THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 157975 : June 26, 2007]

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner, v. FELICISIMO CARILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (petitioner) seeking to annul and set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 26, 2002 and its Resolution2 dated April 10, 2003 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67220.

On November 18, 1993, Felicisimo Carilla (respondent) was hired by petitioner, a manning agent, in behalf of its principal, Anglo-
Eastern Shipmanagement Ltd., to work as Master on board MV Handy-Cam Azobe for twelve months. Their approved POEA
contract provided that respondent would get a basic monthly pay of US$1700.00, fixed monthly overtime of US$765.00, master's
allowance of US$170.00 and leave with pay of six days per month or US$340.00 or a total of US$2,975.00 a month.

On November 29, 1993, respondent boarded the vessel in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Africa. On June 6, 1994, while the vessel was in
Bombay, India, respondent was dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines.

On August 25, 1994, respondent filed with the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency (POEA) a complaint 3 for illegal
dismissal with claims for salaries and other benefits for the unexpired portion of his contract as well as unremitted allotments and
damages. He alleged that: he was dismissed without notice and hearing and without any valid reason; petitioner's unlawful act
deprived him of his expected monthly benefits for the unexpired portion of his contract which totaled to US$16,660.00 i.e.,
US$2975.00 x 5 months and 18 days; petitioner withheld his allotment for the entire month of May 1994 in the sum of US$1,700
and from June 1 to 7 in the amount of US$396.67 or a total of US$2,096.67, as well as his accrued leave pay for the entire time
respondent served on the vessel in the amount of US$2,119.33. Respondent prayed for payment of these amounts, attorney's
fees and damages.

Petitioner filed its Answer4 contending that: respondent's termination was for cause; he failed to take the necessary steps to
ensure the safety of the vessel and its cargo while plying the waters of South Korea and Keelung port causing petitioner to incur
a huge amount of damages on cargo claims and vessel repairs; respondent's incompetence is therefore penalized with
dismissal; despite the fact that respondent was warned of his lapses, he had not shown any improvement which forced petitioner
to dismiss and replace him with a competent one; thus, cost had to be incurred. Petitioner asked for moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees as its counterclaim.

The parties submitted their respective position papers. The case was subsequently transferred to the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."5

On December 1, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision6 in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainant's dismissal illegal and ordering the
respondent to pay complainant the unexpired portion of the contract equivalent to US$16,660.00; unremitted amount of
US$2,096.67; as well as leave pay equivalent to US$ 2,119.33.7

The LA found that respondent's long experience as a seaman and his various recommendations from his previous employers
contradicted any finding of incompetence; that the unauthenticated logbook extract submitted by petitioner lacked even an iota of
admissibility as the entries appearing therein had been merely copied from the original logbook. The LA gave credence to
respondent's allegation that he was unceremoniously removed from his job and found that petitioner had not submitted any proof
of payment of respondent's claims.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its appeal with the NLRC. In its Decision8 dated June 14, 2001, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the LA's decision.

The NLRC found that petitioner's evidence which consisted of a document dated June 1, 1994, entitled "Logs of Events During
Respondent's Command" and the Senior Officer Evaluation Reports, did not prove anything as these documents, besides being
unauthenticated, were self-serving and unreliable.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in a Resolution9 dated July 17, 2001.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC in
upholding the LA decision. In a Decision dated November 26, 2002, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 10, 2003.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on the following grounds:

(1) The Court of Appeals committed a mistake of law when it upheld the ruling of the NLRC that the documentary evidence
presented by petitioner herein are "self-serving and unreliable."

(2) It was not in accord with law and jurisprudence for the Court of Appeals to uphold the decision of the NLRC that respondent
herein was illegally dismissed and was thus entitled to the monetary value of the unserved portion of his employment contract
including pay for unserved overtime and pay for unearned leave credits.10

Petitioner argues that respondent's dismissal could have been completely justified if only the LA, NLRC and the CA accorded
merit to its documentary evidence; that when the LA and the NLRC found petitioner's evidence as self-serving and unreliable, it
was made clear that only the vessel logbook was the acceptable evidence; that the vessel logbook was prepared by the ship
master who happened to be the respondent himself who could not be expected to reflect any derogatory reports on his own
performance; that respondent's incompetence and negligence resulted in costly damage to the shipowners which warranted his
termination from service; that the evaluation reports of the vessel's Chief Officer and Chief Engineer showed that respondent
failed to meet the standards required by his job, which evaluation was largely based on the events that led to monetary losses;
that petitioner has a wider latitude of discretion in terminating respondent, being a managerial employee.

Petitioner further avers that the LA discredited its documents based on the sheer length of respondent's experience as seafarer;
that one's previous experience cannot attest to the fact of respondent's actual performance at the present time, since every
shipboard service is a unique experience which entails varying problems and circumstances; that petitioner would not dismiss
respondent without valid cause considering the costs and inconvenience of replacing a captain/master mariner.

Petitioner further claims that it was error to award the full value of the unserved portion of the contract; that the LA awarded a
total amount of US$20,876.00 without a detailed computation; that under the "no work no pay" principle, overtime and unearned
leave credits shall not be paid, thus the award for approximately US$7,140.00 in overtime pay and leave pay was unwarranted;
that R.A. No. 804211 limits the award to three months of the seafarer's basic pay; thus, US$1,700.00 x 3 months is equal to
US$5,100.00.

In his Comment, respondent contends that petitioner raises pure questions of fact which may not be raised in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari; that the CA did not err in upholding the NLRC findings; that R.A. No. 8042 is not applicable since it took
effect only on July 15, 1995 after the instant complaint was filed on August 30, 1994.

Petitioner filed a Reply wherein it alleges that the issues raised are not merely questions of fact but of law; that the bone of
contention is whether or not the disqualification of its documentary evidence was proper.

The parties subsequently filed their respective Memoranda as required in our Resolution12 dated June 1, 2005.

We find no merit in the petition.

To begin with, the question of whether respondent was dismissed for just cause is a question of fact which is beyond the
province of a Petition for Review on Certiorari . It is fundamental that the scope of our judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is confined only to errors of law and does not extend to questions of fact. More so, in labor cases where the doctrine
applies with greater force.13 The LA and the NLRC have ruled on the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the CA. Thus,
they are accorded not only great respect but also finality,14 and are deemed binding upon us so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.15

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just
cause 16 and failure to do so would mean that the dismissal is not justified. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his
innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer.17 The determination of the existence and sufficiency of a just
cause must be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after observing due process.18

Respondent was dismissed because of his alleged incompetence. To prove respondent's incompetence while on board the
vessel, petitioner presented a piece of paper dated June 1, 1994 entitled "Logs of Events During Capt Carilla (sic)
Command,"19 enumerating therein the alleged incidents where damages to timber products and on the vessel occurred; and the
Senior Officer Evaluation Reports20 showing respondent's unsatisfactory performance, prepared by Chief Officer R. Miu and
Chief Engineer N.K. Jaggi, who allegedly had served with respondent and had seen his work on board the vessel.

We agree with the LA, NLRC and the CA in their finding that petitioner's documents were not authenticated and, hence, were
self-serving and unreliable. It appears from the "Logs of Events During Capt. Carilla Command" that it is merely a typewritten
enumeration of several alleged incidents of damages to the cargoes and to the vessel, but it does not state the source and who
prepared the same. While petitioner claims that it was prepared by the vessel's technical superintendent, he was not identified at
all. The log of events did not also provide a detailed account of respondent's act of incompetence which caused those alleged
incidents. There is no way of verifying the truth of these entries, and if they were actually recorded in the vessel logbook on the
dates the alleged incidents took place. In its Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC, petitioner claims that the original
copies were not available, as they were on file with the vessel at that time. Be that as it may, it was still petitioner's duty to secure
the same to prove the validity of respondent's dismissal.

In Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 we rejected a typewritten collation of excerpts from
what could be the logbook and found that what should have been submitted as evidence was the logbook itself or even
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or photocopied, considering the present
technology on reproduction of documents.

In Abacast Shipping and Management Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,22 we held:

The log book is a respectable record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and the procedure taken against
the employees prior to their dismissal. Curiously, however, no entry from such log book was presented at all in this case. What
was offered instead was the shipmasters report, which was later claimed to be a collation of excerpts from such book.

It would have been a simple matter, considering the ease of reproducing the same, to make photocopies of the pertinent pages
of the log book to substantiate the petitioner's contention. Why this was not done is something that reasonably arouses the
curiosity of this Court and suggests that there probably were no entries in the log book at all that could have proved the alleged
offenses of the private respondents."

Petitioner's arguments are that respondent, being the person responsible for accomplishing the vessel logbook by writing entries
on the day-to-day events on board, could not be expected to reflect any derogatory reports about his own performance; and that
the officers next in rank, who are the technical superintendent and the chief engineer are the only ones who could check on
respondent's performance. These arguments are not sufficient to disturb the findings of the CA.

Assuming the vessel logbook kept by respondent did not reflect the different untoward incidents that occurred in the vessel,
petitioner should have presented other evidence to substantiate these incidents. Petitioner's log of events purports to show that
the timber products on the vessel were damaged, and that the vessel was towed to a port for repair. It was also alleged in
petitioner's pleadings that it had incurred huge amounts for damages on cargo claims. However, petitioner failed to present these
cargo claims from the shipper/consignees, and petitioner's payment thereof as well as its expenses for the cost of the repair of
the vessel.

Moreover, the two sets of Senior Officer Evaluation Reports allegedly prepared by the officers next in rank to respondent did not
help to justify respondent's dismissal for incompetency. While the reports showed that respondent was given an unsatisfactory
performance rating and a recommendation for his replacement, they failed to show the exact designations of the persons who
prepared the same, and neither do their signatures appear over the typewritten names. In fact, these alleged officers did not
even execute an affidavit to attest to the truth of those reports. Thus, we agree with the LA and the NLRC that these documents,
being unauthenticated, have no probative value.

Respondent was terminated without having been given the opportunity to defend himself. He was summarily dismissed and
repatriated to the Philippines without being informed of the charges against him; nor was he given the chance to refute the
charges.

Petitioner's claim that it has a wider latitude of discretion in terminating respondent, since the latter was a managerial employee,
is not plausible. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at
any time, and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. 23 Such employees, too, are entitled to
security of tenure, fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws.24 Managerial employees, no less than rank-
and-file laborers, are entitled to due process.25 The captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee within the
meaning of this doctrine.26 Thus, respondent was illegally dismissed as he was not accorded a fair investigation as required by
law and the ground invoked for his dismissal was not proven.

In cases regarding contract workers who were dismissed without just cause which arose before the effectivity 27 of R.A. No. 8042,
it is settled that if "the contract is for a fixed term and the employee is dismissed without just cause, he is entitled to the payment
of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract.28 In this case, respondent's contract was until November
18, 1994, but he was dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines on June 6, 1994, not for a just cause; thus, respondent is
entitled to be paid his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract.

The LA awarded the amount of US$16,660.00 as prayed for by respondent in his complaint based on his monthly salary and
allowances multiplied by the unexpired portion of the contract equivalent to 5 months and 18 days. Based on such computation,
overtime pay and leave pay were included. Petitioner contends that the same should be deleted.

We agree. Respondent's overtime and leave pays should not be included in the computation of the unexpired portion, since he
was no longer rendering services during that period of time, as he had already been repatriated. In Legahi v. National Labor
Relations Commission,29 we held:

Petitioner's dismissal without a valid cause constitute a breach of contract. Consequently, he should only be paid the unexpired
portion of his employment contract. However, the payment of the overtime pay should be disallowed in the light of our ruling in
the case of Cagampan v. NLRC, where we held that:

Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view that the "guaranteed or fixed overtime pay of 30% of the basic salary per month"
embodied in their employment contract should be awarded to them as part of a "package benefit." They have theorized that even
without sufficient evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, they would automatically be entitled to overtime pay. Their
thinking is erroneous for being illogical and unrealistic. Their thinking even runs counter to the intention behind the provision. The
contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when
overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said
work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be
computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay
but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays
on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra
hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair
and unreasonable.
We already resolved the question of overtime pay of worker aboard a vessel in the case of National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation v. CIR (3 SCRA 890). We ruled:

We can not agree with the Court below that respondent Malondras should be paid overtime compensation for every hour in
excess of the regular working hours that he was on board his vessel or barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he actually
put in work during those hours. Seamen are required to stay on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for
this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters and subsistence allowances when
required to be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to pay them overtime even
when they are not actually working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours
each a day, even if he spent all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of duty. The correct criterion in
determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on board and can not leave
ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours.
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In the same vein, the claim for day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given
during the actual service of the seaman.30

Notably, the LA also made a separate award of leave pay in the amount of US$2,119.33 based on respondent's allegation in his
complaint that his leave pay had been illegally withheld for the entire time he served on the vessel. Petitioner failed to refute such
allegation and had not presented any evidence to prove otherwise. The burden of proving that payment has been made rests
upon petitioner as respondent's employer. The ruling of the Court in Seaborne Carriers Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,31 to wit:

The private respondent's allegation of non-payment of these benefits, to which he is by law entitled, is a negative allegation
which need not be supported by evidence unless it is an essential part of the cause of action. It must be noted that the main
cause of action of the private respondent is his illegal dismissal, and the claim for the monetary benefits is but an incident of the
protest against such dismissal. Thus, the burden of proving that payment of said benefits has been made rests upon the party
who will suffer if no evidence at all is presented by either party, that is, the petitioners as private respondent's employer 32may be
applied by analogy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 26, 2002 and its
Resolution dated April 10, 2003 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the monthly overtime as well as leave pay included in
the computation of the unexpired portion of the contract should be deducted from the awarded amount of US$16,660.00.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53515 February 8, 1989

SAN MIGUEL BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION (PTGWO), petitioner,

vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, as Minister of Labor and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents.

Lorenzo F. Miravite for petitioner.

Isidro D. Amoroso for New San Miguel Corp. Sales Force Union.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Order dated February 28, 1980 of the Minister of Labor in Labor Case No. AJML-069-79,
approving the private respondent's marketing scheme, known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) and
dismissing the petitioner labor union's complaint for unfair labor practice.

On April 17, 1978, a collective bargaining agreement (effective on May 1, 1978 until January 31, 1981) was entered into by
petitioner San Miguel Corporation Sales Force Union (PTGWO), and the private respondent, San Miguel Corporation, Section 1,
of Article IV of which provided as follows:

Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled to a basic monthly
compensation plus commission based on their respective sales. (p. 6, Annex A; p. 113, Rollo.)

In September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS)
whereby its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers through San Miguel's sales offices.

The labor union (herein petitioner) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the Ministry of Labor, with a notice of strike on the
ground that the CDS was contrary to the existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were assigned specific
territories within which to sell their stocks of beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company. It
was alleged that the new marketing scheme violates Section 1, Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement because the
introduction of the CDS would reduce the take-home pay of the salesmen and their truck helpers for the company would be
unfairly competing with them.

The complaint filed by the petitioner against the respondent company raised two issues: (1) whether the CDS violates the
collective bargaining agreement, and (2) whether it is an indirect way of busting the union.

In its order of February 28, 1980, the Minister of Labor found:

... We see nothing in the record as to suggest that the unilateral action of the employer in inaugurating the
new sales scheme was designed to discourage union organization or diminish its influence, but rather it is
undisputable that the establishment of such scheme was part of its overall plan to improve efficiency and
economy and at the same time gain profit to the highest. While it may be admitted that the introduction of
new sales plan somewhat disturbed the present set-up, the change however was too insignificant as to
convince this Office to interpret that the innovation interferred with the worker's right to self-organization.

Petitioner's conjecture that the new plan will sow dissatisfaction from its ranks is already a prejudgment of the
plan's viability and effectiveness. It is like saying that the plan will not work out to the workers' [benefit] and
therefore management must adopt a new system of marketing. But what the petitioner failed to consider is
the fact that corollary to the adoption of the assailed marketing technique is the effort of the company to
compensate whatever loss the workers may suffer because of the new plan over and above than what has
been provided in the collective bargaining agreement. To us, this is one indication that the action of the
management is devoid of any anti-union hues. (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

The dispositive part of the Minister's Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the notice of strike filed by the petitioner, San Miguel Brewery Sales
Force Union-PTGWO is hereby dismissed. Management however is hereby ordered to pay an additional
three (3) months back adjustment commissions over and above the adjusted commission under the
complementary distribution system. (p. 26, Rollo.)

The petition has no merit.

Public respondent was correct in holding that the CDS is a valid exercise of management prerogatives:
 Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and
manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. ...
(NLU vs. Insular La Yebana Co., 2 SCRA 924; Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR 21 SCRA 226, 235.) (Perfecto
V. Hernandez, Labor Relations Law, 1985 Ed., p. 44.) (Emphasis ours.)

Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise means designed towards that
goal. In Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713, We ruled:

... Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer
to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own
business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.

So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements,
this Court will uphold them (LVN Pictures Workers vs. LVN, 35 SCRA 147; Phil. American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and
Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). San Miguel Corporation's offer to compensate
the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-called "back
adjustment commission" to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves the company's good faith
and lack of intention to bust their union.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165960 February 8, 2007

JEFFREY O. TORREDA, Petitioner,

vs.
TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., and GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76289 and the Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court
affirmed the November 15, 2002 Resolution3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-
10931-99-L (CA No. 023462-2000).

The Antecedents

Jeffrey O. Torreda was employed by Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. as a finance assistant 4 (on a probationary
basis) on July 1, 1997. He was mainly responsible for payroll processing and management, and for the bookkeeping of T&P
Properties, Inc.5 Effective January 1, 1998, he was employed on a regular basis as finance accountant6 under the Finance and
Accounting Department headed by Kazuo Kobayashi, Vice-President, and Teresita Sepulveda, Finance Manager.7 He was
tasked to do the following:

(i) processing of the payrolls of the employees of the Company, (ii) maintenance of reports on year-to-date earnings and taxes
withheld, monetary benefits, and government contributions, (iii) preparation of vouchers related to payroll accounts of the
employees, (iv) preparation and reconciliation of payment of taxes withheld and file tax returns, and (v) preparation of reportorial
requirements of government agencies and regulatory bodies.8

On May 22, 1998, Torreda and his four co-employees in the Finance and Accounting Department reported to Senior Vice-
President Hisao Tanaka that, before and after the reorganization, Finance Manager Teresita Sepulveda had ordered them to
prepare petty cash vouchers in their names and that the sums covered by the vouchers were received by Sepulveda for her own
personal use.9 Tanaka told them that he would bring the matter to Gerardo Cristobal, Jr., the Manager of the Human Resources
Department.10 Consequently, Sepulveda was barred from approving petty cash vouchers with an amount beyond ₱1,000.00.
She was also required to make monthly reports of petty cash vouchers to the Senior Vice-President. Thus, restrictions were
imposed on Sepulveda’s authority to approve petty cash vouchers.11

On July 22, 1998, Sepulveda opened Torreda’s personal computer and read his Lotus Notes mail and other personal files,
specifically the report he had sent to Tanaka about her. She reprimanded Torreda and told him that he should not send mails to
Tanaka without her approval.12 Upset over Sepulveda’s actuations, Torreda reported the incident via electronic mail (e-mail) to
Tanaka13 on the same day. He complained that Sepulveda had no right to open the computer because it was his, and it
contained his personal files. He told Tanaka that Sepulveda used to open the employees’ computers; hence, she could no longer
be trusted.14

Sepulveda filed a complaint against Torreda with the Human Resources Department (HRD) for repeated tardiness during the
period of April to July 1998.

On August 27, 1998, Sepulveda ordered Torreda to make a summary of payroll overpayments from October 1996 to June
1998.15 Torreda refused and informed Sepulveda that all countermeasures for immediate and long-term solutions had been
identified, and that what was needed was a strict implementation of countermeasures.16 He further questioned the propriety of
his being ordered to prepare financial summaries starting October 1996, when he was employed only on July 1, 1997.17

From September 1 to 3, 1998, Sepulveda received complaints from separated employees regarding full salary claims, and from
incumbent employees on maternity and other benefits. Torreda failed to process the claims before taking a leave of absence on
September 3, 1998. In order to retrieve the claimants’ payrolls and Social Security Services (SSS) files, which Torreda kept in his
drawer, Sepulveda, with prior approval from Kobayashi, had the drawer forcibly opened by Ruben delos Santos, a staff member
of the General Administration Section. The drawer was opened in the presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio and Flor
Berdin of the Finance Department. The claims of the employees were later processed and released. 18 As shown by official
records, Torreda went to his office on September 5, 1998, a Saturday, and stayed thereat for several hours.

On September 7, 1998, Sepulveda requested Torreda to submit his key for duplication to prevent similar incidents. 19Torreda
refused. Sepulveda sent a formal request via e-mail directing him to turn over his drawer key to the General Administrator of the
company for duplication and to explain in writing why he refused to surrender his key.20 Torreda replied via e-mail to Sepulveda,
to wit:

I WILL ONLY GIVE YOU THE DUPLICATE COPY (sic) IF YOU CAN PROVIDE ME WITH OR (SIC) AN EXPLANATION OF
THE FOLLOWING:

1.) TIP policy on Key duplication to be submitted to your possession (sic).

2.) Why is is (sic) that my Php 200.00 pesos (sic) in my drawer is missing (or STOLEN, by WHO ELSE____)??
Because you are the only one who FORCIBLY open (sic) my drawer without my knowledge. This is a plain and simple
robbery on your part…21

Torreda furnished copies of this e-mail to Cristobal, Kobayashi, Tanaka and N. Florencio, the Senior Manager of the HRD,
Manager of General Administration, Vice-President for Finance, Senior Vice-President and Financial Analyst of the company,
respectively.
Torreda then accomplished the company complaint form against Sepulveda declaring that at 8:00 a.m. on September 7, 1998,
he discovered that two ₱100.00 bills he kept in his drawer were missing. He noted that his drawer had been forcibly opened
before by Ruben delos Santos on Sepulveda’s orders.22

On the same day, Sepulveda sent to the HRD a complaint/request for investigation (via e-mail) regarding Torreda’s accusation
and his abusive and rude behavior.23 The complaint reads:

This is to formally file a complaint against one of my staff, Mr. Jeffrey Torreda. In this statement below, he blatantly accused me
of robbery for the ₱200.00 missing in his drawer. This is a fabrication of a story and I felt very much humiliated by his words.

Would like to request for an investigation to be conducted to clear my name of this incident. I cannot be silent and accept this as
simple error when my name and career are at stake. This is a clear case of misrepresentation. In my position as the Finance
Manager of TIP, integrity is the most important virtue that I have to project and protect. Mr. Torreda, thru his misrepresentation
particularly to top management, caused damage to my image.

I pray for justice. Lest this act of Mr. Jeffrey Torreda will happen again.24

On September 7, 1998, a conference was held in the office of Kobayashi between Torreda, Cristobal and Sepulveda. Torreda
claimed that Sepulveda never informed him that his drawer needed to be opened. He pointed out that some employees of the
Finance and Accounting Section knew his contact numbers. Sepulveda, for her part, claimed that she did not have the contact
numbers of Torreda, hence, was unable to contact him before his drawer was opened. Kobayashi told Sepulveda that she should
have the contact numbers of those in the Finance and Accounting Section.

Maximo Dones of the General Administration Section conducted an investigation of the complaint against Sepulveda. On
September 8, 1998, he submitted a Report where he declared that there was no factual basis for Torreda’s "robbery" charge
against Sepulveda.

In a separate development, the HRD issued a "written warning" on September 10, 1998 to Torreda, in reference to his tardiness
from April to July 1998 (the matter Sepulveda had earlier complained of).25

The next day, September 11, 1998, Sepulveda and Kobayashi directed Torreda to explain, in writing, within 48 hours why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for the following violation against the company:26

Offenses against the Company: Insubordination – Refusal or neglecting to obey the order of the supervisor or superior x x x. in
reference to the Sept. 10 incident.27

He was warned that failure to submit the Employee’s Written Explanation Form within the given period would be considered as
an admission of the offense.28

Torreda, for his part, sent an e-mail message to Hisao Tanaka on September 11, 1998, where he complained against Sepulveda
for the following offenses/violations:

A.) ABUSE OF POSITION IN THE COMPANY TO GAIN PROFIT OR ADVANTAGE FROM THE EMPLOYEE UNDER
HER SUPERVISION. – 1st Offense DISMISSAL

B.) UNAUTHORIZED OPENING OF ANOTHER’S LOCKER, DRAWER OR OFFICE – 1st Offense DISMISSAL

C.) FALSIFYING COMPANY RECORDS AND OR DOCUMENTS – 1st Offense DISMISSAL

D.) FALSE REPORTING – 1st Offense DISMISSAL

E.) OTHER CASE OF DISHONESTY AND MISREPRESENTATION – 1st OFFENSE DISMISSAL

 F.) COERCING, INTIMIDATING AND THREATENING – 1st Offense SUSPENSION

G.) CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENT SUBMISSION OF ANY ITEM OF EXPENSE. 1st Offense DISMISSAL 29

Meanwhile, Sepulveda approved Torreda’s paternity leave from September 12 to September 21, 1998.30 Torreda received the
directive of Sepulveda and Kobayashi on September 13, 1998, but failed to submit his written explanation on the charges against
him.

