Republic of the Philippines communication that results in an understanding thereof.
Any effort falling
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 117873 December 22, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MERCY SANTOS y ENTIENZA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial
Confessions; A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the
prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits
imposed by the 1987 Constitution.—A confession is not admissible in
evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained
within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III
thereof, provides: “(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel. x x x x x x x x x (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the extrajudicial confession satisfies the
constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for voluntariness.—If the
extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is
subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely—without
coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e.,
if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of a person under custodial
investigation to be informed of his rights entails an effective
communication that results in an understanding thereof—any effort falling
short of this standard is a denial of his right.—These questions and the
corresponding responses thereto are insufficient proof of compliance with
the constitutional requirements. They are terse and perfunctory
statements which do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and
explain to appellant her constitutional rights, much less satisfy the
constitutional prerequisites. The right of a person under custodial
investigation to be informed of his rights entails an effective
short of this standard is a denial of this right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; The trial court errs in
admitting an extrajudicial confession without any showing that the
assisting counsel was indeed the “competent and independent counsel of
the accused’s own choosing.”—Thus, the trial court erred in admitting
appellant’s extrajudicial confession without showing that Atty. Gordon Uy
was indeed the “competent and independent counsel of appellant’s own
choosing.” The Court notes appellant’s insistent and persistent disavowals
of knowing said Atty. Uy, much less of retaining him as her counsel of
choice. The prosecution, for unexplained reasons, failed to present Uy as
a witness to show his role in the taking of the alleged confession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No presumption of constitutionality may be
accorded any extrajudicial confession until the prosecution convincingly
establishes the regularity of its taking and its compliance with the
Constitution.—No presumption of constitutionality may be accorded any
extrajudicial confession until the prosecution convincingly establishes the
regularity of its taking and its compliance with the Constitution. This is the
price the prosecution has to pay before it can be allowed to use such
formidable evidence against the accused. Therefore, the trial court had no
basis for ruling that “Atty. Uy rendered independent and competent
assistance to her as her counsel of choice during the investigation.” The
extrajudicial confession must be struck down as inadmissible in evidence
for failure of the prosecution to establish observance of appellant’s
constitutional rights during custodial investigation. Specifically, the
prosecution failed to show that appellant was, at that time, assisted by
competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice.
Same; Evidence; Uncorroborated denial is a negative assertion that is
inferior to positive declarations.—These arguments do not persuade us.
They are mere denials which become sterile in comparison with the firm
and clear declarations of Bautista, who identified appellant as the person
who left Charmaine with her and who fetched the child days after. The trial
court correctly held that appellant’s uncorroborated denial was a negative
assertion that was inferior to the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses. Besides, there appears to be no ill motive for Bautista and the
victim to accuse appellant of such a grave crime, if the same were not
true. Thus, the trial court properly lent credence to their testimony. All in
all, this Court has not been given sufficient reason to deviate from the
time-honored rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
1
their testimonies is best left to the discretion of the trial judge.
Page
Same; Kidnapping; Elements of kidnapping under Article 267, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.—The prosecution has established the elements of
kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3)
the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped
or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the victim initially agreed to go with the
accused does not remove the element of deprivation of liberty where the
victim went with the former on false inducement, without which the victim
would not have done so.—The fact that the victim initially agreed to go
with appellant does not remove the element of deprivation of liberty
because the victim went with her on false inducement, without which the
victim would not have done so. Besides, the minor was distraught
because her mother was late in fetching her from school, and she did not
know the way to her house. It must have been a comfort to her that a
grown-up who could bring her home asked about her situation.
Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 267, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, it
is not the duration of deprivation of liberty which is important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up.—The victim was actually “locked
up” inside what she referred to as the “big house.” Although her detention
there lasted only one night, the trial court held that the victim was actually
deprived of her liberty for five days, including the four-day period when
she was already in the custody of Bautista. It must be stressed that
appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. Under this provision, it is not the duration of
deprivation of liberty which is important, but the fact that the victim, a
minor, was locked up. Furthermore, it bears emphasis that appellant did
not merely take Charmaine to the “big house” against her will; she in fact
detained Charmaine and deprived her of her liberty.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Lockup” is included in the
broader term “detention,” which refers not only to the placing of a person
in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of
liberty.—The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
uses the terms “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “kidnap” (secuestrar or
raptar). “Lockup” is included in the broader term “detention,” which refers
not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave,
but also to any other deprivation of liberty. To repeat, the prosecution
clearly established “lockup” in this case.
Same; Same; Damages; The grant of moral damages requires factual
basis.—The trial court awarded one hundred thousand pesos as moral
damages in favor of the victim and her parents. This is contrary to the
Court’s consistent holding that the agent of moral damages requires
factual basis. The records are bereft of any evidence that the victim and
her parents ever claimed moral damages, or that they were entitled to
such an award.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 96.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Even though the extrajudicial confession is excluded for having been
extracted in violation of the Constitution, the Court holds that appellant
may nonetheless be convicted on the basis of the remaining evidence
clearly showing her liability for kidnapping. The Court also reiterates these
rules: (1) the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is best left to the discretion of the trial court; and (2) bare
denials cannot overturn the positive and straightforward testimonies of
witnesses who are not shown to have any ill motive in testifying against
the accused.
The Case
The foregoing summarizes the Court's ruling on this appeal from the
Decision,1 dated October 3, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-42733, convicting Appellant
Mercy Santos y Entienza of kidnapping.
In the information dated March 25, 1993 filed by Assistant Quezon City
Prosecutor Medardo H. Palomaria, appellant was charged as follows:2
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating
with four (4) other persons whose true names, identifies,
whereabouts and other personal circumstance have not yet been
ascertained and mutually helping one another, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one CHARMAINE
MAMARIL, a female, a minor, 7 years of age, represented herein
by her mother, RAQUEL MAMARIL, from her school at
Kaligayahan Elementary School located at Rivera Compound,
Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches, Quezon City, and brought her
to a house at No. 8 G. Araneta Avenue, Sto. Domingo, Quezon
City, on March 13, 1993, thereby illegally detaining her for five (5)
2
days, to her damage and prejudice.
Page
With the assistance of Atty. Noel Ocampo of the Public Attorney's Office,
she pleaded "not guilty" to the charge during the arraignment.3 A pre-trial
conference was conducted on June 2, 1993, but not stipulation or
agreement was arrived at.4 After trial, the court a quo rendered the
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads: 5
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
MERCY SANTOS y ENTIENZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION and sentencing her to suffer reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the victim CHARMAINE MAMARIL, her parents and
members of her family, represented by her mother, RAQUEL
MAMARIL, in the sum of Pesos: One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.
Hence, this appeal.6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The trial court narrated the facts of this case as presented by the
prosecution:7
Charmaine Mamaril, a kindergarten pupil, was brought to school,
the Kaligayahan Elementary School, in Novaliches, Quezon City
by her mother, Raquel Mamaril, at noontime on March 8, 1993.
Raquel left Charmaine in her classroom with her classmates but
stayed awhile, going home only after 12:30 p.m. She would be
going back for Charmaine, according to her daily routine, at 2:00
p.m. When she returned to fetch Charmaine before 2:30 p.m.,
Charmaine's teacher Ms. Grace Lucena, met and asked her if the
child had already reached home; Raquel replied that Charmaine
did not know the way home. She then looked for her child in
school until someone informed her that a woman had earlier
fetched her daughter. She immediately reported the matter to the
police authorities stationed in Novaliches at around 3:00 p.m. and
then to the National Bureau of Investigations the next day; she
also approached radio and television stations for help. She and
her family conducted their own search from then until her
daughter was finally found on March 13, 1993.
Raquel recounted how her child was recovered. According to her,
a police sergeant came to her house on March 13, 1993 and
asked for her; he told her to contact Kagawad Aida Bautista of
Sto. Domingo. When contacted, Bautista informed her that a child
named Charmaine was with her; Raquel immediately went to
Bautista with some identification papers of Charmaine, and the
child was turned over to her after showing the birth certificate.
This occurred on a Saturday.
Although Charmaine's kidnapper was not immediately caught, the
matter did not end with the return of Charmaine to her family's
bosom. Two days later, on Monday, Bautista telephoned Raquel
to tell her that the woman, a certain Mercy Santos, had returned
to her place to claim Charmaine. Raquel wasted no time notifying
NBI Agent Roel Jovenir, who, in turn and with other NBI agents,
accompanied by Raquel and her husband, proceeded to
Bautista's place and arrested Santos.
Following the arrest of Santos, the kidnapping was investigated at
the NBI office, where Raquel gave her written statement.
Bautista recalled that she was at the store on No. 719 Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City on March 9, 1993 when, at around 2:00
p.m., a woman approached and asked if she could leave her child
with her; that she told the woman to just leave the child "at the
bench" of the store; that the woman then left the child there; that
when it was already 7:00 p.m. and the woman had not yet
returned, she became worried for the child and reported the
matter to the Barangay Chairman who also reported it to Eagle
Base, the base of the Barangay officials; that on March 12, 1993,
she read from a newspaper about a child who was kidnapped in
Novaliches; that she immediately called up to the Novaliches
police sub-station to know more about the kidnapping; that when
the child's mother later phoned her on March 13, 1993, she
required the caller to bring the birth certificate of the child for
identification, that later that day, the child was returned to her
parents in the presence of Barangay Chairman Jose Valdez, the
reporter of Pinoy and a barangay tanod; that on March 15, 1993,
the woman who had left the child returned for her; that she called
up the child's parents to tell them about this; and that soon, three
NBI agents, including one named Roel, came with the parents of
the child and, after talking to the woman, arrested her.
The victim, Charmaine, aged 7 years, declared that Mercy Santos
took her; that she was seated and crying in school when Mercy
waved for her to draw near; that after she approached, Mercy
3
promised to give her a "surprise" if she went with her to a big
Page
house where there were many children; that she went with Mercy
and was brought to a big house with many children; that she and
 Mercy slept there; that Mercy later brought her to the store owned
by Ate Tina; and that Ate Tina later brought her to a house where
she saw her "daddy."
Roel Jovenir was assigned as special investigator of the Anti-
Fraud and Action Division of the NBI from April 18, 1992 to June
1, 1993, whose duties included the conduct of surveillance,
making arrests, and investigating and filing cases involving
violations of laws, like the Revised Penal Code. He testified that
on March 9, 1993, Raquel Mamaril filed her written complaint at
the NBI offices against an unidentified woman for allegedly
kidnapping her daughter on March 8, 1993; that although
Raquel's statement was taken only on March 15, 1993, the NBI
were already conducting their investigation and surveillance of the
kidnapping incident in the vicinity of Kaligayahan Elementary
School since the filing of the complaint; that on March 13, 1993,
Raquel called to tell him about the child being under the custody
of Bautista; that he and the child's parents rushed to Bautista's
place and rescued the child; that on March 15, 1993, Raquel
again called up to inform him that the suspected kidnapper had
gone back to Bautista's place to fetch the child; that in the
company of other NBI operatives, namely, Agents Arnel Azul,
SPO1 Rodrigo Mapoy, and Emeterio Armada, he proceeded to
the Bautista house and waited for the suspect to return; that they
arrested the suspect upon her return and brought her to the NBI;
that the suspect was Mercy Santos; that Santos was investigated
in the presence of counsel, Atty. Gordon Uy, after she was
informed of her rights under the Constitution; that she executed
and signed a statement, on the occasion of which
she admitted the kidnapping; that during the investigation by
question and answer, Atty. Uy would raise objections by
cautioning Santos against answering, in which case the objection
and the question objected to were not anymore typed in the
statement; and that photographs were taken of Charmaine and
the accused during the confrontation.
Version of the Defense
Appearing as the lone witness for the defense, appellant denied the
prosecution's allegations and insisted that her extrajudicial confession
was extracted in violation of her constitutional rights. The trial court related
her version of the facts, as follows:8
The accused testified in her own behalf on November 24, 1993.
She stated that she was arrested by NBI Agent Jovenir on March
15, 1993 at Araneta Avenue, Talayan Village, Quezon City, at the
residence of Aida Bautista; that she was at Bautista's house
because her friend named Elsa had asked her to fetch Charmaine
at that place; that she did not know the surname of Elsa, but Elsa
lived on Tops Street, Talayan; that she had come with Elsa from
Novaliches; that Elsa had left Charmaine at Bautista's place and
later requested her to fetch the child; that Elsa was a nightclub
dancer whom she had known for two years; that she was not the
woman whom Bautista said had left Charmaine at the store; that
she was not able to confer with any Atty. Uy and she might have
merely signed the affidavit; that she did not know Atty. Uy; and
that she signed Exhibit C only because she was threatened by
NBI Agent Rodrigo Mapoy and was maltreated.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court convicted appellant of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. It observed that appellant's identification by the victim and by
Witness Bautista was positive and unassailable. Their testimonies were
straightforward and unhesitating, especially in their identification of the
appellant as the kidnapper. The evidence on appellant's direct and
personal participation in the crime was "absolutely credible, trustworthy
and sincere."
The trial court rejected appellant's explanation that she was merely
fetching the victim upon her friend's request. It was incredible that her
friend would refuse to testify on her behalf, if this allegation were true,
considering the gravity of the charge leveled against her.
Besides, the trial court considered her extrajudicial confession more than
sufficient evidence of her guilt. Such confession was declared as
competent evidence against her, despite her denials of having given it and
her claims of duress and intimidation. Its voluntariness was sufficiently
proven, as it was given after she was apprised of her constitutional rights
with the assistance of her counsel of choice, a certain Atty. Gordon Uy.
Her subsequent retraction during the trial was rejected as a flimsy
machination to extricate herself from criminal liability.
The Issues
The appellant assigns the following errors against the trial court.9
I
4
Page
The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to
the incredible, unworthy and unreliable testimonies of the
 prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the theory of the
defense.
II
The trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to the defense
of denial raised by the accused Mercy Santos.
III
The trial court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the extra-
judicial confession of the accused despite the fact that it was
elicited in violation of the exclusionary rule on evidence.
IV
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his (sic) guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
For clarity and convenience, the Court will tackle the issues in the
following order: (1) admissibility of the extrajudicial confession, (2)
credibility of witnesses and appellant's denial, and (3) sufficiency of
evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The Court rejects the appeal. Although the extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence, there are, apart from said confession, other
credible and competent pieces of evidence to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
First Issue: Extrajudicial Confession Inadmissible
A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecution
satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the
1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is
subsequently tested for voluntariness,10i.e., if it was given freely — without
coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, 11 i.e.,
if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence
of a high order because no person of normal mind will knowingly and
deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience.12 Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the
cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule. Consequently, the burden of
evidence to show that it was obtained through undue pressure, threat or
intimidation shifts to the
accused.13
As proof of alleged compliance with the constitutional standards, the
extrajudicial confession contains the following statements:
01. TANONG : Bb. MERCY SANTOS Y ENTIENZA, ikaw ay
iimbestigahan namin sa pagkakasangkot mo sa kasong
"kidnapping", bago kami magpatuloy sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
nais naming ipaalam sa iyo and iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng
ating Saligang Batas. Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at di
magpahayag ng anumang salaysay kung nais mo, naiintindihan
mo ba ito?
SAGOT: Opo sir.
02. T: Ikaw ay mayroon ding karapatan na kumuha at tulungan ng
isang abogado na pili mo upang umasiste sa iyo sapagsisiyasat
na ito. Kung hindi mo naman kayang bumayad ng serbisyo ng
isang abogado ay ikaw ay bibigyan namin ng isa na siyang
tutulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ng walang bayad,
naiintindihan mo ba ito?
5
Page
S: Opo sir.
 3. T: Ngayon, ikaw ba ay mayroong abogado na sarili mong pili
para tumulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
S: Opo sir, Nandito ang aking abogado si ATTY. GORDON UY na
siyang tutulong sa akin sa pagsisiyasat na ito. 14
These questions and the corresponding responses thereto are insufficient
proof of compliance with the constitutional requirements. They are terse
and perfunctory statements which do not evince a clear and sufficient
effort to inform and explain to appellant her constitutional rights, much
less satisfy the constitutional prerequisites. The right of a person under
custodial investigation to be informed of his rights entails an effective
communication that results in an understanding thereof. Any effort falling
short of this standard is a denial of this right.15
Furthermore, in People vs. Deniega,16 the Court disbelieved the
typewritten statements in the extrajudicial confessions to the effect that
the accused was properly apprised of his constitutional rights, in view of
the glaring inconsistencies in said documents and the token participation
therein by the lawyers assigned to the accused. The Court declared:17
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives
perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the
rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is
so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the
lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the
signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the
constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1) is
not met. The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic
purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding "the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of the offense" and ensuring that the accused's
waiver if his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an
informed one in all aspects.
Thus, the trial court erred in admitting appellant's extrajudicial confession
without showing that Atty. Gordon Uy was indeed the "competent and
independent counsel of appellant's own choosing." The Court notes
appellant's insistent and persistent disavowals of knowing said Atty. Uy,
much less of retaining him as her counsel of choice. The prosecution, for
unexplained reasons, failed to present Uy as a witness to show his role in
the taking of the alleged confession.
In view of such default, the Court disagrees with this holding of the trial
court:
The circumstances of the investigation, to begin with determine
the compliance with the "right to counsel" provision. Where, as in
the instant case, the accused is shown to have accepted the
representation and assistance of the counsel during the
investigation, he may not easily subsequently retract acceptance
and disavow counsel during the trial on the flimsy excuse that
counsel was not an acquaintance. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The accused need not expressly assent to the representation and
assistance of her counsel. Her acquiescence sufficed. . .
The accused should further be instructed that her failure to object
to the representation and assistance of Atty. Uy as her counsel
has precluded her from complaining. She could have easily
objected at any time but apparently did not. For her to assert now
that she could not have done so or that she was not enabled to do
so is not credible, it being shown satisfactorily in the records that
she was far from prevented during the investigation from doing
so. . . .18 (Emphases found in the original.)
No presumption of constitutionality may be accorded any extrajudicial
confession until the prosecution convincingly establishes the regularity of
its taking and its compliance with the Constitution. This is the price the
prosecution has to pay before it can be allowed to use such formidable
evidence against the accused.
Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ruling that "Atty. Uy rendered
independent and competent assistance to her as her counsel of choice
during the investigation." The extrajudicial confession must be struck
down as inadmissible in evidence for failure of the prosecution to establish
observance of appellant's constitutional rights during custodial
investigation. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that appellant
was, at that time, assisted by competent and independent counsel
preferably of her own choice.
Second Issue: Credibility of Witnesses vs. Denial
6
The Court is not persuaded by appellant's posturing that Witness
Page
Bautista's testimony is unworthy of credence for being "of doubtful
veracity." The defense insists that Bautista and appellant met for the first
time at the former's house and harps on the fact that appellant, who was Q Can you remember if there is anything that happened to you on
not even informed of Bautista's address, went to said house only upon the that day?
request of appellant's friend, Elsa. Further, the defense brands as illogical
appellant's act of leaving her victim at the hands of a third person, A Yes, sir.
considering that the prosecution depicted her in the extrajudicial
confession as a seasoned kidnapper. Returning to Bautista's house to
Q What was that which happened to you?
regain custody of the victim, which was practically surrendering herself to
the authorities, would have been the last thing a seasoned kidnapper
would do, appellant contends. A She took me, sir.

