BOC 2015 Recent Jurisprudence Digests Compilation (2014-2015) PDF

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
January 2014 ............................................................................... 9
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises ..................................................................9
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v. Ferdinand Acibo, et al................................................................ 10
Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Celera............................................................................................ 12
February 2014 .............................................................................13

Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al..................................................................................................... 13
Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas .................................................................... 14
Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises Inc ............................................................................ 14
CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation ............................................................................................. 15
Procter & Gamble Asia PTE LTD v. CIR ....................................................................................................... 15
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Asuncion Felonia and Lydia De Guzman ................................. 16
Rex Tupal v. Judge Remegio Rojo ................................................................................................................17
March 2014 ................................................................................ 18

Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson ........................................................... 18
People v. Noel Enojas y Hingpit ................................................................................................................... 18
Macaria Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank Inc .......................................................................................... 19
People v. Henry Go ....................................................................................................................................... 20
April 2015 ...................................................................................21

Universidad De Sta Isabel v. Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr ...................................................................... 21
James and Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, Executive Secretary, et al ....................... 22
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp, Tesoro Mining and Development Inc and Mcarthur
Mining Inc v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp ..................................................................................... 24
Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al v. Secretary of Justice, et al............................................................................... 25
June 2014 .................................................................................. 27

Yujuico v. Quiambao ..................................................................................................................................... 27
PNB v. Garcia ................................................................................................................................................ 28
Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156 ................................................................................... 28
Dulang v. Judge Regencia ........................................................................................................................... 29
People v. Abetong ........................................................................................................................................ 30
People v. Paras .............................................................................................................................................. 31
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Patrimonio v. Gutierrez and Marasigan ....................................................................................................... 31

Quiachon v. Atty. Ramos .............................................................................................................................. 33
Syhunliong v. Rivera......................................................................................................................................34
July 2014 ................................................................................... 35

Araullo v. Aquino ...........................................................................................................................................35
AFP-RSBS v. Republic .................................................................................................................................. 37
Commissioner of Customs v. Oilink ............................................................................................................. 37
Paranaque Kings Enterprises v. Catalina Santos....................................................................................... 39
Naval v. COMELEC ....................................................................................................................................... 40
August 2014 .............................................................................. 41

Indophil textile Mills v. Adviento .................................................................................................................. 41
Jardeleza v. Sereno ...................................................................................................................................... 42
Landbank v. Lajom ........................................................................................................................................43
Noveras v. Noveras ....................................................................................................................................... 44
Ando v. DFA .................................................................................................................................................. 45
September 2014 ......................................................................... 46

GMA v. COMELEC ........................................................................................................................................ 46
Areza v. Express Savings .............................................................................................................................. 47
Arigo v. Swift ................................................................................................................................................. 48
Jalover v. Osmena ........................................................................................................................................ 49
RE: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September
26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan ...................................................... 49
Villalon v. Chan............................................................................................................................................. 50
CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation ................................................................................................................ 51
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College ................................................................................................................... 52
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan ........................................................................................................53
Dela Torre v. Imbuido................................................................................................................................... 54
REPUBLIC VS. SPOUSES LAZO ................................................................................................................. 54
DBP VS. COA ................................................................................................................................................ 55
October 2014 ............................................................................. 56

Imasen v. Alcon ............................................................................................................................................ 56
Robles v. Yapcinco ....................................................................................................................................... 56
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Azuelo v. Zameco ......................................................................................................................................... 58

Radio Mindanao Network v. Amurao .......................................................................................................... 59
Majestic Finance v. Tito ................................................................................................................................ 59
PBCOM v. Basic Polyprinters ....................................................................................................................... 60
Residents of Lower Atab v. Sta. Monica Industrial & Development .......................................................... 61
People v. Andaya .......................................................................................................................................... 62
BPI v. Armovit ................................................................................................................................................63
Duty Free Philippines v. BIR ........................................................................................................................ 65
Santos v. Santos ........................................................................................................................................... 66
Am-Phil v. Padilla.......................................................................................................................................... 67
November 2014.......................................................................... 69
Que v. Revilla ................................................................................................................................................ 69
People v. Yecyec ........................................................................................................................................... 69
Angelito P. Miranda v. Ma. Theresa M. Fernandez, Clerk III, MTC, QC......................................................70
Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue .........................................................71
Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People of the Philippines ..................................................................... 72
Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corp. and Luzvimin Port Services Company, Inc. v. Cebu Port Authority and Port
Manager Angelo C. Verdan .......................................................................................................................... 73
Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security Investigation Agency v. Heirs of Nestor B. Villareal
........................................................................................................................................................................ 73
Corporate Strategies Development Corporation and Rafael Prieto v. Norman A. Agojo........................ 74
New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc., St. Paul Maritime Corp., and Angelina T. Rivera v. Michael D.
Despabelarderas ........................................................................................................................................... 74
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue .............................................................................................................. 75
Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Hon. Commission on Elections, et. al................................................. 76
Dennis A. B. Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Francisco T. Duque III, Executive
Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza, Office of the President ............................................................................ 77
Ariel T. Lim v. People of the Philippines ...................................................................................................... 77
Marcelo Investment and Management Corp. and the Heirs of Edward T. Marcelo, namely Katherine J.
Marcelo, et. al. v. Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. ...........................................................................................................78
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Wilfred N.
Chiok/Global Business Bank, Inc. v. Wilfred N. Chiok ................................................................................ 79
City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority/Prove of Bataan, represented by Governor
Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., and Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Bataan v.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority .......................................................................................................... 80
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
December 2014 .......................................................................... 82

Villareal v. People / People v. the Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. / Dizon v. People / Villa v. Escalona II,
et al................................................................................................................................................................ 82
Cerafica v. Commission on Elections .......................................................................................................... 82
Victoria-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., and Marcelo, Jr. .............................................................................. 83
Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem ................................................................................................................ 84
Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon .......................................................................................................................... 85
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr., and the Province of Camarines Sur v. Hon. Robredo, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government ............................................................................................................. 85
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet ...................................................................................... 86
Aguilar v. Lightbringers Cooperative ...........................................................................................................87
January 2015 ............................................................................. 88

NFF Industrial v G&L .................................................................................................................................... 88
Eastern Shipping Lines v BPI/MS Insurance .............................................................................................. 88
BDO v RCBC ................................................................................................................................................. 89
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v COA ................................................................................. 90
Gutierrez v COA ............................................................................................................................................. 91
Maritime Industry v COA............................................................................................................................... 91
Kalaw v. Fernandez ...................................................................................................................................... 92
Almendras v. Almendras ............................................................................................................................. 94
CBK Power v. CIR.......................................................................................................................................... 95
Wellex v. U-Land .......................................................................................................................................... 96
Sara Lee Phils v Macatlang ......................................................................................................................... 96
Saudi Arabian Air v. Rebesencio .................................................................................................................. 97
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC ................................................................................................................ 98
Risos-Vidal v COMELEC............................................................................................................................... 101
Estrada v Ombudsman ............................................................................................................................... 102
One Shipping v Penafiel ............................................................................................................................. 103
Unicol v Malipot........................................................................................................................................... 103
People v Chi Chan Liu ................................................................................................................................. 104
In re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of
JDF and reduction of Fiscal Autonomy ...................................................................................................... 104
Ricalde v. People ......................................................................................................................................... 106
Fortune v COA ............................................................................................................................................. 106
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove ............................................................................................. 107

Narra v. Redmont ........................................................................................................................................ 107
First Optima v Securitron............................................................................................................................ 108
Aguilar v. Siasat........................................................................................................................................... 109
February 2015 ........................................................................... 110

Araullo v Aquino ........................................................................................................................................... 110
Paje v. Casino................................................................................................................................................. 111
Chinabank v. CIR .......................................................................................................................................... 113
Reicon Realty Builders v Diamond Dragon Realty .................................................................................... 113
Tordilla v Amilano. ....................................................................................................................................... 114
Milan v NLRC ................................................................................................................................................ 114
Sps. Salvador v. Sps. Rabaja ....................................................................................................................... 115
Villena v Batangas II Cooperative ............................................................................................................... 116
LBP v. Heirs of Alsua .................................................................................................................................... 117
BBB v. AAA ................................................................................................................................................... 118
Reyes v. Sps. Valentin .................................................................................................................................. 118
Protective v. Fuentes .................................................................................................................................... 119
Sps. De Leon v Sps. Dela Llana.................................................................................................................. 120
Dona Adela v TIDCORP ............................................................................................................................... 121
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al. ................................. 121
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by his father
Renato P. Cudia, who also acts on his own behalf, and Berteni Cataluña Causing vs. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), The Honor Committee (HC) of 2014 of the
PMA and HC Members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) .......................................... 122
Joseph B. Timbol vs. Commssion on Elections ......................................................................................... 123
March 2015 .............................................................................. 124

JOSE “PEPE” SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-TENIO ..... 124
April 2015 .................................................................................126

Villanueva vs. JBC........................................................................................................................................ 126
SWS vs. COMELEC ...................................................................................................................................... 126
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo .......................................... 127
Luzon Development Bank vs. Krishnan ..................................................................................................... 128
1-UTAK vs. COMELEC ................................................................................................................................. 128
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lexber Inc. vs. Dalman ................................................................................................................................ 129

Bishop Pabillo vs. COMELEC...................................................................................................................... 130
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Reyes ...................................... 131
The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marcos ..................................................................................... 132
June 2015 ................................................................................. 133

Cruz vs. Agas ............................................................................................................................................... 133
Sps. Vergara vs. Sonkin............................................................................................................................... 133
Biñan Rural Bank vs. Carlos ....................................................................................................................... 134
People of the Philippines vs. Nuyok ........................................................................................................... 134
MCIAA vs. City of Lapu-Lapu ...................................................................................................................... 135
Davao City Water District vs. Aranjuez, et al. ............................................................................................ 136
Enriquez vs. Lavadia, Jr. .............................................................................................................................. 136
Garafil vs. Office of the President................................................................................................................137
Ce Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. vs. Province of Nueva Ecija, et al. ................................ 138
CIR vs. Puregold Duty Free......................................................................................................................... 138
United Overseas Bank of the Philippines vs. Board of Commissioners-HLURB, et al. .......................... 139
Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista et al. ........................................................................................................................ 139
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UP LAW BOC JANUARY 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
JANUARY 2014
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises
January 15, 2014 / GR No. 172551
FACTS:
Yatco was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Laguna. The Government placed this land under
the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. LBP valued the property at P1.13 M but
Yatco elevated this valuation to the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. This body valued the
property at P16.54 M. LBP filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation with the
RTC-SAC.
This court fixed the just compensation at P200 per square meter or P55.15 M. It did not give
weight to LBP’s evidence as it failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Sec. 17 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. CA affirmed.
HELD:
The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the Judiciary exercises
within the parameters of the law. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original
and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands under CARP coverage.
In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-
SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the factors enumerated in RA
6657 and the DAR formula that reflect these factors.
The RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail,
particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formula’s strict application. They must,
however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law and the
rules have provided.
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Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v. Ferdinand Acibo, et al.

January 15, 2014 / GR. No. 186439
FACTS:
Complainants in this case were employees of URSUMCO hired from February 1988 to April 1996 on
different capacities. Each signed contracts of one month or for a specific season but were repeatedly
hired for the same duties with renewed contracts each time.
These complainants filed a case before the LA for regularization and entitlement to CBA benefits.
LA dismissed for lack of merit, ruling that they were seasonal or project workers and not regular
employees. It noted that complainants were required to perform, for a definite period, phases of
URSUMCO’s several projects that were not at all directly related to the latter’s main operations.
NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, finding that complainants performed activities which were
usually necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of URSUMCO, and had been repeatedly
hired for the same undertaking every season.
CA upheld the finding that they were regular employees, further noting that URSEMCO failed to
prove that it had given the employees opportunity to work elsewhere during the off-season.
HELD:
The Court distinguished the various kinds of employment, thus:
A. Regular Employment
Regular employment refers to that arrangement whereby the employee "has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer." Under the definition, the primary standard that determines regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee and the usual
business or trade of the employer; the emphasis is on the necessity or desirability of the employee’s
activity.
Art. 280, par. 2 of the Labor Code also considers regular a casual employment arrangement when the
casual employee’s engagement has lasted for at least one year, regardless of the engagement’s
continuity. The controlling test in this arrangement is the length of time.
B. Project Employment
Project employment contemplates an arrangement whereby "the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking whose completion or termination has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee." Two requirements need to be satisfied to remove the engagement
from the presumption of regularity of employment, namely: (1) designation of a specific project or
undertaking for which the employee is hired; and (2) clear determination of the completion or
termination of the project at the time of the employee’s engagement.
The length of time of the engagement is not controlling as the employment may last for more than a
year, depending on the needs or circumstances of the project. Nevertheless, this length of time or the
continuous rehiring of the employee may serve as a badge of regular employment when the activities
performed by the purported "project" employee are necessary and indispensable.
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C. Seasonal Employment
Seasonal employment operates much in the same way as project employment, albeit it involves work
or service that is seasonal in nature or lasting for the duration of the season. Although the seasonal
employment arrangement involves work that is seasonal or periodic in nature, the employment itself is
not automatically considered seasonal so as to prevent the employee from attaining regular status. To
exclude the asserted "seasonal" employee from those classified as regular employees, the employer
must show that: (1) the employee must be performing work or services that are seasonal in nature; and
(2) he had been employed for the duration of the season.
D. Casual Employment
Casual employment, the third kind of employment arrangement, refers to any other employment
arrangement that does not fall under any of the first two categories, i.e., regular or project/seasonal.
E. Fixed-term Employment
The Labor Code does not mention another employment arrangement – contractual or fixed term
employment (or employment for a term) – which, if not for the fixed term, should fall under the
category of regular employment in view of the nature of the employee’s engagement, which is to
perform an activity usually necessary or desirable in the employer’s business.
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, the Court upheld the validity of the fixed-term employment in instances
where (a) the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties
absent any circumstances vitiating the employee’s consent, or (b) where the facts satisfactorily show
that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms
The Court ruled that the employees were regular seasonal workers of URSUMCO since:
(a) they performed tasks that did not at all pertain to any specific phase of URSUMCO’s operations
that would ultimately cease upon completion of a particular phase; rather, they performed
activities that are necessary and desirable in sugarcane production;
(b) they were regularly and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks year after year; and
(c) contrary to the assertion of URSUMCO, the records do not show that the employees were free to
work elsewhere during the off-season.
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Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Celera

January 14, 2014 / AC No. 5581
FACTS:
Rose Bunagan-Bansig filed a Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rogelio Celera for Gross Immoral
Conduct. She alleged that Atty. Celera had married her sister Gracemarie Bunagan in May 1997 but
then contracted a second marriage with Ma. Cielo Alba in January 1998 while the first marriage was
still subsisting. Atty. Celera was required to file his comment but he failed to do so.
He alleged that he did not receive a copy of the administrative complaint. Over the course of
proceedings Bunagan-Bansig would repeatedly send him copies by registered mail, as directed by the
Court. It was later shown that the papers and notices were being returned to sender as Atty. Celera
had moved to a different address.
Notices were also sent to a different address indicated in an entry of appearance by Atty. Celera in
a pending civil case. The indicated address was discovered to be a vacant lot with debris of a
demolished building. Finally, the IBP reported his address based on their records. Since Atty. Celera
failed to appear in the mandatory conference and hearings, the IBP recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
HELD:
The Court ruled that a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
Moreover, the Court found that Atty. Celera’s repeated failure to file his comment constituted willful
disobedience of its lawful orders. Considering his propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land
but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor. Hence, he was held guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders, and ordered disbarred.
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UP LAW BOC FEBRUARY 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
FEBRUARY 2014
Raul Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al.
February 5, 2014 / GR No. 201298
FACTS:
Cosare was employed as a salesman by respondent Arevalo in April 1993. Arevalo was engaged in the
sale of broadcasting equipment to television networks and production houses and later set up
Broadcom to continue the business. Cosare was named as an incorporator of Broadcom and was later
promoted to Asst. Vice President for Sales.
In 2003, Alex Abiog was appointed VP for Sales. In March 2009, Cosare sent a memo to Arevalo
reporting anomalies alleged to have been committed by Abiog. Arevalo failed to act on his
accusations and instead asked him to tender his resignation. Cosare refused.
Cosare later received a memo charging him with serious misconduct and willful breach of trust,
and giving him 48 hours to respond. In the meantime, he was prevented from entering company
offices and his Memo addressing the accusations had to be sent by mail. He filed a case for
constructive dismissal.
LA ruled in favor of Broadcom but this was reversed by the NLRC. On petition for certiorari before
the CA, Broadcom raised the argument that the case was an intra-corporate controversy since Cosare
was a stockholder and a corporate officer. CA granted the petition, finding that the case involved and
intra-corporate controversy.
HELD:
The Court ruled that there are two circumstances which must concur in order for an individual to be
considered a corporate officer, as against an ordinary employee or officer, namely:
(1) the creation of the position is under the corporation’s charter or by-laws; and
(2) the election of the officer is by the directors or stockholders.
Cosare was not a corporate officer as his position of AVP for Sales was not listed in the corporate by-
laws. The reliance by the CA on the General Information Sheets was misplaced as this could neither
govern nor establish the nature of the office held by Cosare.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder of Broadcom at the time of the filing of the
case did not necessarily make the action an intra- corporate controversy. The Court ruled that the
controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as
well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.
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Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas

February 18, 2014 / GR No. 204429
FACTS:
Smart constructed a telecommunications tower in Malvar. The municipality of Malvar passed
Ordinance No. 18, which imposed an assessment fee on Smart. Smart filed a protest with the
municipality, the trial court and the CTA, which were all denied. CTA claimed that it had no jurisdiction
over the case since the assessment involved was regulatory fee and not a tax.
ISSUE: WON the assessment fee was a tax? NO. It is a regulatory fee.
RATIO:
“Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the
identified special projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed
in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the
fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental… If the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does
not make the imposition a tax."
Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises Inc

February 19, 2014 / GR No. 199310
FACTS:
Remman Enterprises filed an application for judicial confirmation over two parcels of land in Taguig.
ISSUE: WON the land is alienable? NO.
RATIO:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., Court stated that in addition to the certification
issued by the proper government agency (such as the PENRO or CENRO) that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable.
Republic v. Tan Properties ruling applies retroactively, since it merely refers to the proper construction
of an already existing law.
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CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation

February 19, 2014 / GR No. 188497
FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp filed an MR as to the SC decision denying the corporation’s claim for
refund for the excise taxes paid by it. Under Sec. 135 of the NIRC, petroleum products sold to
international carriers are exempt from excise tax. Hence, it is the statutory taxpayer (Pilipinas) who has
to pay the tax.
ISSUE: WON the statutory taxpayer can claim a refund for the excise taxes paid on petroleum products
sold to international carriers? YES.
RATIO:
Excise tax is that of a tax levied on a specific article, rather than one "upon the performance, carrying
on, or the exercise of an activity."
Allowing local manufacturers and sellers to shoulder the cost of the tax would have detrimental
effects on the Philippine economy and tourism and in order to comply with our commitments under
international agreements, the statutory taxpayer who is directly liable to pay the excise tax on
petroleum products is entitled to a refund or credit of excise taxes it paid for products sold to
international carrier, the latter having been granted exemption from payment under Sec. 135, NIRC.
Procter & Gamble Asia PTE LTD v. CIR

February 19, 2014 / GR No. 202071
FACTS:
P&G filed an administrative claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT on September 26 and
December 13, 2006. On October 2 and December 29, 2006, filed judicial claims with the CTA. The CTA
dismissed their case for having been prematurely filed (for not complying with the mandatory 120 day
waiting period).
ISSUE: WON P&G’s judicial claim was proper? YES. Due to CIR v. San Roque.
RATIO:
The Court, in San Roque, ruled that equitable estoppel had set in when respondent issued BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03. This was a general interpretative rule, which effectively misled all taxpayers into filing
premature judicial claims with the CTA. Thus, taxpayers could rely on the BIR ruling from its issuance
on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal on 6 October 2010, when CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of
Asia, lnc, was promulgated.
BIR ruling stated that the taxpayer claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120 day period before it
could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of petition for review.
The judicial claims in the instant petition were filed on 2 October and 29 December 2006, well within
the ruling's period of validity. Petitioner is in a position to "claim the benefit of BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03, which shields the filing of its judicial claim from the vice of prematurity."
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Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Asuncion Felonia and Lydia De

Guzman
February 26, 2014 / GR No. 189477
FACTS:
Felonia and De Guzman were the registered owners of a parcel of land. They mortgaged it to Delgado
but executed a Deed of Absolute sale with option of Repurchase. However, Felonia and De Guzman
filed an action to reform the deed into a deed of mortgage, Delgado appealed.
During the pendency of the case, Delgado filed a petition for consolidation of ownership over the
property, which was granted and a new title was issued in Delgado’s name.
Delgado then mortgaged the property to HSLB. Felonia and De Guzman caused a notice of lis
pendens on Delgado’s title.
Eventually, HSLB foreclosed the property and transferred title into its own name. Felonia and De
Guzman filed a complaint against HSLB.
ISSUE: WON HSLB is a buyer in good faith? NO.
RATIO:
A buyer in good faith is one who not only checks the title but also who are in possession of the land
and in what concept they possess such land (New Buyer in Good Faith Doctrine)
A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a property without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, the property and pays full and fair price at the time of purchase or before
he has notice of the claim or interest of other persons in the property.
Spouses Mathay v. CA: When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and circumstances as to arouse
his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps to qualify as a purchaser in good faith. He should
investigate as to the presence of occupants or tenants on the land and inquire into the status or nature
of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land, in the concept of
the owner. An ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent
purchaser usually takes. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would
mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a
purchaser in good faith.
However, at the time HSLB purchased the subject property, the Notice of Lis Pendens was already
annotated on the title.
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Rex Tupal v. Judge Remegio Rojo

February 24, 2014 / AM NO. MTJ-14-1842
FACTS:
Judge Remegio Rojo is an Municipal Trial Court Judge in Bacolod City. He solemnized marriages
without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them
to the contracting parties. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.
ISSUE: WON Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance
of the law? YES.
RATIO:
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they
may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties.
The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in
order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging
in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts’ territorial jurisdiction. However, they must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public
when notarizing documents ex officio and that all notarial fees shall be turned over and for the
account of the government.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
17
UP LAW BOC MARCH 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
MARCH 2014
Republic of the Philippines v. Rosario De Guzman Vda. De Joson
March 10, 2014 / GR No. 163767
FACTS:
Rosario filed an application for land registration in Bulacan.
ISSUE: WON the land is alienable? NO. No express declaration by the State that it was alienable and
no longer needed for public purpose.
RATIO:
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the possessor.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. No tax declarations for prior years
except 2002 were shown.
People v. Noel Enojas y Hingpit

March 10, 2014 / GR No. 204894
FACTS:
2 Policemen noticed that a man, Enojas, was suspicious in a taxi and brought him to the station. On
the way to the station, two more suspicious men appeared and a robbery occurred and the suspect
escaped. However, in the abandoned taxi, the cellphone of Enojas was left behind and monitored the
cellphone’s messages and discovered that Enojas was in collaboration with the two other suspicious
men and the robbery that occurred. Eventually, the policemen conducted an entrapment operation
and arrested the two accused.
ISSUE: WON the text messages were admissible? YES, pursuant to the Electronic Evidence Rule
18
RATIO:
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to
be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.
Macaria Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank Inc

March 19, 2014 / GR No. 200468
Facts:
Sps. Guia owned a parcel of land. However, they sold the south portion to Sps. Arguelles. However,
despite Sps. Arguelles immediately acqurigin possession of the ladn, the deed of sale was not
registered or annotated. Sps. Guia supposedly subdivided the land and applied for separate titles but
Sps. Arguelles claimed they never received their TCT.
Sps. Guia later obtained loan from Malarayat Bank with a deed of mortgage over the land. Years
later did the Sps. Arguelles discover that their land was burdened with a mortgage. Hence, they filed a
complaint for annulment of mortgage.
ISSUE: WON Malarayat Bank are mortgagees in good faith? No. Banks are required for a greater
degree of diligence.
RATIO:
In Bank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr.,19 we declared that indeed, a mortgagee has a right to
rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property offered as security, and in
the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake
further investigation… In addition, In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the
registered owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised by
the mortgagee.
Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private

individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those
involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering
into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as
security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.
19
People v. Henry Go
March 25, 2014 / GR No. 168539
FACTS:
An information was filed against Go for violation of RA 3019 in relation to PIATCO contracts and
conspiring with DOTC Secretary Enrile and entering into a contract which is grossly disadvantages to
the government. Go filed a motion to quash the information since Secretary Enrile passed away, the
public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired with was no longer a public officer, hence
the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense.
ISSUE: WON the motion to quash should be granted? NO! SB has jurisdiction over Go.
RATIO:
It bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
20
UP LAW BOC APRIL 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
APRIL 2015
Universidad De Sta Isabel v. Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr
April 2, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 196280 & 196286
FACTS:
 Universidad De Sta Isabel is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution in Naga
wherein Sambajon was hired as an Assistant Professor on probationary status, as evidenced
by an Appointment Contract, which was effective November 1 2002 up to March 30, 2003. He
continuining teaching until some time in 2005.
 Sambajon complained when his salary was not properly increased and Universidad claimed he
was a probationary employee and could not demand such and ultimately terminated him,
without any explanation as to the cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sambajon was a probationary employee who was validly terminated?
Sambajon was still a probationary employee, however he was not validly dismissed.
RATIO:
 The probationary period can only last for a specific maximum period and under reasonable,
well-laid and properly communicated standards (for regular employees, 6 months and for
teachers, 3 years).
 Clearly, the fixed contract of the teacher is due to the fact that the school year is divided into
trimesters. Therefore, the fixed-term contracts are convenient arrangements and not because
the workplace parties really intended to limit the period of their relationship to any fixed term
and to finish this relationship at the end of that term, seeing as such contracts are renewable
unless the petitioners fail to pass the school’s standards.
 Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude that in a situation
where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the
fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the
contract must give way.
 However, since Sambajon has not completed 3 years, he is still a probationary employee.
Notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary employees, they are entitled to
constitutional protection of security of tenure during and before the end of the probationary
period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be
terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails
to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer.
21
James and Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, Executive

