1
USON v. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS
Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife
of Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945. Nebreda
left 5 pa rcels of land in Lab rad or
Pangasina n, wh ich la nds are the subject of
an action for recovery of possession and
ownership filed by USON against Maria
DEL ROSARIO. DEL ROSARIO is th e common
law w ife of Neb reda to whom he
begotten 4 illegitimate children.
USON contends that DEL
ROSARIO deprived her of the poss
e s s i o n a n d enjoyment of the lands in
question. The latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson
and Nebreda execu ted a p ub lic documen t
whereby th ey agreed to sep arate as
husband and wife. USON was given an alimony in
consideration of which she gave up her rights
to inherit any property from Nebreda. The CFI
ruled in favor of USON.
ISSUE:
WON USON is the rightful heir?
HELD:
Yes. When Faus tino Ne breda died in 1945
the five parce ls of land pas se d from the
moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson (Article 657, old CivilCode). As this
Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the de ath of the
ances tor as com plete ly as if the anc estor
had execute d and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested. The
cla im of the d efenda nts tha t Maria Us on
had relinqu ish ed her righ t over th e lands
in question because she expressly renounced to
inherit any future property that her husband may
acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of
separation they had entered into on February 21,
1931, cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inher itance cannot be
the s ubject of a contr act nor can it be
renounced.
Additional Facts and Ratio:
DEL ROSARIO contends that the 4 illegitimate
children she had with Nebreda are entitled to
successional rights by virtue of the new civil code
promulgated on 1950. HOWEVER, the court ruled
that while it is true that rights first declared in the
new civil code are to be given retroactive effect,
the same is subject to the condition that th e
said rights will not p rej ud ice ves ted or
acqu ired righ ts. Hence, given th e
background of the case, the children cannot have
successional rights since USON’s rights would be
prejudiced.
Ibarle v Po
G.R. No. L-5064
FACTS:
This action commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale
conveying to the defendant, in consideration of
P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land
which previously had been sold, along with the
other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's
grantors. judgment was against the
plaintiff.Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina
Navarro were husband and wife, the former
having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the
surviving spouse and some minor children. When
L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described
under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu. That
the above mentioned property was a conjugal
property. On April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy,
alleging among other things, that she needed
money for the support of her children. On May
24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto
Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff
in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle. The two
deeds of sale referred to above were not
registered and have never been registered up to
the date. On January 17, 1948 surviving spouse
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this
court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half
of the land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po,
defendant in the instant case, which portion
belongs to the children of the above named
spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale to Esperanza Po
valid?
Ruling:
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The
rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." in a
slightly different language, this article is
incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil
Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor
when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance, whether such right be pure or
contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or
long period of time lapses between the death of
the predecessor and the entry into possession of
the property of the inheritance because the right
is always deemed to be retroactive from the
moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear
that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley
sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-
half of it already belonged to the seller's children.
No formal or judicial declaration being needed to
confirm the children's title, it follows that the first
sale was null and void in so far as it included the
children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant
having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact
that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still
the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his
own opposition.
NICANOR NACAR VS CLAUDIO A NISTAL as
Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur,
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur,
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and ANTONIO
DOLORICON
FACTS:
Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to annul an order of the respondent
judge of the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan
del Sur directing the attachment of seven (7)
carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos
seized under the questioned order, and to stop
the respondent judge from further proceeding in
Civil Case No. 65.

A complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it
"Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo
Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" That at
various dates since the year 1968, the defendant
incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total
sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said
amount had long been overdue for payment, and
which the defendant up to this date was not able
to pay, despite repeated demands from the
plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April,
1970 leaving among other things personal
property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos
now in the possession of the defendant Nicanor
Nacar; That plaintiff herein file a claim against the
estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the
aforementioned sum of P2,791.99
It was said that Nacar about t
o dispose the property with intent to defraud.
Nicar filed motion
t o d i s m i s s t o d i s s o l v e w r i t o f t h e pr
eliminary injunction & attachment, Judge denied
the motion.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT JAPITANA HAS CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST NICANOR NACAR.
The respondent judge tried to avoid the
consequences of the issues raised in the motion
to dismiss by stating that although the title of the
complaint styled it a claim against the estate of
the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed
that the nature of the action was really for the
recovery of an indebtedness in the amount of
P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but
it is hardly relevant to the contents of the
complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint
earlier cited that the allegations are not only
vague and ambiguous but downright misleading.
The second paragraph of the body of the
complaint states that the defendant (herein
petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since
the year 1968 incurred debts to the plaintiff in the
sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent
paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts
were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar,
who died several months before the filing of the
complaint. The complaint which the respondent
judge reads as one for the collection of a sum
ofMONEY and all the paragraphs of which
are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as
a material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the
estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the
aforementioned sum of P2,791.00
Under the circumstances of this case,
respondent Japitana has no cause of action
against petitioner Nacar. Indeed, although
respondent Japitana may have a legal right to
recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner
Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to
pay the debt for the simple reason that there is
nothing in the complaint to show that he
incurred the debt or had anything to do with the
creation of the liability. As far as the debt is
concerned, there is no allegation or showing that
the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr.
