Finalest Perlas Bernabe PDF

PERLAS-BERNABE
CASES
(PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS,
PROPERTY, and WILLS & SUCCESSION)
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 (2018-2019)
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG

SCHOOL OF LAW
PERLAS-BERNABE CASES
Table of Contents
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
TOPIC: ARTICLE 7 NCC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
REMULLA VS. MALIKSI ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
TOPIC: ARTICLE 9 NCC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
COCA-COLA FEMSA PH VS. BACOLOD SALES FORCE UNION-CONGRESS OF INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION-
ALU -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
TOPIC: ARTICLE 19------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6
HALILI VS. JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
UNICAPITAL, INC VS. CONSING ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
TOPIC: ARTICLE 20------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. VS. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION ------------------------------------------------ 9
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CASTILLO-------------------------------- 10
TOPIC: PRESUMPTIVE DEATH -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
REPUBLIC VS. TAMPUS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
REPUBLIC VS. DE GRACIA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
DEL ROSARIO VS. DEL ROSARIO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
TOPIC: RECOGNITION OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
MEDINA VS. KOIKE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
REPUBLIC VS. ROMERO II ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
TOPIC: PROPERTY REGIME ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 18
ONSTOTT VS. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
TAN VS. ANDRADE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
WILLEM BEUMER VS. AVELINA AMORES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20
TOPIC: CHILD CUSTODY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21
MASBATE VS. RELUCIO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21
TOPIC: GUARDIANSHIP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
NERI VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES YUSOP ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
PROPERTY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING
CORPORATION (BATCO) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
HEIRS OF ROMULO D. SANDUETA VS. DOMINGO ROBLES, HEIRS OF TEODORO ABAN, AND HEIRS OF
EUFRECENA GALEZA-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26
TOPIC: ACCESSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27
DELOS SANTOS VS. ALBERTO ABEJON -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR, VS. EMILIANA, VICTORIANO ---------------------------------------------------- 29
TOPIC: CERTIFICATE OF TITLE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30
HEIRS OF SARILI VS. LAGROSA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 30
GENORGA VS. HEIRS OF MELITON ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31
ALICIA P. LOGARTA, VS. CATALINO M. MANGAHIS --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
REPUBLIC VS. DAGONDON ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN VS. SPS. NELSON AND CRISTINA CRUZ --------------------------------------------------- 34
LURIZ VS. REPUBLIC -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
TOPIC: JUST COMPENSATION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFREDO HABABAG, SR ------------------------------------------------------------- 36
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. KHO ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MONTINOLA-ESCARILLA ----------------------------------------------------------- 38
HENRY L. SY VS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY ------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
TOPIC: EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
PIEDAD VS. SPOUSES GURIEZA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. SPOUSES JOVELLANOS ------------------------------------------------------------- 41
EUFROCINA NIEVIES VS. ERNESTO DULDULAO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
BAUTISTA VS. DONIEGO JR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44
TOPIC: FORCIBLE ENTRY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
JAVIER VS. LUMONTAD --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
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TOPIC: INJUNCTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46

SPS. ESPIRITU VS. SPS. SAZON ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 46
TOPIC: RES JUDICATA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 47
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDGARDO L. SANTOS ----------------------------------------------------------------- 47
TERESA IGNACIO VS OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY ----------------------------------------------- 47
TOPIC: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48
VICENTE VS. ACIL CORPORATION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48
VERCELES VS. HON. YARANON ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 49
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF PANGASUGAN, BAYBAY, LEYTE VS. EXPLORATION PERMIT APPLICATION OF
PNOC---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 50
RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., VS. GERRY CENTENO -------------------------------------------------- 51
REMEDIOS M. MAULEON VS. LOLINA MORAN PORTER --------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
TOPIC: MORTGAGE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
QUINTOS VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD --------------------------------------- 53
SPOUSES RODOLFO AND MARCELINA GUEVARRA VS. THE COMMONER LENDING CORPORATION, INC. --- 54
MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY PNB-REPUBLIC BANK), PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES OSCAR AND
NENITA TARROSA, RESPONDENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55
TOPIC: QUIETING OF TITLE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 56
BILAG VS. AY-AY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56
TOPIC: EQUITABLE TITLE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57
HEIRS OF EXTREMADURA VS. EXTREMADURA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57
TOPIC: RIGHTS OF AN AGRICULTURAL LESSOR --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58
PEREZ VS. AQUINO --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58
TOPIC: OWNERSHIP --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
HEIRS OF DELFIN VS. RABADON ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE VS. MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG, JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60
HEIRS OF PETER DONTON VS. DUANE STIER ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 61
RAFAEL VALES ET AL VS. MA. LUZ CHORESCA GALINATO ET AL. ---------------------------------------------------------- 62
TOPIC: POSSESSION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64
SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH AND DIRK FAHRENBACH VS. -------------------------------------------------------- 64
JOSEFINA PANGILINAN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64
TANCHULING VS. CANTELA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65
FELISA AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION VS. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION -------------------------- 66
AQA GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION VS. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK ---------------------------------------------------- 67
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL --------------------------------------------------------- 68
SPOUSES CAYAGO VS. SPOUSES CANTARA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 69
HEIRS OF JOSE PEÑAFLOR VS. DELA CRUZ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70
ANICETO BANGIS, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS VS. HEIRS OF SERAFIN AND SALUD ADOLFO -------------------- 71
TOPIC: PUBLIC DOMINION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 72
FIRST MEGA HOLDINGS VS. GUIGUINTO WATER DISTRICT ----------------------------------------------------------------- 72
TOPIC: EASEMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 72
SPS. VERGARA VS. SPS. SONKIN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 72
TOPIC: RECONVEYANCE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
ELIZA ZUÑIGA-SANTOS VS. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN ----------------------------------------------------- 73
TOPIC: NUISANCE------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 74
LINDA RANA VS. TERESITA LEE WONG ET AL. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74
SPS ROSARIO AND WILSON UY ET AL VS. SPS REYNALDO AND LINDA RANA ----------------------------------------- 74
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 76
SPOUSES SOLLER VS. HEIRS OF ULAYAO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 76
TOPIC: CO-OWNERSHIP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77
MAGSANO VS. PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK ------------------------------------------------------------------ 77
DOMINADOR M. APIQUE VS. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH ----------------------------------------------------- 78
TOPIC: PHILIPPINE MINING ACT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 79
WILLS AND SUCCESSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81
TOPIC: ATTESTATION CLAUSE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S.
LOPEZ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81
TOPIC: INSTITUTION OF HEIRS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82
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HEIRS OF YPON VS. RICAFORTE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82

ANG VS. PACUNIO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 83
B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. VS. GUECO ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 84
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, VS. CORONACION PARILLA ----------------------------------------------------------------- 85
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

TOPIC: ARTICLE 7 NCC
REMULLA VS. MALIKSI

G.R. NO. 171633
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law
or ordinance.
ART. 7 paragraph 3
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to laws or the Constitution.
FACTS:
Marietta de Villa in her personal capacity and as administratrix of the estate of her late husband
Guillermo, ceded, through a deed of donation of their property in favor of the Province of Cavite,
on which now stands various government offices and facilities. Thereafter, the Province of Cavite
filed an expropriation case seeking to expropriate the subject property which the former intends
to develop as the Provincial Capitol Site.
De Villa opposed the said expropriation proceedings claiming that there are still areas within the
donated portion which the Province of Cavite failed to develop and she also alleged that the fair
market value of subject property should be P45.00 per s/m. While said expropriation case was
still pending, she sold a portion of the subject property to Goldenrod.
Respondent Cavite Governor Erineo Maliksi issued an EO authorizing the creation of a committee
which recommend the terms and conditions for the proper settlement expropriation case. The
foregoing recommendations were adopted in a Compromise Agreement entered into by and
between Maliksi and Trece Martires Mayor and the owners of Goldenrod. Said compromise was
approved by the RTC in a decision.
In the CA. Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and Vice-Governor filed a petition for
annulment of judgement of RTC that said compromise is grossly disadvantageous to the
government and that extrinsic fraud tainted the expropriation proceedings considering that there
was collusion between the parties.
ISSUE:
WON Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgement be denied
RULING: No.
Records bear out that Remulla filed his petition for annulment of judgment in two capacities:
first, in his personal capacity as a taxpayer; and, second, in his official capacity as then presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite.
With respect to the first, jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
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to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to
be expended to enforce the compromise judgment. As such, Remulla – being a resident-taxpayer
of the Province of Cavite – has the legal standing to file the petition for annulment of judgment
and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on said ground. Notably, the fact that
there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not preclude Remulla
from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood, the concept of
legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which may be relaxed by the Court if the
circumstances so warrant.
As observed in Mamba v. Lara, the Court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases
where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were
involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract in
order to challenge its validity, or to seek the annulment of the same on the ground of extrinsic
fraud. Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a right to question contracts
entered into by the government, as in this case.
Anent the second, Remulla equally lodged the petition for annulment of judgment in his official
capacity as then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Cavite. As such, he represents the interests of the province itself which is,
undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured by the
execution of the compromise judgment.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 9 NCC
COCA-COLA FEMSA PH VS. BACOLOD SALES FORCE UNION-CONGRESS OF INDEPENDENT

ORGANIZATION-ALU
G.R. NO. 220605
DOCTRINE:
Courts should not shirk from exercising their power to review, where under applicable laws and
jurisprudence, such power may be rightfully exercised," as in this case.
ART. 9 NCC
No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of non-nonalcoholic beverages.

Thereafter, Cosmos ceded its sales functions to petitioner which resulted in the integration of a
number of Cosmo’s salesmen (Cosmos integrees) into petitioner’s workforce as route salesmen.
Subsequently, by adopting a route-to-market system abolished the route salesman position and
replaced by account developer position. Through internal selection process, the Cosmos
salesmen’s position were designated as ADs. However, petitioner hired new ADs with a higher
basic monthly pay and benefits occupying the same position, job description and functions.
Aggrieved by the difference in treatment, respondent the recognized CB agent submitted its
concerns to the grievance machinery contending the same. In its defense, Cosmo argued that the
fixing of hiring rates is a management prerogative.
The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) ruled that there is a disparity in the wages between the
two and directed the petitioner to readjust their salaries.
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CA denied the petition for review of petitioner on the ground that VA decision had attained
finality.
ISSUE:
WON the CA can deny its power to judicial review the said case
RULING: No.
The Voluntary Arbitrator’s judgments or final orders which are declared final by law are not so
exempt from judicial review when so warranted. "Any agreement stipulating that 'the decision
of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable' and 'that no further judicial recourse if either
party disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator's award may be availed of' cannot be
held to preclude in proper cases the power of judicial review which is inherent in courts."
The Court sees the prima facie reasonableness of petitioner's asseverations and finds that the
merits of its case, based on such argumentation, properly warrant judicial review. As such, the
CA should look into the soundness of the VA rulings in relation to the nuances averred,
particularly, the impact of the differences in the selection processes applied and relevant
qualifications between the Cosmos integrees and the newly-hired ADs. Moreover, the CA ought
to determine the proper application of the "equal pay for equal work" principle vis-a-vis the
business decision of an employer to adopt a more competitive compensation scheme in light of
the demands in human resource. Thus, borrowing the language in Chung Fu Industries (Phils.) Inc.
v. CA - which similarly involved a restrictive stipulation on appeal from an arbitral award the Court
finds that the CA erred in refusing "to look into the merits of this case, despite prima facie
showing of the existence of grounds warranting judicial review," which, thus, "effectively
deprived petitioner of the opportunity to prove or substantiate its allegations."
TOPIC: ARTICLE 19
HALILI VS. JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL

G.R. NO. 194906
DOCTRINE:
a.) Elements of Abuse of Right Article 19 Civil Code:

1.Theres a legal right or duty
2. Exercised in bad faith
3. With the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
b.) When the law is silent as to the requirement of a legal cause for the
employment contract to be operative, the fundamental principle, is that the law is read into
every contract. Hence, the contract's termination clause should not be interpreted as a form of
blanket-license by which each of the parties may just abdicate the contract at will. Rather, it is
a clause which allows any of the parties to pre-terminate the employment contract within the
stipulated fixed-term period of one year, provided that the party invoking the same has: (a) a
legal cause for terminating it; and (b) notifies the other party in writing four (4) weeks prior to
the intended date of termination.
FACTS:
The Justice for Children International (JFCI) is an international non-governmental organization

whose primary thrust is to provide aftercare to sexually trafficked children. On April 18, 2006, it
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hired Halili as its Consultant Program Coordinator. Respondents Gundelina Velazco (Velazco) and
Rob Morris (Morris), in their respective capacities as Director and President, executed an
employment contract with Halili for a term of one (1) year, with the condition that either party
may terminate the same "at anytime by giving four [(4)] weeks written notice" (termination
clause).
JFCI enforced the termination clause by informing Halili that they are terminating her services as
Consultant Program Coordinator. Claiming that she was illegally dismissed, Halili filed a
complaint against JFCI, Velazco and Morris (respondents) before the NLRC.  In her Position
Paper, Halili contended that while the right to pre-terminate her employment was expressly
stipulated in the contract, the arbitrary manner in which it was exercised by JFCI was in clear
violation of the doctrine of abuse of rights.
ISSUE:
WON the termination of the employment contract was exercised in an arbitrary manner which
violates the doctrine of abuse of rights (Article 19 Civil Code)
RULING: Yes.
Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for any express reference
thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with public interest. In
this case, it is undisputed that the contract entered into by JFCI and Halili is a fixed-term
employment contract, covering a period of one (1) year. The peculiar feature, however, of this
contract lies in its termination clause which reads that either party may terminate the same "at
anytime by giving four (4) weeks written notice"
When the law is silent as to the requirement of a legal cause for the employment contract to be
operative, the fundamental principle, is that the law is read into every contract. Hence, the
contract's termination clause should not be interpreted as a form of blanket-license by which
each of the parties may just abdicate the contract at will. Rather, it is a clause which allows any
of the parties to pre-terminate the employment contract within the stipulated fixed-term period
of one year, provided that the party invoking the same has: (a) a legal cause for terminating it;
and (b) notifies the other party in writing four (4) weeks prior to the intended date of termination.
Here, it is clear that the first requisite of legal cause was not complied with by JFCI. No just or
authorized cause was proven by substantial evidence in support of its invocation of the
termination clause stated in its contract with Halili. As such, the pre-termination of the contract
was infirm. Thus, considering further that respondents' argument on its purported loss of trust
and confidence in Halili cannot be taken into account at this stage since it was belatedly raised
for the first time on appeal, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Halili's
dismissal was illegal.
UNICAPITAL, INC VS. CONSING

G.R. NOs. 175277, 175285 and 192073
DOCTRINE:
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The
Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted.
The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
7
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
FACTS:
Consing Jr and his mother Cecila Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) obtained an P18M, P12M, and P6M loan
from Unicapital on several dates of the year 1997. The loan was secured by Promissory Notes
and a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite registered in the name
of Dela Cruz as per TCT. Plus Builder Inc (PBI) with URI entered into a joint venture agreement
with Unicapital.
The loan and mortgage over the subject property was modified into an Option to Buy Real
Property and after further negotiations, Dela Cruz sold the same to Unicapital and PBI for
P21,221,500 and P21,047,000 respectively. However, the titles cannot be transferred to their
names as Teng and Yu informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject property
and they are not willing to sell the same and that after investigation Dela Cruz’s title was of
dubious origin. Based on the findings of PBI and Unicapital they sent separate demand letters
seeking for the return of the purchase price they paid for the subject property.
Consing Jr. filed a complaint against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martinez, Dela Cruz claimed that the
incessant demands/ recovery efforts made by Unicapital and PBI constituted harassment and
oppression which severely affected his personal and professional life. Unicapital, MRI, and
Martinez filed separate Motions to Dismiss on Consing Jr’s complaint on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
WON Consing Jr’s right has been violated that may result to recovery of damages
RULING: Yes.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized
or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts
with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an
abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another
The philosophy behind Article 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The
Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted.
The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed
8
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind.
To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may also lead to the payment of moral damages
under Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code.
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he has come to discover that
Unicapital and PBI, et al. are speaking of him in a manner that is inappropriate and libelous; and
that they have spread their virulent version of events in the business and financial community
such that he has suffered and continues to suffer injury upon his good name and reputation
which, after all, is the most sacred and valuable wealth he possesses - especially considering that
he is an investment banker." In similar regard, the hypothetical admission of these allegations
may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 26, and even Article 2219(10), of the
Civil Code.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 20
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. VS. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 217426
DOCTRINE:
Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned that Article
20 of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an injury", whereas Article
2176 applies when the negligent act causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach
of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."
FACTS:
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan Raguindin to petitioner
for a pre-deployment medical examination. After undergoing the required examinations,
petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a Medical
Report. Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly
incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41. Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent
another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia, he purportedly
tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia required a re-examination of Raguindin. However, the results of the re-examination
remained the same. An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report likewise conducted by the
Ministry of Health affirmed such finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for
employment" and hence, should be held liable for damages
RULING: No.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence
in the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between
the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing contractual relation.
9
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his
medical examination with petitioner. Based on published reports from the World Health
Organization, HCV or the hepatitis C virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV
infection is usually asymptomatic, and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening
diseases. The incubation period for HCV is 2 weeks to 6 months, and following initial infection,
approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms. Indisputably, Raguindin was not
deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after petitioner's medical examination and hence, could
have possibly contracted the same only when he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA
therefore erred in holding that "had petitioner more thoroughly and diligently examined
Raguindin, it would likely have discovered the existence of the HCV because it was contrary to
human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would
immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his deployment"
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CASTILLO

G.R. NO. 221848
DOCTRINE:
"Public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." This high constitutional
standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric, and should not be taken lightly
considering that those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or
run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty
of dismissal from the service.
ART. 32 NCC
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages
FACTS:
Fe Acacio-Tsuji arrived at NAIA carrying a luggage containing various pieces of jewelry at an

appraised value of P1,184,010.00. Tsuji failed to declare the subject jewelries as required by
customs laws and was consequently confiscated and withheld in the In-Bond Room Section of
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) at NAIA, which issued a held baggage receipt in Tsuji’s favor. Almost
5 years after the subject jewelry was confiscated, Tsuji was authorized to claim the subject
jewelry but the same can no longer be found in the In-Bond Room Section and showed in the
logbook that the same was taken out and given to the Customs Cashier.
Petitioner Field Investigation Office filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a complaint
charging the respondent and others for grave misconduct, for premature release of the subject
jewelry without authority from any higher BOC official or any court, thereby causing undue injury
to Tsuji.
The OMB held respondent for Grave Misconduct, but the CA found respondent liable for only
simple misconduct.
ISSUE:
WON respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct instead of Simple
Misconduct.
10
RULING: Yes.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "public office is a public trust
and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere
rhetoric, and should not be taken lightly considering that those in the public service are enjoined
to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from
reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
Based on the confluence of events, respondent failed to measure up to the standards of conduct
prescribed for his position. As an accountable employee charged with the safeguarding of seized
items in the In-Bond Room Section, he was expected to exercise utmost responsibility and fidelity
in the discharge of that duty, and to ensure that they would only be transferred to another
location and/or released to authorized persons, and pursuant to proper authority issued by the
official custodian thereof, a higher BOC official, or upon court order. However, he disregarded
even the most basic established procedural requirement of prior authorization from a higher BOC
official before removing the subject jewelry from the custody of the In-Bond Room Section, which
paved the way for its loss, and the consequent damage to the owner of the subject jewelry, Tsuji,
and in the process, eroded the public's trust in the BOC as enforcer of the Philippines' tariff and
customs laws, and all other laws, rules and regulations relating to the tariff and customs
administration.
TOPIC: PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
REPUBLIC VS. TAMPUS