These arguments do not persuade us. They are mere denials which Q When you said she took me, whom are you referring to?
become sterile in comparison with the firm and clear declarations of
Bautista, who identified appellant as the person who left Charmaine with A Mercy Santos, sir.
her and who fetched the child days after. The trial court correctly held that
appellant's uncorroborated denial was a negative assertion that was Q If Mercy Santos is in court, can you point her out?
inferior to the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses. Besides,
there appears to be no ill motive for Bautista and the victim to accuse A Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a person seated on the second
appellant of such a grave crime, if the same were not true. Thus, the trial bench)
court properly lent credence to their testimony.19 All in all, this Court has
not been given sufficient reason to deviate from the time-honored rule that
xxx xxx xxx
the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
left to the discretion of the trial judge.20
Pros. Bringas:
Third Issue: Sufficient Evidence for Conviction
Now, Charmaine you stated awhile ago that Mercy Santos took
you, how was she able to get you, when Mercy Santos took you,
The prosecution has established the elements of kidnapping under Article
how did she do it?
267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) the offender is a
private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of detention or A I was left in a store to a certain Mrs. . .
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female or a public officer.21 xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution proved that appellant was not a public officer; that she Q From what place did Mercy get you?
took the victim from the Kaligayahan Elementary School in Novaliches
without the knowledge and consent, and against the wishes of her A At the school sir.
parents; and that the victim was a minor, having been only seven years
old at the time. Q How was she able to get you? I am withdrawing the question.
Do you know Mercy previous to that day?
The element of deprivation of liberty and the identity of her abductor are
clearly established in the victim's testimony:22 A Yes, sir.

Q On March 8, 1993, can you recall if you went to school? Q How did you know her?

7
A Yes, sir.

Page
A When I met her at a big house I cried and a man whipped me
with a piece of rope.
 Q Before Mercy took you from your school, where was she?
A This Mercy was standing while I was seated and crying.
Q Did Mercy call you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did she call you?
A She waved me over to go to her.
Q Did you go to her?
A Yes, sir she told me there is a surprise for me.
Q Do you know the reason why there was a surprise for you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the reason?
A She told me that she will bring me to a big house were [sic]
there were many children.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you went there, where else did you go, if any?
A When I was brought to the big house, Mercy and I are and then
I slept then after sleeping, I was brought to the store. [sic].
The fact that the victim initially agreed to go with appellant does not
remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went with
her on false inducement, without which the victim would not have done so.
Besides, the minor was distraught because her mother was late in
fetching her from school, and she did not know the way to her house. It
must have been a comfort to her that a grown-up who could bring her
home asked about her situation. As the trial court said:23
The crime committed is of the most serious nature, involving a
defenseless minor of seven years of age whom the
accused enticed with her promise of a gift. The accused thereby
deprived the child of her personal liberty and endangered her life.
In addition, the child was forcibly taken away from the midst of her
family, causing to them, particularly her parents, much pain,
anxiety, anger, and wounded feelings in them. That the minor was
subsequently saved from the clutches of the accused and of her
cohorts did not diminish a bit the criminal and civil responsibility of
the accused, for, even if the deliverance of the victim was due to
the overconfidence of the accused, her degree of criminality still
evinced her high malevolence and abject disregard of the rights
and safety of the
child . . .
The victim was actually "locked up" inside what she referred to as the "big
house." Although her detention there lasted only one night, the trial court
held that the victim was actually deprived of her liberty for five days,
including the four-day period when she was already in the custody of
Bautista. It must be stressed that appellant was charged and convicted
under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Under this
provision, it is not the duration of deprivation of liberty which is important,
but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up. Furthermore, it bears
emphasis that appellant did not merely take Charmaine to the "big house"
against her will; she in fact detained Charmaine and deprived her of her
liberty. The Spanish version24 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
uses the terms "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or
raptar). "Lockup" is included in the broader term "detention," which refers
not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave,
but also to any other deprivation of liberty.25 To repeat, the prosecution
clearly established "lockup" in this case.
Damages
The trial court awarded one hundred thousand pesos as moral damages
in favor of the victim and her parents. This is contrary to the Court's
consistent holding that the grant of moral damages requires factual
basis.26 The records are bereft of any evidence that the victim and her
parents ever claimed moral damages, or that they were entitled to such an
award.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED but the award
of moral damages is DELETED for want of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
8
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Page
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 114385 January 29, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EFREN JEREZ, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions;
Fundamental requirements for a confession to be admissible.—It is well-
settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it “must
satisfy all four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing.” Appellant argued that the first
and second requirements were not complied with. The records of the
case, however, reveal otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised
any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer.—While the initial choice of the
lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot
afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused has the final choice as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised
any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer. Thus, “once the prosecution has
shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on
pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and
the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this
presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency.
Same; Same; Same; The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred
from its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign
of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it
being replete with details, which could possibly be supplied only by the
accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically
cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been
applied, it may be considered voluntary.—Although appellant thereafter
claimed that the confession he gave was made under duress, there is,
however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People v.
Villanueva, this Court declared that “voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits
no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details, which could possibly be supplied
only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which
psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary.” A scrutiny of
the sworn statement discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the
commission of the offense charged which the accused himself could only
have known.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Where an accused’s alibi is established only by
himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be
accorded the strictest scrutiny—they are necessarily suspect and cannot
prevail over the testimonies of the more credible witnesses for the
prosecution.—It is settled in this jurisdiction that “for alibi to prosper, it is
not enough that the accused prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission.” Appellant testified that on the day in question,
he was engaged in a drinking spree with his friends at the house of Felix
Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, Camarines Norte and he went home at 4:00
o’clock p.m. staying thereat for the rest of the night. Unfortunately, this
version of the appellant was contradicted by prosecution witnesses, Julian
Ochoa and Gil Villafranca, who positively identified him in court as the
person scouting for carabao buyers in the Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte at around 9:00 o’clock a.m. on May 23, 1990. Needless
to say, where an accused’s alibi is established only by himself, his
relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the
strictest scrutiny. They are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over
the testimonies of the more credible witnesses for the prosecution.
Same; Homicide; Damages; Life Expectancy Formula; The formula
9
consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life expectancy is
Page
(2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death]).—The computation,
however, of the damages awarded by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each victim is erroneous. “The
formula consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life
expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death]).”
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte, Branch 38.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Josefino A. Subia and Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren
Bola (at large), were charged with the crime of robbery with double
homicide in Criminal Case No. 6755 before the Regional Trial Court 1 of
Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38, under an information 2 dated October
15, which reads as follows:
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 23, 1990
within the Basit Compound at barangay Sta. Rosa, municipality of
Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
(accused) armed with revolvers and bladed weapons conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping with one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of
gain and by means of violence take from REYNALDO OCHOA
and JOSELITO BALBASTRO the following personal properties, to
wit: cash money amounting to P45,000.00, two (2) gold plated
Seiko 5 wristwatch(es), one (1) golden Horseshoe type ring and
one (1) gold plated Ray-ban with the total value of P52,000.00,
Philippine Currency, belonging to said Reynaldo Ochoa and
Joselito Balbastro; that on the occasion of said robbery and for
the purpose of enabling the said accused to take, steal and carry
away the aforesaid articles, the herein accused in pursuance of
their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and
strength, assault, attack and stab said Reynaldo Ochoa and
Joselito Balbastro, thereby inflicting upon them multiple mortal
wounds on the different parts of their bodies, and as a result
thereof, the said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro died
instantly, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
A concise narration of the factual circumstances that led to appellant's
conviction follows:
On May 23, 1990, while waiting for passengers near Josie's Restaurant in
the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, tricycle driver Gil Villafranca
was approached by a person, later identified as appellant, informing him
that he was looking for a carabao buyer. 3 Subsequently, Villafranca
accompanied the latter to the house of one Reynaldo Ochoa. When
apprised of purpose of the visit, Julian, the son of Reynaldo, sought his
father near Kathleen Pawnshop and advised him about the four carabaos
allegedly for sale at Barangay Teddy, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte.4
Appellant, together with Reynaldo and another carabao buyer, Joselito
Balbastro, boarded a motorcycle and proceeded to Barangay Teddy to
check the condition of the carabaos. It was the last time, however, that the
two were seen alive. When the latter failed to return the following day, a
search, led by Julian, was conducted. In the course of their inquiry, it was
learned that the motorcycle owned by Reynaldo was in the custody of the
barangay captain of Teddy, Jose Panganiban who told them that it was
recovered from the Basit Compound. Forthwith, they proceeded to the
said compound and found Reynaldo and Joselito lifeless, having
sustained several mortally-inflicted stab wounds in different parts of their
bodies. The victims were divested of their watches, rayban glasses, and a
sum of money amounting to P37,000.00.
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated National
Police testified that upon appellant's arrest, the latter was apprised of his
constitutional rights. On June 25, 1990, in the presence of Atty. August
Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police ensued and
statements therein were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to before
Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired
whether or not appellant understood the consequences of his confession. 5
10
Appellant, on the other hand, proferred alibi as his defense and that the
extra-judicial confession was allegedly obtained through the use of
Page
physical violence, coercion and intimidation.
He contended that on the day the incident in question occurred, he was was assisted by an ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his
with his common law wife, Mercedes Sarical, at the house of a certain constitutional rights and interests.
Felix Rellolosa from 9:00 o'clock a.m. to 4:00 o'clock p.m. drinking liquor
with some friends.6 He further tried to buttress his alibi by declaring that We affirm appellant's conviction.
no one saw with as a participant in the slaying nor was any property of the
victims recovered from him.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it
"must satisfy all four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must
In a decision dated April 19, 1993, the trial court convicted appellant, the be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
dispositive portion of which reads: competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing."8 Appellant argued that the first
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding accused EFREN and second requirements were not complied with. The records of the
JEREZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery case, however, reveal otherwise.
with double homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify and/or reimburse It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial
the heirs of the following: confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider,
and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If indeed his confession were obtained
To the Heirs of Reynaldo Ochoa as a result of coercion and intimidation by policemen at the police station,
he could have informed the Mayor of the maltreatment he suffered.
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death Having failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial confession
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity voluntarily made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. "The presumption,
(estimated income x life span) therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense
3. 25,000.00 articles/money lost proves otherwise."9
(P20,000.00, watch, others)
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have
————— an independent counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the
P225,000.00 time the extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant disclosed to the
police officers that his counsel of choice was Atty. Freddie Venida but that
To the Heirs of Joselito Balbastro the latter would not be available as he is due to depart for Manila on the
same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty. Schneider,
supposedly the only lawyer available in Jose Panganiban, appear as the
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
counsel of appellant during investigation and the latter answered in the
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
affirmative, as shown from the excerpts of his extrajudicial confession,
(estimated income x life span)
3. 27,000.00 articles/money lost thus:
(P17,000.00, watch, Ray-Ban)
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses PASUBALI: — Ginoong Jerez, ikaw ay kukunan namin ng
————— malayang salaysay tungkol sa isang usapin na aming
P227,000.00 sinisiyasat. Subalit, bago ang lahat, nais naming
malaman mo na ikaw ay may mga karapatan susog sa
But for insufficiency of evidence, Joselito Quijan and Zaldy Victa ating Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
are hereby acquitted.
Una: Ikaw ay may karapatang tumangging magbigay ng
7 salaysay o kaya ay magbigay ng salaysay, sapagkat ang

11
SO ORDERED.
anumang sasabihin mo sa pagtatanong na ito ay
maaaring gamitin laban sa iyo sa harap ng hukuman.

Page
Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the Nauunawaan mo ito?
extra-judicial statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he
 Sagot: Opo.
Ikalawa: Ikaw ay may karapatang ding kumuha ng isang
manananggol na sarili mong pili upang siyang maging
gabay mo sa pagtatanong na ito. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo
Nais mo bang maging gabay mong manananggol ang
ating kaharap na manananggol na si Atty. Augusto B.
Schneider?
Sagot: Opo.
Pangatlo: Nais din naming malaman mo at ng lahat na
ikaw ay hindi namin pinangangakuan, sinasaktan o
tinatakot upang magbigay ng iyong sariling salaysay,
kundi, ito ay pawang katotohanang kusang loob mong
sasabihin at isasalaysay. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Kung nauunawaan mong lahat itong mga
pasubaling ito, ikaw ba ay nakahanda ng magbigay ng
iyong sariling malayang salaysay?
Sagot: Opo.10
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under
custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the
preferred lawyer is available as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the accused has the final choice as he may reject
the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by
the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never
raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of
the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer. 11 Thus, "once the prosecution
has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement
on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary
and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this
presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency. 12
Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was
made under duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support
the same. In People v. Villanueva, this Court declared that "voluntariness
of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if upon its
face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending
to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which could
possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to
which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered
voluntary." 13 A scrutiny of the sworn statement discloses in detail
relevant facts surrounding the commission of the offense charged
which the accused himself could only have known.
The Court, therefore, finds that appellant's constitutional right to
counsel was not breached when he agreed to be represented by
Atty. Schneider.
Appellant likewise argued that the trial court should have admitted
his defense of alibi "considering that he was not properly identified
and physical evidence like properties, money, fingerprints were not
discovered by the arresting officers." 14
This contention is simply unavailing in the case at bar. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that "for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the
accused prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission." 15 Appellant testified that on
the day in question, he was engaged in a drinking spree with his
friends at the house of Felix Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, Camarines
Norte and he went home at 4:00 o'clock p.m. staying thereat for the
rest of the night. Unfortunately, this version of the appellant was
contradicted by prosecution witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil
Villafranca, who positively identified him in court as the person
scouting for carabao buyers in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte at around 9:00 o'clock a.m. on May 23, 1990. Needless to say,
where an accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives
and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest
scrutiny. They are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the
testimonies of the more credible witnesses for the prosecution. 16
The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellant's culpability of the
12
offense charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Page
The computation, however, of the damages awarded by the trial
court for loss of earning capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for
each victim is erroneous.