Torreda then applied for leave for the period beginning September 22, 1998 up to October 2, 1998, but Sepulveda disapproved
the same.31

On October 2, 1998, the General Administration (GA) Department recommended that Torreda be dismissed conformably with its
findings that he committed grave slander under the company’s Employee Handbook.

Torreda submitted his written explanation32 to Sepulveda’s complaint for grave slander only on October 6, 1998. He alleged that
he had the right to accuse Sepulveda of stealing because she was the one who ordered his drawer forcibly opened. His charge
of robbery against her was the normal reaction of one who finds out that something he owns is missing due to an unlawful act.
He pointed out that he had been a victim of Sepulveda’s unauthorized acts on prior occasions. She repeatedly opened his
computer and his drawer on September 10 and 11, 1998 while he was on leave. Had Sepulveda acted rightly, he (Torreda)
would not have committed grave slander against her.33 He also pointed out that since his contact numbers were known to his
officemates, Sepulveda should have called him up before ordering the opening of his drawer on September 3, 1998. 34

In a letter35 addressed to Hisao Tanaka dated October 7, 1998, Torreda, Finance Supervisor Visitacion Agustin, and Finance
Assistant Rowena Alinas demanded that appropriate action be taken against Sepulveda for various offenses or violations. They
alleged that Sepulveda had degraded and humiliated them (specifically Torreda); that she looked into their personal computer
files without authority; that she mishandled and appropriated for herself the company’s petty cash; that she forcibly opened the
drawer of Torreda resulting in the loss of documents and money; that there were cases of negligent payment of SSS contribution
and under-declaration of withholding tax due to Sepulveda’s fault; that Torreda was warned for tardiness without due process;
that Sepulveda unjustifiably disapproved Torreda’s leave application; that Torreda was stripped of his duties and responsibilities
and given new ones alien to him; that she intimidated Torreda by ordering the removal of his Lotus Notes Software from his
computer without any explanation; that she deliberately caused the payments of allowances to employees who were not entitled
thereto and the deduction of performance bonuses from employees so entitled; and that overpayments of salaries to several
employees occurred due to Sepulveda’s negligence in checking the payroll.

On October 14, 1998, Torreda received a letter36 from Gerardo Cristobal, Jr. informing him that his employment had been
terminated effective at the end of official working hours on that day, for grave slander, which under the Employee Handbook is
punishable by dismissal.37 The letter of termination reads:

After a thorough review and evaluation of the Grave Slander charge by your superior and your reply/explanation, the following
points become relevant; (sic)

1. While we have a policy prohibiting unauthorized opening of Employee lockers/drawers, your superior, Ms. Teresita
Sepulveda sought the approval of your Department Head/Vice President. This approval made the action of opening
your drawer authorized and official.

2. Your Department Head/Vice President authorized the opening of your drawer to locate and retrieve vital documents
needed last September which was (sic) under your custody.

3. Several employees witnessed the opening and the retrieval of the said vital documents from your drawer by your
superior and testified they did not see any money inside the drawer nor any taken by your superior.

4. Your claim that there was (sic) Pesos 200 in your drawer is not substantiated.
 5. You reported the alleged loss to GA on Monday, September 7, 1998 yet you spent several hours at the office the
previous Saturday, September 5, 1998 per our official records. Mr. Maximino Dones of General Affairs did not receive
any report of loss then. It would seem natural for an Employee to report immediately the loss of his money upon
discovering that his drawer was opened.

6. Prudence and common sense dictate that personal properties including money should not be left behind (sic) in
drawers and lockers which are Company properties.

Based on the Investigation Report submitted by Mr. Maximino Dones on September 8, 1998 of General Affairs on your alleged
theft complaint and the above considerations, we find your complaint against Ms. Sepulveda without basis and merit.
Consequently, there is basis in the charge of Grave Slander against you by Ms. T. Sepulveda when you called her a ‘robber’ in
your e-mail dated September 7, 1998 addressed to her.

Your false accusation has caused her undue embarrassment and has cast aspersion on her character as Manager of TIP. This is
strengthened by the fact that you furnished a copy of the said e-mail to other parties, e.g., K. Kobayashi, R. Suarez, N. Florencio
and H. Tanaka.

As a subordinate, you (sic) action shows an utter disrespect and disregard to her as a person of authority and the Company
considers this a grave and serious violation of our existing policies on Offenses Related to Conduct and Behavior. And as stated
in our Employee Handbook, the penalty for Grave Slander is Dismissal for the first offense.

In view hereof, you are hereby formally informed that your employment with Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), is
terminated effective at the end of official working hours today October 14, 1998.

Please comply with the relevant post-employment requirement of the Company by surrendering your accountabilities to HRA
through Ms. Candice Cipriano to enable us to process your last salary.

(Sgd.) GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL, JR.

Senior Manager, HRA38

On March 23, 1999, Torreda filed a complaint39 for illegal dismissal against Cristobal and Toshiba. The case was docketed as
NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-10931-99-L.

On February 15, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,40 declaring that Torreda’s dismissal from employment was
unjustified. The series of events indicated that Torreda was harassed by Sepulveda because of his exposé of irregularities she
had committed. The opening of his drawer formed part of her harassment tactics.41 Thus, Torreda had all the right to demand an
explanation for the forcible opening of his computer files and drawer which resulted in the loss of some amount of
money.42 1awphi1.net

The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Toshiba did not observe the rudiments of due process in terminating Torreda’s
employment. The result of the investigation on the charges against him came out on October 2, 1998, or four days before
Torreda submitted his written explanation to the charges.43 The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent company is found guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby ordered to
reinstate the complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay him backwages in the amount of
₱238,745.00 [(₱14,692.00 x 15 months = ₱220,380.00) + (13th month pay ₱220,380.00/12 = ₱18,365.00)] computed from the
time of dismissal up to the date of this decision. In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible, respondent company is
hereby ordered to pay complainant separation pay in the amount of ₱44,076.00 (₱14,692.00 x 3 years) plus backwages.

SO ORDERED.44 1awphil.net
Aggrieved by the decision, respondents appealed the case to the NLRC.45 They maintained that the sending of an e-mail
message containing insulting and offensive words, and false and malicious statements against his immediate superior
(Sepulveda), clearly intended to cause dishonor, is not only destructive of the morale of his co-employees and violative of
company rules and regulations; it also constitutes serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from employment. 46 The
requirement of due process was further met, since the termination of the complainant was made on October 14, 1998, or eight
(8) days after the company received his explanation to the charges against him.47

On November 15, 2002, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.48 The NLRC ratiocinated that the complainant
committed the infraction of accusing his immediate superior of stealing ₱200.00 and calling her a robber (through an e-mail
message), without any evidence at all, and forwarding copies to the other officers of the company. The NLRC declared that this
infraction constitutes serious misconduct, a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.

The NLRC declared that considering the urgency of the situation, it was necessary to open the drawer of Torreda: there had
been numerous follow-ups from separated employees regarding their pending final salary payments, and from incumbent
employees claiming maternity and sickness benefits under the SSS, and processing these applications was part of complainant’s
responsibilities. Moreover, the opening of the drawer was conducted in the presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio and
Flor Berdin, who were employees of the Finance Section, with prior notice to Kobayashi, Vice-President for Finance.49

The NLRC further held that disrespect to company officials and staff members constitutes serious misconduct which means a
transgression of some established rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction. Consequently, pursuant to Article 279 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the complainant is not entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and privileges, or to payment of any separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, or payment of any backwages and
other benefits.50 The NLRC cited the ruling of this Court in Gutierrez v. Baron.51 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is VACATED
and a new one ENTERED dismissing the instant case for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.52

When his motion for reconsideration53 was denied by the NLRC in its January 27, 2003 Resolution,54 Torreda filed a petition for
certiorari55 before the CA on April 1, 2003. He alleged that the NLRC committed grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision and in finding that his dismissal was justified. 56

Unpersuaded, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition on February 27, 2004.57 It affirmed the NLRC ruling dismissing
petitioner’s complaint. However, the appellate court found that petitioner committed grave slander when he concocted the charge
of theft against Sepulveda, the penalty for which, under the Employee’s Handbook, is dismissal.58

Petitioner timely filed his motion for reconsideration59 which the appellate court denied in its May 13, 2004 resolution.60

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition insisting that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that the dismissal of the
petitioner was legal.61

Petitioner contends that the ground for his termination does not fall among the just causes stated in Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as amended.62 The alleged grave slander was in response to Sepulveda’s September 7, 1998 e-mail requesting him to
submit the key of his drawer for duplication.63 He reacted in that manner because Sepulveda had previously harassed him.64 In
fact, he wrote Tanaka, on September 11, 1998, requesting for assistance on the offenses committed by his direct superior.
Instead of penalizing Sepulveda, however, respondent Toshiba dismissed him from the service for alleged grave slander. 65

In their Comment,66 respondents Toshiba and HR Manager Cristobal assert that the issues raised by petitioner involve questions
of fact and not of law, which are improper in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.67 The factual findings and conclusion of the
NLRC, which were affirmed by the CA, should be accorded with respect and finality.68

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It bears stressing that what petitioner filed before the CA was one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, he was
burdened to prove that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed his petition. The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:

x x x By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries
of both civil law and common law traditions.69

Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.70 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse
of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.71 An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.72 In Cosep v. NLRC,73 this Court held that
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final by law are not exempt from judicial review for want of substantial
basis in fact and in law.

A careful review of the decisions of the NLRC and the CA reveal that they differ on their bases for the dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint. The NLRC declared that the charge of robbery which was fabricated by petitioner against his immediate superior,
Sepulveda, constitutes serious misconduct punishable by dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code; in contrast, the CA
ruled that petitioner committed grave slander - an act punishable by dismissal under the Employee’s Handbook.

We hold that the CA correctly affirmed the NLRC Resolution ordering the Labor Arbiter to dismiss petitioner’s complaint.
However, the appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner committed grave slander against Sepulveda and in applying the
Employee’s Handbook as basis for his dismissal.

The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee is for a just or valid
cause. Evidence must be clear, convincing and free from any inference that the prerogative to dismiss an employee was abused
and unjustly used by the employer to further any vindictive end.74 In this case, respondent Toshiba adequately proved that
petitioner was dismissed for just cause.

The NLRC did not err much less commit grave abuse of its discretion when it based its ruling on Article 282(a) of the Labor Code
on its finding that petitioner committed serious misconduct for falsely accusing his immediate superior of robbery. As the Court
held in Villanueva v. People:75

Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood,
has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood.

There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon
the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but
also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.76

The false attribution by the petitioner of robbery (theft) against Sepulveda was made in writing; patently then, petitioner
committed libel, not grave slander against Sepulveda. The malicious and public imputation in writing by one of a crime on
another is libel under Article 353, in relation to Article 355, of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
 xxx

Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. – A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.

Indeed, an employee may be dismissed from employment for acts punishable by dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor
Code, which reads:

Article 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; x x x

In Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,77 the Court explained the nature of serious
misconduct as a ground for dismissal from employment:

Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The
misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such
misconduct, however, serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his
separation. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to
the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer. Indeed, an employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such person whose continuance in the service
would be patently inimical to his employer’s interest.78

There is abundant evidence on record showing that petitioner committed libel against his immediate superior, Sepulveda, an act
constituting serious misconduct which warrants the dismissal from employment.

Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery of ₱200.00. As gleaned from his Complaint dated
September 7, 1999 which he filed with the General Administration, he knew that it was Delos Santos who opened his drawer and
not Sepulveda. Thus, by his own admission, petitioner was well aware that the robbery charge against Sepulveda was a
concoction, a mere fabrication with the sole purpose of retaliating against Sepulveda’s previous acts.

The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioner’s drawer. She needed to retrieve the benefits
applications of retirees and incumbent employees of respondent-corporation, which petitioner had failed to process for payment
before his leave. The claimants sought to have their claims approved and released with dispatch. Before opening petitioner’s
drawer, Sepulveda saw to it that she had Kobayashi’s approval. Delos Santos opened the drawer of petitioner in the presence of
his co-employees in the Financial Section. Thereafter, the claims were processed and payments were effected. Thus, Sepulveda
acted in good faith.79

Petitioner admitted that his charge of robbery/theft against Sepulveda was baseless, but claimed that he fabricated the charge
because of his exasperation and anger at Sepulveda’s repeated acts of opening his drawer without prior permission while he
was on leave, not only on September 7, 1998 but also on September 10 and 11, 1998; he also pointed out that Sepulveda
looked into his personal files in his computer. In fine, by falsely ascribing a crime to Sepulveda, petitioner was merely retaliating
against perceived misdeeds she had committed against him. However, the manner resorted to by petitioner of redressing the
wrong committed by Sepulveda is a criminal act. As the adage goes, the end cannot justify the means used by petitioner.

In St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos,80 this Court held that the employer’s right to conduct the affairs of his business, according to
its own discretion and judgment, is well-recognized. An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to
regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties,
including dismissal, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative, where the free will of management to conduct its
own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form.81 The law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer.82

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 76289 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 170811 : April 24, 2007]

SUPREME STEEL PIPE CORPORATION and REGAN SY, Petitioners, v. ROGELIO BARDAJE,Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81775, which reversed the July 10,
2003 Decision2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 028936-01 and reinstated the April
30, 2001 Decision3 of the Labor Arbiter in NCR Case No. 00-09-09800-99.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Supreme Steel Pipe Corporation (SSPC), a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of manufacturing
steel pipes, employed respondent Rogelio Bardaje as a warehouseman on March 14, 1994. SSPC employees were required to
wear a uniform (a yellow t-shirt with a logo and the marking "Supreme") while at work.

On August 19, 1999, respondent reported for work at 6:45 a.m. It was a common practice among warehousemen to wear long-
sleeved shirts over their uniforms to serve as protection from heat and dust while working, and on this day, respondent had on a
green long-sleeved shirt over his uniform. Momentarily, security guard Christopher Barrios called him in a loud voice, and
arrogantly ordered him to remove and turn-over to him (Barrios) the long-sleeved shirt. Insulted and feeling singled-out from the
other warehousemen who were also wearing long-sleeved shirts over their uniforms, respondent replied: "Ano ba ang gusto mo,
hubarin ko o magsuntukan na lang tayo sa labas?" A heated exchange of words ensued, but the brewing scuffle between the two
was averted by a co-employee from the Production Division, Albert A. Bation. A security guard, Ricky Narciso, was able to keep
the parties apart. Barrios reported the incident to the SSPC management.

The next day, respondent received a Memorandum from petitioner SSPC stating that pending the investigation for his alleged
violation of the company rule prohibiting "inciting a fight, harassing, coercing, intimidating and/or threatening co-workers," he was
being meted a 30-day preventive suspension beginning August 23, 1999.4 He was also required to submit his Answer/Comment
to the incident, to which he readily complied.

When respondent reported back to work a month after, he was served with a Notice dated September 8, 1999, terminating his
employment effective September 23, 1999. Petitioner SSPC had taken into account the August 19, 1999 incident as well as
respondent's "previous infractions of company rules." Petitioner SSPC declared that respondent's continued employment would
pose serious and imminent threat to the lives of his co-workers and to the property of the corporation and its employees. In part,
the notice stated:

Upon thorough investigation of your case, and the incident, there surfaced on records similar acts which you had committed on
the following instances: 1.) August 06, 1997, you were charged with Coercing, Intimidating and/or Threatening your co-worker
and challenged to a fight against the Production Supervisor Engr. Benny Lloren[;] 2.) August 07, 1997, Inciting a fight inside the
Company premises against Engr. Benny Lloren; 3.) October 09, 1997, damage to Company Vehicle thru Reckless Imprudence
using Company equipment without proper permission and authority; 4.) August 15, 1998, inflicting injury against a Company
Overseer Mr. Lim; 5.) May 24, 1999, at 6:30 P.M., more or less, Inciting a Fight against your co-employee Ariel Burton.

With the aforecited incident/instances [it] would clearly manifest that your continued employment with this Company [poses] a
serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of your co-workers, but through your pleadings for
forgiveness with the above incidents, the Company being considerate enough[,] you were given a second chance.

At this instance, applying the above-stated Rule to the [facts] obtaining in this most recent case, [it] would inevitably result in the
[finding] that dismissal is proper. Your continued employment would pose a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of
the Company or any of its workers.

Taking into account all the circumstances surrounding this case, the acts which you have showed considering your unruly temper
on August 19, 1999, in the presence of the Personnel Officer inside the Personnel Office [which] was deliberately done to
embolden yourself in a fight against another person[,] you would have been punished of (sic) outright dismissal.

Examination of the circumstances surrounding your quarrel with the Guard shows [that] a serious or [substantial] danger has
been posed by the quarrel to the well-being of your co-employees, and your behavior threatened to cause substantial prejudice
for the business of the Company.5

Alleging that his dismissal from service was illegal, respondent filed a Complaint on September 29, 1999 against petitioner and
its President, Regan Sy. The complaint contained the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, complainant prays that the Honorable Labor Arbiter render a decision:

1. declaring the dismissal of Bardaje illegal;

2. ordering Bardaje to be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages;

3. ordering respondents to pay Bardaje TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) by way of moral damages;

4. ordering respondents to pay Bardaje TWENTY-THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) by way of exemplary damages;

5. ordering respondents to pay Bardaje an amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his total money claims;

6. declaring respondent Regan Sy to be held solidarily liable to complainant for damages.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.6

In their Position Paper, petitioners SSPC and Sy posited that for threatening Barrios and challenging him to a fight after being
"politely advised" to remove the long-sleeved shirt and wear the uniform, respondent committed serious misconduct. Petitioners
submitted in evidence the handwritten statements of Albert Bation and the three (3) security guards, Ricky Narciso, Ben
Montoya, as well as that of Christopher Barrios.

Petitioner SSPC reiterated that the August 19, 1999 incident was not an isolated case; on prior occasions, the complainant had
shown his violent temper and tendency to breach company rules and regulations given the slightest provocation, but in all the
previous offenses, the complainant was just given a "kid's gloves treatment." The August 19 incident was, however, different
since respondent was challenging not only the security guards but petitioner SSPC as well. Petitioner insisted that Barrios was
only performing his job, and that respondent should have complied with the lawful and reasonable instructions on wearing of
proper uniform instead of arrogantly displaying his "perceived superiority." They insisted that respondent was afforded procedural
due process - he was duly informed of the charges against him, and in fact submitted his explanation thereto. Moreover, his
termination was based on the evidence presented.7
On April 30, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment and held that Bardaje was illegally dismissed. The fallo of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is entered FINDING the respondents to have illegally dismissed complainant
thus, ORDERING them to reinstate him to his previous position without loss [of] seniority rights and other privileges and to pay
him full backwages, inclusive of 13th - month-pay benefits and 5-day SILP/year, computed from date of dismissal on 23 August
1999 up to the time of his actual reinstatement, less 3 months salary as penalty for his infraction as shown in the attached
computation sheet by the Computation & Research Unit-this Office.

As the reinstatement aspect is immediately executory even pending appeal by the employer, respondents are to admit back to
work complainant under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or at its option, merely reinstated in the
payroll.

All other claims of complainant are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8

The Labor Arbiter declared that respondents failed to substantiate their claim that the complainant committed serious
misconduct. According to the Labor Arbiter, as between the handwritten account of Montoya and complainant's version that he
only wore his long-sleeved shirt when he was about to work (not at the time he punched in his daily time record) and was
shouted at, the narration of the complainant is more worthy of belief; the guard could not be expected to testify against his own
employer. According to the Labor Arbiter, the respondent's alleged past "misdemeanors" should not be considered since no
investigations were conducted thereon.

However, the Labor Arbiter ruled, even if respondent was not guilty of serious misconduct, that he was not entirely blameless. He
could have easily called the attention of his superiors to the guard's arrogant attitude. Thus, the penalty of suspension for three
(3) months without pay was proper.9

Petitioners appealed the case before the NLRC, alleging that petitioner SSPC had the management prerogative to dismiss
employees as a measure of self-protection. It was claimed that the handwritten statements of Montoya and Narciso substantially
corroborated the allegations of Barrios; considering petitioner's violent tendencies in previous incidents, he was more capable of
provoking the fight. It further claimed that the past offenses of respondent were investigated, but for humanitarian reasons, no
disciplinary actions were imposed. They insisted that the Labor Arbiter should have conducted trial on the merits since the
resolution of the issues in the case basically revolve on the credibility of witnesses. It further alleged that, applying the doctrine of
separate corporate entity in labor cases, petitioner Sy should not be held liable in his personal capacity.10

Meantime, petitioner SSPC opted to reinstate respondent in its payroll effective August 23, 2001, the date he actually reported
back to work.11 However, starting June 2002, petitioner refused to pay respondent's salary. Consequently, on March 26, 2003
(while petitioners' appeal in the NLRC was pending), respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that respondent SSPC
or any of its representatives be immediately ordered to pay his salary from June 2002 up to the present. 12

Without ruling on the motion, the NLRC rendered its July 10, 2003 Decision reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, and
ordering the dismissal of the complaint.13

The NLRC declared that, based on the written statements of Bation, Montoya and Narciso, the incident was not a mere
exchange of words or simple altercation; respondent was "raring for a fight" when accosted for not properly wearing the company
uniform. Moreover, his propensity to incite trouble was evident from the other incidents involving him and Engr. Benny Lloren,
Ape Lim and Ariel Burton. Hence, the August 19, 1999 incident, taken together with respondent's previous infractions, justified
the imposition of the ultimate penalty of dismissal.14

Respondent seasonably filed his appeal before the CA.15 The appellate court rendered judgment on October 14, 2004 reversing
the decision of the NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari is GRANTED.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The assailed decision and resolution of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE; and the 30 April 2001 decision of Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez is REINSTATED.

Private respondent Supreme Steel Pipe Corporation is further ordered to pay the salaries of petitioner Rogelio Bardaje from June
2002, onwards.

SO ORDERED.16

The CA agreed with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that respondent was guilty of misconduct, since he openly acknowledged
that he was engaged in a war of words that could have resulted in a fistfight with Barrios. The CA, however, found that the
penalty of dismissal was not warranted, and that it was too harsh and evidently disproportionate to the act committed. The NLRC
patently erred and gravely abused its discretion when it declared that the dismissal was justified due to the previous "infractions"
committed by respondent, as there was no evidence that respondent was culpable therefor. Even assuming that these were
actually committed, the CA ruled that petitioner SSPC could no longer utilize the infractions since they had been admittedly
condoned for humanitarian considerations.17

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied on December 15, 2005;18hence, this petition.

The petition has no merit.

In this jurisdiction, we have consistently defined misconduct as an improper or wrong conduct, a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, implies wrongful intent and not
mere error of judgment.19 To be a just cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, 20 the
misconduct must be serious,21 that is, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant.22 However serious, such misconduct must nevertheless be in connection with the employee's work; 23 the act
complained of must be related to the performance of the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the
employer.24 Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to
the performance of the employee's duties; and, (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.25

These guideposts were not complied with in the instant case. Although we have recognized that fighting within company
premises may constitute serious misconduct,26 we have also held that not every fight within company premises in which an
employee is involved would automatically warrant dismissal from service.27 Thus, in Sanyo Travel Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission,28 Oania v. National Labor Relations Commission,29 and Foodmine, Inc. (Kentucky Fried Chicken) v.
National Labor Relations Commission,30 where the employees were dismissed for their alleged involvement in a fight, it was
ruled that the employer must prove by substantial evidence the accusation of serious misconduct, and that in failing to discharge
the burden, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed.

Respondent's actuations during the August 19, 1999 incident were not entirely baseless. To begin with, it is certain that the
verbal tussle between him and Barrios did not start due to the alleged "violent temper and tendency to violate company rules and
regulations" of respondent; the incident was primarily due to Barrios' provoking attitude. Other than the self-serving allegation of
petitioner SSPC that Barrios "politely advised" respondent to remove his green long-sleeved shirt and to wear the company-
issued uniform, no competent and credible evidence was shown to support the claim. In fact, even the handwritten statements of
the three security guards, including that of Barrios himself, did not dwell on the manner by which petitioner was instructed. On
the other hand, petitioner's narrations, as corroborated by the duly notarized affidavit of fellow warehouseman Jury
Lobitania,31 revealed how insulting and arrogant Barrios was. This, aside from petitioner's feeling that he was being singled out
from other warehousemen, who were similarly-clothed while on duty, sufficiently explained why he challenged Barrios to a fight.

