enormous increase in the flight of people from the states of their birth in the final decades of the
twentieth century and are fearful that this mass movement is likely to grow exponentially in the twenty-
first century. Increasingly migrants “are resorting to unauthorized methods of entry. often at great risk
to their lives.”10
Resettling climate migrants in the US is dangerous for them -- xenophobia and racism
turn the case
Warren 17 (Phillip J., J.D. Candidate 2017 at Columbia Law School, Forced Migration after Paris COP21,
Evaluating the Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?div=59&handle=hein.journals%2Fclr116&id=&page=//waters)
Further, domestic U.S. politics make it extremely unlikely that a top- down, rights-based treaty that
requires acceptance of climate change migrants will be ratified, at least in the near future. The United
States is currently in the midst of a wave of anti-immigration sentiment,253 which arguably borders on
racism and xenophobia.254 Additionally, many of those who staunchly oppose accepting refugees from
war-torn Syria also deny climate change.>' At best this combination creates an additional barrier to a
rights-based approach; at worst it represents a source of climate change denial. Whatever underlies
these positions (and whatever their merit), it is unimaginable that the U.S. Senate would provide advice
and consent on a treaty that requires acceptance of climate migrants.256 Accordingly, the Facility
should narrow its short-term focus to studying the viability of certain areas for resettlement, along with
supporting soft- law and regional/bilateral negotiation support. This approach might even find favor
with those who are dubious of U.S. participation in climate change negotiations.257 The solution
proposed herein attempts to protect climate change migrants from having to flee to the United States
without a right to enter an already overburdened immigration system. The proposed solution creates no
obligation to accept large populations of climate change migrants, at least in the short term, and would
thus prove more politically palatable to conservative factions in the United States.
C. Long Term: RegionalandBilateralTreatiesandaRolefor the U.N. Security Council This section explores a
long-term role for the Displacement Coordination Facility. First, the UNFCCC's Facility should act as a
clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements to address cross- border displacement. Second, the
Facility should lay the groundwork for a potential expansion to a rights-based treaty if regional
agreements do not develop quickly enough. Lastly, the UNFCCC's Coordination Facility could act in
concert with the U.N. Security Council to serve as a stopgap and enforcement wing to protect the rights
of displaced people.
A Wild DeDev Card
Global climate refugee flows are inevitable and only de-growth solves
Climate refugees are a problem of development policy beyond the scope of a single country or agency.
The problems are fraught with emotion. human agency. and political controversy. How will people be
relocated and settled? Is it possible to offer environmental refugees temporary asylum? Will these
refugees have any collective rights in the new areas they inhabit? And, lastly, as currently vast areas of
the world are being rendered unfit for human habitation, who will pay the costs of all the affected
countries during the process of resettlement? The need for planning for climate refugees comes at a
time when many countries are devoting little thought to this emerging issue. Indeed some critics point
out that nations have yet to challenge the concept of economic growth itself. The problems of climate
refugees cannot be addressed without confronting the socially acceptable definitions of growth and
the largely unquestioned faith in its benefits. Limits to growth are actually emerging. notes Richard
Heinberg. an expert with the Post Carbon Institute and author of The End of Growth: Adapting to Our
New Economic Reality.11 Fossil fuels like oil are nonrenewable, and they are finite; as the world’s
primary sources of oil and gas run out, fossil fuel companies are turning to increasingly risky and
expensive methods of extraction. Wind and solar power can help generate electricity, especially in rural
communities, but they are not good options for dealing with issues like urban crowding. the
transportation of populations. and expanding food supplies. Preserving and protecting green areas of
countries coupled with stabilizing urban growth may be one key to preparing for future problems. Even
before countries can deal with the onslaught of climate refugees, they will have to power down the
ways they pollute and use up the landscapes and open places. Adds Peter Victor, an economist at
Ontario’s York University, the idea of progress once had many measures but now relates only to the
economy.12 If we are to deal with large- scale exchanges of population around the planet. we have to
recognize that economics does not dominate the larger ecosystem. The limits of the natural world
come into play. Ideas such as these need to be kept in perspective as nations debate what to do with
climate refugees. Hopefully, the current attitudes of northern developed countries will change from self-
interest to financial support of climate change adaptation programs in the poorer nations in the
south.15 We are now seeing the decoupling of economic growth and greenhouse emissions. Nearly
two dozen countries increased their GDP since 2000 while their emissions have stayed flat or gone
down. including developed and developing countries alike, the World Resources Institute reported in
2016.14 This is the result of larger consumption of alternatives to high carbon energy like coal and oil.
Articles abound in economic journals about the success of wind and solar power in this regard. Such
optimism may be premature. however. Bill McKibben. journalist and cofounder of the climate advocacy
organization 350.Org. notes that while one greenhouse gas decreased in the United States. another. far
more nefarious one may have increased. Methane. the by-product of natural gas, is a much more
potent greenhouse gas—it captures more of the sun’s rays. And the boom of hydraulic fracturing (or
“fracking”) for natural gas in the States and around the world has led to concerns that methane
emissions may be the new culprit of climate change.15 Regardless, the global economy has largely been
running business as usual—as of April 2016. countries around the globe were still planning to build
hundreds of new coal-fired power plants.16 Without more aggressive action to reduce fossil fuel usage.
including preventing new sources of fossil fiel emissions, the reductions we have seen thus far will not
be enough to prevent catastrophic climate changes. And the decoupling process will require much more
effort in poor countries with large populations living in energy poverty. Under “business as usual,” coal
companies are trying to build new coal plants in a misguided effort to lift developing nations out of
poverty. Yet often the coal plants require massive, and expensive, new distribution infrastructure and
pollute the communities they intended to help. The idea that petroleum and coal is “cheap” in these
communities is not only a farce, but it also ignores the larger problems that emissions bring.17
K
Link – Securitization
Discourse that surrounds climate refugees is inherently securitizing, portraying them

