Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the
case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it
will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on
the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under
such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high
seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line
drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial
waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255,
note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were
then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been
conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of
the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the
ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the
proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the
local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the
consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon
Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court
other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His
Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to
enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to
hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and
security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries,
respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of
Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign
ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.

Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.

J. A. Wolfson for respondent.

MORAN, C.J.:

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against the Commanding General
Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody and
to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense over which
the said court has no jurisdiction.

Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines, who
has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United States
Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States. He has been arrested for that reason
and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to
15 years imprisonment. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.

It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses
committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or
any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain
portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases, and Article XIII thereof
is as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
following offenses:

(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and offended
parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active
duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines;

(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States in
which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the United States; and

(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States
against the security of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside
the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.

3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to
it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the
fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has been committed within ten
days after his arrest, and in such case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.

4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it
in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province where the offense
has been committed shall so notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten days after his
arrest, and in such a case the United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling
under paragraph 2 of this article is committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States.

(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or

(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer holding the offender in
custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty,
the offender's commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of
Justice within ten days from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of
Justice shall be final.

5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial
and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base,
who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial
in a competent court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced
before said court when required by it. The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the information against the accused upon the filing of the original
in the competent court.

6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that in time of war the United States
shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by
members of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines.

7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any person fleeing from
the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be found in any base, he will be
surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of the Philippines.

8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States, the offended
party may institute a separate civil action against the offender in the proper court of the Philippines to
enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the offense.

Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal case against
petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base. Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had
been committed outside a base, still the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense
had been committed by a "member of the armed forces of the United States" there being no question
that the offended party in this case is the United States. It is not necessary therefore, to consider
whether the offense is against "the security of the United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether
petitioner committed it in "the actual performance of a specific military duty" or in time of a declared
"national emergency" under paragraph 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for
in all these instances the military jurisdiction depends also upon whether the offender is a member of
the armed forces of the United States. We shall then determine in this case (1) whether the offense has
been committed within or without a base, and, in the second instance, (2) whether the offender is or is
not a member of the armed forces of the United States.

As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those area named in
Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to
the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas specified in Annexes A and B, there is none that has
reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has allegedly been committed. On the contrary,
it appears in Annex A that "army communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all
stations in the Port of Manila Area."

Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole article is as follows:

TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and
installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable
time, not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the bases for
the United States armed forces. If circumstances require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed
by mutual agreement of the two Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing
temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a
period of three years.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with
boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States armed forces until such time as other
arrangements can be made for the supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.

3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and
installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of
the United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations
located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the
bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election
not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is
agreed that the United States shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and installations
while they are occupied by the armed forces of the United States, including the exercise of such
measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the security of the personnel and property
therein.

The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is "Temporary Installations." Paragraph 1
refers to temporary quarters and installations existing outside the bases specified in Annex A and Annex
B, which may be retained by the United States armed forces for such reasonable time as may be
necessary not exceeding two years in duration, extendible fro not more than three years, the extension
not being applicable to existing temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of
Manila.

Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which will be available for use to the
United States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and installations, its temporariness not being
for a definite period of time, but "until such time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the
bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that
may be construed as placing the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base.

Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and
installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses
within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore,
the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a base, since it has been
committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to
the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of Manila.

The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a member of the armed forces of
the United States under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated, petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a
civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a
civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles
XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members of the
armed forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed
forces do not include civilian employees.

Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United States, which enumerates, among the
persons subject to military law, persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States.
But this case should be decided not under the Articles of War, but under the terms of the Base
Agreement between the United States and the Philippines. And not because a person is subject to
military law under the Articles of War does he become, for that reason alone, a member of the armed
forces under the Base Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a civilian
employee is in the service of the United States Army does not make him a member of the armed forces
of the United States. Otherwise, it would have been necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian
employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States.

Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because the Secretary of Justice had not
notified the officer holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the Philippines desired to retain
jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this
connection that in cases like the present where the offender is a civilian employee and not a member of
the Unites States armed forces, no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney of by the
Secretary of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of Article
XXI, of the Agreement.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent
has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the
judgment rendered by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any criminal
action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable, Secretary of Justice.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

One of the attributes of national sovereignty is the power to try and punish offenses, criminal and
otherwise. The exercise of that power is, by virtue of express provision of our Constitution, vested in the
Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by law. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII) The fundamental law refers to
inferior courts created by an enactment of a national legislature, Assembly or Congress, not to foreign
courts martial, created by foreign countries.

All this is in accordance with elemental principles of political law.

If petitioner is liable for a criminal offense, according to our laws, the jurisdiction to try him belongs to a
justice of the peace or municipal court or to a court of first instance.

The jurisdiction can be transferred to other courts by virtue of a law that may be enacted to said effect.
The law, to be effective, must not violate the constitutional Bill of Rights, among them the guarantee of
fair trial in favor of an accused, the equal protection of the law, the due process of law, the guarantees
against illegal detentions and searches, and others.

Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the U. S. Army, rendering services in the
Philippines. He attacks the power of the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukus Command, U.S. Army,
to have him under military custody and tried by a general court-martial of said army. Respondent
invokes, in opposing the petition, the provisions of the agreement on military Bases entered into by the
Republic of the Philippines and the government of the United States of America on March 14, 1947.