G.R. NO. 214243
DOCTRINE:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code
of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years,
or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes
to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda Tampus was married to Dante Del Mundo on November 29, 1975 in Cordova,
Cebu. Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple
had no children.
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile. Thus, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead
for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
11
Due to the absence of any oppositor, Nilda was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. She
testified on the allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by
inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of
his whereabouts. She averred that she intends to remarry and move on with her life.
ISSUE:
WON Dante may be considered as presumptively dead
RULING: No.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they
also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no
further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters
to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of
the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante
was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could
have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP
who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her
missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents,
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create
a "well-founded belief” of his death.
TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC VS. DE GRACIA

G.R. NO. 171557
DOCTRINE:
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated to psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at Zamboanga del Norte. On
December 26, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. In support of the said complaint, Rodolfo testified that they were students when they
first met and that he was forced to marry her barely three months into their courtship by reason
of accidental pregnancy. That at the time of their marriage, Rodolfo was 21 while Natividad was
18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits. When Rodolfo
decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house
without Rodolfo’s consent. Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain
Engineer named Terez and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. After cohabiting with Terez,
Natividad contracted a second marriage with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has
lived with the latter since then. Rodolfo was left to take care of their daughters and he exerted
earnest efforts to save their marriage which however, proved futile. Natividad failed to file her
answer and appear during the trial but nonetheless informed the court that she submitted herself
for psychiatric evaluation. Rodolfo also underwent the same psychiatric evaluation.
The psychiatric evaluation results showed both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered
12
from "utter emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as
deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct." As for Natividad, she lacked
the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son
with another woman. The mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the
celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos
concluded that the "couple's union was bereft of the mind, will, and heart for the obligations of
marriage.
ISSUE:
WON there is psychological incapacity
RULING: No.
The Supreme Court held that respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not
be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. The RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not,
however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividad's condition could be characterized as grave,
deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on
Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and
to show that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness
of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations
sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos' report. Based on the evidence presented, there exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad's emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
DEL ROSARIO VS. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. 222541
DOCTRINE:
An expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. To
reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a
party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There
must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be
linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
In December 1983, Rachel, 15, and Jose, 17 met each other and became romantically involved.
In 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel
13
allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually
decided to get married in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were
blessed with a son. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony in
Nueva Vizcaya. In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver
only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. In September 2011, Rachel filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC alleging that Jose was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. She claimed that during
their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father,
was hot tempered and violent, and that he would represent himself as single, would flirt openly,
and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message
to her sister, Beverly. On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and
the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose
would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart. Rachel
also presented the testimonies of Wesley and her sisters which corroborated her allegations as
well as the testimony of Dr. Nedy Tayag, who stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality
Disorder. For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. He maintained that he
performed all his obligations to the family, financially provided for their needs, and contributed
to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home.
ISSUE:
WON their marriage is void on the ground of psychological capacity as evidenced by expert
testimony
RULING: No.
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely
necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. The evidence need not necessarily come
from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the
spouses, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about
the time of the marriage. In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its
application calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence
must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence.
14
TOPIC: RECOGNITION OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
MEDINA VS. KOIKE

G.R. NO. 215723
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce. Hence, the courts
cannot grant it. However, Article 26 provides for an exception, which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla, a Filipino citizen and respondent Michiyuki Koike, a Japanese
national were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City. Their union bore two children namely,
Masato Koike and Fuka Koike. Five years later, Doreen and Michiyuki, filed for a divorce decree
in Japan. The divorce decree was exhibited in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register of the respondent.
Petitioner filed a petition for judicial declaration of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry before the RTC. During the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. The
petitioner hereby presented the following pieces of evidence such as: the Certificate of
Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce, Family Register of Michiyuki Koike, Divorce
Certificate, Certification of the Registry office of Manila to the said original copy of the Divorce
Certificate and lastly, the photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan for the year 2000 and 2009 as
proof of existence of Japan’s law on divorce.
The RTC denied the petition on the ground of failure to prove such in accordance with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the divorce decree should be recognized under Philippine laws
RULING:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
15
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Thus, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage. The question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice
warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings.
REPUBLIC VS. ROMERO II

G.R. NO. 209253
DOCTRINE:
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be limited to
cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital
obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity within the context of
Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie.
FACTS:
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 and have two children. Reghis was still a student
at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings and
parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because
he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family
goals. Olivia, however, refused to end their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis.
Olivia's parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis
initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However,
Olivia's parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until
they are financially able. As Olivia's parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis
agreed. However, In 1986, the couple parted ways.
In 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, citing his psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. In support of his petition, Reghis
testified that he married Olivia not out of love, but out of the desire to please the latter's parents
who were kind and accommodating to him.
Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a clinical psychologist, who
submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report and testified that Reghis suffered from Obsessive
Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis' behavioral disorder
gave him a strong obsession for whatever endeavor he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion
of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to his roles as father and husband.
Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis' OCPD was the root of the couple's disagreements and that the
16
same is incurable, explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest
from his mind at the time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.
However, Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also
averred that the petition is barred by res judicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously filed
petitions for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the ground the she is allegedly
psychologically incapacitated, but said petitions were dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for the declaration of the nullity of marriage should be granted on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
RULING: No.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it
has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
The Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioners, Reghis' testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations
which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his
part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for
fourteen 14 years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City.
Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that
he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out
of love, but out of reverence for the latter's parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically
incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
17
TOPIC: PROPERTY REGIME
ONSTOTT VS. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD

G.R. NO. 221047
DOCTRINE:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired.
FACTS:
Albert Onstott (Albert), an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 18,589 square meters, covered by OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 situated in the
Province of Rizal. Due to non-payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal sold
the subject property at public auction to one Amelita De Serra (De Serra), the highest bidder, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated June 29, 2004. Respondent UTNAI, an association
representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed the same
from De Serra.
Thereafter, in 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint for cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 and for
the issuance of a new title in its name before the RTC against Albert and Federico Cas (Cas), the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. It alleged, among others, that it became the owner of
the subject property upon redemption thereof from De Serra and that, consequently, it must be
issued a new title. Moreover, Albert was an American citizen who, under Philippine law, is not
allowed to own a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Herein petitioner Michael Onstott (Michael), claiming to be the legitimate son of Albert with a
certain Josephine Arrastia Onstott (Josephine) filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, alleging
that UTNAI, in its complaint, impleaded only Albert, notwithstanding knowledge of the latter's
death. He averred that, as parties to the case, UTNAI fraudulently and intentionally failed to
implead him and Josephine in order to prevent them from participating in the proceedings and
to ensure a favorable judgment. He contended that his mother Josephine was an indispensable
party to the present case, being the owner of half of the subject property, which he claimed to
be conjugal in nature. The subject property was registered in the name of "Albert Onstott,
American citizen, married to Josephine Arrastia"
18
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI notwithstanding the failure
to implead Josephine as an indispensable party since the subject property was allegedly conjugal
in nature
RULING: No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time element. Needless to say,
the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate
when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As Michael invokes the presumption of conjugality, he must first establish that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage of Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the
presumption cannot stand. Consequently, Michael's insistence that Josephine who, the Court
notes, has never personally appeared in these proceedings to directly challenge the disposition
of the subject property sans her participation is a co-owner thereof and necessarily, an
indispensable party to the instant case, must therefore fail.
TAN VS. ANDRADE

G.R. NO. 171904
DOCTRINE:
Characterization of the subject properties (Conjugal vs. Exclusive)
FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of 4 parcels of land situated in Cebu
city which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu. When the
redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who
agreed to redeem the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her
son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter,
Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the
subject properties. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended
an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., to purchase the same. When
Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and
the TCTs therefor were issued in his name.
Rosario’s children, (Andrades), filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of
conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC. In their complaint, they claimed that
since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr.
(Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to
19
dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-
owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his
name.
In his defense, Bobby contended that the subject properties were solely owned by Rosario per
the TCTs issued in her name.
ISSUE:
WON the subject properties are conjugal in nature
RULING: No.
The subject properties were exclusive or the sole properties of Rosario. With respect to the
nature of the subject properties, the courts a quo were at variance such that the RTC, on the one
hand, ruled that the said properties were exclusive properties of Rosario, while the CA, on the
other hand, pronounced that they are conjugal in nature. In this regard, the consequent course
of action would be for the Court to conduct a re-examination of the evidence if only to determine
which among the two is correct, as an exception to the proscription in Rule 45 petitions.
Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply,
the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed
acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Other than their bare allegation, no
evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured
during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds.
Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in
the subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same.
Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject
properties were exclusive or the sole properties of Rosario.
WILLEM BEUMER VS. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. NO. 195670
DOCTRINE:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch national, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. The RTC of
Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the former’s psychological
incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage. In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception
of their two residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
20
properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to
purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way
of inheritance. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. The RTC rendered its decision, dissolving the
parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding the two houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned
by the parties. It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as
petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. The CA affirmed in toto the judgment
rendered by the RTC. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines. Hence, he cannot invoke
equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
ISSUE:
WON the Dutch national may reimburse one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the
purchase of the properties in the Philippines
RULING: No.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent
registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his
palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. Petitioner’s statements regarding the real
source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims.
Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the
Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. The Court
cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired
no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces
no legal effect at all. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves
the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into. Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. Nor would the denial of his claim amount to
an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the
purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the
Court is duty-bound to protect.
TOPIC: CHILD CUSTODY
MASBATE VS. RELUCIO

G.R. NO. 235498
DOCTRINE:
The preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family Code does not automatically attach to the
grandparents, and is conditioned upon the determination of their fitness to take care of their
21
grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court ratiocinated that the child's welfare being the most
important consideration, it is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. The best
interest of the child demands that a proper trial be conducted to determine if the child had,
indeed, been neglected and abandoned by his/her mother.
FACTS:
Queenie was born out of wedlock between respondent Ricky James Relucio and petitioner
Renalyn Masbate. One day after Queenie's school, Renalyn's parents fetched the child and
refused to return Queenie to Ricky James, who at that time, had the custody over Queenie. Ricky
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court. He argued that Renalyn
abandoned their child when Renalyn left for Manila to continue her studies. The RTC dismissed
Ricky's petition. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the RTC to determine who between
Ricky James and Renalyn has the rightful custody. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Family Code automatically vests on the mother the custody of her illegitimate child
without need for trial
RULING: No.
The CA resolved to remand the case to the RTC, ratiocinating that there is a need to establish
whether or not Renalyn has been neglecting Queenie, for which reason, a trial is indispensable
for reception of evidence relative to the preservation or overturning of the tender-age
presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code.
This choice (right of a child to choose which parent he prefers to live with) is not available to an
illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as Queenie (second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code), because sole parental authority is given only to the mother, unless she
is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of the Family Code).
It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left
for Manila to pursue her studies until the instant controversy took place. As such, Ricky James
had already assumed obligations and enjoyed privileges of a custodial character, giving him a
cause of action to file a case of habeas corpus to regain custody of Queenie as her actual
custodian.
Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the father
of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he
were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly
what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without
running afoul to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of the
minor.
The Court finds that Queenie's best interest demands that a proper trial be conducted to
determine if she had, indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her mother, rendering the latter
unfit to exercise parental authority over her, and in the event that Renalyn is found unsuitable,
whether it is in Queenie's best interest that she be in the custody of her father rather than her
grandparents upon whom the law accords a far superior right to exercise substitute parental
authority. The preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family Code does not automatically
attach to the grandparents, and is conditioned upon the determination of their fitness to take
care of their grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court ratiocinated that the child's welfare being
the most important consideration, is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
22
TOPIC: GUARDIANSHIP
NERI VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES YUSOP

G.R. NO. 194366
DOCTRINE:
Parents should apply for judicial guardianship in order for them to sell properties of their
children.
*Even the parents of their minor children are bound to post bond.
FACTS:
During the lifetime of petitioner’s mother Anunciacion, she and her second husband, Enrique,
acquired several homestead properties. When Anunciacion died, Enrique in his personal capacity
and as natural guardian of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas, together with, Napoleon, Alicia
and Visminda executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, sold the
properties to the late Spouses Uy for a consideration of 80,000.
In 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of the said sale against Spouses
Uy, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period and for
having been executed without the consent or approval of Eutropia, Victoria, Rosa and Douglas;
thus, depriving the latter siblings of their legitime.
Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of
the homestead patents. They also denied that Eutropia and Victoria were excluded from the
extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defense of
prescription and laches.
The RTC rendered a decision annulling the Extra-judicial settlement of estate with Absolute Deed
of Sale. It ruled that the sale is void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their
hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children,
Rosa and Douglas. On appeal, however, CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON Enrique, as guardian of his children and co-owner (with his children), can sell their co-
owned property
RULING: No.
Since Rosa and Douglas were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, Enrique at
that time was merely clothed with powers of administration. He was without any authority to
dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Power of dominion is only granted to a judicial guardian of the ward's property. An exception
would be ratification. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his
minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the
age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Art. 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.
However, the records show that Rosa has ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estates with
an Absolute Deed of Sale. The same is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence
showing ratification. Therefore, the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and not binding
23
on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas. Consequently, the Spouses Uy or their substituted heirs
became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas,
who retained title to their respective shares.
24
PROPERTY
TOPIC: CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILAN AGRICULTURAL

TRADING CORPORATION (BATCO)
G.R. NO. 170018
DOCTRINE:
The determination of the land’s classification as either an agricultural or industrial land – and,
in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption – must be preliminarily
threshed out before the DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary.
FACTS:
Basilan Agricultural Trading Corporation (BATCO) was the owner of several parcels of agricultural
land with an aggregate area of 2065.694 hectares in Lamitan, Basilan. In 1989, the lands were
voluntarily offered for sale to the government pursuant to the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In 1992, BATCO was notified that the 154-hectare portion of the
subject lands was being placed under the compulsory acquisition scheme by the DAR.
In 1993, BATCO reiterated its offer to sell the entire subject land, but this time to include the
improvements thereon, and for a higher consideration of ₱32 Million. By 1997, BATCO received
a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition from the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO), offering it the amount of ₱7.5 Million for the subject portion. BATCO rejected the
valuation and opposed the same before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). In view of BATCO’s
rejection, the DAR directed the Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the compensation in cash
and in agrarian reform bonds and thereafter requested the Basilan Register of Deeds to issue
TCTs in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the subject portion was
surveyed and the beneficiaries were accordingly identified. Corresponding Certificates of Land
Ownership (CLOAs) in favor of the identified beneficiaries were generated and issued even over
BATCO's protest. In 1998, the DAR proceeded with the registration and distribution of the CLOAs
to the said identified beneficiaries.
BATCO filed before the DAR Regional Office a petition for the exemption of the subject portion
from the coverage of the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It
alleged that almost all of the entire subject lands have been devoted to cattle and livestock
production since their acquisition in 1987, warranting their exemption from CARP coverage in
accordance with the ruling in Luz Farms and the provisions of DAR AO 09-93. Meanwhile, BATCO's
certificates of title over the foregoing were cancelled and new titles were issued in the name of
the Republic on July 17, 1998.
The DAR Regional Director issued an Order dismissing BATCO's petition and stated that the
subject portion is not exempt from CARP coverage. BATCO appealed to the Office of the DAR
Secretary. The DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the appeal. BATCO filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion, which were denied by the DAR Secretary. Hence,
BATCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. In 2005, the CA issued a Decision reversing and setting
aside Secretary Morales’ Order.
ISSUE:
WON the subject lands are excluded/exempted from CARP coverage
RULING: No.
25
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the DAR. Under RA 6657, the CARP shall cover all public and
private agricultural lands, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. Section 3(c) thereof defines
"agricultural land" as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising
are classified as industrial, not agricultural lands and, thus, exempt from agrarian reform. As such,
the DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms.
Nevertheless, the determination of the land’s classification as either an agricultural or industrial

land – and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption – must be
preliminarily threshed out before the DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary. Thus,
considering too his technical expertise on the matter, courts cannot simply brush aside his
pronouncements regarding the status of the land in dispute, i.e., as to whether or not it falls
under CARP coverage.
It is settled that in order to be entitled to exclusion/exemption, it must be shown that the land is
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine or poultry raising. The land must be shown to have been
used for such purposes as of the effectivity of RA 6657, or on June 15, 1988, in order to prevent
any fraudulent declaration of areas supposedly used for these purposes as well as to protect the
rights of agrarian beneficiaries therein. This is in consonance with Section 73(c) of RA 6657 which
prohibits the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use
with intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant
farmers of the land tilled by them.
HEIRS OF ROMULO D. SANDUETA VS. DOMINGO ROBLES, HEIRS OF TEODORO ABAN, AND HEIRS
OF EUFRECENA GALEZA
G.R. NO. 203204
DOCTRINE:
Owners of land covered by the OLT Program are allowed to retain a portion of their tenanted
agricultural land not, however, to exceed an area of five (5) has. and, further thereto, provides
that an additional three (3) has. may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm.
FACTS:
The heirs of Romulo Sandueta inherited several agricultural lands situated in Dipolog City when
their parents died intestate. One of these lands had a rice land portion tenanted by Eufrecena
Galeza, Teodoro Aban, and Domingo Pableo who were instituted as tenants by the original
landowner, Diosdado Jasmin, before the sale of the lands to the decedent Sandueta. The subject
portion was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to
Presidential Decree (PD) 27 and consequently awarded to the above-named tenants who were
issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents. The Sanduetas went to the Department of
Agrarian Reform District Office in Dipolog seeking their right to retention over the subject land
pursuant to Sec. 6 of RA 6657 and to annul the emancipation patents. The Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) recommended a grant of a 5-hectare retention area for the Sanduetas,
despite recommending a dismissal of the petition. Later, DAR Regional Office IX approved the
PARO’s order ratiocinating that a landowner who failed to exercise his right of retention under
PD 27 can avail of the right to retain an area not exceeding 5 hectares pursuant to Section 6 of
RA 6657, adding that this award is different from that which may be granted to the children of
the landowner, to the extent of 3 hectares each. However, to be entitled thereto, each child must
meet the age qualification and requirement of actual cultivation of the land or direct
26
management of the farm under Section 6. As petitioners were absentee landowners who had left
the cultivation of the subject portion entirely to the tenants, they were not entitled to exercise
retention rights thereon and, hence, denied their petition for retention. Despite such denial, the
PARO granted the decedent Romulo Sandueta the right to retain 5 has. from the portion of Lot
No. 3419 not covered by the OLT Program. On appeal, the CA upheld the PARO, holding that the
subject portion was covered by the OLT program and that the Sanduetas had no absolute right
to choose their retention area.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners are entitled to avail of any retention right under Section 6 of RA 6657
RULING:
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be
retained subject to legislative standards. Necessarily, since the said right is granted to limit the
effects of compulsory land acquisition against the landowner, it is a prerequisite that the land
falls under the coverage of the OLT Program of the government. If the land is beyond the ambit
of the OLT Program, the landowner need not – as he should not – apply for retention since the
appropriate remedy would be for him to apply for exemption. Exemption and retention in
agrarian reform are two distinct concepts.
If the land is covered by the OLT Program which hence, renders the right of retention operable,
PD 27 – issued on October 21, 1972 – confers in favor of covered landowners who cultivate or
intend to cultivate an area of their tenanted rice or corn land the right to retain an area of not
more than seven hectares thereof. Subsequently, or on June 10, 1998, Congress passed RA 6657
which modified the retention limits under PD 27. In particular, Section 6 of RA 6657 states that
covered landowners are allowed to retain a portion of their tenanted agricultural land but not,
however, to exceed an area of five hectares and, further thereto, provides that an additional
three hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to certain qualifications.
In this case, petitioners being mere successors-in-interest, cannot be said to have acquired any
retention right to the subject portion. Accordingly, the subject portion would fall under the
complete coverage of the OLT Program hence, the 5 and 3-hectare retention limits as well as the
landowner s right to choose the area to be retained under Section 6 of RA 6657 would not apply
altogether.
Retention is an agrarian reform law concept which is only applicable when the land is covered by
the OLT Program; this is not, however, the case with respect to the 14.0910-hectare landholding.
Thus, if only to correct any confusion in terminology, Romulo Sandueta’s right over the 14.0910-
hectare landholding should not be deemed to be pursuant to any retention right but rather to
his ordinary right of ownership as it appears from the findings of the DAR that the landholding is
not covered by the OL T Program.
TOPIC: ACCESSION
DELOS SANTOS VS. ALBERTO ABEJON