as necessary to be 'managed' or 'controlled'
Johnson 18 (Craig A., Professor of Political Science at the University of Guelph, where he has been
based since 2002. He holds a Ph.D. in International Development from the London School of Economics
and Political Science (2000), and has taught at the London School of Economics, the School of Oriental
and African Studies, University College London and the University of Oxford, Climate, migration and
displacement from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 344-
345//waters)
When it is planned and supported through public policy, economic migration has been shown to provide
an important means of diversifying and strengthening poor people’s assets, livelihoods and income,
thereby reducing household and systemic vulnerability to climate change (Bier- mann and Boas, 2008a;
Johnson and Krishnamurthy, 2010; de Haan, 1999; Deshingkar, 2005; McLeman and Smit, 2006; Perch-
Nielson et al., 2008; de Sherbinin et al., 2008, 2011b; Bog- ardi and Warner, 2009; Barnett and Webber,
2010; Foresight, 2011; de Haas, 2012; Adger et al., 2014; Suckall et al., 2016). However, governments
frequently discourage migration, using labour codes, land use restrictions and other policy instruments
as a means of controlling the movement and settlement of itinerant populations (cf. Bakewell, 2008; de
Haas, 2012). Moreover, national and international debates about immigration and asylum policy have
become increasingly hostile towards the rights of migrants,“asylum seekers” and refugees (Neumayer,
2006; Zetter, 2007; Johnson, 2013; Humble, 2014).
Arguably one of the most prominent themes that appears in the extant literature on climate, migration
and displacement is the notion that climate-induced displacement is a threat to political stability and
international security (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Reueney, 2007; WBGU, 2008). At the heart
of this literature is a (largely speculative) assertion that population pressures and a changing climate
pose the risk of triggering new and violent conflicts along ethnic, religious and nationalist lines (Homer-
Dixon, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Kahl, 2006; Christian Aid, 2007; Reuveny, 2007;WBGU, 2008). In the words of
the German Advisory Council:
climate change could exacerbate existing environmental crises such as drought, water scarcity and soil
degradation, intensify land-use con icts and trigger further environmentally induced migration. Rising
global temperatures will jeopardize the bases of many people’s livelihoods, especially in the developing
regions, increase vulnerability to poverty and social deprivation, and thus put human security at risk.
Particularly in weak and fragile states with poorly performing institutions and systems of government,
climate change is also likely to overwhelm local capacities to adapt to changing environmental
conditions and will thus reinforce the trend towards general instability that already exists in many
societies and regions.
Similarly, and more squarely directed towards the American security regime,Werz and Conley (2012: 7–
8) warn that “Environmentally induced migration, resource con icts, and unstable states will not only
have an impact upon the nations where they occur, but also on the United States and the broader
international community.”
At the heart of this analysis are a number of causal assumptions about the factors affecting processes of
state breakdown, “environmental conflict” and social unrest. One is an assumption that migration – and
especially movements of people across national borders – will unleash new and otherwise dormant
ethnic tensions rooted in race, religion, language and other social markers (Kaplan, 1994; Homer-
Dixon, 1991; Reuveny, 2007; WBGU, 2008). A second is the “state breakdown thesis” that internal and
international migration flows will overwhelm the ability of governments to undertake basic functions,
including ones most important to development agendas (e.g. transportation, communication, water and
sanitation) (Kaplan, 1994; Homer- Dixon, 1991; Kahl, 2006; Reuveny, 2007; WBGU, 2008). A third is that
climate change will undermine the agricultural and natural resource base, forcing vulnerable rural
populations into cities, whose capacity to provide even the most basic forms of public services is already
highly constrained (Satterthwaite et al., 2010; Revi et al., 2014).
For many observers, the framing of climate-induced displacement as a national security threat has
evoked considerable scepticism and alarm. A number of analysts, for instance, have questioned the
ability of social science research to isolate the environmental determinants of migration in the absence
of the historical and socio-economic factors that affect migration decisions and processes (e.g. Nordas
and Gleditsch, 2007; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Hartmann, 2010; Gemenne, 2011; Adger et al., 2014;
Bettini, 2015; Boas, 2015). In their crudest forms, environmental migration models appear to suggest
that climate phenomena are the only or primary factors motivating migration when in fact a host of
factors (including seasonality, wage rates, persecution, life cycles and institutions) may have equal or
more bearing on the decision or not to migrate (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002; Boano et al., 2008; Hulme,
2008; Perch-Nielson et al., 2008; IOM, 2009; Black et al., 2011b; Gemenne, 2011; Adger et al., 2014;
Bettini, 2015). At the very least, the lines of causality are more complex than they are sometimes
construed in the literature, highlighting the need to scrutinize far more carefully the theories and
assumptions being used to understand climate, migration and displacement (cf. Barnett and Adger,
2007; Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007; Hartmann, 2010; Gemenne, 2011; Bettini, 2015; Boas, 2015).
Others have argued that climate-displacement narratives (e.g. ooding and displacement due to sea level
rise) are being used (somewhat disingenuously) as a means of “securitizing” wider policy objectives,
such as immigration controls, asylum policy and foreign aid (Levy, 1995; Hart- mann, 2010; Bettini, 2013,
2015; Oels, 2013; Boas, 2015; Boas and Rothe, 2016).The argument here is that migration is being
subsumed by other objectives and being portrayed as a failure to adapt, particularly if it entails
migration across international borders. For Bettini (2015: n.p.),
The idea we should “solve” climate migration is rooted in a view of mobility as pathological, as the result
of a failure to develop, to adapt to climate change, or to be more resilient.
Framed in this way, populations facing the threat of environmental displacement are seen as victims or
threats, whose actions, movements and decisions need to be managed and controlled (cf. Levy, 1995;
Hartmann, 2010; Bettini, 2013, 2015; Oels, 2013; Boas and Rothe, 2016). An alternative perspective
that is rooted far more squarely in the human security paradigm is one that focuses less on questions