The agreement appears to be a concession to two weaknesses: the American distrust in Philippine
tribunals and Filipino yielding to much distrust; on one hand, undisguised prejudice, — national, racial,
or otherwise, — on the other, meek submission to the natural consequences of an unreasonable
prejudice; on one side, the haughtiness of a powerful nation, proud in the consciousness of its power,
on the other, the moral surrender of a new nation, not yet so sure in the exercise to their fullness of
sovereign prerogatives. Extra-territoriality is wrong per se.

It is, therefore, assailable on two opposing fronts. On constitutional ground, it is hardly defensible.

The Bill of Rights has been embodied in the Constitution for the protection of all human beings within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. All persons covered by the waivers made in the agreement,
whether Americans or Filipinos, whether citizens or aliens, are denied the constitutional guarantee of
the equal protection of the law. Their fundamental rights are safeguarded by the Constitution, and the
agreement places them outside the Constitution.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the agreement in question, so far as it stipulates waiver of the
jurisdiction of our courts of justice on the class of persons mentioned therein, is null and void, being in
open conflict with clear provisions of our fundamental law.

Upon this ground, petitioner is entitled to be released by respondent and by the court martial which
tried him.

Even in the erroneous hypothesis that the waiver clauses of the agreement are valid, we concur in the
reasoning of the Chief Justice in support of the position that petitioner is not comprehended in said
waiver clauses. With more reason, respondent has no power nor jurisdiction to hold petitioner in
confinement, nor to have him tried by a U.S. army court-martial.

Notice must be served to the whole world that, in rendering the decision in this case, the Supreme
Court, in the fullness of judicial maturity, acted not as a mere agency of national sovereignty, but in the
consciousness that the administration of justice, more than national, is a human function, untethered by
the narrow provincialism of the points of view of a country, but founded on the universal and
permanent interests of mankind, as expressed in principles with equal value regardless of the
hemisphere of the latitude where a person may be placed.

There is a suggestion that, because it has not found articulate expression in this case, it should be
ignored, when it is boiling in many minds, and it is that respondent, shielded by his military power and
the overwhelming national power of his country, may ignore our decision, and we will be powerless to
enforce it. The fact that respondent appeared before us, through counsel, without any reservation,
answers the suggestion, and gives full justice to the sense of moral values of the respondent.

Besides, in the present state of international affairs, when America is engaged in the noble task of
making a reality the ideal of one world, it can not compromise its moral leadership by any showing of
reckless disregard to the decision of a court of justice. The cry that there must be one world or none can
receive but one satisfactory answer; the reality of world justice. Only in justice hinges the salvation of
humanity. Only justice can give real peace and provide the basis for contentment and happiness.

We concur in the decision, ordering the immediate release of the petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO
PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for their release
from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other
crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense,
a ruling that unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their convictions had become
final. Nor is this the first instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v.
Director of Prisons,2 likewise a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer
given was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would premise their
stand on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the
codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,3 necessarily
resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect
under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at
the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the
same."4 These arguments carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly we find for petitioners, without
going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.

Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion
perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer
the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions.
Each of them has served more than 13 years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the information against the
accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided
case of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of
the Solicitor General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the
petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could
have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal.9

The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas corpus proceeding
prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary,
discarded. We can resolve the present petition without doing so. The plea there made was
unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel,
Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to
raise a serious jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable
to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To repeat, these
two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this petition.

1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under the
circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be
avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ
imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a
deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.
If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for
by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.

Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in the
fundamental law. 10Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the principal safeguards to
personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against
arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick
echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel
made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is
assured.

A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with
its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad
Santos, 17 Paras, 18Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to
emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 21 the remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent
Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation
of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ of habeas corpus
as having been devised and existing "as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint" the opinion of Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if presented in
pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen, 23 where this Court,
again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was fatally
defective in its allegations, this court, on its motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in
the case entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde
v. Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ,
that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles the
accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26

So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter thus: "The writ
of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from
an 1869 decision 28 of the then Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for
centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years
has only served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year,
Justice Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
... The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability
to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great and
efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role
is his adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all
forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure."

2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the
range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back
to 1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained
was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. This is understandable, as
during the time the Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to
authoritative doctrines of constitutional law there followed.

One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As summarized by
Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on which this court, or any court,
without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under
conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the
cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void." 33

There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of
jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal
protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts of
First Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted.
The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It
had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in
conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35

They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people similarly situated were
not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional guarantee is the uniform
operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36

The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued incarceration after the
twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our
controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war
with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise,
what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for
the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the petition before
us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in
jail for perhaps the rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid
their penalty to society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.

4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention,
petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v.
Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions
but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal
to deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously
noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as
legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum
of Bishop Hoadley:

"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the
law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke them." It is to be
admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist John Chipman
Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above observations. We do not
have to go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal
Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive application.

It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect petitioners had
served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate
remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced
in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus: "The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes
punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and
some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable,
the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has
served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director
v. Director of Prisons 47 where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While
the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of
habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused
by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully
sustained the burden of justifying their release.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that petitioners be forthwith
set at liberty.

Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

The petitioners at bar, three of whom pleaded guilty1 and two of whom stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in 1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and other crimes, and have served or are now entering into their 17th year of
imprisonment, save for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was sentenced on December 15, 1955 and is
completing his 15th year of imprisonment, (excluding the periods they were under pre-conviction
detention). The leaders of the rebellion who were meted out death and life sentences for the same
charge by the Court of First Instance of Manila had their sentences reduced last near to ten years
of prision mayor by the Court in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court expressly re-affirmed the doctrine
first laid down in 1956 in People vs. Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with
other common crimes since such common crimes "assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients and consequently cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." The Court rejected
therein the State's plea for the reexamination and setting aside of such doctrine, declaring that "(T)his
Court has given this plea of the Solicitor General a very serious consideration, but after a mature
deliberation the members of this Court have decided to maintain that ruling in the Hernandez case and
to adhere to what this Court said in that case." The said leaders have since been duly freed as having
served out their penalty, but their followers, herein petitioners, are still serving their life sentences.