Secretary, et al
April 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 204819
FACTS:
 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
However, numerous petitions were filed contesting the constitutional of RA 10354.
 Some of the following important issues: 1] Right to Life, 2] Right to Health, 3] Freedom of
Religion and the Right to Free Speech
ISSUE: WON the RH Law is constitutional? YES except Certain Provisions!
RATIO:
Right to life
 Petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to life and health of the unborn child
under Sec. 12 Art. II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.
 Respondents contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.
 SC: Every human being enjoys the right to life, which is protected in Art. III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution. The court stated that based on the traditional meaning of the word, the
constitution framers’ intent and medical studies, life begins at fertilization or upon the union
of the male sperm and female ovum.
 The RH Law clearly prohibit any contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum as that
would be abortive and prohibited. However, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of
the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
 RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Art. 256, which penalizes the destruction or
expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
 However, Abortifacients under the RH-IRR are unconstitutional since it includes the word
primarily. It redefines an abortifacients from drug or device that induces abortion or
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum from
implanting in the mother’s womb to drug or device that primarly induces abortion or
destruction of a fetus… This must be struck down for being ultra vires, since the word primarily
would pave the way for approval of contraceptives that would harm or destroy the life of an
unborn from fertilization in contravention of Art. II, Sec. 12 of the Constitution.
The Right to Health

 Petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion
of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies
in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals, which shall cause negative effects
and expose high risk of diseases to women.
22
 Respondents claim that Art II of Sec. 15 of the Constitution is not self executory and even if it
is, the contraceptives pose no danger to women’s health.
 SC: A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. All the Constitution
provisions should be considered as self-executing unless the contrary is intended. None of the
contraceptives have been submitted to the FDA for determination that they are safe and fit for
public consumption.
 the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that
ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient.
Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech

 Petitioners claim that the Rh law imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the
patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be
able to provide for such patient’s needs.
 Respondents claim that such referral is a balanced compromise between the interest of the
religious objector and that of a citizen who needs access to information and who has aright to
expect that the health care professional will act accordingly.
 SC: The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
 Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.
 Hence, even non-maternity speciality hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers are exempted from such referral as their
religious freedom should be respected.
 However, there is an exception, which is life threatning cases. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it
would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases
that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of
the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner
would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in
grave danger.
23
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp, Tesoro Mining and

Development Inc and Mcarthur Mining Inc v. Redmont Consolidated Mines
Corp
April 21, 2014 / G.R. No. 195580
FACTS:
 Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., a domestic corp, wanted to engage in mining in Palawan.
However, the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration were already covered by
applications for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) by Narra, Tesoro and
McArthur.
 Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators 3 petitions for the denial of the three
applications, alleging that all three were owned by MBMI Resources, a 100% canadian owned
corporation, thus failing to complete with 60% filipino owned requirement under Art. XII Sec.
2 of the Constitution (state may engage in co-production contracts for the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources with Filipino citizens or corporations whose
capital is owned 60% by Filipinos).
 Narra, Tesoro and Mcarthur claimed that they are qualified person to engage in mining under
the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, since using the control test, 60% of their capital stock are owned
by Filipinos.
 POA found that the corporations were foreign corporations and were being effectively
controlled by MBMI thus their MPSAs were void.
 CA used the grandfather rule and affirmed the POA. Grandfather Rule:
o Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which
is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the
percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of
Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in the name of a
corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of
which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by
Filipinos. But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the
corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000
shares shall be recorded as belonging to aliens.
ISSUE: WON Narra, Tesoro and Mcarthur are foreign corporations? YES! They are disqualified from
engaging in mining activities in the Philippines.
RATIO:
 The first part of paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating "shares belonging to corporations
or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be
considered as of Philippine nationality," pertains to the control test or the liberal rule. On the
other hand, the second part of the DOJ Opinion which provides, "if the percentage of the
Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of
shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality," pertains
to the stricter, more stringent grandfather rule.
24
 It is apparent that it is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the grandfather
rule in cases where corporate layering is present.
 In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the
second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is
in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign
stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture
corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently,
where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will
not apply.
 Clearly, in this case, because all corporations have a common investor, MBMI, who is a 100%
Canadian corporation, the 60-40 Filipino-Foreign equity ownership is doubtful. Doubt does
not only exists when stockholdings are less than 60%. It would be ludicrous to limit the
application of the said word only to the instances where the stockholdings of non-Filipino
stockholders are more than 40% of the total stockholdings in a corporation. The corporations
interested in circumventing our laws would clearly strive to have "60% Filipino Ownership" at
face value.
 Using the grandfather test, the court has found that all three corporations are foreign
corporations.
Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al v. Secretary of Justice, et al.

April 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 203335
FACTS:
 Petitioners seek a reconsideration of the Courts decision holding some provisions of RA 10125
(Cybercrime Prevention Act) unconstitutional and some constitutional.
 The SC denies the petition but decided to briefly address certain aspects of the decision.
ISSUE: WON MR will prosper? NO!
RATIO:
SECTION 6 imposing a higher penalty (one degree higher) than the RPC and certain special laws
 The power to fix penalities for violations of penal law exclusively belongs to Congress.
 Sec. 6 makes the commission of crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. There
is a material distinction between using the internet and conventional means. The internet has
unique characteristics such as speed, worldwide reach and relative anonymity.
 An example of such would be Fraud online, however, crosses national boundaries, generally
depriving its victim of the means to obtain reparation of the wrong done and seek prosecution
and punishment of the absent criminal. Cybercriminals enjoy the advantage of anonymity, like
wearing a mask during a heist.
Violation of Freedom of Expression due to upholding the constitutional of Online Libel

 Libel is not a protected speech. Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of speeches that
have never attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the realm of
protected freedom.
25
 Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words – those which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Online libel is vague and overbroad

 Online libel is nota new crime. It is essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised
Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of
jurisprudence that secures the freedom of expression from its reach applies to online libel.
26
UP LAW BOC JUNE 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
JUNE 2014
Yujuico v. Quiambao
June 2, 2014 / GR No. 180416
FACTS:
Petitioner Yujuico was the newly elected president of STRADEC, replacing respondent Quiambao.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against one Giovanni Cassanova for refusing to turn over
corporate records of the company.
Petitioners theorize that the refusal by the respondents and Casanova to turnover STRADEC's
corporate records and stock and transfer book violates their right, as stockholders, directors and
officers of the corporation, to inspect such records and book under Section 7 4 of the Corporation
Code. For such violation, petitioners conclude, respondents may be held criminally liable pursuant to
Section 144 of the Corporation Code.
ISSUE: WON a criminal complaint based on the provisions of the Corporation Code may lie against
outgoing corporate officers. NO.
HELD:
A criminal action based on the violation of a stockholder's right to examine or inspect the corporate
records and the stock and transfer book of a corporation under the second and fourth paragraphs of
Section 74 of the Corporation Code can only be maintained against corporate officers or any other
persons acting on behalf of such corporation.
Violations of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74 contemplates a situation wherein a
corporation, acting thru one of its officers or agents, denies the right of any of its stockholders to
inspect the records, minutes and the stock and transfer book of such corporation.
The problem with the petitioners' complaint and the evidence that they submitted during preliminary
investigation is that they do not establish that respondents were acting on behalf of STRADEC. Quite
the contrary, the scenario painted by the complaint is that the respondents are merely outgoing
officers of STRADEC who, for some reason, withheld and refused to turn-over the company records of
STRADEC; that it is the petitioners who are actually acting on behalf of STRADEC; and that STRADEC
is actually merely trying to recover custody of the withheld records.
27
PNB v. Garcia
June 2, 2014 / GR No. 182839
FACTS:
Spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner,
Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank). The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their
property.
Jose Garcia Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject property as
additional collateral security for the latter’s increased loan. The mortgage was executed after the
death of his wife Ligaya Garcia, but before the liquidation of their conjugal assets.
PNB sought to foreclose on the mortgage, but the heirs of Ligaya Garcia sought to have the
mortgage annulled, as they were not parties to the contract.
PNB asserts that since the property was registered in the name of Jose Garcia, the same is
exclusive property.
ISSUE: WON the property mortgaged is conjugal. YES.
HELD:
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What
is material is the time when the property was acquired. The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property
appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property
if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage.
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved
and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs
vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that"[t]he rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." Consequently, the conjugal
partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the death
of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil
Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed
property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his children’s consent.
Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156

June 2, 2014 / GR No. 203696
FACTS:
President Estrada established SPTF 156 in order to investigate anomalies in the Department of
Finance.
Petitioner was one of the officers investigated in a case involving the questionable issuance of tax
credits to Evergreen corporation. The Office of the Ombudsman found substantial evidence on record
finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
28
In challenging the findings of the OMB, petitioner alleges that he cannot be held administratively
liable for grave misconduct in the performance of his official duties and responsibilities because he
was just an evaluator and not the approving authority for tax credit applications.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can be held liable for grave misconduct given that he was only performing his
functions based on his job description and under instructions from superiors. YES
HELD:
The petitioner apparently failed in one of his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator which was to
conduct a physical verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities. While he followed the
instructions and training given to him by his superiors at the Center, he neither conducted a physical
verification/inspection on the actual office premises and the manufacturing and plant facilities.
There is no doubt that the petitioner, together with the other evaluators, committed a deliberate
disregard of established rules which can only be considered as grave misconduct.
Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been
demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule
the common denominator in these cases was the employee’s propensity to ignore the rules as clearly
manifested by his or her actions.
Dulang v. Judge Regencia

June 2, 2014 / AM No. MTJ-14-1841
FACTS:
Dulang filed an ejectment case in 2000, but Judge Regencia only issued judgement dismissing the
case after eleven years.
Dulang filed a complaint before the OCA, alleging that despite the filing of a notice of appeal
from Judge Regencia’s Judgment, the latter nevertheless issued an Order directing the postmaster
and postal carrier of the Cebu Central Post Office, Cebu City to certify Dulang’s receipt of a copy of the
said Judgment.
In this regard, Dulang accused Judge Regencia ofgross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty, contending that by filing his appeal, the latter was
already stripped of her (Judge Regencia) jurisdiction over the case and should not have issued the said
order. Dulang claimed that this effectively stalled the administration of justice, much to his prejudice.
ISSUE: WoN Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable. YES
HELD:
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "[a] judge shall dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods" and echoed in Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that "[j]udges
29
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness."
Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment
case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.
Her length of service of more than 17 years should be taken against her instead of being considered a
mitigating factor as she should have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an ejectment
case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be expeditiously resolved.
People v. Abetong
June 4, 2014 / GR No. 209785
FACTS:
Abetong was arrested for drug dealing after a buy bust operation conducted by the PNP, and was
convicted by the trial court.
On appeal, he raised the issue of non-admissibility of the evidence, as the prosecution had failed
to prove that the integrity of the evidence had not been preserved.
HELD:
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of it.
The failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecution’s case, becuase he was the only one
who had the key to the evidence locker.
As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the chain, Inspector Lorilla’s testimony became
indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Only he could have
testified that no one else obtained the key from him for purposes of removing the items from their
receptacle. Only he could have enlightened the courts on what safety mechanisms have been installed
in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the locker. Absent his
testimony, therefore, it cannot be plausibly claimed that the chain of custody has sufficiently been
established.
The date and time of confiscation do not appear on the markings of the seized items. It cannot also be
denied that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for documentation purposes. It is
admitted that no representative from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective
official was present to serve as witness in recording the arrest.
30
People v. Paras
June 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 192912
FACTS:
Paras was accused of raping AAA, a minor househelper of his elder sister, on March 1996. As a result
of the act, AAA became pregnant.
Paras denied the charge, and capitalized on the fact that AAA was already three months
pregnant at the time she was examined in October 1996.
HELD:
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is
problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal
duration of pregnancy.
At any rate, pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which
the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment.
What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the
latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
Patrimonio v. Gutierrez and Marasigan

Date / GR
FACTS:
Petitioner Alvin Patrimonio and the respondent Napoleon Gutierrez entered into a business venture
under the name of Slam Dunk Corporation (Slum Dunk), a production outfit that produced mini-
concerts and shows related to basketball.
In the course of their business, the petitioner pre-signed several checks to answer for the
expenses of Slam Dunk. Although signed, these checks had no payee’s name, date or amount. The
blank checks were entrusted to Gutierrez with the specific instruction not to fill them out without
previous notification to and approval by the petitioner.
Without the petitioner’s knowledge and consent, Gutierrez went to Marasigan, to secure a loan in
the amount of P200,000.00 on the excuse that the petitioner needed the money for the construction
of his house. Marasigan eventually gave the money and Gutierrez simultaneously delivered to
Marasigan one of the blank checks the petitioner pre-signed.
Marasigan deposited the check but it was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED." It was
later revealed that petitioner’s account with the bank had been closed since May 28, 1993.
Marasigan sued Patrimonio for violation of BP 22. Patrimonio then sought to have the loan
annulled and have Gutierrez and Marasigan pay damages.
ISSUES:
WoN Marasigan was a holder in due course. NO.
WoN Gutierrez was authorized to make the loan. NO.
HELD:
The contract of loan entered into by Gutierrez in behalf of the petitioner should be nullified for being
void; petitioner is not bound by the contract of loan.
31
In the absence of any showing of any agency relations or special authority to act for and in behalf of
the petitioner, the loan agreement Gutierrez entered into with Marasigan is null and void. Thus, the
petitioner is not bound by the parties’ loan agreement.
Marasigan merely relied on the words of Gutierrez without securing a copy of the SPA in favor of the
latter and without verifying from the petitioner whether he had authorized the borrowing of money or
release of the check. He was thus bound by the risk accompanying his trust on the mere assurances of
Gutierrez.
The checks given to Gutierrez are incomplete but delivered instruments.
If the maker or drawer delivers a pre-signed blank paper to another person for the purpose of
converting it into a negotiable instrument, that person is deemed to have prima facie authority to fill it
up. It merely requires that the instrument be in the possession of a person other than the drawer or
maker and from such possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material
particular, the law presumes agency to fill up the blanks.
In order however that one who is not a holder in due course can enforce the instrument against a party
prior to the instrument’s completion, two requisites must exist:
(1) that the blank must be filled strictly in accordance with the authority given; and
(2) it must be filled up within a reasonable time. If it was proven that the instrument had not been
filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time, the maker can
set this up as a personal defense and avoid liability.
However, if the holder is a holder in due course, there is a conclusive presumption that authority to fill
it up had been given and that the same was not in excess of authority.
Marasigan’s knowledge that the petitioner is not a party or a privy to the contract of loan, and
correspondingly had no obligation or liability to him, renders him dishonest, hence, in bad faith. Since
he did not receive the checks in good faith, he cannot be a holder in due course.
Gutierrez was only authorized to use the check for business expenses; thus, he exceeded the authority
when he used the check to pay the loan he supposedly contracted for the construction of petitioner's
house. This is a clear violation of the petitioner's instruction to use the checks for the expenses of Slam
Dunk. It cannot therefore be validly concluded that the check was completed strictly in accordance
with the authority given by the petitioner.
Considering that Marasigan is not a holder in due course, the petitioner can validly set up the personal
defense that the blanks were not filled up in accordance with the authority he gave. Consequently,
Marasigan has no right to enforce payment against the petitioner and the latter cannot be obliged to
pay the face value of the check.
32
Quiachon v. Atty. Ramos

June 4, 2014 / A.C. No. 9317
FACTS:
Quiachon was represented by Atty. Ramos in a labor case before the NLRC and a Special Proceeding
case before the RTC.
The LA granted the complaint but the NLRC reversed. The case was raised to the CA and the CA
affirmed the reversal. The Notice of the CA Decision was received by respondent on 23 November
2010.
Respondent did nothing after the CA decision and assured petitioner that they had time to
appeal. However, the petitioner was surprised to receive the entry of judgment on the CA decision.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent
did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received.
IBP recommended the dismissal of the case despite a finding that the respondent was negligent
because of the withdrawal of the disbarment complaint.
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Ramos should be disbarred. YES.
HELD:
The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of
the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest
is the primary objective.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in
any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven
In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the
desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any justifiable reason
deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their
appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel.
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.
Whenever lawyers take on their clients' cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise due
diligence in protecting the client's rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their
client/s and make them answerable to the client, the courts and society.
33
Syhunliong v. Rivera
June 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 200148
FACTS:
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF). On the other
hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF.
Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3,
2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to
complete the turn over of papers under her custody to her successor.
Rivera called her successor to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and
incentives. She informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her
salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
This prompted Rivera to send text messages to the BANFF phones describing how terrible
Syhunliong is as a boss on April 6, 2006.
On April 16, 2007, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel.
ISSUE: WoN Rivera can be held liable for the incriminating texts. NO.
HELD:
Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message
was sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18,
2007, it would not alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided
for in Article 90 of the RPC.
The plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the
charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well said in the People v.
Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive
provisions of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes.
The text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication.
The following requisites must concur:

(1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the
one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;
and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter's
claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the
subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who
could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.
34
UP LAW BOC JULY 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
JULY 2014
Araullo v. Aquino
July 1, 2014 / G.R. No. 209287
FACTS:
 Sen. Estrada delivered a privilege speech before the Senate regarding the allotment of P50
million to each senator as an incentive in voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice
Corona.
 In view of this revelation, Sec. Abad of the DBM issued a public statement to explain that the funds
released were part of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). It was designed by the DBM
to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
 The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, namely the (a)
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to
augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law, (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use
Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter
5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of
savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.
 As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special
provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
ISSUES:
1. WON the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). - NO
2. WON the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive. – NO.
3. WON the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. – NO.
4. WON the DAP are savings. – NO.
5. WON the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional. –NO.
6. WON the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for
by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s
no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
35
3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds.
a. However, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
b. Transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by
the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
4. These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned.
a. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
b. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there
is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.
5. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer
to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
6. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP’s effects can no longer
be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially
so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
36
AFP-RSBS v. Republic
July 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 180086
FACTS:
 The Armed Forces of the Phils. Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) filed an
application for original registration over certain parcels of land. These were allegedly acquired
from Narciso Ambrad, Alberto Tibayan, and Restituto Tibayan on March 13, 1997. It was also
alleged that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the properties since June 12,
1945
 The lower court ruled in their favor. The Republic appealed, arguing that since the land was
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the period of possession of the
predecessors-in-interest before that date should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession. Hence, AFPRSBS’s and its predecessors-in-interest’s possessions could not ripen
into ownership.
ISSUE: WON the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable
agricultural land should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession for purposes of
original registration. – YES.
RATIO: The court here upheld its ruling in Republic v. Naguit.

1. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
2. Petitioner’s right to the original registration of title over the property is, therefore, dependent on
the existence of: a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the
application for registration and b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner
through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Commissioner of Customs v. Oilink

July 2, 2014 / G.R. no. 161759
FACTS:
1. In 1966, Union Refinery Corporation (URC) was established under the Corporation Code. It was
involved in the business of importing oil products.
2. In 1996, Oilink was incorporated for the primary purpose of manufacturing, importing, exporting,
buying, selling or dealing in oil and gas, and their refinements and by-products at wholesale and
retail of petroleum. Oilink and URC had interlocking directors.
37
3. In applying for and in expediting the transfer of the operator’s name for the Customs Bonded
Warehouse then operated by URC, the VP and General Manager of URC manifested that URC and
Oilink had the same Board of Directors, and that the former owned the latter.
4. In 1998, the District Collector of the Port of Manila and the Customs Commissioner demanded
URC to pay the taxes due on its shipment. Such demands were initially unacted upon, until URC’s
president conveyed to the then Customs Commissioner of URC’s willingness to pay only a portion
of the assessment, with the payment taken from the collectibles of Oilink from the National Power
Corporation, and the balance to be paid in monthly installments over a period of three years to be
secured with corresponding post-dated checks and its future available tax credits.
5. Despite the offer, a final demand was made upon Oilink and URC to pay the taxes due.
6. Oilink formally protested the assessment on the ground that it was not the party liable for the
assessed deficiency taxes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CTA had jurisdiction over the controversy. – YES.
2. WON there was a valid cause of action. – YES.
3. WON there was a ground to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. – NO.
RATIO:
1. Yes, the CTA had jurisdiction. The CTA correctly ruled that the reckoning date for Oilink’s appeal
was July 12, 1999, not July 2, 1999, because it was on the former date that the Commissioner of
Customs denied the protest of Oilink. Clearly, the filing of the petition on July 30, 1999 by Oilink
was well within its reglementary period to appeal. The insistence by the Commissioner of Customs
on reckoning the reglementary period to appeal from November 25, 1998, the date when URC
received the final demand letter, is unwarranted. The November 25, 1998 final demand letter of
the BoC was addressed to URC, not to Oilink. As such, the final demand sent to URC did not bind
Oilink unless the separate identities of the corporations were disregarded in order to consider them
as one.
2. Yes, there existed a valid cause of action. The CA correctly held that the principle of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies was not an iron-clad rule because there were instances in which the
immediate resort to judicial action was proper. This was one such exceptional instance when the
principle did not apply. As the records indicate, the Commissioner of Customs already decided to
deny the protest by Oilink on July 12, 1999, and stressed then that the demand to pay was final. In
that instance, the exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been an exercise in futility
because it was already the Commissioner of Customs demanding the payment of the deficiency
taxes and duties.
3. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no application here because the Commissioner of
Customs did not establish that Oilink had been set up to avoid the payment of taxes or duties, or for
purposes that would defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse
legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. It is also
noteworthy that from the outset the Commissioner of Customs sought to collect the deficiency
taxes and duties from URC, and that it was only on July 2, 1999 when the Commissioner of
Customs sent the demand letter to both URC and Oilink. That was revealing, because the failure
of the Commissioner of Customs to pursue the remedies against Oilink from the outset manifested
that its belated pursuit of Oilink was only an afterthought.
38
Paranaque Kings Enterprises v. Catalina Santos

July 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 194368
FACTS:
1. Respondent Catalina L. Santos (Santos) entered into a Contract of Lease with Frederick O. Chua
(Chua) over eight (8) parcels of land9 located in Parañaque City (leased premises), specifically
giving the latter the "first option or priority to buy" the same in case of sale.10 Chua then caused
the construction of a 6-door commercial complex on the leased premises but, by reason of
business reverses, he was constrained to assign his rights thereon to Lee Ching Bing (Lee), who
likewise assumed all obligations under the lease contract with Santos. Lee, in turn, executed a
Deed of Assignment over the leased premises, including all improvements thereon, in favor of
petitioner.
2. Paranaque Kings filed a complaint before the RTC against Santos and Raymundo. This was
denied. The MR was also denied. However, the CA reversed, citing the existence of an actionable
contractual breach.
3. During the course of the proceedings in the lower court, Paranaque Kings filed a motion to cancel
pre-trial, on account of its counsel preparing a petition for certiorari and prohibition to be filed
before the CA. This was denied by the RTC. This led to the declaration of the RTC that the
petitioner was non-suited and the dismissal of its complaint.
ISSUES:
1. WON it was correct for the RTC to deny a motion to cancel pre-trial. – YES.
2. WON the dismissal of the Complaint for failure of petitioner to proceed to pre-trial as directed by
the trial court was warranted. – YES.
HELD:
1. The trial court has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or
reschedule the pre-trial conference in accordance with the circumstances obtaining in the case.
This must be so as it is the trial court which is able to witness firsthand the events as they unfold
during the trial of a case.
a. Petitioner clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a procedural
device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the
trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial
has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of
cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It
is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize
the paramount objective of simplifying; abbreviating, and expediting trial.
2. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants.
These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the judicial system.
By trifling with the rules and the court processes, and openly defying the order of the trial court to
proceed to pre-trial, petitioner only has itself to blame for the dismissal of its Complaint. The
dismissal is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, which, as authorized by Section 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court hereunder quoted, must stand absent any justifiable reason to the
contrary
39
Naval v. COMELEC
July 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 207851
FACTS:
1. From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Angel Naval had been elected and had served as a
member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
2. The President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts
in Camarines Sur.
3. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013.
4. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third
District.
5. Nelson Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013
elections.
6. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed
before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Naval.
a. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been
elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same
local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative
of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which
must be strictly construed.
ISSUE: WON Naval could run as a provincial board member when the legislative district he initially
served had already been reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are
carved out and renamed as another district. – NO.
RATIO:
The Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare
otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution
and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a
result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier
exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.
These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.
40
UP LAW BOC AUGUST 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
AUGUST 2014
Indophil textile Mills v. Adviento
August 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 171212
FACTS:
1. Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
thread for weaving. Last Aug. 21, 1990, it hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as a civil
engineer to maintain its facilities in Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan.
2. On Aug. 7, 2002, respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. He
was diagnosed with chronic poly sinusitis, and thereafter, with moderate, severe and persistent
allergic rhinitis. Accordingly, respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite
and textile dust as exposure to these elements would cause him health problems.
3. Since the respondent’s persistent requests for better health conditions in his office went unheeded
by petitioner, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in San Fernando, Pampanga for alleged illegal dismissal and money claims.
4. Subsequently, he filed another complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan,
alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of
petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment.
5. In the RTC case, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, claiming among others, lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint because the same falls under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON it should be the Labor Arbiter who should have jurisdiction over the case. – NO.
RATIO:
While we have upheld the present trend to refer worker-employer controversies to labor court x x x, we
have also recognized that not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by our labor
courts, specifically when the law provides otherwise. For this reason, we have formulated the
"reasonable causal connection rule," wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the
claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor
courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. Such distinction is apt
since it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection
with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken away
from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis.
41
Jardeleza v. Sereno
August 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 213181
DOCTRINE:
While the facets of criminal and administrative due process are not strictly applicable to JBC
proceedings, the rights to be heard and to explain one’s self are still available. Due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself.
FACTS:
Before Justice Abad’s retirement, in accordance with its rules, the JBC announced the opening for
application or recommendation for the said vacated position. Petitioner Jardeleza (incumbent Solicitor
General) was nominated for the position. However, there were objections to his integrity by CJ Sereno.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the
integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a
sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a
public hearing. He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice
Carpio. Thereafter, he was not included in the short-list.
HELD:
The Court could not accept the argument that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the
due process clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal and
administrative due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their peculiarity is
insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable.
Notwithstanding being "a class of its own" (sui generis), the right to be heard and to explain one’s self
is availing. Where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is
not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the
precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. The JBC is not expected to
strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test
that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
The "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process. Due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in
the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster
a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then
and there, subjected to an inquiry. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which
the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable
opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Petition granted.
42
Landbank v. Lajom
August 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 184982
DOCTRINE:
While the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under
the land reform, its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and not conclusive.
FACTS:
Respondents were the registered owners of several parcels of land in Nueva Ecija. A portion of the
land was placed under the government's Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to the "Tenants
Emancipation Decree".
Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and, instead, filed an amended Petition for determination of
just compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR, the LBP, and the farmer-
beneficiaries. He argued that the DAR valuation was arrived at without due process, highly prejudicial
and inimical to his and his heirs’ property rights. He alleged that in computing the amount of just
compensation, the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228, Series of 1997, that
have already been repealed by Section 17 of RA 6657.
For its part, the LBP agreed with the DAR valuation and insisted that PD 27 and EO 228, on which
the DAR valuation was based, were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657, contrary to Lajom’s
stance.
HELD:
1. Applicable Law
Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is
overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled,
as in this case, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA
6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27
and EO 228 are superseded.
2. Reckoning Point for Just Compensation