"The formula consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining

life expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of
death])." 17 Thus, the award for loss of earning capacity for each
victim shall be as follows:

Joselito Balbastro

P36,000.00 — gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)

Multiply: 30 — life expectancy (2/3 x 45 [80 - 35 {age at time
of death}])
P1,080,000.00 — total loss of earning capacity

Reynaldo Ochoa

P36,000.00 — gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)

Multiply: 21 — life expectancy (2/3 x 31 [80 - 49 {age at time
of death}])
P756,000.00 — total loss of earning capacity

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED and

the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant EFREN
JEREZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall
indemnify Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo Ochoa in the amount of
P1,080,000.00 and P756,000.00, respectively, for losses of their
respective earning capacity. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

13
Page
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119308 April 18, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER ESPANOLA y PAQUINGAN alias "Langga" or
"Cocoy", JIMMY PAQUINGAN y BATILO alias"Jimmy" and
JEOFFREY ABELLO y SALADO alias "Beroy," accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; State Witnesses; Requirements Before
an Accused Can be Discharged as State Witness.—The appellants
contend that the trial court violated the rule in discharging Gonzales as a
state witness. They claim that Gonzales was the only one who executed
an affidavit of confession, hence, he was the most guilty of the accused
and cannot be used as a state witness. To be discharged as state
witness, Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused concerned; 2.
his testimony must be absolutely necessary; 3. there is no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed; 4.
his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; 5. he
does not appear to be the most guilty; and 6. he has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Same; Same; Part of the prosecutorial discretion is the determination of
who should be used as a state witness to bolster the successful
prosecution of criminal offenses.—It is also established that there was no
eyewitness to the crime or other direct evidence. The testimony of
Gonzales was absolutely necessary for the proper prosecution of the case
against appellants. This was the decision of the prosecution itself when it
moved for the discharge of Gonzales as a state witness. Part of
prosecutorial discretion is the determination of who should be used as a
state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses.
Unless done in violation of the Rules, this determination should be given
great weight by our courts.
Same; Witnesses; Mental Retardates; A mental retardate is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness.—Appellants also assail the testimony of
Gonzales on the ground of his alleged mental incapacity. Section 20 of
Rule 130 provides that “except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses.” Section 21, inter alia,
disqualifies as witnesses, “those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others.” A mental retardate
is not therefore, per se, disqualified from being a witness. As long as his
senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court,
he can be a witness. In the case at bar, we find that Gonzales had a
tendency to be repetitious and at times had to be asked leading
questions, but he was not unintelligible to be beyond understanding. He
was clear and unyielding in identifying the appellants as the perpetrators
of the crime. On the whole, his account of the crime was coherent enough
to shed light on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental
incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness.—To be sure, modern rules
on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify
a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a
witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts,
seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
Same; Same; Affidavits; It is well-settled rule that affidavits should not be
considered as the final and full repository of truth.—Nor can the alleged
inconsistencies between the sworn statement of Gonza-les and his
testimony in court affect his credibility. Gonzales’ testimony jibes on
material points. His inconsistencies on minor details of the crime are not
earmarks of falsehoods. On the contrary, they show that his testimony is
honest and unrehearsed. Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that affidavits
should not be considered as the final and full repository of truth. Affidavits
are usually taken ex-parte. They are oftentimes incomplete and
inaccurate. Ordinarily in a question-andanswer form, they are usually and
routinely prepared in police precincts by police investigators. Not
infrequently, the investigator propounds questions merely to elicit a
general picture of the subject matter under investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Testimonies given during trials are more exact and
elaborate for their accuracy is tested by the process of cross-examination
where the truth is distilled from half-truths and the total lies.—Indeed,
there is no rule of evidence that would stop an affiant from elaborating his
prior sworn statement at the trial itself. Testimonies given during trials are
more exact and elaborate for their accuracy is tested by the process of
14
cross-examination where the truth is distilled from half truths and the total
lies.
Page
Same; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial
Confessions; The fact that a suspect did not sign his sworn statement
casts serious doubt as to the voluntariness of its execution—it is
inadmissible in evidence.—We now discuss assigned errors numbers 2
and 3. Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it ruled that the
sworn statement of Jimmy Paquingan was voluntarily given by him though
he refused to sign the same. Under the Constitution and existing law and
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3)
the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.
In People v. Bandula, we ruled that an extra-judicial confession must be
rejected where there is doubt as to its voluntariness. The fact that
appellant Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts serious doubt
as to the voluntariness of its execution. It is inadmissible evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel applies
in certain pretrial proceedings that can be considered “critical stages” in
the criminal process. Custodial interrogation before or after charges have
been filed and non-custodial interrogations after the accused has been
formally charged are considered to be critical pretrial stages.—
Additionally, the claim of appellant Paquingan that he was not assisted by
a counsel of his own choice when his affidavit of confession was taken is
worth noting. Paquingan’s sworn statement was taken on November 25,
1991 at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. At that time, an information for rape
with homicide had already been filed against him and his co-appellants.
Hence, when Paquingan gave his confession, Paquingan was no longer
under custodial investigation since he was already charged in court.
Nonetheless, the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings
that can be considered “critical stages” in the criminal process. Custodial
interrogation before or after charges have been filed and non-custodial
interrogations after the accused has been formally charged are
considered to be critical pretrial stages. The investigation by Fiscal
Lagcao of Paquingan after the latter has been formally charged with the
crime of rape with homicide, is a critical pretrial stage during which the
right to counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. It is doubtful
whether the counsels given to Paquingan were of his own choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Legal Officer of the local
government unit cannot qualify as an independent counsel—an
independent counsel cannot be burdened by any task antithetical to the
interest of an accused.—Moreover, we hold that Atty. Cahanap cannot
qualify as an independent counsel, he being a Legal Officer of Iligan City.
An independent counsel cannot be burdened by any task antithetical to
the interest of an accused. As a legal officer of the city, Atty. Cahanap
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the city in carrying
out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance
of peace and order. His office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly
cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict
of interest.
Same; Alibi; Denial; Both alibi and denial are weak defenses which cannot
prevail where there is positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses.—As to the fourth assignment of error, we
subscribe to the finding of the trial court that the evidence of the accused-
appellants proffers the defense of alibi. Time and again, we have ruled
that both denial and alibi are weak defenses which cannot prevail where
there is positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
is somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise
demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place
of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the
case at bar, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the
crime scene considering the proximity of the place where they claimed
they were and the spot where Jessette Tarroza was brutally murdered.
Same; Judges; The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not
himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision
constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions,
and does not per se render his decision void.—We also reject appellants’
claim that the decision of the trial court is void on the ground that the
judge who penned the decision, Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, was
not the one who heard and tried the case. We have ruled in People v.
Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 [1995], that the fact that the judge who heard the
evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated
the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and
conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. While it is true
that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better
position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses,
it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not
present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not
violate substantive and procedural due process of law.
15
Same; Murder; Damages; When death occurs as a result of a crime, the
Page
heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof
of damages.—We now review the award of damages to the heirs of
Jessette Tarroza. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages.
Accordingly, we award P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza for her
death. As for actual damages, we find the award of P50,000.00 proper
considering that Romeo Tarroza spent more or less the same amount for
the interment and burial of his deceased daughter.
Same; Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; The Supreme Court has
also awarded indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
victims.—We have also awarded indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased—an amount to be fixed by the court considering
the victim’s actual income at the time of death and his probable life
expectancy. The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages. We find the same inadequate considering that Jessette, who
was twenty-four (24) years old at the time of her death, was employed as
a medical technologist earning P99.00 per day. To compute the award for
Jessette’s loss of earning capacity, her annual income should be fixed at
P39,146.25. Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the
amount of P15,600.00 per annum, her net income per annum would
amount to P23,546.25. Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by
this court: (2/3 x [80—age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable
portion of the net income which would have been received by the heirs for
support, we fix the award for loss of earning capacity of deceased
Jessette Tarroza at P659,294.50.
Same; Same; Same; Award of P50,000.00 as moral damages also proper
considering the mental anguish suffered by the parents of the victim on
account of her brutal murder, as well as the award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages considering that the killing was attended by
treachery, aside from the fact that the victim was also raped while already
lifeless.—We also find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper
considering the mental anguish suffered by the parents of the victim on
account of her brutal murder. We likewise uphold the award of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages considering that the killing of Jessette Tarroza
was attended by treachery. She was also raped while already lifeless. All
these are shocking to conscience. The imposition of exemplary damages
against the appellants will hopefully deter others from perpetrating the
same evil deed.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Br. 5.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 dated November 21, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 5,
City of Iligan, finding the accused-appellants Christopher Espanola y
Paquingan, Jimmy Paquingan y Batilo and Jeoffrey Abello y Salado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals for the murder of Jessette Tarroza
in Criminal Case No. 3773. The three accused were meted a prison term
of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. They
were ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim
Jessette Tarroza the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Amended Information charging the accused-appellants with the crime
of Murder and indicting another accused in the person of Joel Gonzales
reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned City Prosecutor of Iligan accuses
CHRISTOPHER ESPANOLA y Paquingan alias"Langga" JIMMY
PAQUINGAN y Batilo, JEOFFREY ABELLO y
Salado alias "Beroy" and JOEL
GONZALES alias "Awing" alias "Wingwing" of the crime
of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about November 16, 1991, in the City
of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who
were all under the influence of drugs (Marijuana),
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other with intent to kill and
by means of treachery and with abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit one
Jessette Tarroza, thereby inflicting upon the said
Jessette Tarroza the following physical injuries, to
16
wit:
Page
— Incised wound 2.5 cms in length, lateral border
of (R) ala nasi
— Triangular stab wound, neck (R) side, 4 cms x
3 cms x 5.5 cms
— Incised wound, anterior neck, 6 cms x 4 cms x
3.5 cms which traversed thru the trachea,
external jugular vein and 3/4 of the esophagus
— Stab wound, anterior neck, (R) supraclavicular
area, 2.5 cms x 1 cm x 4 cms
— Stab wound, (L) anterior chest, midclavicular
line 1.5 cms 1 cm x 2.5 cms
— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 4 cms x 2 cms
with fracture of the 4th and 5th rib with lung tissue
out
— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, level of axilla,
2 cms x 1 cm x 5 cms
— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 3rd ICS,
midclavicular line 2.5 x 1.4 cms
— C-shaped stab wound, (R) anterior chest,
midclavicular line, 3.5 cms x 2 cms x 3 cms, 2nd
ICS
— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 2nd ICS, (R)
parasteal line, 2.5 cms x 1.5 cms x 4 cms
— Confluent abrasion (R) elbow joint,
anteromedial aspect 3 cms in diameter
— Multiple punctured wounds (5), back, (R) side
— Confluent abrasion 10 cms by 3 cms, back,
lumbar area
and as a result thereof the said Jessette Tarroza
died; that immediately after inflicting fatal injuries
on the said Jessette Tarroza the, herein accused
took turns in having sexual intercourse with the
victim.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with the aggravating circumstances of: (1) treachery and
abuse of superior strength; (2) cruelty in all (sic) ignominy; (3) that
the accused were under the influence of drugs at the time of the
commission of the offense and (4) outraging or scoffing of (sic)
the corpse of the victim.
City of Iligan, November 29, 1991.
The facts of the case show that Jessette Tarroza went to work at the
Mercy Community Clinic, Camague, Iligan City, as a medical technologist
at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of November 16, 1991. Her tour of duty
was from 3 o'clock in the afternoon to eleven o'clock in the
evening. 2 After working for eight hours, she left the clinic at about 11:15
p.m., with Claro Liquigan, a co-employee. When they reached the junction
road leading to her house at about 11:30 p.m., Claro offered to escort
Jessette to her house but she refused saying that she knew the people in
the area. She then walked towards her house while Claro rode his bicycle
and went home. When they parted ways, Claro noticed four (4) persons in
the pathway leading to Jessette's house. They were about 60 to 70
meters away from him and he did not recognize whether they were male
or female. 3
Jessette Tarroza failed to come home that fateful evening. She was found
dead. Her father, Romeo Tarroza, rushed to the place where her body
was discovered. 4 He was shocked to see Jessette lying in a grassy area
more or less fifty (50) meters from their home and only fifteen (15) meters
from the pathway. Her body bore stab wounds. Her red blouse was wide
open and her pants removed. Her panty was likewise removed while her
bra 5 was cut. The red blouse 6 was torn with three (3) holes at the back,
ten (10) holes on the front and six (6) holes on the left sleeve. Her blouse,
bra and shoes were stained with blood. Her panty, found about two (2)
feet away from her cadaver, had blood on the front portion. A light green
T-shirt with the print "Midwifery" at the back and "ICC" on the front 7 was
also found near the shoes of the victim. The T-shirt was not hers. 8
The law enforcement officers of Iligan City immediately conducted an
investigation. They found blood stains along the pathway which was
approximately fifteen (15) meters away from the place where the victim
17
was found. There was a sign of struggle as the plants and bushes at the
scene of the crime were destroyed and flattened. They extended their
Page
investigation to the neighboring sitios and purok of Kilumco but found no
lead as to the perpetrators of the crime. 9
In the morning of November 19, 1991, SPO 4 Ruperto Neri received an
anonymous telephone call suggesting that a certain "Wing-wing" 10 be
investigated as he has knowledge of the crime. Antonio Lubang, Chief of
the Homicide Section, Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Iligan
City Police Station, and his men looked for "Wing-wing". Lubang knew
"Wing-wing" as the latter frequently roamed around the public plaza. They
learned that the real name of "Wing-wing" is Joel Gonzales. They then
saw Gonzales at his house and invited him to the police station. At the
police station, Gonzales confessed that he was present when the crime
was committed and that he knew its perpetrators. He identified them as
"Beroy", "Langga" and "Jimmy". He informed that the three stabbed and
raped Jessette Tarroza. Gonzales, however, did not give the surnames of
the three suspects. The policemen asked Romeo Tarroza whether he
knew the suspects. Romeo Tarroza declared that they were his
neighbors. He identified "Jimmy" as Jimmy Paquingan, "Langga" as
Christopher Espanola and "Beroy" as Jeoffrey Abello. 11 On the same day,
Gonzales was detained at the police station.
In the early morning of November 21, 1991, Chief Lubang invited Jimmy
Paquingan, Christopher Espanola and Jeoffrey Abello to the police station
where they were investigated. All denied the story of Gonzales. A police
line-up of twelve (12) persons which included the three accused-
appellants was then made in the police station. Gonzales was called and
he pointed to Paquingan, Espanola and Abello as his companions in the
killing and rape of Jessette Tarroza. After the line-up, the three suspects
were brought to the City Health Office for check-up because the
policemen saw that they had bruises and scratches on their faces,
foreheads and breasts. 12 They were examined by Dr. Livey J. Villarin.
With respect to Paquingan, the medical certificate (Exhibit "I") showed that
he had scratch abrasions on the right mandibular area (jaw), on the left
side of the neck and on the right mid-axillary (chest). Dr. Villarin testified
that the abrasions could have been caused by any sharp object or
possibly fingernails. The medical certificate issued to Espanola (Exhibit
"J") showed that he had contusions on the right shoulder and hematoma.
Dr. Villarin testified that the injuries could have been effected by a jab or
sharp blow. The medical certificate issued to Abello (Exhibit "K") showed
that he sustained abrasion and contusion at the right deltoid area which
according to Dr. Villarin, could have been caused by a sharp or hard
object or a fist blow that hit that particular area of the body. 13
On the same day, an information for rape with homicide 14 was filed
against Paquingan, Espanola and Abello. They were committed to the city
jail after their warrant of arrest was issued by Executive Judge Federico V.
Noel. 15
In the afternoon of November 25, 1991, Chief Lubang brought Jimmy
Paquingan to the City Prosecutor's Office for the taking of his confession
after he manifested to the jail warden his intention to confess. City
Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao asked Paquingan if he would avail the
services of counsel and he answered in the affirmative. When asked if he
had a counsel of his own choice, he answered in the negative. He was
provided with the services of Atty. Leo Cahanap, the legal counsel of the
City Mayor's Office, and Atty. Susan Echavez, a representative of the IBP
Legal Aid, Iligan City Chapter. They were given time to confer with
him. 16 Paquingan then confessed. However, when asked to sign the
stenographic notes, Paquingan refused saying he would wait for his
mother first. 17 The sworn statement of Paquingan (Exhibit "L") was
transcribed on November 29, 1991, but signed only by the two lawyers.
According to the statement, Abello slashed the neck of Jessette. Jessette
fell down and was brought to a bushy area where she was sexually
abused. The first to have sexual intercourse with the victim was Abello.
Paquingan then followed him. Espanola had his turn next; and Gonzales
was the last. 18
Upon review of the records of the case, Fiscal Lagcao discovered that the
victim was sexually abused after she was murdered. Thus, he filed an
Amended Information on November 29, 1991, charging the three accused
with the crime of murder and indicting Joel Gonzales as the fourth
accused. 19 A warrant for the arrest of Gonzales was issued on the same
date by Executive Judge Federico V. Noel. 20
All the accused pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. After presenting
several witnesses, the prosecution filed on June 17, 1992, a motion to
discharge accused Joel Gonzales as a state witness 21 in accordance with
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, alleging:
1. That accused Joel Gonzales has intimated to the undersigned
City Prosecutor that he is willing to testify for the prosecution as
state witness;
2. That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused
Joel Gonzales considering that the evidence for the prosecution in
this case is mainly circumstantial;
18
3. That the testimony of accused Joel Gonzales can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
Page
 4. That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and
5. That he has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
In traversing the motion, the defense asserted:
1. That there is no showing in the face of said motion that Joel
Gonzales agrees to be utilized as state witness;
2. That Joel Gonzales appears to be the most guilty as he alone
among the accused has executed a confession regarding the
killing of Jessette Tarroza.
In an Order 22 dated June 26, 1992, the trial court discharged Gonzales as
a state witness.
In the course of the trial, Dr. Chito Rey Gomez, Medico-Legal Officer of
the Iligan City Health Office, testified that he conducted a post mortem
examination on the cadaver of Jessette Tarroza. He issued a Death
Certificate (Exhibit "E") which indicated that the cause of death was
cardiorespiratory arrest due to pneumohemathorax of the right chest. He
also prepared a Necropsy Report (Exhibit "F") after the examination. He
found five (5) stab wounds at the back of the victim and ten (10) stab
wounds at the front, consisting of an incised wound at the lateral border of
the ala nasi, right; triangular stab wounds on the right side of the neck and
lower neck; an incised wound which traversed through the trachea
external jugular vein and three-fourths (3/4) of the esophagus; a C-shaped
stab wound that penetrated the thorax cavity and a stab wound above the
breast near the axilla. He testified further that the wounds inflicted must
have reached some vital organs of the body, possibly the lungs and blood
vessels, and that the wounds were probably caused by three (3) different
instruments. He likewise conducted a vaginal examination on the victim
and noted that there was a fresh complete hymenal laceration at 3 o'clock
and fresh complete lacerations at 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock, which could
have been caused by a finger or a sex organ inserted into the vagina.
When asked if the victim was sexually molested, he answered in the
affirmative. 23
Another witness for the prosecution was Dr. Tomas P. Refe, Medico-Legal
Officer III of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas
Regional Office. He testified that he conducted an autopsy examination on
the cadaver of Jessette Tarroza and prepared Autopsy Report No. 91-27
(Exhibit "H"). He found abrasions and thirteen (13) stab wounds on the
front part of the chest, right side, and at the back of the victim's chest. He
also found an incised wound at the region of the nose involving the upper
portion of the right side of the mouth, an incised wound on the front part of
the neck cutting the trachea and partially the esophagus and an incised
wound at the anterior aspect right side of the neck. 24 He declared that
death was caused by the incised wounds and multiple stab wounds. The
fatal wounds were wound nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 (Exhibits "H", "H-1").
He likewise examined the vagina of the victim and found the hymen
moderately thick and narrow with lacerations complete at 3 o'clock and 6
o'clock, deep at 7 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock and 11 o'clock, and the
edges of the lacerations were sharp and coaptable. He opined that there
could have been a sexual intercourse committed after the death of the
victim considering that the lacerations did not show any evidence of vital
reaction which is commonly found in lacerations during lifetime. 25
The prosecution also presented Joel Gonzales who turned state witness.
On the basis of the demeanor of Gonzales and the manner he answered
the questions, the trial court gathered the impression that he was mentally
retarded. 26 Gonzales did not know how to read and write. 27 In any event,
he was able to testify that on the night of November 16, 1991, he went to
Baybay, Camague, Iligan City, to witness a dance. His companions were
"Beroy", "Jimmy" and "Cocoy". He identified Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy",
Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga" and Jimmy Paquingan as
"Jimmy".
At the dance, they drank one (1) bottle of Tanduay and smoked one (1)
stick of marijuana each. After the dance, he and his three (3) companions
proceeded to Bacayo. While on their way, they met a woman whom
Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy followed. They brought the woman to a nipa hut
and slept ("gidulgan") right beside the woman.
When asked who killed the victim on the night of November 16, 1991, at
Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City, he answered "sila", referring to herein
appellants. He further testified that Beroy slashed the neck of Jessette
Tarroza, Langga slashed her breast, and Paquingan stabbed her at the
back. The victim resisted by scratching her attackers. 28 After she died,
they carried her to a bushy area and all of them sexually molested her.
Beroy was first; Gonzales was second; Cocoy was third and Jeoffrey was
the last. Gonzales likewise identified the T-shirt worn by Jeoffrey Abello
that night as "That one Mercy." He declared that the brownish
discoloration on the T-shirt was caused by the blood of Jessette
Tarroza. 29
19
On cross-examination, Gonzales said that Jessette Tarroza was not the
Page
one brought to the nipa hut, but a woman from Tambacan who went home
later on. He then reiterated that after their encounter with the unnamed
woman, they went to the school, met and followed Jessette Tarroza to a
dark place. They encountered her on the road. He affirmed that it was
Beroy who slashed the neck of the victim while Cocoy, also known as
Langga, was the one who slashed her breasts. 30
For their defense, all the appellants took the witness stand. Jimmy
Paquingan narrated that at about 6 o'clock to 9 o'clock in the evening of
November 16, 1991, he watched "beta" (movie) in the house of Sima
Ybanez at Kilumco, Camague. Thereafter, he went to the house of his
grandmother located at the same barangay and slept there. He did not go
out again and woke up at 6 o'clock in the morning of November 17, 1991.
His testimony was corroborated by Emma Mingo who testified that at
about 6 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991, she viewed "beta"
in her residence at Kilumco, Camague, with her daughter and accused
Christopher Espanola. At about 9:30 in the evening, the film ended and
Christopher left. At about the same time, Jimmy Paquingan, her nephew,
came and proceeded to his room downstairs. As she waited for her
husband to come home, she continuously stayed at the porch until 1:30 in
the early morning of November 17, 1991. In her long wait, she did not see
Jimmy leave his room. 31
Christopher Espanola alleged that he was at home in the evening of
November 16, 1991. He went out to view a "beta" in the house of Sima
Ybanez. From there, he proceeded to a disco. On his way, he passed by
the house of Carmencita Gatase who was then with Jeoffrey Abello. They
went to the disco together. At the disco, he joined the group of Lito
Moraira and Titing Mingo and drank with them. There was no occasion
that he left the disco place until after 1 o'clock in the early morning of
November 17, 1991, when they went home. He woke up at 7 o'clock the
following morning and proceeded to the house of his grandmother to fetch
water. 32
Jeoffrey Abello narrated that in the early evening of November 16, 1991,
he was at their house in Kilumco, Camague. He left their house to watch a
"beta" in the house of Sima Ybanez. However, he was invited by
Carmencita Gatase to go to a disco in Baybay, Camague. He acceded
and went to Gatase's house. Christopher Espanola joined them on their
way to the disco. They arrived at the disco at about 10 o'clock in the
evening. He saw there a group of persons including Joel Gonzales and
Titing Mingo. While he saw Christopher at about 11 o'clock that evening,
he did not see Jimmy Paquingan. At about 1 o'clock in the early morning
of November 17, 1991, he and Carmencita left ahead of Christopher.
They then proceeded to the house of Carmencita where they
slept. 33
In her testimony, Carmencita Gatase identified the three (3) accused as
her neighbors and long-time acquaintances. At about 8 o'clock in the
evening of November 16, 1991, Jeoffrey Abello went to her house. At 9:30
in the evening, she asked Jeoffrey and Christopher Espanola, who was
then downstairs, to go with her to the disco. They reached the place at
about 10 o'clock. Christopher then asked permission to join the group of
his Uncle Mingo. She and Jeoffrey remained conversing and standing at
the side of the disco. They left the dancing area at 1:30 in the early
morning of November 17, 1991, not noticing the whereabouts of
Christopher. On their way home, the two of them passed by the basketball
court which was only eighty (80) meters from their house. They did not
notice anything unusual. Jeoffrey then slept in her house. 34
After considering the opposing versions of the parties, the trial court gave
credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly the
testimony of state witness Joel Gonzales. It found that Jessette Tarroza
was killed by the accused Christopher Espanola, Jimmy Paquingan and
Jeoffrey Abello. It rejected the defense of the accused as unnatural,
incredible and riddled with inconsistencies. The three accused were
convicted of the crime of Murder as the killing was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. They were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a total amount of One Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand pesos (P175,000.00) as damages to the heirs of
the victim.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellants contend:
1. THAT THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF
THE TESTIMONY OF JOEL GONZALES WHO WAS AN
ADDITIONAL ACCUSED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION OF
(sic) MURDER AND WHOSE DISCHARGE WAS SOUGHT BY
THE PROSECUTION AND GRANTED BY SAID COURT,
INSPITE AND DESPITE OPPOSITION BY THE DEFENSE.
2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
PAQUINGAN THAT THE TAKING OF HIS AFFIDAVIT OF
CONFESSION BY CITY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY, AND IN FACT, HE REFUSED TO SIGN THE
SAME, CONTRARY TO THE STATEMENT OF SAID
PROSECUTOR THAT IT WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN BY THE
20
SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Page
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
PAQUINGAN TO COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE, PREMISED
FROM (sic) THE TAKING OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF
CONFESSION BY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO, AGAINST HIS
PENAL INTEREST. IN FACT HE TESTIFIED THAT SAID
LAWYERS, ATTYS. LEO CAHANAP, THE CITY LEGAL
OFFICER OF ILIGAN, AND SUSAN ECHAVEZ, WERE NOT THE
COUNSELS OF HIS OWN CHOICE AND WERE MERELY
SUPPLIED BY THE PROSECUTOR.
4. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UTILIZING THE
GROUND OF ALIBI WHEN IT SAID THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ADVANCED IT AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE.
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DID NOT CLING TO IT AS A
MATTER OF DEFENSE. THEY MERELY STATED WHAT WAS
TRUE AND FACTUAL IN SO FAR AS THEY WERE
CONCERNED, AND IT WAS AN ERROR ON THE PART OF
THE LOWER COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE AS ALIBI,
WHICH PRECISELY, IN MANY DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, (sic) THAT ALIBI NEED NOT
BE INQUIRED INTO WHERE THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE IS WEAK, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONY OF JOEL GONZALES NOTWITHSTANDING
THE IMPROPRIETIES OF HIS DISCHARGE AS AN ACCUSED
ON THE AMENDED INFORMATION OF (sic) MURDER, MORE
SO, ON THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF HIS
TESTIMONIES, AS BORNE OUT BY THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES, AND MOST ESPECIALLY ON HIS
MENTAL INCAPACITY, WHERE HIS TESTIMONIES WERE
RUMBLING. (sic)
6. THAT THE LOWER COURT, AT THE INSTANCE OF HON.
MOSLEMEN MACARAMBON ERRED IN METING A PENALTY
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AS AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS, THE LATTER, (sic) BEING A DETAILED JUDGE
IN RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, WAS THE ONE WHO
PREPARED AND RENDERED THE DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO HEAR A
SINGLE HEARING AND HAD NOT OBSERVED THE
DEMEANOR AND CHARACTER TRAITS OF WITNESSES AND
ACCUSED IN SAID CASE, AND INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
THE JUDGE WHO TOTALLY HEARD THE CASE OF RTC,
BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, (sic) STILL CONNECTED WITH THE
JUDICIARY, BUT MERELY DETAILED IN ONE OF THE SALAS
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY, AND
HENCE, NOT RETIRED OR FOR (sic) OTHERWISE, AND
APPROPRIATELY, THE RECORDS OF THE CASE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SENT TO HIM, FOR HIM TO PREPARE THE
DECISION AND TO (sic) SEND THE SAME TO THE CLERK OF
COURT OF RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, FOR
PROMULGATION, AND THUS WAS (sic) THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION BY JUDGE MACARAMBON WAS NULL AND
VOID.
We find the appeal unmeritorious.
We shall first discuss assigned errors numbers 1 and 5, in view of their
inter-relationship.
The appellants contend that the trial court violated the rule in discharging
Gonzales as a state witness. They claim that Gonzales was the only one
who executed an affidavit of confession, hence, he was the most guilty of
the accused and cannot be used as a state witness. To be discharged as
state witness, Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
that:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused
concerned;
2. his testimony must be absolutely necessary;
3. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
We do not agree that Gonzales is the most guilty of the accused. From
the evidence, it appears that Gonzales is mentally retarded. He could not
21
have been a leader of the group for he was intellectually wanting. He did
not inflict any of the fatal wounds that led to the death of the victim. The
Page
trial court's assessment that he is not the most guilty is well-grounded.
It is also established that there was no eyewitness to the crime or other
direct evidence. The testimony of Gonzales was absolutely necessary for
the proper prosecution of the case against appellants. This was the
decision of the prosecution itself when it moved for the discharge of
Gonzales as a state witness. Part of prosecutorial discretion is the
determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster the
successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless done in violation of
the Rules, this determination should be given great weight by our courts.
The records will also show that while Gonzales rambled in some parts of
his testimony in view of his low intellect, nonetheless, his testimony was
substantially corroborated in its material points. His declaration that the
victim resisted and used her bare hands in scratching her attackers is
confirmed by the findings of Dr. Villarin in Exhibits "I", "J" and "K". His
statement that Beroy slashed the neck of the victim, Langga slashed her
breast and Jimmy stabbed her at the back finds support in the result of the
autopsy of the victim's cadaver by Dr. Refe and Dr. Gomez showing
incised wounds and numerous stab wounds on the front and back of the
victim and incised wounds on her trachea and esophagus. His assertion
that he and the appellants sexually abused the victim after her death is
corroborated by the lacerations found in the private part of the victim as
determined by Dr. Gomez and Dr. Refe.
Lastly, there is no showing that Gonzales has been convicted of an
offense involving moral turpitude. Gonzales also gave his consent to be
utilized as state witness. 35 In sum, all the requirements of Section 9, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the prosecution and
the trial court did not err in discharging Gonzales as state witness.
Appellants also assail the testimony of Gonzales on the ground of his
alleged mental incapacity. Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that "except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses." Section 21, inter alia, disqualifies as witnesses, "those whose
mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to
others." A mental retardate is not therefore, per se, disqualified from being
a witness. As long as his senses can perceive facts and if he can convey
his perceptions in court, he can be a
witness. 36 In the case at bar, we find that Gonzales had a tendency to be
repetitious and at times had to be asked leading questions, but he was not
unintelligible to be beyond understanding. He was clear and unyielding in
identifying the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. On the whole,
his account of the crime was coherent enough to shed light on the guilt or
innocence of the accused. To be sure, modern rules on evidence have
downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. 37 As
observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who
may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and
primitive. 38Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
Nor can the alleged inconsistencies between the sworn statement of
Gonzales and his testimony in court affect his credibility. Gonzales'
testimony jibes on material points. His inconsistencies on minor details of
the crime are not earmarks of falsehoods. On the contrary, they show that
his testimony is honest and unrehearsed. 39 Moreover, it is a well-settled
rule that affidavits should not be considered as the final and full repository
of truth. Affidavits are usually taken ex-parte. They are oftentimes
incomplete and inaccurate. Ordinarily in a question-and-answer form, they
are usually and routinely prepared in police precincts by police
investigators. Not infrequently, the investigator propounds questions
merely to elicit a general picture of the subject matter under
investigation. 40 Thus, the fact that the sworn statement of Gonzales
(Exhibit "M") did not mention a woman from Tambacan whom they met
and brought to a nipa hut and slept with on the night of November 16,
1991, is attributable to the fact that he was not asked about women other
than Jessette Tarroza. His line of questioning was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Q: After 11:00 o'clock that night, where did you and your
companions go?
A: We went to a grassy place in Camague, Iligan City to
wait for a certain Jessette Tarroza.
Q: Whose idea was it that you will wait for Jessette
Tarroza in that secluded place at Camague, Iligan City?
A: Beroy, sir.
Q: And eventually, did you see this Jessette?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
22
The presence of another woman came out only in response to
Page
questions propounded to him during his cross-examination, viz:
 xxx xxx xxx Q: Do you know her name.

