38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

*
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1433. February 21, 2003.
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 00-955-MTJ)

TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO G.

SUPNET, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, respondent.

Courts; Judges; Powers; Contempt; To curb and punish

abuses, courts are vested with the power to declare the guilty party
in contempt.—Courts are vested with the power to penalize a
party for filing an action raising the same basic issues as one still
pending or already disposed of which the same party has filed in
another court. Such an act is deemed an abuse of the processes of
the court. To curb and punish such abuses, courts are vested with
the power to declare the guilty party in contempt. A coun-

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

39

VOL. 398, FEBRUARY 21, 2003 39

Leonidas vs. Supnet

sel who participates in such abuse of court processes can also be

held in contempt. The contempt power is a means by which the
court exercises its authority over those within its jurisdiction, as
well as enables the court to enforce its decisions effectively.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Direct Contempt; The rule is well-
settled that a court should be informed of the pendency of a similar
proceeding a party is filed.—The rule is well-settled that a court
should be informed of the pendency of a similar proceeding a
party has filed. The responsibility cannot be taken lightly because
of the harsh penalties the law prescribes for non-compliance. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, failure to
comply with the requirements prescribed in Section 5 may cause
one to be declared in indirect contempt of court. Moreover, if the
noncompliance is willful and deliberate, then such person may
even be declared guilty of direct contempt of court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If from the circumstances
one can infer a willful and deliberate attempt to mislead the
courts, he can still be held in direct contempt.—As stated in
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “if the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.” This shows that even if the
petitioner did not sign the certification, if from the circumstances
one can infer a willful and deliberate attempt to mislead the
courts, he can still be held in direct contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to punish persons for
contempt is inherent in all courts.—Courts are not powerless to
compel obedience to their orders, writs and processes. The power
to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in all judicial proceedings
and to the reinforcement of their lawful orders and decisions.
Without the power to punish for contempt, courts would become
impotent to maintain the orderly administration of justice and to
compel observance to their lawful mandates. However, there is a
limitation to this power, as it must be used sparingly. It should be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges cannot be disciplined for
every erroneous order or decision rendered.—Judges cannot be
disciplined for every erroneous order or decision rendered in the
absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith. As we
held in Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag,—“x x x good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with
ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision

40

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

from being held accountable for errors of judgment on the premise

that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
administration of justice can be infallible.” However, the absence
of bad faith or malice will not totally exculpate them from charges
of incompetence and ignorance of the law if they render decisions
that are totally bereft of factual and legal bases.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross

Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Proper
Administration of Justice.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner Tomas R. Leonidas charges respondent Judge

Francisco G. Supnet of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 47, with gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, for citing
petitioner in contempt of court.

The Facts

On April 13, 1998, Union Bank of the Philippines (“Union

Bank” for brevity), with petitioner Atty. Tomas R. Leonidas
(“petitioner” for brevity) as counsel, filed a complaint
against the spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza
Tamondong (“Tamondong Spouses” for brevity) to collect
the latter’s unpaid loan secured from Union Bank to buy a
motor vehicle. Union Bank prayed for the issuance of a writ
of replevin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
0717 before Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City (“Pasay RTC” for brevity).
On June 29, 1998, for lack of interest to prosecute, the
Pasay RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Thereafter, Union Bank filed a motion for reconsideration.
On September 11,1998, the Pasay RTC reinstated the case.
Because Union Bank did not take any steps to prosecute
the case, on June 23, 1999,1
the Pasay RTC issued an order
dismissing again the case.

