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S T R A T EG Y

A L E C T U RE D E L I V E RE D BY C OLON EL ARTH U R
A GNE ASS I STA N T AD J U TA N T GENE RA L
R
L .

W ,
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U S A TO TII E O' ' I C E RS O ' TH E R E G


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,

U L A R AR M Y A N D N ATI O N A L GU A R D
AT TH E MA NE UV E RS AT W E S T
P O I NT KY
,
A N D AT ' O RT
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,

R I L E Y KA N S A S
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1 903 .

P R ESS O'

H U DSO N KI MB E LY P UB LI SH I NG CO
R
KA N S AS CITY Mo , .
By H UD SON KIMBER L Y P UBL ISHI NG
- CO
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ST R AT EG Y

A LEC TUR E D ELIVER ED B Y COLON EL AR TH UR L W AGN ER , As .

SISTAN T AD J UTA N T GEN ER AL, U S A , To TH E O'' IC ERS


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O ' TH E R EG ULAR AR M Y AN D N ATIO N AL GUAR D AT

TH E M A N EUVER S AT W EST P OI N T , KEN TUC KY ,


AN D AT 'OR T R ILEY , KAN S AS , 1 903 .

GEN TL EM EN
In appearing before this audie nce to deliver a
lecture on the subject of Strategy I confes s to a feel ,

ing of considerable embarras smen t ; for n ot only is it


a ma tter of great d iflic ulty to compres s within the

limits of a single lecture a subject which woul d t e


quire many volume s for its proper elucidation but ,

there are many officers presen t who are so familiar


with the subject that I feel tha t I am carryin g
c o al s to Newc as tle or at leas t relating a twice
'
,

told tale The best I can hOpe to do is to present


.

well known facts in a new gro uping so as to bring


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,

out in s trong relief in your min ds prin ciples with

which you are alrea dy familiar .

The Art of W ar is broadly divided into the


two subjects of Strategy and Tactics The latter is .

briefly and clearly defined as the ar t of disposing


and maneuvering t roops on the field of battle ; but

it is more diffi cult to find a satisfactory definition


for the for mer The term strategy is derived '
.
4 S TRA T EGY .

from the Greek word s trategos meaning a genet al ; ,

and Strateg y has ac cordingly been desc ribed as

the science of generalship B ut this definition is .

not sa tisfactory for some of the mos t brill iant


,

exhibitions of general ship have been made on the

field of battle after passing in to the unques tioned


domain of Tactics In this connection it is neces
.

sary onl y to rec all Frederick at Le uthen N apoleon ,

at Austerlitz and Well ing ton at Salamanca


, Strat .

egy has been defin ed as the art of movin armie


g s

in the thea ter of operations ; but this is open to the


objection that armie s actually engaged on the field
of battle are moving in the theater of operations ,

and this definition would c ause Tactic s to be com

p l etel y s wall owed up in Strateg y A nothe r d efi ni .

tion of Strategy is the art of moving troops not in


the presence of the enemy ; but this too is unsat , ,

isfactory for Waterloo and Koniggratz both p re


,

sent illus trations of s trategical operations culmi


'

nating in the pre sence of the enemy and merging


into the tactical operations of actual combat A .

d elightfull y brief definition of Strategy is the art


of t aking the enemy at a dis advantage ; but un ,

fortunately this definition has no other merit than


,

its brevity When we prepare an ambuscade


.

when we conceal our in trenchmen ts on the fiel d of


battle when we provide our army with a wea pon
,

superior to tha t of its adversary we are taking the ,

enemy at a disadvantag e but we are not eng aged ,

in strateg y Indeed if this definition were ao


.
,

cepted Dreyse who invented the needl e gun and


, ,
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,
S TRA TEGY 5

Vo n R oon who placed it in the hands of the Prus


,

s ian ar m y would be entitled to be clas sed with


,

Von Moltke as s trateg ists for they were certainly


,

p lacing the enem ie s of Prussia at a disa d van tag e


Strategy has al so been define d as the art of con
d ucting great military operations ; but this too is , ,

open to the objection of em bracing tactical move


ments under the head of Strateg y ; for a general
who is directing the move ments of a mig hty host
on the field of ba ttle is surely cond ucting g rea t

military operations Another d efinition is : Strat


.