As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined at
the time of the property’s taking. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time
emancipation patents are issued by the government (see LBP vs Heirs of Domingo).
3. RTC as Special Court

It must be emphasized that while the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the
value of lands placed under the land reform and, accordingly, the just compensation therefor, its
valuation is considered only as an initial determination and, thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is well-
settled that it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, which should make the final
determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function.
4. Interest Rate
The Court has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was
delay in the payment of just compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State. This incremental interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather,
it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment.
Petition granted.
43
Noveras v. Noveras
August 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 188289
DOCTRINE:
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in
the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. As a general rule, any
modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to
the instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
HELD:
Divorce not recognized in the Philippines
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce
decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred
in proceeding directly to liquidation.
Modification of Marriage Settlements

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Separation in Fact for One Year

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in
the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the
absolute community of properties.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Petition denied.
44
Ando v. DFA
August 27, 2014 / G.R. No. 195432
DOCTRINE:
An applicant should file an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of her
application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edelina married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National. Yuichiro Kobayashi validly
granted under Japanese laws a divorce. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to
remarry, petitioner married Masatomi Ando.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname
with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the DFA that the same cannot be issued to
her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Ando is
valid. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief. RTC dismissed the case stating
that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to file
a direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage, with even more reason
can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further,
petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
HELD:
Documentary Requirements - Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, it is
clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she needed to
present were the following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and one
photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if
applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine
Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
Appeal Process in case of Denial - In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be
issued a Philippine passport under her second husband’s name. Should her application for a passport
be denied, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA. Petitioner’s argument that
her application “cannot be said to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by the DFA, so as to
make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal", as instead she "was merely told" that her passport
cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of
the denial of her application.
Recognition of Second Marriage - With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second
marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce from her first husband. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.
Petition denied.
45
UP LAW BOC SEPTEMBER 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
SEPTEMBER 2014
GMA v. COMELEC
September 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 205357
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal
provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be
properly explained with sufficient basis.
FACTS:
The 5 petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to
elect during the forthcoming elections.
During the May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010 elections, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing
and interpreting Section 6 to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes
“per station.” For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties'
airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis.
HELD:
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be
based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations.
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what
is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media
for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At
the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability
to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which the
communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, with its adoption of the “aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
46
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a
clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the
COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
Areza v. Express Savings

September 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 176697
DOCTRINE:
A depositary/collecting bank may resist or defend against a claim for breach of warranty if the drawer,
the payee, or either the drawee bank or depositary bank was negligent and such negligence
substantially contributed to the loss from alteration.
FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Areza maintained two bank deposits with respondent Express Savings Bank. A
certain Gerry Mambuay purchased from them a second-hand Mitsubishi Pajero and a brand-new
Honda CRV. Mambuay paid petitioners with nine Philippine Veterans Affairs Office checks payable to
different payees for a total of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,800,000.00).
Petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account with the Bank. The Bank, inturn,
deposited the checks with its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank. Equitable-PCI Bank presented the
checks to the drawee, the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks. The Bank informed
petitioners that the checks they deposited with the Bank were honored. He allegedly warned
petitioners that the clearing of the checks pertained only to the availability of funds and did not mean
that the checks were not infirm. Based on this information, petitioners released the two cars to the
buyer.
Later, the subject checks were returned by PVAO on the ground that the amount on the face of
the checks was altered from the original amount of P4,000.00 to P200,000.00. The Bank closed the
Special Savings Account of the petitioners with a balance of P1,179,659.69 and transferred said
amount to their savings account. The Bank then withdrew the amount of P1,800,000.00 representing
the returned checks from petitioners’ savings account.
HELD:
When the drawee bank pays a materially altered check, it violates the terms of the check, as well as its
duty to charge its client’s account only for bona fide disbursements he had made. If the drawee did not
pay according to the original tenor of the instrument, as directed by the drawer, then it has no right to
claim reimbursement from the drawer, much less, the right to deduct the erroneous payment it made
from the drawer’s account which it was expected to treat with utmost fidelity. The drawee, however,
still has recourse to recover its loss. It may pass the liability back to the collecting bank which is what
the drawee bank exactly did in this case. It debited the account of EquitablePCI Bank for the altered
amount of the checks.
The law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited with it
for the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank being primarily
engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it to a high standard
of conduct. As collecting banks, Express Savings Bank and EquitablePCI Bank are both liable for the
amount of the materially altered checks. Since EquitablePCI Bank is not a party to this case and
Express Savings Bank allowed its account with EquitablePCI Bank to be debited, it has the option to
seek recourse against the latter in another forum.
47
Arigo v. Swift
September 16, 2014 / G.R. No. 206510
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian
departed Subic Bay for Makassar, Indonesia. While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
HELD:
The traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the
region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the
VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
48
Jalover v. Osmena
September 23, 2014 / G.R. No. 209286
FACTS:
On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of
Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC, Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen
(15) years prior to the May 2013 elections. Petitioners filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny
Osmena’s application. They alleged that Osmeña was never a resident of Toledo City and that his
alleged house in Toledo City was actually owned by his son.
COMELEC dismissed the petition. Osmena, later, won the elections.
HELD:
The petitioners largely rely on statement that Osmeña was “hardly seen” in Toledo City, Cebu.
However, the law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7)
days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. The fact that Osmeña has no registered property
under his name does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not
among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in
the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the
district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the
landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
Moreover, in a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one
hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we
cannot choose the electorate’s will.
RE: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing Held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong, Sandiganbayan
September 23, 2014 / A.M. No. SB-14-21-J [Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
DOCTRINE:
A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious
misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms.
FACTS:
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain
allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by Associate Justice Ong of the Sandiganbayan.
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an exposé involving billions of government funds
channeled through bogus foundations, the “pork barrel scam”. The whistle-blowers (Benhur Luy)
allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles’ parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies
of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee “that the malversation case involving Mrs.
49
Janet Lim-Napoles et al., was ‘fixed’ (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the
Sandiganbayan”.
The Court assigned the case to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation, who later recommended that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found guilty of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service.
HELD:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross"
has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not
to be excused." The Court agrees with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with
Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in
her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious
misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly
because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible
evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The
totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations
that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process.
Villalon v. Chan
September 24, 2014 / G.R. No. 196508
FACTS:
Respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua. She claimed that her husband and the present
petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person. During the subsistence of their
marriage, Leon, under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with
Erlinda Talde.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for bigamy
in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings
against the petitioners. Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia.
Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia. He argued
that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as
she did not file the complaint-affidavit.
HELD:
(1) Representation by Counsel
The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney
in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy
50
case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. The RTC should have allowed and should not
have disqualified Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the
offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the
offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
(2) Failure to Implead the People

The respondent’s failure to implead the "People of the Philippines" as a party-respondent is not a fatal
defect warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
because: (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions alleged to have acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (2) the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a special civil action
separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the petitioners. For these reasons, the
"People of the Philippines" need not be impleaded as a party in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 192398
DOCTRINE:
The transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not subject to
documentary stamp tax.
FACTS:
Respondent entered into a Plan of Merger with its affiliate, Shell Philippine Petroleum Corporation
(SPPC). In the Plan of Merger, it was provided that the entire assets and liabilities of SPPC will be
transferred to, and absorbed by, respondent as the surviving entity.
Believing that it erroneously paid documentary stamp tax on its absorption of real property
owned by SPPC, respondent filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a formal claim for refund
or tax credit of the documentary stamp tax in the amount of P22,101,407.64.
HELD:
In a merger, the real properties are not deemed "sold" to the surviving corporation and the latter could
not be considered as "purchaser" of realty since the real properties subject of the merger were merely
absorbed by the surviving corporation by operation of law and these properties are deemed
automatically transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed.
Therefore, the transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not
subject to documentary stamp tax.
Documentary stamp tax is imposed only on all conveyances, deeds, instruments or writing where
realty sold shall be conveyed to a purchaser or purchasers. The transfer of SPPC’s real property to
respondent was neither a sale nor was it a conveyance of real property for a consideration contracted
to be paid as contemplated under Section 196 of the Tax Code.
51
Notably, RA 9243, entitled "An Act Rationalizing the Provisions of the Documentary Stamp Tax of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997" was enacted and took effect on April 27, 2004 which
exempts the transfer of real property of a corporation, which is a party to the merger or consolidation,
to another corporation, which is also a party to the merger or consolidation, from the payment of
documentary stamp tax.
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 202666
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College, Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about
to attend, Julia and Julienne took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded on Facebook.
Using STC’s computers, STC's students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts
and showed a teacher photos of the students. STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. STC informed their parents
that they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
ISSUE:
The main issue in this case is whether or not a writ of habeas data should be granted. Crucial in
resolving the controversy, however, is whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
HELD:
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to STC teachers. Respondents were mere recipients of
what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if
any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to the teacher.
It is incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the
courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which
they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if
they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone.
The Court finds that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights; hence,
the petition for writ of habeas data is denied.
52
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 211356
FACTS:
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove. While the company
was already operating a resort in the area, it also applied for the issuance of a building permit covering
the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land located in Sitio Diniwid.
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort
hotel.
Subsequently, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of
nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the Court still finds that the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare.
The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of
the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental
issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle-compliance.
53
Dela Torre v. Imbuido

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 192973
FACTS:
Pedrito filed a complaint for damages against herein respondents in their capacity as the owners and
operators of the Divine Spirit General Hospital in Olongapo City. Pedrito alleged in his complaint that
he was married to Carmen, who died while giving birth at the Divine Spirit General Hospital on
February 13, 1992.
HELD:
While the expert (Dr. Patilano) provided by the Petitoners opined that Carmen died of peritonitis,
which could be due to the poor state of the hospital equipment and medical supplies used during her
operation, there was no sufficient proof that any such fault actually attended the surgery of Carmen,
caused her illness and resulted in her death. It is also significant that the Chief of the Medico-Legal
Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Torres, testified before the trial court that based on
the autopsy report issued by Dr. Patilano, the latter did not comply with the basic autopsy procedure
when he examined the cadaver of Carmen. Dr. Patilano did not appear to have thoroughly examined
Carmen’s vital organs such as her heart, lungs, uterus and brain during the autopsy. His findings were
then inconclusive on the issue of the actual cause of Carmen's death, and the claim of negligence
allegedly committed by the respondents.
The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection
between the negligence and the injuries. The claimant must prove not only the injury but also the
defendant's fault, and that such fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be
based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability
based upon competent expert testimony, which the Court finds absent in the case at bar.
Republic v. Spouses Lazo

September 29, 2014 / G.R. No. 195594
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Rogelio and Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte Vista Homes,
a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily
sold to the National Irrigation Administration a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open
irrigation canal. Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr. Donno G. Custodio, retired
Chief Geologist of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, to conduct a geohazard study on the possible
effects of the project on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with a Geohazard Assessment
Report, finding that ground shaking and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that could
affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista.
Respondents filed a petition for an injunction against NIA.
HELD:
R.A. No. 8975 is the present law that proscribes lower courts from issuing restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions against government infrastructure projects. In ensuring the expeditious and
efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects, its twin objectives are:
54
(1) to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs; and (2) to allow
the immediate enjoyment of the social and economic benefits of the project.
R.A. No. 8975 exclusively reserves to the Supreme Court the power to issue injunctive writs on
government infrastructure projects. A judge who violates the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of
suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay, in addition to any civil and criminal liabilities that he
or she may incur under existing laws. Through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, the Court has
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect the prohibition.
Here, respondents failed to demonstrate that there is a constitutional issue involved, much less a
constitutional issue that is of extreme urgency. More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public
at large are bound to respect the fact that official acts of the Government, including those performed
by governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, and cannot be summarily, prematurely and capriciously set aside. Such
presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but on all persons, especially on those who deal
with the government on a frequent basis.
Respondents failed to satisfy even the basic requirements of the Rules for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. Therefore, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it granted their
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
DBP v. COA
September 30, 2014 / G.R. No. 202733
FACTS:
Foreign travels of former DBP Chairman Vitaliano N. Nañagas II and former Director Eligio V. Jimenez
were not cleared by the Office of the President as required by Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO)
No. 103 (Directing the Continued Adoption of Austerity Measures in the Government). COA disallowed
disbursements to both officials.
HELD:
In an effort to recover from its non-compliance with the requirements of the law, petitioner invoked
good faith as a defense due to the fact that it was faced with a doubtful or difficult question of law. SC,
however, agrees with respondent COA in ruling that petitioner cannot find solace in the defense of
good faith since not only are senior government officials, such as the petitioner’s concerned officials
herein, expected to update their knowledge on laws that may affect the performance of their
functions, but the laws subject of this case are of such clarity that the concerned officials could not
have mistaken one for the other.
Hence, when government officials are found to have clearly committed an outright violation and
disregard of the law, We will not hesitate in ordering the refund of incentive awards and allowances
for while the acts of public officials in the performance of their duties are presumed to be done in good
faith, the presumption may be contradicted and overcome by evidence showing bad faith or gross
negligence.
Decision of the Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED.
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UP LAW BOC OCTOBER 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
OCTOBER 2014
Imasen v. Alcon
October 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 194884
FACTS:
Ramonchito Alcon and Joann Papa, both employees of Imasen, were caught having sexual intercourse
at the Imasen plant’s “Tool and Die” section during work hours. They were given the opportunity to
provide an explanation and a hearing was also conducted regarding the administrative charge against
them. They were found guilty of gross misconduct contrary to company regulations and were
terminated. While the LA and NLRC found the dismissal valid, the CA did not consider such act to be
covered by serious misconduct to warrant dismissal.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal was valid – Yes
HELD:
The misconduct must be related to the performance of the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to
continue working for the employer. Further, and equally important and required, the act or
conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.
Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and during work
hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct. Added to these
considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents did not only disregard company rules
but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on the status of ethics and
morality in the company.
Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse in an area where co-employees or other
company personnel have ready and available access. The respondents likewise committed their act at
a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in fact, been at their respective posts, and
when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other employees had in fact been, working.
Robles v. Yapcinco
October 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 169568
FACTS:
Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of Jose C. Marcelo to secure the performance
of his obligation. Marcelo later transferred his right to Apolinario Cruz. Apolinario Cruz brought an
action for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage when Yapcinco was unable to pay. Yapcinco died during
the pendency of the action so his estate was held liable. Cruz was the highest bidder at the public
auction. However, he did not register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of sale
issued. He later donated the property to his grandchildren. Yapcinco’s heirs filed an action to reconvey
the property. They claimed that although the property had been mortgaged, the mortgage had not
been foreclosed, judicially or extra-judicially.
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ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property – Cruz’s heirs
HELD:
Before anything more, the Court clarifies that the failure of Apolinario Cruz to register the certificate of
sale was of no consequence in this adjudication. The registration of the sale is required only in extra-
judicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of
the right of redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure
because only the equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages with banking
institutions. The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the foreclosure sale, was Section 3,
Rule 70 of theRules of Court. The records show that no judicial confirmation of the sale was made
despite the lapse of more than 40 years since the date of the sale. Hence, it cannot be said that title
was fully vested in Apolinario Cruz.
Although procedural rules are not to be belittled or disregarded considering that they insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice, it is equally true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to the courts the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need
to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
The effect of the failure of Apolinario Cruz to obtain the judicial confirmation was only to prevent the
title to the property from being transferred to him. For sure, such failure did not give rise to any right in
favor of the mortgagor or the respondents as his successors-in-interest to take back the property
already validly sold through public auction. Nor did such failure invalidate the foreclosure
proceedings. To maintain otherwise would render nugatory the judicial foreclosure and foreclosure
sale, thus unduly disturbing judicial stability. The non-transfer of the title notwithstanding, Apolinario
Cruz as the purchaser should not be deprived of the property purchased at the foreclosure sale. With
the respondents having been fully aware of the mortgage, and being legally bound by the judicial
foreclosure and consequent public sale, and in view of the unquestioned possession by Apolinario
Cruz and his successors-in-interest (including the petitioner) from the time of the foreclosure sale until
the present, the respondents could not assert any better right to the property. It would be the height of
inequity to still permit them to regain the property on the basis alone of the lack of judicial
confirmation of the sale. After all, under the applicable rule earlier cited, the judicial confirmation
operated only "to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
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Azuelo v. Zameco
October 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 192573
FACTS:
Azuelo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. However, the complaint was later
dismissed because he was not able to submit his position paper. He filed a similar complaint a few
days later which prompted ZAMECO to file a motion to dismiss for res judicata. It was dimissed for
such reason. LA Abdon pointed out that the dismissal of Azuelo's first complaint for illegal dismissal
was with prejudice; that the appropriate remedy available to Azuelo against LA Bactin's dismissal of
the first complaint was to appeal from the same and not to file a second complaint for illegal
dismissal.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal due to the unreasonable failure of the
complainant to submit his position paper amounts to a dismissal with prejudice –YES
HELD:
The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 Revised Rules), the rules applicable at the
time of the controversy, is silent as to the nature of the dismissal of a complaint on the ground of
unreasonable failure to submit a position paper by the complainant. Nevertheless, the 2005 Revised
Rules, particularly Section 3, Rule I thereof, provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of
Court to arbitration proceedings before the LAs and the NLRC in the absence of any applicable
provisions therein.
The unjustified failure of a complainant in arbitration proceedings before the LA to submit his position
paper is akin to the case of a complainant's failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time in ordinary civil proceedings. In both cases, the complainants are remiss, sans reasonable
cause, to prove the material allegations in their respective complaints. Accordingly, the Court sees no
reason not to apply the rules relative to unreasonable failure to prosecute an action in ordinary civil
proceedings to the unjustified failure of a complainant to submit his position paper in arbitration
proceedings before the LA.
Thus, in arbitration proceedings before the LA, the dismissal of a complaint on account of the
unreasonable failure of the complainant to submit his position paper is likewise regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another complaint, except when the LA's
order of dismissal expressly states otherwise.
Indeed, technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. The LAs and the NLRC are
mandated to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of the law or procedure. Nevertheless, though technical
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, they are necessary for an effective and expeditious
administration of justice. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of
labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The
intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put up the two parties on relatively equal positions.
58
Radio Mindanao Network v. Amurao

October 22, 2014 / G.R. No. 167225
FACTS:
Years after Amurao was hired as a radio broadcater, RMN decided to reformat their station necessarily
affecting the jobs of its employees. However, they were assured their retirement pay and other
benefits. They reluctantly signed the Affidavit of Release/Quitclaim and filed an illegal dismissal
complaint after. RMN concedes that it was an illegal dismissal but would like to bind Amurao to the
quitclaim he earlier signed.
ISSUE: WON the quitclaim executed by the employee was valid and effective against him – YES
HELD:
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy. A quitclaim is invalid or contrary to public
policy only: (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person; or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. In instances of
invalid quitclaims, the law steps in to annul the questionable waiver. Indeed, there are legitimate
waivers that represent the voluntary and reasonable settlements of laborers’ claims that should be
respected by the Court as the law between the parties.
Firstly, Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and thoroughly understood the terms
of his quitclaim and signed it of his own volition. Secondly, the settlement pay of P311,922.00 was
credible and reasonable considering that Michael did not even assail such amount as unconscionably
low, or even state that he was entitled to a higher amount. Thirdly, that he was required to sign the
quitclaim as a condition to the release of the settlement pay did not prove that its execution was
coerced. Having agreed to part with a substantial amount of money, RMN took steps to protect its
interest and obtain its release from all obligations once it paid Michael his settlement pay, which it did
in this case. And, lastly, that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to provide for the
needs of his family and for the schooling of his children did not immediately indicate that he had been
forced to sign the same. Dire necessity should not necessarily be an acceptable ground for annulling
the quitclaim, especially because it was not at all shown that he had been forced to execute it. Nor was
it even proven that the consideration for the quitclaim was unconscionably low, and that he had been
tricked into accepting the consideration.
Majestic Finance v. Tito

October 22. 2014 / G.R. No. 197442
FACTS:
Jose D. Tito (Tito) filed against Majestic a petition to declare earlier proceedings for a levy and the
rescission null and void. He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of his
predecessor-in-interest, Cort, who had passed away almost five years (5) prior to the filing of the
rescission case. His standing to file the annulment case was based on his purported ownership of the
subject property, which he allegedly inherited from Cort. However, he had already transmitted his
interest prior to the petition to spouses Jose and Rosita Nazal.
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Later, the Sps. Nazal moved that the annulment case be set for pre-trial but the motion was not
acted upon. It appears that the records were among those gutted by fire on June 11, 1988, and none of
the parties or the court did anything for a period of almost eleven (11) years. Meanwhile, Sps. Nazal
remained in possession of the subject property.
Sometime in 1998, Sps. Nazal received summons in an unlawful detainer case filed by the new
registered owners of the subject property, spouses Mariano and Rhodora Lim (Sps. Lim), which
apparently prompted Sps. Nazal to set the annulment case for hearing. Learning of the loss of the
records, Sps. Nazal moved for reconstitution of judicial records and for revival of the proceedings in
the annulment case, which was opposed by Majestic. Later, Majestic filed an Urgent Motion to Declare
Case as already Closed and Terminated with Opposition to Revive the Case.
ISSUE: WON the Spouses Nazal have lost the right to participate in the proceedings – YES
HELD:
Case law states that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the placid
operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, who is claiming a
certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert
or protect such right or interests. In other words, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the
right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has ceased to exist,
there is nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently, the right of intervention ceases.
Thus, on the supposition that they were the case’s plaintiffs, Sps. Nazal should bear the obligation
imputed by the RTC upon Tito to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the action within a reasonable
length of time. The RTC, however, pointed out that Sps. Nazal failed in this regard. As the records
would bear, while Sps. Nazal moved to set the case for pre-trial on December 9, 1987, no further action
was taken by them after the court a quo failed to calendar the case and set the same for pre-trial.
Disconcerting is the fact that it took Sps. Nazal almost eleven (11) years, or on October 20, 1998 to
move for the setting of the case for hearing, as they were apparently compelled to act only upon the
threat of being dispossessed of the subject property with the filing of the unlawful detainer case by the
new registered owners, Sps. Lim. Notably, while under both the present and the old Rules of Court,
the clerk of court has the duty to set the case for pre-trial, the same does not relieve the plaintiffs of
their own duty to prosecute the case diligently. Truth be told, the expeditious disposition of cases is as
much the duty of the plaintiff as the court.
PBCOM v. Basic Polyprinters

October 20, 2014 / G.R. No. 187581
ISSUE: WON Basic Polyprinters should be rehabilitated – NO
HELD:
The petitioner posits that the assailed decision of the CA effectively gave Basic Polyprinters a
moratorium for seven years on both interest and principal payments counted from the issuance of the
stay order in 2004 that effectively prejudiced its creditors.
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The petitioner contends that the sole issue in corporate rehabilitation is one of liquidity; hence, the
petitioning corporation should have sufficient assets to cover all its indebtedness because it only
foresees the impossibility of paying the indebtedness falling due. It claims that rehabilitation became
inappropriate because Basic Polyprinters was insolvent due to its assets being inadequate to cover the
outstanding obligations.
Consequently, the basic issues in rehabilitation proceedings concern the viability and desirability of
continuing the business operations of the petitioning corporation. The determination of such issues
was to be carried out by the court-appointed rehabilitation receiver, who was Cacho in this case.
A material financial commitment becomes significant in gauging the resolve, determination,

earnestness and good faith of the distressed corporation in financing the proposed rehabilitation plan.
This commitment may include the voluntary undertakings of the stockholders or the would-be
investors of the debtor-corporation indicating their readiness, willingness and ability to contribute
funds or property to guarantee the continued successful operation of the debtor corporation during
the period of rehabilitation.
The commitment to add P10,000,000.00 working capital appeared to be doubtful considering that
the insurance claim from which said working capital would be sourced had already been written-off by
Basic Polyprinters’s affiliate, Wonder Book Corporation. A claim that has been written-off is considered
a bad debt or a worthless asset, and cannot be deemed a material financial commitment for purposes
of rehabilitation. At any rate, the proposed additional P10,000,000.00 working capital was
insufficient to cover at least half of the shareholders’ deficit that amounted to P23,316,044.00 as of
June 30, 2006.
Due to the rehabilitation plan being an indispensable requirement in corporate rehabilitation

proceedings, Basic Polyprinters was expected to exert a conscious effort in formulating the same, for
such plan would spell the future not only for itself but also for its creditors and the public in general. The
contents and execution of the rehabilitation plan could not be taken lightly.
Residents of Lower Atab v. Sta. Monica Industrial & Development