_______________

1 Rollo, p. 8.

41
 VOL. 398, FEBRUARY 21, 2003 41
Leonidas vs. Supnet

On March 15, 2000, Union Bank, with petitioner again as

counsel, filed against the Tamondong Spouses another
complaint to collect the same unpaid loan with a prayer for
a writ of replevin. This case, docketed as Civil Case No.
342-00, was filed with Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasay City (“Pasay MTC” for brevity) presided by
respondent Judge Francisco G. Supnet (“respondent judge”
for brevity). On March 29, 2000, the Pasay MTC issued a
writ of replevin.
On April 12, 2000, the Tamondong Spouses, in response
to Union Bank’s action, filed a pleading captioned “Urgent
Motions” wherein they prayed for the following reliefs: (1)
to dismiss the case docketed as Civil Case No. 342-00; (2) to
set aside the writ of replevin; (3) to order the immediate
return of the replevied vehicle; and (4) to cite Union Bank
and its counsel for contempt of court for forum shopping
and for misleading the court.
In an Order dated May 9, 2000, the Pasay MTC
promptly acted on the Tamondong Spouses’ Urgent
Motions. The Pasay MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 342-00,
recalled the order of the writ of replevin, and ordered
Union Bank to return immediately the motor vehicle to the
Tamondong Spouses. Moreover, for violating the rule
against forum shopping 2and for making a false certification
against forum shopping, the Pasay MTC cited Union Bank,
its collection officer Desi Tomas and petitioner in contempt
of court. The Pasay MTC ordered each of them to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 without prejudice to civil, criminal or
administrative actions. This is the first of two contempt
orders issued by respondent judge in Civil Case No. 342-00.
On May 16, 2000, Union Bank filed a motion to
reconsider the Pasay MTC’s Order of May 9, 2000. Pending
resolution of this motion, on June 5, 2000, Union Bank filed
a notice of dismissal under Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Order of June 6, 2000, the
Pasay MTC denied the motion for reconsideration but
made no mention of Union Bank’s notice of dismissal.
Moreover, in its Order of June 6, 2000, the Pasay MTC
ordered Union Bank to show cause why it should not be
held in contempt for failing to return the vehicle of the
Tamondong Spouses as earlier directed by the court.

_______________

2 Ibid., p. 24.
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

However, in its Compliance dated June 20, 2000, Union

Bank questioned the manner in which the Tamondong
Spouses commenced the contempt charge for it supposedly
did not conform to the proper procedure. Admitting that it
ignored the Order of May 9, 2000, Union Bank explained
that a provision in the chattel mortgage contract granted
Union Bank the right to take possession3
of the motor
vehicle upon breach of the obligation. Union Bank prayed
that the Tamondong Spouses’ motion dated May 17, 2000
to cite the bank in contempt be denied due course and
dismissed.
On July 20, 2000, the Pasay MTC issued a writ of
execution to enforce payment of the original contempt fine
imposed upon Union Bank’s collection officer Tomas and
petitioner. The Pasay MTC also ordered Union Bank again
to immediately return the replevied motor vehicle. For
Union Bank’s failure to comply with its Order of May 9,
2000, the Pasay MTC again cited collection officer Tomas
and petitioner in contempt and ordered them to pay
another fine of P5,000.00 each. This is the second contempt
order issued by respondent judge.
On August 1, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of July 20, 2000 which
included the second contempt order. Petitioner also prayed
that the notice of dismissal Union Bank earlier filed on
June 6, 20004 be confirmed and all orders issued in the case
be set aside.
On September 7, 2000, the Pasay MTC denied the
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Order of July
20, 2000. The Pasay MTC stated that the motion was
without merit because there was deliberate and willful
failure by collection officer Tomas and petitioner to comply
with the May 9, 2000 Order which ordered the return of the
replevied vehicle.
Hence, petitioner filed the present administrative case
for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice. Petitioner states that respondent
judge cited him in contempt for refusing to return the
replevied motor vehicle to the Tamondong Spouses.
Petitioner, however, claims that it was erroneous for
respondent judge to have done so since the Order of May 9,
2000 was addressed to Union Bank alone. The May 9, 2000
Order did

_______________

3 Ibid., p. 32.
4 Ibid., p. 43.

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VOL. 398, FEBRUARY 21, 2003 43

Leonidas vs. Supnet

not direct petitioner, but rather Union Bank alone, to

return the replevied vehicle.
Petitioner further maintains that he should not be held
responsible for submitting a false certificate against forum
shopping for5 the simple reason that he did not sign the
certification. As gleaned from the pleadings, it is Union
Bank collection officer Tomas whose signature
6
appears on
the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner also accuses respondent judge of ignoring the
procedure that must first be observed before citing one in
indirect contempt, invoking7 Section 4, Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that the
contempt charge initiated by the Tamondong Spouses did
not comply with the requirements prescribed in Section 4.
Therefore, by giving due course to these motions,
respondent judge improperly issued his contempt order.
For respondent judge’s error, petitioner prays for nothing
less than his dismissal from the service 8and the forfeiture
of all privileges appurtenant to his office. 9
In his Comment filed on January 10, 2001, respondent
judge insists that he duly observed the procedural
requirements for declaring petitioner in indirect contempt.
Respondent judge even gave a chronological account of the
proceedings that took place prior to the issuance of the
contempt order. He points out that

_______________

5 Ibid., p. 6.
6 Ibid., p. 14.
7 SEC 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
 In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by
a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege
that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis
supplied)
8 Rollo, p. 7.
9 Ibid., pp. 58-63.