of national security and stability and more on the factors affecting social agency and decisions
regarding migration and adaptation to climate change.
Link – Neoliberalism
Neoliberal policies have created the environmental destruction that has left entire
communities in a precarious position
Given such acute vulnerability to climate-induced environmental change experienced across the Global
South, the climate crisis must be understood as inseparable from the turmoil caused by the first two
dynamics of forced migration—neoliberalization and securitization. Regarding neoliberalization, such
links are apparent in the deregulation and privatization of state sectors and industries that occurred
throughout the Global South in the late 1970s that contributed to the underdevelopment of national
economies and industries. As such, neoliberalization has helped generalize individual and community
vulnerability to climate-induced changes and decrease resilience. It has done so not only by increasing
poverty, but also by re-entrenching colonial relations of dependency that have locked many countries
into natural resource-based economies, and by undermining the development of adequate
infrastructure that might help communities cope.92 A majority of climate refugees comprise people
largely from the Global South who are already marginalized in their communities and geographies, and
whose livelihoods are most vulnerable to climate change. Even further, many lack the resources to
resettle elsewhere after being forcibly displaced by climate-induced environmental disasters.
Framing climate change refugees as “victims” deflects from the systemic issue itself –
the aff allows for continued environmental destruction by characterizing the crisis as a
“social problem” that can be fixed through accepting migrants
Faber and Schlegel ’17 – August 14, 2017 -- Daniel Faber is director of the Northeastern
Environmental Justice Research Collaborative and Christinia Schlegel has a Master’s from Tufts
University in Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, “Give Me Shelter from the Storm: Framing
the Climate Refugee Crisis in the Context of Neoliberal Capitalism,”
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1356494 // shurst
Whether or not environmental migration is defined as a social problem is related to how social events
are framed. Frames, according to Erving Goffman, are schemata of interpretation that allow people to
locate, perceive, identify, and label events taking place around them. Climate refugees may exist in an
objective reality, but until they are recognized as such, social action to address the causes and/or
symptoms of their plight is not possible. The framing of “environmental refugees” and then “climate
refugees” as a social problem goes back to the 1980s, when concerned scientists and environmental
activists first argued that environmental degradation and climate change could lead to mass
displacement and social upheaval. Speculative and highly future-conditional, the perspectives on climate
refugees ranged from the so-called maximalist position (climate change as the primary cause of refugee
creation) to the “minimalist” position (climate change is just one of many migration factors). The
maximalist position takes on a largely alarmist tone, viewing the growing waves of climate refugees as
perhaps the most powerful manifestation of the global ecological crisis. There are two political
tendencies in the maximalist camp. On the one hand, there are scholars, non-governmental
organizations, policy-making bodies, and international institutions that express sympathy for the plight
of climate refugees and offer many policies and programs to aid in their formal recognition and
assistance. The United Nations, for one, has portrayed “environmental refugees” as helpless victims of
climate change in urgent need of foreign assistance. On the Left, the plight of climate refugees is often
framed a consequence of ecological imperialism and the massive carbon debt owed by the advanced
capitalist countries to the global South. The enormous hardships confronting climate refugees require
the transfer of resources to developing countries to help them cope with climate change. On the Right,
the terms “environmental refugee” and “climate refugee” are frequently used in public discourse to
frame the displaced as a potential national security threat. Homer-Dixon encapsulates the fear when he
writes that ecological degradation will produce “waves of environmental refugees that spill across
borders with destabilizing effects on both national and international order.” Likewise, Pentagon-
sponsored research warns of the threat posed to U.S. national security by climate refugees, with the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency predicting that 3 percent of the world’s population will be displaced or
affected by climate change before 2050. This discourse of climate-induced migration as a national
security threat has now entered the arena of high politics. It has been discussed before the UN Security
Council and UN General Assembly. In a 2013 speech in Berlin, Germany, then U.S. President Barack
Obama even warned the world of “new waves of refugees” caused by climate change. Although denying
the realities of climate change, President Donald Trump has repeatedly scapegoated immigrants of color
into the U.S. as undermining the safety and well-being of American citizens. For Hartmann, the portrayal
of climate refugees as a security threat is alarming and could “pose a threat to the kind of peaceful
international cooperation and development initiatives needed to respond equitably and effectively to
climate change.” It can also serve to militarize the provision of development assistance and distort
climate and human rights policy. Australia’s “offshore detainment centers” for refugees from the Pacific
island Nauru and elsewhere, for instance, are located on remote islands and run by private contractors.
Established in 2001 to secure Australia’s borders and labeled—horribly—as “The Pacific Solution,” these
militarized encampments are known for their brutal treatment of the refugees. In fact, human rights
advocates have concluded that the Australian government’s policy has been explicitly designed to deter
future refugees by inflicting incalculable damage on the hundreds of women, men, and children in the
camps. The maximalist position is often criticized for being overly deterministic, neglecting to fully
consider the complex interrelated causes that push migration For some political ecologists, the concept
of environmental or climate refugee is problematic in that it naturalizes the political-economic triggers
of environmental decline, and also … masks the role of institutional responses to it … In the case of
extreme natural events such as droughts, storms and floods, whether or not people are forced to
migrate permanently from their homes usually depends on pre-existing social relations (who is most