We agree with the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that respondent's misconduct on August 19, 1999 does not warrant the imposition
of the ultimate sanction of dismissal. Undeniably, the altercation between respondent and Barrios was nipped in the bud by the
timely intervention of other employees. The momentary work stoppage did not pose a threat to the safety or peace of mind of the
workers. Neither did such disorderly behavior cause substantial prejudice to the business of respondent SSPC. 32
Time and again, we have held that it is cruel and unjust to impose the drastic penalty of dismissal if not commensurate to the
gravity of the misdeed. The reason, as this Court first enunciated in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.,33 is not too difficult
to understand'

xxx [W]here a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a
consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family to
consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain
attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all circumstances of this case,
petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them For all this
while, since private respondent considered them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical
standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision
may be made to rest [on] informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due
weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum
caritatem.34

The alleged previous altercations with Engr. Benny Lloren, Ape Lim and Ariel Burton should not be considered in the resolution
of the case. Aside from having been satisfactorily explained by respondent,35they were not substantially proven and had long
been pardoned by petitioner SSPC. On this point, we agree with the following findings of the CA:

We thoroughly examined the records before us and found no substantial evidence to prove petitioner's alleged culpability for the
above enumerated infractions.

With respect to the infraction alleged to have been committed on the 6th and 7th of August 1997, we find that the Sworn
Statement executed by Engr. Benny Lloren is inadequate to prove that petitioner indeed, incited said Lloren to a fight. Not only is
the said sworn statement uncorroborated, it is worthy to note that it (sworn statement) was executed years after the occurrence
of the said incidents, which purportedly took place on the 6th and 7th of August 1997. The sworn statement of Engr. Benny
Lloren was executed on 07 January 2000.

As regards the infraction supposedly committed on 15 August 1998, while the petitioner impliedly admitted that he inflicted
physical injuries on the person of Ape Lim, Supreme's overseer, by claiming that such physical injuries were merely inflicted in
self-defense, his (petitioner) assertion was, notably, not refuted by the private respondents.

Anent the incident that purportedly happened on 24 May 1999, we give more credence to petitioner's contention that he did not
challenge Ariel Burton to a fight. Petitioner's contention was corroborated by Julius Constantino who executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay, where said Julius Constantino categorically stated that the petitioner did not challenge Ariel Burton to a fight.

On the other hand, other than the uncorroborated statements of Ariel Burton in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, that the petitioner
challenged him to a fight, private respondents presented no other competent evidence to prove petitioner's alleged
culpability.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Moreover, even assuming, gratia argumentis, that the aforementioned infractions were actually committed by the petitioner, still,
private respondents, and for that matter, the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, can no longer utilize said
previous infractions of the petitioner as a justification for his dismissal from work inasmuch as said infractions have been
admittedly condoned by the private respondents supposedly for humanitarian considerations. (Citations Omitted) 36

It appears that respondent impleaded SSPC President Regan Sy only because he is an officer/agent of the company. However,
petitioner Sy cannot be held solidarily liable with petitioner SSPC for the termination of respondent's employment, since there is
no showing that the dismissal was attended with malice or bad faith.37

One final note: for some unexplainable reason, the NLRC failed to act on petitioner's Manifestation and Motion praying that
petitioner SSPC or any of its representatives be immediately ordered to pay his withheld salary beginning June 2002 up to the
pendency of the case with the Commission. It did not even mention the fact of its filing in its Decision. While this may no longer
adversely affect respondent's cause, the Court cannot let this pass. Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, 38 an award or order of
reinstatement is self-executory.39 The reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's decision, albeit under appeal, is immediately
enforceable. Thus, when petitioner SSPC opted for respondent's payroll reinstatement, it should have paid his salary during the
period of appeal before the NLRC. In this case, the Commission's failure, or refusal, to timely act on the matter is a serious
oversight for which it should be admonished. While it is incumbent upon the party to take an active role in his case and not adopt
a wait-and-see attitude, the NLRC as an adjudicating body has the corresponding obligation to act promptly on all incidents
brought before it;40 otherwise, the law would readily be circumvented, causing untold hardships to the dismissed employee.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81775, which reinstated the April 30, 2001 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174593 August 25, 2010

ALEX GURANGO, Petitioner,

vs.
BEST CHEMICALS AND PLASTICS INC. and MOON PYO HONG, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 20 July 2006
Decision2 and 11 September 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94004. The Court of Appeals set aside
the 17 October 20054 and 24 January 20065 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in CA No. 044428-
05, affirming the 6 July 2004 Decision6 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 05-06181-03.

The Facts

Respondent Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc. (BCPI) is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of biaxially oriented
polypropylene and related products. Respondent Moon Pyo Hong (Hong) is the president and chief executive officer of BCPI.

Petitioner Alex R. Gurango (Gurango) and Romeo S. Albao (Albao) worked as boiler operator and security guard, respectively, in
BCPI. In a memorandum7 dated 2 May 2003, BCPI prohibited its empoyees from bringing personal items to their work area.
Erring employees would be suspended for six days. BCPI stated that:

Please be reminded of the following existing rules and regulations that all employees are expected to strictly observe and adhere
to:

xxxx

Bringing in to work station/area of personal belongings other than those required in the performance of one’s duty which
disrupt/obstruct Company’s services and operations, except those authorized by higher authorities. This offense shall include the
following items [sic]: radios, walkman, discman, make-up kits, ladies’ bags, workers’ knapsacks and the like which must be left
behind and safe kept [sic] in the employees’ respective lockers. This being a Serious Offense, the penalty of which is six (6) days
suspension from work without pay.81avvphi1

Gurango and Albao presented two conflicting sets of facts as to what happened on 5 May 2003.
According to Gurango, at 4 a.m., he performed his routine check-up inside the production area. He had in his pocket a camera
without film. On his way out of the production area, he saw Albao standing near the bundy clock. Albao pulled him, grabbed his
pocket, and tried to confiscate the camera. Gurango refused to give the camera because there was no reason to surrender it.

Albao held Gurango’s arm and punched him on the face. Gurango shouted for help. Another security guard, Rodenio I. Pablis
(Pablis), arrived. Instead of pacifying Albao, Pablis joined in punching and kicking Gurango. Albao and Pablis banged Gurango’s
head against the floor and provoked him to fight back.

Gurango’s co-worker, Elvin Juanitas (Juanitas), saw what happened and asked Albao and Pablis to stop hitting Gurango. Albao
and Pablis brought Gurango to the guardhouse. Officer-in-charge Rommel M. Cordero (Cordero) locked the guardhouse, then
ordered Albao and Pablis to continue hitting Gurango. Freddie Infuerto arrived at the guardhouse and asked the security guards
to stop hitting Gurango. Gurango agreed to surrender the camera on the condition that the security guards would prepare a
document acknowledging receipt of the camera.

Albao, on the other hand, alleged that he was on duty at the main entrance of the production area from 7 p.m. of 4 May 2003 to 7
a.m. of 5 May 2003. At 4:20 a.m., Gurango tried to enter the production area bringing a camera. Albao told Gurango that he
could not bring the camera inside the production area. Gurango got mad and tried to grab Albao’s gun. Albao and Gurango
engaged in a fistfight. Cordero, Pablis, and another security guard, Fredrick Lañada, arrived and stopped the fight.

On 5 May 2003, at 8:35 a.m., Gurango went to Dr. Homer L. Aguinaldo (Dr. Aguinaldo) for examination and treatment. Dr.
Aguinaldo issued a medical report9 and advised Gurango to rest for three days.

In a letter10 dated 5 May 2003, BCPI asked Gurango to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
and then placed him under preventive suspension effective 6 May 2003. On 6 May 2003, Gurango wrote a letter11 to BCPI
narrating what happened. On 8 May 2003, Gurango wrote another letter 12 to BCPI stating that:

I already explained my side of the story regarding the alleged fistfight between Romeo Albao and me. I would like to reiterate that
I was never involved in any fistfight nor commit any violation of our Company’s Code of Discipline.

Another issue is the preventive suspension I’m undergoing with [sic]. I would like to question the propriety of such action. Be
reminded that you are putting me under indefinite preventive suspension.

Under the law, an employee may be placed under preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and
imminent threat to the life and property of the employer or of his co-employees. Consequently, without this kind of threat,
preventive suspension is improper.13

On 9 May 2003, Juanitas wrote a letter14 to BCPI narrating what he saw. Juanitas stated that:

Noong May 5 bandang alas 4:20 ng madaling araw ako po ay lumabas ng electral [sic] shop upang pumunta
sa production upang mag monitor. Ng sa bandang locker room pa lang ako may nakita ako tatlong tao na nakasuot ng kulay puti
na nagpaikot-ikot (sa harapan banda ng bandi [sic] clock). Medyo madilim pa kaya hindi ko nakita si Alex Gurango kasi nakasoot
sya ng kulay dark blue na T-shirt. Ng medyo malapit na ako nakarinig ako ng boses na (tama na nasasaktan na ako) at may
sumagot na ibigay mo na masasaktan ka lang. Ng makalapit na ako sa kanila nakita ko na iniipit na ng kanang braso ni Albao
(Guard) ang leeg ni Alex. Akala ko nagbibiroan lang sila. Tinanong ko kung ano yan pero bago ako tumanong sa kanila nakita ko
na nasasaktan na si Alex dahil sa pagkaipit sa kanyang leeg. Sagot ni Alex sa akin pre (ako) kinukuha nila ang kamera sa akin
to eh. Sabi pa ni Alex hindi ko to ibibigay sa inyo kahit ako’y saktan nyo, hindi ako lalaban sa inyo. May pagbibigyan ako, ibibigay
ko to sa management. Sabi ko ano ba yan nasasaktan na ang tao. Nagtataka naman ako sa kanila ni Pables at Lañada bakit
hindi nila inaawat, nakatingin lang sila at kasamahan pa nila. Ako naman natatakot akong paghiwalayin sila kasi may baril
si Albao na naka sabit sa beywang nya baka pag inawat ko baka sasabihin ni Albao na kumampi ako kay Alex dahil parehas
kaming maintenance. Sinabihan ko si Albao na bitiwan mo si Alex ayusin natin to. Hindi pa rin binitiwan ni Albao ang pagkaipit sa
leeg ni Alex hanggang sa naitulak ko sila papunta sa guardhouse. Ng sa loob na ng guardhouse hindi pa rin binitiwan
ni Albao si Alex kaya hinahanap ko ang kanilang O.I.C. Para ayusin na. Maya maya lumabas si Cordero (O.I.C.). Sabi ko awatin
niya si Albao pero hindi manlang nya inawat pati na ang kanyang mga kasama dahil nandoon pa rin sa loob
ng guardhouse sina Pables, Lañada at Cordero. Lumabas ako at tinawag ko si Pong sa kanilang shop. Bumalik ako
sa guardhouse kasama si Pong, ganon pa rin nakakapit pa rin ang braso ni Albao sa leeg ni Alex. Ngayon naglakas loob na lang
ako na paghiwalayin sila. Nahirapan ako dahil malakas si Albao. Napaghiwalay ko sila pero muntik pa nga ako tamaan ng kamay
ni Albao at ng maghiwalay na pinaupo ko si Alex sa upuan sa tabi at hinarang ko si Albao dahil gusto pa nyang lumapit
kay Alex at nagsabi ako kay Pong na bantayan mo si Alex dahil tatawag ako ng Korean o supervisor para ayusin.15

On 10 May 2003, BCPI wrote a letter to Gurango finding him guilty of engaging in a fistfight and violating company policy by
bringing a camera. On 14 May 2003, Gurango wrote a letter16 to BCPI stating that:

I again would like to reiterate that I was never involved nor commit [sic] any violation of Company’s Code of Discipline.

For me to further explain, could you please be more specific what company policies are you referring to when you said that
bringing of camera inside the production area and refusal to surrender the same camera constitute infractions of company
policy.17

On 15 May 2003, Gurango filed with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Carmona, Cavite, a criminal
complaint18 against Albao, Cordero and Pablis for slight physical injury.

In a letter19 dated 19 May 2003, BCPI dismissed Gurango effective 20 May 2003. BCPI stated that:

After a thorough evaluation and intensive deliberation on the facts attendant to your case, Management has found you to have
committed the following Offenses under the Company’s Code of Discipline:

1. Concealing and bringing in to work station/area of personal belongings (e.g., a camera), other than those required in
the performance of one’s duty which disrupt/obstruct Company services and operations, except those authorized by
higher authorities. (Table II, Serious, No. 10 of Code of Discipline);

2. Utter disregard for or refusal to submit to reasonable inspection connected within [sic] the Company premises by
authorized Company security personnel in the conduct of their business. (Table IV, Minor, No. 1 of Code of Discipline);

3. Starting or provoking a fight, i.e., involvement in a fist fight with a security guard last May 5, 2003. (Table I, Grave,
No. 6 of Code of Discipline);

4. Attempting to inflict or inflicting bodily injury upon any Company official (e.g., security guard who is a peacekeeping
officer of the company) or employee. (Table I, Grave, No. 05 of Code of Discipline); and

5. Intentionally causing personal injury to another person (i.e., the security guard) within the Company premises. (Table
I, Grave, No. 12 of Code of Discipline).

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, and in view of the gravity of the offenses that you have committed which constitute gross misconduct,
the Company is constrained to terminate your employment for cause effective May 20, 2003, at the close of business hours.20

On 26 May 2003, Gurango filed with the NLRC a complaint against BCPI and Hong for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter’s Ruling

In his 6 July 2004 Decision, the Labor Arbiter found BCPI liable for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ordered BCPI to pay
Gurango backwages and separation pay. The Labor Arbiter held that:

I find that the complainant was illegally dismissed from employment.

He was dismissed from [sic] trying to bring an alleged prohibited item, a camera, inside the Production Area but company rules
did not prohibit the bringing of camera.

How can an unloaded camera be said to "disrupt/obstruct company services and operations"? It cannot.

As to the alleged fistfight between the complainant and security guard Albao, I am more inclined to believe and find credible
complainant’s version that he was mauled by Albao and, later, by some of the guards.

His letter/statement was made on May 6, 2003, or only a day after the incident. The statement of guard Albao was made on May
28, 2003, several days after the incident.

I find that complainant’s statement is freshly unblemished, and, therefore, very credible while Albao’s contradictory statement is
the fruit of afterthought.

Moreover, I don’t find the complainant was foolish enough to try to snatch the gun of Albao during the incident. I am convinced
Albao lied in his statement.

xxxx

In the present case, no solid cause exists to dismiss complainant from employment as to warrant a dismissal.21

BCPI and Hong appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC’s Ruling

In its 17 October 2005 Resolution, the NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter’s 6 July 2004 Decision. The NLRC held that:

Although fighting within company premises constitute serious misconduct, this however, does not apply in this case. Complainant
did not start nor provoke the fight. It was precipitated, instead, by guard Albao when he tried to get the complainant’s camera for
no valid reason. The statement of Albao that complainant tried to snatch his service firearm is not only unbelievable but is also
exaggerated. The Labor Arbiter is correct and we concur in his finding that the complainant was not foolish enough to try to
snatch the gun of Albao. The camera is undisputably owned by complainant. Bringing it inside his workplace is not a crime. So
why would he try to snatch a gun for a very trivial misunderstanding. What is clear is that the security guards over acted in the
performance of their duty.

xxxx

x x x The prohibition against the bringing of personal belongings in to the work station/area is qualified by a condition that such
belongings will disrupt/obstruct company’s services and operations. That is why in the enumerations the following are included,
radios, walkman, discman, make-up kits, ladies’ bag workers’ knapsacks and the like. An unloaded camera is not listed and we
cannot imagine how such camera could "disrupt or obstruct company services and operations.

Moreover, even if we assume that the complainant indeed violated this Inter-Office Memorandum, still, this will not justify
complainant’s dismissal because the penalty provided therein is only six (6) days suspension from work without pay, not
dismissal.22

BCPI and Hong filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied. BCPI and Hong filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In its 20 July 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 17 October 2005 and 24 January 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC.
The Court of Appeals held that "private respondent engaged himself in a fistfight with the security guard" 23 and that engaging in a
fistfight constituted serious misconduct.

Gurango filed a motion24 for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its 11 September 2006 Resolution. Hence, the
present petition.

The Issue

Gurango raises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he was legally dismissed. BCPI failed to prove that he
engaged in a fistfight and that there was just cause for his dismissal.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of
Rule 45 states that, "The petition shall raise only questions of law." In Triumph International (Phils.), Inc. v. Apostol,25 the Court
enumerated exceptions to the rule. Among the exceptions are when the findings of fact are conflicting and when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.26

In the present case, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of fact of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter. Also, the finding of the Court of Appeals that Gurango engaged in a fistfight is a conclusion without citation of specific
evidence on which it is based.

In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, that the dismissal is for just cause. If the
employer fails to discharge the burden of proof, the dismissal is deemed illegal. In AMA Computer College — East Rizal v.
Ignacio,27 the Court held that:

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no
showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.1avvphi1 And the
quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. An employee’s dismissal due to serious
misconduct must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.28

In the present case, aside from Albao’s statement, BCPI did not present any evidence to show that Gurango engaged in a
fistfight. Moreover, there is no showing that Gurango’s actions were performed with wrongful intent. In AMA Computer College –
East Rizal, the Court held that:

The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for a just cause.1âwphi1 Among the just
causes in the Labor Code is serious misconduct. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code must be of such a grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. x x x

In National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, the Court stressed that "[i]n order to constitute serious misconduct
which will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient
that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and
required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent."
After a thorough examination of the records of the case, however, the Court finds that petitioner AMACCI miserably failed to
prove by substantial evidence its charges against respondent. There is no showing at all that respondent’s actions were
motivated by a perverse and wrongful intent, as required by Article 282(a) of the Labor Code. 29(Emphasis supplied)

The surrounding circumstances show that Gurango did not engage in a fistfight: (1) in his 9 May 2003 letter to BCPI, Juanitas
corroborated Gurango’s version of the facts; (2) nobody corroborated Albao’s version of the facts; (3) in his medical report, Dr.
Aguinaldo found that Gurango suffered physical injuries; (4) Gurango filed with the MCTC a complaint against Albao, Cordero
and Pablis for slight physical injury; (5) the Labor Arbiter found Gurango’s statement credible and unblemished; (6) the Labor
Arbiter found Albao’s statement contradictory; (7) the Labor Arbiter stated, "I am convinced Albao lied in his statement"; (8) the
NLRC found that Gurango did not start a fight; (9) the NLRC found Albao’s statement unbelievable and exaggerated; and (10)
the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is baseless.

In Triumph International (Phils.), Inc., the Court held that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are accorded not only respect but finality when supported by susbstantial evidence.30

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 20 July 2006 Decision and 11 September 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94004 and REINSTATE the 17 October 2005 and 24 January 2006 Resolutions of the
NLRC in CA No. 044428-05.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 169712 March 14, 2008

MA. WENELITA TIRAZONA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE EDS-TECHNO SERVICE INC. (PET INC.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA, MAMORU ONO and
JUNICHI HIROSE, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed in this Special Civil Action for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals dated 24 May 2005 and 7 September 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85065. The appellate court’s
Decision dismissed petitioner Ma. Wenelita Tirazona’s Special Civil Action for Certiorariand affirmed the Decision4 dated 30
January 2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 034872-03, which ruled that petitioner’s
dismissal from employment was legal; and its Resolution which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Philippine EDS-Techno Services Inc. (PET) is a corporation duly registered under Philippine laws and is
engaged in the business of designing automotive wiring harnesses for automobile manufacturers. Private respondents Ken
Kubota, Mamoru Ono and Junichi Hirose are all Japanese nationals, the first being the President and the latter two being the
directors of PET.

On 21 July 1999, PET employed Ma. Wenelita S. Tirazona (Tirazona) as Administrative Manager. Being the top-ranking Filipino
Manager, she acted as the liaison between the Japanese management and the Filipino staff.

On 15 January 2002, Fe Balonzo, a rank-and-file employee, wrote a letter5 that was addressed to nobody in particular, but was
later acquired by PET management. In her letter, Balonzo complained that Tirazona humiliated her while she was reporting back
to work after recuperating from a bout of tuberculosis. Balonzo explained that Tirazona insinuated, in a manner loud enough to
be heard from the outside, that Balonzo still had the disease. This allegedly occurred despite Balonzo’s possession of a medical
clearance that proved her fitness to return to work. Balonzo thus requested that the necessary action be undertaken to address
the said incident.

Upon receiving the letter, the PET management directed Tirazona to file her comment. Tirazona replied accordingly in a
letter6 wherein she denied the accusations against her. Tirazona stated that her only intention was to orient Balonzo about the
latter’s rights as a sick employee, i.e., that under the law, if the latter planned to resign, the company can give her separation
pay. Tirazona likewise asked for an independent investigation and threatened to file a libel case against Balonzo for allegedly
trying to destroy her reputation and credibility.

After weighing the situation, PET director Ono sent a memorandum to Tirazona, which reads:

February 8, 2002

To: Mrs. W. Tirazona

Re: Letter-Complaint of Fe S. Balonzo

This is to advise you that Management is satisfied that you did not intend to humiliate or embarrass Ms. Balonzo during the
incident on January 14, 2002. It also appreciates the concern you profess for the welfare of PET employees.

Nonetheless, Management finds your handling of the situation less than ideal. Considering the sensitive nature of the issue, a
little more circumspection could have readily avoided the incident which it cannot be denied caused unnecessary discomfort and
hurt feelings to Ms. Balonzo. Certainly, you could have discussed the matter in private and allowed her to first deliver her piece
rather than pre-empt her declaration. As it turned out, your assumption (that Ms. Balonzo would request for a leave extension)
was in fact wrong and she had a medical certificate attesting her fitness to return to work.

Management therefore would like to remind you of the high expectations of your position.

Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you that it does not view with favor your notice to
file legal action. Management believes that you share the idea that issues regarding employee relations are best threshed out
within the Company. Resorting to legal action is unlikely to solve but on the contrary would only exacerbate such problems.

We trust that, after emotions have calmed down, you would still see it that way.

(Sgd.)
Mamoru Ono
Director7

On 6 March 2002, Tirazona’s counsels sent demand letters8 to PET’s business address, directed separately to Ono and Balonzo.
The letter to Ono states:

February 27, 2002

MR. MAMORU ONO

Director
PET, Inc.
20/F 6788 Ayala Avenue
Oledan Square, Makati City

Dear Mr. Ono:

We are writing in [sic] behalf of our client, Ms. MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA, Administrative Manager of your corporation.

We regret that on February 8, 2002, you delivered to our client a letter containing among others, your conclusion that Ms.
Tirazona was guilty of the unfounded and baseless charges presented by Ms. Fe Balonzo in her letter-complaint dated January
15, 2002. You may please recall that in Ms. Tirazona’s letter to Mr. Junichi Hirose, she presented point by point, her side on the
allegations made by the complainant. In the same letter, Ms. Tirazona requested for an independent investigation of the case in
order to thresh out all issues, ferret out the truth and give her the opportunity to be heard and confront her accuser. These were
all denied our client.

As a result of the foregoing, Ms. Tirazona’s constitutional right to due process was violated and judgment was rendered by you
on mere allegations expressed in a letter-complaint to an unknown addressee.

Considering the position and stature of Mrs. Tirazona in the community and business circles, we are constrained to formally
demand payment of P2,000,000.00 in damages, injured feelings, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation that she is now
suffering.

We are giving you five (5) days from receipt hereof to make favorable response, otherwise, much to our regret, we will institute
legal procedures to protect our client’s interests.

Please give this matter the attention it deserves.

Very truly yours,

PRINCIPE, VILLANO, VILLACORTA & CLEMENTE

By:

(Sgd.)
PEDRO S. PRINCIPE

(Sgd.)
GLICERIO E. VILLANO

The letter sent to Balonzo likewise sought the same amount of damages for her allegedly baseless and unfounded accusations
against Tirazona.

Because of Tirazona’s obstinate demand for compensation, PET sent her a Notice of Charge, 9 which informed her that they were
considering her termination from employment by reason of serious misconduct and breach of trust. According to the
management, they found her letter libelous, since it falsely accused the company of finding her guilty of the charges of Balonzo
and depriving her of due process.

On 26 March 2002, Tirazona explained in a letter10 that her counsels’ demand letter was brought about by the denial of her
repeated requests for reinvestigation of the Balonzo incident, and that the same was personally addressed to Mamoru Ono and
not to the company. She also reiterated her request for an investigation and/or an open hearing to be conducted on the matter.

The PET management replied11 that the Balonzo incident was already deemed a closed matter, and that the only issue for
consideration was Tirazona’s "ill-advised response to the Management’s disposition to the Fe Balonzo incident," for which an
administrative hearing was scheduled on 4 April 2002.

On 3 April 2002, Tirazona submitted a written demand12 to PET that the Balonzo incident be included in the scheduled hearing.
She further stated that since the management had already prejudged her case, she would only participate in the proceedings if
the investigating panel would be composed of three employees, one each from the rank-and-file, supervisory, and managerial
levels, plus a representative from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The PET management rejected Tirazona’s demands in a letter 13 and informed her that the hearing was reset to 10 April 2002,
which would be presided by PET’s external counsel.

On 10 April 2002, Tirazona and her counsel did not appear at the administrative hearing. The PET management informed them
through a memorandum14 dated 12 April 2002 that the hearing was carried out despite their absence. Nevertheless, Tirazona
was granted a final chance to submit a supplemental written explanation or additional documents to substantiate her claims.