Japitana's rights with consequential injury or
damage to the latter as would create a cause of
action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that
respondent Japitana filed the case against
petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of
carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar
which Japitana wanted to recover from the
possession of the petitioner to answer for the
outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar.
DIGESTED CASE: TORRES, LOPEZ DE BUENO vs.
LOPEZ February 26, 1926
FACTS: It was contended that the testator lacked
mental capacity because at the time of the
execution of the will, he had senile dementia and
was under guardianship.
HELD: The testator may have been of advanced
years, may have been physically decrepit, may
have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a
loss of memory, may have had a guardian, and
may have been extremely eccentric, but he still
possessed the spark of reason and of life, that
strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to
summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that
intention, which the law terms ―testamentary
capacity.‖ Only compete senile dementia will
result to testamentary incapacity.
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES:
Idem; Effect of infirmity or disease. —
Neither is physical infi rmity or disease
inconsistent with testamentary capacity, although
there is no question that evidence of such fact is
admissible on the issue of testamentary capacity.
Just as in the case of old age, the usual tests of
testamentary capacity must still have to be
applied.31 Thus, it has been held that the fact
that the testator, at the time of the execution of
the will, was suffering from the last stages of
tuberculosis and asthma,32 or from paralysis and
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loss of speech,33 or from cholera,34 or from a
combination of sleeping
sickness, insomnia, tuberculosis, and diabetes,35
will not affect his testamentary capacity, so long
as it cannot be proved by competent evidence
that, at the time when the will was executed, he
was no longer in a position to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed
of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act. The same rule
can be applied even if, at the time
when the will was being executed, the testator
was so sick that it was necessary for somebody
else to guide his hand in order that he could sign
it,36 or even if a few months before the execution
of the will, the testator, who was 85 years old,
had a stroke of cerebral
hemorrhage, with hemiplegia, caused by high
blood pressure.37 On the other hand, it has also
been held that the fact that the testator, at the
time of the execution of the will, was already in a
comatose or semi-comatose condition, caused by
cerebral hemorrhage,38 or by
apoplexy,39 or by diarrhea and gastro-enteritis
with complications of miocarditis,40 or by
cerebral thrombosis,41 so that nothing around
him could cause any impression or reaction,
would certainly destroy his testamentary
capacity.
Dorotheo vs. CA
Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate children
of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The
latter died in 1969 without her estate being
settled. Alejandro died thereafter. After
Alejandro's death, petitioner, filed a special
proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will
and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In
1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the
motion and issued an order declaring
respondents as the only heirs.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming
that she is entitled to some compensation since
she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
although they were not married to each other.
Upon denial of her motion, petitioner appealed to
the CA but the same was dismissed. The dismissal
became final and executory and a corresponding
entry of judgment was issued by the CA. A writ of
execution was issued by the lower court. Private
respondents filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them
the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering
the properties of the late Alejandro. When
petitioner refused, private respondents filed a

motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner
opposed the motion.
An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas
setting aside the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing
the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that it is interlocutory. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Thus, private respondents filed a
petition before the CA which nullified the two
assailed Orders.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for
review and likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the Order
which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to
probate. She also filed a motion to reinstate her
as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro
and to maintain thestatus quo or lease of the
premises thereon to third parties. Private
respondents opposed the motion on the ground
that petitioner has no interest in the estate since
she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
Issue:
Whether or not a last will and testament
admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect.
Ruling:
Yes. A final and executory decision or order can
no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter
how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the
January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality,
the trial court in effect nullified the entry of
judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well
settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set
aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for
to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of
courts and nullify the essence of review. It has
been ruled that a final judgment on probated will,
albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is
taken in due time from a judgment or order of
the trial court, the same attains finality by mere
lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will
became final and the question determined by the
court in such order can no longer be raised anew,
either in the same proceedings or in a different
motion. The matters of due execution of the will
and the capacity of the testator acquired the
character of res judicata and cannot again be
brought into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and forever
closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive
against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity
and due execution.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals
generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated, particularly on three
aspects: (1) whether the will submitted is indeed,
the decedent's last will and testament; (2)
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the
execution of wills; (3) the testamentary capacity
of the testator; and (4) the due execution of the
last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a
determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its
execution, that he had freely executed the will
and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace
or undue influence and that the will is genuine
and not a forgery, that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the
declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as
she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory
Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private
respondents were declared as the only heirs do
not bind those who are not parties thereto such
as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the
same constitutes res judicata with respect to
those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that
would amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs
when the same issue had already been resolved
adversely by some other court. It is clear from the
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and
his spouse should be distributed according to the
laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order
is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set
aside by the trial court. In support thereof,
petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring
who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs
is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to
require delivery of shares from one person to
another particularly when no project of partition
has been filed." The trial court declared in the
January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the
legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and
at the same time it nullified the will. But it should
be noted that in the same Order, the trial court
also said that the estate of the late spouses be
distributed according to the laws of intestacy.