ATTY. FLORES: A: No.

Q: Who was that woman killed? COURT:

A: Jessette Tarroza. In other words, for the Court's clarification, there were two
(2) women during that night that you found in the nipa hut
Q: The same woman brought to the nipa hut? that you mentioned?

FISCAL LAGCAO: A: Yes.

I object, your Honor. . . COURT:

COURT: The other woman was killed — Jessette Tarroza?

Witness may answer, let him answer. A: Yes.

A: No. COURT:

COURT: The other woman was not killed?

Proceed. A: No.

ATTY. FLORES: Q: And this was not known to the authorities, the one that
was not killed?
Q: You want to tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness that
there was another woman in the nipa hut? A: No.

A: Yes. Q: What was only mentioned to the authorities was the

one that was killed?
Q: Who was the woman in the nipa hut?
A: Yes.
FISCAL LAGCAO:
xxx xxx xxx 41
Immaterial . . .
Indeed, there is no rule of evidence that would stop an affiant
from elaborating his prior sworn statement at the trial
COURT:
itself. 42 Testimonies given during trials are more exact and
elaborate for their accuracy is tested by the process of cross-

23
Witness may answer. examination where the truth is distilled from half truths and the
total lies.

Page
A: She is from Tambacan.
The appellants also contend that Gonzales mixed-up his identification of A: Yes.
appellants. In his sworn statement, he mentioned "Beroy, Jimmy and
Langga" as his companions on the night of November 16, 1991, and as Q: If he is around, will you please point to him?
the ones who killed Jessette Tarroza, while in his direct testimony, he
named and pointed at Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy. A reading of his
A: (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as
testimony, however, will reveal the fact that he consistently referred to
Jimmy Paquingan).
appellant Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy" and
Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL LAGCAO:
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Q: Now, this Cocoy which you are referring to, is he in the
courtroom at present?
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Beroy?
A: Yes, he is around.
A: Yes.
Q: Please identify him if he is around.
Q: If this Beroy is in court, will you please identify him by
pointing at him?
A: (Witness pointing to a person who when asked to
identify himself answered that he is Christopher
A: Yes, sir. Espanola.)

Q: Please point to him if he is around.

xxx xxx xxx 43

A: (Witness pointing to a person who when asked The foregoing testimony of Gonzales clearly shows that appellant
identified himself as Jeoffrey Abello.)
Christopher Espanola is "Cocoy" or "Langga".

Q: Do you know a certain Langga?

We are not also prepared to disbelieve Gonzales simply because of his
inconsistent statement as to the correct sequence the victim was sexually
A: Yes. abused by the appellants. It matters little that Gonzales was tentative on
who molested the victim first, second, third and last. What matters is that
Q: If he is around, will you please identify him by pointing all the appellants molested the dead Tarroza.
at him?
The appellants also capitalize on the discrepancy in the identification of
A: Yes. the print on the T-shirt worn by appellant Jeoffrey Abello. When asked to
recall the clothes worn by Abello that fateful night, Gonzales stated "That
Q: Please point at him. one Mercy." In contrast, prosecution witness Romeo Tarroza testified that
the light green T-shirt found near the shoes of the victim was printed with
"Midwifery" and "ICC". This was corroborated by the testimony of Georgie
A: (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as
Tarroza that he recalled having seen Abello wearing that night a green T-
Christopher Espanola.)
shirt printed with "Midwifery" at the back and "ICC" on the front. We

24
uphold the explanation of the trial court that the discrepancy could be
Q: Do you know a certain Jimmy?

Page
attributed to the fact that Gonzales does not know how to read and write.
We now discuss assigned errors numbers 2 and 3. Appellants contend
that the trial court erred when it ruled that the sworn statement of Jimmy
Paquingan was voluntarily given by him though he refused to sign the
same. Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: 1)
the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession
must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. 44In People
v. Bandula, 45 we ruled that an extra-judicial confession must be rejected
where there is doubt as to its voluntariness. The fact that appellant
Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of its execution. It is inadmissible evidence.
Additionally, the claim of appellant Paquingan that he was not assisted by
a counsel of his own choice when his affidavit of confession was taken is
worth noting. Paquingan's sworn statement was taken on November 25,
1991, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, an information for rape
with homicide had already been filed against him and his co-appellants.
Hence, when Paquingan gave his confession, Paquingan was no longer
under custodial investigation 46 since he was already charged in court.
Nonetheless, the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings
that can be considered "critical stages" in the criminal
process. 47 Custodial interrogation before or after charges have been filed
and non-custodial interrogations after the accused has been formally
charged are considered to be critical pretrial stages. 48 The investigation
by Fiscal Lagcao of Paquingan after the latter has been formally charged
with the crime of rape with homicide, is a critical pretrial stage during
which the right to counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. 49 It is
doubtful whether the councels given to Paquingan were of his own choice.
In her rebuttal testimony, Rosita L. Abapo, declared to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: In other words, you want to tell this Honorable Court
as you stated earlier that it was Fiscal Lagcao who called
up for these lawyers? Do you want to tell the Honorable
Court that these lawyers were not the counsel of choice
of Jimmy Paquingan at that time? They were not the
counsel of choice of Mr. Paquingan at that time?
COURT:
Mr. Counsel, this witness does not know what is a
counsel of choice. Make it clearer. It was not Mr.
Paquingan who asked that Atty. Dalisay, Atty. Echavez
and Atty. Cahanap be called to represent him?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 50
Moreover, we hold that Atty. Cahanap cannot qualify as an independent
counsel, he being a Legal Officer of Iligan City. An independent counsel
cannot be burdened by any task antithetical to the interest of an accused.
As a legal officer of the city, Atty. Cahanap provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic
services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. His
office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of
interest. 51 Assigned errors numbered 2 and 3 are therefore ruled in favor
of the appellants.
As to the fourth assignment of error, we subscribe to the finding of the trial
court that the evidence of the accused-appellants proffers the defense of
alibi. Time and again, we have ruled that both denial and alibi are weak
defenses which cannot prevail where there is positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses. 52 For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that the accused is somewhere else when the crime was
committed but he must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission. 53 In the case at bar, it was not physically
impossible for the appellants to be at the crime scene considering the
proximity of the place where they claimed they were and the spot where
Jessette Tarroza was brutally murdered.
We also reject appellants' claim that the decision of the trial court is void
on the ground that the judge who penned the decision, Judge Moslemen
T. Macarambon, was not the one who heard and tried the case. We have
ruled in People v. Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 [1995], that the fact that the judge
who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and
25
promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his
findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void.
Page
While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in
a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death;
witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. 54 For a judge who b) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as actual damages;
was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. 55 Such reliance does
c) Six Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Four pesos and
not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.
Fifty centavos (P659,294.50) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased;
We now review the award of damages to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza.
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
d) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and
entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the
victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages. 56 Accordingly,
we award P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza for her death. As for e) Twenty Five Thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
actual damages, we find the award of P50,000.00 proper considering that
Romeo Tarroza spent more or less the same amount for the interment Costs against appellants.
and burial of his deceased daughter. 57
SO ORDERED.
We have also awarded indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased — an amount to be fixed by the court considering the victim's Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
actual income at the time of death and his probable life expectancy. 58 The
trial court awarded P50,000.00 as compensatory damages. We find the
same inadequate considering that Jessette, who was twenty-four (24)
years old at the time of her death, was employed as a medical
technologist earning P99.00 per day. 59 To compute the award for
Jessette's loss of earning capacity, her annual income should be fixed at
P39,146.25. 60Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the
amount of P15,600.00 per annum, her net income per annum would
amount to P23,546.25. Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by
this court: (2/3 x [80 - age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable
portion of the net income which would have been received by the heirs for
support, 61 we fix the award for loss of earning capacity of deceased
Jessette Tarroza at P659,294.50.

We also find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper

considering the mental anguish suffered by the parents of the victim on
account of her brutal murder. We likewise uphold the award of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages considering that the killing of Jessette Tarroza
was attended by treachery. She was also raped while already lifeless. All
these are shocking to conscience. The imposition of exemplary damages
against the appellants will hopefully deter others from perpetrating the
same evil deed.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the assailed

26
Decision dated November 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5)
of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 3773. Accordingly,