Tirazona’s written explanation15 dated 17 April 2002 merely reiterated, without further details, her previous claims, to wit: that
Balonzo’s charges were unfounded and baseless; that she had been denied due process; and that she would not submit herself
to an investigating panel that had already prejudged her case. Tirazona also stated that her claim for damages would be justified
at the proper forum, and that she admitted to reading a confidential letter addressed to PET directors Ono and Fukuoka,
containing the legal opinion of PET’s counsel regarding her case.

After finding the explanations unsatisfactory, PET sent Tirazona a Notice of Termination,16 which found her guilty of serious
misconduct and breach of trust because of her demand against the company and her invasion of PET’s right to privileged
communication.

Tirazona then instituted with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, and damages against PET,
docketed as NLRC-CA No. 034872-03.

In the Decision17 dated 22 January 2003, Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero ruled in favor of Tirazona, holding that the latter’s
termination from employment was illegal.

The Arbiter declared that there was no breach of trust when Tirazona sent the demand letter, as the same was against Ono in
his personal capacity, not against the company. The decision also ruled that PET failed to discharge the burden of proving that
the alleged breach of trust was fraudulent and willful, and that the company was careless in handling its communications. The
Arbiter further stated that Tirazona was deprived of her right to due process when she was denied a fair hearing.

On appeal by PET, the NLRC reversed the rulings of the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 30 January 2004, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated January 27, 2003 and a
new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.18

Contrary to the Labor Arbiter’s findings, the NLRC concluded that Tirazona’s termination from employment was in accordance
with law. It ruled that Tirazona’s demand letter addressed to Ono constituted a just cause for dismissal, as the same was "an
openly hostile act" by a high-ranking managerial employee against the company.19 The NLRC likewise found that PET complied
with the notice and hearing requirements of due process, inasmuch as Tirazona’s demand for a special panel was without any
legal basis. Furthermore, petitioner breached the company’s trust when she read the confidential legal opinion of PET’s counsel
without permission.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Tirazona was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated 31 May 2004, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Complainant-Appellee’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and our Decision dated 30 January 2004 is thus AFFIRMED with finality.20

Aggrieved, Tirazona instituted with the Court of Appeals a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85065.

In a Decision dated 24 May 2005, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC and ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the petition is perforce dismissed.21

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 7 September 2005, Tirazona
now impugns before this Court the Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 May 2005, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THERE WAS BREACH OF TRUST ON THE PART OF PETITIONER TIRAZONA WHEN SHE WROTE THE TWO
MILLION PESO DEMAND LETTER FOR DAMAGES, WARRANTING HER DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT.

II.

WHETHER DUE PROCESS WAS SUFFICIENTLY AND FAITHFULLY OBSERVED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE DISMISSAL
OF PETITIONER TIRAZONA FROM EMPLOYMENT.

In essence, the issue that has been brought before this Court for consideration is whether or not Tirazona was legally dismissed
from employment.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that Tirazona elevated her case to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The appropriate remedy would have been for Tirazona to file an appeal through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.

For a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions: (2) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.22

There is grave abuse of discretion "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."23

The Petition for Certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the sixty (60)-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.24

On the other hand, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari whereby "a party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals x x x may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."25

The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. 26

In the present case, the assailed Decision is the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of Tirazona’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65. Said Decision partakes of the nature of a judgment or final order, thus, is reviewable only through an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45.

As aptly declared by the Court in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals27:

[s]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the
exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil
action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes
final and executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his deliberate inaction.
[Emphasis ours.]
Even just a cursory glance at the issues raised by Tirazona before this Court readily reveals that these pertain to purported
errors of judgment committed by the appellate court in its appreciation of the allegations, evidence, and arguments presented by
the parties. There is no question here of the Court of Appeals acting on Tirazona’s Petition in CA-G.R. No. 85065 without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

A review of the rollo of the Petition at bar divulges even further that Tirazona’s resort to a wrong remedy was not an innocent
mistake but a deliberate choice.

On 5 October 2005, Tirazona filed with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review
on Certiorari.28 Tirazona stated therein that she received the notice of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration on 23 September 2005. Since she only had fifteen (15) days after the said date to file a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, or until 8 October 2005, Tirazona prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days, with her counsel citing extreme
pressures of work.

In a Resolution29 dated 19 October 2005, the Court granted Tirazona’s Motion for Extension. The extended period was to end
on 7 November 2005. However, Tirazona failed to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari within the said period. Instead, she filed
the present Petition for Certiorari on 5 December 2005, seventy-three (73) days after notice of the Court of Appeals Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

From the foregoing, it is fairly obvious that Tirazona was aware that she was supposed to file an appeal through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. That she filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and only after an inexplicably
long period of time leads to the inescapable conclusion that the same was merely an afterthought, nothing more than a
desperate attempt to revive a lost appeal.

The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own neglect
or error in the choice of remedies.30 It also bears to stress the well-settled principle that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised Rules of Court, a wrong or
inappropriate mode of appeal merits an outright dismissal.31

Tirazona, in her Reply32 before this Court, even admits that although the instant Petition is one of special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, her petition is in reality an appeal under Rule 45 as her petition raises pure questions of law. Tirazona
herself acknowledges the formal defects of her own Petition and attributes the same to the haste and inadvertence of her former
counsel, who allegedly prepared the instant Petition without her participation.33 She thus urges this Court to suspend the
application of its own rules on grounds of equity and substantial justice, considering that it is her employment that is at stake in
this case.

In this regard, it needs to be emphasized that before the Court may treat the present petition as having been filed under Rule 45,
the same must comply with the reglementary period for filing an appeal. This requirement is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional such that failure to do so renders the assailed decision final and executory, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.34 Since the instant petition was filed after the lapse of the extended
period for filing an appeal, the same should be dismissed outright.

Nevertheless, the Court finds it essential that we discuss the case on its merits, bearing in mind that the paramount consideration
in this case is an employee’s right to security of tenure, and in order to provide Tirazona the amplest opportunity to know how the
Court arrived at a proper and just determination of her case.

Even if the Court were to ignore the conspicuous procedural defects committed by Tirazona and treat her Petition as an appeal
under Rule 45, it still finds that the Petition must be denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner contends that, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, her dismissal from employment was illegal for having
lacked both a legal basis and the observance of due process.
In employee termination cases, the well-entrenched policy is that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law and after due process. Clearly, dismissals have two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which
constitutes substantive due process; and second, the legality in the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due
process.35

Under Article 282(c)36 of the Labor Code, loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes for dismissing an employee. It is
an established principle that loss of confidence must be premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of
trust and confidence. This situation obtains where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as care and
protection, handling or custody of the employer’s property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the
employer. Besides, for loss of confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, such loss of confidence must arise from particular
proven facts.37

Tirazona claims that her demand letter was merely an expression of indignation by a disgruntled employee against a director, not
against the company and, by itself, cannot constitute a breach of trust and confidence. The company’s notice of charge allegedly
insinuated Tirazona’s guilt in the Balonzo incident; hence, the need to defend herself. Tirazona likewise asserts that she is an
ordinary rank-and-file employee as she is not vested with the powers and prerogatives stated in Article 212(m) 38 of the Labor
Code. As such, her alleged hostility towards her co-workers and the PET management is not a violation of trust and confidence
that would warrant her termination from employment.

At the outset, the Court notes that the issues set forth above are factual in nature. As the Court is asked to consider the instant
Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, then only pure questions of law will be entertained.39

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.40

In the instant case, Tirazona would have the Court examine the actual wording, tenor, and contextual background of both her
demand letter and the PET’s notice of charge against her. Similarly, the determination of whether Tirazona is a managerial or
rank-and-file employee would require the Court to review the evidence that pertains to Tirazona’s duties and obligations in the
company. Also, in order to ascertain whether the breach of trust was clearly established against Tirazona, the Court will have to
sift through and evaluate the respective evidence of the parties as well. These tasks are not for the Court to accomplish.

The Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion.41

In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings.
Long established is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded with respect, even
finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and
conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed.42Though this doctrine is not without exceptions,43 the
Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.

Thus, on the matter of Tirazona’s demand letter, this Court is bound by the following findings of the Court of Appeals:

Clearly, petitioner Tirazona’s letter to respondent Ono dated 27 February 2002, as DIRECTOR of PET was addressed to an
officer and representative of the corporation. The accusations in the aforesaid demand letter were directed against respondent
Ono’s official act as a representative of respondent PET. Suffice it to stress, an attack on the integrity of his (Ono) corporate act
is necessarily aimed at respondent PET because a corporation can only act through its officers, agents and representatives.

xxxx
A thorough and judicious examination of the facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case as could be found in the records,
would clearly show that petitioner Tirazona has absolutely no basis for a P2 million demand, coupled with lawsuit if the same was
not paid within the five (5) days [sic] period. Her justification for the demand of money is that she was allegedly found by the
respondent PET through respondent Ono guilty of the charges filed by Ms. Balonzo. As the records would indubitably show,
petitioner Tirazona was never charged of any offense with respect to the Fe Balonzo’s [sic] incident. She was never issued a
Notice of Charge, much less a Notice of Disciplinary Action. What was issued to her by respondent Ono in his letter x x x was a
gentle and sound reminder to be more circumspect in handling the incident or situation like this [sic]. As fully evidenced in the
last paragraph of the said letter, it states that:

xxxx

Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you that it does not view with favor your notice to
file legal action. Management believes that you share the idea that issues regarding employee relations are best threshed out
within the Company. Resorting to legal action is unlikely to solve but on the contrary would only exacerbate such problems.

But for reasons only known to petitioner Tirazona, she treated respondent Ono’s letter as an affront to her honor and dignity.
This, instead of seeking a dialogue with respondent PET on her felt grievance, petitioner Tirazona through her lawyer sent the
questioned demand letter to respondent Ono. Suffice it to state, this act of petitioner bared animosity in the company and was
definitely not a proper response of a top level manager like her over a trivial matter.

xxxx

In fine, the confluence of events and circumstances surrounding the petitioner Tirazona’s actions or omissions affecting her
employer’s rights and interest, would undoubtedly show that she is no longer worthy of being a recipient of the trust and
confidence of her employer. x x x.44

Likewise conclusive upon this Court is the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that Tirazona is in fact a managerial employee, to
wit:

The records would indubitably show that it is only now that petitioner Tirazona is asserting that she is not a managerial employee
of respondent PET. From the very start, her dismissal was premised on the fact that she is a managerial and confidential
employee, and she never denied that fact. It was never an issue at all before the Labor Arbiter and the public respondent NLRC.
Therefore, she is estopped to claim now that she is [just a] rank and file employee of respondent PET, especially that she herself
admitted in her pleading that she is a managerial employee:

xxxx

If the respondent Company has to protect Respondent Mamoru Ono, the Complainant [petitioner] has also the right to be
protected from the baseless accusations of a Rank and File Employee for she [petitioner] is a part of the management like Mr.
Mamoru Ono" (par. 5, Complainant’s Rejoinder [to Respondent’s Reply] dated 2 September 2002 (note: unattached to the
petitioner [sic]) [attached as Annex "1" hereof]. (p. 263, Rollo).45

Tirazona next argues that she was deprived of procedural due process as she was neither served with two written notices, nor
was she afforded a hearing with her participation prior to her dismissal.

Tirazona’s arguments are baseless.

Procedural due process is simply defined as giving an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of those elements can be
eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.46
The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected. The first notice apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of
the employer’s decision to dismiss him.47

It is fairly obvious in this case that Tirazona was served with the required twin notices. The first was embodied in the Notice of
Charge dated 25 March 2002 where PET informed Tirazona that it was considering her termination from employment and
required her to submit a written explanation. In the said Notice, PET apprised Tirazona of the ground upon which it was
considering her dismissal: (1) her letter that contained false accusations against the company, and (2) her demand for two million
pesos in damages, with a threat of a lawsuit if the said amount was not paid. The Notice of Termination dated 22 April 2002
given to Tirazona constitutes the second notice whereby the company informed her that it found her guilty of breach of trust
warranting her dismissal from service.

Equally bereft of merit is Tirazona’s allegation that she was not given the benefit of a fair hearing before she was dismissed.

It needs to be pointed out that it was Tirazona herself and her counsel who declined to take part in the administrative hearing set
by PET 10 April 2002. Tirazona rejected the company’s appointment of its external counsel as the investigating panel’s presiding
officer, because her own demands on the panel’s composition were denied. As correctly held by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, Tirazona’s stance is without any legal basis. On the contrary, this Court’s ruling in Foster Parents Plan
International/Bicol v. Demetriou48 is controlling:

The right to dismiss or otherwise impose disciplinary sanctions upon an employee for just and valid cause, pertains in the first
place to the employer, as well as the authority to determine the existence of said cause in accordance with the norms of due
process. In the very nature of things, any investigation by the employer of any alleged cause for disciplinary punishment of an
employee will have to be conducted by the employer himself or his duly designated representative; and the investigation
cannot be thwarted or nullified by arguing that it is the employer who is accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same
time. x x x Of course, the decision of the employer meting out sanctions against an employee and the evidentiary and procedural
bases thereof may subsequently be passed upon by the corresponding labor arbiter (and the NLRC on appeal) upon the filing by
the aggrieved employee of the appropriate complaint. [Emphasis ours.]1avvphi1

This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a
chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.49 Tirazona in this
case has been afforded a number of opportunities to defend her actions. Even when Tirazona failed to attend the scheduled
hearing, PET still informed Tirazona about what happened therein and gave her the chance to submit a supplemental written
explanation. Only when Tirazona again failed to comply with the same did PET terminate her employment.

As a final plea for her case, Tirazona asserts that her dismissal from employment was too harsh and arbitrary a penalty to mete
out for whatever violation that she has committed, if indeed there was one.

Tirazona ought to bear in mind this Court’s pronouncement in Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC50 that:

When an employee accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust and confidence, she gives up
some of the rigid guaranties available to ordinary workers. Infractions which if committed by others would be overlooked or
condoned or penalties mitigated may be visited with more severe disciplinary action. A company’s resort to acts of self-defense
would be more easily justified. x x x.

Tirazona, in this case, has given PET more than enough reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown
towards the company and her stubborn, uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the company’s termination of her
employment. Moreover, Tirazona’s reading of what was supposed to be a confidential letter between the counsel and directors of
the PET, even if it concerns her, only further supports her employer’s view that she cannot be trusted. In fine, the Court cannot
fault the actions of PET in dismissing petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 24 May 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169016 January 31, 2007

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. Petitioner,

vs.
CARLOS ANTONIO BALAGOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Capitol Wireless, Inc. (Capwire) hired respondent, Carlos Antonio Balagot (Balagot), as collector on September 16,
1987. As Balagot’s duties required him to work outside of the office, Capwire assigned to him a motorcycle as a service vehicle,
for which it shouldered expenses for gasoline and maintenance.

At around 3:35 p.m. of May 9, 2000, the director of Capwire’s Human Resource Department (HRD) saw, to his surprise, Balagot
at the Head Office at Paseo de Roxas, Makati of the China Banking Corporation (China Bank) with which Capwire had no
business relations. It was thereupon discovered that Balagot had been rendering services to China Bank and that since 1992,
Balagot had been concurrently employed with Contractual Concepts, Inc. (CCI), a local manpower company, which assigned him
to render messengerial services to China Bank in the same year.

As Capwire HRD director recommended the immediate termination of the services of Balagot on the ground of grave misconduct
and willful breach of trust and confidence,1 the HRD sent on May 10, 2000 a memorandum to Balagot reading:

A report was received this morning from HRD for grave misconduct on your part. It was found out that you are employed with
Contractual Concepts, Inc. as a motorized messenger serving their client, China Banking Corp. In view of this, explain within
twenty four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for this matter. 2

In an undated handwritten letter-reply, Balagot admitted the charge against him.3

An administrative hearing was thus conducted on May 18, 2000 during which Capwire presented 1) a certification of Balagot’s
employment with CCI, signed by its president and general manager, stating that Balagot had been assigned to China Bank since
December 8, 1992;4 2) a cash voucher in favor of Balagot issued by CCI reflecting a loan amounting to P2,000;5 and 3) Balagot’s
payslip from CCI for the period April 1-15, 2000.6

Balagot admitted that simultaneously with his employment as a collector for Capwire, he had been performing messengerial
duties to China Bank on a "part time basis."7

On May 22, 2000, Capwire informed Balagot that he was found guilty of grave misconduct, resulting in the loss of trust and
confidence in him, and that he was dismissed on even date.8

Balagot thereafter filed on August 4, 2000 a complaint for illegal dismissal against Capwire and its president Epifanio Marquez
(Marquez) before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).9 The case, docketed as NLRC NCR (S) Case No. 30-08-
03099-00, was raffled to Labor Arbiter Potenciano Cañizares.10

By Decision of March 7, 2001, Labor Arbiter Cañizares decided in favor of Balagot in this wise:

After careful deliberation, We are of the opinion that as far as the complainant’s working in another company while being an
employee of the respondent is not a just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code, especially that there is no positive showing
that the complainant uses the company time of one employer in his service with another or that the two employers are in
competing businesses. Indeed, an employee or worker has to resort to

the proper use of all his time and skills in order to survive in our country at its economic crisis. Even in America this having-
double-jobs on moonshining is an accepted – even encouraged – system. On the other hand, just as companies have to be
innovative if they do not desire to die, the workers should apply his imagination and judgment wisely to augment his earnings for
his family.

The respondents exclaimed that it is hard to believe that the complainant’s employment with Contractual Concepts, Inc. does not
interfere with his work with them. However, a scrutiny of the record does not show that the respondents has [sic] established a
prima facie case against the complainant for using their company time in working with another. The respondents may indeed find
it "hard to believe" that the complainant has not been cheating them of company time, but unless they can show us the evidence,
We cannot affirm that belief.11(Underscoring supplied)

The Labor Arbiter thus ordered Capwire and Marquez to jointly and severally12 reinstate Balagot without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges;13 and to pay Balagot full backwages and 10% of the monetary award as attorney’s fees, and should Balagot
opt for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, to give him separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of
service, a fraction of six months being considered one whole year.14

On Capwire’s appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision, holding as follows:

There is no denying that taking on double job [sic] per se is not illegal as extra income would go a long way for an ordinary
worker like herein complainant. The only limitation is where one job overlaps with the other in terms of time and/or poses a clear
case of conflict of interest as to the nature of business of complainant’s two employers.

In the case at bar, the conflict of interest scenario is out of the question since respondent Capitol Wireless (Capwire) business is
very different from Contractual Concepts Incorporated. The problem, however, is as to time and performance of duty. With
respondent CAPWIRE complainant works as a collector from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. On the other hand, his job at Contractual
Concept is as a messenger assigned at China Bank. As a messenger, we do not believe that he’ll be performing his task after
5:00 P.M. as by then all private offices are closed. In fact, Bank closes at 3:00 PM. This being so, it is highly improbable that in
the exercise of a performance of his work with Contractual Concept, the same will not eat up or use part or portion of his official
time as collector with herein respondents. So that while earning his salary with respondent from 8:00-5:00 PM as messenger, he
was also being paid as messenger by the other company. In which cases, respondent company has all the right and reason to
cry foul as this is a clear case of moonlighting and using the company’s time, money and equipment to render service to another
company. A classic case of wanting to have his cake and eat it too. A situation which we simply cannot countenance. Apropos
from evidence on records it is clear that complainant was guilty of violating the company rules and regulations resulting into lost
[sic] of trust and confidence. He was therefore lawfully and rightfully separated from service for cause and with due
process.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The NLRC accordingly dismissed Balagot’s complaint.

On Balagot’s Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision16 of May 31, 2005, holding that Capwire failed to prove that
Balagot was dismissed for just cause, reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of
Appeals absolved Capwire president Marquez of solidary liability with Capwire, however.17

Its Motion for Partial Reconsideration18 having been denied,19 Capwire filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising
the issue of "whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in holding that respondent was illegally
dismissed, thus, totally disregarding the evidence on record, in violation of the Labor Code as amended, and the revised rules of
evidence."20

In his Comment, 21 Balagot reiterates his argument that his job at CCI did not interfere with his job at Capwire, maintaining that
he performed his tasks for CCI only after office hours. To bolster his argument, he asserts that his performance at Capwire was
always satisfactory and never went below average.22
The petition is impressed with merit.

Capwire’s evidence, consisting of, among other things, its HRD director’s report that he saw Balagot at China Bank at 3:35 p.m.
of May 9, 2000; Balagot’s above-stated handwritten admission; the December 8, 1992 certification of employment signed by
CCI’s president and general manager; the cash voucher in favor of Balagot for a company loan from CCI; and Balagot’s payslip
from CCI for the period April 1-15, 2000, unmistakably indicate that from December 8, 1992 to May 22, 2000, Balagot had been
using Capwire time to perform service for another company.

Balagot’s claim that he performed his tasks for CCI only after his office hours with Capwire does not impress. As Capwire
argues:

Under the Rules on Evidence, specifically Section 3, Rule 131, the presumptions: "that the ordinary course of business has been
followed" and "that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life," are disputable
presumptions that can only be overcome by clear and preponderant evidence.

In this connection, it is of general knowledge that the banking industry follows the ordinary working hours of 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM.
Accordingly, an employee of a bank is expected to work from eight in the morning to five in the afternoon. And, logically, since
the banking industry deals with businesses which observe the same working hours, a bank has no use for an employee who can
only be of service to it after 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Now, since it is presumed, until contradicted that, "the ordinary course of business has been followed," and "things happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life," it logically follows that petitioner performed his duties
with China Banking Corporation during office hours – that is from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. This presumption can be overcome only
by clear and preponderant evidence. However, the records of the case will clearly show that respondent failed to present any
proof to contradict the same, hence, the presumption stands against him. Thus, it was a highly erroneous conclusion for the
Court of Appeals to have found that there was no convincing evidence to prove that petitioner was using the company resources
of petitioner in rendering messengerial services for China Banking Corporation x x x.1avvphi1.net

In the same manner, this Honorable Court can also take judicial notice of the fact that banks, or any business establishment for
that matter, close its [sic] business transactions and operations at 5:00 in the afternoon because this fact is of public/common
knowledge. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that there is no need to produce evidence that indeed banks close its [sic]
operations after 5:00 P.M.

Besides, respondent admitted in his petition, that his job with petitioner was to be carried out from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday. [Underscoring in the original] And, it has also been established that banks carried its [sic] business
operations simultaneous with the petitioner. Undeniably, respondent’s work schedule with China Banking Corporation conflicts
with his work schedule with petitioner. Verily, as offices customarily close at 5:00 P.M., it would be impossible for respondent to
have rendered his services to China Banking Corporation only "after office hours". . .23

xxxx

Moreover, if respondent’s allegation is true that indeed he was only rendering services to China Banking Corporation after 5:00
P.M., then why was he sighted by private respondent’s HR director within the premises of the said bank at 3:35 pm in the
afternoon?24 (Italics in original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Furthermore, the minutes of the administrative hearing conducted by Capwire on May 18, 2000 reflect the observations of
Balagot’s superiors about his shortcomings in the conduct of his duties as collector, to wit: failure to submit a detailed report of all
collections, incomplete collections, and delayed collections.25 These observations, which were not refuted, detract from Balagot’s
claim that his job with CCI did not interfere with his duties at Capwire.

Capwire having established, through substantial evidence, a prima facie case of just cause to dismiss Balagot, the burden of
evidence shifted to Balagot.26 Balagot failed, however, to controvert the same. This Court is thus constrained to uphold his
dismissal.
Verily, jurisprudence recognizes as a valid ground for dismissal of an employee unauthorized use of company time, as Pepsi-
Cola Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC27 holds:

[An employee] cannot serve himself and [his employer] at the same time all at the expense of the latter. It would be unfair to
compensate private respondent who does not devote his time and effort to his employer. The primary duty of the employee is to
carry out his employer’s policies. . . .28 (Underscoring supplied), and of company vehicle, as Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of
Davao29 holds:

. . . Petitioner avers that the damage inflicted on MERCO by his activities due to his misuse of the company vehicle during
working hours did not hamper the smooth business operations of MERCO.

However, what should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement
said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. A rule prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for
private purpose without authority from management is, from our viewpoint, a reasonable one. This regulation cannot be faulted
by petitioner because this is proper and necessary even if only for an orderly conduct of MERCO’s business. From the evidence
presented, petitioner twice used the company vehicle in pursuing his own personal interests, on company time and deviating
from his authorized route, all without permission. x x x Certainly, to condone petitioner’s own conduct will erode the discipline that
an employer should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and regulations by its other employees.
Otherwise, the rules necessary and proper for the operation of its business, would be gradually rendered ineffectual, ignored,
and eventually become meaningless.30 (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the September 23, 2002 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162017 April 23, 2010

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., WILLIAM P. TIFFANY, E.C. CAVESTANY, and E.M. CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMIE G. AGAD and CALTEX UNITED SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 22 May 2003 and Resolution3dated 27
January 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74199, which reversed the Decision4 dated 6 June 2001 and
Resolution5 dated 24 September 2002 of the National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 018872-
99.