Accordingly, it has no option but to implement
that order of intestate distribution and not to
reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic
provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the
Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that
testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there
could be testate distribution, the will must pass
the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by
law considering that the deceased testator is no
longer available to prove the voluntariness of his
actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of
the estate is usually onerous in nature and that
no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur
donare. No intestate distribution of the estate
can be done until and unless the will had failed to
pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the
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will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy
apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If
it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether
the provisions of the will are valid according to
the laws of succession. In this case, the court had
ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically
valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were
void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as
correctly held by the trial court.
CELESTINO BALUS Vs. SATURNINO BALUS
GR # 168970 January 15, 2010
FACTS:
Herein petitioner and respondent are the children
of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus
Sometime in 1979, Ruo mortgage a parcel of land,
which he owns, as a security for a loan he
obtained from a certain bank. Rufo failed to pay
his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the bank
as the sole bidder. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of
the bank. In the meantime, Rufo died on 1984.
On 1989, herein petitioner and respondent
executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate
adjudicating to each other one third portion of
the subject property. The extra judicial settlement
also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact their father
mortgagef the subject property to the bank and
that they intended to redeem the same at the
soonest possible time.
Three years after, the respondents bought the
subject property from the bank. Title was
transferred in their name.
Thereafter, the respondents demanded the
possession of the property from the petitioner
but the latter refused.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that
the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement
contained a provision that the petitioner had the
right to purchase from the respondents his share
in the disputed property.
CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered the
petitioner to immediately surrender possession of
the property to respondents.
ISSUE:
WON co-ownership over the property by the
petitioner and respondent persisted even after
the lot was purchased and title thereto was
transferred in the name of the bank and even it
was eventually bought back by the respondents
from the bank.
HELD:

NO. Petitioner and respondents are arguing on
the wrong premise that, at the time of the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the
subject property formed part of the estate of
their deceased father to which they may lay claim
as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is
no dispute with respect to the fact that the
subject property was exclusively owned by
petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the
time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was
stipulated by the parties during the hearing
conducted by the trial court on October 28,
1996.12 Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of
Sale13 was issued in favor of the Bank on January
25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired.
There is neither any dispute that a new title was
issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on
July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the
Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death.14 In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of
the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as
well as those which have accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession.15 In the present
case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject
property during his lifetime, it only follows that at
the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land
no longer formed part of his estate to which his
heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner
and respondents never inherited the subject lot
from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were
wrong in assuming that they became co-owners
of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the
supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the
contested parcel of land is negated by the fact
that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did
not pass into the hands of petitioner and
respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any
given point in time.
Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228
FACTS:
First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement.
The amount was intended for the payment of one
(1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC. On Dec.
1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement for the payment of another unit of
Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again,
Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note
and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was
appointed as the special administrator of the
4
estate. During the pendency of the testate among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning
sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
wherein they agreed to divide between specially so since at the time of its execution,
themselves and take possession of the three (3) there was already a pending proceeding for the
tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for probate of their late father’s holographic will
Florence. Each of them was to assume the covering the said tractors.
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by The Court notes that the loan was contracted by
them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of
with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed
its money claim with the probate court in
and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against
Bank. Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to
Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose
against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund of protecting the estate of the deceased by
and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. informing the executor or administrator of the
Summonses were issued against both, but the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
one intended for Edmund was not served since he each claim and to determine whether it is a
was in the United States and there was no proper one which should be allowed. The plain
information on his address or the date of his and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
return to the Philippines. Florence filed her settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
Answer and alleged that the loan documents did early delivery of the property to the distributees,
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. legatees, or heirs. Perusing the records of the
case, nothing therein could hold Florence
ISSUE: accountable for any liability incurred by her late
father. The documentary evidence presented,
W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been particularly the promissory notes and the
filed with the probate court before which the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and
pending. his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it
W/N the agreement between Edmund and
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte
decedent under the said promissory notes and
estate) was void considering that it had not been
continuing guaranty.
approved by the probate court.
W/N there can be a valid partition among the
heirs before the will is probated.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has
the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of
the deceased, to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our
jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a
holographic will which contained the provision
which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I
own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing
provision embracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might have escaped his mind at
that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This
being so, any partition involving the said tractors