G.R. NO. 215820
DOCTRINE:
The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. On the other hand, bad faith
27
may only be attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting, or sowing was done
with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
FACTS:
As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property in Makati city. After Pedro
died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject land
to Teresita for P150,000 or for the amount of the loan plus an additional P50,000. TCT No. 180286
was issued in the name of Teresita Abejon. Thereafter, respondents constructed a 3-storey
building worth P2,000,000 on the subject land. Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to
acknowledge the sale, pointing out that since Pedro died in 1989, his signature in the Deed of
Sale executed in 1992 was definitely forged. As such, respondents demanded from petitioners
the amounts of P150,000 representing the consideration for the sale of the subject land and
P2,000,000 representing the construction cost of the 3-storey building, but to no avail. Thus,
respondents filed the instant case.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners should be held liable to respondents
RULING: No.
It is more accurate to apply the rules on accession with respect to immovable property,
specifically with regard to builders, planters, and sowers, as this case involves a situation where
the landowner is different from the owner of the improvement built therein, i.e., the 3-storey
building. Thus, there is a need to determine whether petitioners as landowners on the one hand,
and respondents on the other, are in good faith or bad faith.
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject land
was done in 1992. However, Teresita was apprised of Pedro's death as early as 1990. As such, she
knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale was void and would not have operated to transfer
any rights over the subject land to her name. Despite such awareness of the defect in their title
to the subject land, respondents still proceeded in constructing a 3-storey building thereon.
Indubitably, they should be deemed as builders in bad faith. On the other hand, petitioners knew
of the defect in the execution of the Deed of Sale from the start, but nonetheless, still acquiesced
to the construction of the 3-storey building thereon. Hence, they should likewise be considered
as landowners in bad faith. It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
In this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the
builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good
faith.
Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code in this case, under the first option, petitioner may
appropriate for themselves the 3-storey building on the subject land after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, as applied in existing
jurisprudence. Under this option, respondents would have a right of retention over the 3-storey
building as well as the subject land until petitioners complete the reimbursement. Under the
second option, petitioners may sell the subject land to respondents at a price equivalent to the
current market value thereof. However, if the value of the subject land is considerably more than
the value of the 3-storey building, respondents cannot be compelled to purchase the subject
land. Rather, they can only be obliged to pay petitioners reasonable rent.
28
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR, VS. EMILIANA, VICTORIANO

G.R. NO. 182908
DOCTRINE:
An alluvion is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can
be seen.
FACTS:
Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which she conveyed to her 3
daughters: Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) in 1920. Meanwhile, Catalina’s
husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-
sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan. Ciriaco
and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while respondents
occupied the southern portion. Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq.
m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. In 1952, an OCT was issued in the
name of respondent Victoriano, covering the First Accretion. Decades later, or in 1971, the
Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion
on its southern portion. In 1978, an OCT was issued in the names of all the respondents covering
the Second Accretion. Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children
of Alejandra and Balbina, filed an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition, and/or
damages against respondents. They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the
help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property. Likewise,
Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent
Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to
the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their names, notwithstanding
the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which
the accretions merely formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they
did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two accretions because they
respected respondents’ rights, until they discovered that respondents have repudiated their
(Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents, Victoriano and the heirs of Ciriaco, being granted with homestead patent,
are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion and Second Accretion, respectively
RULING: Yes.
When an OCT covering the Motherland was issued in Ciriaco’s name pursuant to a homestead
patent, his title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. Being the owner of the land
adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential
right to lease the foreshore area. Accordingly, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a
river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons. In this case, Francisco, et al. and now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the
riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot
assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely
attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were
they able to show that they acquired these properties through prescription as it was ·not
established that they were in possession of any of them.
29
TOPIC: CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
HEIRS OF SARILI VS. LAGROSA

G.R. NO. 1935174
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness
of the certificate of title issued and that he has no legal obligation to look beyond such title to
determine the condition of the property. However, a higher degree of prudence is required from
the one who buys from a person who is not a registered owner. In this case, the buyer should
examine not only the certificate of title, but also the identity of the person he is dealing with
and the latter's authority to convey the property.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint against Spouses Sarili and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
(RD) before the RTC alleging, among others, that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land
situated in Caloocan and has been religiously paying the real estate taxes since its acquisition in
1974. Respondent claimed that he is a resident of California and that during his vacation in the
Philippines, he discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject property was issued by the
RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparo by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute
Sale. He argued that the falsification of the said deed was a result of the fraudulent, illegal, and
malicious acts committed by the Spouses Sarili and the RD in order to acquire the subject
property and, as such, prayed for its annulment and that the spouses deliver to him the
possession of the subject property, or, in the alternative, that the spouses and the RD jointly and
severally pay him the amount of ₱1,000,000 including moral damages as well as attorney’s fees.
The Spouses Sarili maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the
subject property from Ramon Rodriguez who had Special Power of Attorney to sell and execute
a Deed of Absolute Sale. The RTC found the sale to be valid. However, the CA reversed such
decision as there was forgery involved.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid conveyance of the subject property to the Spouses Sarili
RULING: No.
The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, a higher degree of
prudence is required from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner. The
buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and
the latter’s legal authority to convey the property.
The strength of the buyer’s inquiry on the seller’s capacity or legal authority to sell depends on
the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney
duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes sufficient
inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appears to be
flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do.
In the present case, the Spouses Sarili failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond
the subject SPA and into the circumstances of its execution as required by prevailing
30
jurisprudence. Hence, they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value.
The due execution and authenticity of the subject SPA are of great significance in determining
the validity of the sale entered into by Victorino and Ramon since the latter only claims to be the
agent of the purported seller (i.e., respondent). In other words, if the subject SPA was not proven
to be duly executed and authentic, then it cannot be said that the foregoing requirement had
been complied with; hence, the sale would be void.
GENORGA VS. HEIRS OF MELITON

G.R. NO. 224515
DOCTRINE:
In the absence of a verified and approved subdivision plan and technical description duly
submitted for registration on the transfer certificate of title, it must return the same to the
presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right to the
possession of the said owner's duplicate title as against respondents.
FACTS:
The Meliton’s own a lot wherein Julian Meliton owns 8/14 portion of the land and the other co-
owners own 1/14 each. Julian sold portions to different owners including the petitioner’s
husband who took possession and introduced improvements on portions sold. However, Julian
failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate TCT to enable buyers to register their deeds of sale and
file a petition asking for annulment thereof and issuance of new titles. The court issued a
favorable decision to the petitioners and ordered Julian to surrender possession and enter into
the deed of sale. The administratrix however, failed to comply thus, the court rendered their TCT
null and void and a new one was issued.
Respondents filed a complaint saying they are entitled to possession as registered owners.
Petitioner, in her answer averred that she and the other buyers are in the process of completing
all the requirements for registration of sale in their favor and paid taxes. The RTC ruled in favor
of respondents considering the long period of time that had lapsed for the annotation of the
buyers’ deeds of sale.
ISSUE:
WON Remedios Geñorga should surrender the TCT
RULING: Yes.
Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-owned property
when Julian sold different portions thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the
pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject land were eventually
sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same
in their names, and paid the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection from respondents
who never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds that there is
a partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to the
segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their
names upon compliance with the requirements of law.
Moreover, it bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds is only ministerial in nature.
Thus, the RD of Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the subject owner's duplicate
title longer than what is reasonable to perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved
subdivision plan and technical description duly submitted for registration, it must return the
31
same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right
to the possession of the said owner's duplicate title as against respondents.
ALICIA P. LOGARTA, VS. CATALINO M. MANGAHIS

G.R. NO. 213568
DOCTRINE:
Voluntary instruments such as contracts of sale, contracts to sell, and conditional sales are
registered by presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title for annotation, pursuant to
Sections 51 to 53 of PD 1529. The exception to this rule is when the registered owner refuses or
fails to surrender his duplicate copy of the title, in which case the claimant may file with the
Register of Deeds a statement setting forth his adverse claim.
FACTS:
Mangahis is a registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, with
an area of 28,889 square meters. He authorized a certain Zamora to sell the subject property
who, in turn, delegated his authority to Peña.
Peña entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Carmona Realty represented by
Logarta for the sale to Carmona Realty of contiguous parcels of land in Malitlit Estate which
included the subject property. Carmona Realty agreed to deposit in escrow a total of
P1,476,834,000 within 30 days from the execution of the MOA. The release of escrow deposits
was subject to Peña's submission of a number of documents. The MOA was annotated on the
TCT.
Mangahis filed a petition to cancel the subject entries and revocation of Zamora’s authority to
sell on the ground that the MOA was a private document that had no legal effect because the
notary public before whom it was acknowledged was not commissioned as such in the City of
Manila.
Petitioner contended that the MOA was duly notarized in Makati city by Atty. Loreto Navarro and
that Peña had the authority to enter into the MOA at the time it was executed, considering that
respondent expressed his intention to revoke the same only in the petition. The RTC ordered the
cancellation. The CA dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the annotation of the MOA as an adverse claim instead of a voluntary dealing is proper
RULING: No.
A cursory perusal of the MOA shows that it is essentially a conditional sale where Carmona
Realty's payment is subject to the submission of certain documents by Peña, respondent's
authorized representative. It is settled that in a deed of conditional sale, ownership is transferred
after the full payment of the instalments of the purchase price or the fulfillment of the condition
and the execution of a definite or absolute deed of sale.
Moreover, being a conditional sale, the MOA is a voluntary instrument which, as a rule, must be
registered as such and not as an adverse claim. Thus, the prevailing rule is that voluntary
instruments such as contracts of sale, contracts to sell, and conditional sales are registered by
presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title for annotation, pursuant to Sections 51 to 53
of PD 1529. The exception to this rule is when the registered owner refuses or fails to surrender
32
his duplicate copy of the title, in which case the claimant may file with the Register of Deeds a
statement setting forth his adverse claim.
In the case at hand, there was no showing that respondent refused or failed to present the
owner's duplicate of TCT, which would have prompted Carmona Realty to cause the annotation
of the MOA as an adverse claim instead of a voluntary dealing. Being a voluntary dealing affecting
less than the ownership of the subject property, Section 54 of PD 1529 — which states that the
cancellation of annotations involving interests less than ownership is within the power of the
Register of Deeds — should have been applied. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA should have
dismissed the petition for cancellation of the subject entries for being the wrong remedy.
REPUBLIC VS. DAGONDON

G.R. NO. 210540
DOCTRINE:
The following must be present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the certificate
of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are
sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c)
that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that
the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the
description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
FACTS:
Respondents Homer and Ma. Susana Dagondon, as attorneys-in-fact of Jover

Dagondon, prayed for the reconstitution of a parcel of land located at Bonbon, Catarman,
Camiguin, denominated as Lot No. 84. Respondents alleged that Jover is the registered owner
of Lot 84, having purchased the same from a certain Lourdes Borromeo Cordero, and
consequently, registered it under his name for taxation purposes. They obtained two separate
certifications from the Land Registration Authority, one stating that Decree No. 466085 was
issued in relation to Lot 84, and the other stating that it did not have a copy of Decree No.
466085 on file, and that the same was presumed lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last
world war. They secured another certification, this time from the Register of Deeds of
Mambajao, Camiguin, declaring that the subject property had no existing OCT and that it was
probably destroyed or dilapidated during the eruption of Hiboc-Hiboc Volcano or World War II.
In opposition, petitioner Republic of the Philippines prayed for the dismissal of the petition for
insufficiency in form and substance, considering that respondents failed to establish the
existence of the very Torrens Title which they sought to reconstitute.
ISSUE:
WON the reconstitution is valid
RULING: No.
Verily, case law provides that the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in
the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person
to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when
the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to
be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System. Hence,
under the aforesaid law, the following must be present for an order for reconstitution to
issue: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents
33
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or
had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and
destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially
the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Thus, petitioner
correctly pointed out that the applicability of RA 26 in this case is contingent on the existence
of a previously issued OCT which has been lost or destroyed.
JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN VS. SPS. NELSON AND CRISTINA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 220940
DOCTRINE:
When the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact
in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that
rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owner of a land in Pangasinan covered by OCT no. P-41566. In
November 2009, respondent Nelson, through his father Lamberto sold the land to petitioner
Sebastian, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, when the petitioner tried to cause
the transfer of the title to her name, she was directed by the Register of Deeds to secure a Special
Power of Attorney from the respondents, which Lamberto promised but failed to comply with.
Petitioner then causes the annotation of an adverse claim in the subject certificate of title to
protect her rights. Thereafter, petitioner found out that the respondents executed an affidavit of
loss and filed a petition for the issuance of a second owner’s copy of OCT no. P-41566, which was
granted by the RTC on March 2014. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of
judgment before the CA for lack of jurisdiction contending that the certificate of title was never
lost and in fact, in her possession all along. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is a jurisdictional
matter in judicial reconstitution proceedings
RULING: Yes.
The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is Republic Act (RA) 26, Section 15 of which
provides when reconstitution of a title should be allowed:
Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents
presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and
proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title, and that petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an
interest therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was
lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of court
shall forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and all the
documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis of the
reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis to
justify the reconstitution, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal
shall not preclude the right of the party or parties entitled thereto to file an
34
application for confirmation of his or their title under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act.
From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be complied with for an order
for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered
owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of
title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.
The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed
by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction
occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has
already been brought under the provision of the Torrens System. Indubitably, the fact of loss
or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with
jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings.
LURIZ VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. NO. 298948
DOCTRINE:
Particularly, when the reconstitution is based on an extant owner's duplicate TCT, the main
concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate.
FACTS:
Luriz filed before the RTC a verified Amended Petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 12976 in the
name of his predecessor-in-interest, Urakami. Luriz alleged that Urakami was the registered
owner of the subject properties who sold the same to Tomas Balingit by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale who in turn sold the same to him through a separate Deed of Absolute Sale.
However, the copy of TCT No. 1297 was destroyed by the fire that gutted Quezon City Hall in June
1988; hence, the reconstitution petition based on the owner’s duplicate copy.
ISSUE:
What must be present for an order of reconstitution to issue?
RULING:
In the present case, the reconstitution petition is anchored on a purported owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 1297 - a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act 26.
Based on the provisions of the said law, the following must be present for an order of
reconstitution to issue: (a) the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) the documents
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and
(e) the description, area, and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Particularly, when the reconstitution is
based on an extant owner's duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness
of the certificate.
35
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Luriz was not able to prove that TCT No. 1297
sought to be reconstituted was authentic, genuine, and in force at the time it was lost and
destroyed.
TOPIC: JUST COMPENSATION
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFREDO HABABAG, SR

G.R. NO. 172342
DOCTRINE:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the
market value of the property, at the time of the actual taking by the government. Not on the
potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership.
FACTS:
Alfredo Hababag, Sr. (Alfredo) was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land with an
aggregate area of 82.4927 hectares situated in Barangays Carriedo, Manapao, and Casili, in the
Municipality of Gubat, Sorsogon. The aforesaid landholdings were voluntarily offered for sale to
the government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.”
As a matter of course, the RTC appointed two commissioners designated by each party to conduct
an evaluation and appraisal of the subject lands. The RTC rendered a Decision (December 20,
1999 Decision) fixing the amount of just compensation of the subject lands at P5,653,940.00,
applying the Income Productivity Approach.
Alfredo appealed to the CA averring that the RTC committed a mathematical error in computing
the amount of just compensation for the subject lands, as well as in fixing the remaining
productive life of the coconut trees to only 20 years instead of 40 to 45 years.
ISSUE:
WON the Income Productivity Approach should be applied
RULING: No.
To elucidate, in determining the amount of just compensation for the subject lands, the RTC
applied the Income Productivity Approach which approximated the income for the remaining
productive life of the crops therein, without considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases,
and with the expectation that they would be compensated by developments which could be
made by the property owner. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of
just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value of the property,
which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary
course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In
this accord, therefore, the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which was "based
on the principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a property is dependent on the
potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership." Clearly, this approach, which is
largely characterized by the element of futurity, is inconsistent with the idea of valuing the
expropriated property at the time of the taking.
36
Furthermore, the Court also observes that the Income Productivity Approach, as applied by the
RTC, adopts an investor's point of view which is actually off-tangent with the governmental
purpose behind the acquisition of agricultural lands. On this score, case law states that
agricultural lands are not acquired for investment purposes but for redistribution to landless
farmers in order to lift their economic status by enabling them to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. Hence, in order to be just, the
compensation for the land must be what the farmer-beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay
based on what the land can produce. Such could not have been the intent of the State's agrarian
reform program. In fine, the Court cannot sustain the RTC's application of the Income
Productivity Approach used as one of its bases in arriving at its decreed valuation.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. KHO