The Facts

On 1 September 1983, petitioner Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) employed respondent Hermie G. Agad (Agad) as Depot
Superintendent-A on a probationary basis for six months. On 28 February 1984, Agad became a regular employee with a
monthly salary of ₱2,560 and cost of living assistance of ₱380.
For the next eleven years, Agad obtained various commendations6 and held the positions of Depot Superintendent-A, Field
Engineer, Senior Superintendent, and Bulk Depot Superintendent until his dismissal on 8 August 1994. Agad received a monthly
gross salary of ₱31,000, a mid-year bonus equivalent to one month’s salary and 13th month pay at the time of his termination.

After Agad had served for two years since 1990 as Superintendent of the Tacloban Bulk Depot (Depot) in Leyte, Caltex
transferred Agad to Bauan Bulk Depot in Batangas effective 16 May 1992.7

To transfer his belongings from Leyte to Batangas, Agad secured the carpentry services of Alfredo Delda (Delda), the owner of
A.A. Delda Engineering Services (Delda Services) for the construction of two crates. Agad paid Delda ₱15,500, evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 09708 dated 12 May 1992. Agad submitted the receipt sometime in August 1992 and Caltex reimbursed him
the said amount.

On 13 April 1993, Caltex conducted its regular audit of employees’ account and expenses as of 31 December 1992. 9 The
company auditor of Caltex verified the crating expense incurred by Agad with Delda. Delda, through an Affidavit dated 5 May
1993,10 disclosed that Delda Services did not perform any crating service for Agad or receive the amount of ₱15,500 as stated in
the official receipt. Delda alleged that he was forced by Agad to issue the official receipt in order to get a favorable
recommendation from the incoming superintendent of the Depot.

Further investigations revealed that Arsenio Asperas (Asperas), a carpenter from Tacloban, was commissioned by Agad to build
two wooden crates on 12 May 1992. Asperas attested that Agad paid him the amount of ₱400 and he completed the work in 2 ½
days beside the quarters of Agad inside the Depot.11 Basilia Villalino (Villalino), a household staff of the Depot Staff House,
corroborated Asperas’ statement in a Sworn Testimony dated 24 May 1993 that Agad did hire Asperas to make two wooden
crates inside the Depot before he left for his next post.12

In another audit report dated 12 May 1993,13 the company auditor declared that 190 pieces of 11 kg. liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) cylinders from the Depot were allegedly withdrawn for scrap and repair purposes without proper documentation on 8
February 1991 when Agad was still depot superintendent. Isidro B. Millanes (Millanes), the depot’s LPG cylinder
repair/reconditioning contractor and owner of IBM Enterprises, claimed that the LPG cylinders were hauled to his compound and
allegedly later sold, upon the express instructions of Agad, to Leyte Development Corporation and Ernesto Mercado, a service
station dealer.

On 5 July 1993, petitioner E.C. Cavestany (Cavestany), the Regional Manager of Caltex, issued a Memorandum14to Agad
directing him to explain the following audit review findings: (1) the questionable reimbursement of crating expense; and (2) the
alleged unauthorized withdrawal and sale of 190 pieces of LPG cylinders.

On 29 July 1993, Agad sent his reply15 answering all the charges against him. Agad stated: (1) that Delda Services constructed
the two crates worth ₱15,500 as evidenced by an official receipt issued by Delda; and (2) that the withdrawal of the scrap LPG
cylinders formed part of his housekeeping duties as depot superintendent. The scrap materials consisting of tanks, pumps and
pipelines of Gebarin, a logging account of Caltex located in Marabut, Samar, were bidded out to a certain Rogelio "Boy" H. Bato
on an "as is, where is" basis.16 However, the scrap materials went missing and Boy Bato demanded that such be replaced with
equivalent materials. The scrap LPG cylinders were released instead after Agad secured the approval of his superiors as
evidenced in a Memorandum dated 12 February 1992.17 After the approval, Boy Bato’s buyer, a certain Mr. Ang, allegedly
acquired the scrap cylinders from IBM Enterprises.

Caltex created an investigating panel chaired by Cavestany to look into the offenses allegedly committed. On 17 August 1993,
the investigating panel held its first formal inquiry.18 The transcript of the investigation was dated 2 September 1993.19

On 29 April 1994, Caltex placed Agad under preventive suspension. On 26 May 1994 or almost 10 months after the first formal
inquiry, the investigating panel conducted another hearing.20 Two other hearings were held on 14 June and 6 July 1994.

In a Confidential Memorandum dated 8 August 1994,21 Cavestany informed Agad of his dismissal on the grounds of serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence, both just causes for termination of employment. Agad received the memorandum
on 25 August 1994.
On 1 September 1994, respondents Agad and Caltex United Supervisors’ Association filed a complaint22 with the Labor Arbiter
(LA) for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension with prayer for full backwages of ₱31,000 per month from 25 August 1994 until
reinstatement, moral damages of ₱5,000,000, exemplary damages of ₱5,000,000 and 10% of the total monetary award as
attorney’s fees against petitioners Caltex and its officers – William P. Tiffany, President and Chief Executive Officer; E.M. Cruz,
General Manager for Distribution; and Cavestany.

On 16 November 1998, the LA rendered a decision in favor of Agad.23 The LA held that there were no just causes for Agad’s
termination of employment. On the charge of fraudulent reimbursement of crating expense, the LA found no basis for this since
Delda issued an official receipt which served as best evidence that the crating expense was actually incurred. According to the
LA, Delda’s claim that he was only forced by Agad to issue the receipt for fear of losing his job as a contractor does not appear to
be credible. In the administrative inquiry held on 26 May 1994, it was clearly established that Delda held a grudge against Agad
since Agad did not recommend him to be a contractor of Caltex for failure to meet the minimum capital required of aspiring
contractors. Also, the LA did not give any weight to the testimonies of Asperas and Villalino since they were not presented for
cross-examination during the investigation.

As to the charge of unauthorized withdrawal and sale of the LPG cylinders, the LA ruled that Agad was denied the right to
present his witnesses and other evidence in support of his defense which constitutes a denial of due process. Thus, the LA ruled
that Agad had been illegally dismissed by Caltex. The dispositive portion of the LA’s decision states:

Since there was no just cause for termination of the services of the complainant; and since the complainant was not given due
process in the proceedings to terminate his services; and since he was illegally placed under preventive suspension, we
therefore rule that the complainant is entitled to the twin remedies of reinstatement, with full backwages, from the time of his
dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position as Depot Superintendent of the Bauan Bulk Depot, or to a similar position,
without any loss of seniority rights.

By reason of the arbitrary nature of the termination of the service of the complainant, and the denial of due process in the denial
of his right to present evidence in his defense in the administrative inquiry prior to the termination of his services, we hold further
the respondents liable to the complainant for moral damages, in the sum of ₱5,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of
₱5,000,000.00; and attorney’s fees in the sum of ten (10%) percent of the total monetary awards.

SO ORDERED.24

Caltex filed an appeal with the NLRC.

The Ruling of the NLRC

On 6 June 2001, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The NLRC held that there existed just causes which justified Agad’s
dismissal. With regard to the first allegation, the NLRC ruled that the amount of crating expense reimbursed by Agad was
fictitious. The fact that a receipt was issued by Delda does not conclusively prove that the crating service was performed by
Delda. At the most, the existence of the receipt only proves its execution. The NLRC declared that Delda’s testimony, made
under oath, enjoys the presumption of regularity and good faith. Corroborated by two other witnesses, Asperas and Villalino,
Delda’s testimony clearly established that Agad was dishonest in his dealings. The NLRC added that even if the amount involved
was only worth ₱15,500, the same was of no moment since what was involved was Agad’s propensity to commit dishonesty
against the company. As a supervisor, a greater degree of diligence, honesty and trust was expected of him. The NLRC further
stated that Caltex had no bad motive to pick on Agad and tell lies about him if indeed he was trustworthy since Agad was given
awards and commendations before the discovery of the questioned acts.

On the second allegation, the NLRC ruled that Agad had no authority to withdraw the LPG cylinders from the Depot. The NLRC
declared that Agad did not observe existing company rules and regulations in procuring the required forms, in the submission of
periodic LPG cylinders inventory and in selling the LPG cylinders without the requisite bidding. Thus, the NLRC concluded that
Caltex validly dismissed Agad. The dispositive portion of the NLRC’s decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding sufficient reasons/grounds to warrant reversal of the findings of the Arbiter a quo, the assailed decision is
hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering the DISMISSAL of the complaint for lack of basis both in fact and in law.
SO ORDERED.25

Agad filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated 24 September 2002.

Agad then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Agad sought the nullification of the decision of the NLRC.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 22 May 2003, the CA modified the judgment of the NLRC and ruled in favor of Agad. On the issue of fraudulent
reimbursement of crating expense, the CA concurred with the LA. According to the CA, the regularity of the official receipt
remained untarnished since the only other proof relied upon by petitioners, Delda’s affidavit, failed to substantiate his allegations.
Delda never assailed the due execution of the receipt and even admitted that he actually issued the receipt. The supporting
affidavits of Asperas and Villalino, since they were not cross-examined, must be rejected for being hearsay. Thus, no sufficient
evidence was presented to prove that the amount in the receipt was fictitious. Further, the CA indicated that Caltex did not make
any limitations to the crating expense to be reimbursed such that Agad was entitled to move his personal and household effects
at reasonable costs.

On the second issue of unauthorized withdrawal and sale of LPG cylinders, the CA agreed with the NLRC that Agad did not
comply with company rules and regulations. Nonetheless, the CA held that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon Agad was too
harsh considering that this was his first infraction and that Agad had been awarded several commendations in the past and had
worked for Caltex for more than 10 years. The dispositive portion of the CA’s decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the judgment of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED.
Accordingly, finding no just cause for the termination of employment of the petitioner Hermie G. Agad, we therefore rule that the
petitioner was illegally dismissed; he should be entitled to reinstatement, with full backwages, from the time of his illegal
dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position as Depot Superintendent of the Bauan Bulk Depot, or to a similar position
without any loss of seniority rights.

SO ORDERED.26

Caltex filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated 27 January 2004.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The main issue is whether Caltex legally terminated Agad’s employment on just causes: (1) acts tantamount to serious
misconduct and willful violation of company rules and regulations; and (2) willful breach of trust and confidence as Depot
Superintendent.

The Court’s Ruling

Article 282 of the Labor Code states:

ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

 (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no
showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. 27

The quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. An employee’s dismissal due to serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.28

In the present case, petitioners terminated Agad’s employment based on these acts: (1) Agad’s submission of a fictitious crating
expense amounting to ₱15,1500; and (2) the unauthorized withdrawal and sale of 190 pieces of 11 kg. LPG cylinders for his
personal gain and profit.

Crating expense is reasonable

Petitioners insist that the CA erred in ruling that the crating expense of ₱15,500 was justifiable without however stating the basis
for such a ruling. According to petitioners, the records prove that there were more than ample evidence to show that the crating
expense was fictitious. Petitioners reiterate the sworn testimonies of Delda, Esperas, and Villalino, and that of Augusto Cabugao,
the Regional Audit Manager of Caltex, who testified that the crating expense of ₱15,500 was unreasonably high considering that
depot houses of Caltex were fully furnished and expenses incurred in transferring personal effects were usually very small.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the crating expense was necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances. First, Caltex readily approved the reimbursement claim when Agad submitted the official receipt. It was only a
year later, during a regular audit, when Caltex sought Delda’s affidavit of denial when the company questioned the authenticity
and reasonableness of the amount of the crating expense. Second, of the first three witnesses for the petitioners, only Delda was
presented for cross-examination during the administrative investigation. Thus, the affidavits of Esperas and Villalino remain
hearsay and deserve scant consideration. Last, George Taberrah, the former Manager for Distribution of Caltex, testified on 26
February 1996 that the amount of ₱15,500 for crating expense was reasonable. Even Roger San Jose, the former auditor of
Caltex, testified on the necessity and reasonableness of said amount.

In R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag,29 we held that factual issues may be reviewed by the CA when the findings of fact of the NLRC
conflict with those of the LA. By the same token, this Court may review factual conclusions of the CA when they are contrary to
those of the NLRC or of the LA.

In the present case, the evidence of the parties with respect to the crating expense reimbursed by Agad finds discord on the
official receipt issued by Delda vis-a-vis Delda’s sworn testimony denying that he received the amount stated in the receipt or
rendered any crating service for Agad. The petitioners presented the affidavits of Asperas and Villalino to corroborate Delda’s
testimony while Agad relied on the official receipt as the best evidence that he contracted Delda’s services and that Delda indeed
issued said receipt. The decisions of the CA and NLRC produced different factual conclusions on this issue.

After a careful review of the records, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the CA.

First, the official receipt submitted by Agad serves as the best evidence of payment and is presumed regular on its face
absent any showing to the contrary.
 Second, records show that the reimbursement of the crating expense was approved by Agad’s superior upon
presentment of the receipt. At the time, Agad’s superior did not mention that the amount of the crating expense
incurred was unreasonable.

Third, Delda, in his affidavit, disclosed that he was forced to issue the receipt in order to get a favorable
recommendation from the incoming superintendent who would replace Agad in the Depot. However, in the same
affidavit, Delda mentioned that he had been a standby worker at the Depot from 1956 to 1982 and a piece-worker from
1982 up to 1993, the date he executed the affidavit. It appears then that Delda had established a name for himself and
his business with Caltex. Any favorable recommendation from Agad, as the outgoing superintendent, would not provide
much impact compared to the reputation he had built all those years.

Fourth, the testimonies of the two corroborating witnesses, Esperas and Villalino, cannot be given credence since
Agad was not given an opportunity to cross-examine them. Their testimonies are considered as hearsay evidence.

Last, petitioners did not present any other evidence to show that Agad violated company policy dealing with crating
expenses to be limited to a certain amount. Reasonableness was the only criterion given by the employer.

Thus, all these taken into consideration, we conclude that petitioners were not able to fully substantiate the alleged fictitious
reimbursement of the crating expense. Delda’s testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence to prove otherwise, is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of his own official receipt which he gave to Agad.

Withdrawal and sale of 190 pieces of LPG cylinders is unauthorized

Petitioners assert that Agad committed serious violation of internal control procedures and company policies due to the following:
(1) no Records of Materials Received/Delivered (RMRD) were issued to cover the withdrawal of the empty cylinders for repair
purposes; (2) the testimony of Millanes demonstrates that the cylinders were initially stored at his premises on 8 February 1991
and later sold as good units without bidding, upon the instructions of Agad, to Leyte Development and Ernesto Mercado; (3) no
evidence was submitted to show that the sales proceeds were turned over to Caltex and petitioners surmise that the total
prevailing price of the LPG cylinders would have been from a low of ₱95,000 to a high of ₱133,000; (4) the periodic report of
inventory of the LPG cylinders, considered part of storehouse materials, to Head Office Accounting was not submitted by the
depot; and (5) the depot clerk acted beyond his authority when he approved the gate passes for the withdrawal of the
cylinders.301avvphi1

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain the following: (1) that as depot superintendent, Agad had the authority to transfer
materials, including

scrap, from one place to another; (2) Agad had specific authority, per Memorandum dated 12 February 1992, to withdraw the
scrap materials as replacement for the missing scrap tanks, pumps and pipelines earlier sold to Boy Bato; (3) the withdrawal of
the LPG cylinders was covered by gate passes 8499 and 8500, negating any fraudulent intent on Agad’s part; and (4) petitioners’
own witness, Millanes, testified that the LPG cylinders withdrawn were actually junk or scrap materials and of no accounting
value. In addition, even assuming that the withdrawal of the LPG cylinders was unauthorized, the penalty of dismissal is too
harsh a penalty.

We agree with petitioners.

The findings of the CA in the present case revealed:

With regard to the second issue, the petitioner contends that the withdrawal/sale of 190 LPG cylinders in the Tacloban Bulk
Depot was well within his authority as a Depot Superintendent and covered by an authority stated in an instrument, as a
consequence of a contract of sale with Mr. Bato. Furthermore, such cylinders were already considered as scrap or without
monetary value. Therefore, its withdrawal/sale could not constitute just cause for dismissal.
The contention is without merit. Although his position as Depot Superintendent includes such authority, as part of his
housekeeping duties, it does not automatically justify his acts which were contrary to company rules and regulations. The
company rules required the issuance of RMRDs for any company properties with value to be withdrawn from the Bulk Depot.
Petitioner failed to comply with this rule. Furthermore, he ordered the sale of the cylinders without bidding, and there were no
evidence that the proceeds of such sale were turned over to the company. Mere existence of authority does not justify his acts,
he must show that he properly exercised such authority as contemplated in the company rules and regulations, especially when
the act is not within his discretion.

His contention that such withdrawal mas merely a part of a contract of sale between the company and Mr. Bato, is likewise
erroneous. The instrument never mentioned of any LPG cylinders, what was mentioned therein was 3,000 B.I. plates. And even
if the contract involved LPG cylinders, still, its withdrawal must be accounted for.

The petitioners’ assumption that the subject LPG cylinders were merely scrap materials is likewise erroneous. The cylinders,
although declared as scraps, still has monetary value because it can still be sold even as scrap materials. Moreover, even if such
cylinders were merely scrap, the petitioner cannot just appropriate them without the company’s consent. Being company
property, its disposal is still within the discretion and prerogative of the company.31

In the same manner, the NLRC, in its Decision dated 6 June 2001, held:

x x x It was sufficiently established that complainant Agad had no authority to withdraw the LPG cylinders from the Tacloban Bulk
Depot. Complainant Agad’s claim that he merely withdrew the LPG cylinders in view of the loss of certain scrap materials earlier
sold to Mr. Boy Bato is belied by the fact that the alleged loss was not established. On the other hand, the records show that
complainant Agad’s request for the withdrawal of scrap materials only covered 3,000 kilograms of B.I. plates. This request,
however, did not include the LPG cylinders, numbering 190, which were withdrawn from the Tacloban Depot.

Complainant Agad also did not observe the existing company rules and regulations on the withdrawal of LPG cylinders from the
Tacloban Bulk Depot. According to the Audit Report, which was not controverted by complainant Agad, no Records of Materials
Received/Delivered were issued to cover the withdrawal of the cylinders. Also, the periodic inventory of the LPG cylinders was
not submitted by complainant Agad to the accounting department. Further, the LPG cylinders were not sold through bidding,
which was corroborated by the statement of Mr. Isidro B. Millanes, who testified that the subject LPG cylinders were first stored
at his premises and later sold without bidding upon the express instructions of complainant Agad.

In this regards, it cannot be validly claimed that the LPG cylinders in question were mere scrap materials, i.e. they had no
monetary value anymore and therefore not subject to the strict requirement laid down by the company rules and regulations. As
testified to by Mr. Cabugao, and by no less than complainant Agad himself and his own witnesses, Mr. George Taberrah, and
Mr. Roger San Jose, Jr., the LPG containers have monetary value as they can still be sold even as scrap. 32

The findings of the CA and NLRC establish the following: (1) Agad’s request for withdrawal of the 190 pieces of LPG cylinders as
stated in a Memorandum dated 12 February 1992 cannot be given credence since the Memorandum pertains to the replacement
of the scrap materials due to Boy Bato consisting of 3,000 kilograms of black iron plates and not to the subject LPG cylinders; (2)
Agad did not observe Caltex’s rules and regulations when he transferred the said cylinders to Millanes’ compound without the
RMRD form as required under Caltex’s Field Accounting Manual; (3) Agad gave specific instructions to Millanes to sell the
cylinders without bidding to third parties in violation of company rules; (4) Agad failed to submit the periodic inventory report of
the LPG cylinders to the accounting department; (5) Agad did not remit the proceeds of the sale of the LPG cylinders; and (6)
even if considered as scrap materials, the LPG cylinders still had monetary value which Agad cannot appropriate for himself
without Caltex’s consent.

Considering these findings, it is clear that Agad committed a serious infraction amounting to theft of company property. This act
is akin to a serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer in connection with his
work, a just cause for termination of employment recognized under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.
Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To be serious, the misconduct must be of
such grave and aggravated character.33

Further, Agad’s conduct constitutes willful breach of the trust reposed in him, another just cause for termination of employment
recognized under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. Loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment,
is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence. The employee must
be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, care and protection of the employer’s property
and funds.34

As a superintendent, Agad occupied a position tasked to perform key and sensitive functions which necessarily involved the
custody and protection of Caltex’s properties. Consequently, Agad comes within the purview of the trust and confidence rule.

In Sagales v. Rustan’s Commercial Corporation,35 we held that in loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for dismissal, it is
sufficient that there must only be some basis for the loss of trust and confidence or that there is reasonable ground to believe, if
not to entertain the moral conviction, that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that his participation in
the misconduct rendered him absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence.

In sum, even if Agad did not commit the alleged charge of fictitious reimbursement of crating expense, he was found to have
acted without authority, a serious infraction amounting to theft of company property, in the withdrawal and sale of the 190 pieces
of LPG cylinders owned by the company. Caltex, as the employer, has discharged the burden of proof necessary in terminating
the services of Agad, who was ascertained to have blatantly abused his position and authority. Thus, Agad’s dismissal from
employment based on (1) acts tantamount to serious misconduct or willful violation of company rules and regulations; and (2)
willful breach of trust and confidence as Depot Superintendent was lawful and valid under the circumstances as mandated by
Article 282 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22 May 2003 and Resolution dated 27 January 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74199. We DECLARE as valid the termination from employment of respondent
Hermie G. Agad for just causes prescribed under the law.

SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 160138 January 16, 2013

AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS, INC. (AER), ANTONIO T. INDUCIL, LOURDES T. INDUCIL, JOCELYN T. INDUCIL
and MA. CONCEPCION I. DONATO, Petitioners,
vs.
PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AER, ARNOLD VILLOTA, FELINO E. AGUSTIN, RUPERTO M.
MARIANO II, EDUARDO S. BRIZUELA, ARNOLD S. RODRIGUEZ, RODOLFO MAINIT, JR., FROILAN B. MADAMBA,
DANILO D. QUIBOY, CHRISTOPHER R. NOLASCO, ROGER V. BELATCHA, CLEOFAS B. DELA BUENA, JR., HERMINIO
P. PAPA, WILLIAM A. RITUAL, ROBERTO CALDEO, RAFAEL GACAD, JAMES C. CAAMPUED, ESPERIDION V. LOPEZ,
JR., FRISCO M. LORENZO, JR., CRISANTO LUMBAO, JR., and RENATO SARABUNO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 160192

PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AER, ARNOLD VILLOTA, FELINO E. AGUSTIN, RUPERTO M.
MARIANO II, EDUARDO S. BRIZUELA, ARNOLD S. RODRIGUEZ, RODOLFO MAINIT, JR., FROILAN B. MADAMBA,
DANILO D. QUIBOY, CHRISTOPHER R. NOLASCO, ROGER V. BELATCHA, CLEOFAS B. DELA BUENA, JR., HERMINIO
P. PAPA, WILLIAM A. RITUAL, ROBERTO CALDEO, RAFAEL GACAD, JAMES C. CAAMPUED, ESPERIDION V. LOPEZ,
JR., FRISCO M. LORENZO, JR., CRISANTO LUMBAO, JR., and RENA TO SARABUNO, Petitioners,
vs.
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEREBUILDERS, INC., and ANTONIO T. INDUCIL, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by Progresibong Unyon Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa AER (Unyon)
which questioned the Court’s July 13, 2011 Decision insofar as it failed to award backwages to fourteen (14) of its members. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the complaining employees should be reinstated without backwages. If
reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned employees should be given separation pay up to the date set for their return in
lieu of reinstatement.1

In arriving at said determination, the Court found out both parties were at fault or in pari delicto and must bear the consequences
of their own wrongdoing.2 Thus, it decreed that the striking employees must be restored to their respective positions prior to the
illegal strike and illegal lockout.