Page
the monetary awards granted in favor of the heirs of Jessette Tarroza are
modified as follows:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 98252 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO
SARITA @ TOTO, EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO CID, accused.
RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y
BAYOT, accused-appellants.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Trial
procedure is ordinarily followed to insure the orderly conduct of litigations
to attain the magisterial objective of the Rules of Court to protect the
parties’ substantive rights.—The trial procedure as outlined in this rule is
ordinarily followed to insure the orderly conduct of litigations to attain the
magisterial objective of the Rules of Court to protect the parties’
substantive rights. However, strict observance of the Rules depend upon
the circumstances obtaining in each case at the discretion of the trial
judge.
Same; Same; Same; Court may allow the prosecutor even after he has
rested his case or even after the defense has moved for dismissal to
present voluntarily omitted evidence as long as it has still jurisdiction over
the case.—Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has
rested his case or even after the defense has moved for dismissal, to
present involuntarily omitted evidence. The primary consideration is
whether the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case. Thus “The claim
that the lower court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to introduce
new evidence is devoid of any merit, for while the prosecution had rested,
the trial was not yet terminated and the cause was still under the control
and jurisdiction of the court and the latter, in the exercise of its discretion,
may receive additional evidence. Sec. 3(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
clearly provides that, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant
either of the parties the right and opportunity to adduce new additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.”
Same; Same; Same; If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s
behalf it is important that he should be competent and independent.—
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be
as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e,, that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People
v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the
right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle/
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation should be engaged by the accused himself or by the latter’s
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the
court.—Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged For an individual facing
custodial investigation (if the Jatter could not afford one) should be
engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such
petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally
suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law
enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
Same; Same; Same; Under the circumstances described by the
prosecution, Atty. Saunar could not have been the independent counsel
solemnly spoken of by the Constitution.—Let us for the moment grant
arguendo that Saunar’s competence as a lawyer is beyond question.
Under the circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could
not have been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our
Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it
can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was
actually employed by the NBI a few months after. As regards appellant
Januario, Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise
appellant of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn
statement itself.
Same; Same; Same; The right to remain silent and to counsel implies a
27
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and
to contemplate an effective communication that results in an
Page
understanding of what is conveyed.—Furthermore, the right of a person
under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to remain silent
and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective communication that
results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Appellant Canape’s
sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to
reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the aforequoted
testimony of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that appellant Canape
reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have exerted more
effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Confession and admission explained in People vs.
Lorenzo.—An admission which, under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, is an “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact”
is different from a confession which, in turn, is defined in Section 33 of the
same Rule as the “declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein.” Both
may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. In
People vs. Lorenzo, the Court explained that in a confession there is an
acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the statements of fact by
the accused do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which the accused is charged.
Same; Same; Same; Verbal admission should also be made with the
assistance of counsel.—It is therefore clear that prior to the execution of
the sworn statements at the NBI head office, appellants had already made
verbal admissions of complicity in the crime. Verbal admissions, however,
should also be made with the assistance of counsel. Thus: “The verbal
admissions allegedly made by both appellants of their participation in the
crime, at the time of their arrest and even before their formal investigation,
are inadmissible, both as violative of their constitutional rights and as
hearsay evidence. These oral admissions, assuming they were in fact
made, constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions within the
meaning of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.”
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Br.
18.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose C. Claro for Rene Januario.
Florendo C. Medina for Efren Canape.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when
our nation was reeling from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and
outright violations of our people's rights to life, liberty and property. Hence,
our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of human liberty
and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigations
from ignorant, overzealous and/or incompetent peace officers. The
Constitution so dearly values freedom and voluntariness that, inter alia, it
unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer
who is not merely (a) "competent" but also (b) "independent" and (c)
"preferably of his own choice" as well.
In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of
appellants was their own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were
extracted and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a lawyer
who was applying for work in the NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be
considered "independent" because he cannot be expected to work against
the interest of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a few months
later he in fact was admitted into its work force. For this violation of their
constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal.
After the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible
evidence remains in the Court's records to overturn another constitutional
right: the right to be presumed innocent of any crime until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case No. TG-l392-
89, viz.:
WHEREFORE, and premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused:
(1) RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN
- and -
(2) EFREN CANAPE Y BAYOT
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec.
14 last sentence of R.A. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-
28
Carnapping Law and as charged against them in the Information
and pursuant to the said law, this Court hereby imposes upon the
Page
 said accused, the supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life
imprisonment.
Further, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, but
separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo
Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of:
(a) P50,000.00 for moral damages
(b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P25,000.00 for actual damages
and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
There being no evidence to warrant a finding of conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
ACQUITTING Accused SANTIAGO CID of the crime
charged. Being a detention prisoner, the City Warden of
Tagaytay City is hereby ordered to immediately release
said person from his prison cell, unless he is therein
detained for any other cause.
SO ORDERED.
The Antecedents
On November 7, 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against accused-appellants Rene
Januario and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo
Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation
of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law)2 allegedly commited as
follows:
That on or about September 4, 1987, at Barangay Bulihan,
Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, the above-named
accused, together with Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos
who (sic) still at-large, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of
force, violence and intimidation; did, then and there, willfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously, after stabbing to death the driver
Gernonimo (sic) Malibago and conductor Andrew Patriarca, take,
steal and carry away and carnap, one Isuzu passenger type
jeepney, with plate No. DFB- 550, owned by Doris and Victor
Wolf, to their damage and prejudice in the total amount of
P124,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Arraigned on February 7, 1989, appellants Januario and Canape, assisted
by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.4On May 30, 1989, Cid, assisted
by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty.5 Sarita and
Sarinos remained at large. At the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Myrna Temporas, NBI Agent Arlis S. Vela, Vicente
Dilanco Pons, Andrew Patriarca, Sr., Juliana Malibago, Atty. Magno
Toribio, and Atty. Carlos Saunar, documentary and other evidence
tending to prove the following:
Sometime in March 1988, Santiago Cid went to the house of prosecution
witness Vicente Dilanco Pens, a farmer engaged in the buy and sell
business, in Camarines Sur. Cid, Pens' cousin, asked Pens if he wanted
to buy a jeepney. Pons replied that he had no money but that he could
help him find a buyer for the jeepney for the price of P50,000.00. With
Amador Alayan, one of the drivers of his son who was around, Pons
offered to look for a buyer of the jeepney provided that Cid would entrust
the vehicle to them. Cid agreed to the proposal. At that time, Pens did not
know who owned the jeepney, but he eventually offered it for sale to
Myrna Temporas who agreed to the purchase price of P65,000.00.
However, Temporas paid Pens only the amount of P48,500.00.6
Myrna Temporas had a slightly different story. According to her, Pons said
that the jeepney was owned by his niece, Doris Wolf. Pons, purportedly
acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf, borrowed from Myrna
Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the jeepney as a collateral.
The amount was given to Pens in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a
check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared
from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris
Wolf at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who
subsequently deposited it in his account.
On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of
attorney from Doris Wolf. Pens promised to comply in one or two weeks.
But Pens failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly
went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount
borrowed but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her
house to pay.7
Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the
jeepney, Temporas lodged a complaint against him for estafa before the
29
NBI.8 Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the relatives of the
owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney
Page
and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and
conductor (deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by
carnappers.9
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation,
an NBI team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the
carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were
the "handiwork" of a group of four (4) persons named Rene Januario,
Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Tote, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo.
The team also discovered that the jeepney was disposed of through
Cid. 10
Appellants Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on
the carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with
its engine partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the
jeepney had been found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila.
From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office
on March 27, 1988, the team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took
Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where presumably they
were killed. Because appellants volunteered that their companions were
their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarinas, Cavite who could be in Manila
already, the NBI team decided to take down their statements at the NBI
head office in Manila. The team traveled with appellants to Manila, arriving
there at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 28, 1988.
At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of
appellants one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just
around somewhere," to assist appellants during the investigation Agent
Arlis Vela took the: statement of appellant Januario while Supervising
Agent Toribio took that of Canape. The first portion of the statement,
Exhibit C, taken from appellant Januario reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NA IBINIGAY NI RENE JANUARIO Y
ROLDAN SA HARAP NI NBI AGENT ARLIS E. VELA NGAYONG
IKA-28 NG MARSO 1988 SA NBI, NCR, MANILA.
TANONG Mr. RENE JANUARIO ipina-aalam namin sa
iyo na ikaw ay aming inuusig sa salang pagnakaw ng
isang jeepney at pagkapatay sa driver at conductor nito.
Gusto naming malaman mo na ikaw ay hindi maaring
pilitin na magbigay ng salaysay at kong (sic) sakaling
magbibigay ka ng salaysay, ano mang sasabihin mo rito
ay pueding (sic) gamitin laban sa iyo sa ano mang caso.
Nauunawaan mo ba ito?
SAGOT Naiintiendihan (sic) ko.
T Kailangan mo ba ang tulong ng abogado sa
ipagtatanong na ito?
S Magsalaysay (sic) lang ako nag-may abogado ako.
T May abogado ka ba sa ngayon?
S Mayroon no si Atty. CARLOS SAUNAR ay nandito para
tulongan (sic) ako.
T Nanunumpa ka na magsasabi ng katotohanan, buong
katotohanan at wala ng iba kungdi katotohanan lamang
sa nagtatanong na ito?
S Opo.
T Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at iba-ibang bagay
tungkol sa iyong pagkatao?
S RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, 26 taong gulang, binata,
isang (sic) buy and sell hanapbuhay at naninirahan sa
Puro Batya, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
xxx xxx xxx 11
According to appellant Januario, two weeks before September 1987, he
was already in the house of appellant Canape in Bgy. Palapala,
Dasmarinas, Cavite to procure chicken and "kalawit" for his business. He
also went there because his new friends named Toto Sarita and Digo
Samera (sic), as well as appellant Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer
of a jeep. Appellant Januario asked for a photograph of the jeep to assist
him in making a canvass of buyers in Bicol but he was told that he would
have it later at night because they were then having drinks in the house of
Toto.
After that drinking spree, the group agreed to fetch appellants Januario
and Canape at 4:00 o'clock the following morning. It was Digo Samera
who fetched appellants before they went to the house of Tote Sarita.
Together, they went to GMA town in Cavite. It was around 5:00 o'clock in
30
the morning when they hailed a jeep from the "looban." There after, the
following allegedly transpired:
Page
T Ano na ang nangyari noong kayo ay sumakay sa jeep?
S Ako ang naunang sumakay pagtigil noong jeep. Bago
maka-alis ang jeep nagsalita si TOTO SARITA na nasa
baba pa kasama sina EFREN CANAPE at DIGO na
'HINTAY ka muna may naiwanan pa ako. Sumakay si
Digo sa tapat ng conductor na nasa loob ng jeep
samantalang si TOTO ay pumuesto sa bandang kanan sa
unahan ng jeep at si EFREN ay sa bandang kaliwa rin ng
jeep tapat ng driver at sabay si EFREN at TOTO na
sumakay sa unahan ng jeep at mabilis na tinulak ni
EFREN ang driver patungo kay TOTO na siyang tumutok,
(sic) sa driver ng isang sandata balisong 29. Habang
nangyayari iyon ay tinutukan naman ni DIGO na nasa
loob ng jeep ang conductor na pinasubsub ang ulo
habang tinutukan ng 29. Ang sabi sa akin ni DIGO ay
"REN igapos mo ito" at inabutan niya ako ng isang
panyong panali. Sa aking kabiglaanan ako ay napasunod
at tinali ko iyong conductor.
T Ano na ang sumunod na nangyari matapos matalian
mo ang conductor?
S Napansin ko na lang na maneho na ni TOTO Sarita
ang jeep na kanyang pinasibad habang ang driver ay
nakatali na rin at ako naman ay sinabihan ni DIGO na
hawakan iyong conductor sa balikat habang tinutukan no
patalim ni DIGO. Ang conductor ay nagsasalita na siya ay
nasasaktan dahil nakatusok na ang patalim sa kanyang
leeg o batok.
T Ano ang nangyari matapos na matutukan ang
conductor at driver at habang nagmamaneho Si TOTO?
S Mula sa lugar na iyon pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay
biglang iniliko sa isang-maliit na lupang kalsada na
napapaligiran ng tubo at talahib at doon ay hininto ang
sasakyan:
T Ano na ang sumonod (sic) na nangyari sa lugar na iyon
matapos na maihinto ang jeep?
S Unang bumaba po ay si TOTO na hawak ang driver
pababa at itinulak ang driver sa may tobohan (sic). Si
EFREN ay sumonod (sic) hanggang sa may gilid ng
karsada' habang si TOTO ay tuloy sa tobohan (sic) na
dala ang driver. Si DIGO naman ay tinulak ang conductor
hawak-hawak sa buhok at ang sabi naman sa akin ay
hawakan ko ang balikat. Kinuha sa akin ang conductor ni
DIGO at dinala sa may tubuhan (sic) at akin na lang
narinig na ang pag-ungol no conductor dahil malapit lang
iyon sa sasakyan.
T Nakikita mo ba sila DIGO at ang conductor habang siya
ay umuungol?
S Hindi ko na po nakita kasi nasa tubohan na.
T Sila TOTO at ang driver nasaan sila habang naririnig
mong umuungol ang conductor?
S Pumasok po sa tubohan hindi ko na sila makita.
T Ano na ang nangyari matapos na dalhin ni TOTO ang
driver at ni DIGO naman ang conductor sa tobohan (sic)?
S Mga ilang minuto lang po ay bumalik na sila sa
sasakyan at kami sumakay na at si TOTO ang
nagmaneho ng sasakyan at tuloy-tuloy na kami sa Bikol,
sa Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
T Noong kayo ay umalis sa tubohan na iyon, nasaan na
noon ang driver at ang conductor?
S Wala na no.
T May napansin ka ba kina DIGO at TOTO noong sila ay
sumakay sa jeep galing sa tubuhan (sic)?
S Humihingal sila po na parang pagod at napansin ko na
may dugo ang kamay ni DIGO at ang damit at pantalon
naman ni TOTO ay may tilamsik (sic) ng dugo.
xxx xxx xxx 12
Appellant Januario described the driver as more than fifty years old, Of
31
medium build, and with gray hair and a fine nose. Upon reaching
Page
Libmanan, they went directly to Santiago Cid with whom appellant
Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. Appellant
Januario did nor know to whom the jeep was sold but he knew that Cid
approached Vicente Pens. The latter gave appellant Januario P1,000
cash and rice and eggs worth around P600. A second jeep was brought
by Tote and Digo to
Roger Abajero. Cid brought both appellants to the house of Roger. Later,
the jeep was impounded at the NBI Naga City office.
Appellant Januario signed and thumbmarked his statement which was
sworn before NBI Executive Director Salvador R. Ranin. It was also
Signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar "as counsel."
Appellant Canape's sworn statement, Exhibit I, was taken by Atty. Magno
V. Toribio, a supervising NBI Agent. Quoted in full, the statement reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI (BINIGAY NI EFREN CANAPE y
BAYOT KAY AGENTS MAGNO V. TORIBIO AND TOMAS C.
ENRILE MGA AHENTE NG NBI DITO SA NCR, NBI, MANILA,
NGAYONG IKA 27 NG MARSO 1988.
1. TANONG Ginoong EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ikaw
ay aming iniimbistigahan ngayon tungkol sa pagnanakaw