October 15, 2014 / G.R. No.198878
FACTS:
One Torres owned a lot in Baguio and petitioners are his transferees-in-interest. However, Sta Monica
began to build a fence on the property, claiming that it was the owner of a large portion thereof, as
proved by a Transfer Certificate of Title. It alleged that petitioners are mere illegal occupants of the
property. Petitioners acknowledged that while they declared their respective lots for tax purposes,
they applied for the purchase of the same – through Townsite Sales applications – with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). They filed a complaint for quieting of title
with damages against Sta. Monica. The lower courts ruled in favor of Sta. Monica saying that the
complaint was a collateral attack and that petitioners had no standing to file such complaint.
ISSUE: WON quieting of title was the proper remedy – NO
61
HELD:
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be present, namely: "(1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy."
Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently, there are no
certificates of title in their respective names. And by their own admission in their pleadings, specifically
in their pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial court, they acknowledged that they applied
for the purchase of the property from the government, through townsite sales applications coursed
through the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be
nullified in order that the said title would not hinder the approval of their townsite sales applications
pending with the DENR.Thus, petitioners admitted that they are not the owners of the subject
property; the same constitutes state or government land which they would like to acquire by purchase.
It would have been different if they were directly claiming the property as their own as a result of
acquisitive prescription, which would then give them the requisite equitable title. By stating that they
were in the process of applying to purchase the subject property from the government, they admitted
that they had no such equitable title, at the very least, which should allow them to prosecute a case for
quieting of title.
In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject property lies in the State.
Thus, as to them, quieting of title is not an available remedy.
As far as this case is concerned, the extent of petitioners’ possession has not been sufficiently shown,
and by their application to purchase the subject property, it appears that they are not claiming the
same through acquisitive prescription.
People v. Andaya
October 13, 2014 / G.R. No. 183700
FACTS:
An information was filed against Andaya for violation of RA 9165 after having been found selling 0.09
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride shabu through a buy bust operation. The accused and his
wife as a defense denied the sale of shabu that fateful night. There were allegations in their
testimonies that the police demanded money from them. The wife of the accused even testified that
she gave P1,500.00 to the police officer who then eventually released said accused. And early on, she
even claimed money and a cellphone were missing after the accused was arrested in their house.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was proper – NO
HELD:
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
62
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous
drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-
arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/ poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have
been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned
at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the offense charged, the members of the
buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their
positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur
buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of the members
of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over were the marked P100.00 bills and that
what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.
Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of
the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does
not show what the prearranged signal consisted of.
For sure, the frame-up defense has been commonly used in prosecutions based on buy-bust
operations that have led to the arrest of the suspects.19 Its use might be seen as excessive, but the
failure of the accused to impute any ill motives to falsely incriminate them should not deter us from
scrutinizing the circumstances of the cases brought to us for review. We should remind ourselves that
we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes they have been charged with. The State
must fully establish that for us.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the State's
case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-
arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his non-presentation
must be credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy the
quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not themselves
participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
BPI v. Armovit
October 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 163654
FACTS:
Armovit was dining at a restaurant and was unable to use her credit card to pay for the meal. She later
found out that it was because she had defaulted in several payments. BPI countered that she was
indeed delayed at that time and while she had settled her obligations, she was unable to fill up the
63
form required to reactivate her account. Therefore, they were not liable to her for any money
compensation. She was later sent a telegraphic message saying that she was mistakenly included in
the Caution List.
As a result, Armovit sued BPI Express Credit for damages in the RTC, insisting that she had been
a credit card holder in good standing, and that she did not have any unpaid bills at the time of the
incident.
In its answer with counterclaim, BPI Express Credit raised the defense of lack of cause of action,
and maintained that Armovit had defaulted in her obligations for three consecutive months, thereby
causing the temporary suspension of her credit card in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the credit card. It pointed out that Armovit had been duly notified of the suspension; that for her
failure to comply with the requirement for the submission of the application form and other
documents as directed in its letter dated April 8, 1992, her credit card had not been reactivated and
had remained in the list of suspended cards at the time she used it on November 21, 1992; and that the
telegraphic message of March 11, 1993, which was intended for another client whose credit card had
been erroneously included in the caution list, was mistakenly sent to her.
ISSUE: WON BPI is liable to Armovit for moral and exemplary damages – YES
HELD:
The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a contractual one that is
governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and
conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be present because negligence
may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of
Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes gross negligence.
Considering that the terms and conditions nowhere stated that the card holder must submit the new
application form in order to reactivate her credit card, to allow BPI Express Credit to impose the duty
to submit the new application form in order to enable Armovit to reactivate the credit card would
contravene the Parol Evidence Rule. Indeed, there was no agreement between the parties to add the
submission of the new application form as the means to reactivate the credit card.
In the context of the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties, the only condition for the
reinstatement of her credit card was the payment of her outstanding obligation.25 Had it intended
otherwise, BPI Express Credit would have surely informed her of the additional requirement in its
letters of March 19, 1992 and March 31, 1992. That it did not do so confirmed that they did not agree on
having her submit the new application form as the condition to reactivate her credit card.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that a credit card contract is considered as a contract of adhesion
because its terms and conditions are solely prepared by the credit card issuer. Consequently, the
terms and conditions have to be construed against BPI Express Credit as the party who drafted the
contract.
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Duty Free Philippines v. BIR

October 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 197228
FACTS:
Duty Free is a merchandising system established by the then Ministry of Tourism (now Department of
Tourism) through the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). It argued that as a tax-exempt
establishment under E.O. No. 46, it should not be subjected to the 1.1/2% expanded withholding taxes
on certain income payments that were withheld by credit card companies. Respondent opined that
E.O. No. 93 dated 17 December 1986 withdrew all the tax and duty incentives granted to government
and public entities, including petitioner. Hence, respondent denied the request of petitioner for a
refund of the withholding tax on certain payments made by credit card companies and remitted to the
BIR. Later, the CTA Special First Division found Duty Free liable for several tax deficiencies. The MR
was denied so Duty Free directly appealed to the SC under Rule 45.
In its Comment, respondent BIR raised the issue of the mode of appeal of petitioner. Respondent
alleged that petitioner chose the wrong mode of appeal by directly availing itself of the remedies
before this Court without first elevating the case to the CTA en banc as provided under Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of the CTA.
ISSUE: WON the mode of appeal was proper – NO
HELD:
This Court has had a long-standing rule that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute.14 In this regard, we find that petitioner’s direct
appeal to this Court is fatal to its claim.
RA 1125, promulgated in 1954, created the CTA. The enactment of R.A. No. 9282, which took effect on
23 April 2004, elevated the rank of the CTA to the level of a collegiate court, making it a co-equal
body of the Court of Appeals. The appeal of a CTA decision under Section 18 of R.A. No. 1125 was also
amended by R.A. No. 9282. Sections 18 and 19 said:
SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil proceeding involving matter
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local
Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal
has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for

reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc.
SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en
banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
65
Furthermore, Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA17 reiterates the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the CTA en banc relative to the review of the court divisions’ decisions or resolutions on
motion for reconsideration or new trial in cases arising from administrative agencies such as the BIR.
Santos v. Santos
October 8, 2014 / G.R. No. 187061
FACTS:
Ricardo and Celerina were married and because of financial difficulties, Ricardo alleges that Celerina
left the Philippines to be a domestic worker in Hong Kong and was not heard from again. 12 years
after, filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage
on June 15, 2007. The RTC ruled in his favor and Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when
she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies. She alleged that Ricardo knew where she lived, which was in their conjugal home, and that
she never left the Philippines. She argued that he was the one who left in order to live with another
woman.
Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28,
2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition – YES
HELD:
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence. Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation. Celerina claimed that because of these, she
was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death
were false. Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with
the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud
perpetrated on her.
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission
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on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he
or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions. The existence of these conditions means
that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of
the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the
effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect
of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife.” This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited
or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to
her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of
judgment will, therefore, lie.
Am-Phil v. Padilla
October 1, 2014 / G.R. No. 188753
FACTS:
Am-Phil informed some employees that it was going to implement a retrenchment program. The
retrenchment program was allegedly on account of serious and adverse business conditions, i.e., lack
of demand in the market, stiffer competition, devaluation of the Philippine peso, and escalating
operation costs.
Padilla questioned Am-Phil’s choice to retrench him. He noted that Am-Phil had six (6)
contractual employees, while he was a regular employee who had a good evaluation record. He
67
pointed out that Am-Phil was actually then still hiring new employees. He also noted that Am-Phil's
sales have not been lower relative to the previous year.
In response, Am-Phil's three (3) officers gave him two options: (1) be retrenched with severance
pay or (2) be transferred as a waiter in Am-Phil’s restaurant, a move that entailed his demotion.
Padilla was eventually retrenched so he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: WON the retrenchment was valid - NO
HELD:
Thus, this court has outlined the requirements for a valid retrenchment, each of which must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence, as follows:
(1) That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if
already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only
expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
(2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or
at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the
advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of
tenure; and
(5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and
who would be retained among the employees, such as status (i.e., whether they are temporary,
casual, regular or managerial employees), efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial
hardship for certain workers.
Am-Phil’s 2001 to 2004 audited financial statements, the sole proof upon which Am-Phil relies on to
establish its claim that it suffered business losses, have been deemed unworthy of
consideration. These audited financial statements were mere annexes to the motion for leave to
admit supplemental rejoinder which Labor Arbiter Chuanico validly disregarded. No credible
explanation was offered as to why these statements were not presented when the evidence-in-chief
was being considered by the labor arbiter. It follows that there is no clear and convincing evidence to
sustain the substantive ground on which the supposed validity of Padilla’s retrenchment rests.
Moreover, it is admitted that Am-Phil did not serve a written notice to the Department of Labor and
Employment one (1) month before the intended date of Padilla’s retrenchment, as required by Article
283 of the Labor Code.
While it is true that Am-Phil gave Padilla separation pay, compliance with none but one (1) of the
many requisites for a valid retrenchment does not absolve Am-Phil of liability.
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UP LAW BOC NOVEMBER 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
NOVEMBER 2014
Que v. Revilla
November 11, 2014 / A.C. No. 7054 / Per Curiam
FACTS:
Following an unlawful detainer case, a disbarment case was filed against Atty. Revilla for fraud,
deliberate forum shopping, disregarding court processes, and misrepresentation. He was disbarred
and now prays for judicial clemency because he has repented and the disbarment has made him frail.
ISSUE: WON he should be granted reinstatement into the Bar - No
HELD:
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy
of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred,
his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal
for judicial clemency, the respondent no longer questioned the Court's decision. According to him, he
has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to
reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his
mistakes.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown
by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.In other cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after
his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement,
and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys' sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.
While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his
previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for
his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily
showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy
of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had
completely reformed.
People v. Yecyec
69
November 12, 2014 / G.R. No. 183551
FACTS:
Sison, engaged in the buying and selling of rubber, was informed that the rubber lumps he had
purchased from one Edon were actually stolen from FARBECO, managed by Rodolfo Yecyec. Later,
Yecyec appeared at Sison’s home with about 35 men, demanding to get back their stolen goods. They
went to Sison’s home without any authority or warrant. While in the process of destroying Sison’s
fence, Sison returned with police officers and this prompted Yecyec and his men to leave. From the
total of 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps stored inside Sison’s fenced premises, only 207 kilos were left.
The value of the rubber cup lumps taken from the premises was P27,825.00. The RTC and CA both
dismissed the complaint of Theft for want of probable cause.
ISSUE: WON there was probable cause - Yes
HELD:
To determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the
crime as defined by law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive
function.The public prosecutor, who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by law and, thus, should
be held for trial, has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court.
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience,
expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the
reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office
designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state
from the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding
trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.
Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she
deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge should not override the public
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the
evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable cause is limited only
to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrant should be issued against
the accused.
It was clearly premature on the part of the RTC and the CA to make a determinative finding prior
to the parties' presentation of their respective evidence that the respondents lacked the intent to gain
and acted in good faith considering that they merely sought to recover the rubber cup lumps that they
believed to be theirs. It has long been settled that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be best passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.
Angelito P. Miranda v. Ma. Theresa M. Fernandez, Clerk III, MTC, QC
70
November 18, 2014 / A.M. No. P-14-3270
FACTS:
Miranda filed a complaint against Fernandez, Clerk III, MTC, QC, for grave misconduct, dishonesty,
estafa, and other deceits. Fernandez acts as an agent to money lenders, who granted a P124,800 loan
to respondent, surrendering her ATM as security for the loan. When the debt fell due, the creditors
tried to withdraw from her ATM machine, but the same was blocked by respondent to prevent
withdrawals. Miranda filed this complaint and respondent failed to comment on the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether Fernandez is liable administratively.
HELD:
Yes. EO 292 provides that an public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary
action. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, “just debts” is
defined as those 1) claims adjudicated by a court of law or 2) claims the existence and justness of
which are admitted by the debtor. For respondent’s failure to comment on the complaint, she is
deemed to have admitted the existence and justness of the claim against her.
Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 198076
FACTS:
Taganito Mining Corp. is registered with the Board of Investments for exporting nickels and ores. It
filed an application with the CIR on February 19, 2004, for refund of its excess input VAT paid on its
domestic products on taxable goods and services. The CTA dismissed the case, invoking the Aichi
doctrine, and ruling that it was bereft of jurisdiction for being prematurely filed for not waiting for the
120 days mandated by Section 112(D) of the NIRC. Taganito questioned the Aichi doctrine, arguing
that before that case, a taxpayer need not wait for the decision of the CIR on its administrative claim
for refund before it could file its judicial claim for refund, consonant with the period in Section 229.
ISSUE: Whether CTA had jurisdiction over the claim.
HELD:
Yes. Under the Aichi doctrine, the 120+30 day period prescribed under Section 112(D) is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The jurisdiction of the CTA over decisions or inaction of the CIR is only appellate in
nature and, thus, necessarily requires the filing of an administrative case before the CIR under Section
112. An exception to this period was carved out in San Roque, where the Court ruled that judicial claims
filed from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 need not wait for the exhaustion of the 120-day
period, pursuant to good faith reliance on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which expressly stated that the
“taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief
with the CTA by way of a Petition for Review”. Being filed within the period of exception, CTA has
jurisdiction over the present case.
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Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People of the Philippines

November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 199032
FACTS:
The PNP, through Senior Police Superintendent Fajardo, applied with the RTC of Manila Branch 50 for
a warrant to search 3 caves located inside Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City,
where the alleged remains of the victims of the victims summarily executed by the “Davao Death
Squad” may be found. In support of the application, Avasola testified that he personally witnessed the
killing of 6 victims and was part of the group that buried them. The search warrant was issued by
Judge Peralta and the search yielded positive results. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence principally on the grounds that: 1) Judge Peralta had no authority
to act on the application since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive
Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court, and 2) the
Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant which was sought to be enforced in Davao.
ISSUE: Whether the Search Warrant was validly issued.
HELD:
Yes. While the imposition of administrative penalties, pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, did operate to
divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, the abstraction of authority would not,
by itself, invalidate the Search Warrant. Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance
as a de facto officer whose acts would, as a matter of public policy, remain valid for all purposes in so
far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order for the de facto
doctrine to apply, the following elements must concur: 1) there must be a de jure office, 2) there must
be a color of right or general acquiescence by the public, and 3) there must be actual physical
possession of the office in good faith. These elements were all availing in this case.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search
warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These criminal cases
pertain to those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, and other relevant laws
enacted by Congress and included herein by the Supreme Court. Search warrant applications for such
cases may be filed by the NBI, PNP, and the Anti-Crime Task Force, and personally endorsed by the
heads of such agencies. The Executive Judge of the RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges are authorized t act on
such applications and shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The case, murder, being a heinous crime, properly fell within
the Rule, and the judge here complied with all the procedures required for the issuance of the search
warrant.
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Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corp. and Luzvimin Port Services Company, Inc. v.
Cebu Port Authority and Port Manager Angelo C. Verdan
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 201284
FACTS:
In 1997, the Cebu Port Authority (CPA) issued a Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate to
petitioners, authorizing them to operate a private port facility until December 31, 2022. In 2006, the
CPA rescinded the registration/permit on the ground that it is defective, and forthwith took possession
of the port facility, and started to fence the premises. Petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction and
Damages against CPA and its Port Manager before the RTC. RTC granted the injunction, ruling that
petitioners were not given an opportunity to be heard. The CA ruled that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, ruling that the writ cannot be issued to
take over the port facility because the repair of the RORO ramp, asphalting of back-up area,
construction of office, passenger terminal and covered walk are considered national government
projects as defined by RA 8975 against which no injunctive can lie pursuant to the same law.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ.
HELD:
No. The statute clearly states that no court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue injunctive writs
against the government to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: (d) Termination or rescission
of any such contract/project. The prohibition covers national government projects, which include
infrastructure projects, where the subject seaports are categorized under. Thus, only the Supreme
Court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents herein.
Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security Investigation Agency v.

Heirs of Nestor B. Villareal
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 212584
FACTS:
On March 17, 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron due to loss
of trust and confidence brought about by violations of RA 3019, Incompetence, gross negligence,
intellectual dishonesty, and intellectual immaturity as mayor of Puerto Princesa City. COMELEC issued
a Resolution finding the recall petition sufficient, but suspended further proceedings on recall until
the funding issue raised before Congress (in that no funding relative to the conduct of recall elections
was included in the 2014 GAA) is resolved. Goh filed this complaint alleging that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion for refusing to augment its savings, which power is granted to it
in the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether supplemental legislation is needed to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall
elections for 2014.
HELD:
73
No. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. The Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC’s fiscal autonomy, but also granted its
head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA
provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
Corporate Strategies Development Corporation and Rafael Prieto v. Norman

A. Agojo
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 208740
FACTS:
CSDC is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Makati. From 1994 to 2006, its real property taxes
in the amount of P1.458,199.85 had not been paid. As a result, the City Treasurer of Makati issued a
warrant on April 7, 2006, subjecting the property to levy pursuant to Section 258 of the LGC. A public
auction sale was then conducted on May 24, 2006 where respondent emerged as the highest bidder
in the amount of P2M, and was issued a certificate of sale. After the expiration of the 1 year period for
redemption, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. CSDC filed its
opposition thereto, alleging that the auction sale was defective, as they did not receive of the tax
delinquency or the warrant subjecting the property, for the same was made upon its old office address
despite its transfer to another location years ago. CA ruled that the sale was valid, on the basis of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the City Treasurer’s duties.
ISSUE: Whether the auction sale was defective for failure to observe due process.
HELD:
Yes. There could be no presumption of the regularity of any administrative action which resulted in
depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale. This is an exception to the rule that
administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular. The due process of law to be followed in tax
proceedings must be established by proof and the general rule was that the purchaser of a tax title
was bound to take upon himself the burden of showing the regularity of all proceedings leading up to
the sale. The requirements for a tax delinquency sale (publication of notice, issuance of a warrant of
levy served upon the person having legal interest therein, public advertisement of the sale within 30
days from service of levy) under the LGC are mandatory, and failure to observe the same is tantamount
to a deprivation of due process sufficient to invalidate the sale.
New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc., St. Paul Maritime Corp., and Angelina
T. Rivera v. Michael D. Despabelarderas
November 19, 2014 / G.R. No. 209201
FACTS:
Respondent was hired as Wiper to work on board the vessel M/V Athens Highway for a period of 9
months. On April 26, 2009, Michael joined the vessel. On August 20, 2009, while going down the
stairs of the vessel to get some tools, he slipped and fractured his left hand. A few days later, he
experienced severe pain and swelling in his left wrist, and so he was brought to the nearest hospital.
He was repatriated on August 28, 2009 and was given medical attention supervised by the company
74
physician, and later on endorsed to an orthopedic surgeon, who recommended that he continue with
physical therapy sessions. On Feb 10, 2010, he was required to return for a follow-up checkup on Feb
17, but for unknown reasons, he failed to return. During this length of time of more than 120 days, no
assessment of his fitness to return to work or permanent disability was made by the company
physician. Respondent argued that this failure to report, leaving his medical condition unresolved,
rendered him totally and permanently disabled.
ISSUE:
Whether Michael is entitled to disability benefits for failure to perform his pre-injury duties as seaman
for more than 120 days.
HELD:
No. The Court in Vergara held that the 120-day rule could not simply be applied as a general rule for
all cases and in all contexts. Vergara’s application depends on the circumstances of the case,
especially the parties’ compliance with their contractual duties and obligations as laid down in the
POEA-SEC and/or their CBA, if one exists. That same case instructed that the POEA SEC contract
must be read together with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code in that if the 120 day period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention,
the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days. There being no
assessment because of his own medical abandonment, his condition cannot be considered a
permanent total disability. Temporary total disability only becomes permanent when declared by the
company physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the 240-day
medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability.
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The

Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
November 24, 2014 / G.T. No. 210987
FACTS:
Philamlife sold its Class A shares in PhilamCare for USD 2,190,000 to STI Investments, Inc., who
emerged as the highest bidder. After the sale was completed and the necessary DST and CGT were
paid, Philamlife filed an application for a certificate authorizing registration/tax clearance with the
BIR Large Taxpayers Service Division to facilitate transfer of shares. It was instructed to secure a BIR
Ruling due to potential donor’s tax. The Commissioner denied Philamlife’s request and imposed a
donor’s tax pursuant to RR 06-08 and RMC 25-11, which Ruling was appealed to the Secretary of
Finance, assailing the nullity of the rules and circular. The same was dismissed. Petitioner then
appealed to the CA under Rule 43, which dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that
the same was with the CTA. Petitioner argued that the CTA had no jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and may not rule on the nullity of rules.
ISSUE:
Whether the CTA had jurisdiction over an appeal from the Secretary of Finance involving the nullity of
revenue regulation and revenue memorandum circulars.
75
HELD:
Yes. While there is no provision in the law that expressly provides where exactly the ruling of the
Secretary of Finance under Section 4 of the NIRC is appealable to, RA 1125 (Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals) addresses the seeming gap in the law as it vests the CTA with jurisdiction over the petition as
“other matters” arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR. CTA furthermore has
the power certiorari in cases within its appellate jurisdiction. As held in the case of City of Manila v.
Grecia-Cuerdo. in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction, such as
the power to issue writs of certiorari.
Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Hon. Commission on Elections, et. al.

November 25, 2014 / G.R. No. 212398
FACTS:
Edgar San Luis, a gubernatorial candidate and the incumbent governor of the Province of Laguna,
filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC First Division against E.R. Ejercito for
distributing material consideration in the form of “Orange Cards”, which could be used in any public
hospital within the province. He also alleged that Ejercito exceeded the maximum amount of
authorized expenses for the candidate by P16M. COMELEC disqualified him. Ejercito argued that the
advertising contract with ABS-CBN and Scenema Concept were executed by an unidentified supporter
without and knowledge and consent and he must not be penalized for the acts of third parties. He
furthermore wishes to draw a distinction between “contribution” and “expenditure”, for which
COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 makes no proscription on the amount of contributions.
ISSUE: Whether Ejercito should be disqualified for overspending in his election campaign.
HELD:
Yes. COMELEC Resolution 9476 requires that advertising contracts be signed by the donor and
accompanied by the written acceptance of the candidate before election propaganda materials
donated thereto shall be broadcasted. Thus, there was consent and the concept of “independent
expenditure” for which no authority or request for contributions were made cannot be applied. There is
likewise no merit in petitioner’s attempt to draw a distinction between “contribution” and
“expenditure”. The Court traced the legislative history of the assailed provision and concluded that the
intent of the lawmakers was to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his
contributor/supporter/donor, by including in the aggregate limit of the former’s election expenses
those incurred by the latter. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Rights of the
supporters to freedom of speech can neither be invoked for the regulation involved is content-neutral.
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Dennis A. B. Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Francisco T.

Duque III, Executive Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza, Office of the President
November 25, 2014 / G.R. No. 191672
FACTS:
On January 11, 2010, PGMA appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC, which appointment was
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on February 3, 2010. On February 22, 2010, PGMA
issued E.O. No. 864 providing for the inclusion of the Chairman of the CSC as “Ex-Officio member” of
the Board of Trustees/Directors of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC, and HDMF. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of EO 864 and the designation of
Duque as member of the Board of Directors/Trustees for being clear violations of Sections 1 and 2,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent argues that the prohibition against holding any
other office or employment under the Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities.
ISSUE: Whether Duque’s appointment as member of the Board of Trustees is proscribed by the
constitutional provision against holding any other office or employment.
HELD:
Yes. Section 2, Article IX-A provides that no member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. The court interpreted this disqualification in relation to
Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, which provides that unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government xxx. Being an appointive official who does not occupy a Cabinet position, Duque can hold
any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position. Such is not the case here. The term “ex officio” means “from
office; by virtue of office”, and refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position. It is the
functions of the officer, and not the use of the title “ex officio” that is controlling. A perusal of the
Charters of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF reveal that the these functions do not arise in consequence
of being the Chairman of the CSC. Thus, he cannot be considered an “ex officio” member of these
entities.
Ariel T. Lim v. People of the Philippines

November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 190834
FACTS:
Lim issued a 2 Bank of Commerce Checks, payable to CASH, in the amount of P100,000 each. He gave
the checks to Willie Castor as his campaign donation to the latter’s candidacy in the 1998 elections.
Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed Lim to issue a “Stop
Payment” order for the 2 checks, which were used for the payment of the same. The checks were then
dishonored and 2 demand letters were sent by Ms. Badiee to Lim, who then filed a complaint before
the Office of the Prosecutor. After receiving the subpoena, Lim issued a replacement check for
P200,000, which Ms. Badiee was able to encash. Nevertheless, 6 months after payment, 2
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Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against Lim before the MeTC, which found petitioner
guilty.
ISSUE: Whether Lim is liable for violation of B.P. 22.
HELD:
No. In Griffith v. CA, the Court held that while the gravamen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless
checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, penal laws should not be applied
mechanically. Although the payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day
period provided for in B.P. 22 would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the Court has long
recognized extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime are present, the conviction
of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society’s sense of justice. However, it must be
maintained that payment of the value of the bounced checks after the information has been filed in
court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no
circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate
the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason
to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
Marcelo Investment and Management Corp. and the Heirs of Edward T.