Records disclose that this labor controversy started when both parties filed charges against each other, blaming the other party
for violating labor laws. Thirty-two (32) employees filed and signed a complaint,3 dated February 18, 1999, against Automotive
Engine Rebuilders, Inc. (AER). The complaint prayed that AER be declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practices, Illegal Dismissal,
Illegal Suspension, and Run-away shop; that the complainants be reinstated; and that they be paid "full backwages and without
loss of seniority rights and privileges, payment of wages during suspension, plus moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees."4

The names of the 32 complaining employees are as follows:

1. Felino Agustin

2. Ruperto Mariano II

3. Eduardo Brizuela

4. Otilio Rabino

5. Arnold Rodriguez

6. Froilan Madamba

7. Ferdinand Flores

8. Jonathan Taborda

9. Rodolfo Mainit, Jr.

10. Danilo Quiboy

11. Christopher Nolasco

12. Roger Belatcha

 13. Claud Moncel

14. Cleofas dela Buena, Jr.

15. Edwin Mendoza

16. Herminio Papa

17. Oscar Macaranas

18. William Ritual

19. Roberto Caldeo

20. Rafael Gacad

21. James Caampued

22. Esperidion Lopez, Jr.

23. Frisco Lorenzo, Jr.

24. Bernardino Acosta, Jr.

25. Benson Pingol

26. Tammy Punsalan

27. Edward Ferrancol

28. Crisanto Lumbao, Jr.

29. Arnold Villota

30. Menching Mariano, Jr.

31. Carlos Carolino

32. Renato Sarabuno

Out of the 32, six (6) resigned and signed waivers and quitclaims, namely:

1. Oscar Macaranas

2. Bernardino Acosta

3. Ferdinand Flores

4. Benson Pingol
 5. Otillo Rabino

6. Jonathan Taborda

On the other hand, the earlier complaint5 filed by AER against Unyon and eighteen (18) of its members for illegal concerted
activities prayed that, after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:

1. Finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal concerted activity;

2. Finding respondents guilty of abandonment of work, serious misconduct, gross disrespect, commission of felonies
against the complainant and their respective officers, threats, coercion and intimidation;

3. Penalizing complainants with dismissal and/or termination of employment; and

4. Adjudging respondents to be jointly and solidarily liable to complainant for moral damages in the sum of
₱500,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of ₱500,000.00 and attorney’s fees and costs.

The names of the 18 workers charged with illegal strike by AER are as follows:

1. Felino Agustin

2. Eduardo Brizuela

3. Otilio Rabino

4. Ferdinand Flores

5. Jonathan Taborda

6. Rodolfo Mainit, Jr.

7. Christopher Nolasco

8. Claud Moncel

9. Cleofas dela Buena

10. Herminio Papa

11. Oscar Macaranas

12. William Ritual

13. Rafael Gacad

14. James Caampued

15. Benson Pingol

16. Frisco Lorenzo, Jr.

 17. Bernardino Acosta, Jr.

18. Esperidion Lopez, Jr.

AER likewise suspended seven (7) union members who tested positive for illegal drugs, namely:

1. Froilan Madamba

2. Arnold Rodriguez

3. Roberto Caldeo

4. Roger Bilatcha

5. Ruperto Mariano

6. Edwin Fabian

7. Nazario Madala

Out of the seven (7) suspended employees, only Edwin Fabian and Nazario Madala were allowed by AER to report back to work.
The other five (5) suspended employees were not admitted by AER without first submitting the required medical certificate
attesting to their fitness to work.

On August 9, 2001, after the parties submitted their respective position papers,6 the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision7 in
favor of Unyon by directing AER to reinstate the concerned employees but without backwages effective October 16, 2001. Both
parties filed their respective appeals8 with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

On March 5, 2002, the NLRC issued its Resolution9 modifying the LA decision by setting aside the order of reinstatement as it
ruled out illegal dismissal. The NLRC likewise ruled that the concerned employees had no valid basis in conducting a strike. On
April 19, 2002, Unyon filed a motion for reconsideration10 insisting, among others, that AER was guilty of unfair labor practice,
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. Unyon also argued that since AER charged only 18 of the 32 employees with illegal
strike, the employees who were not included in the said charge should have been admitted back to work by AER. Unyon also
claimed that there was no allegation that these employees, who were not included in AER’s charge for illegal strike, were
involved in the January 28, 1999 incident.11

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Unyon and the concerned employees filed a petition12 before the Court of
Appeals (CA). Unyon reiterated its argument that AER should admit back to work those excluded from its list of 18 employees
charged with illegal strike.13

On June 27, 2003, the CA rendered a decision,14 the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Respondents are hereby directed to reinstate the petitioners
effective immediately but without backwages, except those who were tested positive for illegal drugs and have failed to submit
their respective medical certificates.

On October 1, 2003, ruling on the motion for partial reconsideration filed by Unyon, the CA rendered the assailed Amended
Decision,15 ordering the immediate reinstatement of all the suspended employees without backwages. Thus,

WHEREFORE, the partial motion for reconsideration is GRANTED insofar as the reinstatement of the suspended employees is
concerned. This Court’s decision dated June 27, 2003 is hereby MODIFIED. Private respondents are hereby directed to reinstate
all petitioners immediately without backwages.
Unsatisfied, both parties filed the present consolidated petitions. Unyon argued that the CA erred in not awarding backwages to
the suspended employees who were ordered reinstated. AER, on the other hand, argued that the CA erred in ordering the
reinstatement of the suspended employees.

On July 13, 2011, this Court rendered a decision,16 the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the complaining employees should be reinstated without backwages. If
reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned employees should be given separation pay up to the date set for their return in
lieu of reinstatement.

Unyon filed the subject Motion for Partial Reconsideration17 questioning the Court’s July 13, 2011 Decision insofar as it failed to
award backwages to fourteen (14) of its members.

Unyon argues that backwages should have been awarded to the 14 employees who were excluded from the complaint filed by
AER and that the latter should have reinstated them immediately because they did not have any case at all.

AER was directed to file its comment. Its Comment,18 however, failed to address the issue except to say that the motion for
partial reconsideration was pro-forma.

After going over the records again, the Court holds that only nine (9) of the fourteen (14) excluded employees deserve to be
reinstated immediately with backwages.

Records disclose that thirty-two (32) employees filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unfair labor practice against AER.
Out of these 32 workers, only eighteen (18) of them were charged by AER with illegal strike leaving fourteen (14) of them
excluded from its complaint. The names of these 14 employees are as follows:

1. Ruperto Mariano II

2. Arnold Rodriguez

3. Froilan Madamba

4. Danilo Quiboy

5. Roger Belatcha

6. Edwin Mendoza

7. Roberto Caldeo

8. Tammy Punsalan

9. Edward Ferrancol

10. Crisanto Lumbao, Jr.

11. Arnold Villota

12. Menching Mariano, Jr.

13. Carlos Carolino

 14. Renato Sarabuno

Technically, as no charges for illegal strike were filed against these 14 employees, they cannot be among those found guilty of
illegal strike. They cannot be considered in pari delicto. They should be reinstated and given their backwages.

Out of these 14 employees, however, five (5) failed to write their names and affix their signatures in the Membership
Resolution19 attached to the petition filed before the CA, authorizing Union President Arnold Villota to represent them. It must be
noted that Arnold Villota signed as the Affiant in the Verification and Certification by virtue of the Membership Resolution.20 The
names of these 5 employees are:

1. Edwin Mendoza

2. Tammy Punzalan

3. Edward Ferrancol

4. Menching Mariano, Jr.

5. Carlos Carolina

Because of their failure to affix their names and signatures in the Membership Resolution, Edwin Mendoza, Tammy Punzalan,
Edward Ferrancol, Menching Mariano, Jr. and Carlos Carolina cannot be granted the relief that Unyon wanted for them in its
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Only the following nine (9) employees who signed their names in the petition can be granted the relief prayed for therein, namely:

1. Ruperto Mariano II

2. Arnold Rodriguez

3. Froilan Madamba

4. Danilo Quiboy

5. Roger Belatcha

6. Roberto Caldeo

7. Crisanto Lumbao, Jr.

8. Arnold Villota

9. Renato Sarabuno

These excluded nine (9) workers, who signed their names in their petition before the CA, deserve to be reinstated immediately
and gra:1ted backwages. It is basic in jurisprudence that illegally dismissed workers are entitled to reinstatement with back
wages pi us interest at the legal rate.21

As stated in the Amended Decision of the CA, which the Court effectively affirmed after denying the petition of both parties, the
reinstatement shall be "without prejudice to the right of private respondent AER to subject them for further medical check-up to
determine if subject petitioners are drug dependents."22
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Pa1iial Reconsideration filed by Progresibong Unyon Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa AER is GRANTED
only insofar as the nine (9) employees are concerned, namely: Ruperto Mariano II, Arnold Rodriguez, Froilan Madamba, Danilo
Quiboy, Roger Belateha, Roberto Caldeo, Crisanto Lumbao, Jr., Arnold Villota, and Renato Sarabuno.1âwphi1

Accordingly, the July 13, 2011 Decision is hereby MODIFIED in that the aforementioned nine (9) workers are entitled to be
reinstated and granted backwages with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum which shall be increased to twelve
percent (12%) after the finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164939 June 6, 2011

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN and HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 172303

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), Petitioner,

vs.
HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 164939, assails the
Resolutions dated October 3, 20031 and August 13, 20042 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78364, which
dismissed petitioner’s petition for review at the CA for being the wrong remedy. The second petition, docketed as G.R. No.
172303, assails the Decision3 dated December 16, 2005 and Resolution4 dated April 12, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
77478, modifying the judgment of the Voluntary Arbitrator in NCMB-NCR-CRN-07-008-01.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly registered union and the certified bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star hotel owned and operated by respondent
Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. On January 31, 2001, Hyatt’s General Manager, David C. Pacey, issued a
Memorandum5 informing all hotel employees that hotel security have been instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and
body frisking in every entrance and exit of the hotel. He enjoined employees to comply therewith. Copies of the Memorandum
were furnished petitioner.

On February 3, 2001, Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotel’s Cafe Al Fresco restaurant and a director of the union, refused to
be frisked by the security personnel. The incident was reported to the hotel’s Human Resources Department (HRD), which
issued a Memorandum6 to Caragdag on February 5, 2001, requiring him to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. The following day, on February 6, 2001, Caragdag again refused
to be frisked by the security personnel. Thus, on February 8, 2001, the HRD issued another Memorandum7 requiring him to
explain.
On February 14, 2001, the HRD imposed on Caragdag the penalty of reprimand for the February 3, 2001 incident, which was
considered a first offense, and suspended him for three days for the February 6, 2001 incident, which was considered as a
second offense.8 Both penalties were in accordance with the hotel’s Code of Discipline.

Subsequently, on February 22, 2001, when Mike Moral, the manager of Hyatt’s Cafe Al Fresco and Caragdag’s immediate
superior, was about to counsel two staff members, Larry Lacambacal and Allan Alvaro, at the training room, Caragdag suddenly
opened the door and yelled at the two with an enraged look. In a disturbing voice he said, "Ang titigas talaga ng ulo n’yo. Sinabi
ko na sa inyo na huwag kayong makikipagusap sa management habang ongoing pa ang kaso!" (You are very stubborn. I told
you not to speak to management while the case is ongoing!) Moral asked Caragdag what the problem was and informed him that
he was simply talking to his staff. Moral also told Caragdag that he did not have the right to interrupt and intimidate him during his
counseling session with his staff.

On February 23, 2001, Moral issued a Memorandum9 requiring Caragdag to explain his actions in the training room. Caragdag
submitted his written explanation on February 25, 200110 narrating that he was informed by someone that Lacambacal and
Alvaro were requesting for his assistance because Moral had invited them to the training room. Believing that he should advise
the two that they should be accompanied by a union officer to any inquisition, he went to the training room. However, before he
could enter the door, Moral blocked him. Thus, he told Lacambacal and Alvaro that they should be assisted by a union
representative before giving any statement to management. Caragdag also prayed that Moral be investigated for harassing union
officers and union members.

On February 28, 2001, Moral found the explanations unsatisfactory. In a Memorandum 11 issued on the same date, Moral held
Caragdag liable for Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action (OSDA) 3.01 of the hotel’s Code of Discipline, i.e., "threatening,
intimidating, coercing, and provoking to a fight your superior for reasons directly connected with his discharge of official duty."
Thus, Caragdag was imposed the penalty of seven days suspension in accordance with the hotel’s Code of Discipline.

Still later, on March 2, 2001, Caragdag committed another infraction. At 9:35 a.m. on the said date, Caragdag left his work
assignment during official hours without prior permission from his Department Head. He was required to submit an explanation,
but the explanation12 he submitted was found unsatisfactory. On March 17, 2001, Moral found Caragdag liable for violating
OSDA 3.07, i.e., "leaving work assignment during official working hours without prior permission from the department head or
immediate superior," and suspended him for three days.13

Because of the succession of infractions he committed, the HRD also required Caragdag to explain on May 11, 2001 why the
hotel’s OSDA 4.32 (Committing offenses which are penalized with three [3] suspensions during a 12-month period) should not be
enforced against him.14 An investigation board was formed after receipt of Caragdag’s written explanation, and the matter was
set for hearing on May 19, 2001. However, despite notice of the scheduled hearing, both Caragdag and the Union President
failed to attend. Thereafter, the investigating board resolved on the said date to dismiss Caragdag for violation of OSDA
4.32.15 Caragdag appealed but the investigating board affirmed its resolution after hearing on May 24, 2001.

On June 1, 2001, the hotel, through Atty. Juancho A. Baltazar, sent Caragdag a Notice of Dismissal, 16 the pertinent portion of
which reads:

Based on the findings of the Investigation Board dated May 19, 2001 which was approved by the General Manager Mr. David
Pacey on the same day and which did not merit any reversal or modification after the hearing on your appeal on May 24, 2001,
the penalty of DISMISSAL is therefore affirmed to take effect on June 1, 2001.

Caragdag’s dismissal was questioned by petitioner, and the dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration upon agreement of the
parties. On May 6, 2002, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision,17 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Arbiter rules that the three separate suspensions of Mr. Caragdag are valid, his
dismissal is legal and OSDA 4.32 of Hyatt’s Code of Discipline is reasonable.

However, for humanitarian considerations, Hyatt is hereby ordered to grant financial assistance to Mr. Caragdag in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP100,000.00).
In finding the three separate suspensions of Caragdag valid, the Voluntary Arbitrator reasoned that the union officers and
members had no right to breach company rules and regulations on security and employee discipline on the basis of certain
suspicions against management and an ongoing CBA negotiation standoff. The Voluntary Arbitrator also found that when
Caragdag advised Lacambacal and Alvaro not to give any statement, he threatened and intimidated his superior while the latter
was performing his duties. Moreover, there is no reason why he did not arrange his time-off with the Department Head
concerned. Thus, Caragdag was validly dismissed pursuant to OSDA 4.32 of Hyatt’s Code of Discipline, which states that an
employee who commits three different acts of misconduct within a twelve (12)-month period commits serious misconduct.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision while respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration. However, the
Voluntary Arbitrator denied both motions on May 26, 2003.18

On August 1, 2003, petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for certiorari which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78364.19 As mentioned at the outset, the CA dismissed the petition outright for being the wrong
remedy. The CA explained:

Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgments, final
orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition for Review which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary arbitrator.

Considering that petitioner intends this petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves to dismiss the petition
outright for being an improper mode of appeal.

Even if this Court treats the instant petition as a Petition for Review, still the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the same for
having been filed out of time. As admitted by the petitioner it received the Order dated 26 May 2003 denying their motion for
reconsideration on 02 June 2003. The fifteen (15) day period within which to appeal through a Petition for Review is until June
17, 2003. The petitioner filed the present petition on August 1, 2003, way beyond the reglementary period provided for by the
Rules.20

Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the motion was denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner filed
before this Court a petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 164939.

In the meantime, on June 30, 2003, respondent also filed a petition for review21 with the CA on the ground that the Voluntary
Arbitrator committed a grievous error in awarding financial assistance to Caragdag despite his finding that the dismissal due to
serious misconduct was valid. On December 16, 2005, the CA promulgated a decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 77478 as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 6, 2002 of Voluntary Arbitrator Buenaventura C. Magsalin is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION by DELETING the award of financial assistance in the amount of P100,000.00 to Angelito Caragdag.

SO ORDERED.22

In deleting the award of financial assistance to Caragdag, the CA cited the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Abad,23 which held that the grant of separation pay or other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just cause is
based on equity and is a measure of social justice, awarded to an employee who has been validly dismissed if the dismissal was
not due to serious misconduct or causes that reflected adversely on the moral character of the employee. In this case, the CA
agreed with the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator that Caragdag was validly dismissed due to serious misconduct. Accordingly,
financial assistance should not have been awarded to Caragdag. The CA also noted that it is the employer’s prerogative to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain
disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to ensure compliance therewith.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, petitioner filed before us
a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172303.
Considering that G.R. Nos. 164939 and 172303 have the same origin, involve the same parties, and raise interrelated issues, the
petitions were consolidated.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

In G.R. No. 164939

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT
THE SAME IS AN IMPROPER MODE OF APPEAL.24

In G.R. No. 172303

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF
₱100,000.00 TO ANGELITO CARAGDAG.25

The issues for our resolution are thus two-fold: first, whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed
before it on the ground that the same is an improper mode of appeal; and second, whether the CA erred in deleting the award of
financial assistance in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to Caragdag.

On the first issue, petitioner argues that because decisions rendered by voluntary arbitrators are issued under Title VII-A of
the Labor Code, they are not covered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, by express provision of
Section 2 thereof. Section 2, petitioner points out, expressly provides that Rule 43 "shall not apply to judgments or final orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines." Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy for
questioning the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator, and petitioner having availed of such remedy, the CA erred in declaring that
the petition was filed out of time since the petition was filed within the sixty (60)-day reglementary period.

On the other hand, respondent maintains that the CA acted correctly in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong
mode of appeal. It stresses that Section 1 of Rule 43 clearly states that it is the governing rule with regard to appeals from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of voluntary arbitrators. Respondent contends that the voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law include the voluntary arbitrators appointed and accredited under the Labor Code, as they are considered as
included in the term "quasi-judicial instrumentalities."

Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade.

In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan,26 we repeated the well-settled rule that a
decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43. We held that:

The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon Development
Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the
quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide a
uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.

Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, and Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals, the Court
reiterated the aforequoted ruling. In Alcantara, the Court held that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in Luzon
Development Bank still stands. The Court explained, thus:

"The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Employees’ Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

"The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but, nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary
arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit x x x"

Furthermore, Sections 1, 3 and 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the x x x, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

xxxx

SEC. 3. Where to appeal. - An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner
therein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

SEC. 4. Period of appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for
certiorari.

Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case to deviate from the general rule.
Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to
defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital
system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system
of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules. 27

On the second issue, petitioner argues that Caragdag is entitled to financial assistance in the amount of ₱100,000 on
humanitarian considerations. Petitioner stresses that Caragdag’s infractions were due to his being a union officer and his acts did
not show moral depravity. Petitioner also adds that, while it is true that the award of financial assistance is given only for
dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as amended, this Court has, by way of
exception, allowed the grant of financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes based on equity.

Respondent on the other hand, asserts that the CA correctly deleted the award of financial assistance erroneously granted to
Caragdag considering that he was found guilty of serious misconduct and other acts adversely reflecting on his moral character.
Respondent stresses that Caragdag’s willful defiance of the hotel’s security policy, disrespect and intimidation of a superior, and
unjustifiable desertion of his work assignment during working hours without permission, patently show his serious and gross
misconduct as well as amoral character.28

Again, petitioner’s arguments lack merit.

The grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based on equity. 29 In
Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,30 we ruled that severance compensation, or whatever name it is called, on the
ground of social justice shall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or for causes
which reflect adversely on the employee’s moral character. The Court succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of
separation pay in this wise:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the
reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee
for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with
the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay
even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks
he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any
good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At
best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every
humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted
to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social
justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This
great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers
who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.31

Here, Caragdag’s dismissal was due to several instances of willful disobedience to the reasonable rules and regulations
prescribed by his employer. The Voluntary Arbitrator pointed out that according to the hotel’s Code of Discipline, an employee
who commits three different acts of misconduct within a twelve (12)-month period commits serious misconduct. He stressed that
Caragdag’s infractions were not even spread in a period of twelve (12) months, but rather in a period of a little over a month.
Records show the various violations of the hotel’s rules and regulations were committed by Caragdag. He was suspended for
violating the hotel policy on bag inspection and body frisking. He was likewise suspended for threatening and intimidating a
superior while the latter was counseling his staff. He was again suspended for leaving his work assignment without permission.
Evidently, Caragdag’s acts constitute serious misconduct.1âwphi1

In Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.,32 we ruled that a series of irregularities when put together may constitute
serious misconduct, which under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, is a just cause for dismissal.

Caragdag’s dismissal being due to serious misconduct, it follows that he should not be entitled to financial assistance. To rule
otherwise would be to reward him for the grave misconduct he committed. We must emphasize that social justice is extended
only to those who deserve its compassion.33

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The October 3, 2003 and August 13, 2004 Court of Appeals
Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 78364, as well as the Court of Appeals December 16, 2005 Decision and April 12, 2006
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 77478, are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113178 July 5, 1996

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), NORBERTO T. BRAGA, PETRONILA R. VALBUENA,
TOMAS C. PARROCHA and PACENCIA M. ILUSTRE, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARIO DANILO B. VILLAFLORES, respondents.

G.R. No. 114777 July 5, 1996

MARIO DANILO B. VILLAFLORES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p

The issue in these two consolidated1 petitions for certiorari is whether or not the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) illegally terminated the services of its Assistant Vice-President for Management Services,
Mario Danilo B. Villaflores, on the grounds of gross misconduct and loss of confidence.

Villaflores was employed by the RCPI on July 1, 1975. A certified public accountant (CPA), who finished the law course
while working, he also took units in Master of Laws at the University of Sto. Tomas. In the course of his employment,
he became the Internal Auditor, Acting Assistant Vice-President for Finance and Comptroller, and Assistant Vice-
President for Management Services. At the time of the incident here involved, Villaflores was receiving P8,200.00 as
basic monthly salary and representation and transportation allowances of P5,300.00.

As determined by Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec and affirmed on appeal by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), the facts which gave rise to these petitions are as follows:

German Bernardo Mattus was hired by RCPI on July 2, 1990 as manager of its Management Information System
Department. He was under the division of Villaflores but he was required to report directly to Norberto T. Braga, the
Executive Vice-President (EVP) for Corporate Services.

On October 29, 1990, Mattus posted a copy of an invitation to a computer seminar on the bulletin board without having
sought the permission of Villaflores. When the latter arrived and saw the poster, he asked his secretary, Lydia
Henares, to remove it order. When Mattus learned of its removal, he took the poster from Lydia Henares and sought
out Villaflores.

Mattus found Villaflores at work in the computer room. He said, "Ano ba ito, Danny?" Villaflores replied, "Hindi puede,"
at the same time, getting a stapler with the apparent intention of throwing it at Mattus. When a co-employee grabbed
the stapler from Villaflores, the latter snatched the poster from Mattus, tore and crumpled it, and threw the pieces at
Mattus but missed. Had it not been for the timely intervention of the other employees present, the two would have
assaulted each other. As Mattus was leaving the room, Villaflores shouted invectives such as "bullshit ka," "baboy ka,"
and "gago ka" at him.

On the same day, Mattus lodged a complaint against Villaflores for: (a) conduct unbecoming of an assistant vice-
president of the company; (b) threatening a subordinate with physical injury, and (c) shouting invectives at a
subordinate in the presence of the Management Services Staff.2

The next day, EVP Braga asked Villaflores to explain why no administrative action should be taken against him "for
provoking and instigating a fight within company premises, using abusive and dirty language directed to your Manager,
and for threatening the MIS Manager."3
In his explanation, Villaflores claimed that after he had instructed his secretary to remove all the publications posted on
the bulletin board, Mattus rushed into the computer room and shouted at the top of his voice, "Ano ito, Danny?" Mattus,
who was bigger than Villaflores, allegedly attempted to attack him but was prevented by co-employees from doing so.
Villaflores admitted having uttered "shit, baboy" but these were mere expressions of disgust at and by way of objecting
to the imminent attack against his person and dignity.4

The RCPI management scheduled a formal investigation and summoned several employees who witnessed the
incident. Both parties, however, agreed to forego the "trial-type" investigation, opting instead to submit their formal
explanations. Mattus submitted his explanation on November 13, 1990 while Villaflores submitted his own November
26, 1990.

On December 10, 1990, RCPI, through EVP Braga, placed Villaflores under preventive suspension, at the same time
giving him a final chance to explain further "why no drastic administrative action should be taken against him for
serious misconduct" and "for acts unbecoming of a company official."5 on December 13, 1990, Villaflores submitted his
final explanation.6

After investigation and personally evaluating all the evidence presented by both parties, EVP Braga issued a
memorandum dated January 18, 1991 advising Villaflores of the termination of his services effective December 10,
1990 on grounds of gross misconduct unbecoming of a company official in gross violation of Rules 52, 53 and 55 of the
Company Rules and Regulatory.7 As a consequence, the company had lost trust and confidence in him.8

On December 19, 1990, several of Villaflores' co-employees wrote Braga a letter stating that the penalty imposed upon
Villaflores appeared "to be not commensurate and too harsh a penalty for the alleged offense committed" and praying
that the penalty imposed upon Villaflores be considered,9 but the plea was ignored.

On January 25, 1991, Villaflores filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Arbitration Branch in
the National Capital Region a complaint against RCPI for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, illegal deduction of
allowances and nonpayment of 13th month pay with claim for moral damages of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages
of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees of P100,000.00. 10

On November 4, 1992, Labor Arbiter Amansec rendered a decision, the pertinent portions of which read:

We reviewed the entire records of the case and arrived at the findings that complainant was not guilty of
serious misconduct. Complainant reacted to the posting by Mattus of a poster at the bulletin board without
his consent and the latter's angrily barging into the room where he was seated but his reaction — his attempt
to throw a stapler at Mattus and, thereafter, his uttering foul language at him although constituting
misconduct cannot, we are confident, fall under the category of a serious misconduct. Complainant was
provoked by Mattus who unjustifiably barged into his room. Complainant did not actually throw a stapler at
Mattus. He could have just tried to scare him with the stapler. He allowed himself to be pacified by cooler
heads. These attending circumstances removed complainant's reaction from the classification of a serious
misconduct.