vulnerable) and post-disaster responses (what kind of aid/relief is provided and who receives it)
questions whether or not there is a determinable relationship between a given environmental “driver”
and some typology of human migration. Instead, he claims that “it is analytically meaningless to talk of
the ‘environment’ as an independent variable, as any configuration of ‘environmental’ factors in terms
of their societal implications are fundamentally structured and inflected by social, political and economic
conditions.” Therefore, use of the term poses the danger of strategic essentialism, where an ill-defined
empty signifier may be appropriated by various social actors for purposes other than the protection of
the forced migrants and offering assistance to them. As stated by Hartmann, the extent of displacement
by climate change is … dependent on the existence and effectiveness of adaptation measures that help
individuals and communities cope with environmental stresses. Whether or not such measures are in
place in turn depends on political economies at the local, regional, national and international levels that
are often conveniently left out of the discussion of so-called “climate refugees.” Absent a discussion of
the larger political-economic context, “climate refugee” as a concept has the potential to help
“depoliticize the causes of displacement,” and mask the role of class exploitation and social injustices
perpetuated under capitalism. In such an instance, the term could even relieve wealthier countries of
their obligation to offer asylum and assistance, further states that this is not to deny that environmental
changes due to global warming could in some instances exacerbate already existing economic and
political divisions. However, whether or not violent conflict and mass migrations result depends on so
many other factors that it is far too simplistic to see climate change as a major cause or trigger. She
argues that the goal of the Left should be to assist communities in their efforts to adapt to climate
change by strengthening institutions that democratically and equitably manage resources.
Neoliberalism – Root Cause
Neoliberal capitalism is responsible for the climate refugee crisis – the aff can’t resolve
the broader system that causes their scenarios – turns the case
Faber and Schlegel ’17 – August 14, 2017 -- Daniel Faber is director of the Northeastern
Environmental Justice Research Collaborative and Christinia Schlegel has a Master’s from Tufts
University in Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, “Give Me Shelter from the Storm: Framing
the Climate Refugee Crisis in the Context of Neoliberal Capitalism,”
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1356494 // shurst
First of all, global capitalism is rendering climate-related stresses and “natural” disasters more frequent
and severe in nature. The inability of the global capitalist system to significantly reduce the emission
of greenhouse gases is causing a planetary crisis. According to the National Climate Assessment, global
warming is triggering ever more extreme weather and climate events. Over the last 50 years much of
the U.S. has seen increases in prolonged periods of excessively high temperatures, heavy downpours
and, in some regions, severe floods and droughts. Likewise, the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
has found thousands of record-breaking weather events worldwide, bolstering long-term patterns of
increasing heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts and wildfires. A combination of observed trends,
theoretical understanding of the climate system, and numerical modeling demonstrates that global
warming is increasing the risk of these devastating types of events. Today the vast majority of people
affected by natural disasters suffer from climate-related disasters. For instance, between 1980 and
2007, there were 6500 climate-related natural disasters (an average of 343 events per year). During this
time some 98 percent of all those affected by natural disasters—243 million people annually—were
linked to climate change. This represents a 70-percent increase over the previous decade (1984–1994),
which saw an average of 174 million people affected by natural disasters each year. Since 2008 natural
disasters have displaced an average of 25.4 million people each year—the equivalent of one person
per second. In 2015 the number of natural disasters rose to 574 and killed over 32,550 people. Even
more insidious than the spectacular kinds of headline natural disasters typically associated with climate
change are the often-invisible forms of “slow” or “attritional violence” against nature that is scattered
across time and space The everyday forms of environmental degradation installed by unjust and
unsustainable systems of capitalist production are especially vulnerable to the more mundane (but just
as consequential manifestations) of climate change. In Syria, where a five-year drought drove 1.5 million
rural people and farmers off the parched landscape and into the cities, only to have their needs largely
ignored by the Assad regime, climate change may be one factor in the larger civil war that has caused
nearly five million refugees to flee the war-torn country. Secondly, neoliberal capitalist development is
resulting in the increased social and ecological impoverishment of the world’s popular classes and
subaltern populations, rendering them more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The age of
globalization has witnessed the triumph of a distinctly hard-nosed brand of neoliberal capitalism.
Facilitated by the free trade agreements (market liberalization), an end to most governmental
regulatory “interference” with business practices (deregulation), the takeover of former public services
and state agencies by domestic and/or international capital (privatization), the growth in foreign direct
investment (FDI) and finance capital provided by bilateral and multilateral lending agencies, and
reductions in social welfare and environmental protection measures in both the global North and South
(fiscal conservatism), neoliberal capitalism is increasingly facilitating the capitalization of nature and
confiscation of environmental space in the global South. In addition to the appropriation of natural
resource wealth, globalization is also facilitating the increased displacement of pollution and other
negative externalities—the export of ecological hazard in all circuits of capital—to historically
marginalized communities in the global North and South alike. World labor forces, natural resources and
energy, technology and machinery, biosystems, and other “productive inputs” are becoming more
integrated into the circuits of global capital (economically) and the structures of transnational
corporations and banks (organizationally). Laboring in service of this new global order, but receiving few
of its benefits, are the popular classes and subaltern populations of the global South—the poor