agy is the art of moving an army in the theater of

operations with a view to placing it in such a posi


,

tion rela tive to the en emy as to increase the prob


, ,

vict or y , or lessen the o


c nse u ncesq e of d efeat . I

than that it is my own Yet I would not be under

nition , for in formulating


it I have merely end eavored
to epitomize in a definition several a ble parag raphs
in Haml ey 3 Opera tions of W ar
’ '
.

war belongs more or less intima tely either to Stra t


eg y or Tactic s When the engineer is engaged in
.

the co nstr uction of a fortress to ser ve as a place


agains t which an army can res t its heel so to spea k , ,

when it pushes forward to encounter the enemy ,

or on which it can pivot in the maneuvers of a cam

p g
a i n he
, is dir ectl y con cerned wi th the s ubj e ct o f
Strateg y When he marks out a line of has ty ih
.
6 S TRA TEGY .

trenchment s on the battle field which will enable


.
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the troops to hold in check or defea t superior num


bers of the enemy he is playing his part in the do
,

main of Tactics Without the Quart ermas ter s and


.

Subsisten ce Departments it woul d be impo ssible


to conduct strategical Operations Without the .

supply of arms an d ammun ition furnished by t he

Ordnan ce Depart men t Strategy woul d be a mock


,

ery an d Tactic s a delusion The Medic al Depart


ment provides the sanitar y measur es for the pres
er vation o f the heal th of the troop s and the means

of removing an d c aring for the sick an d woun ded ,

so tha t the army can be in a g ood con dition to

march and fight ; in other words to play its part in ,

both Strategy and Tactic s And so with every com


.

bat ant and administrati ve branch of the army ; if


we anal yze the ul timate objects of each we shall
find tha t they are insep arably connected with the
mobility the fighting power the informa tion or the
, ,

moral e of an army and thus with its efficiency in


,

either Strategy or Tactics or both , .

Tactic s may be chara cterize d a s essentiall y


syn thetic al an d Strategy a s e s sen ti al ly an alyt ic al .

The former begins with the individual in struction


of the recruit passes through the school of the sol
,

dier the school of the company the s chool of the


, ,

battalion the evolutions of the regimen t the ma ,

n euvers of the brigade s an d divi sion s con tinuall y ,

combining units into larger tactical organization s ,

an d fin al ly it reaches its cul min ation in the handl ing

of mighty masses on the field of battle The latter .


S TR A TEGY .
7

b egin s with a broad general sweep of the geography


,

of the con tending na tions ; from this it descends

to a selection an d study of the thea ter of opera


tions the choice of an objective and the roads by
whi ch the objective is to be reached ; the subject
narrowing down gra dual ly from a comprehensive

V iew of an enormous area to the few bl oody acres

on which the weal or woe of the na tion is to be de

cided It follows naturally that to a strategist a


.

good map is as essential as a saw is to a carpen ter ,

an an vil to a blacksmith or a tel es cope to an as


,

tronomer It is said that Napoleon when a sked


.
,

to what he attributed in the greatest degree the


success of his militar y operations replied I lived '
, ,

on the map ; a n d
'
sur el v n o co mm an der eve r made
a wiser use o f mil itary geography .

The principles of Strateg y are essentially sim


l I h i
'

p l.e I n deed C au s ewitz


, s ay s n w ar ,e v er yt n g is

simple he dd The d ifi l i tt i
'
b
'

; ut a s , cu ty s to a a n
the req uisite Si mplicity But it is not to be in
.

ferred tha t because the principles of Strategy are


s imple the science of Strategy can be mas ter ed

without difficul ty or that it s art is easy of execution .