ing isang Izuzu (sic) type jitney sa Silang, Cavite sa
pagkamatay ng conductor nito noong buwan ng
Septembyre (sic) 1988. Bago ka namin tanungin aming
ipinaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng
Saligang Batas. Una, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag
magbigay ng salaysay sa imbistigasyon na ito, at
manahimik. Ano mang sabihin mo dito ay puweding
gamitin laban sa iyo sa asunto Kriminal o civil. Ikalawa
ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng iyong abogado
upang tulungan ka saimbistigasyon na ito. At kung gusto
mo pero wala kang pambayad sa sirbesyon (sic) nito,
ikaw ay bibigyan ng NBI ng libre. Matapos mong
malaman ang iyong mga karapatan, ikaw ba ay
nakahandang magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay?
ANSWER Opo, sir.
T Kung ganoon sabihin mo ang iyong buong pangalan,
tirahan at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na pweding
pagkakakilalanan sa sa iyong pagkatao?
S Ako is EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, 31 anyos and idad
(sic), kasal kay AIDA ROLDAN, isang mag-sasaka (sic)
nakatapos ng ika-limang baitang sa elementarya, at at sa
kasalukuyan ay naninirahan sa Bgy. Sibuho, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur.
T Ikaw ba ay may nalalaman sa pagkanakaw ng isang
Malaguena type type Jeepney sa Bulihan, Silang, Cavite
noong buwan ng Septyembre 1988?
S Opo, sir.
T Kung ganoon sabihin mo sa mga imbistigador na ito
kung paano ang buong pangyayari?
S Kasi nung (sic) minsan ako ay mapasyal sa Bgy.
Crossing, sakop ng Dasmarinas, Cavite noong mga
buwan ng Agosto 1987 kami ay nagkita ng aking aking
Kaibigan na si 'TOTO' SARETA at ang kanyang kasama
na si DIGO (complete name unknown) at ako ay kanyang
sinabihan na humanap ng buyer ng isang jeep. Kaya, ng
(sic) ako ay umuwi na ng Libaman, Camarines Sur ako ay
humanap (sic) ng taong interesado na bumili ng nasabing
Jeep, katulung si RENE JANUARIO na taga bayan ng
Libmanan. Ang aming nakitang interesado sa jeep ay si
SANTIAGO CID. Kaya ang aming ginawa ni RENE ay
bumalik sa Bgy. Crossing, Dasmarinas, Cavite para
ipaalam kina TOTO SARETA na kami ay nakakuha na ng
buyer. Ng gabing yaon na kami ay dumating kami ay
niyaya nina TOTO na mag inuman at habang kami ay
nag-iinuman sinabi ni TOTO na may makukuha na kami
na jeep. Mga bandang alas kuwatro ng madaling araw,
kami ay niyaya na nlna TOTO na kunin na ang jeep. Kami
ay lumakad na papuntang Bulihan Silang, Cavite,
Pagdatlng namin doon, kami ay naghintay ng mga ilang
minuto. Ng (sic) dumaan ang isang Jeep na wala pang
(sic) pasahero, ito ay pinara ni DIGO at kami ay sumakay.
Mga ilang minuto naman lumipas habang ang diyep (sic)
ay tumatakbo papuntang Alabang ay naglabas ng patalim
sin TOTO at DIGO at tinutukan ang driver at ang
kundoktor. Tapos kami ni RENE ay sinabihan (sic) din
nila na maglabas ng patalim at tutukan din ang driver at
ang kundoktor (sic). Pagdating namin sa Bgy. Maguyam,
sakop din ng Silang sapilitang (sic) ibinaba nina TOTO,
32
DIGO at RENE ang driver at ang kundoktor (sic) at dinala
sa loob ng tubuhan. Ako ay naiwan sa loob ng jeep. Hindi
Page
naman natagalan ay lumabas na ang tatlo galing sa loob
ng tubuhan, hindi na kasama ang driver at and kundoktor
(sic). Tapos, narining ko kay TOTO na ayos na daw'. Ang
sunod naming ginawa ay pinatakbo na namin ang jeep
papuntang Libmanan. Pagdating namin sa Libmanan
dumerretso (sic). kay SANTIAGO CID at ibinigay na
namin sa kanya jeep. Ang sabi naman ni SANTIAGO ay
dadalhin niya ang jeep kay VICENTE PONS na taga
Libmanan din.
T Alam mo ba ang nangyari sa driver at konduktor (sic)
ng Jeep na inagaw niyo?
S Ang pag-kaalam ko ho sa sabi ni TOTO na 'ayos na'
ang ibig sabihin ay patay na sila.
T Sino naman ang VICENTE PONS na ito?
S sabi sa amin ni SANTIAGO si VICENTE PONS ay ang
kanyang nakuhang buyer ng jeep.
T Sa pagkaalam mo ba ay talagang binili ni VICENTE
PONS and Jeep?
S Opo, sir.
T Magkano naman ang pagkabili ni VICENTE PONS?
S Hindi ko po alam kung magkano ang iksaktong halaga,
pero ang presyo sa amin ni SANTIAGO ay P25,000.00.
T Nang dalhin ha ninyo ang jeep kay SANTIAGO ay agad
ninyong dinala at pinagbili rin kay VICENTE PONS?
S Opo, ng araw din na iyon.
T Magkano ha ang paunang bayad kung mayroon man,
na ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS sa inyo?
A Ang alam ko ho ay P4,000.00 ang ibinigay ni VICENTE
PONS kay SANTIAGO dahil siya ang kausap nito.
T Magkano naman ang halagang naparte mo?
S Ako ho ay binigyan ni SANTIAGO ng P1,000.00?
T Ito bang pag-pabili ninyo ng jeep kay VICENTE PONS
ay may kasulatan?
S Wala po.
T Kailan pa ang mga sumunod na bayad na ibinigay sa
inyo ni VICENTE PONS?
S Hindi ko na ho masyadong matandaan ang iksaktong
oras na kanyang pagbayad at kung magkano basta ang
pag-kaalam ko ay mga tatlong beses lang siyang
naghulog at iyon ay kanyang ibinibigay kay SANTIAGO.
Si SANTIAGO naman ang siyang nag-bibigay (sic) sa
amin.
T Ito bang si SANTIAGO CID at si VICENTE PONS ay
alam kung saan at paano ninyo nakuha ang jeep?
S Opo, sir
T Nasaan na ngayon sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO?
S Sa Dasmarinas, Cavite ho.
T Hindi na ba sila napupuntang Libmanan?
S Bihira na ho sir. Pumupunta lang ho sila kung kukuha
ng pera
T Sa pagkaalam mo, mayroon pa ba silang ibang Jeep na
dinala sa Libmanan?
S Mayroon pa ho akong nalaman kay SANTIAGO CID,
na may isa pang jeep na dinala daw sina TOTO at DIGO
sa kanya at kanya namang ibenenta kay Mr. ROGELIO
ABAJERO, na taga Libmanan din.
T Ano pa ang ibang alam mo tungkul (sic) dito sa
pangalawa jeep, na ibenenta (sic) nila kay Mr.
ABAJERO?
33
S Wala na ho sir.
Page
 T Iyung tungkol sa unang jeep na ibenenta kay Mr.
VICENTE PONS, alam mo ba kung nasaan na iyon
ngayon?
S Hindi ko rin po alam kung saan dinala ni Mr. PONS.
T Ito bang sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO ay matagal mo
ang kakilala?
S Matagal no ho sir, dahil sa ako ay ipinanganak din sa
Dasmarinas, Cavite at doon din lumaki. Sila ho ay aking
mga kababayan at matalik kung mga kaibigan.
T Nung ikaw ba ay sabihan nina TOTO na humanap ng
buyer ng jeep alam mo ba na ang jeep na iyon ay
nanakawin lamang?
S Opo, sir.
T Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong sa
iyo, ikaw ba ay mayroon pa ibig sabihin?
S Wala na po, KATAPUSAN NG SALAYSAY.
(Signed and thumbmarked)
EFREN B. CANAPE
Nagsalaysay
SINGED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Illegible signature) (Illegible signature)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 27th
day of March 1988 at NBI National Capital Region,
Manila. I likewise certify that I have carefully examined
the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that he voluntarily
executed his statement and understood the same.
(Signed)
Atty. ARLIS E. VELA
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)13
After the investigation, appellants went with the NBI agents in searching
for their companions." 14
Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son,
Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to the police detachment in
Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang and Imus, Cavite.
Two weeks after September 4, 1987, the body of 23 year-old Andrew
Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head
was severed from his body. 15 The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago,
stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, 16 was recovered after
the harvest of sugarcane in the plantation 17 in Maguyam. 18 Malibago's
widow identified the body from its clothing. 19
On September 12, 1989, the prosecution formally offered its
evidence, 20 which the court duly admitted 21 For its part, the defense,
through counsel, manifested its intention to file a demurrer to evidence.
However, because the defense had not yet presented accused Cid, the
court on November 21, 1989, ordered the cancellation of his bail bond and
gave his surety thirty days within which to show cause why judgment
against the bond should not be rendered. The defense counsel, Atty. Jose
Claro, was likewise required to explain why he should not be held in
contempt of court for his failure to file a demurrer to evidence. 22
For failure of the defense counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing
dates and to file the promised demurrer to evidence, the court on
December 22, 1989, issued an order stating that the "accused may no
longer at this time be allowed to present their Demurrer to Evidence." It
scheduled dates for the presentation of defense evidence and appointed
Atty. Oscar Zaldivar as counsel de oficio for the defendants. 23
Nevertheless, on December 26, 1989, counsel for the defense Claro
mailed a "demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss on (sic) insufficiency
of
evidence." 24 On January 10, 1990, the trial court denied the motion
finding that the demurrer did not "contain any reason compelling enough
to recall the previous order," disallowing the filing of said pleading. 25
On February 8, 1990, upon the manifestation of Atty. Claro that appellants
would no longer present evidence, the trial court issued an order
considering the case terminated as far as appellants were concerned.
However, it granted a "reservation" to present evidence as regards Cid.
The trial court further directed Atty. Claro to present Cid before the court
on March 9, 1990. It ordered the filing of memoranda "as the case of
accused Januario and Canope (sic) is now considered closed." It set the
"partial promulgation of judgment" on March 9, 1990 "insofar as the two
34
(2) accused are concerned." 26
Page
On March 1, 1990, appellants' counsel filed their memorandum. 27
On March 9, 1990, the trial court did not make a "partial promulgation of
judgment." Instead, it ordered the "continuation of proceedings for
purposes of rebuttal evidence." 28
On the same day, the defense presented Santiago Cid as a witness. He
testified that a certain Raul Repe, Tote Sarita and Digo Sarreal
approached him about the sale of the jeepney. He referred them to
Vicente Pens who he thought would buy the vehicle. He knew appellants
were "i" from Libmanan but did not see them during the transaction for the
sale of the jeepney. 29
On March 27, 1990, the Court denied defense counsel Claro's motion to
cancel the hearing scheduled for that day. Noting the presence of Atty.
Carlos Saunar, a prosecution witness whose attendance during
Scheduled trial dates had been delayed, and citing the "imperatives of
justice," the trial court issued an order directing that the testimony of said
witness should be heard that day. 30 In the absence of the counsel of
record for the defense; the trial court reiterated the appointment of Atty.
Oscar Zaldivar as counsel de oficio.
Atty. Saunar testified that he joined the NBI sometime in May or June
1988. In March 1988, while still in private practice, he was at the NBI head
office handling a client case when Arty. Vela, an NBI agent, approached
him. The latter and Arty. Toribio introduced him to appellants and Cid.
Vela and Toribio told him that the three had verbally confessed to
participation in a crime and that they needed his assistance as they were
about to execute their sworn statements. 31 Saunar agreed to assist the
three suspects and allegedly explained to them the consequences of their
confession. He also supposedly told them individually, and in Tagalog,
their constitutional rights, like their rights to be silent and to counsel and
that whatever they would say could be used against them. 32
Saunar identified his signature in the sworn statement of appellant
Januario. However, he could no longer recall which of the three accused
,appellant Canape although he admitted that the latter's face was
"familiar." 33 He was certain, however, that he participated in the taking of
appellant Canape's sworn statement on March 28, 1988. He admitted that
his signature does not appear on appellant Canape's sworn statement but
he could "only surmise" that he did not sign the same sworn statement
because either it was not presented to him immediately after the
statement was taken or that it had been misplaced. 34
After receiving Saunar's testimony, the trial court asked the prosecution
whether it was presented as rebuttal testimony. Answering in the positive,
the prosecutor reminded the court that when Saunar could not be
presented as a witness, he had made a reservation to call him as
"additional evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal" testimony.
Clarifying this, the court said that as against Cid, the testimony was a
principal one but a rebuttal as far as the appellants were concerned. 35
On May 11, 1990, the defense manifested that it was closing its case. The
prosecution having waived its right to present "any rebuttal evidence," the
trial court issued an order requiring the filing of the parties' respective
memoranda. 36 On June 27, 1990, the trial court rendered the herein
questioned Decision. 37
The Issues
In their separate briefs filed by their respective counsel (Atty. Jose C.
Claro for Januario and Any. Florendo C. Medina for Canape), appellants
ascribe basically two errors against the trial court:
(1) The trial procedure, particularly the presentation and admission Of the
testimony of Arty. Carlos Saunar, was irregular and prejudicial to the
appellants; and
(2) The extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in
evidence for having been extracted in violation of their constitutional right
to counsel.
Insisting that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
appellant Januario contends that the trial court erred in admitting in
evidence his sworn statement before the NBI and the testimony of Arty.
Saunar as rebuttal or additional witness after the prosecution had rested
its case, he (appellant Januario) had filed his memorandum, and the
decision had been scheduled for promulgation. 38
For his part, appellant Canape also claims that his guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He questions the trial court's having
given "weight and sufficiency" to his extra-judicial confession. 39
Appellant Januario contends that the trial court erred in allowing the
presentation of Saunar as a witness after the prosecution had closed its
case and offered its documentary evidence. Saunar could not in any guise
be considered as a rebuttal witness simply because there was no defense
evidence to rebut.
35
The Court's Ruling
Page
The First Issue: Order of Trial
The pertinent provisions of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court state:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the
following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the
charge, and in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his
defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance
of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, in the furtherance of
justice, permits them to present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the cases shall be
deemed submitted unless the court directs the parties to
argue orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or
omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial procedure as outlined in this rule is ordinarily followed to insure
the orderly conduct of litigations to attain the magisterial objective of the
Rules of Court to protect the parties' substantive rights. 40 However, strict
observance of the Rules depend upon the circumstances obtaining in
each case at the discretion of the trial judge. Thus, as early as 1917, this
Court explained:
. . . . The orderly course of proceedings requires,
however, that the prosecution shall go forward and should
present all of its proof in the first instance; but it is
competent for the judge, according to the nature of the
case, to allow a party who has closed his case to
introduce further evidence in rebuttal. This rule, however,
depends upon the particular circumstances of each
particular case, and falls within the sound discretion of the
judge, to be exercised or not as he may think proper. 41
Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his
case or even after the defense has moved for dismissal, to present in-
voluntarily omitted evidence. 42 The primary consideration is whether the
trial court still has jurisdiction over the case. Thus
The claim that the lower court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to
introduce new evidence is devoid of any merit, for while the prosecution
had rested, the trial was not yet terminated and the cause was still under
the control and jurisdiction Of the court and the latter, in the exercise of its
discretion, may receive additional evidence. Sec. 3(9), Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides that, in the furtherance of justice, the court
may grant either of the parties the right and opportunity to adduce new
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. 43
Saunar's testimony was admitted in evidence before the trial court
rendered its Decision. Undoubtedly then, the court a quo retained its
jurisdiction even though the prosecution had rested its case. As to
appellants, Saunar was an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal
witness, because the defense waived presentation of evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case. 44 Saunar was, therefore, a rebuttal
witness with respect to accused Cid. 45
The Second Issue: Appellants' Right to Counsel
Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants
is, however, not a guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had
been taken in accordance with Article 111, Section 12(1) of the
Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than
"competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice."
Elucidating on this particular constitutional requirement, this Court has
taught:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms
absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition
in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded
to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions
of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal
conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment
based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent
lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be
as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
36
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he Is
Page
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People
v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the
right to remain silent and to counsel 'contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged
by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic. 46
We find that Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his
custodial investigation counsel. Thus, NBI Agent Arlis Vela testified:
Q Now, considering that they were then under your custody, and
under investigation, were they represented by counsel during the
time that you took their statements?
A Yes, sir. They were.
Q Do you recall who was that counsel who represented them?
A Atty. Carlos Saunar, sir.
Q Was he the counsel of their own choice, or was the counsel
furnished by your office?
A Because they were not represented by counsel of their own
choice, we got the service of Atty. Carlos Saunar who helped
them. 47
xxx xxx xxx
Q And Atty. Saunar is connected with the NBI?
A At that time, he was at the NBI Office. He was just somewhere
around.
Q And it was the NBI who requested Saunar to assist Mr. Rene
Januario in the investigation?
A We requested him, because he was just around,
sir. 48 (Emphasis supplied.)
As regards Saunar's assistance as counsel for appellant Canape,
investigating NBI Agent Magno Toribio testified as follows:
Q Now, with regards to your advice that he has a right to counsel,
and to seek assistance of a counsel of his own choice if he does
not have one, and to remain silent, and if he does not have a
lawyer, you will furnish One, for him, now what was his answer?
WITNESS:
According to him, he does not need a lawyer, but despite that
refusal to have a lawyer. . .
COURT:
That is not refusal. That is manifestation that he does not need a
lawyer. He did not refuse. He raid, he does not need a lawyer.
WITNESS:
Although, he does not need a lawyer, we provided him a lawyer
by the name of Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was present during the
investigation, and who advised him of the consequences of the
statements that he will give, and he did not refuse.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, how did you know that Atty. Saunar gave him advice gave
accused Canape advice?
A Because we were present.
Q Now, when did Atty. Saunar give that advice to accused
Canape, was it before, during, or after the taking of this
37
statement?
Page
A Before, during, and after the taking of the statement.
Q Now, may we know from you why Atty. Saunar was present A I think he is from Bicol.
there?
xxx xxx xxx
A He was present the because be was then applying for the
position of NBI agent. Q Now, how many times have you requested Atty. Saunar to
assist a person under your investigation in the NBI office, other
FISCAL VELAZCO: than this? A I cannot remember anymore.

