Analytical Politics II: Developing World

Problem Set 1
Section 2 Xi Yang ID: 12208296
Question 1
1. All 3 alternatives are not defeated by another spending level under pairwise majority voting.
2.
 Each groups’ preferences are as follows.
Group 1: Medium ≻1 High ≻1 Low
Group 2: High ≻2 Low ≻2 Medium
Group 3: Low ≻3 Medium ≻3 High
 Then, make pairwise comparison:
(i) Start from comparing Medium and High: Medium ≻ High, Low ≻ Medium.
So Low ≻ Medium ≻ High
(ii) Start from comparing High and Low: High ≻ Low, Medium ≻ High.
So Medium ≻ High ≻ Low
(iii) Start from comparing Low and Medium: Low ≻ Medium, High ≻ Low
So High ≻ Low ≻ Medium
 So all 3 alternatives are not defeated by another spending level under pairwise majority voting.

Question 2
B is the condorcet winner, his
1. Alternative y2.
most preferred is y2
xA = 0.15 xB=0.5 xC=0.85

y1 = 0 y2 = 0.6 y3 = 0.9

Since the utility function is

𝑈𝑖 (𝑥) = −|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦|
So the individual prefers the policy which is closest to him.
 Each groups’ preferences are as follows.
For A: y1 ≻ y2 ≻ y3
For B: y2≻ y3 ≻ y1
For C: y3≻ y2 ≻ y1
 Then, make pairwise comparison:
(i) Start from comparing y1 and y2: y2 ≻ y1, y2 ≻ y3
(ii) Start from comparing y2 and y3: y2 ≻ y3, y2 ≻ y1
(iii) Start from comparing y3 and y1: y3 ≻ y1, y2 ≻ y3
 Alternative y2 beats other alternatives for most times under pairwise comparison. So y2 cannot
be defeated in pairwise majority rule.
2.
a. No. Because B’s utility function changes into 𝑈𝐵 (𝑥) = |0.4 − 𝑦|, so B prefers the policy which
is furthest from him. Therefore, B prefers y3 most now. However, we can see from the picture
below that y3 is farther than y2, so individual B’s preference is NOT single-peaked.

xA = 0.15 xB=0.5 xC=0.85

y1 = 0 y2 = 0.6 y3 = 0.9

b. y3.
 First, calculate individual B’s preference:
Under y1, 𝑈𝐵 (𝑥) = |0.4 − 𝑦| = |0.4 − 0| = 0.4
Under y2, 𝑈𝐵 (𝑥) = |0.4 − 𝑦| = |0.4 − 0.6| = 0.2
Under y3, 𝑈𝐵 (𝑥) = |0.4 − 𝑦| = |0.4 − 0.9| = 0.5
So B’s preference is y3≻ y1 ≻ y2
 Each individual’s preferences:
For A: y1 ≻ y2 ≻ y3
For B: y3≻ y1 ≻ y2
For C: y3≻ y2 ≻ y1
 Then, make pairwise comparison:
(i) Start from comparing y1 and y2: y1 ≻ y2, y3 ≻ y1
(ii) Start from comparing y2 and y3: y3 ≻ y2, y3 ≻ y1
(iii) Start from comparing y3 and y1: y3 ≻ y1, y3 ≻ y2
 Alternative y3 beats other alternatives for most times under pairwise comparison. So y3 cannot
be defeated in pairwise majority rule.

c. All three alternatives are not defeated in pairwise majority rule.

xA = 0.15 xB=0.5 xC=0.7

y1 = 0 y2 = 0.6 y3 = 0.9

 First, calculate individual C’s preference:

Under y1, 𝑈𝐶 (𝑥) = −|0.7 − 𝑦| = −|0.7 − 0| = −0.7
Under y2, 𝑈𝐶 (𝑥) = −|0.7 − 𝑦| = −|0.7 − 0.6| = −0.1
Under y3, 𝑈𝐶 (𝑥) = −|0.7 − 𝑦| = −|0.7 − 0.9| = −0.2
So C’s preference is y2 ≻ y3 ≻ y1
 Each individual’s preferences:
For A: y1 ≻ y2 ≻ y3
For B: y3≻ y1 ≻ y2
For C: y2 ≻ y3 ≻ y1 we get loop
 Then, make pairwise comparison:
(i) Start from comparing y1 and y2: y1 ≻ y2, y3 ≻ y1
So y3 ≻ y1 ≻ y2
(ii) Start from comparing y2 and y3: y2 ≻ y3, y1 ≻ y2
So y1 ≻ y2 ≻ y3
(iii) Start from comparing y3 and y1: y3 ≻ y1, y2 ≻ y3
So y2 ≻ y3 ≻ y1
 So all three alternatives are not defeated in pairwise majority rule.