In fact all grea t things human are essen tially


,

simple . When we read the works of Shakespeare ,

we are so struck with the simplicity of the beautiful


aphorisms of him who wrote for all time that
'

we are almost inclined to wonder why we never


thought of them ourselves When we peruse that .

wonderful aggregation of wise observation s kn own


as the Proverbs of Solomon the truths therein are
8 S TR ATEGY .

human nature that we are perhaps inclined to


un derra te the ge nius of the wise king until we
und er take to make a few proverbs ourselves The .

stea m eng ine which has wr ought such a wo ndrous

which has been such a potent factor in civilization ,

d epend s upon the simple fa ct that s team inj ected


into a cylin der will pus h forward a piston and that ,

the condens ation or the e sc ape of the steam will


cause the pressure of the air to force the pis ton

back in to the vacuum thus crea ted From this


.

fund amental fact the growth of the steam engine


seems so n atural and so l ogical that we ahn ost los e

sig ht of the g enius of Watt .So too with the


, ,

principles of Strateg W h en we read the cam


y
.

p g
ai ns of N apoleo n in
, the cl ear lig ht o f his toric al
elucid ation and foll ow his movements on the map
, ,

his plans seem so plainl y to have been the ones


bes t adapted to the existing conditions t o be I -
,

might ahnost say the o nly ones suited to the situa



,

tion tha t it is not until we reflect that facts made

up no meager and detached bits of information


a ined th r ou gh his s ecr et s ervice ; tha t his mo ve
g
ments were based upon probabilities which he
fathomed by his knowledge of human nature and
his accurate es timate of his own and his enemies

ma terial and moral res ources ; and that his cam


i ns a n d b ttles we re conducted under conditions
p g
a a
S TR A TEGY .
9

of al mos t inconceivable responsibility personal d an ,

er
g , physical hardship , and mental anx iety , t ha t

of thepre eminent warrior who al ways mad e the


most correct and powerful application of the prin '

ciples of Strategy ; who generally achieved s ucces s ,

The t wo g reat und erlying principles of Strateg y


may be expressed in the homely a xio ms that the
s old ier like e very other human being needs foo d
, , ,

clothing and medicine ; that in addi tion to these


,

sup ply mmunition ; and tha t all other things


of a ,

equal two or three men are able to whip one The


, .

more we examine the subject of Strateg y the more


clearly shall we see tha t it is based entirely on these

Before beginning military operations it is requi


s ite that the sup plies n eeded by the army shoul d be

from the o untry from which they are drawn and


c ,

from which they can be readily d istributed to the

be fely located and well fortified so as to be safe


sa ,

from sudden forays or anything short of the mos t

The reg ion in whi ch the supplies are thus coll ecte d
and from which they are forward ed to the army

constitute s the B as e of Operations which is d efined


,

by Jomin i as the portion of country from which


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Io S TRA TEGY .

the army obtains its reinforcemen ts an d resources ,

from which it starts when it takes the offensive to ,

which it retreats when necessary and by which it ,

is suppor ted when it t akes position to cover the


coun try defensively From the nature of things
.

bas es of operations an d bases of supply are usual ly


coin cident ; but as we shal l presen tly see they are
, ,

not al wav s so ' or manifest reas ons of security


.
,

the base generally is covered by a river a chain of ,

moun tains or other natural feat ures forming a


,

good defensive lin e but an army may sometimes


be based upon a smgle point This is especial ly .

the cas e when an expedition is lan ded on a hostile


coas t ; thus in the invasion of Mexico Scott s base ,

was at first the single poin t of Vera Cruz But in .

all such c as es other poin ts on the coas t are seized

an d fort ified as soon as pos sibl e s o as to give a


,

longer bas e and thus not onl y facilitate the suppl y


,

of the army but dimin ish the danger of its being


,

cut ofi from it s retrea t to its base in cas e of a dversity .