Marcelo, namely Katherine J. Marcelo, et. al. v. Jose T. Marcelo, Jr.
November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 209651
FACTS:
On August 24, 1987, Jose Sr. died intestate, leaving 4 compulsory heirs: Edward, George, Helen, and
Jose Jr. MIMCO filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate, and pending
the issuance of the same, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose Jr. as special administrators. The RTC
then appointed Edward as regular administrator of the estate, to which Jose Jr. filed an MR, arguing
on his competence to better administer his father’s estate, which was denied. The Court subsequently
approved the partition of Jose Sr.’s estate as proposed by Edward. The intestate proceedings were
then archived pending Edward’s submission of proof of payment of estate taxes, during which Edward
died. Jose Jr. wasted no time in reviving the intestate proceedings involving his father’s estate and
moved for his appointment as regular administrator thereof. The RTC granted the motion, ruling that
there was no previous ruling that respondent was unfit to administer the estate. Petitioners appealed
the order on two points: 1) that the appointment of a regular administrator is no longer necessary as
there no longer remains a pending matter in the settlement of Jose Sr.’s estate requiring attention and
administration as there was no existing or unliquidated debt against the estate; and 2) that Jose Jr.
was found by final judgment to be unfit to act as administrator.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the appointment of an administrator is no longer necessary; and
2) Whether Jose Jr. is disqualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate.
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HELD:
1) No. The proceedings were still at the liquidation, partition, and distribution stage, necessitating
the appointment of a regular administrator. There was no showing from either parties that the
receivables of and claims against Jose Sr.’s estate has been actually liquidated. Further, the
liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, and partition and distribution to the heirs are still
held in abeyance pending the payment of estate taxes. The intestate proceedings thus requires a
regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the
decedent.
2) Yes. Records show that in all of Jose Jr.’s oppositions to Edward’s appointment as regular
administrator, he simultaneously prayed for his appointment, thereby proffering his competence
and qualification to be appointed as regular administrator as a legal issue for resolution of the
courts. The decision of the trial court appointing Edward, was not merely a comparison of the
qualifications of Edward and Jose Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the
unfitness of Jose Jr., who allegedly “borrowed” company assets for his personal use and has not
returned them. RTC’s categorical declaration of Jose Jr.’s unfitness and unsuitability to administer
his father’s estate was a decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by this Court. Thus, he is
not qualified to be appointed as such.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Bank of the

Philippine Islands v. Wilfred N. Chiok/Global Business Bank, Inc. v. Wilfred
N. Chiok
November 26, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 172652, 175302, 175394
FACTS:
Chiok has been engaged in dollar trading for several years, by reason of which he maintained accounts
with Metrobank and Global Bank, with which he had a Bills Purchase Line Agreement (BPLA). 2
Manager’s Checks (MC) and 1 Cashier’s Check (CC) were issued by Global Bank and Metrobank
respectively in the name of Gonzalo Nuguid, which Chiok deposited in the Nuguid’s BPI account. In
return, Nuguid was supposed to deliver around US$1M, which he failed to do. Chiok secured a TRO
from the RTC directing the banks from honoring the checks, which Metrobank received a day after the
check was presented for payment. BPI filed a complaint-in-intervention for allegedly allowing Nuguid
to withdraw the amounts of the Global Bank MCs on the same day the checks were deposited. RTC
ruled that payment of MCs and CCs are subject to the condition that the payee thereof complies with
his obligations to the purchaser of the checks. It ultimately ordered the banks to pay Chiok the value of
the checks, and Nuguid to pay the banks. The banks submit that the Stop Order was illegal and
contrary to principles of commercial law.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the Stop Order by the RTC, grounded on the breach of the payee’s obligation, was valid;
and
2) Whether the purchaser of the checks has the right to have the checks cancelled by filing an action
for rescission of its contract with the payee.
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HELD:
1) No. An MC, like a CC, is an order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its
total resources, integrity, and honor behind its issuance, and is regarded substantially to be as
good as the money it represents. While indeed, it cannot be said that manager’s and cashier’s
checks are pre-cleared, “clearing” should not be confused with “acceptance”. MCs and CCs are
still the subject of clearing to ensure that the same have not been materially altered or otherwise
completely counterfeited. However, MCs and CCs are pre-accepted by the mere issuance thereof
by the bank, which is both its drawer and drawee. Thus, while MCs and CCs are still subject to
clearing, they cannot be countermanded for being drawn against a closed account, insufficient
funds, or for similar reasons such as a condition not appearing on the face of the check.
2) No. The right to rescind under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the CA in tis ruling, is
predicated upon the reciprocity of the obligations of the injured party and the guilty party. The
right of rescission under Article 1191 can only be exercised in accordance with the principle of
relativity of contracts under Article 1131, where contracts can only bind the parties who entered into
it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof. Here, while Chiok may have a cause of action against Nuguid for
the rescission of their contract, he does not have a cause of action against the banks that would
allow him to rescind the MCs and CC, which would have resulted in the crediting of the amounts
thereof back to his account. The RTC and CA Order on this point must therefore be reversed.
City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority/Prove of Bataan,

represented by Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., and Emerlinda S. Talento, in
her capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Bataan v. Philippine Economic Zone
Authority
November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 184203
FACTS:
The City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA P32M in real
property taxes from 1992 to 1998 on its properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The City
made subsequent demands to PEZA; in its last reminder, PEZA was assesserd P86M as real property
taxes for the period of 1992 to 2002. PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Pasay, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of the same. The City filed an MR
and thereafter appealed to the CA. The City argued that in the first place, the RTC of Pasay had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy for PEZA.
HELD:
No. The Court ruled that the remedy of a taxpayer depends on the stage in which the LGU is enforcing
its authority to impose real property taxes. Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the LGC is
necessary in cases of erroneous assessments where the correctness of the amount assessed is assailed.
The taxpayer must first pay the tax then file a protest with the Local Treasurer within 30 days from the
date of payment of tax. If denied or upon the lapse of the 60-day period to decide the protest, the
taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days, which has 120 days to
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decide the appeal. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision, he may appeal before the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, whose decision is thereafter appealable to the CTA En Banc. The
decision can then be appealed to the SC raising pure questions of law.
In case of an illegal assessment where the assessment was issued without authority, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not necessary and the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action. The
taxpayer shall file a complaint for injunction before the RTC to enjoin the local government from
collecting real property taxes. The party unsatisfied with the decision shall file an appeal, not a
petition for certiorari, before the CTA, the complaint being a local tax case decided by the RTC. The
decision may then be appealed before the SC through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
raising pure questions of law.
In case the LGU has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a complaint for injunction
to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public auction. In case the property had already
been sold, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court the amount for which the real property was
sold, together with interest of 2% per month from the sale of the to the time of the institution of the
action. The decisions of the RTC in these cases shall be appealable to the CTA, whose decisions are
can then be appealed to the SC raising pure questions of law.
A petition for declaratory relief was not the proper remedy, since the subject matter of the
petition, PEZA’ alleged tax exempt status under its charter, had already been breached.
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UP LAW BOC DECEMBER 2014 DIGEST COMPILATION
DECEMBER 2014
Villareal v. People / People v. the Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. / Dizon v.
People / Villa v. Escalona II, et al.
December 1, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080
FACTS:
This case involves the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa due to fraternity hazing in 1991. In 1993, the
RTC found the 26 accused guilty of homicide. On appeal, the CA set aside the finding of conspiracy
and rendered judgment acquitting 19 of the accused and reducing the pronouncement of 4 of the
accused (Tecson et. al.) to slight physical injuries in 2002. Motions for reconsideration were filed by
the Republic of the Philippines. Tecson et. al. filed separate motions insisting that the previous verdict
of the CA has already lapsed into finality as a result of their previous availments of the probation
program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. SC found them guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide instead.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the motion for reconsideration is barred under the accused’s right against double
jeopardy; and 2) Whether the accused may reapply for probation despite an appeal made from a
previous judgment of guilt for a crime wherein probation is unavailable.
HELD:
1) No. Section 7, Rule 120 shows that to prevent double jeopardy, only the accused may appeal
the criminal aspect of a criminal case; and thus the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when
applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. This rule,
however, does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. The rule of double jeopardy is
not absolute, and this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the
court that issued the criminal judgment, such as in a Rule 65 petition. In such petition, any resulting
annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
2) Yes. In Colinares v. People, the Court, on grounds of fairness, allowed the accused to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him, unlike the one erroneously imposed
by the trial court, is subject to probation. The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his
right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality
towards the accused.
Cerafica v. Commission on Elections

December 2, 2014 / G.R. No. 205136
FACTS:
On October 1, 2012, Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig, for the
2013 Elections. Said COC stated that she was born on October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 on the
day of the elections, in contravention of the minimum age requirement of 23. She was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing; but instead of attending, Kimberly opted to file a Sworn Statement of
Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute for Kimberly. COMELEC
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resolved to cancel Kimberly’s COC and denied the substitution on the ground that the initial COC was
void and thus cannot be used for substitution.
ISSUE: Whether the substitution was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not give due course to COCs. The duty of the
COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and while the
COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on its
face. The question of eligibility and ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC. Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B.P. Blg. 881, not just any
person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted.
In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can validly
substituted.
Victoria-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., and Marcelo, Jr.

December 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 193018
FACTS:
Pacific Plans Inc. is engaged in the selling of pre-need plans and educational plans, including
traditional open-ended educational plans (PEPTrads), and petitioner is a holder of 2 of these
PEPTrads. On April 7, 2005, foreseeing the impossibility of meeting its obligations to the availing
plan holders as they fall due, respondent filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation with the RTC.
The RTC issued a Stay Order, and subsequently approved the Alternative Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). In
the meantime, the value of the Peso strengthened and since Pacific Plan’s trust fund is mainly
composed of NAPOCOR bonds that are denominated in US Dollars, respondent submitted a
Manifestation and Motion to Admit the Modified Rehabilitation Plan (MRP) with the Rehabilitation
Court. The Rehabilitation Court, invoking its “cram down” power, approved the MRP over the
comments/opposition by the concerned parties. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review under Rule
43 with the CA, questioning the Rehabilitation Court’s approval of the MRP, insofar as it reduces the
original claim and amount that petitioner was to receive under the ARP.
ISSUES: 1) Whether a Rule 43 petition for review is the proper mode of review of a decision of the
Rehabilitation Court approving a Rehabilitation Plan; and 2) Whether it was within the power of the
Rehabilitation Court to approve the MRP.
HELD:
1) No; but the petition may be given due course, as the Rules at the time the petitioner filed the
petition for review provided for a Rule 43 mode of review. The Supreme Court has since issued A.M.
No. 00-8-10-SC (Rehabilitation Rules) which took effect on January 16, 2009, which unequivocally
states that “an order issued after the approval of the rehabilitation plan can be reviewed only through
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2) The “cram down” power of the Rehabilitation Court has long been established and even
codified under the Rehabilitation Rules, to wit: “The court may approve a rehabilitation plan over the
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opposition of creditors if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition
of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. While the voice and participation of the creditors is crucial
in the determination of the viability of the rehabilitation plan, as they stand to benefit or suffer in the
implementation thereof, the interests of all stakeholders is the ultimate and prime consideration.
Thus, while we recognize the predisposition of the planholders in vacillating on the enforcement of the
MRP, since the terms and conditions stated therein have been fundamentally changed from those
stated in the Original and Amended Rehabilitation Plan, the MRP cannot be considered an abrogation
of rights to the planholders/creditors.
Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem

December 10, 2014 / G.R. 193707
FACTS:
Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on Sept.
25, 1990. In 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who, at the time
of filing the petition, was 16 years of age. They were divorced in 1995 by virtue of a Court Decree issued
by the Court of Holland; thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. She alleged
that Ernst promised to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of P17,500, but he never
gave such support. On August 28, 2009, Norma sent a letter demanding support from Ernst, who
refused to receive the letter. She thus filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
for violation of Section 5 (E2) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjust refusal to support his minor child. The RTC
dismissed the case, ruling that the obligation to support of the accused is subject to his national law,
thus he cannot be charged under R.A. No. 9262 for failure to support his child.
ISSUE: Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child and can thus be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
HELD:
Yes. Since Article 15 stresses the principle of nationality, petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the
NCC is demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen. Insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. However, this does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether. Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum”. Thus, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforces a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalizes non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines, because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto. Thus, respondent may be made liable under R.A. 9262.
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Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon

December 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 201781
FACTS:
Respondents filed a verified complaint before the HLURB against Silverland Realty & Development
Corp., Silverland Village Homeowners Association, Silverland Alliance Christian Church (SACC) and
the Geronimo’s. They alleged that the Geronimo’s caused construction of a building, which turned out
to be the SACC, which was used for daily worship services, baptisms, summer school, choir rehearsals,
band practice, etc., causing a lot of noise and allegedly affected their health. This was contrary to the
Contract to Sell the parcel of land, which provided that the parcel of land “shall be used exclusively for
one single-family residential building”. SACC responded that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the
case which primarily involves abatement of nuisance, which is primarily lodged with the regular
courts. The HLURB rendered its decision, enjoining the use of the property for religious purposes.
ISSUE: Whether HLURB had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause
of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties. The provisions of P.D. No. 957
entitled “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” were intended to encompass
all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. In the present case, respondents are buyers
of a subdivision lot from the Corporation, and its action against the same was for violation of its own
subdivision plan when it allowed the construction and operation of the SACC. Respondents sough to
stop the church activities inside the subdivision which is in contravention of the residential use of the
subdivision lot. Undoubtedly, the suit for enforcement of statutory and contractual obligations of the
subdivision developer clearly falls within the ambit of the HLURB’s jurisdiction.
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr., and the Province of Camarines Sur v. Hon. Robredo, in
his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
December 10, 2014 / G.R. No. 195390
FACTS:
In 1995, the COA conducted an audit on the manner the LGUs utilized their Internal Revenie Allotment
(IRA) for the years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, revealing that a substantial
portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects
but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses (MOOE). In response thereto, the DILG Secretary released Memorandum Circulars restricting
the meaning of “development” and enumerated activities which must be funded by the development
fund. It also required publication of income and expenditures. In 2011, Villafuerte filed a petition for
certiorari, seeking to nullify the issuances for allegedly infringing upon the local and fiscal autonomy
of LGUs. Respondent filed his comment, moving to dismiss the case for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies.
ISSUE: 1) Whether the case is ripe for judicial review; and 2) Whether the Memorandum Circulars is
void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
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HELD:
1) Yes. The issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the DILG. In challenging
the validity of an administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not stand das a bar in promptly resorting to
the filing of a case in court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-judicial power.
2) No. The assailed Memorandum Circulars do not transgress the local and fiscal autonomy
granted to LGUs. A reading of the MC shows the definition provided for “development” is a mere
reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine
themselves if they had been complying with the law. The requirement of posting is valid, as the
supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to embrace the power to require publication of
certain documents as a mechanism for transparency. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. The President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies,
plans and programs for the entire country.
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Hon. Colet

December 10, 2014 / G.R. Nos. 120051, 121613, 121675, 121704, 121720-28, 121847-55, 122333,
122335, 122349, 124855
FACTS:
10 consolidated petitions question the constitutionality and/or validity of Section 21(B) of Ordinance
No. 7794 of the City of Manila, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, enacted in 1993.
Petitioners were corporations with principal offices in Manila that paid business taxes on the gross
receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight
by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water under protest to the City Treasurer, pursuant to the
business tax provision in the Manila Revenue Code. The RTC upheld the power of the City of Manila, as
an LGU, to levy business tax, consistent with the basic policy of fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Whether Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code was valid.
HELD:
No. The provision was null and void for being beyond the power of the City of Manila and its public
officials to enact, approve, and implement under the LGC. It is well-settled that although the power to
tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by
Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. The
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, or the municipality cannot assume
it. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides, “the power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and
other charges.” Nevertheless, such authority is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
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Congress may provide”. Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from
imposing any tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water. This is a
specific provision that explicitly withholds from any LGUs the power to tax the aforementioned
activities, and cannot be defeated by the “catch-all” provision in Section 143(h) of the LGC on the
grant of the power to the municipality to impose business tax.
Aguilar v. Lightbringers Cooperative

Jan. 12, 2015 / G.R. No. 2096205
FACTS:
The case stemmed from 3 complaints for sum of money filed by Lightbringers vs. Aguilar and
Calimbas, which were consolidated before the MCTC.
Aguilar et al filed their answers, but they did not appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference,
leading to Lightbringers presenting its evidence ex-parte. Aguilar et al thus filed a motion to be
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses presented. MCTC denied that motion. As a result, judgment
was rendered against Aguilar and Calimbas. RTC affirmed the judgments. CA further affirmed RTC,
partially holding that the petition was formally defective for failure to attach the entire records of the
case. MR denied.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) WON the failure to attach the entire records rendered the petition formally defective. (No)
2) WON the failure to attend pretrial conference results in the default of the parties (No)
RATIO:
1) Sec. 2, R42 does not require that the entire records of the case be attached to the petition for review,
providing instead only that “material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition” be attached. That means not the entire records.
The Court ruled that attached photocopies of the material documents which is substantial
compliance with Sec. 2, R42.
2) ****CLARIFICATION TIME******
While the rule remains that the court can only consider the evidence presented by the party which
attended the pre-trial conference, this does not result in the default of the defendant. Rather, such
failure shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the Court could only consider the evidence presented by
Lightbringers, with Aguilar et al losing their right to present their evidence.
Petition Partially Granted.
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JANUARY 2015
NFF Industrial v G&L
Jan. 12, 2015 / G.R. No. 178169
FACTS:
G&L bought bulk bags from NFF Industrial. The delivery of such bags were duly acknowledged by
representatives of G&L, and were covered by sales invoices. However, G&L claimed that the delivery
was not made to an authorized representative, as proven by the name in the purchase order. Thus, it
did not pay for the supposed delivery within 30 days
This led NFF to send a demand letter to G&L for payment. This, and 2 subsequent demand letters
went unheeded. Thus, NFF filed a complaint for a sum of money against G&L. RTC ruled in favor of
NFF. CA reversed. MR denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: WON there was valid delivery on the part of NFF, which would give rise to an obligation to pay
on the part of G7L to pay. (Yes)
RATIO:
NFF clearly actually delivered the bulk bags, albeit not to the person named in the purchase order. In
addition, by allowing NFF’s employee to pass through the guard-on-duty, who allwed the entry of
delivery into the premises of Hi-Cement, which is the designated delivery site, G&L effectively
abandoned whatever infirmities may have attended the delivery of the bulk bags. If G&L was wary
about the manner of delivery, that issue should have been brought up immediately after the first
delivery was made. Instead, the non-representative acknowledged receipt of the bulk bags and even
followed up on the balance.
This means that the failure to strictly comply with delivery instructions was of no moment,
because acceptance may be inferred from the conduct of G&L. Further, the use of the bulk bags shows
that they took ownership over the bags. Thus, delivery having been made, G&L should have paid NFF.
Petition Granted. CA decision reversed. RTC affirmed.
Eastern Shipping Lines v BPI/MS Insurance

Jan. 12, 2015 / G.R. No. 182864
FACTS:
Sumitomo shipped steel sheets to Calamba Steel via Eastern Shipping, insured by BPI/MS. The steel
sheets were loaded in good order, but were received at Manila in bad order. Calamba thus rejected the
damaged shipment for being unfir for the intended purpose.
This led BPI/MS to file a complaint against Eastern Shipping as carrier and ATI as arrastre
operator for Damages. Both denied liability, leading to an insurance claim with BPI/MS. Having paid
the amount, BPI/MS was subrogated in the rights of Calamba.
In its defense, ATI claimed that the sheets were already damaged upon receipt from Eastern
Shipping. Having exercised due diligence, it claimed, it was free from liability. In response, Eastern
shipping filed a cross claim against ATI, claiming that the latter was negligent.
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RTC found both Eastern and ATI liable. CA affirmed with regard to Eastern, but absolved ATI from
liability. Hence, Eastern Shipping filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: WON Eastern shipping is liable (Yes)
RATIO:
In trying to prove its innocence, Eastern Shipping relied on the survey report of its Cargo Surveyor.
However, in that report, Eastern was not absolved of liability
***DOCTRINE****
Also, from that survey report, there is an absence of a crucial point in determining the liability of
either or both Eastern and ATI—the lack of determination whether the cargo was in good order
condition as described in the bills of lading at the time of their boarding. The actual conition of the
cargo upon arrival prior to discharge must be proven.
Common carriers must observe extraordinary diligence. Mere proof of delivery of the goods in
good order to a common carrier and the subsequent arrival in bad order constitutes a prima facie case
of fault or negligence against a carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the loss,
deterioration or destruction of the goods occurred, the transporter will be held liable. Here, in the
absence of proof that the goods did not arrive to Eastern in good condition, but with proof that they
arrived in bad condiditon, the fault is attributable to the common carrier Eastern Shipping.
Petition Denied. CA affirmed.
BDO v RCBC
Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 198756
FACTS:
RCBC assisted CODE-NGO in requesting approval from the Department of Finance for the issuance of
Treasury Certificates, which it would purchase through a special purpose vehicle, and then repackaged
and sold at a premium to investors as PEACe bonds, in order to endow a permanent fund to finance
meritorious activities and projects of accredited NGOs throughout the country.
Upon a request for a BIR ruling on the tax treatment of the bonds, the BIR initially ruled that the
bonds, not being issued to 20 or more individual or corporate lenders, were not to be considered
deposit substitutes, and thus were not subject to 20% withholding tax. In accordance to this ruling,
the auction for the said bonds were only offered to at most 19 buyers, as the origination of the bonds
was “one time” in accordance with the NIRC.
RCBC won the auction, resulting in a discount of approximately 24.83B. RCBC Capital later
entered into an underwriting agreement with CODE-NGO. Under the underwriting agreement. It was
stated that all income derived from the bonds was tax-exempt, based on the prior ruling of the BIR.
However, the BIR later reversed that ruling in a later ruling, and imposed a 20% final withholding tax.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: WON the PEACe bonds are deposit substitutes subject to 20% final withholding tax. (Maybe)
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RATIO:
Preliminarily, there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies because this is purely a legal
question, and the circumstances indicate the urgency of judicial intervention.
It must be noted that any monetary benefits from deposit substitutes are subject to a 20% final
withholding tax, unlike regular debt instruments, which are subject to regular income tax. Deposit
substitutes are an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public. Public means borrowing from
20 or more individual or corporate lenders at one time.
A zero-coupon bond is a bond bought at a price substantially lower than its face value, with the
face value repaid at the time of maturity. It is claimed that the zero coupon bonds involved here were
only issued to one lender—RCBC.
The SC disagreed. The financial market is an aggolomeration of financial transactions in
securities performed by market participants that works to transfer the funds from the surplus units to
those who need them. From the viewpoint of the financial market, the phrase “at any one time” for
purposes of determining the “20 or more lenders” means every transaction executed in the primary or
secondary market in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
Here, while ostensibly there was only one lender, the issuance of bonds in favor of RCBC would
then be followed by a sale to an undisclosed number of individual buyers, but possibly more than 20.
Thus, the SC ruled, this indirect financing made the issuance of the bonds public, and subjected the
income derived from the deposit substitute PEACe bonds taxable. If there were more than 20
purchasers the income from the bonds would be subject to FWT.
Petition Granted. BIR rulings saying that the bonds are tax-exempt nullified.
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v COA

Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 185544
FACTS:
Clark Development Corp approached Laguesma Magsalin to handle the labor cases. While the OGCC
originally did not approve this request, it later did. Thus, Laguesma Magsalin began rendering legal
services. However, it had yet to get the approval of the COA. Eventually, however, neither OGCC nor
COA wanted to concur until the other did.
The COA decided the matter by denying the request for clearance of engaging Laguesma
Magsalin, ruling that CDC violated the Memorandum that the consent of both the OGCC and the COA
was necessary. Thus, it was not the government’s responsibility to pay the legal fees already incurred
by Clark, but the responsible government officials. MR denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: WON the payment of legal fees was correctly disallowed. (Yes)
RATIO:
When a government entity engages the legal services of private counsel, it must do so with the
necessary authorization required by law; otherwise its officials bind themselves to be personally liable
for compensating private counsel’s services.
The OGCC is mandated by law to provide legal services to GOCCs such as CDC. Generally, GOCCs
are not allowed to engage the services of private counsels, but they are allowed to only in
“extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” or “exceptional cases.”
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Here, the labor cases were not of a complicated or peculiar nature that could justify the hiring of a
known expert in the field. Further, the private counsel was engaged without the necessary consent of
the OGCC and the COA.
While the applicable COA circular does not so provide, in order to fill this gap in the law the SC
ruled that the officers who violated the circular shall be personally liable for the payment of the fees.
Petition Dismissed.
Gutierrez v COA
Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 200628
FACTS:
Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer designated to the NFA’s NCR District Office. She sometimes
placed her daily collections in a wooden cabinet.
However, the Office was robbed, including the funds in the wooden cabinet. Nevertheless,
Gutierrez was informed that she must immediately produce the missing funds. She appealed, but the
appeal was denied.
ISSUES: WON Gutierrez is still accountable for the lost funds (Yes)
RATIO:
First, the right to counsel applies only to criminal, not administrative proceedings.
Second, and more pertinently, a cashier who is found to have been negligent in keeping the funds in
his or her custody cannot be relieved from his or her accountability for amounts lost through robbery.
As a cashier for the NFA, Gutierrez qualifies as an accountable officer under PD 1445.
An accountable officer is a government officer whose duties require them to possess or be in
custody of government funds or properties. Under PD 1445, Sec. 105, they are liable for all losses
attributable to negligence in the keeping of funds.
Here, Gutierrez was negligent in keeping the funds in wooden cabinets instead of in the vault. As
such, she was liable.
Petition Denied.
Maritime Industry v COA