G.R. NO. 214901
DOCTRINE:
Case law dictates that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete, such as in
this case where the just compensation due to the landowner has yet to be settled, just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, as amended.
||
FACTS:
A portion of Apolonio Kho’s land was placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program
pursuant to PD 27. The initial offer by the government was rejected by Kho, prompting the Land
Bank of the Philippines to deposit the offer price in Kho’s name until the computation for just
computation. When the land was valued at P109,748.35, the LBP disagreed with the said
computation and appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
which dismissed the appeal. The LBP then filed a petition for the determination of just
computation before the RTC. After the valuation of the RTC, the land was valued at
P1,402,609.46. The LBP then appealed to the CA. The CA concurred with the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed reversible error in upholding the RTC Decision in fixing the just
compensation of the subject land
RULING: Partly granted. The case was remanded to the RTC for proper valuation.
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is
transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.
In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the
acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use
of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax
declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
However, it bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 further amending certain
provisions of RA 6657, among them, Section 17, and declaring "that all previously acquired lands
wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved
pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657], as amended," DAR AO 2, series of 2009, which is the
37
implementing rules of RA 9700, had clarified that the said law shall not apply to claims/cases
where the claim folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009. In such a situation, just
compensation shall be determined in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior
to its further amendment by RA 9700.
In this case, since the claim folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC and
the CA were duty-bound to utilize the basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR
regulations existing prior to the passage of RA 9700, to determine just compensation.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MONTINOLA-ESCARILLA

G.R. NO. 178046
DOCTRINE:
property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking. The potential use of the
expropriated property is only considered in cases where there is a great improvement in the
general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should never control the determination of
just compensation.
FACTS:
The case is about the determination of just compensation of a 150-hectare tract of land owned
by respondent and expropriated by the government in 1998 under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, or CARL. The government expropriated the property in the amount of 823,000 pesos
which respondent objected to.
ISSUE:
How should the fair market value of an expropriated property be determined for the purpose of
arriving at the just compensation?
RULING:
property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking. In the implementation of
RA 6657, Section 17 provides the manner by which just compensation is determined.
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA ignored the fact that, at the time of the ocular
inspection, a substantial portion of the subject property was idle and abandoned, but the farmer-
beneficiaries "were already starting to cultivate their designated area of occupancy as evidenced
by the cutting of trees and some have already started to plant corn, bananas and other crops."
Under DAR A.O. No. 11 Series of 1994, "the landowner shall not be compensated or paid for
improvements introduced by third parties such as the government, farmer-beneficiaries or
others." Hence, it was erroneous to reclassify the acquired property into cornland and coco land
based on plaintiff's evidence considering that the improvements were introduced by the farmer-
beneficiaries. At most, they may be considered only as economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and farmworkers to the property in determining its valuation. Consequently, there is a
need to remand the case to the court a quo for reception of evidence and final determination of
just compensation taking into account the factors under Section 17 of RA 6657.
38
HENRY L. SY VS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. NO. 202690
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the amount of compensation is to be ascertained at the time of the taking. In
addition, a debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of the property subject
of an expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance and therefore, warrants the
application of a 12% legal interest rate.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for
expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered
under the name of Sy, which was intended to be used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall,
day-care center, playground and community activity center for the benefit of the residents of
Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.
During the preliminary conference, Sy did not question the City's right to expropriate the subject
property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue. The RTC appointed
Commissioner Edgardo Ostaco, Commissioner Victor Salinas, and Commissioner Carlo Alcantara
as commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid by the City
for the subject property. Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara recommended the
payment of P5,500.00 per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation
complaint. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a separate report recommending the
higher amount of P13,500.00 per sq. m. as just compensation.
The RTC, citing the principle that just compensation must be fair not only to the owner but to the
expropriator as well, adopted the findings of Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara and thus, held
that the just compensation for the subject property should be set at P5,500.00 per sq. m. While
legal interest was not claimed, for equity considerations, it awarded six percent (6%) legal
interest, computed from November 7, 1996 until full payment of just compensation. The CA
observed that the expropriation would not leave the rest of Sy's properties useless as they would
still be accessible through a certain Lot 8 based on the Property Identification Map.
ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly upheld the amount of just compensation as determined by the RTC as well
as its grant of 6% legal interest
RULING: No.
Based on a judicious review of the records and application of jurisprudential rulings, the Court
holds that the correct rate of legal interest to be applied is 12% and not 6% per annum, owing to
the nature of the City's obligation as an effective forbearance.
In the case of Republic v. CA, the Court ruled that the debt incurred by the government on account
of the taking of the property subject of an expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance
which therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal interest rate. This allowance of
interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of
the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.
39
In similar regard, the Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera, pronounced that:
In many cases decided by this Court, it has been repeated time and again that the award
of 12% interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect
makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. This is to
ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the
owner that can drag from days to decades.
As to the reckoning point on which the legal interest should accrue, the same should be
computed from the time of the taking of the subject property in 1986 and not from the filing of
the complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996. This is based on the principle that interest
"runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking.”
TOPIC: EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
PIEDAD VS. SPOUSES GURIEZA

G.R. NO. 207525
DOCTRINE:
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category
of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by
tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents who were the assigned
caretakers. Piedad alleged that the property was acquired through intestate succession from his
late father who inherited the same from the latter's parents as evinced by a Deed of Confirmation
of an Adjudication and Partition (Deed of Confirmation). The Spouses Gurieza on the other hand,
had declared the subject lot under their name for tax purposes and applied for titling with the
DENR when they learned it was public land. Upon learning of their acts, petitioner demanded
them to vacate but they refused.
The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner finding that the Spouses Gurieza's continuous stay on
the subject lot was by Bonifacio's mere tolerance and such stay became illegal when they refused
to vacate the said lot despite the latter's demand. This was affirmed by the RTC. However, the
CA reversed such decision stating that the Deed of Confirmation was not credible proof since not
all of the heirs of Piedad’s grandparents had signed it. Hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Piedad had better right of possession over subject property
(2) WON there is cause of action for Unlawful Detainer
RULING:
(1) First, the evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the
subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house thereon. Moreover, when he migrated to
Hawaii, Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the said house and lot, the last being the
Spouses Gurieza. Thus, despite his migration to Hawaii, Bonifacio never relinquished said
40
possession over the house and lot. Consistent with Article 524 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled
that "it is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has
possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another
person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy." Thus, the Spouses Gurieza's stay
on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere tolerance of Bonifacio.
Second, when Bonifacio learned that the Spouses Gurieza declared the subject lot under their
name for tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application for
survey authority and titling with the CENRO DENR Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to
terminate their tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and demanded that they leave
immediately, rendering the Spouses Gurieza's stay on the subject lot illegal.
(2) Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. The only Issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case
is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties.
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category
of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by
tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus holds that the CA erred in dismissing Bonifacio's
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against the Spouses Gurieza. Perforce, a reversal
of its ruling is proper.
OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. SPOUSES JOVELLANOS

G.R. NO. 189145
DOCTRINE:
REQUISITES OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER; CONTRACT TO SELL; MACEDA LAW
The case is Unlawful detainer if it recites that:
(a) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) thereafter, defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(d) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
FACTS:
The Spouses Jovellanos entered into a Contract To Sell with Palmera Homes for the purchase of
a residential house and lot situated in Caloocan city. Upon payment of their downpayment, they
took possession of the subject property with undertaking to pay the remaining balance of the
contract price in equal monthly installments for a period of 10 years starting June 12, 2005. On
August 22, 2016, Palmera Homes assigned all its rights, title and interest in the Contract to Sell in
favor of petitioner Optimum Development Bank (Optimum) through a Deed of Assignment of
even date.
41
On April 10, 2006, Optimum issued a Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell
for the Spouses Jovellanos due to their failure to pay monthly installments despite several written
and verbal notices.
Final Demand Letter was issued requiring the Spouses Jovellanos to vacate and deliver possession
of the subject property, but they failed to do so. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
WON the Spouses Jovellanos’s "rights of possession over the subject property necessarily
terminated or expired after non-payment of installments; and hence, their continued possession
thereof constituted unlawful detainer"
RULING:
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites that:
(a) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) thereafter, defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(d) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.
Given the nature of the contract of the parties, the respondent court correctly applied RA 6552
otherwise known as the Maceda Law. Applying such law in the present case, the 60-day grace
period automatically operated in favor of the buyers, the Spouses Jovellanos, and took effect
from the time that the maturity dates of the installment payments lapsed. With the said grace
period having expired bereft of any installment payment on the part of the Spouses Jovellanos,
Optimum then issued a notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract. Finally, in
proceeding with the actual cancellation of the contract to sell, Optimum gave the spouses an
additional 30 days within which to settle their arrears and reinstate the contract, or sell or assign
their rights to another
It was only after the expiration of the 30-day period did Optimum treat the contract to sell as
effectively cancelled – making as it did a final demand upon the Spouses Jovellanos to vacate the
subject property. Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds that there was a valid and
effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell in accordance with Section 4 of RA 6552 and since
the Spouses Jovellanos had already lost their right to retain possession of the subject property as
a consequence of such cancellation, their refusal to vacate and turn over possession to Optimum
makes out a valid case for unlawful detainer as properly adjudged by the MeTC.
EUFROCINA NIEVIES VS. ERNESTO DULDULAO

G.R. NO. 190276
DOCTRINE:
Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure, may be ejected from their landholding
only on the grounds provided by law. These grounds the existence of which is to be proven by
the agricultural lessor in a particular case are enumerated in Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
3844, otherwise known as the "Agricultural Land Reform Code"
42
FACTS:
Petitioner, Eufrocina Nieves is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice land with an area of 6
hectares, more or less, located at Dulong Bayan, Quezon, Nueva Ecija. Ernesto and Felipe
Duldulao are tenants and cultivators of the subject land who are obligated to each pay leasehold
rentals of 45 cavans of palay for each cropping season, one in May and the other in December.
Claiming that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay their leasehold rentals since 1985 which had
accumulated to 446.5 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, petitioner filed a petition on March
8, 2006 before the DARAB Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), seeking the ejectment of
respondents from the subject land for non-payment of rentals.
Prior to the filing of the case, a mediation was conducted before the Office of the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer and Legal Division in 2005 where respondents admitted being in default
in the payment of leasehold rentals equivalent to 200 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, and
promised to pay the same. Subsequently, however, in his answer to the petition, Ernesto claimed
that he merely inherited a portion of the back-leasehold rentals from his deceased father,
Eugenio Duldulao, but proposed to pay the arrearages in four installments beginning the dayatan
cropping season in May 2006. On the other hand, Felipe denied incurring any back-leasehold
rentals, but at the same time proposed to pay whatever there may be in six installments, also
beginning the dayatan cropping season in May 2006. Both respondents manifested their lack of
intention to renege on their obligations to pay the leasehold rentals due, explaining that the
supervening calamities, such as the flash floods and typhoons that affected the area prevented
them from complying.
PARAD declared that the tenancy relations between the parties had been severed by
respondents' failure to pay their back-leasehold rentals, thereby ordering them to vacate the
subject land and fulfill their rent obligations. With respect to Ernesto, the PARAD did not find
merit in his claim that the obligation of his father for back leasehold rentals, amounting to 446
cavans of palay, had been extinguished by his death. Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the case
on appeal. DARAB issued a Decision affirming the findings of the PARAD that indeed, respondents
were remiss in paying their leasehold rentals and that such omission was willful and deliberate,
justifying their ejectment from the subject land.
Respondents elevated the matter to the CA. CA granted respondents' petition for review, thereby
reversing the ruling of the DARAB terminating the tenancy relations of the parties. While it found
respondents to have been remiss in the payment of their leasehold rentals, it held that the
omission was not deliberate or willful.
ISSUE:
WON it is proper to eject respondents from the subject land
RULING: Yes
Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure, may be ejected from their landholding
only on the grounds provided by law. These grounds the existence of which is to be proven by
the agricultural lessor in a particular case are enumerated in Section 36 of RA 3844, otherwise
known as the "Agricultural Land Reform Code".
To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the leasehold rentals under RA 3844,
jurisprudence instructs that the same must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant the
agricultural lessee's dispossession of the land that he tills. In fine, the Court affirms the DARAB
Decision granting the petition for dispossession with the modification, however, on the amount
of rental arrearages to be paid considering that an action to enforce any cause of action under
RA 3844 shall be barred if not commenced within three years after it accrued. Accordingly,
respondents are held liable to pay petitioner only the pertinent rental arrearages reckoned from
the last three cropping years prior to the filing of the petition before the Office of the PARAD on
March 8, 2006 or from the May 2003 cropping season, until they have vacated the subject land.
43
BAUTISTA VS. DONIEGO JR.

G.R. NO. 218665
DOCTRINE:
Appeal property case)For appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be
complied with: (a) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA within the time
for doing so; (b) he must have filed his petition for review within the reglementary period; (c)
he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (d) the other parties must have perfected
their appeals in due time.
FACTS:
Bautista et al. filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and award
of damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Palayan City (MTCC) against respondents.
They alleged that beginning March 2013, respondents, with the help of soldiers from Fort
Magsaysay, by means of stealth, strategy, force, threat, and intimidation, entered the parcels of
land located at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City which they have been occupying in the concept of
owner for more than ten years.
In defense, respondents denied the allegations and claimed that it was Bautista, et al. who
surreptitiously entered the subject land despite knowledge that it was part of the Fort Magsaysay
Military Reservation since December 19, 1955 pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 237 of
then President Ramon Magsaysay. They also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages.
The MTCC rendered its decision directing the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf
to vacate the subject land and to peacefully turn over the premises to Bautista, et al.
The RTC reversed and set aside the MTCC Decision. Finding respondents to be the lawful
possessors of the subject land, it ordered Bautista, et al. to vacate and peacefully turn over the
same to the former.
The CA acted on J. Bautista's Motion for Extension denying the same for failure to pay the
required docket fees within the reglementary period without justifiable reason.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in merely noting without action Bautista, et al.' s Petition for Review and other
subsequent pleadings, thus, denying them due course
RULING: Yes.
The CA committed reversible error in merely noting without action the Petition for Review, as
well as the subsequent pleadings that Bautista, et al. had filed. The Petition for Review was an
entirely new and distinct pleading assailing the RTC's issuances and did not proceed from the
Motion for Extension filed by J. Bautista, which the CA had already ordered expunged from the
records. As such, with the expunction of J. Bautista's Motion for Extension, the docket number
previously assigned to it should not have been re-assigned to the properly and seasonably-filed
Petition for Review.
The appellate jurisdiction did not attach with the filing of J. Bautista's Motion for Extension.
Notably, the pleading filed was a mere motion for extension and not a petition for review, and
there was no payment of the required docket fees.
44
However, the same does not hold true with respect to the Petition for Review subsequently filed
by Bautista, et al. The said petition was filed together with the payment of docket and other
lawful fees and assailed not only the Decision of the RTC, but also its Order denying their Motion
for Reconsideration. Records show that Bautista, et al. filed their Petition for Review within the
15-day period after their receipt of the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly,
therefore, the Petition for Review was properly filed, and the CA acquired appellate jurisdiction
over the case. Consequently, it is only proper that the CA reinstate and re-docket the same.
TOPIC: FORCIBLE ENTRY
JAVIER VS. LUMONTAD

G.R. NO. 203760
DOCTRINE:
Notwithstanding petitioner's proper classification of his action, his forcible entry complaint,
nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed to justify his right
to the de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the disputed premises.
FACTS:
This case originated from a forcible entry Complaint filed by petitioner Homer Javier, represented
by his mother and natural guardian Susan Canencia against respondent Susan Lumontad before
the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal (MTC). The petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons
of the late Vicente Javier (Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-square meter parcel of land
located at Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal. Since his birth,
petitioner's family has lived in the residential house erected thereon. Upon Vicente's death,
petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession over the same. On March 26,
2007, respondent gained entry into the subject land and started to build a 2-storey building on a
150 sqm. portion thereof, despite petitioner's vigorous objections and protests. The dispute was
submitted to barangay conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent the instant forcible entry complaint,
averring, in addition to the foregoing, that reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy
of the above-said portion may be fixed at P5,000 per month.
The MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the
disputed portion and surrender possession thereof to petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent
to pay petitioner the amounts of P5,000 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said portion,
as reasonable compensation for its use and occupation, and P20,000 as attorney's fees, including
costs of suit. The CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the latter court for trial
on the merits.
ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the case to the latter
court for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of ownership and possession
RULING: No.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that the allegations in the
petitioner's complaint do not make a case for forcible entry but another action cognizable by the
RTC.
45
In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land
or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the
language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took
place under said conditions. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations
demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
A plain reading of petitioner's complaint shows that the required jurisdictional averments, so as
to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied with. Said pleading
alleges that petitioner, as Vicente's, successor-in-interest, was in prior physical possession of the
subject land but was eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007
by respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the same and, thereafter,
erected a building thereon. Hence, it was erroneous to conclude that petitioner only made a
general allegation that respondent's entry in the premises was made by means of force and
intimidation and, consequently, that a forcible entry case was not instituted before the MTC.
TOPIC: INJUNCTION
SPS. ESPIRITU VS. SPS. SAZON

G.R. NO. 204965
DOCTRINE:
Injunctive Relief does not operate to evict a lawful possessor
FACTS:
The Spouses Espiritu are registered owners of parcel of land. The Spouses Sazon filed a complaint
for annulment of sales, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession against the Spouses Espiritu.
The Spouses Sazon claimed to be the lawful owners of the subject land having purchased the
same from the Spouses Diaz. After the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Spouses Diaz
surrendered the physical possession of the land and the corresponding duplicate copy of the title
to the Spouses Sazon. However, after almost 7 years, the Spouses Espiritu occupied and fenced
the subject land and claimed ownership thereof. The Spouses Sazon discovered that his title was
cancelled by virtue of a purported sale by the Spouses Diaz in favor of Peco, who was issued a
new title. Thereafter, Peco sold the subject land to the Spouses Espiritu. Injunctive relief was
issued by the RTC against the Spouses Espiritu.
ISSUE:
WON injunctive relief operates to evict the Spouses Espiritu and transfer the possession to the
Spouses Sazon
RULING:
As the present registered owners having a subsisting certificate of title in their names, the
Spouses Espiritu have the right to be maintained in the possession of the subject land until their
title is nullified. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the RTC is presumed to have been
guided by the dictum that it cannot make use of its injunctive power to alter the status quo ante
litem. Hence, it could not have contemplated the eviction of the Spouses Espiritu from the subject
land and the transfer of its possession to the Spouses Sazon because it will defeat its rationale
for issuing the injunctive writ in the first place.
46
TOPIC: RES JUDICATA
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDGARDO L. SANTOS