Was he the only lawyer who was present there? Q You always ask him to assist if there is no lawyer available, or
the person to be investigated has no lawyer?
A I remember, Atty. Claro, sometimes is there, representing
another client. 49 A If he is around. 50 (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx Let us for the moment grant arguendo that Saunar's competence as a
lawyer is beyond question. Under the circumstances described by the
Q Now, Atty. Saunar is employed with the NBI office, am I right? prosecution however, he could not have been the independent counsel
solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a position
in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
A Yes, sir.
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months
after. As regards appellant Januario, Saunar might have really been
Q When was he employed at the NBI office? Tell us the exact around to properly apprise appellant of his constitutional right as reflected
date? in the written sworn statement itself.

COURT: However, the same cannot be said about appellant Canape. Clearly, he
was not properly informed of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily
If you can. informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants
to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for
WITNESS: counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request,
are simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. 51 In this
Maybe in September. case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and
posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative
answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to
ATTY CLARO:
counsel of his own choice.

19?
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative
A 1988. obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to con-
template an effective communication that results in an understanding of
Q But he was always frequent in the NBI office because he was to what is conveyed. 52 Appellant Canape's sworn statement, which reads
be employed, is that what you mean? and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this
requirement. Neither does the aforequoted testimony of NBI Agent
Toribio. Bearing in mind that appellant Canape reached only the fifth

38
A He was applying.
grade, the NBI agents should have exerted more effort in explaining to
him his constitutional rights.

Page
Q And from where is he?
Moreover, there is enough reason to doubt whether appellant Canape
was in fact and in truth assisted by counsel. Atty. Saunar affirmed on the
witness stand that he assisted appellants on March 28, 1988. 53 However,
the sworn statement itself reveals that it was taken on March 27, 1988. No
satisfactory explanation was made by the prosecution on this discrepancy.
All that Agent Vela stated was that they conducted an oral investigation in
Naga City on March 27, 1988 and that investigation at the NBI Manila
head office was made in the afternoon of March 28, 1988. 54
Apparently attempting to avoid the questions on whether appellants
admitted complicity in the crime, Agent Toribio testified:
ATTY. CLARO:
When you were conducting an investigation, and you saw me at
the NBI building, Naga City, you were' referring to the
investigation of Mr. Canape, am I right?

The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of appellants'

A Yes, sir.
constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section
12 (1) of Article m of the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the
third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that Q And that investigation you were conducting was reduced to
an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the writing, and that is now Exhibit "G", am I right?
assistance of counsel; otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence
against the person so admitting. 55 A That is not.

An admission which, under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Q But you investigated Mr. Canape in Naga City at the NBI
is an "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact" is building, am I right, tell the Court?
different from a confession which, in turn, is defined in Section 33 of the
same Rule as the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of A At that time, we were taking the statement of the woman, the
the Offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein." Both complainant, in the estafa case, and the; other witnesses.
may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing.
In People vs. Lorenzo, 56 the Court explained that in a confession there is COURT:
an acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the statements of fact
by the accused do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt or of
You mean, at the time you investigated that estafa complaint, that
the criminal intent to commit the offense with which the accused is
was the time when you also investigated Canape, is that what you
charged.
mean?
Appellants verbally intimated facts relevant to the commission of the crime
FISCAL VELAZCO:
to the NBI agents in Naga City. This is shown by the testimony of NBI
Agent Vela that, based on the facts gathered from interviews of people in
that city, they "invited" and questioned appellants, thus: No, your Honor.

Q Now, tell us, what was your purpose in inviting these two (2) COURT:
people?
But there is a question of counsel. You better clarify that.
A That was in connection with the vehicle I mentioned earlier, in
connection with the carnapping incident mentioned earlier. WITNESS:

Q You invited them in connection with the carnapping because He was asking me if I had already taken the statement of Canape.
you want to, know from them actually what they know about the

39
carnapping, am I correct? COURT:

Page
A Precisely, that is right. 57 That is it, sir, Naga City. That is the question.
WITNESS: A We conducted an investigation. When we took the statement of
the other witnesses, complainant and witnesses.
Not yet. We were only asking him.
COURT:
ATTY. CLARO:
Does that satisfy you?
By him, whom are you referring to:
ATTY. CLARO:
A The complainants and the witnesses, sir.
No.
Q All right. You were with Atty. Vela when you conducted an
investigation to (sic) Mr. Canape, am I right? In Naga City? COURT;

WITNESS: Please clarify the question.

Yes, sir. WITNESS:

Q And Mr. Vela at that time, was also conducting an investigation It is true that we were sometimes talking with those people, but
to (sic) a certain Rene Januario in Naga City, is that right? not investigating them yet. 58 (Emphasis supplied.)

A. No. We took the statement in Manila. Note should also be taken of the fact that according to Atty. Saunar, when
he acceded to be the custodial investigation counsel of appellants, the
COURT: latter had already confessed. Thus:

You took the statement in Manila. How about in Naga, that is the COURT:
question of counsel?
There is one thing that he would like to add, 'that I talked to the
A Naga, no statement yet. accused one by one,' you want to add something?

ATTY. CLARO:
Mr. Toribio, because you were with Mr. Vela, Mr. Vela did not
conduct any investigation to (sic) Mr. Januario, one of the
accused in this case, in Naga City? Tell the Court?
A And I confirmed with them whether they are confessing to their
crime, and they said yes. In fact, from what I: observed, they have
already confessed to the NBI agents.
COURT:

A Not yet at that time, because it was useless. The crime was All of them confessed?
committed in Silang, Cavite. They will have to be brought to
Manila for the appropriate Judge or Fiscal. A Yes, your Honor, because they also told me what happened .