Jan. 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 185812
FACTS:
Several officers and employees of the Maritime Industry Authority received allowances and incentives,
including anniversary allowances and birthday allowances. This was according to a supposed approval
by the President of such allowances.
The Resident Auditor issued notices of disallowance on the allowances and incentives received by
the officers and employees of Maritime Industry Authority, citing the Salary Standardization Law,
ruling that the grant of the allowances would constitute double compensation under the
Constitution. The Legal and Adjudication Office of the Commission on Audit upheld the notices of
disallowance issued. The Commission on Audit affirmed the notices of disallowance.
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ISSUE: WON the allowance or incentives granted to the officers and employees of Maritime Industry
Authority have legal basis. (No)
RATIO:
Contrary to the position of MIA that the allowances were not integrated into the SSL because no
circular had been issued yet to that effect, the DBM’s issuances are only for the purposes of identifying
additional non-integrated benefits, over and above the standardized salary rates.
Action by the Department of Budget and Management is not required to implement Section 12
integrating allowances into the standardized salary. Rather, an issuance by the Department of Budget
and Management is required only if additional non-integrated allowances will be identified. Without
this issuance from the Department of Budget and Management, the enumerated non-integrated
allowances in Section 12 remain exclusive.
As for the supposed approval by the President, that is not a law that would allow the grant of
allowances and benefits to the employees of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority. Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758 does not require the enactment of a law to exclude benefits or allowances from
the standardized salary. What is required is a determination by the Department of Budget and
Management of the non-integrated benefits or allowances.
Thus, in accordance with Section 8, Art. IX (B) of the Constitution, the allowances are double
compensation and thus void. If a public officer or employee receives compensation above the
standardized salary, it is double compensation.
COA affirmed.
Kalaw v. Fernandez
Jan. 14, 2015 / G.R. No. 166357
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion
of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this
case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this
case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
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The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of
nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
“less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the
next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
“trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must
of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally
examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that
a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the
better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The
position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article
36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the
RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.
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The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages,
for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination
of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made
her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly
on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture
of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
Petition Granted. Decision set aside. RTC decision reinstated. Marriage declared void ab initio.
Almendras v. Almendras
Jan. 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 179491
FACTS:
Alejandro Almendras sent letters to House Speaker JDV and the President of Oil Carriers, Inc, wherein
he essentially insulted his brother Alexis Dodong Almendras, calling him a blackmailer. Thus, Dodong
filed a case for damages arising from defamation. RTC ruled that there was defamation. On appeal,
Alejandro claimed that the letter was privileged communication because he sent it to the house
speaker. Appeal Denied.
Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the letters fall within the purview of privileged communication, and therefore WON the CA erred
in awarding damages. (No)
HELD:
The statements in the letter were defamatory, as they labeled Dodogn as a renowned blackmailer, a
vengeful family member who field cases against his mother and siblings with nefarious design.
As to the privileged communications argument, he did not snd it only to the person with interest or
duty in the matter alleged, i.e. JDV. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. Examination of the letters would
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reveal that petitioner himself intended for the letters to be circulated when Alejandro asked for the
assistance of the office in circulating the information to concerned officials . thus, the letters were
defamatory and damages are in order.
Petition Granted.
CBK Power v. CIR

Jan. 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 193383-84
FACTS:
CBK is a limited partnership engaged in the development and operation of hydroelectric power plants
in Laguna, and registered as a preferred pioneer area of investment. It obtained a syndicated loan
from several foreign banks, from countries with tax treaties with the Philippines. Under the treaties,
income derived from the loans are subject to a preferential tax rate of 10%.
Nevertheless, the CIR assessed a Final Withholding Tax of 20%. CBK’s claim for a refund was not
acted upon. Upon the lapse of the mandatory 180 day period, petitions for review were filed with the
CTA. CTA granted the petitions and ordered a refund. However, the CTA en banc reversed. Hence
these consolidated petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON the BIR may add a requirement-prior application for an ITAD ruling-that is not found in
the income tax treaties signed by the Philippines (No.)
2. WON CBK should have exhausted administrative remedies before seeking redress (No)
HELD:
1. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No.
1-2000, which required that the parties apply for treaty relief with the International Tax
Affairs Decision. The policy of the latter issuance is to prevent erroneous interpretation or
interpretation of the treaties. However, where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or
excessive payment, and not a supposed attempt to claim benefits. Thus, those who are
entitled to the benefit of a treaty cannot be deprived of such benefit for failing to strictly
comply with an administrative issuance. Further, that requirement is not found in the treates
at all. Thus, the administrative claim should be deemed substantial compliance with the RMO.
2. The exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only to judicial claims for refund, not
administrative ones like this one.
Petition Granted. CTA reversed.
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Wellex v. U-Land
Jan 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 167519
FACTS:
Wellex owns all the sahres of stock of Airphil, while U-Land is a Taiwanese Airline. Wellex and U-Land
entered into an agreement whereby U-Land would acquire shares of stock of AirPhil from Wellex,
equivalent to 35% of the outstanding capital stock, in exchange for shares of stock of U-Land.
The transfer of the stocks was conditioned on the SEC approval of the issuance of shares of stock .
Further, should the 2 parties be unable to agree on the terms of the share purchase agreement within
40 days from signing, the MOA would cease to be effective.
The parties then entered into a 2nd MOA whereby Wellex said that it would acquire the requisite
number of AirPhil Stocks. However, after the 40 day period elapsed, no stock swap was realized.
Despite this, U-Land still paid Wellex the purchase price for the shares. After the swap still failed to
materialize, U-Land demanded the return of the price it paid. Wellex refused, on the ground that the
agreements had yet to be finalized when U-Land was forced to suspend operations because of
financial problems. Thus, it was their fault the swap didn’t push through.
This led to a complaint for rescission, which was granted by the RTC. CA affirmed. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the rescission was proper. (Yes)
HELD:
Interpreting the terms of the contract, the parties agreed that terms had to be agreed and a share
purchase agreement executed before the stock swap could take place. The transfer of the shares of
stock is different from the execution of the agreement. The 40-day period was clearly meant for the
parties to negotiate that agreement.
Thus, as no such agreement had been executed, U-Land was under no obligation to pay. As such, the
payment made was premature and not an indication that the obligation to pay it had been
consummated.
Petition Granted.
Sara Lee Phils v Macatlang

Jan. 14, 2015/ G.R. No. 180147
FACTS:
Aris Philippines ceased operations, leaving almost 6,000 employees unemployed. However, Fashion
Accessories Phils Inc. was later incorporated. This led the employees to file a case for illegal dismissal
against both those companies, alleging that FAPi was a mere continuation of Aris Philippines.
LA found that there was illegal dismissal. NLRC reversed, on the ground that the corporations
had yet to post an appeal bond. CA ordered them to file the bond, as did the SC. Hence this MR.
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ISSUES:
1. WON the filing of the 10% appeal bond is sufficient compliance. (No)
2. WON the case has been decided by confessions of judgment in accordance with the
compromise entered into between the corporations and the workers (No)
HELD:
Previous rulings that 10% appeal bonds are sufficient compliance pertains only to the reasonable
amount that the NLRC would accept to accompany a motion to reduce bond, not a reduction of the
amount of the appeal bond.
As for the compromise designated as confession of judgment, it was struck down for being against
public policy. First, a confession of judgment is void when executed by counsel without the knowledge
and authority of the client. Here, not all 6000 complainants signed SPAs. Thus, the confession of
judgment is void.
Even if this was a compromise agreement and not a confession of judgment, it is against public policy
because there is a great disparity beteen the amount offered therein by the corporations (342M) and
the judgment award (3.45B). Accepting this outrageously low amount of consideration as a
compromise defeats the complainants’ legitimate claims.
MR Denied.
Saudi Arabian Air v. Rebesencio

Jan. 14, 2015 / G.R. No. 198587
FACTS:
2 Filipina stewardesses were dismissed from Saudi Arabian Airlines, on the ground that their
employment contracts provided that should stewardesses become pregnant during the pendency of
the contract, the same shall be terminated. Instead of terminating them, however, they were forced to
sign resignation letters.
This led the 2 stewardesses to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA dismissed the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the LA and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the complaint and could apply Philippine law
(Yes)
2. WON the stewardesses were illegally terminated (Yes)
HELD:
1. Summons were validly served on Saudia, through its Philippine Office. Thus the courts had
jurisdiction. Next, there were no circumstances which required the application of forum non
conveniens. Even though forum non conveniens is different from choice of law, the choice of
law clause in the contracts does not preclude the application of Philippine law.
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In fact, more explicitly, Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground
for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it
shall be deemed waived. It must also proceed from a factually established basis, i.e. that the
case has been brought in another jurisdiction.
Thus, a defendant must show not only supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this
jurisdiction, but also that the danger is real and present in that litigation and that a foreign
tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction.
As for choice of law, citing Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople, Philippine labor laws must
be construed as being written into employment contracts of Filipinos, in accordance with the
public policy of the Philippines. That also includes the constitutional provs on the equal
treatment of women and the CEDAW. Thus, the provision on termination in case of pregnancy
touches on public policy, and Philippine law should be applied.
2. The stewardesses were constructively dismissed, as they did not intend to resign and were
forced to resign. They intended to continue working for Saudia, and exerted all efforts to
remain so employed.
CA affirmed.
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

Jan. 21, 2015 / G.R. No. 205728
FACTS:
The Diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarps within a private compound. The first one read “IBASURA RH
LAW,” while the second, more controversial one contains the heading “Conscience Vote,” and lists
candidates either as (Anti-RH) Team Buhay, with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark, obviously based on how they voted on the RH bill.
Mavil Majarucon, Election officer of Bacolod City, issued a notice to remove campaign materials
addressed to the Bishop of Bacolod, on the ground that it was oversized. In response the bishop
requested for a definite ruling regarding the legality of the tarpaulin.
Hence this SCA for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the SC could rule on the case, no MR having been filed. (Yes)
2. WON the COMELEC had the legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens (No.)
3. WON the tarpaulins are a form of expression (protected speech) or election
propaganda.(Political speech.)
4. WON the limitation on the size of the tarp is content-neutral or content-based regulation.
(content-based)
5. WON the tarps were valid expressions. (Yes)
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6. WON the order of Majarucon violated the principle of separation of church and state and
WON the action of posting the tarpaulin violated the principle of separation of church and
state. (No)
HELD:
1. Previous cases ruled in that wise apply to losing candidates seeking public office. They do not
apply to this petition, which is filed to assert a fundamental right to expression. As the
COMELEC notice and letter affect protected speech, the SC has jurisdiction over this case.
a. The COMELEC claimed that it had jurisdiction over the case, not the SC, because the
case involves election matters. However, the SC ruled that the case was not about an
election matter; rather, it was about whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction to act
on the tarps, and so the case was properly within the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari.
i. Further, there was no violation of the hierarchy of courts. That rule is not an
ironclad rule, and the SC has full discretionary power to take cognizance of
and assume jurisdiction over SCAs for certiorari filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons. This case involves an active effort of the
electorate to reform the political landscape. As this is a fundamental principle
of democracy as enshrined in the constitution, the right to engage in free
expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by the court.
ii. Also, this case is one of transcendental importance.
iii. It is also one of first impression.
iv. Besides, constitutional ISSUES raised are best decided by the SC
v. The time element can also not be ignored.
vi. The petition also reviews an act of a constitutional organ.
vii. There was no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
viii. Finally, The petition includes questions dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy.
b. The matter of the size and the right to post the tarpaulins is not a political question. It
can be acted upon by the SC through the expanded jurisdiction granted the SC under
the 1987 Constitution, because the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental right.
c. There was no need to exhaust administrative remedies here, because the controversy
was ripe for adjudication. A resort to further administrative remedies would prolong
the violation of their rights.
2. As the Diocese of Bacolod is neither a franchise holder nor a candidate, the COMELEC has to
constitutional power to regulate their speech. The consti only gives it the power to regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits, or public information campaigns among
candidates. The COMELEC’s own rules define election propaganda as matters done by or on
behalf of and in coordination with candidates and political parties. The tarpaulins here were
not paid for by any candidate or political party.
Further, unlike in National Press Club v. COMELEC, what is involved here is the opportunity to
comment on the elections, not the opportunity for each candidate to campaign. As such, the
COMELEC cannot regulate it.
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3. While there is now law, as it were, abridging the freedom of speech or of expression, the SC
has previously applied upheld the freedom of expression against other governmental acts,
such as prohibiting the us of public places for protests and COMELEC resolutions.
Communication is the essential outcome of protected speech. The right of freedom of

expression applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct
enacted.
Also, “size does matter.” It enhances efficiency in communications, and may underscore the
importance of the message to the reader. It allows for more messages. These are all important
considerations when it comes to public discussions during elections. Thus, the size of the tarps
are a fundamental part of the expression protected under Art. III, Sec. 4.
Justice Leonen then listed 6 theories under which freedom of expression should be protected,
which should be familiar to his students, but since I’m the only guy left who took Justice
Leonen, they are:
a. The right of the people to participate in public affairs
b. Market place of ideas, which means that all ideas should be ventilated to allow
others to consider, test, and develop their own conclusions.
c. Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
d. Expression is a marker for group identity
e. The Bill of rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and
minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through the framework of
democratic governance.
f. Safety valve theory, which says that allowing dissent to be expressed reduces the
likelihood of violence.
The content of the tarpaulin is definitely political speech. While the tarpaulin may influence
the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily
mean it is election propaganda. It was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group. Which makes it political speech. Which makes it
important.
4. Compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based. The size of the
tarp strikes at a core part of expression not easily divorced from the size of the medium. Thus,
the regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and is subject to the clear and present
danger rule.
a. Even if it were a content-neutral regulation, it would still fail the intermediate test to
which those are applied.
i. Within the constitutional power of government—COMELEC has no power to
regulate the tarp.
ii. Furthers an important or substantial government interest.
There is no compelling reason to further the interest of the government in
limiting size of political materials over freedom of speech. That does not qualify
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as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the

preferred right to freedom of expression.
iii. Unrelated to suppression of free speech
The size regulation is not unrelated. Limiting the maimum size of the tarp would
render ineffective the message of the Diocese of Bacolod and thus violate their
right to exercise freedom of expression, as previously discussed.
iv. Incident restriction is no greater than essential to the furtherance of the
interest.
The act has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences
5. The tarps were mere satire. They exaggerated and caricatured olictical parties and parodies
the intention of those in the list. The terms “team patay” and “team buhay” further emphasize
the them of the maker. There is then a long discussion on freedom of speech either as
“egalitarian” or “libertarian.”
6. The tarpualins were not religious speech. Not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops,
ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation.
The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop
amounts to religious expression. The tarp does not on its face convey any religious doctrine of
the Catholic church. Thus, the speech was not religious, and could not be subject of any
violation of the separation of church and state.
Risos-Vidal v COMELEC
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 206666
FACTS:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was convicted of plunder by the Sandiganbayan. This crime brought with it
perpetual absolute disqualification. However, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo extended executive clemency
in the form of pardon to Estrada. The pardon explicitly provided that he was restored to his civil and
political rights.
Freshly pardoned, Erap ran for President. This was opposed by 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. All
were dismissed. Erap lost. This led to a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed for mootness.
And then Erap ran for Mayor of Manila, which led Risas-Vidal to file a petition for disqualification
against Erap, citing his previous conviction for plunder, an offense involving moral turpitude.
COMELEC dismissed the petition, and affirmed its stand en banc. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, Erap won. Fred Lim then intervened in this case.
ISSUE: WON Erap is qualified to vote and be voted for as a result of the pardon. (Yes)
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HELD:
Erap was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, including the
right to seek public elective office. Contrary to the claim that the pardon, in order to allow Erap to run
again, should expressly restore such right, obviously a restoration of all political rights includes that.
Further, the President’s power to pardon cannot be limited by legislative action. In particular, Arts. 36
and 41 of the RPC, which require that a pardon shall nto work the restoration of the right to hold
public office or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, must not be interpreted to diminish the President’s power to pardon by requiring that the
President explicitly name the rights to be restored. This is because the form and manner in which the
President pardons is part of the power to pardon.
Finally, thought he pardons preambular clause sates that “whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” that does not function to make
the pardon conditional on that commitment. The preamble is not an essential part of an act, or in this
case of a pardon.
Petition Dismissed. COMELEC affirmed.
Estrada v Ombudsman
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 212140-41
FACTS:
Jinggoy Estrada was charged by the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019. After he filed his counter-
affidavit, he filed a request to be furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the other respondents.
The Ombudsman refused, ruling that nothing in the Ombudsman rules requires that the respondent
be served with the pleadings of his co-respondent.
Hence this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Jinggoy is entitled to receive the pleadings of his co-defendants (No)
HELD:
There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
coutner-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the ROC only gives the respondent a right
to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to
copy them at his expense.
While administrative cases with the Ombudsman o require the service of the affidavits of co-
respondents, that is under a different set of rules of procedure from those in criminal cases. At that
point in the proceedings, Estrada was not yet an accused in the contemplation of the Constitution and
the requirements of due process.
Further, the request came at Estrada’s preliminary investigation, where the only purpose is to
determine probable cause. This is not part of the trial and as such the accuse cannot invoke the
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various rights Jinggoy was raising, e.g. to confront an cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence. Also, any admissions made by the co-respondents could not prejudice him, unlike in the
jurisprudence Estrada cited. To treat them as such would have the disastrous consequence of
remanding all criminal investigations for preliminary investigation because none of them would satisfy
the administrative due process standard of Ang Tibay v. CIR.
Petition Granted.
One Shipping v Penafiel

Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 192406
FACTS:
One Shipping hired Ildefonso Penafiel as a Second Engineer aboard the MV/ACX Magnolia. While
aboard, he had chest pains. However, he was refused medical attention. When he came back to the
Philippines after his contract was up, he died of myocardial infarction. His wife then filed for monetary
claims arising from his death. One Shipping refused to pay death benefits because they claimed his
death came after the employment contract ha lapsed.
LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC affirmed. CA, however, reversed. MR denied. Hence this
Petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the death benefits should have been granted. (No)
HELD:
Ildefonso pre-termnated his contract when he asked for a vacation leave and was paid all due him as a
result of his employment. Thus, at the time he arrived in the Philippines, the employer-employee
relationship had already been terminated. Thus, in accordance with the POEA standard employment
contract, to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the
employment contract.
Petition Granted.
Unicol v Malipot
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 206562
FACTS:
Glicerio Malipot worked as a seaman processed by Unicol Management services. While he was aboard
the ship, he suffered emotional strain. Because of this, he wanted to disembark, but the Port captain
did not allow him to leave the vessel. He thus became depressed until he committed suicide by
hanging in the store room of the ship.
His wife thus filed a complaint for death benefits. LA awarded the benefits. NLRC reversed, ruling
that there was no proof that Glicerio committed suicide. CA reversed again. MR denied. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
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ISSUE: WON Glicerio committee suicide during the term of his employment which would exempt
Unicol from paying death benefits (Yes)
HELD:
The CA ruled that there was no suicide because the evidence did not state the circumstances
regarding the cause of Glicerio’s death. The SC ruled that the Investigation Report, log book extracts
and Master’s Reports all strongly point out that seaman Glicerio died because he committed suicide.
As such, in accordance with the POEA standard employment contract, no death benefits should be
paid in respect of death resulting from his willful or criminal acts, including suicide.
Petition Granted.
People v Chi Chan Liu

Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 189272
FACTS:
Chi Chan Liu was convicted with violation of Sec. 21 (a), Art. IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
which prohibits illegal importation of drugs. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Chi was guilty. (No)
HELD:
The defense of Chi on appeal was that there was no actual importation because there was no proof
that the ship came in from a foreign country. The SC believed this, ruling that importation means that
something was brought in from a foreign country.
Here, just because Chi and his co-accused are Chinese nationals did not mean that the drugs came
from China. Thus, he is not guilty of illegal importation of drugs.
That being said, possession is inherent in importation; thus, Chi is still guilty of possession.
Appeal denied, except they’re guilty merely of possession, not imporation.
In re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movement v. Abolition of JDF and reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
Jan. 21, 2015/UDK-15143
FACTS:
The Save the Judicial Indepenence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement, represented by Rolly Mijares,
prays for an issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the court to exercise its judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress, in that there were proposed bills
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abolishing the Judicial Development Fund and Replacing it with the Judiciary Support Fund. Mijares
claims that the passage of these acts show a threat to judicial independence.
The controversial bills woul have the collections from the JDF remitted to the national treasury but
then distributed as disbursements from the National Treasury.
ISSUE: WON the mandamus can be issued (No)
HELD:
The bills are merely proposed bills and are not yet law. Thus, the petition is premature, there being as
of yet no case or controversy. Further, this would be overreaching the judiciary’s constitutional powers.
Also, Mijares has no standing. He has not shown that he has sustained or will sustained a direct injury
if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does
not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill
that may only affect the judiciary.
Neither is there transcendental importance in this case. The mere invocation of that doctrine does not
mean that the petition is of transcendental importance.
Hilariously however, the decision essentially pleads that the Congress NOT pass the bills, viz:
The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts have power to declare what
law is given a set of FACTS, but it does not have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the
power of the purse. “Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the judiciary
should not go below the appropriation for the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending
on how low the budget is.”
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund,
used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly
basis. The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website. These funds, however,
are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for
their personnel. The reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the generosity of local
government units that provide additional subsidy to our judges.
If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the
Department of Justice.As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often
undermined by low levels of budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating
expenses, and the reliance on local government units and the Department of Justice.
Petition Dismissed.
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Ricalde v. People
Jan. 21, 2015/ G.R. No. 211002
FACTS:
This case involves the rape of a 10-year old boy, by Richard Ricalde. He was convicted for rape under
the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 266-A of the RPC, otherwise known as rape by sexual assault. He was
convicted by the RTC. CA affirmed. In this appeal, Ricalde claims reasonable doubt, because the
medico-legal found no signs of trauma in the victim’s anus, nor did the victim categorically say that
Ricalde inserted his penis into any orifice.
ISSUE: WON Ricalde is guilty of rape. (Yes)
HELD:
The SC made the pronouncement that the standards for consummation in vaginal rape apply with
equal force to rape by sexual assault.
Thus, the victim’s statement that his anus was penetrated was given credence by the court. The
finding of lack of anal orifice does not remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility
of the sphincter. The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of
lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
CA affirmed.
Fortune v COA
Jan. 27, 2015 / G.R. No. 213525
FACTS:
The Fortune Life Insurance policy files this MR against the SC order dismissing its petition for certiorari
under rule 64 due to the late filing of the petition. Fortune lost a case before the COA, and filed an MR
from that decision. However, as stated, the petition for certiorari before the SC was denied.
Fortune invokes the fresh period rule, claiming that the period for filing the petition commenced
upon denial of the MR by the COA.
ISSUE: WON the fresh period rule applies in appeals from the COA to the SC (No)
HELD:
It just doesn’t. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for
certiorari uner rule 64. Appeal is different from certiorari. The reglementary periods are diferent.
MR denied.
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Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove

Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 187226
FACTS:
Leus was a teacher with St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove. She was fired for engaging in pre-marital
sexual relations, and getting pregnant out of wedlock, allegedly because this constituted immoral
conduct, a ground for dismissal under the Education Act of 1982. This, even if she later married the
father of her chil. She thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA dismissed complaint. NLRC and
CA affirmed. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Leus was illegally dismissed. (Yes)
HELD:
The conclusion that the premarital pregnancy was disgraceful or immoral conduct was arrived at
arbitrarily. The LA, NLRC, and CA all rule that pregnancy out of wedlock was disgraceful and immoral
per se, as Leus worked at a Catholic school.
The SC disagreed. For that to be the case, there must be substantial evidence to establish that
the pre-marital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock were indeed immoral. To constitute
immorality, the circumstances of each particular case should be considere and evaluated in light of
the prevailing norms of onuct an applicable laws. It is worth noting that those norms should be public
an secular morals, not religious morals.
Here, the pregnancy out of wedlock was ruled not disgraceful or immoral conduct because she
and the father of her child had no impediment to marry each other. Neither was there any evidence
that the pregnancy caused grave scandal to St. Scho and its students.
Petition Granted. CA decision set aside.
Narra v. Redmont
Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 195580
FACTS:
This is an MR for the SC case of Narra v. Redmont, whereby the SC struck down Narra’s capital
structure for being contrary to the Constitution and the FIA, after applying the Grandfather rule
ISSUE: Whether or not the capital structures are valid. (No)
HELD:
The SC reiterated its ruling that while the control test is still the prevailing mode of determining
whether or not a corporation is a Filipino Corporation, where there is doubt, based on the attendant
FACTS and circumstances, the grandfather rule should be applied. 1
Thus, there being a doubt as to the ownership of Narra and the other companies, their capital
structures are void.
MR denied.
1The digester would like to state that he helped prepare this MR and thus obviously disagrees with this case.
Because it’s stupid.
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First Optima v Securitron

Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 199648
FACTS:
First Optima owned a property in Pasay City. Securitron offered to buy the property though its GM
Eleazar. However, the EVP of First Optima said that she could not accept the offer without the
approval of the Board of Directors.
Undeterred, Securitron sent a letter to First Optima which included a check for P100k supposedly
as earnest money. This letter was received by a receptionist, and the check was deposited to First
Optima’s bank account without the directors ever knowing about it.
As a result, Securitron demande the sale of the property in writing. First Optima said that it could
not be compelled to sell the property. This led Securitron to file a case for specific performance against
First Optima. RTC ruled in favor of Securitron. CA affirmed. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the payment of earnest money bound First Optima to sell the property. (No)
HELD:
In a potential sale transaction, the prior payment of earnest money even before the property owner
can agree to sell his property is irregular, and cannot be used to bind the owner to the obligations of a
seller under an otherwise perfected contract of sale; to cite well-worn cliche, the carriage cannot be
laced before the horse. The property owner-prospective seller may not be legally obliged to enter into
a sale with a prospective buyer through the latter's employment of questionable practices which
prevent the owner from freely giving his consent to the transaction; this constitutes a palpable
transgression of the prospective seller's rights of ownership over his property, an anomaly which the
Court will certainly not condone.
Thus, while there were negotiations, and while the check was deposited, this cannot be considered as
consent to enter into a contract to sell the property. First Optima, as represented by its Board, never
accepted Securitron’s offer. Thus, there was still no contract. The sending of the check was merely a
reiteration of the offer.
Neither could the deposit of the check constitute acceptance of the offer. The supposed payment was
made under dubious circumstances and the EVP and the Board coul not have known about it. Despite
approaching EVP young personally, Securitron sent the check to a clerk/receptionist, which places it
under grave suspicion of putting into effect a premeditated plan to unduly bind First Optima to its
offer.
Petition Granted.
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Aguilar v. Siasat
Jan. 28, 2015 / G.R. No. 200169
FACTS:
The Sps. Aguilar died intestate an without debts. In controversy are 2 parcels of land which are part of
their estate.Rodolfo Aguilar claimed to be the son and the sole surviving heir to the spouses. He filed a
case for mandatory injunction that Edna Siasat, Mrs. Aguilar’s sister, be ordered to surrender the titles
over the said land to him.
In response, Siasat alleged that Rodolfo was not the son and heir of the spouses, and was merely
a stranger raised by the Aguilars out of the goodness of their hearts. As such, she claimed, she
inherited the land from her sister, and so she was in lawful possession of the same. The determination
of the case hinged on whether or not Rodolfo was the son of the deceased spouses.
RTC ruled that no proof existed to show that Rodolfo was a child of the spouses. CA affirmed.
Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Rodolfo was a recognized son of the spouses. (Yes)
HELD:
Admission of legitimate filiation may be made in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned. In this case, Rodolfo was filiated through his father
Alfredo’s SSS form E-1. This is a public instrument through which express recognition can be given.
Petition Granted.
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FEBRUARY 2015
Araullo v Aquino
Feb. 3, 2015 / G.R. No. 209287
FACTS:
This an MR of the decision in which the SC ruled that the DAP is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON PDAF is unconstitutional (Yes)
HELD:
The Court reiterated the bases for its original decisions, to wit:
1. The interpretation of “savings” was a judicial matter which the Court was competent to rule
on, because that issue was brought up in the pleadings.
2. The power to augment should be strictly construed because it is an exception to the general
rule that PAPs shall be limite to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. This is in order
to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives
during budget execution. Thus, regarless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, an
regardless if it is an effective tool in stimulating the national economy, it is still illegal and
unconstitutional so long as it allows the funds used to finance the projects to deviate from the
relevant provisions of the GAA.
3. As to the argument that the DAP was just the augmentation of funds out of the savings of the
executive, although the President does have the power to suspend or stop further
expenditure, and then use any savings in the regular appropriations, under the AC1987, the
reissuance of such allotments shows that they have not bn suspended or stopped. Rather
obviously they have been reappropriated.
a. The SC was quick to point out that this doesn’t apply to the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group, including the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, the CHR,
and the Ombudsman.
4. The power granted by Sec. 39 to the President to approve the use of any savings to cover a
deficit in any other appropriations, however, is plainly unconstitutional, as under the
Consitution, the Presient may only augment an item in the GAA in his own department. The
DAP allowed the President in exercising the augmenting power must still comply with the
requirements of line-veto. Contrary to the argument that the Consti allows for “allotment
classes,” what is really required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item
veto of the President.
a. That being said, any DAP-funded projects funded with legally accumulated savings
would be considered legal.
b. The Court didn’t bother discussing the argument that “cross-border transfers” have
been the practice int eh past.
5. Next, unprogrammed funds may only be released upon proof that the total revenues exceeded
their targets.
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6. Despite this, the SC clarified that despite the pronouncement that the operative fact doctrine
cannot be used to shield liable officials, the presumption of good faith in the performance of
duties remains.
7. However, an importantly, recognizing the impact of declaring all DAP-funded projects void,
the operative fact doctrine was applied to uphold the efficacy of such projects.
MR Partially Granted.
Paje v. Casino
February 3, 2015 / G.R. No. 207257
FACTS:
This case concerns the MOU between the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and the Taiwan
Cogeneration Corporation, whereby the parties expressed their intention to build a coal-fired power
plant in Subic Bay. This was opposed by the City of Olongapo. Nevertheless, the DENR-EMB issued an
ECC for the project. This led to the filing for a writ of kalikasan before the CA. CA denied the writ of
kalikasan, but struck down the ECC granted for the plant. Hence these consolidated appeals, with one
asking for a writ of kalikasan, and the other asking for the CA decision to be struck down.
RATIO:
1. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to
establish that the subject project will not cause rave environmental damage, through its
Environmental Management Plan, which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits
of existing environmental laws and standards;
2. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr.
Aboitiz in the CC’s Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP
Energy to the appellate court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the
particular circumstances of this case show that the ENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised
of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments
on this point, as the issue only arose during the course of the proceedings Upon clarificatory
questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the
certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been invalidated on the
ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of the appellate court. The certified
true copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability
portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB, and remains uncontroverted. It showed that the Statement
of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Because the signing was done
after the official release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, we note that the DENR did not strictly
follow its rules, which require that the signing of the Statement of Accountability should be done
before the official release of the ECC. However, considering that the issue was not adequately
argued nor was evidence presented before the appellate court on the circumstances at the time of
signing, there is insufficient basis to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was
tainted with bad faith or inexcusable negligence. We remind the DENR, however, to be more
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circumspect in following its rules. Thus, we rule that the signature requirement was substantially
complied with pro hac vice.
3. The appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were
invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual. It failed to properly consider the applicable provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual for amendment to ECCs. Our own examination of the provisions on amendments to ECCs
in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, as well as the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that
the DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and
second amendments, respectively. Through these documents, which the DENR reviewed, a new
EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent sufficient
showing of Decision grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both the procedure
and substance of the amendment process, we uphold the validity of these amendments;
4. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC for failure to comply with Section 59 of the
IPRA Law. The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law
and its implementing rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59
before an ECC may be issued, and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the
aforesaid certification does not render it invalid;
5. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy for failure to
comply with Section 59 of the IPRA Law. While we find that a CNO should have been secured prior
to the consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy, considering that this is the first
time we lay down the rule of action appropriate to the application of Section 59, we refrain from
invalidating the LDA for reasons of equity;
6. The appellate court erred when it ruled that compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26,
of the LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to issuance
of the subject ECC. The issuance of an ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the
project. Hence, there is no necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement, and the issuance of the subject ECC without first complying with the
aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid. The appellate court also erred when it ruled that
compliance with the aforesaid requirement is necessary prior to the consummation of the LDA. By
virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227, the project is not subject to the aforesaid requirement
and the SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over the apparent objections of the
concerned sanggunians. Thus, the LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy suffers from
no infirmity despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians; and
7. The appellate court correctly ruled that the issue as to the validity of the third amendment to the
ECC cannot be resolved in this case because it was not one of the issues set during the preliminary
conference, and would, thus, violate RP Energy’s right to due process.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF KALIKASAN DENIED. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CHALLENGING THE CA
DECISION GRANTED.
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Chinabank v. CIR
February 4, 2015 | G.R. No. 172509
FACTS:
CBC was assessed deficiency DST on the sales of foreign bills of exchange to the CB. CBC protested to
the BIR. More than 12 years after the filing of the protest, the BIR rendered a decision upholding the
assessment. CBC filed a petition for review to the CTA. CTA in division affirmed, as did the CTA en
banc. In the meantime, the CIR demanded that CBC pay its deficiency taxes. Hence this petition for
review.
ISSUES:
WON the right of the BIR to collect the deficiency tax has prescribed. - YES
RATIO:
The time limit to collect the tax is set at 3 years from the date when the BIR sends the assessment
notice. The attempt to collect by the BIR was made 13 years from the date from which the prescriptive
period was to be reckoned. The collection period was not suspended by the request for reinvestigation.
Doctrinally, when the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred by
prescription, the court must dismiss the claim even if prescription is not raised as a defense.
Further, the failure of the BIR to raise the raising of the defense for the first time on appeal estops it.
Estoppel or waiver prevents the government from invoking the rule against raising the issue of
prescription for the first time on appeal. To clarify, while the general rule is that estoppel does not
prevent the government from paying taxes, in this case the estoppel was only on a procedural matter,
and to rule otherwise would be injustice. The fact is that it took more than 12 years for the BIR to take
steps to collect the taxes.
PETITION GRANTED.
Reicon Realty Builders v Diamond Dragon Realty

February 4, 2015/ G.R. No. 204796
FACTS:
Reicon owns a parcel of land and a one-storey building it leased to Diamond Dragon Realty. Diamond
failed to pay monthly rentals, and the checks it had issued to pay them bounced. This prompted
Reicon to terminate the lease and enter into new leases with Jollibee and Maybunga.
This led Diamond to file a complaint for breach of contract with damages. MTD denied.
On certiorari to the CA, Diamond challenged the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
its person via special appearance, claiming that the address to which the petition was served was
incorrect. MTD granted. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON The CA acquired jurisdiction over Diamond Realty. - YES
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RATIO:
The case was decided on the ground that the address was the correct one. However, more doctrinally,
the SC ruled that special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance; accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court oer the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e. set forth in an unequivocal manner; and failure to do so constitutes
voluntary submission to the jurisdiciton of the court. Thus, the ff. guidelines were set out:
1. Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
2. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must
be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
3. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution.
PETITION GRANTED.
Tordilla v Amilano.
February 4, 2015 / AM No. P-14-3241
FACTS:
Mary-Ann Tordilla filed an administrative complaint against Court Stenographer Lorna Amilano for
failure to pay just debts. The debt in question involved the cash advance Amilano supposedly received
as Tordilla’s travel allowance, despite the latter not going on that trip.
ISSUES:
WON Amilano was administratively liable for willful failure to pay just debts. - YES
RATIO:
The OCA ruled that Amilano was only liable for simple negligence because the debt had not been
judicially declared. However, Failure to pay just debts includes not only those which have been
judicially declared but also those which are admitted by the debtor. As such, failing to pay such a debt
is grounds for administrative liability.
AMILANO GUILTY AND REPRIMANDED.
Milan v NLRC
February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 202961
FACTS:
Various employees of Solid Mills had been allowed to live in SMI village, which was owned by Solid
Mills, on the condition that they would vacate the premises any time the Company deemed it fit. Solid
Mills then ceased operations due to serious business losses. As part of the cessation of business, Solid
Mills was to give separation pay and benefits. In order to be paid such benefits, the employees signed
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quitclaims, which included agreements to vacate the village. Milan et al. refused to sign the
quitclaims, but demanded the payment of their separation pay. The company didn’t.
This led to the filing of a complaint for non-payment of separation pay. Solid Mills’ defense was
that it would not pay until Milan vacated the village. LA ordered the payment of separation pay, as this
was a case of illegal withholding thereof. NLRC and CA affirmed. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUES:
WON Solid Mills should pay the separation pay even before Milan et al vacate the village. - NO
RATIO:
While, as a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees, as an
exception, the employer may require clearance before the release of wages. Such clearance
procedures are SOPs among employers, and are provided for in order to ensure that their properties in
the possession of the separated employees are returned to the employer before the employee’s
departure.
The bases are Art 113 of the LC, which provides that an employer, as an exception may deduct from an
employee’s wages when authorized by law, and Art. 1706 of the CC, which provides that an employer,
again by exception, may withhold wages for a debt due.
The debts contemplated include the undertaking to vacate the premises of SMI Village. The continued
stay at the village was as a result of employment with Solid Mills, which had terminated. It is not
claimed otherwise. The law does not sanction a situation where employees who do no assert any claim
over their employer’s property are allowed to take all the benefits out of their employment while
simultaneously withholding possession of their employer’s property for no rightful reason.
PETITION DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.
Sps. Salvador v. Sps. Rabaja

February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 199990
FACTS:
The Sps. Salvador sold a parcel of land to the Sps. Rabaja through their agent Rosario Gonzales.
Payment was made to Gonzales, who in turn gave the OCT over the parcel of land to the Sps. Rabaja.
However, the Sps. Salvador complained that they never received any payment from Gonzales, which
caused the Rabajas to suspend payment of the purchase price.
This led the Salvadors to file an ejectment suit against the Rabajas. The Rabajas responded with
a complaint for rescission. This case concerns that case for rescission.
RTC ruled in favor of the Rabajas, ruling that the payment had already been made. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
WON payment had already been made to the Salvadors, despite Gonzales not remitting payments. -
YES
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RATIO:
The contract was a contract of sale which could be validly rescinded. An act done by an agent, as far
as 3rd persons are concerned, if within the terms of the power of attorney as written, is valid. Here,
Gonzales acted within the bounds of her SPA, as presented to the Rabajas.
This being the case, the Rabajas made a valid payment. Payment to an agent who does not remit the
funds to his principal is still valid payment. That matter is an internal matter between the principal
and the agent.
PETITION PARTLY GRANTED BECAUSE OF OTHER ISSUES NOT DOCTRINALLY DECIDED.
Villena v Batangas II Cooperative

February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 205735
FACTS:
Villena was a financial manager of Batangas II Cooperative. She won a labor case for illegal dismissal.
However, the NLRC judgment was silent on the payment of allowances, benefits, and attorney’s fees.
Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA granted petition, granting her allowances and
any other benefits, before remanding the case to the NLRC for computation.
The LA, on computing the amounts, excluded, among others, retirement benefits and
representation, transportation and cellular phone usage allowances.. NLRC included those amounts,
leading Batangas II to appeal to the CA. CA reversed the inclusion of those benefits. Hence this
petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. WON representation, transportation, and cellular phone usage allowances should have been
awarded. - YES
2. WON retirement pay should be awarded - NO
RATIO:
1. Representation, Transportation and cellular phone allowances are clearly given to financial
managers as part of their benefits, so they should be awarded.
2. However, retirement benefits should not be awarded. Villena’s complaint for illegal dismissal
stated no cause of action for retirement benefits. She had not retired at the time the decision
had become final and executory.
PETITION PARTLY GRANTED.
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LBP v. Heirs of Alsua

February 4, 2015 / G.R. No. 211351
FACTS:
Alsua owned an unregistered cocoland in Albay. His heirs voluntarily offered to sell part of the land to
the government under the CARL. The LBP used the formula of the DAR in arriving at a value for just
compensation of P1.37M. The heirs rejected that amount. LBP deposited the cash in their name
anyway.
Deciding on the matter of amount of just compensation, PARAD fixed the value at P5.47M. LBP
filed a case for determination of just compensation before the RTC. RTC came up with a new valuation
based on a new DAR formula of P4.245M, fixing the date of taking as the date of presumptive taking,
in accordance with the most recent DAR circular. On appeal, CA fixed amount for just compensation
using the DAR formula, but starting from the date of actual taking, resulting in a lower valuation of
P2.465M. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON the CA correctly calculated the just compensation to be paid. - NO
RATIO:
The RTC and CA used formulae to be applied to rice and corn land, not to cocoland. The taking should
be at the time of actual taking. Thus, the RTC was wrong.
The CA was also wrong, as it used capitalized net income and not the average of the last 12 months’
selling prices prior tot eh date of receipt of the CF by the LBP for processing under the cited DAR AO.
NOT THAT IT MATTERED SINCE THE SC CHANGED IT AGAIN, under the ff. guidelines:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property. In this case, this was the issuance of OCTs in
the names of the beneficiaries.
2. The evidence must conform to Sec. 17 of the CARL.
3. The RTC may impose interest on the just compensation as may be warranted by the
circumstances of the case.
4. Finally, despite all this wrangling about the proper application of the formula, the RTC is not
strictly bound to adhere to DAR formulas if the situations before it do not warrant their
application.
PETITION DENIED, BUT CASE REMANDED TO RTC FOR FINAL DETERMINATION OF AMOUNTS.
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BBB v. AAA
February 9, 2015 / G.R. No. 193225
FACTS:
BBB was charged with violation of VAWC by his wife AAA. AAA already had a son, CCC. Their
relationship resulted in the birth of DDD and EEE.
It was alleged that his mistress FFF insulted and humiliated AAA in BBB’s presence. This led AAA
to leave the conjugal home. While AAA and CCC eventually returned to the conjugal home, BBB
supposedly was biased in favor of DDD and EEE to the detriment of CCC. He also failed to pay the
rentals for the condo in which AAA was staying and did not give sufficient support to them.
This led to BBB filing for a TPO against BBB, which was granted and eventually made permanent
by the RTC. BBB appealed to the CA, which affirmed. Hence this petition for review. This digests
focuses on a supposed memorandum of agreement between AAA and BBB, which was supposedly a
compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
ISSUE:
WON the award of support should be deleted, in light of the compromise agreement. - NO
RATIO:
This case is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement. Under RA 9262, compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women is prohibited, because a process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. Further, the Rules
on Court-Annexed Mediation explicitly except those covered by the Anti-VAWC law.
PETITION DENIED.
Reyes v. Sps. Valentin

February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 194488
FACTS:
Reyes filed a complaint for easement of right of way against the Sps. Valentin in order to access a
national road from her property in Malolos, Bulacan. RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the proposed
right of way was not the least onerous to the servient estate of the Valentins, as it would pass through
improvements such as their garage, garden and grotto. Instead, the trial court recommended that a
right of way be built over a nearby irrigation canal through an adjacent rice land.
CA affirmed. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUES:
WON Reyes has compulsory easement of right of way over the Valentins’ property. - NO
RATIO:
First, Reyes was isolated due to the acts of her predecessor-in-interest. These acts bind her, and
already deny her the easement she prays for, because her isolation is caused by her acts.
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Second, there was an adequate exit to a public highway, namely the path through the rice field over
the irrigation canal. The convenience of the dominant estate’s owner is not the basis for granting an
easement of right of way, especially if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing the
easement.
While the proposed right of way is longer and more inconvenient to Reyes because she has to traverse
other properties and build a bridge over the canal, these do not justify the imposition of an easement
on Valentin’s property. “Least Prejudice” trumps “Distance between the dominant estate and the
public highway.”
Here, her proposed right of way would involve destroying permanent structures, which is far more
prejudicial to the servient estate than her having to build a bridge.
Protective v. Fuentes
February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 169303
FACTS:
Fuentes worked as a security guard for Protective Maximum Security Agency. He was assigned to
PICOP in Agusan Del Norte. However, the compound was ransacked by the NPA. Fuentes was
believed to have conspired and acted with the NPA, based on the affidavits of the other security
guards. Thus, a complaint for robbery was filed against him. As a result of this, Fuentes was detained
by police in Surigao del Sur, and later at the Trento Municipal jail. Fortunately for him the case was
dismissed at the PI stage.
When he tried to return to work, however, he was refused entry at PICOP on the ground that he
was a member of the NPA and that a new guard had been hired to replace him. He then filed a case
for illegal dismissal. LA ruled in favor of Protective. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed. Hence this petition
for review.
ISSUES:
WON Fuentes could have been justifiably dismissed for abandonment. - NO
RATIO:
Fuentes’ absence did not constitute abandonment. Abandonment constitutes a just cause for
dismissal because the employer cannot be compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in
fulfilling his duties to the employer, particularly the fundamental task of reporting to work. However,
the employer must prove the ff. 2 elements of abandonment:
1. A failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reasons
2. A clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship.
Here, there were justifiable reasons for Fuentes not to return to work. It was proven that he was beaten
by PICOP’s employees while in the custody of the police. He was so traumatized that he asked to
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remain in police custody because he feared for his life. He only left such custody when accompanied by
his mother. (Awwww.) Thus, he was justified in not reporting for work.
Neither was there a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. He reported for work
after the criminal charges against him were dropped. This shows that he still intended to work for
Protective.
Sps. De Leon v Sps. Dela Llana

February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 212277
FACTS:
Sps. Dela Llana filed an ejectment complaint against De Leon, alleging that the lease between them
was up. The lease contract included a clause that any case was to be filed in Davao City only. Despite
this, the de Leons stupidly filed it in the MCTC of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley.
Despite this, the MCTC, ruling on the merits, dismissed the complaint, holding that the lease
contract was relatively simulated and thus non-binding. The MCTC continued, however, to rule that
granting arguendo that the lease contract was not simulated, the complaint should still have been
dismissed for improper venue for failure to bomply with the exclusive venue clause.
With dogged determination, the Sps. Dela Llana filed another ejectment case before the MTCC of
Davao City. Sps. De Leon raised the defense of res judicata, referring to the earlier case. MTCC,
however, ruled in favor of the dela Llanas, and ordered the de Leons to vacate. RTC reversed,
dismissing the complaint for improper venue. CA reversed again, holding solely that the venue was
correct. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUES:
WON res judicata barred the second complaint. - YES
RATIO:
The first complaint was decided on the merits; the MCTC ruled that de Leon did not have to vacate the
premises because the contract was simulated. Even if the court went on to discuss venue as a ground
for dismissal, it still ruled on the merits. Thus, res judicata set in, even if one of the grounds of
dismissal was mere improper venue, which normally would not be considered a judgment on the
merits.
PETITION GRANTED. CA REVERSED. 2ND EJECTMENT CASE DISMISSED.
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Dona Adela v TIDCORP

February 11, 2015 / G.R. No. 201931
FACTS:
Dona Adela filed a case for Voluntary insolvency. During the proceedings, Dona Adela entered into a
compromise agreement with TIDCORP to enter into a dacion en pago in order to pay its obligations.
The agreement which specified the details of the dacion, which importantly was negotiated by BPI and
TIDCORP, and not with Dona Adela, included a waiver of confidentiality of bank accounts under the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the GBL of 2000 regarding Dona Adela’s accounts, as well as those
of its directors.
One of the affected directors, Epifanio Ramos, filed a manifestation challenging the waiver of the
confidentiality over his bank account, claiming that he has a separate personality from the
corporation. Nevertheless, the RTC approved the compromise agreement. Ramos’ MR was denied.
ISSUES:
WON Dona Adela is bound by the waiver provision of the compromise agreement. - NO
RATIO:
The compromise agreement was entered into by BPI and TIDCORP, with Dona Adela not a party. The
Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits requires that waiver be by written permission of the depositor,
Here, Dona Adela did not give such written consent. BPI and TIDCORP were the parties. The provision
on waiver as merely inserted into their agreement. Thus, Dona Adela was not bound by the provision.
Further, Dona Adela’s silence on the matter during the proceedings cannot constitute a waiver. Mere
silence on the part of the holder of a right should not be construed as a waiver thereof.
PETITION GRANTED. WAIVER STRUCK DOWN.
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board,

et al.
February 23, 2015 / G.R. No 181293
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(ASTOA) which was approved by the DOTC Secretary and not the President.
ISSUE:
WON the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid. - YES
RATIO:
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or
the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are
exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively
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the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. As explained in Villena v. Executive
Secretary, this doctrine is rooted in the Constitution:
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the
executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence," and, in the language
of Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter
ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority."
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair
or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of
executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the
President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding
responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries.
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy,
represented by his father Renato P. Cudia, who also acts on his own behalf,
and Berteni Cataluña Causing vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), The Honor Committee (HC) of 2014 of the PMA
and HC Members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)
February 24, 2015 / G.R. No 211362
FACTS:
Cadet Cudia was dismissed from his class before his supposed graduation. He filed a petition for
mandamus that he be included in the graduating class.
ISSUE:
WON mandamus will prosper as a remedy to include him to the graduating class. - NO
RATIO:
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be
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filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the
act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice
but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has
the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an
imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
Joseph B. Timbol vs. Commssion on Elections

February 24, 2015 / G.R. No 206004
FACTS:
Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the Second District of Caloocan City. He was placed on the COMELEC list of nuisance candidates.
Despite the recommendation of an election officer, his name was not removed from the list of
nuisance candidates. Regardless of the clarificatory hearing, his name was still not removed.
ISSUE:
WON Timbol should have been afforded due process before his name was included as a nuisance
candidate. - YES
RATIO:
COMELEC’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the
candidate’s opportunity to be heard.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run for
or hold public office[.]" To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law." Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance candidates are
persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or
to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by
other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.”
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide
intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610on January 11, 2013 when
petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an
ineffective opportunity to be heard.
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MARCH 2015
JOSE “PEPE” SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
JENNIFER SON-TENIO
March 25, 2015 / G.R. No 198753
FACTS:
The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing (Criminal Case No. 3433-
CR) and theft of minerals (Criminal Case No. 3434-CR) in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-
Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC).
On April 22, 2009, Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC.4 Consequently, on
January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal.
Sanico did not comply.
On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for
reconsideration7 vis-à-vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the
memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to his wife’s debilitating
illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel, Atty. Baring’s own medical condition
which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof.
ISSUE:
WON the appeal should have been disallowed. - NO
RATIO:
The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in
criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122 are the following:
Section 3. How appeal taken.—

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.
Section 9. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts.—

(a) Within five (5) days from perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the original
record to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
(b) Upon receipt of the complete record of the case, transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(c) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said notice, the parties may submit memoranda or
briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court to do so. After the submission of such
memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the Regional Trial
Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda
or briefs as may have been filed.
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in
civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the
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RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda
or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon
the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be
properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner was
entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he filed his
memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC was, therefore,
an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that occasioned severe prejudice because his
conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal being a matter of right, and because his
conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its
civil aspect.
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APRIL 2015
Villanueva vs. JBC

April 7, 2015 / G.R. No. 211833
FACTS:
Petitioner MCTC Judge Ferdinand Villanueva applied for vacancies in three RTCs, but was not
included on the list of candidates due to the JBC’s policy requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, and he had only served one
year. He assailed the policy for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the JBC’s policy requiring five years of service before a first-level judge can qualify to
apply to second-level courts
HELD:
Yes. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does
not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to
effectively ensure its mandate. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its
nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position.
SWS vs. COMELEC