I concede the validity of the ruling in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons5 that "(W)ith reference to persons
in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want
of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error." "I grant, too, that at the
time of the Pomeroy decision in 1960, as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion
(was) still upheld by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court."
But with the doctrine first enunciated in 1956 in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four majority vote having
withstood the test of time6 and having been just last year unreservedly reaffirmed without a single
dissent in Lava, it cannot now be gainsaid that it is now part of our legal system that the crime of
"complexed" rebellion does not exist in our Revised Penal Code. No prosecutor would now file an
information for "complexed" rebellion but simply for the offense of simple rebellion as defined in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and even if such an information for "complexed" rebellion to be so filed,
the trial courts would be bound to quash such information as not charging an offense on the strength
of Lava and Hernandez.

Petitioners have therefore properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code that:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of
article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

in relation to the provisions of Article 8 of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."

The situation of petitioners is no different than it would be if, say, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua were imposed by statute for the crime of simple rebellion at the time of their conviction and
they were accordingly sentenced, and the statutory penalty were now reduced to prision mayor or 12
years imprisonment; having served out the maximum penalty of 12 years now imposed by the amended
statute, they would be entitled to invoke the retroactive effect of the statute favoring
them.lâwphî1.ñèt The only difference between the situation given and the present case is that here it is
this Supreme Court, interpreting the laws in discharge of its constitutional prerogative, that has laid
down the doctrine since Hernandez in 1956 that no offense of "complexed" rebellion exists and
petitioners should therefore be now equally entitled to the retroactive favorable effect of such doctrine.

The actual case of petitioners is that at the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the crime committed by them was punishable by life imprisonment, but
the Court has subsequently judicially determined it not be so and that the maximum imposable penalty
is prision mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are entitled to the benefit of this later judicial
declaration, just as if a statutory amendment had been enacted—not because the sentencing court had
no jurisdiction or is now ousted of jurisdiction. The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo
vs. Director of Prisons,7 "the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas corpus."
The question of jurisdiction of the sentencing court therefore is moot, for it is universally recognized
that relief by habeas corpus may be properly sought in cases of imposition of excessive penalty, such
that the part of the sentence beyond or in excess of the power of the court to impose is held void, the
applicant having already served out the entire part of the sentence within the court's power. 8 As
pointed out by the Court in Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons,9 furthermore, "Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code ... extends its benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to
them to make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus inasmuch as, if the penalty imposed
upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code, the excess has become
illegal."

Regardless, therefore, of whether the trial courts that sentenced petitioners to life sentences had
jurisdiction or not to impose such penalty, or were right or wrong in imposing such penalty, the only
relevant question now is whether petitioners have served the maximum — and lesser — sentence
of prision mayor that this Court has by firm judicial doctrine since 1956 determined to be the penalty
that the Revised Penal Code fixes for the crime of rebellion. Since they have actually served much more
than the maximum imposable penalty, the excess of the sentence imposed upon them over the
imposable maximum of twelve years of prision mayor cannot but be declared illegal and they should
now be set free.

In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held that the provisions of a new law (Act 3030) for the prescription of
certain election offenses (fixing the same at one year after commission) were more favorable to the
accused than those of the pre-existing law and were therefore retroactive as to the same offenses
committed before the enactment of the new law. In meeting the objection that the reduced prescription
period was by its terms applicable only to offenses resulting from the new law (which amended the pre-
existing Election Law) and could not be given retroactive effect, the Court found "that practically all of
the offenses defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in Act 3030 (the new law),
the only difference being that the penalties have been increased." Holding that the retroactivity clause
of Article 22 of the Penal Code must apply in all in which the new law is more favorable to the accused,
in the absence of any express statutory exception, the Court drew this analogy: "Let us suppose that a
statute is enacted defining the crime of murder in the same language in which it is defined in the Penal
Code, but providing that the maximum penalty for the crime defined in the new statute shall be life
imprisonment, the statute containing no provision that it shall not be retroactive in its effect. Would
anyone then maintain that the death penalty might still be imposed for murder committed before the
new statute was enacted?"

The case at bar for petitioners is much stronger. Here, there is no question even as to the enactment of
a law statute describing the crime in the same language and imposing a lesser penalty, but the settled
doctrine of this Court that there does not exist in our legal system the complex crime of rebellion of
which the petitioners stand convicted, "since rebellion cannot form a complex with common crimes,
because the latter are either absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent
offenses." 11 Petitioners here have been convicted for the very same rebellion and under the very same
law for which their leaders, Jose Lava et al., have been convicted. Yet, while their leaders have since
been freed after serving their sentences of ten years of prision mayor, petitioners as mere followers are
serving out the life sentences imposed on them, notwithstanding their already having served out much
more than the maximum penalty of twelve years of prision mayor imposable upon them. The fact that
the legal doubts about the non-existence of the crime of "complexed" rebellion were cleared up only in
1956 after they had already been convicted and were serving their sentences does not make the excess
in the penalty imposed upon them beyond the maximum of twelve years any less illegal.