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44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

judges are not infallible and cites that the Court has ruled
that to hold a judge accountable for every erroneous ruling
or decision would be nothing short10 of harassment and
would make his job unbearable. Averring that he
faithfully conformed to the procedure laid down by the law,
respondent judge implores the Court to dismiss the
administrative case filed against him.

OCA’s Report and Recommendation

The Office of the Court Administrator (“OCA” for brevity)

opined that respondent judge was correct in stating that
the petitioner should have appealed the Pasay RTC’s
orders of dismissal instead of filing the case before the
Pasay MTC. The OCA’s primary concern is the procedure
adopted by respondent judge in issuing the contested
orders.
On the first order which declared petitioner in direct
contempt of court, the OCA found no reason to hold
respondent judge administratively liable. Although the
wording of the dispositive portion of the order is emprecise,
the order clearly sought to punish two acts. The first act
being punished is the violation of the rule against forum
shopping, and the second act is the submission of a false
certificate against forum shopping. Respondent judge cited
petitioner in contempt for the first act, that is, for filing
Civil Case No. 342-00, which was exactly the same case as
Civil Case No. 98-0717 which the Pasay RTC had already
dismissed. Thus, the OCA opined that petitioner’s act
constitutes direct contempt which respondent judge may
punish summarily pursuant to 11
Section 1, Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

_______________

10 Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 569 (1998) citing Arcenio v.

Pagorogon, 224 SCRA 246 (1993).
11 SEC. 11. Direct contempt punished summarily.—A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by
such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) day or both, if it be a lower court.

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VOL. 398, FEBRUARY 21, 2003 45

Leonidas vs. Supnet

It is on the second order declaring petitioner guilty of

indirect contempt that the OCA found respondent judge
remiss in his duties.
Unlike the first contempt, the second contempt is
governed by Section 4, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rule of Civil
Procedure, which provides that proceedings for indirect
contempt must be initiated either
12
motu proprio by the
court, or by verified petition. Here, petitioner clearly
committed an act constituting indirect contempt. However,
the OCA found that the Tamondong Spouses initiated the
contempt proceedings by mere motion,
13
and not by a verified
petition as required by the Rules. The OCA stated that
respondent judge took cognizance of the contempt 14action
through the Tamondong Spouses’ Urgent Motions 15
and
Motion to Cite Plaintiff For Contempt of Court, neither of
which were verified petitions. Therefore, the OCA
recommended that respondent Judge Francisco G. Supnet
be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law with a warning that a similar offense in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the conclusions and recommendation of
the Court Administrator but disagrees with its findings as
to how the second contempt proceeding was initiated.
Courts are vested with the power to penalize a party for
filing an action raising the same basic issues as one still
pending or already disposed of which the same party has
filed in another court. Such an act is deemed an abuse of
the processes of the court. To curb and punish such abuses,
courts are vested with the power to de-

_______________

12 SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for indirect

contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by
a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, x x x (Emphasis supplied)
13 Rollo, p. 5.
14 Ibid., p. 18.
15 Ibid., p. 48, Annex “N”.

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46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

clare the guilty party in contempt. A counsel who

participates in such abuse of court processes can also be
held in contempt. The contempt power is a means by which
the court exercises its authority over those within its
jurisdiction, as well as enables the court to enforce its
decisions effectively.
The rule is well-settled that a court should be informed
of the pendency of a similar proceeding a party has filed.
The responsibility cannot be taken lightly because of the
harsh penalties the law prescribes for non-compliance.
16
As
provided in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, failure
to comply with the requirements prescribed in Section 5
may cause one to be declared in indirect contempt of court.
Moreover, if the non-compliance is willful and deliberate,
then such person may even be declared guilty of direct
contempt of court.
Neither Union Bank nor petitioner as its counsel
bothered to inform the Pasay MTC that the Pasay RTC had
previously dismissed a case of the same nature and
involving the same parties. The Tamondong Spouses were
the ones who brought it to the attention of the Pasay MTC.