7 April 2015 / G.R. No. 208062
FACTS:
Petitioners SWS and Pulse Asia conducted a pre-election survey on voter preferences for senatorial
candidates, and published the same. COMELEC asked SWS to give the names or identities of the
subscribers who paid for the pre-election survey, or else be liable for violation of the Fair Election Act.
The COMELEC issued a resolution directing petitioners and similar survey firms to submit the names
of all commissioners, payors and subscribers for copying and verification by COMELEC. Petitioners
contended that this was ultra vires.
ISSUE: Whether the requirement to disclose the names of subscribers to election surveys is
constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The resolution is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s regulatory powers; there is a compelling
interest and it effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service, and is impelled by the imperative of fair elections. While election surveys on their face do not
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state or allude to preferred candidates, when published, they have the tendency to shape voter
preference and thus partake of the nature of election propaganda.
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo
April 8, 2015 / G.R. No. 197597
FACTS:
Butukan Malang was one of the accused for alleged participation in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre. Datukan Malang Salibo, who had been in Saudi Arabia from November 7-
December 19, 2009 for the Hajj Pilgrimage, learned that police officers in Maguindanao suspected
him to be Butukan Malang. Salibo presented himself with his passport and other documents to the
police to clear his name. Despite assurances that they would not arrest him, the police apprehended
Salibo and tore off the page in his passport evidencing his departure for Saudi Arabia. Salibo filed a
petition for habeas corpus. The CA dismissed the petition, stating that the proper remedy was a
Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest, since Salibo’s arrest and detention were made
under a valid information and warrant of arrest, even if these named Butukan Malang.
ISSUE: Whether the proper remedy was the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
Yes. Generally, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must exhaust the usual
remedies (i.e. filing a motion to quash the information or warrant of arrest), not resort to the
extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus. However, petitioner was not arrested by virtue of
any warrant charging him of any offense, nor was he restrained under a lawful process or order of
court. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo. Even if Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect alleged could not be cured
by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest, as changing the name of the
accused appearing thereon would not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in his case.
127
Luzon Development Bank vs. Krishnan

April 13, 2015 / G.R. No. 203530
FACTS:
Respondent Krishnan filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against
petitioners. The RTC granted a preliminary writ of attachment in Krishnan’s favor, by virtue of which
petitioner bank’s accounts were garnished. When petitioners were required to file a counter-bond,
they prayed to be allowed to deposit certificates of title of real property to serve as their counter-bond.
ISSUE: Whether a party has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to
secure a contingent lien on its property should the other party win the case.
HELD:
No. Sec 2 and Sec 5 of Rule 57, RoC make it clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued,
the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the
counter-bond. Thus, this does not cover the deposit of real property to discharge the attachment or
stay the implementation thereof.
1-UTAK vs. COMELEC

April 14, 2015 / G.R. No. 206020
FACTS:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, providing for the implementing rules for the Fair
Election Act in connection with the May 2013 national and local elections, and subsequent elections.
Sec 7 enumerated prohibited forms of election propaganda, which included posting of election
propaganda outside of authorized common poster areas in public places. “Public places” was defined
to include public utility vehicles and the premises of public transport terminals. Violation would result
in revocation of the public utility franchise and make the owner liable for an election offense.
Petitioner challenged the Resolution as violative of the free speech and property rights of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals,
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition of posting campaign materials in PUVs and transport terminals was
valid
HELD:
No. These restrictions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech,
i.e. the freedom of the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with
them. COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities during
an election period pursuant to Sec 4, Art IX-C of the Constitution; it may not regulate the ownership
per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
The expression of ideas of a PUV owner through posting election materials on the vehicle does
not affect considerations pertinent to the PUV’s operations; hence, regulating expression of ideas is in
such a manner not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very
ownership of the vehicle.
128
Lexber Inc. vs. Dalman

April 20, 2015 / G.R. No. 183587
FACTS:
Lexber filed a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments on its loan obligations.
Among its creditors were the Sps. Dalman, to whom it had undertaken to sell a house and lot. The TC
gave due course to Lexber’s rehabilitation petition and appointed a rehabilitation receiver. The Sps.
Dalman filed a MR arguing that the TC should have dismissed the rehabilitation petition outright for
failure to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180 days from initial hearing, and that no
rehabilitation petition of a real estate company should be given due course without the HLURB’s prior
request for appointment of the rehabilitation receiver. The TC denied the MR, prompting the Sps.
Dalman to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was granted. Lexber sought recourse in the
SC. In the meantime, the TC had dismissed the rehabilitation petition due to disapproval of the
proposed rehabilitation plan, and at the time, the CA was currently reviewing said dismissal in a
separate proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether SC should rule on the petition despite the pendency of the dismissal order with the CA
HELD:
No. This would lead to the possibility of rendering conflicting rulings with the CA, which was reviewing
the dismissal for different and more substantive reasons. This possibility of rendering conflicting
decisions among reviewing courts is one of the reasons why the 2009 Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation amended the Interim Rules’ on the available procedural remedies after the filing of the
rehabilitation petition, which was then further amended in the new 2013 Financial Rehabilitation
Rules of Procedure.
Under the Interim Rules, a MR was a prohibited pleading. Under the 2008 Rules, an appeal through a
Rule 43 petition may be filed only after the TC issues an order approving or disapproving the
rehabilitation plan. Any issue arising from a denied MR may only be raised as an assigned error in the
Rule 43 petition and may not be questioned in a separate Rule 65 petition. The exception is when the
issue only arose after the issuance of the order denying or approving the rehabilitation plan.
In the 2013 Rules, any relief from the TC’s denial of a MR is no longer available, and the CA’s mode of
review is through Rule 65. However, the 2013 Rules retained the guideline that review may be sought
from the CA only after the rehabilitation court issues an order approving or disapproving the
rehabilitation plan. Hence, if after the filing of the rehabilitation petition the TC is satisfied that the
jurisdictional requirements were complied with, initial hearing will commence. At this stage, no appeal
or certiorari petition may be filed as any remedy is only available after the order approving or
disapproving the rehabilitation plan.
129
Bishop Pabillo vs. COMELEC

April 21, 2015 / G.R. No. 216098
FACTS:
After bidding, a lease with option to purchase until December 31, 2010 and warranty for labor,
technical support and maintenance for 10 years for the AES was awarded to Smartmatic-TIM in 2009.
In 2012, COMELEC exercised the option to purchase. In 2013, Smartmatic offered to extend the
warranty of the PCOS machines for 3 years, and a draft contract was sent to COMELEC. The
COMELEC’s Law Department upon review stated that the procedure for direct contracting would only
be applied if the conditions for resort to said method were present, and that the Bids and Awards
Committee and COMELEC’s Information Technology Department should first confirm if Smartmatic
was the sole provider of the services to be procured. However, the COMELEC approved the proposal.
Petitioners challenged the validity of the contract due to the resort to direct contracting.
ISSUE: Whether the resort to direct contracting was valid
HELD:
No. Public bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government contracts. As an exception,
Art. XVI of the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA) sanctions resort to alternative methods
of procurement, including via direct contracting. This is only available in highly exceptional cases and
subject to several conditions.
The Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Goods and Services of the Government Procurement
Policy Board allows alternative methods if: (1) There is prior approval of the Head of the Procuring
Entity, as recommended by the BAC; and (2) The conditions required by law for the use of alternative
methods are present. Also, (3) The Procuring Entity must ensure that the chosen method promoted
economy and efficiency; and (4) The most advantageous price for the government must be obtained.
There was non-compliance with (2). Sec 50(a), Art XVI of the GPRA allows direct contracting only
when it involves goods of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the proprietary source.
The “goods” herein involved refer to the services of the machines’ repair and refurbishment, not the
machines themselves. No evidence was shown that Smartmatic-TIM possessed intellectual property
rights over the method, process, system, program, or work servicing the PCOS machines for their
repair and refurbishment, and thus cannot be said to be the services’ proprietary source. Moreover,
based on the 2009 contract, COMELEC was granted a license to use, modify and customize the PCOS
systems and software, including the right to alter and modify the source code, due to the exercise of
the option to purchase.
130
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs.

Reyes
April 21, 2015 / G.R. No. 180771
FACTS:
Two petitioners were filed concerning Service Contract 46 which allowed the exploration,
development and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanon Strait and was executed with
JAPEX, which was 100% Japanese-owned. The petitioners in the first petition, were collectively
referred to as the “Resident Marine Mammals”, consisting of the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises
and other cetacean species inhabiting the waters in and around Tanon Strait. They were also joined by
their legal guardians and friends who allegedly empathize with and seek the protection of the
aforementioned marine species.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the resident marine mammals have standing to file the petition
2. Whether the SC No. 46 is violative of the Constitution
HELD:
1. Unnecessary to show. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases have been given a
more liberalized approach. The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a citizen suit and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
courts for violations of our environmental laws. The rationale for the citizen suit is the principle
that humans are stewards of nature. The Resident Marine Mammals need not be given standing
since any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, is allowed to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. Notably, the Stewards are joined as real parties, not just in representation of
the named cetacean species, and thus said Stewards have the legal standing to file the petition.
2. Yes. SC-46 was null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the Constitution as
enumerated in La Bugal: (1) That the service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general
law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country; (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government; (3) Within 30 days of the
executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government
an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. SC-46 did not
comply with (2) and (3).
Moreover, Tanon Strait is a protected seascape, and thus any activity outside the scope of its
management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA
to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system. The exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, but there is no such
law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tanon Strait.
131
The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marcos

April 22, 2015 / G.R. No. 202331
FACTS:
Five days before the end of her term as Governor, Governor Ong appointed Hilario Marco as
Cooperative Development Specialist II, along with 25 other appointments. These were later
disapproved due to lack of funds. Marco successfully challenged the disapproval. However, the
Province then argued that Marco was a midnight appointee. The CA ruled that Marco’s case was an
exception to the prohibition of midnight appointees as he was fully qualified for the position and
underwent a screening process long before the election ban. The Province then claimed that Marco
failed to present convincing evidence showing that he underwent a regular screening process.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition against midnight appointments applies
HELD:
No. A midnight appointment, prohibited by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution, is one made within two
months immediately prior to the next presidential election. The constitutional prohibition on midnight
appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to those made by local
chief executives.
The CSC may establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in civil service,
including prohibition against local official smaking appointments during the last days of their tenure.
In Nazareno, the Court upheld a CSC Resolution prohibiting local electives from making appointments
immediately before and after elections, and against mass appointments. However, Nazareno is
inapplicable as the Resolution effective during the appointments made in Nazareno was superseded
by another Resolution which permits appointments made after elections up to June 30 if the
appointee is fully qualified and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban.
Marco fell under this category.
132
JUNE 2015
Cruz vs. Agas
June 15, 2015 / G.R. No. 204095
FACTS: Dr. Cruz filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence
and Medical Malpractice against Dr. Agas, alleging that through Dr. Agas’ negligent and reckless
conduct, he suffered internal hemorrhage after Dr. Agas performed a colonoscopy procedure on him.
The prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Such decision was affirmed by the
DOJ, and by the CA on petition on review.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in affirming the DOJ’s resolution. – NO
HELD: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination (in this case, by the DOJ) of probable cause for the purpose of filing an Information, in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, medical negligence and malpractice was not
established in this case. A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof
that the doctor either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or
that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or
action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.
Sps. Vergara vs. Sonkin

June 15, 2015 / G.R. No. 193659
FACTS: Sps. Vergara and Sps. Sonkin are adjoining landowners, but the property owned by the latter
is slightly lower in elevation than that of the former. The Sonkins’ house is attached to the partition
wall. Sps. Vergara subsequently levelled the uneven portion of their property by filling it with gravel,
earth and soil. The Sonkins later complained that water coming from the Vergara Property was
leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks and damage to the paint and the
wooden parquet floor. Due to their unheeded request that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall to
contain the landfill, Sps. Sonkin filed a suit for damages and injunction.
ISSUE: WON the Sps. Vergara were duty-bound to build a retaining wall for the landfill. – NO
HELD: The Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, thus, it is legally obliged to
receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Art. 637 of the Civil Code. In this light, Sps.
Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary
adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of
doing so, they disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against the perimeter
wall, thereby violating Sec. 708(a) of the National Building Code, which provides that dwellings shall
at least be two meters from the property line (2-meter setback rule). As such, the Sonkins must
necessarily bear their own loss, and are hereby directed to strictly comply with the National Building
Code by demolishing the portion of their house the 2-meter easement from the property line.
133
Biñan Rural Bank vs. Carlos

June 15, 2015 / G.R. No. 193919
FACTS: Carlos et al. filed a complaint for reconveyance, among others, against Biñan Rural Bank et al.
The latter moved to dismiss the complaint but it was denied by the RTC, even on MR. The bank filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA but it was also dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s resort to certiorari after the denial of its motion to dismiss is proper. – NO
HELD: The denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, generally cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can it be the subject of an appeal which is available
only after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial of the motion to
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
be justified. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross
so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
People of the Philippines vs. Nuyok

June 15, 2015 / G.R. No. 195424
FACTS: Nuyok was accused of raping his nephew who lives in the same dwelling as he does. Nuyok
claims the charge to be trumped up, arguing that there is no way he can commit the crime in their
house as it is a cramped one-room dwelling, with the alleged victim and her other relatives all
sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: WON Nuyok is guilty of rape. – YES
HELD: The presence of other occupants in the same house where the accused and the victim lived did
not necessarily deter him from committing the rapes. The crowded situation in any small house would
sometimes be held to minimize the opportunity for committing rape, but it has been shown repeatedly
by experience that many instances of rape were committed not in seclusion but in very public
circumstances. Cramped spaces of habitation have not halted the criminal from imposing himself on
the weaker victim, for privacy is not a hallmark of the crime of rape, and seclusion is not one of its
elements.
Furthermore, conviction for rape may rest on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Thus, an
accused can be declared guilty of rape even if the sole witness against him was the victim who had
been rendered unconscious at the time of the consummation of carnal knowledge provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence existed showing that the victim was violated, and that it was the accused and
no other who had committed the violation. To disallow such showing is to obstruct the successful
prosecution of a rapist who renders his victim unconscious before the consummation.
134
MCIAA vs. City of Lapu-Lapu

June 15, 2015 / G.R. No. 181756
FACTS: On September 11, 1996, the SC rendered a decision in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Marcos (the 1996 MCIAA case) declaring that upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code of 1991, GOCCs like MCIAA was no longer exempt from real estate taxes. In January
1997, respondent City issued to petitioner a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessing the lots
comprising the Mactan International Airport. MCIAA opposed the same, averring that it included
properties which should be exempt from RPT as they are utilized solely and exclusively for public or
governmental purposes (airport terminal building, the airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which
they are situated). Despite an Opinion rendered by the SOJ and the Dept. of Finance’s endorsement
affirming that the properties are exempt from RPT, the City still included them in the assessment for
RPT and even issued Notices of Levy on MCIAA’s properties. MCIAA filed a petition for prohibition,
praying, among others, for a declaration that the properties aforementioned are exempt from RPT.
MCIAA alleges that it is similar to the Manila International Airport Authority, which is a government
instrumentality exempt from RPT, as ruled by the Court in the 2006 MIAA case. MCIAA argues that
the 2006 MIAA ruling overturned the 1996 MCIAA ruling.
ISSUE: WON MCIAA’s properties are subject to RPT. – NO
HELD: What governs is the 2006 MIAA ruling as it reversed the 1996 MCIAA ruling. In the 2006 MIAA
case, we held that MIAA’s airport lands and buildings are exempt from RPT imposed by local
governments; that it is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government, with its real
properties being owned by the Republic, and these are exempt from real estate tax. Similarly, MCIAA
is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually, solely and exclusively used for
public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on
which they are situated, are not subject to RPT.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or
non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed
a GOCC. Examples are MCIAA, the PPA, UP and BSP, which are sometimes loosely called government
corporate entities, but are not GOCCs. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate
powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not
only governmental but also corporate powers.
Moreover, there is no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for
rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The fact that the MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands
and Buildings as properties for public use.
135
Davao City Water District vs. Aranjuez, et al.

June 16, 2015 / G.R. No. 194192
FACTS: Officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water District
(NAMADACWAD) were charged with several administrative cases due to acts committed during the
anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of bond
papers bearing employees’ grievances outside the designated places.
ISSUE: WON the collective act of respondents in wearing t-shirts with grievance inscriptions during
office hours was within the ambit of the definition of prohibited mass action punishable under CSC
Rules. – NO
HELD: Under CSC Rules, the operative phrases in the definition of prohibited mass action are
collective activity” and “work stoppage or service disruption.” Without the intent at work stoppage or
service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not
determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a concerted activity is
allowed if it is without any intent at work stoppage.
In this case, it is clear the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA
incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents,
they followed the advice of GM Gamboa “to be there” at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not
disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else,
government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Enriquez vs. Lavadia, Jr.

June 16, 2015 / A.C. No. 5686
FACTS: A letter-complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Lavadia for before the OBC and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. The Court required Atty. Lavadia to comment,
but the latter failed repeatedly to comply for various reasons (did not receive copy of complaint, his
wife is sick, their house was razed by fire, etc.), despite his numerous motions for extension of time
(totaling eight) to file his comment. The IBP recommended that he be disbarred.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Lavadia should be disbarred. – YES
HELD: While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his
act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This
reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties
and functions as a lawyer. The Court’s Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant disregard
or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we
gave Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he
continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits disciplinary
action.
136
We note that this is Atty. Lavadia’s first infraction. However, given his proven propensity for filing
motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds that it should
impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing client's engage his services only to lose their
case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier
actions both to his client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, the penalty of disbarment is
proper.
Garafil vs. Office of the President

June 16, 2015 / G.R. No. 203372
FACTS: The midnight appointees of then President Arroyo are assailing the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 2 issued by President Aquino which revoked all of Arroyo’s midnight appointments.
ISSUE: WON EO 2 is unconstitutional. – NO
HELD: All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional. The dissent makes the singular exception
that during the constitutionally mandated ban on appointments, acceptance is not necessary to
complete the appointment. The dissent gives no reason why this Court should make such singular
exception, which is contrary to the express provision of the Constitution prohibiting the President
from making appointments during the ban.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (meaning both complete and
effective) appointment:(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;(2)
transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;(3) a vacant position at
the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the
appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps
in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step. In this case, petitioners have failed to show
compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand,
petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.
137
Ce Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. vs. Province of Nueva Ecija,
et al.
June 17, 2015 / G.R. No. 196278
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the assessment of RPT issued to it by the Province of Nueva Ecija by filing
with the RTC a complaint for injunction to restrain collection of the assessed taxes. The RTC denied
the application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, and this was challenged by the
petitioner in a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. Such petition was denied by the CA, ruling that
jurisdiction lies with the CTA.
ISSUE: WON the CA has jurisdiction to resolve the certiorari petition. – NO
HELD: The CTA has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In praying to restrain the collection of RPT,
petitioner also implicitly questions the propriety of the assessment of such RPT. This is because in
ruling as to whether to restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule on the propriety of
the assessment. No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case.
CIR vs. Puregold Duty Free

June 22, 2015 / G.R. No. 202789
FACTS: In accordance with the tax exemption certificates granted to Puregold Duty Free pursuant to
RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act), it enjoyed five percent (5%) preferential tax, in lieu
of all other national and local taxes for the period of January 1998 to May 2004. In 2005, the Court in
one case withdrew preferential tax treatment enjoyed by all businesses located in the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ), prompting the BIR to assess Puregold for its unpaid VAT and excise tax on the
wines, liquors and tobacco products it imported by from January 1998 to May 2004. Pending
resolution of Puregold’s protest against the assessment, Congress enacted RA 9399, specifically to
grant a tax amnesty to business enterprises affected by the aforementioned Court ruling.
ISSUE: WON Puregold is liable for the assessed deficiency VAT and excise taxes. – NO
HELD: Puregold is entitled to avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9399. During the proceedings in the
CTA, the CIR never challenged Puregold’s eligibility to avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9399 on the
ground that its principal place of business, per its Articles of Incorporation, is in Metro Manila and not
in Clark Field, Pampanga. Neither did the CIR present the supposed Articles of Incorporation nor
formally offer the same in evidence for the purpose of proving that Puregold was not entitled to the
tax amnesty under RA 9399. Hence, this Court cannot take cognizance, much less consider, this
argument as a ground to divest Puregold of its right to avail of the benefits of RA 9399.
In any event, assuming arguendo that petitioner’s new allegation can be raised on appeal, the same
deserves short shrift. RA 9399, as couched, does not prescribe that the amnesty-seeking taxpayer has
its principal office inside the CSEZ. It merely requires that such taxpayer be registered and operating
within the said zone.
138
Furthermore, the amnesty provision of RA 9399 covers the deficiency taxes assessed on Puregold. The
issue on the coverage and applicability of RA 9399 to Puregold has already been addressed and
disposed of by the CTA when it pointed out that RA 9399 covers all applicable tax and duty liabilities,
inclusive of fines, penalties, interests and other additions thereto. Consequently, the government,
through the enactment of RA 9399, has expressed its intention to waive its right to collect taxes,
which in this case is the tax imposed under Sec. 131(A) of the 1997 NIRC, subject to the condition that
Puregold has complied with the requirements provided therein.
United Overseas Bank of the Philippines vs. Board of Commissioners-

HLURB, et al.
June 23, 2015 / G.R. No. 182133
FACTS: A Deed of Absolute Sale covering Condo Unit E of the Aurora Milestone Tower was executed
between the developer JOS Managing Builders and EDUPLAN Philippines. Notwithstanding this, the
former failed to cause the issuance of Condominium Cert. of Title in the latter’s name. When the latter
subsequently learned that the lot on which the condo was erected had been mortgaged to United
Overseas Bank without the prior approval of the HLURB, it filed a complaint seeking, among others,
for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage.
ISSUE: WON the mortgage executed by the condo developer without the prior approval of the HLURB
is void. – NO
HELD: While a mortgage may be nullified if it was in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957
(Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree Act), such nullification applies only to the
interest of the complaining buyer. It cannot extend to the entire mortgage. A buyer of a particular unit
or lot has no standing to ask for the nullification of the entire mortgage.
Since EDUPLAN has an actionable interest only over Unit E, 10thFloor, Aurora Milestone Tower, it is
but logical to conclude that it has no standing to seek for the complete nullification of the subject
mortgage and the HLURB was incorrect when it voided the whole mortgage between JOS Managing
Builders and United Overseas Bank. Despite the fact that the mortgage constituted between JOS
Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank cannot bind EDUPLAN, because of the non-observance
of the provision of P.D. No. 957 by JOS managing Builders, the mortgage between the former and
United Overseas Bank is still valid.
Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista et al.

June 30, 2015 / G.R. No. 210551
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to enjoin the enforcement of QC Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the
Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) of Quezon City and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee
collection. SHT imposes a special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed
value of land in excess of Php100,000 which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the
139
QC Government, and those who dutifully pay for 5 years may be able to enjoy tax credit. Petitioner
argues that the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the QC Government
as an exercise of its power to create sources of income under Sec. 5, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution,
adding that SHT operates as penalty to real property owners, while the garbage fees amount to
double taxation. On the other hand, respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social
justice principle in the Constitution and in the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA).
ISSUE: WON the assailed ordinances are valid. – Yes as to the SHT Ordinance, no as to Garbage Fee
Ordinance
HELD:
a. SHT: The 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social
function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government in the exercise of police power. In this jurisdiction, taxation may be made the implement
of the state’s police power. Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is
within its power to impose. The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and
projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a
regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of
the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only
beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property
owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying
the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the
poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
b. Garbage Fee: The garbage fee is not a tax, hence, the contention that the garbage fee under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail. Nonetheless,
although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation, it must be
reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service. In the subject ordinance, the
rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, social housing project or apartment. For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in
fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in
a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Indeed, the
classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of “promoting
shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming
the present resources and in generating waste.” Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into
land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment,
respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of
wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household
age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity
to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.
140

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1

February 2014 .............................................................................13

March 2014 ................................................................................ 18

April 2015 ...................................................................................21

June 2014 .................................................................................. 27

Patrimonio v. Gutierrez and Marasigan ....................................................................................................... 31

July 2014 ................................................................................... 35

August 2014 .............................................................................. 41

September 2014 ......................................................................... 46

October 2014 ............................................................................. 56

Azuelo v. Zameco ......................................................................................................................................... 58

December 2014 .......................................................................... 82

January 2015 ............................................................................. 88

Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove ............................................................................................. 107

February 2015 ........................................................................... 110

March 2015 .............................................................................. 124

April 2015 .................................................................................126

Lexber Inc. vs. Dalman ................................................................................................................................ 129

June 2015 ................................................................................. 133

Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v. Ferdinand Acibo, et al.

Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Celera

Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas

Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises Inc

ISSUE: WON the land is alienable? NO.

CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation

Procter & Gamble Asia PTE LTD v. CIR

Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Asuncion Felonia and Lydia De

ISSUE: WON HSLB is a buyer in good faith? NO.

Rex Tupal v. Judge Remegio Rojo

People v. Noel Enojas y Hingpit

Macaria Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank Inc

Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private

James and Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, Executive

ISSUE: WON the RH Law is constitutional? YES except Certain Provisions!

The Right to Health

Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech

Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp, Tesoro Mining and

Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al v. Secretary of Justice, et al.

ISSUE: WON MR will prosper? NO!

Violation of Freedom of Expression due to upholding the constitutional of Online Libel

Online libel is vague and overbroad

ISSUE: WON the property mortgaged is conjugal. YES.

Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156

Dulang v. Judge Regencia

ISSUE: WoN Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable. YES

Patrimonio v. Gutierrez and Marasigan

The checks given to Gutierrez are incomplete but delivered instruments.

Quiachon v. Atty. Ramos

ISSUE: WoN Atty. Ramos should be disbarred. YES.

The following requisites must concur:

RATIO: The court here upheld its ruling in Republic v. Naguit.

Commissioner of Customs v. Oilink

Paranaque Kings Enterprises v. Catalina Santos

2. Reckoning Point for Just Compensation

3. RTC as Special Court

Modification of Marriage Settlements

Separation in Fact for One Year

Areza v. Express Savings

(2) Failure to Implead the People

CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

Dela Torre v. Imbuido