The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its corollary rule of the
law of the case, have no application here. These salutary rules decree that rights of parties having been
decisively settled and determined by final judgment of the court of competent jurisdiction with the
party adversely affected having had the opportunity to raise in the case all relevant questions, the
decision becomes the law of the case, and vested rights would be impaired, judicial chaos and disorder
ensue and litigation would be never-ending and would become more intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress, should an adjudicated case be reopened simply because in another and subsequent
case, this Court adopted a new or different construction of the law under which a different result of the
adjudicated case might have been obtained. Here, the whole question
turns — simply — on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the Revised Penal
Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of the same Code. As this Court
had ruled since 1956--which is now settled doctrine—that only the crime of simple rebellion exists in our
legal system for which the maximum penalty of prision mayor may be imposed, the excess of the life
sentences imposed upon petitioners over the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and
must necessarily be declared void.

Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at bar presents a
clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision mayor which has become
illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with
other common crimes. On this ground, as well as on the further and more fundamental ground that to
hold them liable to continue serving life sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their
conviction as well as now—punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served,
would be to deny them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.

Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and unconstitutional and
the petition for habeas corpus should be granted and petitioners forthwith set at liberty.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

The petitioners at bar, three of whom pleaded guilty1 and two of whom stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in 1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and other crimes, and have served or are now entering into their 17th year of
imprisonment, save for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was sentenced on December 15, 1955 and is
completing his 15th year of imprisonment, (excluding the periods they were under pre-conviction
detention). The leaders of the rebellion who were meted out death and life sentences for the same
charge by the Court of First Instance of Manila had their sentences reduced last near to ten years
of prision mayor by the Court in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court expressly re-affirmed the doctrine
first laid down in 1956 in People vs. Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with
other common crimes since such common crimes "assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients and consequently cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." The Court rejected
therein the State's plea for the reexamination and setting aside of such doctrine, declaring that "(T)his
Court has given this plea of the Solicitor General a very serious consideration, but after a mature
deliberation the members of this Court have decided to maintain that ruling in the Hernandez case and
to adhere to what this Court said in that case." The said leaders have since been duly freed as having
served out their penalty, but their followers, herein petitioners, are still serving their life sentences.

I concede the validity of the ruling in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons5 that "(W)ith reference to persons
in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want
of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error." "I grant, too, that at the
time of the Pomeroy decision in 1960, as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion
(was) still upheld by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court."
But with the doctrine first enunciated in 1956 in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four majority vote having
withstood the test of time6 and having been just last year unreservedly reaffirmed without a single
dissent in Lava, it cannot now be gainsaid that it is now part of our legal system that the crime of
"complexed" rebellion does not exist in our Revised Penal Code. No prosecutor would now file an
information for "complexed" rebellion but simply for the offense of simple rebellion as defined in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and even if such an information for "complexed" rebellion to be so filed,
the trial courts would be bound to quash such information as not charging an offense on the strength
of Lava and Hernandez.

Petitioners have therefore properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code that:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of
article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

in relation to the provisions of Article 8 of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."

The situation of petitioners is no different than it would be if, say, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua were imposed by statute for the crime of simple rebellion at the time of their conviction and
they were accordingly sentenced, and the statutory penalty were now reduced to prision mayor or 12
years imprisonment; having served out the maximum penalty of 12 years now imposed by the amended
statute, they would be entitled to invoke the retroactive effect of the statute favoring them. The only
difference between the situation given and the present case is that here it is this Supreme Court,
interpreting the laws in discharge of its constitutional prerogative, that has laid down the doctrine
since Hernandez in 1956 that no offense of "complexed" rebellion exists and petitioners should
therefore be now equally entitled to the retroactive favorable effect of such doctrine.

The actual case of petitioners is that at the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the crime committed by them was punishable by life imprisonment, but
the Court has subsequently judicially determined it not be so and that the maximum imposable penalty
is prision mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are entitled to the benefit of this later judicial
declaration, just as if a statutory amendment had been enacted—not because the sentencing court had
no jurisdiction or is now ousted of jurisdiction. The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo
vs. Director of Prisons,7 "the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas corpus."

The question of jurisdiction of the sentencing court therefore is moot, for it is universally recognized
that relief by habeas corpus may be properly sought in cases of imposition of excessive penalty, such
that the part of the sentence beyond or in excess of the power of the court to impose is held void, the
applicant having already served out the entire part of the sentence within the court's power. 8 As
pointed out by the Court in Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons,9 furthermore, "Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code ... extends its benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to
them to make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus inasmuch as, if the penalty imposed
upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code, the excess has become
illegal."

Regardless, therefore, of whether the trial courts that sentenced petitioners to life sentences had
jurisdiction or not to impose such penalty, or were right or wrong in imposing such penalty, the only
relevant question now is whether petitioners have served the maximum — and lesser — sentence
of prision mayor that this Court has by firm judicial doctrine since 1956 determined to be the penalty
that the Revised Penal Code fixes for the crime of rebellion. Since they have actually served much more
than the maximum imposable penalty, the excess of the sentence imposed upon them over the
imposable maximum of twelve years of prision mayor cannot but be declared illegal and they should
now be set free.