_______________

16 SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or

principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall
be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party
or his counsel constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

47

VOL. 398, FEBRUARY 21, 2003 47

Leonidas vs. Supnet

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court specifically

mandates that either the “plaintiff or principal party filing
the initiatory pleading” must disclose to the court the
pendency of another proceeding concerning the same case.
Obviously, since Union Bank initiated the case, it was its
duty to make such disclosure. In this case, Union Bank
failed to discharge such obligation—an action tantamount
to contempt of court.
Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent judge’s
order citing him in contempt for executing a false
certification against forum shopping is erroneous.
Petitioner claims that it was Union Bank’s collection officer
Tomas who signed the certificate. Petitioner argues that
the certification should be signed by a Union Bank officer
and not by counsel. A certification by counsel is a defective
certification and is clearly equivalent to non-compliance
with the17requirement in the second paragraph18
of Section 2,
Rule 42, in relation to Section
19
4, Rule 45, warranting the
dismissal of the petition.
As stated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “if
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground
for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.” This shows that even if the petitioner did not
sign the certification, if from the circumstances one can
infer a willful and deliberate attempt to mislead the courts,
he can still be held in direct contempt.

_______________

17 SEC. 2. x x x the petitioner shall also submit together with the

petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status thereof, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
18 SEC. 4. Contents of petition.—The petition shall x x x contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
19 Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, et al., 297 SCRA 30 (1998).

48

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

Both Union Bank and petitioner were aware of the

consequences that came with the submission of a false
certification. Strangely, Union Bank collection officer
Tomas signed the certification against forum shopping—an
act which is normally outside the scope of her assigned
tasks. The execution of such certification is a rather serious
responsibility assigned to a member of the bank’s
20
Board of
Directors or one of its higher-ranking officers. Normally, a
collection officer is not privy to legal matters of the
corporation, and for the corporation to hide behind a person
who is without such knowledge arouses one’s suspicions.
The reason for requiring the plaintiff himself to sign the
certification is that only the plaintiff has actual knowledge
of whether he has initiated similar21actions or proceedings
in different courts or agencies. In the case of a
corporation, a duly authorized Board member or a senior
ranking officer must sign the certification. A mere
collection officer is not expected to know the court cases in
which the corporation is a party litigant.
Thus, the first order issued by respondent judge
declaring petitioner in direct contempt was issued to
punish his act of forum shopping as well as for his
participation in the submission of a false certification
against forum shopping. The order of respondent judge
suffers no legal defect contrary to the stance taken by
petitioner.
On the second order which declared petitioner in
indirect contempt of court, respondent judge also followed
the correct procedure.
Petitioner was under the mistaken belief that the order
declaring him in indirect contempt was improper for not
having been issued in accordance with the procedure laid
down by the Rules. Petitioner claims “that an order of
indirect contempt can only be issued after the proceedings
therefor have been initiated either by verified petition or by
the court motu proprio. In his petition, petitioner states:

“x x x Firstly, the respondent took cognizance of the contempt

charges were embodied in ordinary motions, and not formulated
in a separate

_______________

20 Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 286 (2000).

21 Ibid.

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VOL. 398, FEBRUARY 21, 2003 49

Leonidas vs. Supnet

verified petitions (sic) . . . All charges of contempt were initiated

by Tamondong and not by the court, so that the22 requirements
mentioned above should have been complied with.”

Petitioner alleges that the contempt proceedings were not

initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio.
He asserts that respondent judge 23
premised the contempt
order on the various motions filed by the Tamondong
Spouses. He contends that respondent judge should not
have entertained the motions as they do not meet the
requirements prescribed by the Rules. Moreover, he asserts
that mere motions cannot be considered verified petitions
for purposes of initiating proceedings for indirect contempt.
Thus he concludes that respondent judge’s order declaring
him in indirect contempt originated from the motions filed
by the Tamondong Spouses, and prays that this contempt
order be set aside for being procedurally defective.
Contrary to the findings of the Court Administrator, we
find that the Pasay MTC did initiate the contempt
proceedings motu proprio. Disobedience to the May 9, 2000
Order issued by the Pasay MTC, which required Union
Bank to return the replevied vehicle, qualifies as indirect
contempt for which the Pasay MTC properly issued a show
cause order to Union Bank. This Order dated June 6, 2000,
which directed Union Bank to show cause why it should
not be held in contempt, was a legitimate exercise of the
Pasay MTC’s judicial discretion to determine whether
Union Bank should be sanctioned for disregarding its
previous orders. Thus, independently of the motions filed
by the Tamondong Spouses, it was the Pasay MTC which
commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No
verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect
contempt are initiated in this manner, and the absence of a
verified petition does not affect the procedure adopted.
It is true that the Tamondong Spouses 24did file a Motion
To Cite Plaintiff For Contempt Of Court, dated May 17,
2000. In this pleading they prayed that Union Bank be
declared in indirect contempt of court for its disobedience
to the Pasay MTC’s Order dated May 9, 2000. This Order
dated May 9, 2000 specifically directed

_______________

22 Rollo, p. 5.
23 Rollo, p. 18, Urgent Motions dated April 12, 2000; Rollo, p. 48,
Motion To Cite Plaintiff For Contempt Of Court dated May 17, 2000.
24 Rollo, p. 48.