It is not suflicient that the supplies of an army


shoul d be coll ected an d securely guarded at the b ase ;

it is n ecessary that they should be forwar ded


promptly an(1 without interruption to the troops in
the field We hear a great deal about armies liv
.

ing on the coun try as they advan ce but such a ,

means of supply is usually pr acticable only as a


mere temporary expedien t or as an auxiliary to
,
.

the regul ar method of supply An invading army


.

has often been aptly comp ared to a swarm of locus ts ,

an d if it depen ds upon the resources of the regi on


S TR A TEGY . II

in which it is operating it quickly consumes every


,

thing in the line of its march If we ignore all con


.

sidera tion s o f humanity to the inh abitant s an d limit

our selves merely to the question of the supply of


the troops this is all very well s o long as the army
,

keeps moving ; but as soon as it is compelled to


hal t to fight or for any other purpose if its supplies
, ,

be not forthcoming from the rear it will soo n feel ,

distress which may increas e to positive suffering


,

an d even termin ate in tot al disas ter Aside from .

the precariousnes s of supply demoralization is in


,

variabl y p roduced to a greater or l es s deg ree in an

army that l ives by foragin g When Napoleon in


.

vaded R ussia his army exhaus ted the resour ces of


,

the country as it advanced It reached Mos cow in


.

a demo ral ized condition ; and whil e it s sufferings

in retreat were greatly intensified by the extreme


cold and the haras sing operations of the ubiquitou s
Cossacks the mere fact of its being compelled to re
,

treat ov er an exhaus ted coun try would in itself have


been suffi cient to wor k its prac tical ruin even if the ,

weather had been b almy and the Cossacks ineffi cien t .

It follows then tha t there must be good means of


, ,

communic ation from the bas e to the f ront in order ,

that the army may be properly supplied ; and such


communications are neces sary also for the pur
pose of relieving it of its sick an d wounded bro ,

ken material prisoners an d trophies


, These lines .

may be compared to ar terie s and veins ; nour


ishing the army w ith good blood from the b ase
an d carry ing b ack the impure drain for pur ification .
rz S TR ATEGY .

It is obvious that the line by which the army oper


ates is ordinaril y the one by which it is supp lied

and the one by which it communicates with the

rear . In other words the lines of operation supply


, , ,

and com un icatio n are usually coinciden t ; but ,

as we shall soon see this is no t invariably the case


, .

The lines of supply may be rivers railroads ordinary , ,

inent part as bas es or lines of supply , and thus of en


t

t
s ance , the Army of the Elbe , the Army of the R hine ,

the Ar my of the Potomac , and the Army of the Cum

nary wag on road s must as a rule be larg ely d e


, ,

pended on for t he final suppl y of t h e troop s .

As the army ad vances its line o f supply mus t


, ,

of course , be mad e secure, and this need s the con

t
s ant detachmen t of h o ops from the ma in body to
g uard the m ea ns of co mm u n ica tio n It foll ows .

then that in a greatly ex tended line of Operations


such detachments would continually we aken the

fig hting force until at las t its streng th would be


,

exhausted in g uarding its lines to the rear To .

prevent this, new bases are established as the army


advances To these new bas es supplies are s ent for
.

ward f rom the orig inal bas e and ac cumul a ted in


such quantity as to g ive the army new points on

which it can depend at le as t for a time with some


, ,

degree of independence of its primar v bas e Often .


S TR A TEGY . 13

a p oint is gained to which supp lies can be sent


by easy transportation from the home reg ion and ,

the former line can be abando ned This adoption.

of the new point of supply and the abandonment


of the old is termed a chang e of base One of .