COURT: FISCAL VELAZCO:

40
Page
So, you are claiming that you did not conduct any investigation of
Canape?
Now, when they informed you that they intend to confess, now,
did you explain to them, to the accused or to the persons under
investigation the consequences of confessing?
A Yes, that is basic. I informed them of their rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and whatever they will confess there will be used
against them during the trial of this case.
Q How about that ultimate consequence of admission?
A Yes. I told them that if they confess, they will have to go to
prison.
Q And what were their answers?
A Actually, they have already confessed to their crime before I
talked to them.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
Your Honor, the witness has just answered during the preliminary
question of the Fiscal that at the time his assistance was sought
by the NBI, the accused had in fact already confessed.
COURT:
I am now asking him, have you said that?
A They have already confessed.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
We can review the transcript of stenographic notes.
COURT:
What do you mean by that?
A They were still confessing at that time, your Honor.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
I just want to manifest into the record that they have already
confessed; that the witness has just repeated the word .
COURT:
But there is an explanation by him. Put that on record, all of them.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, did you verify whether that confession was only verbal or in
writing?
A That was only verbal that is why there is a need for the sworn
statement to be taken. That was the time that I was telling them
that they can be put to jail. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
It is therefore clear that prior to the execution of the sworn statements at
the NBI head office, appellants had already made verbal admissions of
complicity in the crime. Verbal admissions, however, should also be made
with the assistance of counsel. Thus:
The verbal admissions allegedly made by both appellants
of their participation in the crime, at the time of their arrest
and even before their formal investigation, are
inadmissible, both as violative of their constitutional rights
and as hearsay evidence. These oral admissions,
assuming they were in fact made, constitute uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions within the meaning of Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution. 60
That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the
crime in Naga City is shown by the fact that the NBI agents brought them
to Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other culprits who could be
either in Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral admissions in
Naga City resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila,
the latter had become as constitutionally infirm as the former. In People
vs. Alicando, 61 this Court explained the ramifications of an irregularly
counselled confession or admission:
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda
warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the
41
libertarian exclusionary rules known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Page
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. According to this rule, once theprimary
 source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The fruit
of the poisonous tree is at least once removed from the
illegally seized evidence, but is equally inadmissible. The
rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence sub- sequently obtained.
Appellants might have indeed committed the crime in concert with Eliseo
Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos. However, what could have been their
valuable admissions and confessions as far as the prosecution was
concerned were sullied and rendered inadmissible by the irregular manner
by which the law enforcement agents extracted such admissions and
confessions from appellants Without such statements, the remaining
prosecution evidence — consisting mostly of hearsay testimony and
investigation reports — is sorely inadequate to prove appellants'
participation in the crime.
Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the mandate of Section 12
of the Bill of Rights but, after making "inquiries" from appellants about the
crime, they likewise illegally detained appellants as shown by the
admission of one of the NBI agents that appellants were deprived of their
liberty while in their custody. 62 Appellants were even made to travel for
ten (10) hours 63 from Naga City to Manila just so their formal confessions
could be executed in the latter city. According to NBI Agent Vela, they
"actually arrested" the appellants when the court issued the warrant for
their arrest. 64 The records show however that the NBI turned appellants
over to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo in Cavite only
on March 30, 1989. On the same day, the same court turned them back to
the NBI for "detention during pendency of the case. 65
Epilogue
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies
in apprehending violators of the law especially those involving syndicates.
It sympathizes with the public clamor for the bringing of criminals before
the altar of justice. However, quick solution of crimes and the consequent
apprehension of malefactors are not the end-all and be- all of law
enforcement. Enforcers of the law must follow the procedure mandated by
the Constitution and the law. Otherwise, their efforts would be
meaningless. And their expenses in trying to solve crimes would
constitute needless expenditures of taxpayers' money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic
constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome
investigative and prosecutory powers of government. The admonition
given by this Court to government officers, particularly those involved in
law enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case of People
vs. Cuizon, 66 where NBI agents mishandled a drug bust operation and in
so doing violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests
and illegal searches and seizures, is again called for and thus reiterated in
the case at bench, to wit:
. . . In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would
have no right to expect Ordinary people to be law abiding if we do
not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
Prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal
search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged
evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
were Obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the
name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid
breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration
of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the
efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to Preserve the
peace and security of Society, we nevertheless admonish them to
act with deliberate care anti within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means. 67
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape are ACQUITTED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Director, National Bureau of investigation " order
that Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos, who are still at large, may be
apprehended and this time properly investigated and prosecuted
The accused-appellants are hereby ORDERED RELEASED immediately
unless they are being detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED,
42
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Page
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67422-24 October 31, 1984
FERNANDO VALDEZ alias WILSON VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch XVI, Kabacan,
North Cotabato, respondents.
Evidence; Judges; A trial judge should limit himself to clarificatory
questions and not ask searching questions after witness has given direct
testimony.—To be sure a trial judge has the right, nay even the duty, to
address questions to witnesses. But the questions should be clarificatory;
they should not build the case for any of the adversaries.
Same; Same; Same.—In his memorandum the respondent judge claims
that he “did not proceed with the trial but merely sought clarifications on
vital aspects taken up in the hearing of April 7, 1983.” The explanation of
the respondent judge is belied by the transcript which shows that he
asked the private complainant searching questions and this is reflected on
pages 4 to 12 of the transcript.
Same; Criminal Procedure; A judge may not hold a trial of a criminal case
in the absence of counsel for accused.—The statement of the respondent
judge that he wanted to protect the right of the accused to a speedy trial is
not appreciated. He “protected” the rights of the accused by holding a trial
in the absence of the latter’s counsel. If an accused has a “protector” like
the respondent judge, there is no need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor.
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that the accused did not
complain of delay in the trial of his case probably because he was not
there. At any rate if the respondent judge had wanted to expedite the trial
he should have appointed a temporary counsel for the accused.
Same; Same; Where trial is held inside the judge’s chamber, the accused
is entitled to be personally inside the chamber and not another room.—
The respondent judge claims, however, “that the accused together with
his guard were at the door of a make-shift room, so-called judge’s
chamber.” This might well have been the case but the accused was
entitled as of right to be inside the room because it was his liberty and
honor which were at stake.
Judges; Trial judge should have prudently inhibited himself.—The petition
which questions the actuations of the respondent judge and seeks his
disqualification was received by him on March 29, 1984. Prudence
dictated that he refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold
in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court.
But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted
precipitated by deciding the cases on April 2, 1984, and promulgating his
decision on May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of the respondent
judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of North Cotabato, Br. XVI. Aquilizan, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari which was posted on March 22, 1984, in
Cotabato City by speed airmail but was received only on April 26, 1984.
The petitioner is accused of rape in three cases — Criminal Case Nos. 13,
14 and 15 — filed in the court presided by the respondent judge. The
private complainant is the same in all the three cases but the rapes were
alleged to have been committed on different dates, namely: February 10,
1982, March 17, 1982 and April 10, 1982.
The petition seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the
respondent judge and to disqualify him from the case. Because the
verified petition imputed serious irregularities to the respondent judge, this
Court issued a temporary restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining
him from further proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15.
In the comment which the respondent judge was required to submit, he
said that he had already decided the three cases. (Petitioner Wilson
Valdez was convicted of rape in each of the three cases and was
sentenced to three reclusion perpetua plus indemnity.) The decision is
dated April 2, 1984, but the petitioner claims that it was promulgated on
43
May 3, 1984, without the presence of his counsel and even of the Fiscal;
that no notice was issued in respect of the promulgation; and that no copy
Page
of the decision was given to the defense counsel of record.
The case was set for hearing on August 6, 1984, and thereafter the Court A. Yes, your Honor.
issued a resolution which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
COURT: Proceed Fiscal.
At the hearing this morning the following appeared: Attys. Jose V.
Juan and Antonio T. Nicolas of the Special Appealed Cases FISCAL FULVADORA:
Division, Citizens' Legal Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice,
Padre Faura, Manila, for the petitioner; respondent Judge Q You mentioned about a pair of scissors used by the accused.
Gregorio U. Aquilizan on his own behalf; and North Cotabato Showing to you this scissors, what relation is this scissors which
Provincial Fiscal Aquiles Narajos who brought the record of
was used by the accused in threatening you on February 10,
Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 in the sala of the respondent
1982?
judge.
A Yes, sir, this is the one being used by him.
Counsels for the petitioner mentioned several irregularities said to
have been committed by the respondent judge in the handling of
the case above-mentioned. Resort to the record proved to be COURT:
fruitless because it was grossly deficient.
Q Is this the very scissors that you saw when he pressed it?
Counsels for the petitioner are hereby given ten (10) days from
notice hereof to submit a memorandum specifying the A Yes, your Honor.
irregularities said to have been committed by the respondent
judge with supporting evidence. A copy of the memorandum shall Q When was this used by the accused Wilson Valdez?
be furnished to the respondent judge who is required to answer
the same point by point within ten (10) days from receipt. (Rollo, A On February 10, 1982, your Honor.
p. 127.)
FISCAL FULVADORA:
The memoranda are now before this Court and the immediate reaction is
that the petition is highly impressed with merit.
May we request that this scissors Identified by the witness be
marked as Exh. "F", your Honor.
In the hearing of the three criminal cases on May 26, 1983, the private
complainant was to be cross- examined inasmuch as her direct
COURT: têñ.£îhqwâ£
examination had been finished at the previous hearing on April 7, 1983.
On May 26, the private prosecutor, Atty. Norberto Ela, was absent.
Thereafter, the respondent judge stated: "It appears in the records that Mark it.
the complaining witness is still under cross. It is the Honorable Judge who
is examining her ... (Addressing the witness) During the last hearing of Q Please demonstrate to the Court how this Exh. "F" was used by
this case, the Honorable Court reserved its right to cross examine you on the accused in intimidating you?
your testimony." And the respondent judge examined the witness but the
examination is better described as direct rather than cross. Witness the A (Witness demonstrating to the Court)
following:
The witness demonstrating to the supposed victim the pressing of
COURT: ... After going over the records of the cases and the the pointed scissors at the left side abdomen.
supposed exhibits, you mentioned about a pair of scissors used to

44
intimidate you, coerced and forced by the accused, by pressing Q Did he also use that during the accord rape he committed
the same at your left side?

Page
A Yes your Honor.
 Q About the third time, he use also?
A Yes your Honor. (TSN, May 26, 1983.)
To be sure a trial judge has the right, nay even the duty, to address
questions to witnesses. But the questions should be clarificatory; they
should not build the case for any of the adversaries.
On June 23, 1983, a hearing was scheduled. The transcript for that day
shows that Fiscal Camilo Fulvadora appeared for the prosecution but
private prosecutor Ela, was absent. Also absent was Atty. Jorge Zerrudo,
counsel for the accused. The transcript does not show whether or not the
accused was brought to court. Notwithstanding the absence of counsel for
the accused and probably the accused himself, the respondent judge
continued his "cross-examination" of the private complainant. The
respondent judge explained his behaviour thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the absence of
Atty. Zerrudo who in spite of due notice in open court, during the
last hearing of this case and without justifiable reason failed to
appear, however, for the sake of justice in order not to prejudice
the right of the accused as the complaining witness was on cross-
examination, stated the witness is being cross examined by the
court in order to get an illustration of certain facts needed by all
defense here or the prosecution of the accused Wilson Valdez
alias Willy. (TSN, June 23, 1983.)
In his memorandum the respondent judge claims that he "did not proceed
with the trial but merely sought clarifications on vital aspects taken up in
the hearing of April 7, 1983."
The explanation of the respondent judge is belied by the transcript which
shows that he asked the private complainant searching questions and this
is reflected on pages 4 to 12 of the transcript.
The statement of the respondent judge that he wanted to protect the right
of the accused to a speedy trial is not appreciated. He "protected" the
rights of the accused by holding a trial in the absence of the latter's
counsel. If an accused has a "protector" like the respondent judge, there
is no need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor. It may not be amiss to state
in this connection that the accused did not complain of delay in the trial of
his case probably because he was not there. At any rate if the respondent
judge had wanted to expedite the trial he should have appointed a
temporary counsel for the accused.
The hearing on the three cases was resumed on August 18, 1983. In the
meantime, Atty. Zerrudo was replaced by Atty. Julian Ruiz as counsel for
the accused because he wanted an Ilocano lawyer to represent him for
better communication. On that day. the private complainant was still on
cross-examination. Without any request from the parties, the respondent
judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber "due to delicadeza."
Present in the chamber were counsel for the accused, the fiscal and the
stenographer only; the accused was not allowed to go inside. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The respondent judge claims, however, "that the accused
together with his guard were at the door of a make-shift room, so-
called judge's chamber." This might well have been the case but
the accused was entitled as of right to be inside the room
because it was his liberty and honor which were at stake. On
August 31, 1983, the respondent judge announced, "We will hear
this in chamber." And then the following took place:
ATTY. RUIZ:
Now, last time this case was presented and was
scheduled for hearing inside the chamber. Counsel for
the accused requested that the accused be given chance
to confront the complaining witness but this, your honor
was denied so at this instance it is reiterated that the
accused be given again a chance to be present during
the investigation (sic).
COURT:
Fiscal.
FISCAL CAMILO FULVADORA: têñ.£îhqwâ£
With the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court.
COURT: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Denied. (TSN, August 31,1983.)
On February 7, 1984, the following took
45
place:
Page
ATTY. RUIZ:
Your honor, we are still in the process of direct
examination for the accused. We are recalling the
accused in the witness stand. I understand your honor
last time, due to lack of material time, we requested for a
resetting of these three cases inasmuch as the matter
whether to give the accused for the meantime your honor,
I am petitioning that he must be recalled and placed in the
witness stand.
COURT:
It is discretionary on the part of the
Judge. What can you say Fiscal?
FISCAL FULVADORA:
I remembered right that it is the purpose for the trial, that
the manifestation of the defense counsel that he is
through with the testimony of the witness, he requested
that the prosecution will be continued in some other time.
ATTY. RUIZ:
We concur with the Provincial Fiscal but prior, we are
petitioning the Honorable Court to recall the witness for
further direct examination and I am requesting that will
have to continue the proceeding. We are convinced with
the observation of the Court that it is discretionary of the
Honorable Court but this representation however, we
would like to request and reiterate and manifest for the
petition that he be recalled. It is not the intention of the
defense counsel, your honor, to delay the speedy
termination of these cases. As a counsel for the accused,
I would like to reiterate that the accused be recalled to the
witness stand.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
The Honorable Court will decide on that part of
presentation of the accused, whether to grant it or not the
manifestation.
COURT: têñ.£îhqwâ£
How many questions are you asking?
ATTY. RUIZ:
Due to lack of material time, the three cases, I forgot to
ask few questions regarding the evidences or exhibits
which are the panty, knife, and scissors, in the direct
examination in that, it was overlooked in the part of this
representation that the three after presented some of the
exhibits per prosecution, were not questioned.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
It is not the matter of forgotting the exhibits of the
counsel, there are time given to present this trial. I
remembered that he propounded few questions for the
defense and he manifested that he is through in his direct
examination and it is my time to cross the testimony of
the accused.
ATTY. RUIZ:
I forgot, before the Honorable Court that this
representation have reasons of overlooking why I was not
able to question to all the matters considering of the lack
of material time and that there are other cases waiting
which are ready for the hearing. It is the discretionary on
the part of the Honorable Court specially that the criminal
penalty is death and while the Provincial Fiscal having
further presentation of exhibits at the beginning of the
case, where the questioning we were already finished, yet
the Provincial Fiscal continued separately to the
presentation of other cases.
COURT': têñ.£îhqwâ£
Denied.
Under cross. (TSN Feb. 7, 1984.)
It is obvious from the foregoing that the respondent judge did not manifest
46
the requisite cold impartiality which the petitioner deserved.
Page
The petition which questions the actuations of the respondent judge and
seeks his disqualification was received by him on March 29, 1984.
Prudence dictated that he refrain from deciding the cases or at the very
least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action
by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent
judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases on April 2, 1984, and
promulgating his decision on May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part
amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision in Criminal

Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the respondent judge is set aside; the
aforesaid cases shall be transferred to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial
Court in Kidapawan for trial de novo which shall also resolve the
petitioner's motion for release on recognizance under Sec. 191 of P.D.
No. 603. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Escolin and Cuevas,

JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

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