peasants, workers, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples. Lacking access to adequate technical and
financial assistance from the state, secure land rights, fair price mechanisms for locally produced
commodities, and favorable loan packages, their social and ecological impoverishment is the legacy of
neo-colonial dependent development, and increases vulnerability to climate change. The acquisition
of land and natural resources by transnational capital, as well as large landowners, corrupt government
officials, security forces, and various domestic economic elites allied with multinational corporations and
international banks, restricts access to the means of livelihood such as rivers and oceans, agricultural
and grazing lands, forests, fisheries, and drinking water. Utilizing financial assistance provided by
multilateral lending agencies, large-scale development projects typically transfer access and control over
natural sources from popular classes at the local level to the state, elite land speculators, or private
companies and multinational corporations. The displacement and ecological impoverishment of
popular classes around the world by global capitalist development is resulting in the relocation of
these populations into increasingly precarious and dangerous areas in which to live and work. Such
areas include the edges of rivers and waterways that can be prone to flash flooding, or steep hillsides
subject to landslides, or perhaps arid regions plagued by drought and heat-related stresses. Lacking
protections afforded by the state, as well as the forms of capital required for true resiliency, these are
among the global populations most vulnerable to climate change stresses. Over 2.8 billion people live in
areas of the world that are prone to more than one of the physical manifestations of climate change:
severe storms, floods, droughts, or sea level rise. Climate change burdens households, communities, and
societies that are the most ecologically vulnerable and also lack the political-economic capacity to cope
and adapt to ecological disruption. Climate change weakens the livelihoods of poor people the most by
eroding their scarce assets in the form of physical capital (damage to shelter and infrastructure); human
capital (increased malnutrition and disease); social capital (displacement and disruption of beneficial
social networks); natural capital (loss of ecosystem productivity, such as in agriculture and fisheries), and
financial capital (loss of income and property). The point here is not to reduce all processes of climate-
related displacement to the logic of capital but rather to recognize the importance of the larger political-
economic and social context. Because marginalized peoples lack sufficient conditions of resilience and
recovery (such as flood insurance) and receive little support from the state under neoliberal capitalism,
their capacity to withstand and recover from shocks and restore these assets is minimal, whether
created by conflict, collapse of market prices, land degradation, political oppression, or climate change
itself. When faced with the collapse of these assets and compelled to move, we could just as easily
speak of these migrants as being “neoliberal refugees” as much as “climate refugees.” Poverty, as
manifested in resource scarcity, poor living conditions such as overcrowding or lack of sanitation, and
insufficient disaster response mechanisms, arguably has the greatest magnifying effect on disaster risk.
This is especially true for poorer women. The poor and the powerless often have no alternative but to
settle in disaster-prone zones and areas more susceptible to climate-related stresses where land is
cheaper and more plentiful. Lacking the adaptive and financial capabilities of richer communities, the
poorest populations and nations in the global South are shouldering the greatest stress: 95 percent of all
lives lost from weather-related disasters are in developing nations. A community’s coping ability may yet
be the most important determinant of climate-induced migration. Limitations on coping ability manifest
in a variety of ways, from the socioeconomic, political, and cultural fabric of the affected community to
national financial limitations, potentially weak or ineffective government, uneven development, heavy
dependence on trade, exploitive economic arrangements, remoteness, and even regional social capital
and established migration networks. This is most apparent in the case of the Small Island Developing
States (SIDS), where off-island aid after a natural disaster is essential and commonplace due to their
small size and limited resources. Whether these measures exist hinges on the economics and politics at
play at the local, regional, national, and international levels.Some of the greatest humanitarian
emergencies emerge where people lack the means to migrate from zones in ecological crisis, as was
evidenced in past climate emergencies in the South Pacific and across Southeast Asia. Thirdly,
corporate-led globalization is creating increasingly degraded and denuded landscapes, reducing the
resiliency of existing ecosystems and therefore magnifying the impacts of climate change. The full
integration of the global South into the world economy as a supplier of cheap raw materials and
consumer goods has led and is leading to the colonization and ecological devastation of lands and
natural resources on which hundreds of millions of people depend. Those peoples in the South who
draw their livelihood directly from communal access to land, water, forests, coastal mangroves, and
other ecosystems are being hit the hardest by the construction of large dams, mining and oil industry
operations, and the capitalization of agriculture and fisheries. Forcibly removed off their land by
government policies, economic acquisition or military force, the displaced masses of the global South
migrate to ecologically fragile areas, including rugged hillsides prone to erosion, barren desert regions
lacking in water, and pristine tropical rainforests. Once resettled, they try to eke out an existence by
exploiting the limited resource base to which they have access. After a few years of abuse, the resource
base eventually collapses, as in much of Central America. In the fragile highlands of El Salvador, for
instance, hundreds of thousands of desperately poor family farmers displaced by the expansion of
export coffee estates are attempting to survive in a landscape already irreversibly destroyed by erosion,
gully formation, and deforestation. Coupled with the overexploitation of land by capitalist export
agriculture and the mining sector (just recently banned), more than 77 percent of the country suffers
serious soil erosion.Denuded watersheds and degraded landscapes of this sort typically magnify the
impacts of climate change, converting what would have been a heavy but harmless rainstorm into a
devastating flood. All around the world, neoliberal capitalist development is resulting in the severe