In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held that the provisions of a new law (Act 3030) for the prescription of
certain election offenses (fixing the same at one year after commission) were more favorable to the
accused than those of the pre-existing law and were therefore retroactive as to the same offenses
committed before the enactment of the new law. In meeting the objection that the reduced prescription
period was by its terms applicable only to offenses resulting from the new law (which amended the pre-
existing Election Law) and could not be given retroactive effect, the Court found "that practically all of
the offenses defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in Act 3030 (the new law),
the only difference being that the penalties have been increased." Holding that the retroactivity clause
of Article 22 of the Penal Code must apply in all in which the new law is more favorable to the accused,
in the absence of any express statutory exception, the Court drew this analogy: "Let us suppose that a
statute is enacted defining the crime of murder in the same language in which it is defined in the Penal
Code, but providing that the maximum penalty for the crime defined in the new statute shall be life
imprisonment, the statute containing no provision that it shall not be retroactive in its effect. Would
anyone then maintain that the death penalty might still be imposed for murder committed before the
new statute was enacted?"

The case at bar for petitioners is much stronger. Here, there is no question even as to the enactment of
a law statute describing the crime in the same language and imposing a lesser penalty, but the settled
doctrine of this Court that there does not exist in our legal system the complex crime of rebellion of
which the petitioners stand convicted, "since rebellion cannot form a complex with common crimes,
because the latter are either absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent
offenses." 11 Petitioners here have been convicted for the very same rebellion and under the very same
law for which their leaders, Jose Lava et al., have been convicted. Yet, while their leaders have since
been freed after serving their sentences of ten years of prision mayor, petitioners as mere followers are
serving out the life sentences imposed on them, notwithstanding their already having served out much
more than the maximum penalty of twelve years of prision mayor imposable upon them. The fact that
the legal doubts about the non-existence of the crime of "complexed" rebellion were cleared up only in
1956 after they had already been convicted and were serving their sentences does not make the excess
in the penalty imposed upon them beyond the maximum of twelve years any less illegal.

The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its corollary rule of the
law of the case, have no application here. These salutary rules decree that rights of parties having been
decisively settled and determined by final judgment of the court of competent jurisdiction with the
party adversely affected having had the opportunity to raise in the case all relevant questions, the
decision becomes the law of the case, and vested rights would be impaired, judicial chaos and disorder
ensue and litigation would be never-ending and would become more intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress, should an adjudicated case be reopened simply because in another and subsequent
case, this Court adopted a new or different construction of the law under which a different result of the
adjudicated case might have been obtained. Here, the whole question
turns — simply — on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the Revised Penal
Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of the same Code. As this Court
had ruled since 1956--which is now settled doctrine—that only the crime of simple rebellion exists in our
legal system for which the maximum penalty of prision mayor may be imposed, the excess of the life
sentences imposed upon petitioners over the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and
must necessarily be declared void.

Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at bar presents a
clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision mayor which has become
illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with
other common crimes. On this ground, as well as on the further and more fundamental ground that to
hold them liable to continue serving life sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their
conviction as well as now—punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served,
would be to deny them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.

Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and unconstitutional and
the petition for habeas corpus should be granted and petitioners forthwith set at liberty.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES
UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

MAKASIAR, J.:.

This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized
and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties
thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to
propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in
paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.

Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the first paragraph of
Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.

The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the questioned provision is a valid
limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and
equal protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin
substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the
laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the
guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be
"beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that should be accorded
primacy.1

The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements in the cases of Imbong
and Gonzales.2

The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law is likewise
untenable.

An ex post facto law is one which:.

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful; and

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3

From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition
refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.4

While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a)
thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or
any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23
directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.

WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is
not unconstitutional. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused
in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following pronouncement:

Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper penalty
imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).

Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,

(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as
moral damages, P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been represented by a private
prosecutor, and to pay the costs;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as
moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been represent by a private
prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p. 48, rec.).

The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:

At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez
together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George
Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the
hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At
the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n.,
Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were
being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant
would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the
group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is
good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however,
answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his
gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense
transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9,
Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).

It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the
Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the
assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.

From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take
judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:

Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937
and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He
established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who
petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation
and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.

Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in
Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased
and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.

Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the
survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According
to the survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for
Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be
distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).

The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for
disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August
14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the
settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the
Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days
with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was
later repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon,
approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The
settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the
decision in favor of the company.

On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which
then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to
the company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had
repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent
machination on the part of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R)
which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the
company.

This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24,
1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the
appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around
P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The
second house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by
Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store from his former
residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15
meters east of the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used
for drying grains and copra.

On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other
leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an
injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the
pendency of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company
whereby he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the
company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. According
to him, he signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid
trouble, until the question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he
alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased
Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:

You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in which your house
and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on February 21, 1967. You have not paid as as even
after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.

In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no alternative but to
terminate our agreement on this date.

I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the
land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on December 31, 1966.

In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month period, the company
shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).

On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting
bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the
concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with
the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would
have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since
the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August
22, 1968, with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts.

At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all
morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and
looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall
of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and
deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the
highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant
surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two
persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).

Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:

First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact
that he acted in defense of his person; and

Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-appellant although
he acted in defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).

The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them
from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He
claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be
exempt from criminal liability.

Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised
Penal Code, as amended).

The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following
words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the
deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp.
227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house
being chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the
fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp. 225-227, supra). According
to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I
took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr.
Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:

When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at
Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing that there
was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p.
132, supra, Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim,
however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in
question, when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons,
consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of
appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being
nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal
weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary
gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just
a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke
up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he
saw the damage being done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be
shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to his compadre, the
deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer
answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.

The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have
resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to
and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is
no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and
Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights.

The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the
contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence
and the highway?

Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or
tenements.

However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order
of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The
parties could not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August
22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in
1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the
company, between the same parties, which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement
in spite of the subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such
1970 dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the
Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate
of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the
sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the
government's supplemental petition was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28,
1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the
evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.

Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil
Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21,
1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970,
thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place because even though
we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay while
waiting for the case because at that time, it was not known who is the right owner of the place. So we
decided until things will clear up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p.
169, t.s.n., Vol.6).

In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within
which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up
to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the
highway.

The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver
the thing.

Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and
the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to
appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop
and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful
aggression as contemplated by law.

Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind
(People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).

In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to
resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property (Emphasis supplied).

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense
or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired
his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.

WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no
provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced
by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over
with him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he
could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held
earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore
lacking.

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk
to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a
situation where the slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).

WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently
established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto
Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and
Company, which may be summarized as follows:

On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying corn near the
house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South Cotabato, when the accused
and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She
further told him that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez
added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his
head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told him not to believe as
they were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).

This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be "direct evidence of the planning or
preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the
crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused
premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that there was
sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to
reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).

Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer,
neutralizes his credibility.

Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims
nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's
conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.

Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and
destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.

Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant
awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill
bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger
of closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time
when his first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have
so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun
and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where
appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of
relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his
dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should be credited with
this mitigating circumstance.

Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any
qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the
deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same. Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the
penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
the same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.

The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World
Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to
the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually
provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing
in the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently
designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza
Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of evidence
linking her to the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated
October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58,
CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).

Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite
its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to the
resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land
accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to
take advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big
landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant and his
family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision
correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his civil liabilities to
serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50. However, the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines
only and not to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs
of proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES,
MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL
AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION,
WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF
DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS,
WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES.

CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY
ORDERED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin Vasquez and
Relova, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

Plana, J., in the result.

G.R. No. 146425 November 21, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PROCULO MEJECA y MONTALLANA, BALDOMERO QUINTINA, ROMEO SOLARTE,
DIOSECORO NARCISO, ADELINA NARCISO, NICOLAS PICACHE, JR., JULIE HILARIO,
ARNOLD NARCISO and DANTE ARAS, accused.
ARNOLD NARCISO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Lita Berlanas, the vault custodian of the Marikina City Branch of the JTC Pawnshop owned by Victoria T.
Tuparan, was fatally shot as she tried to flee to safety when several armed men barged into the shop
and carted away assorted jewelry worth more or less P3,000,000.00.

Initially charged for the felony were Proculo Mejeca y Montallana, Baldomero Quintina and Romeo
Solarte. The corresponding information for Robbery with Homicide was filed on August 15, 1996.1

Subsequently, additional suspects were identified. Thus, indicted for the crime in an Amended
Information for Robbery in Band with Homicide2 were: Proculo Mejeca y Montallana, Baldomero
Quintina, Romeo Solarte, Diosecoro3 Narciso, Adelina Narciso, Nicolas Picache, Jr., Julie Hilario, Arnold
Narciso and Dante Aras. The amended information alleges –

That on or about the 11th day of July 1996 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all armed with assorted firearms, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
premises of JTC Pawnshop and once inside robbed the aforesaid pawnshop of assorted jewelries worth
more or less P3,000,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery one of the accused with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot LITA
BERLANAS, vault custodian of the said JTC Pawnshop thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds
which directly caused her death.

Contrary to law.

Accused Proculo M. Mejeca, Nicolas Picache, Jr., Adelina Narciso, Romeo Solarte and Baldomero
Quintana have, to date, remained at large4 despite alias warrants of arrest issued against them. Thus,
Arnold Narciso, Diosecoro Narciso, Julie Hilario and Dante Aras, who were captured after the incident
were the only ones arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.5

The case then proceeded to trial after which, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the accused ARNOLD NARCISO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide penalized under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of the use of unlicensed firearm and in band and
is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. The said accused is further
ordered to pay the heirs of Lita Berlanas the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as
indemnity for the latter’s death and to pay the owner of JTC Pawnshop, Victoria Tuparan Manansala, the
amount of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY FIVE
(P3,563,645.00) PESOS representing the value of the pieces of jewelry that were taken from the
pawnshop subject of the robbery. The other accused DIOSECORO NARCISO, JULIE HILARIO and DANTE
ARAS are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered released from the custody of the Marikina City Jail
unless validly held for some other offense. The case against the other accused who remain at large is
ordered archived and let a warrant of arrest be issued against them.

SO ORDERED.6

On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellant Arnold Narciso assails the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death against him alleging that –

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS NANCY ALEGRE

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.

From the prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in the People’s brief, it appears that on
July 11, 1996, Nancy "Ancy" Alegre, then an appraiser employed by the JTC Pawnshop, owned and
operated by Victoria Tuparan-Manansala, left the pawnshop’s Cogeo-Antipolo branch, around 5:30 in
the afternoon and proceeded to the main branch at Bayan-bayanan Avenue, Concepcion, Marikina City
to submit her report to Lita Berlanas and to Edna Escabe, employees of the main branch. She arrived at
the main branch between 6:30 and 7:00 in the evening.

When she was about five steps from the entrance of the main branch, she saw a man in front of the
pawnshop, brandishing a gun in his right hand while holding Lita Berlanas by her nape with his left hand.
She later identified this man as accused-appellant Arnold Narciso.

Bystanders advised Ancy not to proceed to the pawnshop warning her, thus: "Miss, huwag ka nang
tumuloy, may hold-apan." Alerted to the danger, she then went to other side of the road near a 7-11
Convenience Store to observe what was going on. She heard several gunshots fired inside the
pawnshop. She saw Arnold fire the gun upwards and towards the street. After the gun was fired, Lita
Berlanas ran and Arnold shot her. Several men, numbering about four, including Arnold, ran out of the
pawnshop. One of the men, who was also carrying a gun, manned the traffic. The four men
commandeered a Tamaraw FX vehicle and boarded it.