We find Mattus to be guilty of disrespect to complainant, his superior officer. Firstly, he posted a material on
the bulletin board without complainant's consent. Secondly, he barged into complainant's room. A respectful
subordinate should have secured his prior permission to post a material at the bulletin board and a respectful
subordinate should have controlled himself and desisted from barging into the room where his superior is
working. Even if he believed the superior to be at fault or to have erred in ordering the removal of the poster,
proper decorum would have caused him to bring his case to the superior officer in a mild and respectful
manner. Respect to authority is the tie that binds society. Disrespect to superiors in the office, persons of
authority like policemen and judges, or parents is a certain step to a chaotic society where everyone wants
his wishes to prevail. If complainant unduly reacted when Mattus angrily barged into his room, it was
because the barging was improper.
 Expressing disapproval of Villaflores' attempt to throw a stapler at Mattus, the Labor Arbiter added that Villaflores
"should not have met anger with anger but with sobriety and authority" for he "degraded his position by engaging a
subordinate in a shouting match of foul language." The Labor Arbiter concluded that Villaflores was guilty of minor
misconduct. However, he held that the latter may not be reinstated considering that the relationship between "the
parties" had "unduly soured and strained." He stated that since Villaflores was "not entirely blameless in the incident," it
would be unfair to require his reinstatement to RCPI which, "rightly or wrongly," had lost trust and confidence in him.
On the part of Villaflores, his nonreinstatement would be better for his "tranquillity of mind and career prospects."

Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, complainant is hereby declared to have been illegally dismissed by respondent corporation.
Concomitantly, and considering all the attending Circumstances of the case, complainant's being guilty of a
minor misconduct, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant backwages from date of his dismissal
up to the date of this decision plus separation pay at thirty (30) days for every pay rate under company policy
or practice, if this is higher.

Respondent corporation is also ordered to pay complainant his unpaid bi-monthly allowance of P250.00 from
May 1990 up to the time of his preventive suspension and his 13th month pay for 1990 in the amount of
EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P8,200.00).

Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC. RCPI maintained that Villaflores should have been held guilty of grave misconduct
instead of a minor one and that his claim for a bi-monthly allowance of P250.00 should have been disallowed. On the
other hand, Villaflores contended that, as there was no just cause for his dismissal, the Labor Arbiter should have
ordered his reinstatement; that the finding of illegal dismissal warranted the award of damages, and his suspension
should have been declared illegal on the face of the evidence on record.

On August 30, 1993, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision except that it found the claim of Villaflores for bi-
monthly allowance of P250.00 to be without legal basis. Both parties elevated the case to this Court on separate
petitions for certiorari which were ordered consolidated by the Court in its resolutions dated May 25, 1994 in G.R. No.
114777.

In its petition in G.R. No. 113178, RCPI and it officials asserts that Villaflores should have been found guilty of serious
or grave misconduct which warrants his termination from employment. On the other hand, in G.R. No. 114777,
Villaflores insists that, not only should he be reinstated, but that he should have been awarded damages and the bi-
monthly allowance of P250.00.

Additionally, petitioners RCPI and its officials contend that public respondents' findings are contrary to law and
jurisprudence as they are based on a misappreciation of facts. They insist that the unauthorized posting of the
invitation to a computer seminar by Mattus is a "trivial matter which could not justify the actuations" of Villaflores
considering his educational attainment and position in the company. Specifically, the public respondents' finding on the
"barging into the room" by Mattus is as "implausible" as it is "counter to common human experience for a new
employee" like him to be "overbearing in his attitude and start trouble in his new job."11 In effect, therefore, petitioners
impugn the evaluation by public respondents of the facts proven by the parties.

Said petitioners' objection to the findings of fact of public respondents is naturally impelled by the latter's variance from the result
of their own investigation. Although the investigation by petitioners in G.R. No. 113178 appears on its face to be above board, an
employer's findings and conclusion as to whether an act of an employee constitutes serious misconduct or not should not be
considered conclusive. The investigation of the incident was conducted by petitioner EVP Norberto T. Braga. While no solid
evidence was presented to show that Braga was partial to Mattus at the investigation, petitioners do not disclaim the fact that
Mattus was ordered to report directly to Braga upon his employment. In fact, it was Braga himself who allegedly made "constant
suggestion" to Mattus on the posting of the invitation.12 His impartiality may, therefore, be open to question.

On the other hand, substantial evidence support the public respondents' findings, particularly the sworn statements of
at least seven (7) eyewitnesses to the incident in addition to written explanations of both Mattus and Villaflores. While
the use of the phrase "barge in" by the Labor Arbiter may imply brashness and aggression on the part of Mattus, the
same is the conclusion that may be gleaned from the affidavits of the co-employees who witnessed the incident.

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently accorded great respect to the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. As long as their decision is supported by facts and the evidence, the matter of evaluating the merits
and demerits of the case is left to their sound discretion13 and, in the absence of any arbitrariness in the process of
their deduction from the evidence adduced, their findings may not be left at issue before this Court. 14

Petitioner Villaflores contends in G.R. No. 114777 that he "merely responded to the aggression against him to protect himself"
and that his "act of defending himself cannot and should not be held to be misconduct since the law protects such acts as
privileged"15 in accordance with the law which considers self-defense as a justifying and exempting circumstance in criminal
cases.16 Petitioner adds that neither may his act of "self-defense" be the basis of loss of confidence; otherwise, employers may
"use agents provocateurs to assault its unwanted employees."

Petitioner Villaflores' contention is as far-fetched as it is unfounded. The public respondents themselves did not find the
element of self-defense existing in this case. All they found was that Mattus "barged in" in the room where Villaflores
was working. Although its was proven that Mattus was almost twice the size of Villaflores, there was no proof that in
"barging in," Mattus meant to physically harm Villaflores.

Consequently, we agree with the public respondents that the termination of employment of petitioner Villaflores on
account of a minor in misconduct was illegal because Art. 282 of the Labor Code mentions "serious misconduct" as a
cause for cessation of employment. Art. 279 of the same Code provides that an illegal dismissal gives rise to payment
of full backwages and the reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights, of the dismissed employee. Full backwages
should be given petitioner Villaflores from the time his compensation was withheld from him until the finality of this
Decision.17

While there is not clear and convincing evidence 18 that petitioner's employer has lost trust and confidence in him on
account of the October 29, 1990 incident, it has presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
working relationship between them has become so strained that reinstatement may well exacerbate what, to the
company, has degenerated into an untenable situation between them. Petitioner Villaflores failed to rebut the following
allegations of his employer:

(1) In December, 1975, as the new internal auditor, Villaflores was charged with "hiring without authority from
higher management and without immediate requirement for such hiring," his wife, Mrs. Avelita B. Villaflores,
as cashier/clerk of the RCPI branch in Kiamba, South Cotabato.

(2) In August, 1977, then field auditor in RCPI's Davao City branch, Villaflores was denounced by his
subordinates for repeated arrogance, disrespect and direct interference with the functions of other
departments/sections.

(3) In February, 1980, as internal auditor in the central office in Cubao, Quezon City, Villaflores was charged
with high-handedness, disrespect, incompetence and instilling an atmosphere of fear and hatred among
employees.

(4) On August 18, 1984, another group of employees under Villaflores denounced him for dishonesty and
taking advantage of his position, mismanagement, abuse of authority and corrupt acts, loss of confidence in
his job, favoritism and unprofessionalism before the RCPI president, and
 (5) In 1985, a fellow auditor charged petitioner Villaflores with having "white-washed" an investigation on
unauthorized conversions of company funds by certain employees. The management "simply let go" of
Villaflores' improper conduct but a subordinate employee would not have so serious an imputation if it were
not true.19

There is no denying the fact that petitioner Villaflores had held responsible positions in the past. According to EVP
Braga, however, Villaflores' responsible position in RCPI were not so much on account of promotions but mere
movements to place Villaflores "in responsibilities where the occurrence of friction, between you and your co-
employees, is less if not naught." Braga also alleged that Villaflores had promised to resign in 1990 but because he
failed to do so, the company was forced to hire another person to attend to the projects which Villaflores should have
undertaken. Several opportunities had been given to Villaflores to give him the change to mend his "quarrelsome and
vengeful manners and attitudes" but still he failed to reform himself.20

However, if petitioner Villaflores were indeed as inept as pictured by Braga, the company should have terminated his
employment early on. By its failure to take seasonable steps for its "self-preservation," the company may not now claim
all previous infractions allegedly committed by Villaflores as contributory reasons for dismissing him. After all, the
immediate cause of his dismissal was the incident with Mattus, obviously a Braga protege. As such, in the interest of
both the company and Villaflores, in lieu of reinstatement, he shall receive separation pay of one month for every year
of service or as provided for in the then prevailing collective bargaining agreement, whichever would result in a higher
award.

There being no evidently support for the claim of petitioner Villaflores for damages, the same was correctly denied by
public respondents. In the same spirit, neither may he be allowed the P250.00 monthly increase in allowance in view of
the unrebutted allegation of petitioner company that it was erroneously granted to him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that Mario
Danilo B. Villaflores shall be entitled to backwages from the time his compensation was withheld by the company until
the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 130957 January 19, 2000

VH MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HERMINIO C. GAMIDO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the Decision1 and the Order2 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), First Division, dated February 27, 1997 and August 14, 1997, respectively, which
set aside the Decision3 dated June 20, 1996 of the Labor Arbiter. Essentially, public respondent found and declared that the
petitioner's allegation that private respondent slept on the job on February 10, 1995 was not proven and, as a result, there was
no just and valid cause for his dismissal, and that even if there was, the penalty of dismissal was too harsh a punishment for
violation of petitioner's Company Rule 15-b.1âwphi1.nêt

The facts of the case are the following:

Since November 5, 1985 private respondent was employed in petitioner's, business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG)
cylinders.4 He served as a quality control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any possible defects
and earning P155.00 a day.5 His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served
a notice of termination of his employment.6

His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein petitioner's company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco,
allegedly caught private respondent sleeping on the job.7 On that same day, private respondent was asked through a written
notice from the petitioner's Personnel Department8 to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b9 which provides for a penalty of separation for sleeping during working
hours. Without delay, private respondent replied in a letter which reads:

Sir, ipagpaumanhin po ninyo kung nakapikit ako sa aking puwesto dahil hinihintay ko po ang niliha hi Abreu para i
quality pasensiya na po kung hindi ko po namalayan ang pagdaan ninyo dahil maingay po ang painting booth. 10

Notwithstanding his foregoing reply, he was terminated.11

Feeling aggrieved, private respondent initially instituted on April 26, 1995 a criminal suit for Estafa, for alleged withholding of his
salary, against the company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco.12 Said complaint was dismissed on June 22, 1995 for improper
forum.13 He then filed on July 4, 1995 a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement to his position as quality control
inspector.14 On June 20, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora rendered his decision upholding petitioner's position and declared
that private respondent's dismissal is anchored on a valid and just cause and the latter's contention of denial of due process as
devoid of merit.15

Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the public respondent NLRC where it was assigned to the
First Division. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered herein petitioner to reinstate private respondent
with full backwages less one-month pay.16 Inasmuch as public respondent in its Order dated August 14, 1997 denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration17 , petitioner now challenges the correctness of the NLRC's decision and order via the instant petition.

Petitioner anchors its petition on two (2) grounds, to wit:

1. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT GAMIDO'S DISMISSAL WAS NOT
ANCHORED ON A JUST AND VALID CAUSE.

2. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT DISMISSAL WAS TOO HARSH A
PENALTY FOR GAMIDO'S VIOLATION OF COMPANY RULE 15-b.18

The instant petition must fail.

First. Basically, the reason cited for the dismissal of private respondent is sleeping on the job in violation of Company Rule 15-b.
Was the private respondent sleeping on the job or was he merely idle and, as he claimed, waiting for the next cylinder to be
checked? Evidence on this score is material, for it is the be-all and end-all of petitioner's cause, in view of the gravity of the
penalty of separation, as provided by the Company Rules and Regulation. In termination disputes, the burden of proof is always
on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause.19 What is at stake here is not only the job itself of the
employee but also his regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family.

A thorough review of the record discloses that, contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner's claim that private
respondent slept on the job on February 10, 1995 was not substantiated by any convincing evidence other than the bare
allegation of petitioner. The report20 of Ronaldo M. Alvarez, Acting Quality Control Department Head of petitioner corporation, on
the circumstances which ultimately served as basis for the termination of private respondent's employment, did not confirm the
alleged violation by private respondent of the pertinent Company Rule 15-b. The report merely stated private respondent's denial
and response to petitioner's allegation which he reiterated in his written reply.21

Second. Petitioner's reliance on the authorities22 it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is
misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times
inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations,23 is "to protect the
company from pilferage or loss." Accordingly, the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar.

Third. While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-
related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding
penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bar,
the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to
be too harsh a penalty,24 considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine (9) long years of unblemished service,
for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense.
The authorities cited by petitioner are also irrelevant for the reason that there is no evidence on the depravity of
conduct,25 willfulness of the disobedience,26 or conclusiveness of guilt on the part of private respondent.27 Neither was it shown
that private respondent's alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was gross and habitual.28 Thus, reinstatement is just and
proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the challenged Decision and Order of public respondent NLRC are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 121035 April 12, 2000

RUFINO NORBERTO F. SAMSON, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SCHERING-PLOUGH CORPORATION, LEO RICONALLA and JOSE L.
ESTINGOR, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Through this petition for certiorari, Rufino Norberto F. Samson ("petitioner") assails the Decision, dated 17 March 1995, of the
National Labor Relations Commission in the consolidated cases of NLRC NCR-00-01-00652-94 and NLRC NCR-00-02-00887-
94. Petitioner likewise assails the Resolution, dated 10 May 1995, of the NLRC denying his motion for reconsideration.

The assailed decision of the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 25 August 1994, of Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora
finding respondent Schering-Plough Corporation ("respondent company") guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering it to reinstate
petitioner to his former position as District Sales Manager and to pay him backwages.

As culled from the decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, the facts of the case are as follows:

This pertains to the case (NCR-00-01-00652-94) filed by the complainant Rufino Norberto F. Samson against the respondents
Schering — Plough. Corp. ("SPC" for brevity) and Mr. Leo C. Riconalla, National Sales Manager, for money equivalent of rice
subsidy for the period April 1990 to December 1992 and holiday pay, now deemed submitted for resolution based on records
available.

On February 1, 1994, said complainant filed another case (NCR-00-02-00887-94) for illegal preventive suspension raffled to the
Honorable Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. and consolidated to the above case number.

Likewise, on February 4, 1994, complainant filed a Motion to Amend Complaint and averred pertinently that ". . . complainant
was placed under an indefinite preventive suspension on 25 January 1994"; and ". . . was arbitrarily and summarily terminated
from employment on 03 February 1994 on ground of loss of confidence."
As culled from the records of the instant case, what really precipitated complainant's preventive suspension culminating to his
dismissal is (sic) the incident that took place on December 17, 1993 as gleaned from the exchange of letters/memoranda from
both parties.

In a letter dated 25 January 1994 (Annex "A") addressed to the complainant Mr. Samson signed by one J.L. Estingor, the latter
called the attention of (sic) the complainant's conduct ". . . in a manner inimical to the interests of SPC" and enumerated the
following acts committed by the complainant; to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

1. On or about 17 December 1993, during the Sales and Marketing Christmas gathering, you made utterances of
obscene, insulting, and offensive words, referring to or direct against SPC's Management Committee, in the presence
of several co-employees.

2. On that same occasion, and again in the presence of several co-employees, you uttered obscene, insulting and
offensive words, and made malicious and lewd gesture, all of which referred to or were directed against Mr. Epitacio D.
Titong, Jr. President and General Manager of SPC.

3. Also on that same occasion, you repeated your malicious utterances and threatened to disrupt or otherwise create
violence during SPC's forthcoming National Sales Conference, and enjoined your co-employees not to prepare for the
said conference.

4. Subsequently, on or about 3 January 1994, you repeated your threats to some co-employees, advising them to
watch out for some disruptive actions to happen during the National Sales Conference. (Emphasis ours)

Complainant was given two (2) days from receipt of the foregoing letter and to-explain ". . . why no disciplinary action, including
termination", should be taken against the complainant and in the meantime was placed on preventive suspension effective
immediately, until further notice.

Complainant on the very same date 25 January 1994 and in reply to the above-mentioned letter/memo (Annex "B") wrote an
explanation stating:

xxx xxx xxx

Relative to the said memo I would like to categorically state the following facts:

1. That the act(s) alluded in the memo, specifically paragraph[s] 1 and 2, which alleged that I uttered obscene, insulting
and offensive words is not true. If ever I happened to utter such words it was made in reference to the decision taken
by the management committee on the Cua Lim case and not to any particular or specific person(s) as stated in the
memo.

2. I beg to disagree with the statement made in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same memo as I deny to have uttered much
less threaten to create violence and disrupt the holding of the National Sales Conference:

Finally, I am lodging a formal protest for being placed under preventive suspension it being contrary to the memo which gave me
two (2) days within which to explain my position before any disciplinary action could be initiated. I believe that the pre-empted
imposition of the preventive suspension is not only arbitrary but is violative of my constitutional "right to due process".

Submitted for your information. (Emphasis ours)

Again, on January 27, 1994, complainant wrote a letter (Annex "C") addressed to Mr. J.L. Estingor, HRD Manager, which in part
reads:
 xxx xxx xxx

Being a staff (DSM) assigned in the field I seldom stay in the office except on extreme necessity or when my presence
is required. Under such situation my continued employment will not in any way poses [sic] serious or imminent threat to
the life and property of the company as well as my co-employees. The preventive suspension meted out against me is
not only abusive, arbitrary but indiscriminately applied under the guise of managerial prerogative but violative of my
right under the law.

I trust that my immediate reinstatement will be acted upon without any further delay.

In a letter dated February 3, 1994, respondent SPC thru Mr. J.L. Estingor, wrote a letter (Annex "D") to the complainant Mr.
Samson, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, notice is hereby given that your employment from Schering Plough Corporation is terminated
effective at the close of business hours of 3 February 1994.

We reiterate our previous directive for you to turn over the service vehicle, all money, documents, records and other
property in your possession or custody to the National Sales Manager. Please comply with this directive immediately. 1

On the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties and evidence on record, the labor arbiter rendered his Decision, dated 25
August 1994, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal. The labor arbiter ruled that petitioner's conduct is not so serious as to
warrant his dismissal because: 1) the alleged offensive words were uttered during an informal and unofficial get-together of
employees where there was social drinking and petitioner was already tipsy; 2) the words were uttered to show disapproval over
management's decision on the "Cua Lim" case; 3) the penalty for the offense is only "verbal reminder" under respondent
company's rules and regulations; and 4) petitioner was already admonished during a meeting on 4 January 1994. Accordingly,
respondent company was ordered to reinstate petitioner as District Sales Manager and to pay him backwages. 2

Both parties appealed said decision to the NLRC. Petitioner filed a partial appeal of the denial of his claim for holiday pay and the
cash equivalent of the rice subsidy. For its part, respondent company sought the reversal of the decision of the labor arbiter
alleging that the latter erred in ruling that petitioner's employment was terminated without valid cause and in ordering his
reinstatement.

In reversing the labor arbiter's decision, the NLRC found that there was just cause, i.e., gross misconduct, for petitioner's
dismissal. The NLRC made the following disquisition, thus:

It is well established in the records that complainant made insulting and obscene utterances directed at the respondent
company's management committee in the presence of several employees. Again, he directed his verbal abuse against
General Manager and President Epitacio D. Titong, Jr. by uttering "Si EDT, bullshit yan", "sabihin mo kay EDT yan";
and "sabihin mo kay EDT, bullshit yan" while gesturing and making the "dirty finger" sign. (page 7, Decision) These
utterances were made by the complainant in [a] loud manner. (Affidavit of Leo C. Riconalla, Annex "1", of respondents'
position paper) He was further accused of threatening to disrupt respondents' national sales conference by telling Ms.
Anita Valdezco that the conference will be a "very bloody one." (Respondents' position paper)

We consider the foregoing actuations of the complainant as constituting gross misconduct, sufficient to justify
respondents in terminating his services. The actuation of the complainant is destructive of the morals of his co-
employees and, therefore, his continuance in the position of District Sales Manager would be patently inimical to the
respondent company's interest.1âwphi1.nêt

Complainant is a managerial employee as he is a District Sales Manager. As such, his position carries the highest
degree of responsibility in improving and upholding the interests of the employer and in exemplifying the utmost
standard of discipline and good conduct among his-co-employees. (Top Form Mfg. Inc., vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 313) In
 terminating the employment of managerial employees, the employer is allowed a wider latitude of discretion than in the
case of ordinary rank-and-file employee. (Aurelio vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. 99034, April 12, 1993)3

Preliminarily, we find it necessary to resolve the procedural issues raised by respondent company in its Comment (with Motion
for Clarification), dated 6 September 1995. Respondent company harped on the fact that the caption of the petition did not
include the docket numbers of the cases before the NLRC in violation of Supreme Court Circular 28-91. We do not find this
omission fatal as the pertinent docket numbers had been set out in the first and second pages of the petition. The same
constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.

Respondent company further opined that the petition should be summarily dismissed as the decision had become final and
executory citing Section 114, Rule VII and Section 2 (b), Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. This contention is
likewise untenable. As an original action for certiorari, the petition was merely required to be filed within a reasonable time from
receipt of a copy of the questioned decision or resolution.4 Under the rules then in effect at the time of the filing of the instant
petition, a period of three (3) months was considered to be "reasonable time".5 In this case, petitioner received a copy of the
assailed NLRC decision on 25 April 1995. He filed a motion for reconsideration on 27 April 1995 but it was denied by the NLRC
in its assailed resolution, a copy of which was received by petitioner on 1 July 1995. The instant petition was filed twenty-seven
(27) days after said receipt or on 28 July 1995. Clearly, the instant petition was filed well within the reglementary period provided
by law.

Having settled that, we now address the substantive issue involved in this case, i.e., whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter and ruling that petitioner was
validly dismissed.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The issue of whether petitioner was validly dismissed is a factual one and generally, factual findings of the NLRC are accorded
respect. In this case, however, there is compelling reason to deviate from this salutary principle because the findings of facts of
the NLRC are in conflict with that of the labor arbiter. Accordingly, this Court must of necessity review the records to determine
which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.6

To constitute valid dismissal, two (2) requisites must be met: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article
282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself.7 Article 282 of the
Labor Code provides:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;

b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and

e. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

As borne by the records, petitioner's dismissal was brought about by the utterances he made during an informal Christmas
gathering of respondent company's Sales and Marketing Division on 17 December 1993. Petitioner was heard to have uttered,
"Si EDT (referring to Epitacio D. Tiaong, General Manager and President of respondent company), bullshit yan," "sabihin mo kay
EDT yan" and "sabihin mo kay EDT, bullshit yan," while making the "dirty finger" gesture. Petitioner likewise told his co-
employees that the forthcoming national sales conference of respondent company would be a "very bloody one."

The NLRC ruled that the foregoing actuation of petitioner constituted gross misconduct warranting his dismissal. Citing
jurisprudence, the NLRC held that "in terminating the employment of managerial employees, the employer is allowed a wider
latitude of discretion than in the case of ordinary rank-and-file."8

We do not agree with the findings of the NLRC.

Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act,
a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct to be
serious must be of such gave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct, however
serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his separation. 9

In this case, the alleged misconduct of petitioner, when viewed in its context, is not of such serious and grave character as to
warrant his dismissal. First, petitioner made the alleged offensive utterances and obscene gesture during an informal Christmas
gathering of respondent company's district sales managers and marketing staff. The gathering was just a casual get-together of
employees. It is to be expected during this kind of gatherings, whom tongues are more often than not loosened by liquor or other
alcoholic beverages, that employees freely express their grievances and gripes against their employers. Employees should be
allowed wider latitude to freely express their sentiments during these kinds of occasions which are beyond the disciplinary
authority of the employer. Significantly, it does not appear in the records that petitioner possessed any ascendancy over the
employees who heard his utterances as to cause demoralization in the ranks.

Second, petitioner's outburst was in reaction to the decision of the management in the "Cua Lim" case. Admittedly, using the
words "bullshit" and "putang ina" and making lewd gesture to express his dissatisfaction over said management decision were
clearly in bad taste but these acts were not intended to malign or cast aspersion on the person of respondent company's
president and general manager.