degradation of ecosystems and social structures that would normally offer greater protections against
the manifestations of climate change and extreme weather events, especially for the most vulnerable.
Migration management just perpetrates their impacts – refugees are caught within
“sacrifice zones” of capitalism that make natural disasters inevitable – only addressing
the root cause can allow people to experience the world through their own bodies and
prevent refugees from being perceived as separable from land
Scott and Smith ’17 – Summer 2017, Dayna Nadine Scott is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall
Law School and the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University and Adrian Smith is a professor
of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University – “Sacrifice Zones in the Green Energy Economy: The
New Climate Refugees” // shurst
Our intention in undertaking the analysis in this Comment is thus twofold. We want to suggest both that
those displaced and dispossessed by green energy enthusiasm can be conceived of as "climate change
refugees," caught within sacrifice zones of global capitalism, and that the international legal order is
producing 'solutions' that-in the mitigation context-border on the absurd. Thus, as we have argued
elsewhere, by integrating planned relocation as a key strategy within climate migration management
and examining how it would apply in the context of the Site C dam, we gain a valuable perspective on
the production of subjectivities in relation to climate migrants in the dominant international legal order.
Briefly, for the purposes of this Comment, we outline two central ways the climate migration
management approach constructs the abstract subject of the climate migrant. First, it discounts the
possibilities of meaningful connections to specific places. Second, it obscures the actual "loss and
damage" that transpires when people have to relinquish long-standing practices of being and living on
the land. On the first point, we demonstrate how the prevailing climate migration management
approach tends to treat places as if they are generally interchangeable. As McAdam and Ferris explain,
"the availability of livelihoods in the destination" plays a central role in a community's perception of the
move-whether it was voluntary or not-and their overall well-being post-relocation. 48 As we have
previously argued: The implication is not only that any place is as good as any other, as long as all the
amenities are provided, but also that any livelihood will do. It completely discounts the possibility that
people will suffer a loss in relation to their inability to be on the land, or to undertake a specific
livelihood in a specific place. 49 In stark contrast, Indigenous peoples of the Peace Valley invoke the
characteristics of unique places with spiritual and cultural significance for them-places of deep
connection to their pasts and futures. 50 They explain how fishing is a traditional practice that depends
on specific places, species, and means; they detail how these specific fishing spots are crucial to the
community's cultural and subsistence activities. 51 Clearly, the traditional practices of gathering berries
and sacred medicines, holding ceremonies, and visiting ancestral burial grounds are practices specific to
place. 52 On the second point, regarding embodied practices of living on the land, we are guided by
Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson's notion that people experience the world through
their bodies. 53 She states, "the process of coming to know is the pursuit of whole body intelligence."54
This learning "takes place in the context of family, community and relations" and is realized
collectively.55 It "comes through the land." 56 The climate migration management approach cannot
capture, nor meaningfully consider, these ongoing, embodied practices of living on the land. Instead, it
completely abstracts laboring bodies from consideration. Even as livelihoods are recognized as
important in the processes of planned relocation, they are somehow seen as distinct and separable
from land. The World Bank's Involuntary Resettlement objective, as an example, is "to assist displaced
persons in improving or at least restoring their livelihoods and standards of living in real terms relative
to pre-displacement levels. . . ."57 We argue this makes livelihoods reducible to incomes and constructs
them as independent of land. It is as if embodied practices of living on the land can be replaced; as if
ways of earning a living are not connected to ways of being.
Alternative – Energy Justice
Energy justice is a prerequisite to the aff – it plays a “decolonial” role in challenging
climate displacement
Mastor et al ’18 – 5/2/18, Roxana Mastor has a J.D. from Vermont Law School with expertise in
energy and the environment, “Energy Justice and Climate Refugees,” pages 144-145, http://www.eba-
net.org/assets/1/6/Duff_Dworkin_Landa__Mastor_FINAL_(2).pdf // shurst
The complexity of the energy system has evolved more rapidly than a social and moral framework to
manage the “profound ramifications” of a highly centralized, power plant-based energy system
dependent on fossil fuels.44 Nevertheless, the energy system is no longer thought to be only the result
of technological decisions, but rests on moral determinants through the concept of energy justice.45
Hence, we view energy justice as encompassing both benefits and burdens, both rights and obligations
to construct and maintain a global energy system that promotes “happiness, welfare, freedom, equity,
and due process” for both producers and consumers.46 The emphasis on energy justice can be
perceived as an ultimate attempt to give solutions and answers to questions that go beyond
“contemporary energy planning and analysis” and instead implicate “aspects of equity and morality.”47
There are at least two reasons why concepts of energy justice deserve a role in a discussion about how
energy systems affect climate-refugees. The energy system has extraordinary impacts on issues that
have moral implications, such as the dependence on fossil fuels that have caused environmental
hazards including air and water pollution among others. Awareness of those impacts is a critical part of
coherent thinking about policies to pursue. The second reason to consider concepts of energy justice is
that centuries of careful thought about ethics and justice have yielded vocabularies and theories that
can help in making energy policy decisions. In this sense, energy justice is not just a tool for
implementing extrinsically chosen policies, but rather, considering its varying concepts of justice can
have a ‘decisional’ role in the choice among competing policy actions. This is what makes choosing
among the concepts of energy just tice more than a ‘mere’ abstract and abstruse debate about
academic philosophy.
Evaluating neoliberal-market narratives and their effects on climate change is a

