Part 1

A theory provides reasoning for why something may occur or explain patterns in
behaviour. Theories appear from many sources with varying quantities of evidence to
reinforce their argument. Some with little to no evidence, and some with considerably
more.

A theory can never be considered wholly true as a well evidenced theory that is
widely considered fact at a particular point in time may, in the future be found false with
the finding of new evidence. Similarly, a theory with little evidence may, in time be backed
up by evidence gained through the development of new technologies and research
techniques.

Theories can be modified or amended over time as understanding of the subject

matter evolves, this means that no theory can be completely discredited even if there is an
overwhelming amount of opposing evidence. Theories can complement each other or may
conflict, this is healthy, and encourages critical analysis, leading to a more in depth
understanding of each theory and the evidence/research that supports each.

Part 2
To propose a more formal account of what is happening in the realist mode.
First, we can say that theo- retical signs are “grounded” in a general and consistent
social reality. Then (and here is the key point): in the realist epistemic mode, every case
or instance that grounds evidential interpretation is made to point back to the singular
referent — social reality — to which theory points di- rectly.
The referential meanings of this sign-system allow her to discover what is
underneath her data. This does not imply that the interpretations produced proceed
only and singularly from theory to evidence. But a clear and coherent framework
for the evidence is provided, precisely because the underly- ing structures that will do
the explaining are drawn from a coherently developed, general account of social life.
Jack Goldstone separates “comparative histori- cal analysis” (abbreviated CHA)
from large-N statistical inferences, arguing that “Analysts using CHA generally face
a finite set of cases, chosen against a backdrop of theoretical interests, and aim to
determine the causal sequences and patterns producing outcomes of interest in
those specific cases. Generalization is certainly a goal, but that generalization is
 sought by piecing together finite sets of cases, not by sampling and inference to a
larger universe.”
A null hypothesis was constituted that the analysis of a case does not enter into
neutral intellectual ground for Goldstone. Crucially, this linking of events “involves
making deductions about how events are linked over time, drawing on general
principles of economics, sociology, psychology, and political science regarding human
behavior” (emphasis added). This linking occurs with the aid of quantitative and
qualitative evidence that is marshaled “within complex cases.” Then these processes
are compared across “particular cases of interest.”
Crucial experiment theories are general principles of human behavior, which
articulate the processes that un- derlie and link together key events. Cases are then
examined for the “existence/absence” of causal chains or processes, on the basis of
which the theory is refined.
Theory is expected to be in principle general, to work referentially, and to
be consistent with itself in the abstract. That is the essence of the realist epistemic
mode. The idea is that models are built and “tested” with cases.
Goldstone uses the language of Bayesian analysis to articulate the logic of all of
this. Comparative historical sociologists answer ques-tions like this: “What would
you bet that you would find certain conditions in a given case before a CHA of that
case, and would you make the same bet after a CHA of that case?” Presumably,
here, Goldstone means to ask “would you make the same bet about the next case,” The
theory was predicted that after the CHA of the case at hand reveals, or does not
reveal, the conditions. The commensurability of this case and the next is not a major
problem for Goldstone, because the commensurability of the cases is guaranteed if
they have the same object as defined by general social theory. This general social
theory then proceeds gradually to refine itself and to store knowledge, thus creating
the accumulation of knowledge that characterizes a research program on revolutions,
or on whatever the theoretical object may be.
Part 4 and 5
 The problem, ultimately, for the naturalist analogy is that social life may not be
“intransitive”. That social reality exists outside the head of the investigator, and indeed
outside the heads of any subset of individual humans engaged in it, is taken as evidence
for the “intransitivity” of society, social structure, etc.

The principle of realist signification is that unity in theory can bring together
disparate cases under the same general scheme; theory has direct referents in social reality,
and these referents are what enable evidence to be sorted and causal claims to be made.
Subjectivity, understood literally as that element of the world that continually exceeds
its objective constraints,47 gives to the social object of study a distinct historical
dynamism and cultural difference.48

That subjectivity and history render the naturalist approach to so- cial knowledge
problematic has been the refrain of antiscientism argu- ments for over a century in
academic social studies in the West

The empirically responsible social research is impossible. The contradictions of

real- ism emerge in the attempt to apply the naturalist metaphor to the process of
using theory to build explanations. Thus to argue against realism is not to deny the
existence of facts, or even the possibility of constructing social explanations. The core
ambition of realism is to take the risk of depth interpretation, or in the terms
developed here, to construct maximal interpretations that use theory to go beyond
the facts, but remain responsible to those facts. (Naturalist error). Yet the problem is
that in realism, identifying some mechanistic aspects of social life brings with it an
entire framework for investigation, wherein the basic mechanisms of the social are
defined in a general social theory, and then the investigator tests for their presence
or absence, strength or weakness.
This is a discursive effect: realism’s constant use of ontological language makes
it hard to keep in mind that mechanism is a metaphor, derived originally from the
mechanical clocks that surrounded the men who launched the scientific revolution in
the West.
 we should look for a way to integrate the core ambition of scientific realism
(causal explanation) and its core insights into social life (that social life does proceed,
some of the time, with a rather frightening regularity) into a different epistemic
mode.

if the social is denaturalized, then the question of the institutionalization and

main- tenance of social realities becomes connected to the question of how the social
life is normatively imagined. Another way of saying this is: if, contra Bhaskar’s reading of
Marx, one cannot identify a single social theory of reality that both debunks ideology
and explains why some people would believe it, then both social criticism, and
eventually the understanding of social reality itself, must reconsider themselves