The instant case should be distinguished from the previous cases where we held that the use of insulting and offensive language
constituted gross misconduct justifying an employee's dismissal. In De la Cruz vs. NLRC, 10 the dismissed employee shouted
"sayang ang pagka-professional mo!" and "putang ina mo" at the company physician when the latter refused to give him a
referral slip. In Autobus Workers' Union (AWU) vs. NLRC, 11 the dismissed employee called his supervisor "gago ka" and taunted
the latter by saying "bakit anong gusto mo, tang ina mo." In these cases, the dismissed employees personally subjected their
respective superiors to the foregoing verbal abuses. The utter lack of respect for their superiors was patent. In contrast, when
petitioner was heard to have uttered the alleged offensive words against respondent company's president and general manager,
the latter was not around.

In Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation vs. Deputy Minister of Labor, 12 the dismissed employee made false and
malicious statements against the foreman (his superior) by telling his co-employees: "If you don't give a goat to the foreman you
will be terminated. If you want to remain in this company, you have to give a goat." The dismissed employee therein likewise
posted a notice in the comfort room of the company premises which read: "Notice to all Sander - Those who want to remain in
this company, you must give anything to your foreman. Failure to do so will be terminated — Alice 80." In Reynolds Philippine
Corporation vs. Eslava, 13 the dismissed employee circulated several letters to the members of the company's board of directors
calling the executive vice-president and general manager a "big fool," "anti-Filipino" and accusing him of "mismanagement,
inefficiency, lack of planning and foresight, petty favoritism, dictatorial policies, one-man rule, contemptuous attitude to labor,
anti-Filipino utterances and activities." In this case, the records do not show that petitioner made any such false and malicious
statements against any of his superiors.

Third, respondent company itself did not seem to consider the offense of petitioner serious and grave enough to warrant an
immediate investigation on the matter. It must be recalled that petitioner uttered the alleged offensive language at an informal
gathering on 17 December 1993. He then allegedly made threatening remarks about the forthcoming sales conference on 3
January 1994. During a meeting on 4 January 1994, Mr. Titong, Jr., the president and general manager of respondent company
and allegedly to whom the offensive words were directed, merely admonished petitioner stating that, "when there is a
disagreement, act in a professional and civilized manner." Respondent company allowed several weeks to pass before it
deemed it necessary to require petitioner to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his behavior. This
seeming lack of urgency on the part of respondent company in taking any disciplinary action against petitioner negates its charge
that the latter's misbehavior constituted serious misconduct.

Further, respondent company's rules and regulations 14 provide as follows:

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

1. . . .

2. Loafing or loitering, engaging in fistcuffs or loudmouthed quarreling or provoking or engaging others to such
behaviour, inflicting bodily harm to another, any violent act or language which affects adversely morals, production or
the maintenance of discipline, indecent or immoral conduct during working hours; unauthorized participation in
activities during official hours which are outside of regularly assigned duties: malingering; unauthorized absence such
as undertime; going on sick leave although not actually sick; frequently receiving visitors during official hours for
personal matter.

3. Willful and intentional refusal without valid reason to accept work or follow specific instructions; disrespect;
insolence; and like behavior towards a superior authority of a high ranking officer of the company.

PENALTIES

First Offense: Verbal reminder

Second Offense: Written reprimand

Third offense: Payroll deduction for time not worked due offenses. Review with Dept. Head with written follow up.

Fourth Offense: 2nd written reprimand with warning of suspension.

Fifth Offense: Suspension and final rapimand with warning of dismissal if reoccurs.

Sixth Offense: Dismissal

Petitioner's conduct on 17 December 1993 may be properly considered as falling under either paragraph number 2, i.e., use of
violent language, or paragraph number 3, i.e., insolence or disrespect towards a superior authority. Being a first offense, the
appropriate penalty imposable on petitioner is only a "verbal reminder" and not dismissal.

Indeed, the penalty of dismissal is unduly harsh considering that petitioner had been in the employ of respondent company for
eleven (11) years and it does not appear that he had a previous derogatory record. It is settled that notwithstanding the existence
of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is
too severe a penalty if the latter had been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer, and such
employment is untainted by any kind of dishonesty and irregularity. 15

This concern of the Court for the termination of employment even on the assumption that conduct far from exemplary was
indulged in was made evident in the case of Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc., 16 where this Court held:

It would imply at the very least that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed
by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the
workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those
dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be
acceptance of the view that under all circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of
 livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them. For all this while, since private respondent considered
them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly
stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision may be made to rest on
informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight. 17

Given the environmental circumstances of this case, the acts of petitioner clearly do not constitute serious misconduct as to
justify his dismissal. Neither is his dismissal justified on ground of loss of confidence. As a ground for dismissal, the term "trust
and confidence" is restricted to managerial employees. 18 We share the view of the Solicitor General that petitioner is not a
managerial employee. Before one may be properly considered a managerial employee, all the following conditions must be met:

(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department
or sub-division thereof;

(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;

(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as
to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees we given particular
weight. 19

Further, it is the nature of the employee's functions, and not the nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines whether
he has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial status. 20 Petitioner describes his functions as District Sales Manager as follows:

The office of a District Sales Manager's primary responsibility is to achieve or surpass the sales and profit targets for
each territory in the assigned district through: (a) efficient planning; (b) management function; and (c) auditing and
control. "Management action," on the other hand, means to direct the activities of the Professional Medical
Representatives [by]: (1) [making] decisions that are compatible with district, national and corporate objectives; (2)
[directing] the activities of representative through — (a) frequent field visits (must spend at least 80% of working days
in a quarter, allocating eight (8) working days per PMR/quarter excluding travel time); (b) written communications; (c)
sales meetings — (3) [training] PMRs in medical/product knowledge; (4) [motivating] and [developing] PMRs toward
greater productivity; (5) [acting] as a channel between field and home office; (6) [maintaining] records as basis for quick
analysis of the district performance; (7) [overseeing] special projects assuring the cost benefit value of such benefit; (8)
. . . suggesting to sales management new ideas, methods, devices to increase productivity of sales district or individual
properties; and [insuring] safe custody and proper maintenance of all company properties (e.g. company cars, audio-
visuals). 21

The above job description does not mention that petitioner possesses the power "to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees." Absent this crucial element, petitioner cannot be considered a
managerial employee despite his designation as District Sales Manager.

Granting arguendo that petitioner were to be considered a managerial employee, the ground for "loss of confidence" is still
without basis. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee's dismissal must be clearly established. 22 A
breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness,
whims, caprices or suspicion, otherwise, the employee would remain at the mercy of the employer. 23 When petitioner made the
offensive utterances, it can be said that he merely acted "carelessly, thoughtlessly or heedlessly" and not "intentionally,
knowingly, purposely, or without justifiable excuse."

In fine, there being no just cause for petitioner's dismissal, the same is consequently unlawful.1âwphi1 Petitioner is thus entitled
to reinstatement to his position as District Sales Manager, unless such position no longer exists, in which case he shall be given
a substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights. He is likewise entitled to the payment of his full backwages.

With respect to petitioner's other monetary claims, however, we agree with the findings of the labor arbiter that he failed to
establish his entitlement thereto. We quote with approval the labor arbiter's pertinent findings as follows:
 Anent the monetary claims of complainant for payment of the holiday pay and the cash equivalent of the rice subsidy
for the period April 1990 to December 1992 vis-a-vis the documentary evidence available on records (Annexes "H" and
"I") this Office is inclined to deny said claims for failure of the complainant to substantially and convincingly prove the
same.

When complainant was appointed District Sales Manager effective April 1, 1990, his salary was increased by PESOS:
Two Thousand Five Hundred Only (P2,500.00) (Annex "H") in accordance with respondent's "Salary Administrative
Policy".

Again, effective January 1, 1993, complainant's salary was increased by PESOS: One Thousand One Hundred Four,
so much so that in the span of two (2) years, complainant's salary reached the amount of Twenty Thousand Five
Hundred Thirty Six (P20,536.00) Pesos which lends credence to the position of the respondent SPC that said claims
for holiday pay and rice subsidy is already integrated in complainant's salary. 24

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision, dated 17 March 1995, and Resolution, dated 10 May 1995, of
the NLRC in the consolidated cases of NLRC NCR-00-01-00652-94 and NLRC NCR-00-02-00887-94 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision, dated 25 August 1994, of the labor arbiter is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 205575 July 22, 2015

VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and CASMERO MAHILUM, Petitioners,

vs.
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (VECO), Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS -BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1are the Resolutions dated September 25, 2012 2 and December 19, 2012 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06329, which dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioners Visayan Electric
Company Employees Union-ALU TUCP (the Union) and Casmero Mahilum (Mahilum; collectively petitioners) against the
Decision 4 dated June 30, 2011 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CC(V)-12 000003-10 (NCMB-
RBVII-NS-10-12-10) for failure of their new counsel to show cause why their certiorari petition should not be dismissed for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Respondent Visayan Electric Company, Inc. (VECO) is a corporation engaged in the supply and distribution of electricity in Cebu
City and its neighboring cities, municipalities, and barangays.5 The Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of VECO's rank and-
file employees, and Macyi.Jttm was the Union's president from October 2007 until his termination from employment on October
28, 2010. 6

It was claimed that, before Mahilum was elected as union officer, he was transferred from VECO's Public Relations Section to its
Administrative Services Section without any specific work. When he was elected as union secretary, he was transferred to the
Line Services Department as its Customer Service Representative. 7 At the time of his election as union president, VECO
management allegedly: (a) terminated active union members without going through the grievance machinery procedure
prescribed under the Collective Bargaining Agreement 8 (CBA); (b) refused to implement the profit-sharing scheme provided
under the same CBA 9 (c) took back the motorbikes issued to active union members; and (d) revised the electricity
privilege 10 granted to VECO's employees. 11
Thus, on May 1, 2009, union members marched on the streets of Cebu City to protest VECO's refusal to comply with the political
and economic provisions of the CBA. Mahilum and other union officers were interviewed by the media, and they handed out a
document 12 containing their grievances against VECO, the gist of which came out in local newspapers.13 Following said incident,
Mahilum was allegedly demoted as warehouse staff to isolate him and restrict his movements. Other union officers were
transferred to positions that will keep them away from the general union membership. 14

On May 8, 2009, Mahilum was issued a Notice to Explain 15 why he should not be terminated from service due to loss of trust
and confidence, as well as in violating the Company Code of Discipline, for causing the publication of what VECO deemed as a
libelous article. The other union officers likewise received similar notices 16 for them to explain their actions, which they
justified 17 as merely an expression of their collective sentiments against the treatment of VECO's management towards them. 18

On May 20, 2009, the union officers we.re notified19 of the administrative investigation to be conducted relative to the charges
against them. During the scheduled investigation, the Union's counsel initially raised its objection to the proceedings and insisted
that the investigation should be conducted through the grievance machinery procedure, as provided in the CBA. 20 However,
upon the agreement to proceed with the investigation of the Union Vice President, Renato Gregorio M. Gimenez (Gimenez),
through his own counsel, Mahilum and the other union officers likewise agreed to proceed with the aforesaid investigation, with
Gimenez's counsel representing the Union.21

Prior to the said investigation, the Union filed on May 18, 2009, a Notice of Strike 22 with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) against VECO, which facilitated a series of conferences that yielded a Memorandum of Agreement 23 (MOA)
signed by the parties on August 7, 2009. 24 The parties likewise put to rest the critical issue of electricity privilege and agreed
before the NCMB on a conversion rate of said privilege to basic pay. Moreover, the administrative investigation on the alleged
libelous publication was deferred until after the CBA renegotiation. 25

However, even before the conclusion of the CBA renegotiation 26 on June 28, 2010, several complaints for libel were filed against
Mahilum and the other union officers by VECO's Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Jaime Jose Y.
Aboitiz. 27 The administrative hearing on the charges against Mahilum resumed with due notice to the latter, but he protested the
same, referring to it as "moro-mord' or "kangaroo" and insisting that the investigation should follow the grievance machinery
procedure under the CBA. 28 Nonetheless, VECO's management carried on with its investigation and, on the basis of the findings
thereof, issued a notice 29 terminating Mahilum from employment on October 28, 2010. 30

On even date, the Union filed another Notice of Strike 31 with the NCMB against VECO on the grounds of unfair labor practice,
specifically union busting - for the dismissal and/or suspension of its union president and officers, refusal to bargain collectively,
as well as non-observance of the grievance procedure in their CBA. 32 To avert any work stoppage that will prejudice VECO's
power distribution activity, the Secretary of Labor intervened and issued an Order 33 dated November 10, 2010 certifying the
labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.34Consequently, the strike was enjoined; Mahilum was ordered reinstated in
the payroll; and the parties were directed to refrain from committing any act that would exacerbate the situation.35

The NLRC Ruling

After submission of the respective position papers 36 of both parties, the NLRC Seventh Division rendered Decision 37 on June
30, 2011 dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice against VECO for lack of merit, and declaring Mahilum's dismissal from
employment as legal.

The NLRC found VECO to have acted within the bounds of law when it administratively investigated the suspended or
terminated employees and union officers/members, instead of subjecting their respective cases to the grievance machinery
procedure provided in the CBA. 38 In resolving apparently conflicting provisions in the CBA, the NLRC applied the specific
provision found in Section 13 of Article XIV that disciplinary actions shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated
by the company. Since the administrative investigations conducted by VECO were found to have complied with procedural due
process requirements, there was no unfair labor practice to speak of. 39

On the matter of Mahilum's dismissal and the filing of criminal cases against the union officers, the NLRC found no substantial
evidence to prove the imputation of union busting. Similarly unsubstantiated were the allegations of fraud and deceit in hiring and
contracting out services for functions performed by union members, and declaring certain positions confidential and transferring
union members to other positions without prior discussions, thereby allegedly interfering with their right to self-organization and
reducing union membership.40

The issue on VECO's alleged modification of the electricity privilege, which the Union claimed as violative of the CBA, was
declared mooted by the MOA entered into between the parties, with the assistance of the NCMB, providing for, inter alia,
electricity privilege conversion to basic pay. This was subsequently incorporated in the Renegotiated CBA dated June 28,
2010. 41

Finally, the NLRC ruled that Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, i.e., fraud
or willful breach of trust by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative, when he,
together with some other union officers, caused the publication of a document which was deemed to have dishonored and
blackened the memory of former corporate officer Luis Alfonso Y. Aboitiz, besmirched VECO's name and reputation, and
exposed he latter to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. 42

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 43 from the foregoing NLRC Decision, which was denied in a
Resolution 44 dated July 29, 2011.They received said Resolution on August 18, 2011. 45

On October 18, 2011, petitioners elevated their case to the CA on certiorari petition, 46 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06329,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.

On February 29, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution 47 directing petitioners to show cause why the certiorari petition should not be
dismissed for having been filed "one day behind the reglementary period." 48

On March 13, 2012, Atty. Jonas V. Asis (Atty. Asis) from the Seno Mendoza & Associates Law Offices filed in behalf of
petitioners a Manifestation/Explanation 49 claiming that "there was unintended error/mistake in the computation of the
period," 50 and that there was no prejudice caused to V~CO by the "unintended one-pay late filing of the petition." 51

The CA Ruling

On September 25, 2012, the CA issued the assailed September 25, 2012 Resolution 52 pointing out that on March 7, 2012,
petitioners had filed a Manifestation 53 that they had terminated the services of Atty. Asis and the Seno Mendoza & Associates as
their counsel in this case, and have contracted the services of Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. (Atty. Saladero) as their new
counsel. Consequently, the CA deemed as not filed the Manifestation/Explanation filed by Atty. Asis, and dismissed the certiorari
petition for failure of Atty. Saladero to comply with the Resolution dated February 29, 2012.

The motion for reconsideration 54 filed by Atty. Saladero imploring the CA to consider the Manifestation/Explanation filed by Atty.
Asis despite the fact that he was no longer petitioners' counsel of record was denied in a Resolution 55dated December 19, 2012
for lack of merit.

The Issue

Undeterred, petitioners are now before the Court maintaining that the CA erred in dismissing the certiorari petition on account of
the one-day delay in its filing despite the serious errors committed by the NLRC in absolving VECO from the charge of unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal of Mahilum.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution" sought to be assailed. The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. 56
The Union admittedly/ 57 received on August 18, 2011 the NLRC's July 29, 2011 Resolution, which denied their motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30, 2011 Decision. Therefore, the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari
ended on October 1 7, 2011. But the certiorari petition was filed one day after, or on October 18, 2011. Thus, petitioners' failure
to file said petition within the required 60-day period rendered the NLRC's Decision and Resolution impervious to any attack
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the same. 58

Petitioners adamantly insist, however, that the "one-day delay occasioned by an honest mistake in the computation of dates
should have been overlooked by the CA in favor of substantial justice."59 Their former counsel, Atty. Asis, allegedly thought in
good faith that the month of August has thirty (30) days, and that sixty (60) days from August 18, 2011 is October 18, 2011. 60

The Court is not convinced.

First, The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one day is not a legal justification for non-
compliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or
resolution. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends of justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition for
certiorari filed only one day late. When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one ( 61) days, as the
Court had previously declared in this wise:

[W]hen the law fixes thirty days [or sixty days as in the present case], we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that
deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two days in
another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the
alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded
on reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application. 61

Second. While it is always in the power of the Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its
operation,62 the liberality with which equity jurisdiction is exercised must always be anchored on the basic consideration that the
same must be warranted by the circumstances obtaining in the case. 63 However, there is no showing herein of any exceptional
circumstance that may rationalize a digression from the rule on timeliness of petitions.

Moreover, petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the refusal of VECO to follow the grievance machinery procedure under
Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA in the suspension and termination from employment of the other union officers and members
constituted unfair labor practice.

True, it is a fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its
provisions. If the provisions of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.
However, as in this case, when general and specific provisions of the CBA are inconsistent, the specific provision shall be
paramount to and govern the general provision.64

Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA states that "(a)ny difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem or complaint arising from
Company-Union or Company-Worker relations concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or regarding any
matter affecting Company-Union or Company-Worker relations shall be considered a grievance." 65 On the other hand, under
Section 13, Article XIV, "(t)he Company agrees that henceforth there shall be a fair and uniform application of its rules and
regulations. It is understood that disciplinary actions imposed on employee or laborer shall be governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Company as well as those provided for by existing laws on the matter. " 66

The Court is in accord with the ratiocination of the NLRC that the sweeping statement "any matter affecting Company-Union or
Company-Worker relations shall be considered a grievance" under Section 4, Article XVII is general, as opposed to Section 13,
Article XIV of the CBA, which is specific, as it precisely refers to "what governs employee disciplinary actions." 67 Thus, the NLRC
correctly ruled that VECO acted within the bounds of law when it proceeded with its administrative investigation of the charges
against other union officers and members.

This is consistent with jurisprudential rulings supporting an employer's free reign and "wide latitude of discretion to regulate all
aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including
dismissal, upon erring employees. This is management prerogative, where the free will of management to conduct its own affairs
to achieve its purpose takes form. The only criterion to guide the exercise of its management prerogative is that the policies,
rules[,] and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable[,] and the corresponding
penalties, when prescribed, are commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction." 68 The Labor Code
does not excuse employees from complying with valid company policies and reasonable regulations for their governance and
guidance.69

Delving now into the merits of Mahilum's dismissal, the Court holds that the two requisites for a valid dismissal from employment
have been met, namely: ( 1) it must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. 70

VECO anchored its termination of Mahilum on Article 282 ( c) of the Labor Code and Articles 5.1 and 4.4 71 of VECO's Company
Code of Discipline, which read as follows:

Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code:

Art. 282. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

xxxx

(c) Fraud or willful breach of trust by the employee of the trust reposed 'in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

Company Code of Discipline:

Art. 5.1 Every employee shall uphold company trust and confidence as well· as the trust relationship between the company and
its customers/ suppliers.

Art. 4.4 Every employee shall willfully respect the honor or person of his immediate superior and/or department head or company
officers.

VECO found the following "Press Release", 72 which Mahilum, together with other union officers, caused to be published, as
libelous for dishonoring and blackening the memory of then corporate officer Luis Alfonso Y. Aboitiz, as well as for maliciously
impeaching and besmirching the company's name and reputation:

VECEU-ALU President, Casmero A. Mahilum, said that since 2004 up to present the new VECO Management under the
administration of the Aboitizes unceasingly attack the local Union by continuously limit (sic) its membership and diminish (sic)
and/or abolish (sic) worker's benefits and privileges stipulated in the CBA. x x x. Through clever use of psychological warfare,
intimidation, deception, divide and rule tactic and taking great advantage of the weakness of the Union especially of the
leadership during that time, the [new] Management under the late Alfonso Y. Aboitiz was able to secure a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) signed by the Union and Management representatives and ratified by the General Membership that gave
Management more flexibility in dealing with labor. x x x.

xxxx

The [l]ocal Union wrote a letter to Mr. Aboitiz expressing full support of his campaign for energy conservation x x x. But Mr.
Aboitiz was too hard and too arrogant to deal with. x x x.

x x x. We, therefore, ask the general public to understand our plight and support our actions. We also urge everyone to oppose
any electricity rate increase filed by VECO and NAPOCOR at the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). Any rate increase in
the electricity will only worsen the already burdened public and further increase profits for the Aboitizes. The entire Union
membership are one with you in condemning such increase and brazen connivance of VECO and NAPOCOR to justify increases
in electricity rate.

x x x x 73
The Court has consistently held that "x x x loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the
employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on
substantial evidence and not on the employer's whims or caprices or suspicions[,] otherwise, the employee would eternally
remain at the mercy of the employer. x x x. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be
work-related and show that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer.1âwphi1 In addition, loss of
confidence x x x is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust, and confidence or
that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as handling or care and
protection of the property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an
employee is penalized."74

Mahilum's attempt to rationalize his act as part of his "moral, legal or social duty xx x to make known his legitimate
perception" 75 against VECO does not, in any way, detract from the indubitable fact that he intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely caused the aforequoted "disparaging publication." Neither can he hide behind the claim that the press release was
simply "an expression of a valid grievance." 76 As the NLRC aptly pointed out, "(i)nstead of him and the rest of the union officers
bringing their sentiments and/or grievances against the management to the proper forum, they intentionally, knowingly and
purposefully breached their employer's trust, by issuing x x x derogatory statements and causing their publication, apparently, to
incite public condemnation against the latter." 77It bears noting that, while petitioners harp on the refusal of VECO to follow the
grievance machinery procedure under the CBA, they conveniently forgot that they themselves shunned the very procedure to
which they now hang by a thread.

Moreover, the Court is unmoved by Mahilum's insistence that there was nothing in his position which called for management's
trust and confidence in him. 78 The NLRC, whose findings of facts and conclusions are generally accorded not only great weight
and respect but even with finality, correctly held that, as Customer Service Representative, Mahilum occupied a position of
responsibility especially in dealing with VECO's clients.79 His duties and responsibilities included: (1) accepting pertinent
documents and processing electrical service applications; (2) verifying authenticity of documents submitted; (3) interviewing
customer-applicant on applications, complaints, and requests; (4) preparing job assignment of service inspectors; (5) filing all
service .orders of inspectors; ( 6) assessing and accepting bill deposits; (7) preparing and facilitating signing of Metered Service
Contract; (8) issuing service order for meter-related activities; (9) verifying existing account of customer-applicant and approving
account clearances; (10) accepting payment of bills from customer applicant for account clearances; and (11) processing
payment arrangements of customers. 80

His performance was measured according to how he: (1) handled customers' transactions; (2) made decisions in processing
customers' applications and payment arrangements; and (3) maintained posture at all times in handling customers transactions
even with angry customers 81.

It is clear from the foregoing that Mahilum was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His job entailed the observance of proper
company procedures relating to processing and determination of electrical service applications culminating in the . signing of
service contracts, which constitutes the very lifeblood of VECO's existence. He was further entrusted with handling the accounts
of customers and accepting payments from them.

Not only that, it was his duty to address customer complaints and requests. Being a front liner of VECO, with the most consistent
and direct interaction with customers, Mahilum's job involved a high degree of responsibility requiring a substantial amount of
trust and confidence on the part of his employer, i.e., VECO.

However, with the derogatory statements issued by Mahilum that were intended to incite, not just public condemnation of VECO,
but antagonism and obstruction against rate increases in electricity that it may be allowed, by law, to fix, there can be no dispute
that VECO, indeed, had lost its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his ability to perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and
loyalty expected of an employee entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be
compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has the right to
dismiss its employee if only as a measure of self protection. 82

Thus, Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause. Moreover, as declared by the NLRC, VECO complied with the
procedural due process requirements of furnishing Mahilum with two written notices before the termination of employment can be
effected. On May 8, 2009, 83 Mahilum was apprised of the particular acts for which his termination was sought; and, after due
investigation, he was given a Notice of Decision 84on October 28, 2010 informing him of his dismissal from service.

The fact that Mahilum served the company for a considerable period of time will not help his cause. It is well to emphasize that
the longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with
the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the company. 85

As a final word, while it is the state's responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy should not be used as an instrument to
oppress management and capital. In resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and justice should always prevail.
Social justice does not mandate that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. Justice is to be granted to
the deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. 86

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.