Ancy then rushed towards the pawnshop where she found Edna Escaba hiding under the sink. She
proceeded towards the side of the pawnshop and found the lifeless body of Lita Berlanas. All the
pawned items were gone. At that point, Ancy lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital.7
The pawnshop’s owner, Victoria Tuparan-Manansala, arrived at the scene of the crime after the
robbery. She had just come from their branch on Molave Street, where she inspected the pawned items.
She received a message on her pager that there was a robbery at the main branch and that Lita Berlanas
was gunned down. She rushed to the site where she saw barangay officials carrying Lita Berlanas’ body
out of the shop. She found that all the items in the pawnshop were taken.8 The value of the items taken
from the pawnshop amounted to more or less Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00).

Almost two years later, in January 1998, the pawnshop’s Karuhatan-Valenzuela branch was robbed at
gunpoint. The suspects were caught and brought to Camp Crame where the employees of the JTC
Pawnshop, Ancy and a certain Edera, identified them as the same persons who committed the July 11,
1996 robbery of the pawnshop’s Marikina branch. They were identified as accused Diosecoro Narciso,
Dante Aras, Arnold Narciso and Julie Hilario.9Accused-appellant Arnold Narciso was arrested and
detained.

On the other hand, accused-appellant had a different story to tell. He denied any participation in the
crime and alleged that on July 11, 1996, he was in his residence in Bagong Nayon II, Antipolo City,
digging a well. He asserted that the claim of Ancy Alegre that it was he who took Lita Berlanas hostage
was a "big lie." He pointed out that when Ancy first testified, she identified the person on the
cartographic sketch as Baldomero Quintana. However, she later declared that it was accused-appellant
who was depicted on the sketch. He also claimed that Ancy may have singled him out because among
the four accused, he was the only one who was the most vocal in court. He denied knowledge of the
location of the Marikina Branch of JTC Pawnshop. He claimed that he only found out where it was
situated when he was indicted and detained in Marikina.10 He further testified that the distance
between the pawnshop and the 7-11 Convenience Store where Ancy allegedly stood was approximately
35-40 meters.11 The JTC Pawnshop is facing the church while the convenience store is facing Bayan-
bayanan Avenue.12

Accused-appellant alleged that on January 24, 1998, while he was in his house in Bagong Nayon II,
Antipolo City tending to his child and nephew, two men in civilian clothes arrived. One of the men stood
in front of the house while the second who was in shorts with a long firearm approached him and asked
him if he was the brother of Diosecoro Narciso. When he answered affirmatively, the man suddenly
struck him on his stomach with the butt of the gun. He was then pushed to the ground, handcuffed
behind his back, blindfolded and brought to a vehicle. He learned for the first time that he was being
implicated in the robbery when he was detained in Valenzuela.13

Accused-appellant insists that he was not positively identified by eyewitness Ancy Alegre. He argues that
Ancy could not have seen his face as she described him as "sporting long hair with dark brown
complexion," therefore "it is highly probable that the witness could not have clearly seen the face of the
man as the latter’s face may have been covered by his long wavy hair." He also makes capital of the fact
that Ancy did not describe his features to the police-investigator/cartographer, implying that had she
really been familiar with his face, other sketches need not have been shown to her. He further argues
that he is not the only one among the accused with "medium build, dark complexion, sporting long wavy
hair," inasmuch as his co-accused, Baldomero Quintina, also fits that description and, thus, Ancy may
have mistaken him for Quintina.14
In fine, accused-appellant raises the issue of credibility. He assails the assessment by the trial court of
the witnesses’ testimonies in regard to his identification as one of the perpetrators of the offense
charged.

Matters concerning the credibility of the witnesses are best addressed to the sound judgment of the
trial court.15 It is well-settled that appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment in
this regard, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts of
substance or value or gravely abused its discretion.16 The matter of assigning values to declarations at
the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of accused’s behavior, demeanor, conduct
and attitude at the trial.17

In this connection, we note in particular accused-appellant’s positive identification by eyewitness Ancy

Alegre, who testified on direct examination as follows:

PROSECUTOR

Q You said earlier that there were five men whom you saw participated in the incident which you
witnessed on July 21, if you will again see this group of men, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please look inside this courtroom and point to us if they are here or if any of the five men are
inside this courtroom?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you step down and tap the shoulder or you can come close to them and point to them?

A THE WITNESS POINTING TO A PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM.

COURT

The person pointed to by the witness, stand up and identify yourself.

ACCUSED

I am ARNOLD NARCISO Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR

Q How about the four others?

A I do not know, sir.

Q If you again see them will you be able to identify them?

A No, sir. Because I did not see their faces, sir.

Q Insofar as the incident of July 21, 1996 is concerned which you just narrated to us, what was the exact
participation of the man you earlier pointed to and identify himself as Arnold Narciso?

A He was the man standing at the door of the pawnshop, sir.

Q And also the man who shot Lita Berlanas?

A Yes, sir.

Q And also one of the men who came out of the pawnshop?

A Yes, sir.18

There were attempts by defense counsel to impeach Ancy’s credibility on cross-examination by dwelling
on what was perceived to be a vague description of accused-appellant and the supposed darkness and
poor visibility, but they only succeeded in eliciting the opposite response:

ATTY. LARRACAS

Q When you said Miss Witness that when you were about to go in the pawnshop at JTC Pawnshop in
Concepcion, Marikina City, bystanders shouted to you that there was a hold-up. You said that you did
not go inside the pawnshop. My question is. How far is the other side of the street from the pawnshop?