prerequisite to solving the refugee crisis
Dylan ’16 – Arielle Dylan, PhD, is a professor at St. Thomas University, 1/1/16, “Rethinking
Sustainability on Planet Earth: A Time for New Framings,” Electronic Green Journal at UCLA // shurst
Flannery (2005) has referred to us as “the weathermakers,” and he argues fittingly that the
“future…hangs on our actions.” Before discussing remedial strategies, it is necessary to have a full
understanding of the severity of the climate crisis. The rate at which global heating is occurring is faster
than climate models predicted, which leaves less time to respond and has some wondering whether it is
indeed too late (Diamond, 2005). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published their
Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 which predicts a global temperature increase of 2.4 to 4.6°C above
pre-industrial levels if our emissions of greenhouse gases are not reduced. Any temperature increase of
3°C or more “would eventually result in the world’s oceans rising by around seven meters, dramatically
redrawing the geography of the Earth” (Hamilton, 2010, 8) and permanently displacing millions of
people, adding to the climate refugee crisis. Many climate scientists, including James Hansen, believe
the present 392 ppm is already beyond a safe level, and urge us to lower this number below 350 ppm to
avoid irreversible environmental “tipping points.” Sadly, even if in a surreal scenario we as a species
were suddenly to stop emitting CO2 tomorrow, the world would still continue to get warmer for several
decades due to the methane being released from anthropogenic, Dylan: Rethinking Sustainability on
Planet Earth: A Time for New Framings 1 amplified permafrost melt; through a positive feedback
process, climate change is perpetuated. According to Hawken (2010) the potency of methane is twenty
times that of CO2, which spells catastrophic environmental outcomes, if business as usual holds sway,
and lost climate stability for centuries (2007). Although China is now the greatest emitter of CO2,
industrialized nations of the global north have historically contributed the most CO2, precipitating our
current climate crisis. In fact, the US which comprises only four percent of the world population is
responsible for a full 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (Schönfeld, 2010). For this reason
Schönfeld (2010) calls climate change not only anthropogenic and androgenic, but also amerigenic.
Canada has been censured on the global climate stage and has the dubious distinction of being both
among the highest emitters per capita of greenhouse gases and home to the “most destructive project
on Earth,” the tar sands (Hatch & Price, 2008). Canada, Australia, and the US have contributed 30
percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. Yet these same countries, together with other
industrialized nations failed miserably at the 2009 Copenhagen meetings designed to establish a
reasonable international climate response and agreement. Although climate change will affect us all, the
bleakest effects will be experienced most keenly by millions of poor people in the poorest nations
(McKibben, 2010; Foley, 2004).