G.R. NOs. 213863 and 214021
DOCTRINE:
Res judicata does not apply when the pronouncement in the first decision was a mere obiter
dictum. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no
binding force for purposes of res judicata.
FACTS:
Pursuant to PD No. 27, the 3 parcels of lands owned by Santos were distributed to the farmer-
beneficiaries who were issued their Emancipation Patents. Finding the valuation unreasonable,
he filed 3 petitions for the determination of just compensation of the subject lands before Office
of Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD). Dissatisfied of PARAD’s valuation, LBP instituted two
complaints for determination of just compensation before the RTC. LBP elevated the matter to
the CA stating that no further proceedings were necessary to arrive at the just compensation in
view of the final and executory decision that directed the remand of the case to the RTC for
computation purposes only.
ISSUE:
WON res judicata has set in, which will bar the proceedings for the settlement of just
compensation
HELD: No.
The Court cannot subscribe to the LBP’s contention that the RTC was barred by res judicata from
conducting further proceedings to determine just compensation.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive to the right of the parties and their privies, and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
The decision did not preclude the RTC from proceeding with the determination of the just
compensation of the subject lands since the issue raised in the said case merely pertained to the
LBP’s legal standing to institute the complaints for just compensation and not the valuation of
the subject lands. The pronouncement in the said decision on the matter of computation of just
compensation was a mere obiter dictum, an opinion expressed upon some question of law that
was not necessary in the determination of the case before it.
TERESA IGNACIO VS OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. NO. 221620
DOCTRINE:
For Res Judicata to apply, there must be identity of causes of action. There is no identity of
causes when the Annulment Case is for the alleged nullity of the auction sale and the
Cancellation Case is for failure to redeem the property within the one-year period.
47
FACTS:
Teresa Ignacio filed a Complaint for Annulment of Warrant of Levy and Public Auction Sale against
the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City, stating that she is the registered owner of the
real property that public respondents, with malice and bad faith, sold at a public auction to the
Spouses Dimalanta. Public respondents argued that they had strictly complied with the legal and
procedural requirements for the conduct of the public auction sale. The Spouses Dimalanta
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Teresa’s cause of action is barred by the final
judgment in LRC case rendered by RTC as Land Registration Court, which upheld and confirmed
the validity of the auction sale.
ISSUE:
WON the Annulment Complaint must be dismissed on the ground of res judicata
RULING: No.
For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, one of the requisites is that there must be
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.
In this case, there is no identity of causes of action between these two cases. In the Cancellation
case, the cause is the expiration of the one-year redemption period without the landowners
having redeemed the property; whereas in the Annulment case, the cause is the alleged nullity
of the auction sale for denial of the property owner’s right to due process. The issues are different
because in the former, the issue is whether or not the Spouses Dimalanta is entitled to the
cancellation of the TCT while in the latter, the issue is whether she is entitled to recover the
property and to damages.
Since the validity of auction sale was not raised or resolved in the Cancellation case, the
subsequent filing of the complaint in the Annulment case was not barred by res judicata.
TOPIC: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
VICENTE VS. ACIL CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 196461
DOCTRINE:
There is no need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to execute the judgment.
FACTS:
Acil Corporation acquired a land and adjacent to theirs is the land acquired by petitioner Vicente
through a free patent and consequently an Original Certificate of Title was issued under his name.
Acil alleged that it owned the lot along the north eastern boundary through accretion and it was
also pointed out by Acil that Vicente encroached a portion of their lot. Geodetic Engineer Agustin
Vedua conducted a survey and identified the encroachment.
The RTC eventually ordered Vicente to vacate the encroached portion and issued a writ of
execution however, Vicente posited that the decision could not yet be executed since no prior
survey has been conducted to determine the encroached portion.
48
ISSUE:
WON there is a need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to execute the judgement
RULING: No.
The RTC correctly held that there is no need for the appointment of a surveyor for the sheriff to
execute the judgment, considering that the CA had already determined Vicente’s encroachment
on Acil’s property as consisting of approximately 4,237 square meters, and had equally identified
such illegally occupied area to be that shaded portion in Acil’s Exhibit "G-4", i.e., the sketch plan
prepared by Engr. Vedua who had first conducted the survey on the encroachment. Thus, there
appears to be no more reasonable basis to thwart the judgment’s execution.
VERCELES VS. HON. YARANON

G.R. NO. 206423
DOCTRINE:
The Court exhorts that absent compliance with the laws allowing for summary eviction,
respondents cannot resort to the procedural shortcut of ousting petitioners by the simple
expedient of a summary demolition order from the Office of the City Mayor. They have to
undergo the appropriate proceeding as set out in the NBCP and its IRR or avail of the proper
judicial process to recover the subject property from petitioners.
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto Lardizabal filed a complaint for demolition before the City Engineer’s Office
of Baguio City questioning the ongoing construction of a residential structure and garage
extension by petitioners on a parcel of land, situated on the property allegedly owned by Mariano
Pangloy and Ernesto’s father Juanito Lardizabal. The City Engineer’s office found out that the
construction had no building permit.
ISSUE:
In what cases are evictions or demolitions are allowed and who may order the demolition of the
structures?
HELD:
To note, the Summary Eviction IRR was issued pursuant to Section 28 Article VII of RA 7279, which
equally provides for the situations wherein eviction or demolition is allowed as crafted exceptions
to the moratorium on eviction under Section 44, Article XII of the same law.
Meanwhile, Section 215 of the NBCP, and its corresponding IRR provision (both of which are
respectively quoted hereunder) states that before a structure may be abated or demolished,
there must first be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is
a nuisance, ruinous or dangerous:
Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.

When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree
of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be
taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
49
PROCEDURE FOR ABATEMENT/ DEMOLITION OF DANGEROUS/ RUINOUS BUILDINGS/

STRUCTURES
The following steps shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings under this Rule:
1. There must be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is a
nuisance, ruinous or dangerous;
2. Written notice or advice shall be served upon the owner and occupant/s of such finding or
declaration, giving him at least 15 days within which to vacate or cause to be vacated, repaired,
renovated, demolished and removed as the case may be, the nuisance, ruinous or dangerous
building/structure or any part or portion thereof;
3. Within the 15-day period, the owner may, if he so desires, appeal to the Secretary the finding
or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the
building/structure be made.
To this, it bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the
authority to order the demolition of the structures under the NBCP.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF PANGASUGAN, BAYBAY, LEYTE VS. EXPLORATION PERMIT

APPLICATION OF PNOC
G.R. NO. 162226
DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act
which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
FACTS:
Herein respondent applied for an exploration permit with Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB)
covering a land located within Leyte Geothermal Reservation. Petitioner passed a Resolution
expressing its deep concern for the possible environmental damages by the said activities. It also
filed a Complaint praying for the denial of the application of the respondent with the MGB Panel
of Arbitrators (PA). Due to the dismissal by the PA of the Complaint, petitioner appealed the case
to the Mines Adjudication Board which decided that the complaint is dismissible for being
premature. Petitioner did not file for any motion for reconsideration or appeal hence an Order
was issued declaring the Decision as final and executory.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner may still assail the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board
RULING: No.
It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down.
This doctrine has a two-fold purpose, namely:
50
(a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality
to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of
procedural law.
RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., VS. GERRY CENTENO

G.R. NO. 200667
DOCTRINE:
It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute
right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper
application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely
a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party
claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor.
FACTS:
The Spouses Centeno, as owners of the subject lots mortgaged the foregoing properties in favor
of petitioner Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. as security for a ₱1,753.65 loan. The spouses
however, defaulted on the loan, prompting petitioner to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the said mortgage. Consequently, the subject lots were sold to petitioner being the highest
bidder at the auction sale. The Spouses Centeno failed to redeem the subject lots within the 1-
year redemption period pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135. Nonetheless, they still continued
with the possession and cultivation of the aforesaid properties. Respondent Gerry Centeno, son
of the Spouses Centeno, purchased the said lots from his parents. While the latter was in
possession of the subject lots, petitioner secured a Final Deed of Sale thereof and was able to
obtain the corresponding tax declarations in its name which prompted the petitioner to file a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC, claiming entitlement to the said
writ by virtue of the Final Deed of Sale covering the subject lots. Respondent opposed the
petition, asserting that he purchased and has, in fact, been in actual, open and exclusive
possession of the same properties for at least fifteen years. Moreover, he claims that petitioner’s
rights over the subject lots had already prescribed.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession
RULING: Yes.
The RTC had the ministerial duty to issue – as it did issue – the said writ in petitioner’s favor.
Records show that the RTC had already passed upon petitioner’s title over the subject lots during
the course of the proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been
established for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession. It is hornbook principle that absent
any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Court, as in this case. It cannot be disputed
that respondent is a mere successor-in-interest of the Spouses Centeno. Consequently, he cannot
be deemed as a "third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor" under legal contemplation.
51
REMEDIOS M. MAULEON VS. LOLINA MORAN PORTER

G.R. NO. 203288
DOCTRINE:
Immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be
stayed if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic
deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject
premises during the pendency of the appeal. These requirements are mandatory and
concurrent, without which execution will issue as a matter of right.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner and all persons claiming rights
from her, seeking to recover possession of the property located at 10th Avenue, Caloocan city.
Respondent alleged therein that she is the absolute owner of the subject by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed with Renato Maulion. Despite the sale, however, the petitioner continued
to occupy the subject property through respondent's tolerance. But when she made demands to
vacate the last of which was through a letter, petitioner refused to do so. Respondent instituted
a suit for unlawful detainer.
During the preliminary conference petitioner failed to appear, despite notice. Thus, respondent
moved for the rendition of judgment pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules
on Summary Procedure, which the MeTC granted.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
dismissed the certiorari petition for lack of merit holding that the pendency of the annulment of
documents and reconveyance case did not abate an ejectment suit nor bar the execution of the
judgment therein.
CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the pendency of a prior case for annulment of documents and
reconveyance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the certiorari petition
RULING: No.
Records show that during the scheduled preliminary conference, petitioner and her counsel
failed to appear despite notice. Hence, the MeTC was justified in granting respondent's motion
to render judgment in the ejectment case pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure.
Section 19 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the immediate execution of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed if the defendant perfects an
appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the
appeal. These requirements are mandatory and concurrent, without which execution will issue
as a matter of right.
In this case, it is evident that petitioner failed to interpose an appeal from the MeTC Decision
rendering the same final and executory. Hence, the Order granting its execution was properly
issued. It is settled that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable and
52
unalterable. By this principle of immutability of judgments, the Court is now precluded from
further examining the MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner's perceived errors
therein.
TOPIC: MORTGAGE
QUINTOS VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD

G.R. NO. 185838
DOCTRINE:
A mortgagee does not become the “landowner” of the mortgaged property until he has
foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. The
consent of the landowner should be secured prior to the installation of tenants.
FACTS:
Golden Country Farms, Incorporated (GCFI), a domestic corporation organized for the purpose
of engaging in poultry and livestock production, processing, and trading, owns a parcel of land
consisting of mango orchard and a rice land. GCFI contracted loans with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which were secured by several
real estate mortgages over GCFI properties, including the subject property. For GCFI's continuous
failure to pay its loans, PNB and DBP initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the
GCFI properties which however was enjoined by Quintos, GCFI’s managing stockholder at that
time. After the EDSA revolution, PNB and DBP transferred their financial claims against GCFI to
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). The then APT officer-in-charge entered into a verbal
agreement with 53 members of Kanlurang Mindoro Farmers' Cooperative, Inc. (KAMIFCI),
allowing the latter to work on the mango orchard and payment for fruits to be remitted to
Quintos who subsequently reacquired the possession and management of the GCFI properties
through a Memorandum of Agreement between him and APT approved by the RTC.
Thereafter, pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government,
the DAR Secretary eventually ordered that the area of the subject property actually cultivated be
placed under CARP coverage.
Meanwhile, KAMIFCI filed a tenancy case against Quintos and GCFI asserting its rights under an
agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement over the mango orchard it purportedly entered into
with then APT officer-in-charge. In his answer, Quintos denied the existence of any tenancy
agreement covering the subject property. However, the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA all Ruling
that a tenancy relationship exists between GCFI and the 53 KAMIFCI members who were
allegedly installed as tenants by APT, the "legal possessor" of the mango orchard at that time.
ISSUE:
WON a mortgagee as “legal possessor” of a land may validly execute a tenancy agreement
RULING: No.
The following essential elements must be shown for tenancy relationship to exist:
(a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c)
there is consent between the parties; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.
All the above elements must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. Thus, the absence
53
of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator or a planter thereon, a de jure
tenant entitled to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws.
In this relation, it bears stressing that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. Hence, the consent of the landowner should be
secured prior to the installation of tenants.
In the present case, records are, however, bereft of any showing that APT was authorized by the
property's landowner, GCFI, to install tenants thereon. To be sure, APT only assumed the rights
of the original mortgagees in this case, i.e., PNB and DBP, which, however, have yet to exercise
their right to foreclose the mortgaged properties due to the RTC's order enjoining the same. It is
settled that a mortgagee does not become the owner of the mortgaged property until he has
foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. With
the foreclosure proceedings having been enjoined, APT could not have been regarded as the
"landowner" of the subject property. Thus, since the consent of the standing landowner, GCFI,
had not been secured by APT in this case, it had no authority to enter into any tenancy agreement
with the KAMIFCI members.
SPOUSES RODOLFO AND MARCELINA GUEVARRA VS. THE COMMONER LENDING CORPORATION, INC.
G.R. NO. 204672
DOCTRINE:
The repurchase price should include the principal and interest, as well as all the expenses of
foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee
FACTS:
On December 16, 1996, the Spouses Guevarra obtained a P320,000 loan from The Commoner
Lending Corporation (TCLC), which was secured by a real estate mortgage over subject property.
The Spouses Guevarra, however, defaulted in their payment, prompting TCLC to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135. In said process, TCLC emerged as the
highest bidder at the public auction for the bid in the amount of P150,000. Eventually, the
spouses failed to redeem the property within the 1-year reglementary period. TCLC subsequently
applied for a writ of possession before the RTC. The Spouses Guevarra contend that they are still
entitled to redeem the subject property within 5 years from the expiration of the 1-year period
to repurchase. Subsequently, they filed before the RTC a petition for redemption for P150,000
plus 1% interest per month which would sum up to P240,000. The RTC ruled that the Spouses
Guevarra are entitled to reposes the property for said price plus the corresponding tax
assessments and foreclosure expenses. TCLC appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the
decision of the RTC with the modification that the same be conditioned upon the payment of the
purchase price fixed by TCLC. It ruled that after the expiration of the redemption period, the
present owner has the discretion to set a higher price. The spouses, aggrieved, filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the repurchase price for the subject property should be fixed by the TCLC
RULING: TCLC’s argument is partly correct.
To resolve the matter, it must first be pointed out that case law has equated a right of repurchase
of foreclosed properties under Section 119 of the Public Land Act as a right of redemption and
the repurchase price as a redemption price.
54
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the
public auction plus interest at the rate of 1% per month up to November 17, 1983, together with
the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private respondent might have
paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the
purchase price. Moreover, the Court notes that the stipulated 3% monthly interest is excessive
and unconscionable, hence, illegal and void for being contrary to morals.
In addition to the principal and interest, the repurchase price should also include all the expenses
of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with
Section 4769 of the General Banking Law of 2000. Considering further that the Spouses Guevarra
failed to redeem the subject property within the 1-year reglementary period, they are liable to
reimburse TCLC for the corresponding Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) and Capital Gains Tax (CGT)
it paid pursuant to Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue Regulations No. 4-99, which
requires the payment of DST on extrajudicial foreclosure sales of capital assets initiated by banks,
finance and insurance companies, as well as CGT in cases of non-redemption. CGT and DST are
expenses incident to TCLC’s custody of the subject property, hence, likewise due, under the
above provision of law.
MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY PNB-REPUBLIC BANK), PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES OSCAR
AND NENITA TARROSA, RESPONDENTS
G.R. NO. 213014
DOCTRINE:
it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary, or when required, such demand is made and
subsequently refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default and the mortgagee
obtains the right to file an action to collect the debt or foreclose the mortgage
FACTS:
On December 15, 1980, respondents-spouses Oscar and Nenita Tarrosa (Spouses Tarrosa)
obtained from then PNB-Republic Bank, now petitioner Maybank Philippines, Inc. (Maybank), a
loan in the amount of P91,000. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a 500-
square meter parcel of land situated in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental and the improvements
thereon.
After paying the said loan, the Spouses Tarrosa obtained another loan from Maybank in the
amount of P60,000 (second loan). However, the Spouses Tarrosa failed to settle the second loan
upon maturity.
Sometime in April 1998, the Spouses Tarrosa received a Final Demand Letter from Maybank
requiring them to settle their outstanding loan in the aggregate amount of P564,579.91, inclusive
of principal, interests, and penalty charges. They offered to pay a lesser amount, which Maybank
refused. Thereafter, Maybank commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings before the
office of Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff Ildefonso Villanueva, Jr. (Sheriff Villanueva). The subject
property was eventually sold in a public auction sale for a total bid price of P600,000, to the
highest bidder, Philmay Property, Inc. (PPI), which was thereafter issued a Certificate of Sale.
The Spouses Tarrosa filed a complaint for declaration of nullity and invalidity of the foreclosure
of real estate and of public auction sale proceedings and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction against Maybank, PPI, Sheriff Villanueva, and the Registry of Deeds of San Carlos city,
Negros Occidental before the RTC. They averred, inter alia, that: (a) the second loan was a clean
or unsecured loan; (b) after receiving the final demand letter, they tried to pay the second loan,
55
including the agreed interests and charges, but Maybank unjustly refused their offers of
payment; and (c) Maybank's right to foreclose had prescribed or is barred by laches.
On the other hand, Maybank and PPI countered that: (a) the second loan was secured by the
same real estate mortgage under a continuing security provision therein; (b) when the loan
became past due, the Spouses Tarrosa promised to pay and negotiated for a restructuring of their
loan, but failed to pay despite demands; and (c) the Spouses Tarrosa's positive acknowledgment
and admission of their indebtedness controverts the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
WON the period to foreclose the mortgage had prescribed
RULING: No.
The period for the mortgage did not prescribe. A mortgagee only acquires the right to foreclose
the property when the mortgagor is in default. In order that the debtor may be in default, it is
necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays
performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless
demand is not necessary. In the case at bar, the spouses only received the final demand letter on
March 4,1988, their failure to pay later the receipt of such puts them in default. Hence, the right
to foreclose their property which is considered a continuous mortgage for their second loan, only
became available after 5 days of receipt of final demand letter. Thus, the action the foreclose the
mortgage has not prescribed.
TOPIC: QUIETING OF TITLE
BILAG VS. AY-AY