A From my seat up to the door of the courtroom, ma’am.

PROSECUTOR

May we ask that the question be clarified to this witness?

COURT

It is noted.

ATTY. LARRACAS

You Honor, can we just stipulate. . .

PROSECUTOR

We can say 6 vehicles can accommodate the entire width.

COURT

It is a judicial notice.

ATTY. LARRACAS

Q And the incident happened at about between 6:30 and 7:00 in the evening, you will agree with me that
at that time it was quite dark or it was already dark at that time?

A It was dark but in our place it was lighted, ma’am.19

What, however, spelled finis to accused-appellant’s pretensions of innocence are the following
declarations of Ancy Alegre on re-direct examination:

Q Miss Witness, you earlier identified Arnold Narciso as the one whom you saw standing in front of the
pawnshop at the time of the incident and who was then holding the nape of Lita Berlanas, how certain
are you that you pointed to that man whom you saw as the one holding Lita Berlanas in her nape?

A Because I could not forget his face, sir.

Q Are you one hundred percent sure that the man you pointed to is Arnold Narciso?

A Yes, sir.

Q In my previous question, you specifically identified Arnold Narciso as the one who fired at Lita
Berlanas. On cross-examination when you were asked by the counsel de oficio, you stated that because
there were several shots fired, you can no longer distinguish which shot hit Lita Berlanas, will you tell
which between the two answers is correct?

A I saw his shot (sic) Lita Berlanas, sir.

Q Miss Witness, you were earlier confronted with the description of the man as mentioned by counsel de
oficio, who is 5’6" to 5’7" in height, weighing 140-150 lbs., medium built with dark complexion, long
wavy hair,is this person that you described in your statement the same as Arnold Narciso as you have
pointed now?

A Yes, sir.20

The trial court rejected accused-appellant’s defense which consisted mainly of denial and alibi. Ancy
Alegre placed him at the scene and time of the robbery and saw him shoot Lita Berlanas. In convicting
accused, the trial court relied on Ancy’s testimony which it found to be "clear and
straightforward."21 Such positive testimony prevails over accused-appellant’s denial and alibi.22

Furthermore, as established at the trial, Ancy Alegre had no ulterior motive to falsely testify against
accused-appellant whom she has never met prior to the robbery. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over accused-appellant’s defense of denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.23

All told, we find no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quo insofar as accused-appellant’s
culpability is concerned. This brings us to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty against
him.

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides that:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. – Penalties. – Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson; xxx.

In meting out the supreme penalty of death, the trial court appreciated the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm under Section 1, paragraph 3, of R.A. No. 8294.

The imposition of the death penalty is infirm for several reasons:

First, R.A. No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The
crime imputed to accused-appellant was committed on July 11, 1996. It is fundamental that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.24 More importantly, penal laws are construed
liberally in favor of the accused.25 Thus, insofar as R.A. No. 8294 is not beneficial to the accused because
it unduly aggravates the crime, such new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it acquire the
character of an ex post facto law.26 Stated differently, R.A. No. 8294, which considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the killing of a victim as an aggravating circumstance, cannot be given retroactive
effect because to do so would be unfavorable to the accused.27

Second, inasmuch as the use of an unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special aggravating
circumstance28which would merit the imposition of the supreme penalty of death, the same must be
specifically alleged in the information. The amended information in this case alleges, inter alia, that –

. . . the above-named accused, all armed with assorted firearms, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the premises of JTC Pawnshop
and once inside robbed the aforesaid pawnshop of assorted jewelries worth more or less P3,000,000.00;
that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery one of the accused with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot LITA BERLANAS, vault custodian of
said JTC Pawnshop, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.
xxx

The use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of murder or homicide is a qualifying circumstance.
Following the well established rules pertinent to this issue, the imposition of capital punishment on
accused-appellant is improper absent the express allegation of such qualifying circumstance,29 otherwise
it would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.30

Third, two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of
the subject firearm; and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the guns did not
have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence.31 Given the prevailing facts of
this case, it becomes readily apparent that these elements are absent herein. With regard to the first
element, it must be noted that the murder weapon was never presented in evidence as it was not
confiscated by the police. There was, therefore, no opportunity to prove that the accused-appellant
used an unlicensed firearm.32

As for the second element, it bears stressing that the essence of the crime penalized under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of license or permit to carry or possess the firearm, as
possession by itself is not prohibited by law.33 As such, it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege
it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.34 In this regard, either the testimony of a representative
of or a certification from the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element.35 There, likewise, has been no such proof to show the existence of such element herein.

Likewise, the generic aggravating circumstance of cuadrilla (band) can not be appreciated in this case.
An offense is deemed to have been committed by a band where more than three armed malefactors
acted together in the commission thereof.36 As stated, the prosecution failed to establish with certainty
that all the perpetrators of the robbery, numbering four, were armed as no such weapons were
presented in evidence.37

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties.38
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina
City, Branch 272, finding accused-appellant Arnold Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and ordering him to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the
heirs of the deceased, Lita Berlanas, and the amount of Three Million Five Hundred Sixty-Three
Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Five Pesos (P3,563,645.00) as actual damages to Victoria Tuparan, the
owner of the JTC Pawnshop, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed by the trial
court on accused-appellant is reduced to Reclusion Perpetua.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.