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Climate Refugees Aff / Neg – HJPV ‘18

Alex Baime – GBS

Suchetas Boklis – Alpharetta

Jordan Frese – GBS

Adrian Gushin – Rowland Hall

Sophia Hurst – Greenhill

Tanuj Koli – MBA

Suraj Peramanu – Chattahoochee

Shreya Ram – Wayzata

Sarah Waters – Niles West

Who and How Many?

The UNHCR also does not have the capabilities to

It is causing accelerating, global eco collapse – it creates conflict, starvation, and

Resource wars are the greatest existential threat

Pandemics risk extinction—no burnout, human transportation is reaching the tipping

Continued unsustainable refugee flows crater the European economy

Otherwise, populism carves up NATO

NATO collapse causes extinction via Russia nuclear launch

Nuclear Sharing exists and will continue to be

Climate change magnifies precarious economic positions and displaces millions.

Demographic trends are undermining ecosystem health, causing surging levels of

As the magnitude of conflict-induced displacement continued togrow at an unprecedented rate

Human-caused environmental change and environmental degradation – desertification, deforestation,

Clearly, addressing such displacement could prove to be a defining environmental management

Relevance of migration and displacement to the UN Environment

Law should be expanded to incld climate

Should expand legal rights to climate refugees

Climate refugees are afforded zero legal protection

As to inequalities resulting in migration, it is a well-established finding that class as a heterogeneity plays

Climate migration contributes to conflict in a variety of ways

Climate migration uniquely leads to conflict – many warrants

This section argues that climate

Acknowledging climate refugees is key – millions would be saved

The question of climate migration is surely underemphasized in contemporary writings on

The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate immigrants – greenhouse gas

The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate migrants – migration is unavoidable,

The Ethics of Migration

The Historical Principle

a) The activities of country X cause a change in environmental conditions of country Y.

a) Country X’s activities cause livelihood destruction of some residents in country Y.

b) Destruction of livelihoods is a morally wrong action.

c) Morally wrong actions require restorative measures.

Therefore, country X’s action required restorative measures towards country Y.

Signal of protectionism causes nuclear war

It escalates and independently tanks Himalayan biodiversity

Indo-China border dispute goes nuclear

Tibetan biodiversity collapse is also an existential risk

But that number doesn’t include people displaced by climate change.

Is a legal definition outdated?

Climate refugees are going to the EU – results in a substantial influx of refugees –

Trouble on the Farm

The influx created a massive backlog of refugee claimants.

Otherwise, it escalates – AI weaponization is an existential threat

Canada’s standing as a middle power is a controlling impact – necessary to mediate

Canadian softpower’s key to navigate tensions on the subcontinent

South Asian war causes extinction – other conflicts do not

Canadian populism risks Quebec secession

In brief, Canadian populism is an evolution of Canadian conservatism. In my opinion, it reflects a new

Quebec secessionism causes Russia to first-strike the US

nuclear-armed rivals. PERSPECTIVE THREE AI Learns the Winning Move Is to

Incoming climate migrants strain Canada politically and generate backlash.

Immigration fuels populism in Canada.

Canadian populism rising now – polling proves.

differentiated responsibilities” found in the UNFCCC.170