G.R. NO. 189950
DOCTRINE:
Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title
are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
FACTS:
This is a case for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by the respondents,
Ay-Ay et al. against the petitioners Bilag et al. According to the respondents, petitioner's
predecessor's in interest sold to them separately various portions of a 159, 496 square meters
parcel of land situated at Sitio Benin, Bagiuo City which was designated by the Bureau of Lands.
They registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. Respondents alleged
that they have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976 when the land was
delivered to them at the same time they have already introduced various improvements on the
said land. On the other hand, petitioners refused to honor the forgoing sales and continued to
harass and threatened the respondents to demolish all their improvements. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, prescription/laches/estoppel
and res judicata. They averred that the subject lands are untitled, unregistered and form part of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public domain, hence
the Director of Lands has the authority to award their ownership.
56
ISSUE:
WON the action for quieting of title will prosper
RULING: No.
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of
title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of
hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable
claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by
reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents
are unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void documents, namely the "Catulagan"
and the Deed of Waiver of Rights. However, the records reveal that petitioners do not have legal
or equitable title over the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case that petitioners' predecessors-
in-interest, were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which
remains public land. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.
TOPIC: EQUITABLE TITLE
HEIRS OF EXTREMADURA VS. EXTREMADURA

G.R. NO. 211065
DOCTRINES:
Equitable title has been defined as "[a] title derived through a valid contract or relation, and
based on recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have
the legal title transferred to him. In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title,
he must show that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer.
It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has
possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another
person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy.
FACTS:
Jose, now deceased, filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession against his
brother, Manuel and his nephew, Marlon, claiming that Jose purchased 3 parcels of agricultural
land from his aunt, Corazon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Since Jose resided in Manila, he
placed one parcel in Manuel's care, in exchange for which, the latter and his son, Marion,
religiously delivered the produce of said land from 1984 until 1995. Unfortunately, respondents
Manuel and Marlon continuously refused to deliver the produce of the land or vacate the same.
57
ISSUES:
Should the quieting of title with recovery of possession be ruled in favor of Jose for having legal
and equitable title over the property as evidenced by the notarized deed of absolute sale?
Was the possession for almost 50 years of the subject land, where the residential house stands,
by the respondents in the concept of an owner?
RULING:
YES. In order for an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must
have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject matter of the
action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership. Equitable title has been defined as a title derived through a valid contract or relation,
and based on recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have
the legal title transferred to him. In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title,
he must show that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer. Jose's
title to the subject land was derived through a contract of sale, as evidenced by a notarized
document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby the previous owner/s transferred the
subject land to Jose for and in consideration of P6,000 for which Jose duly paid the required
capital gains tax.
NO. Article 524 of the NCC provides that “possession may be exercised in one's own name or in
that of another.” "It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the
property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate
has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when
another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy," as the parties in this
case. Jose — not only through the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, but also as
evinced by his exercise of the rights and obligations as owner thereof — was able to prove his
title over the subject land. Therefore, the action for quieting of title should prosper to the benefit
of his heirs, herein petitioners.
TOPIC: RIGHTS OF AN AGRICULTURAL LESSOR
PEREZ VS. AQUINO

G.R. NO. 217799
DOCTRINE:
An agricultural lessor has the right to sell his land, with or without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, subject, however, to the latter's right of redemption over the said land.
FACTS:
Respondent is a tenant of a parcel of land originally owned by the late Luis Cardona. The Cardona
heirs sold the subject land to petitioner. Redemption complaint against petitioner was filed
before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Tarlac City. PARAD
ruled that the respondent is entitled to redeem the subject land.
ISSUE:
WON an agricultural lessee may validly redeem the subject land
58
RULING: Yes.
An agricultural lessor has the right to sell his land, with or without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, subject, however, to the latter's right of redemption over the said land. The
right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: (a) the
redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the land must have been sold
by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees
and the DAR; (c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; and (d) the
right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from written notice of the sale by the
vendee. Case law further holds that tender or consignation is an indispensable requirement to
the proper exercise of the right of redemption by the agricultural lessee. Thus, an offer to redeem
can be properly effected through: (a) a formal tender with consignation, or (b) a complaint filed
in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. It must
be stressed that in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem
merely manifests his desire to repurchase. This statement of intention must be accompanied by
an actual and simultaneous tender of payment of the full amount of the repurchase price, i.e.,
the consideration of the sale, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual.
This notwithstanding, petitioner, as the new owner, is bound to respect and maintain respondent
as tenant of the subject land because of the latter’s tenancy right attached to the land regardless
of who its owner may be. Under the law, the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship
is not terminated by changes in ownership in case of sale, as in this case, since the purpose of the
law is to strengthen the security of tenure of tenants.
TOPIC: OWNERSHIP
HEIRS OF DELFIN VS. RABADON

G.R. NO. 165014
DOCTRINE:
The probative value of petitioners’ evidence, which consist of tax declarations and tax receipts,
pales in comparison to that of respondents’ evidence which consists of a decree of ownership.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or
may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is
bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the property
registration decree.
FACTS:
Respondents filed before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and possession of the
subject property from petitioners. Based on their complaint and the testimonies of their
witnesses during trial, respondents alleged that: (a) the subject property was owned by their
predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana Bacalso, pursuant to Decree No. 98992; (b) while the foregoing
decree was lost during the last World War, its existence could still be shown by a certification
Issued by the Land Registration Authority, and a certified copy from page 19 of the daybook of
cadastral lots Issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City; (c) after Emiliana’s death, Genaro
Rabadon took over the possession of the subject property and upon his death, his children, herein
respondents, took over its possession until 1988; (d) in 1989, they discovered that the said
property was already in the possession of petitioner Alejandra Delfin and some of her children
and their families already constructed their houses thereon; and (e) when they confronted
Alejandra, she claimed that petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Remegio Navares previously
59
bought the said property; however, when they asked to see a copy of the deed of sale, she could
not produce the same.
For their part, petitioners countered that: (a) they inherited the subject property from their
predecessor-in-interest, Remegio, who bought the foregoing even before the second World War;
(b) the subject property was Issued a certificate of title in the name of Remegio, however, the
said title was lost; (c) Alejandra inherited the subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and after its execution, she and her children, petitioners Leopoldo, Francisco and
Marcelito Delfin, took over the possession of the same; and (d) the subject property had been
declared by them for taxation purposes and they paid the corresponding realty taxes due
thereon. By way of affirmative defense, petitioners further contended, inter alia, that
respondents’ demands were already barred by laches, given that they took about 55 years to file
their complaint.
RTC ruled that petitioners had the better right to the ownership and possession of the subject
property on the fact that the subject property was declared by petitioners for taxation purposes
and that they paid the realty taxes due thereon. The CA reversed the RTC’s pronouncement.
ISSUE:
WON respondents have a better right to the ownership and possession of the subject property
RULING: Yes.
The Court finds that the respondents have shown a better right to the ownership and possession
of the subject property. The probative value of petitioners’ evidence, which consist of tax
declarations and tax receipts, pales in comparison to that of respondents’ evidence which
consists of a decree of ownership, i.e., Decree No. 98992, under the name of their predecessor-
in-interest, Emiliana. While the actual copy of the said decree was lost, the existence of the said
decree was actually proven by the LRA certification and the daybook entry. It is an elemental rule
that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to
the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto
quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the property registration decree. Accordingly,
respondents’ Decree No. 98992 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax
declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case.
Besides, tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership
when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. In this case, records are
bereft of any showing that petitioners, or any of their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
actual possession of the subject property prior to 1989 as they claim.
SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE VS. MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG, JR., NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP)
G.R. NO. 193787
DOCTRINE:
Where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer
of the payment of the purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their
agreement is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this case.
FACTS:
In 1977, the Spouses Roque entered into a deed of conditional sale over a 1,231 sq. m. land with
its original owners, one of them a certain Velia Rivero by paying P15,387.50 and that the balance
60
shall be paid upon registration. Spouses Roque then proceeded with the possession and
introduction of improvements on the said land. On Aug 12, 1991 Sabug Jr. (former Treasurer of
National Council Churches in the Philippines) applied for a free patent. Thereafter, Sabug Jr. and
Rivero executed a joint affidavit, acknowledging that the subject portion belongs to the Spouses.
Roque.
Sabug Jr. sold the lot to one Pamela Aguado then later, Aguado obtained a loan from the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). She, however, failed to pay the loan. As a result, the LBP
commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid in the
auction sale. Upon Aguado’s failure to redeem the property, the LBP consolidated its ownership
and a TCT was issued in its name. The spouses Roque filed a reconveyance, annulment of sale,
deed of real estate mortgage, foreclosure and certificate of sale and damages before the RTC
claiming that they are the real owners. The RTC dismissed the complaints of Spouses Roque and
NCCP. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Spouses Roque are the lawful owners of the subject land
RULING: No.
The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name to its rightful owner or to one
with a better right. Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal
claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
The Court finds that the Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to sell and
not one of sale contrary to the Spouses Roque's belief. In this relation, it has been consistently
ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by
the buyer of the payment of the purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their
agreement is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this case.
HEIRS OF PETER DONTON VS. DUANE STIER

G.R. NO. 216491
DOCTRINE:
An alien cannot own real properties in the Philippines.
FACTS:
The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land located in Quezon city. It was previously under
the name of Donton until its registration in the names of respondents Duane Stier, an American
citizen, and Emily Maggay.
While Donton was in the United States, he discovered that herein respondents took possession
and control of the subject property, as well as the management of his business operating thereat.
Donton's lawyers in the Philippines made demands upon respondents to vacate the subject
property and to cease and desist from operating his business, but to no avail. Donton was forced
to return to the Philippines, where he learned that respondents, through alleged fraudulent
means, were able to transfer the ownership of the subject property in their names. Hence, he
filed the instant complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of property alleging that the
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery. Respondents claimed that the subject
property had been lawfully transferred to them, asserting that Donton executed an Occupancy
61
Agreement; that Stier had extended a loan to him in the amount of P3,000,000 secured by a
mortgage over the subject property and its improvements; and that until full payment thereof,
Donton allowed Stier to occupy the same.
Both the RTC & CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON Stier, an American citizen, can acquire real property in the Philippines
2. WON Maggay (co-respondent) had no capacity to purchase a real property
RULING:
1. An alien cannot own real properties in the Philippines. Hence, the courts a quo erred in
ruling that Stier's American citizenship was not established in this case, effectively rendering the
sale of the subject property as to him void ab initio, in light of the clear proscription under Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution against foreigners acquiring real property in the Philippines.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain as well as private lands.
2. Petitioner failed to prove that Maggay, the other vendee, had no capacity to purchase the
subject property. Thus, the sale to her, remains valid but only up to the extent of her undivided
one-half share therein. Meanwhile, the other undivided one-half share, which pertained to Stier,
shall revert to Donton, the original owner, for being the subject of transaction void ab initio.
Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale, together with the TCT issued in respondents' favor,
must be annulled only insofar as Stier is concerned without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.
RAFAEL VALES ET AL VS. MA. LUZ CHORESCA GALINATO ET AL.

G.R. NO. 180134
DOCTRINE:
The May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum provides that tenants should (a) have actual knowledge
of unregistered transfers of ownership of lands covered by Torrens Certificate of Titles prior to
October 21, 1972, (b) have recognized the persons of the new owners, and (c) have been paying
rentals/amortization to such new owners in order to validate the transfer and bind the tenants
to the same.
FACTS:
On March 3, 1972, the Spouses Perfecto and Marietta Vales executed a Deed of Sale conveying
5 parcels of registered agricultural land with an aggregate area of 20.3168 hectares situated in
Barrio Manguna, Cabatuan, Iloilo to their 3 children, herein petitioners. However, the subject sale
was not registered, hence, title to the subject lands remained in the names of Spouses. Vales. At
the time of the sale, the subject lands were tenanted.
Presidential Decree (PD) 27 was passed decreeing the emancipation of tenants. Petitioner Rafael
Vales executed a sworn declaration, asserting that he and his sisters are co-owners of the subject
lands. This notwithstanding, the subject lands were placed under the coverage of the
government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program as properties belonging to Spouses Vales,
not to petitioners.
Invoking the landowner’s retention rights provided under PD 27, petitioners filed a letter- request
for the retention of the subject lands with the Office of the Agrarian Reform which was not acted
62
upon. Thereafter, they filed a petition to be the certified owners of the subject lands before the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Region VI. They further prayed that they be allowed to partition
the subject lands with the end in view of obtaining titles for their respective shares. The petition,
however, remained unresolved for nearly two decades.
Meanwhile, petitioners entered into several Agricultural Leasehold Contracts with several
tenants. These contracts were duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Cabatuan. Later, Emancipation Patents were issued to certain tenants of the subject lands.
Petitioners claimed, however, that such issuances were made "without their knowledge and
despite their vehement protest and opposition.”
Petitioners filed a petition before the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) which ruled that ownership over the subject lands remained with Spouses Vales. The DAR
Secretary held that the tenants must be shown to have acquired actual knowledge of the subject
sale in order to grant validity thereto. However, it appears from the date of the earliest receipts
evidencing the rental payments to petitioners that the tenants knew of the said sale only in 1977.
As such, petitioners never became valid owners of the subject lands, thus warranting the denial
of their petitions for exemption and retention.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner can claim exemption of the subject lands from the OLT Program of the
government by claiming ownership on the basis of a sale thereof by the registered owners, i.e.,
Spouses Vales
RULING: No.
Transfers of ownership of lands covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title duly executed prior to
October 21, 1972 but not registered with the Register of Deeds concerned before said date in
accordance with the Land Registration Act shall not be considered a valid transfer of ownership
insofar as the tenant-farmers are concerned and therefore the land shall be placed under the
OLT Program.
Transfer of ownership of unregistered lands (ownership may be evidenced by tax declaration,

deeds of conveyance) executed prior to October 21, 1972, whether registered or not with the
Register of Deeds concerned pursuant to Act No. 3344 may be considered a valid
transfer/conveyance as between the parties subject to verification of the due execution of the
conveyance/transfer in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
In order that the foregoing transfers of ownership mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs
may be binding upon the tenants, such tenants should have knowledge of such
transfers/conveyance prior to October 21, 1972, have recognized the persons of the new owners,
and have been paying rentals/amortization to such new owners.
Tersely put, the DAR Memorandum provides that tenants should (a) have actual knowledge of
unregistered transfers of ownership of lands covered by Torrens Certificate of Titles prior to
October 21, 1972, (b) have recognized the persons of the new owners, and (c) have been paying
rentals/amortization to such new owners in order to validate the transfer and bind the tenants
to the same.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the subject sale was not registered or even annotated on
the certificates of title covering the subject lands. Thus, it may be concluded that petitioners
failed to comply with the requirements stated under the DAR Memorandum. As a result, the
subject sale could not be considered as valid, especially as against the tenants and/or their
relatives – particularly, herein respondents. The subject lands were therefore correctly placed
under the OLT Program of the government, which thereby warranted the denial of the petition
for exemption.
63
TOPIC: POSSESSION
SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH AND DIRK FAHRENBACH VS.

JOSEFINA PANGILINAN
G.R. NO. 224549
DOCTRINES:
The law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before
it can be said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v. Factor, the Court held that “visiting
the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. The fact of
her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession.”
Tacking of possession only applies to possession de jure, or that possession which has for its
purpose the claim of ownership. In Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Galabo, “tacking is
made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership
through prescription. x x x possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession.
FACTS:
In 1995, Josefina Pangilinan acquired a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 0056 from her aunt, Felomina Abid, through a Waiver of Rights. Unknown to her, Abid also
executed a Deed of Sale covering the same piece of land in favor of Columbino Alvarez.
Upon learning that the Deed of Sale was erroneous, Alvarez executed a handwritten letter setting
forth that the land belongs to Pangilinan and, in a Sinumpaang Salaysay, that it was not the
property he intends to buy, but the one with an area of 8-hectares under Tax Declaration No.
019-0233-A.
Pangilinan learned that petitioners Spouses Fahrenback were occupying the subject lot and had
built structures thereon without her consent. Despite demands, petitioners refused to vacate.
After the barangay conciliation proceedings failed, Pangilinan filed a complaint for forcible entry
against petitioners before the MCTC of Coron-Busuanga, Palawan.
The MCTC decided in favor of Spouses Fahrenback. The trial court observed that they were
claiming one and the same lot. But in resolving the issue of prior possession, it noted that it was
indeed Alvarez who was the actual occupant of the subject lot.
The RTC reversed the ruling of the MCTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the lot. The CA
affirmed the findings of the RTC insofar as it held that respondent was the prior possessor of the
subject lot. The de facto possession of respondent having visited the same, paid realty taxes, and
even requested for a survey authority thereon. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was
denied; hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON Josefina Pangilinan had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject
lot
2. WON the Spouses Fahrenback’s possession should be tacked onto that of Alvarez who
allegedly occupied the property since 1974
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RULING:
1. YES. In truth, the subject lot was not the property sold to petitioners by Alvarez, but was the
one which respondent acquired from Abid by virtue of a Waiver of Rights. In fact, this first lot was
subject of Alvarez’s handwritten letter and Sinumpaang Salaysay, acknowledging respondent’s
ownership over it. With the true identity of the subject lot established, it must nonetheless be
determined whether or not respondent had prior de facto possession over the same.
Notably, jurisprudence states that the law does not require a person to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v.
Factor, the Court held that “visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual
or physical possession. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss
of possession.”
Petitioners claim that they began occupying the subject lot only in August 2005; there is no doubt
that respondent had prior de facto possession.
2. NO. The tacking of possession only applies to possession de jure, or that possession which has
for its purpose the claim of ownership.
In Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Galabo, “possession in this regard, however, pertains to
possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for
acquiring or losing ownership through prescription xxx possession in forcible entry suits refers to
nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.
As earlier stated, possession de jure is irrelevant because the only question in forcible entry—as
it is here—is prior physical possession or possession de facto.
TANCHULING VS. CANTELA

G.R. NO. 209284
DOCTRINE:
Failure to take possession of the real property is a clear indication of simulation.
FACTS:
Petitioners Spouses Tanchuling executed a deed of sale in favor of defendant Cantela covering 2
parcels of land denominated as Block 1 Lots 5 and 6 with P400,000 as consideration.
Simultaneously, an undated deed of sale was also executed selling back the same property to the
Spouses Tanchuling containing the identical witnesses, community tax certificate details and
letter composition. Sometime after the subject deed's execution, Tanchuling delivered the
owner's copies of the aforementioned TCTs to Cantela, although it is undisputed that none of the
parties were in actual physical possession of the properties.
When the Spouses Tanchuling tried to recover the TCTs from Cantela, the latter refused thus
prompting them to file a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale and delivery of the TCTs
with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Tanchuling and nullified the deed of sale for
being absolutely simulated and that the parties never intended to be bound by the subject deed.
The CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE:
WON the failure of Cantela to take possession of the property is also a clear indication of
simulation
RULING: Yes.
Cantela failed to take possession of the properties, which, according to Cruz, is a clear indication
of simulation:
The failure of Sulit to take possession of the property purportedly sold to her was
a clear badge of simulation that rendered the whole transaction void and without
force and effect, pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code. The fact that she was
able to secure a Certificate of Title to the subject property in her name did not vest
her with ownership over it. A simulated deed of sale has no legal effect;
consequently, any transfer certificate of title (TCT) issued in consequence thereof
should be cancelled. A simulated contract is not a recognized mode of acquiring
ownership.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus concludes that the Spouses Tanchuling never intended
to transfer the properties to Cantela; hence, the subject deed was absolutely simulated and in
consequence, null and void.
FELISA AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION VS. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION