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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonidas vs. Supnet

Union Bank to “return immediately

25
to the defendants the
replevied motor vehicle.” However, the Tamondong
Spouses’ unverified motion dated May 17, 2000 cannot
invalidate the contempt proceedings because these
proceedings were initiated by respondent judge motu
proprio in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, respondent judge should have been more
circumspect in issuing the second contempt order.
Petitioner accuses respondent judge of exceeding his
authority in punishing him for not complying with the May
9, 2000 Order which was directed at Union Bank alone.
True enough, the order makes no mention of peti-tioner’s
name. Moreover, in respondent judge’s Order of June 6,
2000, he gave Union Bank, not petitioner, five days to show
cause why it should not be held in contempt for failing to
return the replevied vehicle as earlier directed.
A party cannot be held in indirect contempt for 26
disobeying a court order which is not addressed to him.
Petitioner should therefore not be punished for
disregarding an order that he was never meant to comply
with in the first place. On this point, respondent judge
clearly committed a mistake. He should have been mindful
that he never ordered petitioner to return the replevied
vehicle. There was also no evidence that petitioner was
ever in possession of the replevied vehicle.
Courts are not powerless to compel obedience to their
orders, writs and processes. The power to punish persons
for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in all judicial proceedings and to the 27
reinforcement of their lawful orders and decisions.
Without the power to punish for contempt, courts would
become impotent to maintain the orderly administration of
justice and to compel observance to their lawful mandates.
However, there is a limitation to this power, as it must be
used sparingly. It should be exercised on the preservative,
not vindictive principle, and 28on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment.

_______________

25 Ibid.
26 Cañas v. Castigador, 348 SCRA 425 (2000).
27 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
28 Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, 313 SCRA 739 (1999).

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Leonidas vs. Supnet

Judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or

decision rendered in the absence of a clear showing of ill
motive, malice29or bad faith. As we held in Pilipinas Bank v.
Tirona-Liwag, —

“x x x good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or

improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a
judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and
promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable
for errors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice
can be infallible.”

However, the absence of bad faith or malice will not totally

exculpate them from charges of incompetence and
ignorance of the law if they render decisions that are
totally bereft of factual and legal bases.
Finally, the issue of the alleged inaction of respondent
judge on the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner
deserves scant consideration. Union
30
Bank filed the Notice
of Dismissal dated June 5, 2000
31
after the case was already
dismissed on May 9, 2000. Obviously, petitioner filed the
Notice of Dismissal only to evade the effects of the Order 32
of
May 9, 2000 citing him in contempt for forum shopping.
In another
33
administrative case docketed as A.M. No. 02-
2-12-SC, the Court en banc found respondent Judge
Francisco G. Supnet guilty of serious misconduct. The
Court ordered his dismissal from the service and the
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits. Although respondent judge has been
dismissed from the service, he can still be fined for gross
ignorance of the law committed while in office. However,
the fine recommended by the Court Administrator should
be reduced to P3,000.00 considering that respondent judge
actually followed the proper procedure in issuing both
contempt orders.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to adopt the
recommendation of the Court Administrator with
modification. Judge Fran-

_______________

29 190 SCRA 834 (1990).

30 Rollo, p. 29.
31 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
32 Ibid., p. 5.
33 Dr. Cora J. Virata v. Judge Francisco G. Supnet, November 27, 2002,
393 SCRA 12.

52
 52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Botona vs. Court of Appeals

cisco G. Supnet is FINED in the amount of THREE

THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) for gross ignorance of the
law. This fine may be deducted from his accrued leave
credits.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug and Azcuna,

JJ., concur.
     Ynares-Santiago, J., On leave.

Respondent meted a P3,000 fine for gross ignorance of

the law.

Note.—A person adjudged in contempt may avail

himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition, not
appeal. (Eballa vs. Paas, 362 SCRA 389 [2001])

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