G.R. NOs. 231655 & 231670
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing
of expropriation proceedings, the Court has ruled that it is the value of the property at the time
of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation.
The general rule is that upon the filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right
to take or enter into possession of the real property involved, if he deposits an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property. An exception to this procedure is provided by
RA 8974 with respect to national government projects, which requires the payment of 100% of
the zonal value of the property to be expropriated as the provisional value.
FACTS:
Petitioner claimed that in 1997, it discovered that the NPC's transmission towers and
transmission lines were located within a 19,635-square meter portion of its lands situated in Brgy.
Felisa, Bacolod City. Further verification revealed that the transmission towers were constructed
sometime before 1985 by NPC which entered the subject land without its knowledge and
consent. For its part, NPC denied having entered the subject land without any authority, and
claimed that petitioner's President, Jovito Sayson, granted it the permit to enter for the
construction of the 138 KV Mabinay-Bacolod Transmission Line.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties agreed to narrow down the issue to the payment of
just compensation and agreed to settle the case at the price of P400.00/sq. m. but the proposed
compromise did not push through in view of the failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to
act on the Deed of Sale entered into by the parties. Subsequently, petitioner moved that NPC be
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immediately ordered to pay the amount of P7,845,000 representing the 100% zonal value of the
subject land in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 8974. NPC opposed the motion, contending
that the said law only applies to expropriation cases initiated by the government to acquire
property for any national government infrastructure project.
ISSUE:
WON RA 8974 applies even if the government failed or refused to file an expropriation case
considering that the recovery of possession case partakes of the nature of an inverse
expropriation proceedings
RULING: Yes.
The government had long entered the subject land and constructed the transmission towers and
lines. However, petitioner initiated inverse condemnation proceedings after the effectivity of RA
8974. Hence, procedurally and substantially, the said law should govern. Notably, the payment
of the provisional value of the subject land equivalent to 100% of its current zonal value is
declared for the first time by the said law which is evidently more favorable to the landowner
than the mere deposit of its assessed value as required by Rule 67. Accordingly, the application
of the provisions of RA 8974 to the instant case is beyond cavil. Besides, there is no legal
impediment to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent as successor of NPC,
despite entry to the subject land long before the filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings
before the RTC because physical possession gained by entering the property is not equivalent to
expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership thereon.
AQA GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION VS. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

G.R. NOs. 211649 & 211742
DOCTRINE:
For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party,
but also held by him adversely to the judgment obligor - such as that of a co-owner, agricultural
tenant or usufructuary, who possess the property in their own right and not merely the
successor or transferee of the right of possession of, or privy to, the judgment obligor
FACTS:
AQA Global Construction occupies the property of KTC. However due to non-payment of loans
by KTC, the said property was foreclosed and Plantersbank was the highest builder. Thereafter,
Plantersbank applied for a writ of possession, which was granted by the RTC. AQA filed a
Manifestation and Motion before the RTC, seeking leave of court to intervene in the case and to
be excluded from the implementation of the writ of possession. Plantersbank opposed AQA's
motion, contending that AQA cannot be considered a third party possessing the subject
properties adversely against KTC. AQA filed its Reply and averred that KTC has no right over the
subject properties.
ISSUE:
WON the possession of AQA Global is valid
RULING: No.
The general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased who is entitled to the possession of
the said property. Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial court to issue the writ of
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possession in his favor. The exception, however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules, which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages. Under the
said provision of law, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser
in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to
the judgment debtor. Thus, where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is occupied by a
party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to
determine the nature of said adverse possession. For the exception to apply, however, the
property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by him adversely to the
judgment obligor - such as that of a co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary, who possess
the property in their own right and not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of, or privy to, the judgment obligor.
In this case, petitioners' claim of right of possession over the subject properties is not analogous
to any of the foregoing as to render such possession adverse to the judgment obligor, KTC, under
legal contemplation.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL

G.R. NO. 196741
DOCTRINE:
In this case, respondents failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject
property after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in
their answer to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting
caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons. Suffice it to state that possession in
the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the
ground before he is deemed in possession.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of the subject property and other parcels of land located in Moalboal,
Cebu since 1981 when it bought the same from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings, Inc. It had then
been in actual, physical, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property and
had declared the same for taxation purposes. Sometime in 1997, however, respondents
Tapaleses and Sabandal-Herzenstiel by force, strategy and stealth entered into the 2,940 square
meter portion of the subject property, on which they proceeded to cut down some coconut trees,
introduced improvements and fenced the area. Petitioner made demands to vacate.
ISSUE:
Did the respondents properly prove their possession to the property?
RULING:
In this case, respondents failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject
property after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their
answer to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting
caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons. Suffice it to state that possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the
ground before he is deemed in possession. Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion to be well-
founded, the MCTC properly adjudged petitioner to have prior possession over the subject
property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who never claimed ownership or possession thereof.
In fine, the Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging petitioner to be
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the lawful possessor of the subject property, square as they are with existing law and
jurisprudence.
SPOUSES CAYAGO VS. SPOUSES CANTARA

G.R. NO. 203918
DOCTRINE:
Well settled that in civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. If the plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, the same
must be proven by competent evidence. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.
FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by the Spouses Cantara against the Spouses Cayago,
alleging that they are the rightful and legitimate owners and actual possessors of the agricultural
land located at Eastern Samar. They bought the subject land from Asteria Rubico in 1993
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale and acquired it in 1979 from Justina evidenced by Sale of
Riceland. Since then, the Spouses Cantara have been in actual possession through their tenants
who have been religiously cultivating the land. However, sometime in 2007, the Spouses Cayago,
using hired hands and without the knowledge of Spouses Cantara or their tenants, by means of
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth, entered the subject land, cleared it up, and
planted palay, effectively depriving the latter and their tenants access thereto. Hence, Spouses
Cantara demanded that Spouses Cayago vacate and surrender possession of the subject land, but
to no avail thus, prompting the filing of the present complaint before the Municipal Trial Court
of Borongan, Eastern Samar.
The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding the Spouses Cayago to have
sufficiently proven, by preponderance of evidence, their ownership and prior physical possession
of the land. Dissatisfied, the Spouses Cantara appealed the matter before the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar.
ISSUE:
WON the Spouses Cantara have a better right to possess the subject land over Spouses Cayago
RULING:
The RTC found that the Spouses Cantara were able to discharge the burden of proving prior
physical possession of the subject land of which they were illegally deprived. It gave probative
weight to the notarized Deed of Sale between Spouses Cantara and Asteria which proves that the
former have been occupying the subject land since 1993, as corroborated by the sworn
statements of the present tenants thereof. On this score, the RTC noted that the Spouses Cayago
failed to adduce evidence to discredit the validity of the said Deed of Sale. Further, it observed
that the MTC overlooked the finding of Engr. Suyot in the Commissioner's Report that the
Spouses Cantara possess the southern portion of Lot 12224 acquired by purchase since 1993.
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HEIRS OF JOSE PEÑAFLOR VS. DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 197797
DOCTRINE:
Possession, being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other
attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
may demand possession as a matter of right. As such, it imposes upon the RTC a ministerial
duty to issue a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. Furthermore,
it is settled that a pending action to annul the mortgage or the foreclosure sale does not stay
the issuance of a writ of possession. It is only ceased upon a credible showing by a third-party
claimant of his independent right over the foreclosed property.
FACTS:
Respondents are the successors-in-interest of the late Artemio Dela Cruz who is the son of
Nicolasa Dela Cruz, the original owner of a parcel of land situated at No. 11, Ifugao St., Brgy.
Barretto, Olongapo City, including a 2-storey building erected thereon. In 1991, Nicolasa
authorized her daughter, Carmelita Guanga to mortgage the subject property to Jose Peñaflor,
the predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, Jose Peñaflor, Jr. and Virginia Agatep in order
to secure a loan in the amount of P112,000. As Nicolasa failed to settle her loan obligation when
it fell due, Peñaflor filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the RTC
of Olongapo city. Peñaflor emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was thus issued
in his favor. The period of redemption expired without the subject property being redeemed;
hence, a Final Bill of Sale was issued and registered in Peñaflor's name. Thereafter, the latter
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. This notwithstanding, Nicolasa persisted in
her occupancy of the subject property and refused to deliver possession to Peñaflor.
The RTC granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Nicolasa and Carmelita did
not appeal the decision; thus, the same lapsed into finality. However, the writ of possession was
not enforced as Artemio filed a complaint for annulment of judgment before the same trial court,
claiming to be the lawful owner and possessor of the subject property. Artemio's complaint was
eventually dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The CA annulled and set aside the writ of possession and notice to vacate issued by the RTC.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erroneously set aside the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued by the RTC
in favor of herein petitioners
RULING: Yes.
It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the
absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one year from the registration
of the certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the
rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, not least of
which is possession, or jus possidendi.
Possession, being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other
attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may
demand possession as a matter of right.
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As a final word, it should be clarified that the purpose of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the
mortgagee who has already shown prima facie right of ownership over the subject property
based on his consolidated title over the same his incidental right to possess the foreclosed
property. Thus, it is only upon a credible showing by a third-party claimant of his independent
right over the foreclosed property that the law's prima facie deference to the mortgagee's
consolidated title should not prevail. Verily, a mere claim of ownership would not suffice. As
jurisprudence prescribes, the demonstration by the third party-claimant should be made within
the context of an adversarial hearing, where the basic principles of Evidence and Civil Procedure
ought to be followed, such as: (1) it is the claimant who has the burden of proving his claim; (2)
the claim must be established through a preponderance of evidence; and (3) evidence not
presented or formally offered cannot be admitted against the opposing party.
ANICETO BANGIS, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS VS. HEIRS OF SERAFIN AND SALUD ADOLFO
G.R. NO. 190875
DOCTRINE:
A person who takes possession of a land and claims ownership over it under a spurious or non-
existent title cannot validly claim the rights of a builder in good faith. Moreover, even if
acquisitive prescription can be appreciated in the case of possession in bad faith, the Civil Code
requires a 30-year uninterrupted adverse possession of the land.
FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Salud Adolfo were the original registered owners of a lot covered by an OCT
derived from a homestead patent, which was mortgaged to the then Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines). Upon default in the payment of the loan
obligation, it was foreclosed and the ownership was consolidated in the name of DBP under a
new TCT. Serafin Adolfo repurchased the same and was issued a new TCT a year after his wife
died. He allegedly mortgaged the subject property to secure a loan to Aniceto Bangis, who took
possession of the land but the transaction was never reduced in to writing. When Adolfo died,
his heirs executed a deed of Extrajudicial Partition over the subject lot and new TCTs were issued
to them. They likewise filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale and declaration of
the purported contract of sale as antichresis, accounting, and redemption of property and
damages against Bangis. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Adolfo declaring
that the contract was that of antichresis, ordering the heirs of Bangis to deliver the possession of
the property in question to the plaintiffs, and to declare the TCT under the name of Bangis null
and void. This prompted the heirs of Bangis to file an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC, finding that the contract between the parties was a mortgage, not a sale. It noted that while
Bangis was given possession of the subject property, the certificate of title that remained in the
custody of Adolfo was never cancelled.
ISSUE:
WON the heirs of Bangis can claim the rights of a builder in good faith
RULING: No.
The heirs of Bangis cannot validly claim the rights of a builder in good faith as provided for under
Art. 449 in relation to Art. 448 of the Civil Code. The contention of the heirs is untenable. They
claim that since they have been in possession of the subject land since 1972 or for 28 years
reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2000, the present action has prescribed. It bears to
note that while Bangis indeed took possession of the land upon its alleged mortgage, the
certificate of title remained with Adolfo and upon his demise, transferred to his heirs, thereby
71
negating any contemplated transfer of ownership. Settled is the rule that no title in derogation
of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover,
even if acquisitive prescription can be appreciated in this case, the heirs of Bangis' possession
being in bad faith is two years shy of the requisite 30-year uninterrupted adverse possession
required under Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
TOPIC: PUBLIC DOMINION
FIRST MEGA HOLDINGS VS. GUIGUINTO WATER DISTRICT

G.R. NO. 208383
DOCTRINE:
Explorations for subterranean waters of land of public dominion may be made only with the
permission of the administrative authorities.
FACTS:
Petitioner First Mega, filed with NWRB (National Water Resources Board) a WPA (Water Permit
Allocation) for the installation of deep well for its gas station and commercial complex.
Respondent Guiguinto Water District, filed a protest stating that water level is at critical which
would hamper the water requirement of the municipality and contended that it is not cost
effective since there is no pipeline that petitioner can connect within 1-kilometer radius. The
NWRB ordered a cease and desist order and subsequently denied the WPA since it violates the
Water Code.
ISSUE:
WON the opening of a deep well in favor of petitioner is in violation of the Water Code
RULING: Yes.
The NWRB correctly denied petitioner’s water permit allocation since it is a flagrant disregard of
the Water Code and its IRR. Record shows that petitioner drilled a deep well and installed a water
pump without having first secured the necessary permit to drill. Moreover, despite the NWRB’s
cease and desist order refraining it from operating a water pump, petitioner extracted water
from the deep well. The drilling of a well and appropriation of water without necessary permit
constitute a grave offense under section 82 of the IRR, and shall subject the violator who is not a
permittee or grantee to the imposition of fines and penalties, and the stoppage of the use of
water, without prejudice to the institution of a criminal/civil case as the facts and circumstances
may warrant. Therefore, the order of the CA denying the Water Permit Allocation is affirmed.
TOPIC: EASEMENT
SPS. VERGARA VS. SPS. SONKIN

G.R. NO. 193659
DOCTRINE:
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither
can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.
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FACTS:
Spouses Vergara and the Spouses Sonkin are adjoining landowners; the Sonkin Property is of
lower elevation than the Vergara property. Between their lands is a partition wall, which was
raised by the Spouses Sonkin during their acquisition and thereafter built their house directly
beside the wall. Due to the raising of the partition wall, the Spouses Vergara decided to level their
property with the newly raised wall, filling the uneven portion with gravel, soil and other landfill.
The landfill seeped through the wall and caused several damages to the Sonkin house. This
caused the Spouses Sonkin to demand Spouses Vergara to build a retaining wall to contain their
landfill however, it remained unheeded. Hence the Spouses Sonkin’s complaint for damages
against the Spouses Vergaras.
The RTC granted their complaint, but was overturned by the CA on the ground of contributory
negligence and under Article 637 of the NCC regarding the obligatory right of the lower elevation
property owner to receive water from the higher elevated property.
ISSUE:
WON the house directly built beside the partition wall should be demolished
RULING: Yes.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara
property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter pursuant
to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the
natural drainage of lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water
which naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not those
collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters.
TOPIC: RECONVEYANCE
ELIZA ZUÑIGA-SANTOS VS. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN

G.R. NO. 197380
DOCTRINE:
If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession, the
action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference point
being the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
FACTS:
Eliza Zuñiga-Santos filed a complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against Maria
Divina Gracia Santos-Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina city. She claims to be the
owner of 3 parcels of land located in Montalban. When she contracted a second marriage with
Lamberto Santos, with whom they did not have any children, she was forced to take care of
Lamberto's alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear that the
latter was petitioner's daughter. Pursuant to the falsified documents, Lamberto succeeded in
transferring the subject properties in favor of and in the name of Gran.
Gran claims that: (a) the action filed by Eliza had prescribed since an action upon a written
contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this
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case, from the time of registration of the questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds;
and, (b) the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable
documents sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set
forth, thus, precluding the RTC from rendering a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer to
surrender the subject properties.
ISSUE:
WON there is possession that will amount to ownership
RULING: Yes.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by
another, to its rightful and legal owner. Having alleged the commission of fraud by Gran in the
transfer and registration of the subject properties in her name, there was, in effect, an implied
trust created by operation of law pursuant to Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, the
plaintiff's possession of the disputed property is material. If there is an actual need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession, the action for reconveyance based on
implied trust prescribes in 10 years, the reference point being the date of registration of the deed
or the issuance of the title. On the other hand, if the real owner of the property remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property
does not run against him and in such case, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of
a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
In the case at bar, a reading of the allegations of the Amended Complaint failed to show that
petitioner remained in possession of the subject properties in dispute. Since the new titles to the
subject properties in the name of Gran were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, the
filing of the petitioner's complaint before the RTC on January 9, 2006 was obviously beyond the
10-year prescriptive period.
TOPIC: NUISANCE
LINDA RANA VS. TERESITA LEE WONG ET AL.

G.R. NO. 192861
SPS ROSARIO AND WILSON UY ET AL VS. SPS REYNALDO AND LINDA RANA
G.R. NO. 192862
DOCTRINE:
A nuisance per se is one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property while a
nuisance per accidens is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances
surrounding the fact.
FACTS:
Teresita Wong (Wong) and the Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ong (Spouses Ong) are co-owners pro
indiviso of a residential land situated in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City (Wong-Ong
Property), abutting a 10m wide subdivision road. Across the Wong-Ong Property are the adjacent
lots of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy (Uy Property) and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana (Rana
Property). The lots follow the rolling terrain, with the Rana Property standing about 2m higher
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than and overlooking the Uy Property, while the Wong-Ong Property is at the same level with
the subject road.
In 1997, the Spouses Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that runs
between the Rana and Wong-Ong Property in order to level the said portion with their gate.
Likewise, they backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and Uy properties
without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials. This
matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay as well as the Office of the Building Official of
Cebu, but to no avail.
The Spouses Wong et al filed a complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against
Spouses Rana before the RTC seeking to declare the subject portion as a nuisance which affected
the ingress and egress of Spouses Wong and Ong, among other things.
The Spouses Wong et al filed a Motion for Leave to be Allowed to Bring in Heavy Equipment for
the immediate development of the Wong-Ong Property with a view to use the subject road as
access to their lot. Notwithstanding Spouses Rana’s opposition, the RTC granted the motion. The
Spouses Wong et al proceeded to level the subject portion which eventually hampered Spouses
Rana’s ingress and egress, resulting to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage.
The Spouses Rana filed with another branch of the same trial court a Complaint for Recovery of
Property and Damages against Spouses Uy alleging that the latter encroached upon an 11sqm
portion along the common boundary of their properties. In light of the foregoing, the RTC
appointed 3 commissioners to conduct a resurvey of the Uy and Rana property for the purpose
of determining if any encroachment occurred.
The RTC declared that the parties all acted in bad faith, therefore, no relief can be granted to
them against each other. Dissatisfied, all parties filed separate appeals with the CA which
affirmed the decision of the RTC. All the parties filed separate motions for reconsideration which
were denied. Hence, the instant petitions.
ISSUES:
1. WON the elevated and cemented portion and the subject backfilling are nuisance per se
or per accidens
2. WON there was encroachment
RULING:
1. The elevated and cemented portion is a nuisance per accidens
Jurisprudence classifies nuisance in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary

abatement (corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance
may either be:
1. A nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity;
or
2. A nuisance per accidens or that which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated
without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such
a thing does in law constitutes a nuisance
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not
be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be
taken under the parameters of Articles 704 (public nuisances) and 706 (private
nuisances), a private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably
interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the property
75
of another may file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be
judicially sought through a civil action therefor, if the pertinent requirements under the
Civil Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se,
do not concur.
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same
is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of the Spouses Rana
from their house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject
road and the adjoining the Uy and Wong-Ong Properties. Since the subject portion is not
a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily abated.
As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong et al maintain the rights to the

unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject
portions, the Spouses Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly
transgressed the aforesaid rights.
As for the subject backfilling touching the perimeter fence of the Uy property, records
show that the said fence was not designed to act as a retaining wall but merely to
withhold wind load and its own load. Both the RTC and the CA found the subject
backfilling to have added pressure on the fence, consequently endangering the safety of
the occupants of the Uy Property, especially considering the higher elevation of the Rana
Property.
2. YES. There was encroachment.
The report of the court-appointed commissioner, who conducted a relocation survey of

the Rana and the Uy properties identified and delineated the boundaries of the 2
properties and showed that the Spouses Uy’s perimeter fence intruded on 2sqm of the
Rana Property.
Having sufficiently proven their claim, the Spouses Rana are, therefore, entitled to the
return of the 2sqm encroached portion. Corollary thereto, the compliance by Linda Rana
with the directive to build a retaining wall on their property shall be held in abeyance
pending the return of the encroached portion.
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION
SPOUSES SOLLER VS. HEIRS OF ULAYAO

G.R. NO. 175552
DOCTRINE:
The defense of acquisitive prescription inevitably involves the issue of actual, physical and
material possession, which is always a question of fact. The existence of this issue therefore
necessitates, for its proper resolution, the presentation of competent and relevant evidence,
which can only be done in the course of a full-blown trial.
FACTS:
The Spouses Soller are allegedly the registered owners of a certain parcel of land. They and their
predecessors-in-interest were purportedly in open, peaceful, and continuous possession of the
property in the concept of owner since time immemorial. However, in February 1996, the original
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defendant, now-deceased Jeremias Ulayao, and all persons claiming rights under him, allegedly
by means of force, violence, stealth and intimidation, entered into the possession of the land
and, despite repeated demands to desist, constructed a house on the property. This prompted
the Spouses Soller to bring the matter before the barangay, but conciliation failed.
Thus, they instituted a complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). The MCTC rendered a summary judgment upon finding that no
genuine issue of fact had been tendered. The RTC affirmed the MCTC. On appeal, the CA vacated
the summary judgments rendered by the RTC and MCTC. It held that, having raised the defense
of acquisitive prescription, the respondents ought to have been duly heard on such defense in
the course of a trial. Consequently, the rendition of a summary judgment was improper.
ISSUE:
WON summary judgment is proper when acquisitive prescription was raised as a special and
affirmative defense
RULING: No.
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court
finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material
fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Relief by summary judgment
is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed. Where
the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment
cannot take the place of a trial.
In this case, records show that the original defendant, Jeremias, raised the special and affirmative
defense of acquisitive prescription in his answer, claiming that he was in open, continuous and
notorious possession of the disputed property as, in fact, his house and other permanent
improvements are still existing thereon. The existence of this issue therefore necessitates, for its
proper resolution, the presentation of competent and relevant evidence, which can only be done
in the course of a full-blown trial.
TOPIC: CO-OWNERSHIP
MAGSANO VS. PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK

G.R. NO. 215038
DOCTRINE:
A co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent.
FACTS:
Roque Magsano and Susana Capelo (mortgagors), the parents of petitioners, purportedly
executed in favor of respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located in
Dagupan City as well as the improvements thereon as security for the payment of their loan.
The mortgagors, however, defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation when it fell due,
causing respondent bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged property and, in the process,
emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction sale. Respondent bank subsequently sold the
subject property to Spouses Manuel.
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Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Certificate of
Sale, Sheriff's Final Sale, Deed of Sale against respondent bank, Spouses Manuel, and Sheriff
Daroy before the RTC. They claimed that the said property is their family home, but the consent
of the majority of the beneficiaries had not been secured. They likewise asserted that the Spouses
Manuel were aware that: (a) the foreclosure proceedings were invalid; and (b) petitioners were
in possession of the subject property, hence, purchasers in bad faith.
ISSUE:
WON the Spouses Manuel were purchasers in bad faith
RULING: Yes.
Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, as in this case, the
purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries concerning the actual
possessor.
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when the Spouses Manuel bought
the same. However, records do not show that the spouses inspected the property and inquired
into the nature of petitioners' possession and/or the extent of their possessory rights as a
measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a similar situation,
and thereby discover the irregularity in the acquisition of title by the respondent bank. The
Spouses Manuel, therefore, failed to exercise the diligence required in protecting their rights; as
such, the Court cannot ascribe good faith to them.
It is undisputed that at the time the Real Estate Mortgage was constituted, the father of the
petitioners was already deceased. Upon his death, the conjugal partnership between him and his
spouse was dissolved and an implied ordinary co-ownership arose among his wife and other heirs
with respect to his share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation. The
ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in the
conjugal partnership, she could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without
an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
While she herself as co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in
the subject property, she could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety
without the consent of the other co-owners. Consequently, the validity of the subject Real Estate
Mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor of
respondent bank should be limited only to the portion which may be allotted to it, as Susana's
successor-in-interest, in the event of partition, thereby making it a co-owner with petitioners
pending partition.
DOMINADOR M. APIQUE VS. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH

G.R. NO. 205705
DOCTRINE:
A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more
juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of
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the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Dominador and Evangeline Apique are siblings who used to lived together in Davao until
Evangeline left to work in Germany in 1979. Sometime in August 1995, Evangeline executed
General and Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Dominador, to purchase a real property for
her and to manage or supervise her business in the Philippines. Evangeline opened a Joint
Account with Dominador under PCI Bank, now BDO Savings. Dominador withdrew P980,000 from
the said account and transferred it to his own account under the same bank. This was only known
by Evangeline a year after the withdrawal took place, after updating their passbook. Aggrieved,
Evangeline demanded the return of the money, but to no avail. Hence, a complaint was filed
against Dominador, alleging that the latter has no authority to withdraw from the said account
and that the bank violated its rules for allowing a withdrawal without a passbook. Dominador
contended that he was fully authorized, as it was a joint “OR” account and by virtue of the
General and Special Powers of Attorney issued to him. He also contended that he owns the
money, representing his contributions and his compensation from Evangeline’s common-law
husband. The RTC ruled in favor of Dominador, but the CA reversed, holding that the withdrawal
is still subject to Evangeline’s approval, because of the reason of opening the account.
ISSUE:
WON Evangeline is entitled to the return of the money
RULING: Yes.
A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more
juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of
the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall
be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.
The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each
of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may
deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other,
during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each other
may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was opened
and how it will be operated. In their case, as between him and Evangeline, his authority to
withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose for which the
subject account was opened. The court modified the amount because the alleged contributions
of Dominador was not refuted.
TOPIC: PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
APO CEMENT CORPORATION VS. MINGSON MINING INDUSTRIES CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 206728
DOCTRINE:
The Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of 1 9 9 5, clearly require that the parties
involved in mining disputes be given the opportunity to be heard.
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FACTS:
A dispute arose between Apo Cement Corporation (Apocemco) the petitioner, and Mingson
Mining Industries Corporation (Mingson) the respondent, which involved mining claims known
as “Allied 1 and 2” and “Lapulapu 31 and 32”, the subject mining claims. A Mineral Product
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal was submitted by Apocemco before the DENR to take over
the development of the mineral properties found in the area since the current holder, Luvimin
Cebu Mining Corporation (Luvimin) failed to do so.
Later, the DENR Regional Office declared the subject mining claims abandoned and open for
location to other interested parties. Consequently, Luvimin filed an appeal. Mingson assailed the
declaration since its own mining claim overlapped with the subject mining claims. The DENR
Regional Office decreed that the portions of the subject mining claims be awarded to MIngson.
However, upon Apocemco’s motion for reconsideration the DENR Regional Office’s Legal Division
awarded the mining claim to them. The DENR Regional Director affirmed the resolution, subject
to the concurrence of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7—Panel of Arbitrators (POA).
The POA upheld the resolution without requiring the parties to file any pleading or setting the
matter for hearing. Mingson Appealed to the DENR MAB, which granted its appeal since it found
that POA merely conducted a review of the case and Mingson, in particular, was not given an
opportunity to be heard which is repugnant to due process.
ISSUE:
WON Mingson was deprived of due process under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
RULING: Yes.
Sections 223 (on preliminary conference), 224 (on hearing), and 227 (on the proceedings before
the POA), as well as Sections 221 (on due course) and 222 (on answers) of DENR DAO 95-23, or
the Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, clearly require that the parties
involved in mining disputes be given the opportunity to be heard. These rules — which were
already in effect during the time the dispute between the parties arose — flesh out the core
requirement of due process; thus, a stark and unjustified contravention of the same would oust
the errant tribunal of its jurisdiction and, in effect, render its decision null and void.
Here, it has been established that the POA proceeded to resolve the present mining dispute
without affording either party any fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard in violation of the
aforementioned provisions of DENR DAO 95-23.
80
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
TOPIC: ATTESTATION CLAUSE
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 189984
DOCTRINE:
The total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of
each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.
FACTS:
Enrique Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy Lopez, and their four legitimate children,
namely, petitioner Richard and the respondents Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory
heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard as
his executor and administrator.
Richard then filed a petition for the probate of his father’s last will and testament before the RTC
of Manila. Respondent Marybeth opposed the petition stating that the will was not attested to
nor was it executed in accordance with the law and that it was procured with undue pressure
and influence.
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will and the CA dismissed the appeal. The appellate court
found no reason to deviate from the trial court on the ground that the attestation clause failed
to indicate the number pages therein and that the Acknowledgment portion of the will states
that the will has 7 pages including the acknowledgement where it actually has 8.
ISSUE:
WON the will was attested to and executed in accordance with law
RULING: No.
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The
will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
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TOPIC: INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
HEIRS OF YPON VS. RICAFORTE

G.R. NO. 198680
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.
FACTS:
Petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte, they alleged that
Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless, leaving behind several parcels of land.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno's collateral
relatives and successors-in-interest. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of
Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic
School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.
The RTC issued an Order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship
with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,
this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent's compulsory heirs. On
the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno's son — and
hence, he is a compulsory heir — through the documentary evidence he submitted.
ISSUE:
WON the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may
be dispensed with
RULING:
The determination of who the decedent's lawful heirs are must be made in the proper special
proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination
of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.
82
ANG VS. PACUNIO

G.R. NO. 208928
DOCTRINE:
Grandchildren will only be deemed to have material interest over the subject land if the Right
of Representation is available to them, otherwise they are not real parties in interest to the
case.
FACTS:
Respondents as grandchildren of Udiaan, claiming their successional rights, allege that an

impostor falsely represented herself as Udiaan sold to petitioner the subject land that should
have been their inheritance. Petitioner entered the subject land and used it in his livestock
business. Respondents informed that petitioner did not validly acquire the land since Udiaan
already died 20 years ago and then demanded its return but to no avail. Hence, a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity, Reconveyance and Damages was filed against petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit. The CA affirmed that
respondents are not real parties-in-interest to the instant case considering that as mere
grandchildren of Udiaan, they have no successional rights to Udiaan’s estate since it was not
established that they could succeed by right of representation through their mother, as one of
the children of Udiaan, since she did not predecease Udiaan.
ISSUE:
WON the CA is correct in distributing portions of the subject land to different parties, among
others, despite ruling that respondents are not real parties-in-interest to the instant case
RULING: Qualified no.
With respect to the distribution of portions of the subject land, the CA erred in awarding portions
of it to various non-parties to the case, such as the heirs of Gaccion and Udiaan's children. Basic
is the rule that no relief can be extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to
a case.
In the instant case, respondents claim to be the successors-in-interest of the subject land just
because they are Udiaan's grandchildren. Under the law, however, respondents will only be
deemed to have a material interest over the subject land - and the rest of Udiaan' s estate for
that matter - if the right of representation provided under Article 970, in relation to Article 982,
of the Civil Code is available to them. In this situation, representatives will be called to the
succession by the law and not by the person represented; and the representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded.
For such right to be available to respondents, they would have to show first that their mother:
(a) predeceased Udiaan; (b) is incapacitated to inherit; or (c) was disinherited, if Udiaan died
testate. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, nothing in the records would show that the
right of representation is available to respondents. Hence, the RTC and the CA correctly found
that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant case.
83
B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. VS. GUECO

G.R. NO. 193078
DOCTRINE:
While the Sta. Ritas may be shareholders of B. Sta. Rita at the time of the institution of their
complaint against Gueco, their rights did not antedate nor coincide with the date of the
questioned sale. (The heirs of a party to a case do not have the same personality as the
deceased party, nor can they be considered parties to the case.
FACTS:
Gueco purchased four parcels of land from B. Sta. Rita through its then President, Ben Sta. Rita.
Thereafter, Gueco filed a petition for the surrender of the subject titles against B. Sta. Rita, its
corporate secretary Edgardo, and the Register of Deeds of Tarlac city.
While the surrender of titles case was pending, Alfred Ramos Sta. Rita, Ariel Ramos Sta. Rita, and
Arnold Ramos Sta. Rita, (Sta. Ritas), as alleged heirs of the late Ben Sta. Rita and as shareholders
of B. Sta. Rita, for themselves, their co-heirs and on behalf of B. Sta. Rita, and by way of a
derivative suit, filed a complaint for reformation and rescission of contract and quieting of title
against Gueco. The Sta. Ritas alleged that the sale transaction was a conditional and not an
absolute sale, for a consideration of ₱25,000,000 of which Gueco paid only ₱1,000,000. Further,
they maintained that the subject deed was executed only for the purpose of helping Gueco
secure a loan with the bank to pay the balance of the purchase price. Unfortunately, Gueco failed
to obtain a loan and consequently failed to settle the outstanding balance despite demands;
hence, the possession of the subject properties as well as the subject titles properly remained
with B. Sta. Rita.
Petitioner Arlene Sta. Rita Kanapi (Arlene), wife of Edgardo, together with the latter’s heirs (heirs
of Edgardo), moved for leave to file their complaint-in-intervention in the reformation case,
alleging that she is also a stockholder and director of B. Sta. Rita.
ISSUE:
WON Arlene, together with the heirs of Edgardo have legal personality
RULING: No.
Petitioner Arlene and the heirs of Edgardo do not have any legal personality to appeal the CA
decision before the Court since first, they were only intervenors in the reformation case which
had already been dismissed by the Court with finality; and second, they were not parties in the
surrender of titles case.
In other words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal
efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal.
Applying these principles to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the
main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of Arlene’s and the
heirs of Edgardo’s complaint-in-intervention lodged in the same case.
Anent the second incident, records disclose that Arlene or the heirs of Edgardo were not parties
– either as defendants or intervenors – in the surrender of titles case nor did they, in any manner,
participate in the proceedings of the same. It is a standing rule that no person shall be adversely
affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party.
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MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, VS. CORONACION PARILLA

G.R. NO. 196750
DOCTRINE:
All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as
such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
FACTS:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at Cor.
Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City. During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first
was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two children namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and
(b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven children namely, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three
illegitimate children namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado,
Sr. and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and
Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and
children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
Upon Conrado, Sr’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo,
Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their
respective interests over the subject land to Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as
embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated which
was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares, namely,
Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their
children). The same parties then executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs
and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up
front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the partition of
the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to have the TCT cancelled and the subject
document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to surrender the said
title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the subject land,
prompted Santiago to file a Complaint for judicial partition and for receivership.
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file
an action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender the TCT because, inter alia: (a)
Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is
a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may
validly inherit the same.
ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly ruled that Felcon’s siblings, Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children as heirs are
indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition
RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Thus, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1 Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and
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persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and
illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr.,
Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo,
Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and
thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the Civil Code, their respective interests shall
be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni,
Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only
Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with
regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude,
when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should
have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs
renders his complaint for partition defective.
The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for
partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and
finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of
Conrado, Sr. as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest
over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be
determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested
interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint.
86

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PERLAS-BERNABE

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 (2018-2019)

SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG

TOPIC: INJUNCTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46

HEIRS OF YPON VS. RICAFORTE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

REMULLA VS. MALIKSI

WON Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgement be denied

TOPIC: ARTICLE 9 NCC

COCA-COLA FEMSA PH VS. BACOLOD SALES FORCE UNION-CONGRESS OF INDEPENDENT

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of non-nonalcoholic beverages.

HALILI VS. JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL

a.) Elements of Abuse of Right Article 19 Civil Code:

The Justice for Children International (JFCI) is an international non-governmental organization

UNICAPITAL, INC VS. CONSING

ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. VS. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CASTILLO

Fe Acacio-Tsuji arrived at NAIA carrying a luggage containing various pieces of jewelry at an

TOPIC: PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

REPUBLIC VS. TAMPUS

WON Dante may be considered as presumptively dead

TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC VS. DE GRACIA

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated to psychological incapacity.

WON there is psychological incapacity

DEL ROSARIO VS. DEL ROSARIO

TOPIC: RECOGNITION OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE

MEDINA VS. KOIKE

WON the divorce decree should be recognized under Philippine laws

REPUBLIC VS. ROMERO II

TOPIC: PROPERTY REGIME

ONSTOTT VS. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD

TAN VS. ANDRADE

Characterization of the subject properties (Conjugal vs. Exclusive)

WON the subject properties are conjugal in nature

WILLEM BEUMER VS. AVELINA AMORES

TOPIC: CHILD CUSTODY

MASBATE VS. RELUCIO

NERI VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES YUSOP

TOPIC: CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILAN AGRICULTURAL

WON the subject lands are excluded/exempted from CARP coverage

Nevertheless, the determination of the land’s classification as either an agricultural or industrial

DELOS SANTOS VS. ALBERTO ABEJON

WON petitioners should be held liable to respondents

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR, VS. EMILIANA, VICTORIANO

TOPIC: CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

HEIRS OF SARILI VS. LAGROSA

jurisprudence. Hence, they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value.

GENORGA VS. HEIRS OF MELITON

WON Remedios Geñorga should surrender the TCT

ALICIA P. LOGARTA, VS. CATALINO M. MANGAHIS

REPUBLIC VS. DAGONDON

Respondents Homer and Ma. Susana Dagondon, as attorneys-in-fact of Jover

WON the reconstitution is valid

JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN VS. SPS. NELSON AND CRISTINA CRUZ

LURIZ VS. REPUBLIC

What must be present for an order of reconstitution to issue?

TOPIC: JUST COMPENSATION

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFREDO HABABAG, SR

WON the Income Productivity Approach should be applied

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. KHO

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MONTINOLA-ESCARILLA