1 86 3 ,
when McClellan finding his base
,
at W hite
house Pamunkey mena ced by the movement
on the
of Lee again st the Fed eral rig ht transferred his
,

supplies from that point to H arrison s Landing on



the James R iver destroying such as he could not
remove — and falling ba ck during seven days of
,

liantly aggr essi ve campaign which had for its object


,

the turning of the Fede ral right and the cutting ofi


of the Union army from its bas e resul ted only in
,

the establishment of his opponen t in a more secure


p os ition than before ; a po sition in
, fa ct w hich ,

McClellan would probably have taken up of his


own volition had he not felt constrained to ex tend

his right up the Chi ckahominy to effect an ex pected


ju n ctio n with McD o w e ll .

The popular idea of mil itary operations takes


no account of the vital question of supply The .

non military reader seem s to think that armies can


-

be moved with the same ease as the pieces in a g ame


of chess ; that an army corp s can be moved a s easil y

as a castle a divi sion as readily as a bishop and a


, ,

reg iment with the ease with which a pawn can

be pushed forward from one square to an other .

Hamley truly says : It is extremely difficul t to


I4 S TRAT EGY .

persuade even intelligent auditors that two armies


are not like two fen cers in an arena who may shift ,

their ground to all points of the compas s ; but rather


resemble two swordsmen on a narrow plank which

overhangs an abyss where each has to think not


only of g iving an d parrying thrusts but of keeping ,

his footing under penalty of destruction ; and he


'

add s tha t the gen eral probably direct s a hundred


glances a hundred anx ious thoughts to the commu
, ,

nicat ions in his rear for one that he bes tows on


,

his adversary s fron t


’ '
.

As an ill ustration of t he man ner in which stra



teg ical O pe rations are affected in fact regulated ,

by the paramount consideration of supply let us


foll ow the course of one of the principal Union
armies from I 8 6 I to the clo se of the Great W ar .

When the invasion of the Confederate States in


the Mississippi Vall ey had been decided upon the
principal armies were based upon the Ohio R iver
at Cincinna ti Louis ville and Cairo ; the two former
, ,

places being bases of the Army of the Ohio un der ,

Buell and the las t that of the Army of the Tennes


,

see un der Grant


, W hen the successful Operations
.

of Gran t ag ainst Forts Henry and Donelson had

re sul ted in the Opening of the Cumberland R iver ,

Buell pushing forward from Bowling Green seized


, ,

Nashville Here a se condary base was e st ablished


.

'
for the Army of the Ohio Supplies of all kinds in
.

great quantities were sen t here by rail and by water ;


the city was strongly fortified an d though the , ,

primary base was still essential a new poin t was,


S TR A TEGY . 1 5

g a med by Buell from which he coul d advance


a gains t the enemy an d upon which he coul d in
, ,

c ase of reverse fall b ack and be sus tained for a con


,

s id erable time ind ep en d ently of his o riginal b ase .

From his new base on the Cumberland R iver he


a dvan ced to eff ect his j unction with Grant at Shiloh .

After the capture of Corinth Buell was directed to


,

move against Chattanooga an importan t strateg ic


point from which further operations might be con
ducted in Georgia B ut while there was no doubt
.

a s to the wi sdom of choosing this obj ectiv e there ,

was a decided differen ce of opinion between H alleck


(the n Co mm an ding G en e ral of the Army ' an d B ue ll
a s to the line of Operation s an d q uite n aturall y
,

the whole matter hinged upon the question of supply .

The difficul ty of supplying the army was great at


best owing to the activity of Morgan an d Forres t
,

with their partisan caval ry but Buell believed tha t


, ,

he could keep the line open from N ashville as he


pushed on to Chattanooga Halleck on the other
.
,

hand regarded the line from Memphis to Chat


,

tanoog a as the prope r one for the supply of Buell s


a rmy n otwithstanding that the railroad c ros sed
,

the Tennessee R iver twice rendering necessary the


reb uilding and guarding of two long bridges and ,

the still more objectionable fact that the line ran


paral lel to the en emy s general fron t rendering its

protection against raiding parties almost impos sible


It does not need much strateg ical acumen to see
that Buell was right and Halleck was wrong but the ,
I6 S TR A TEGY

latter was the commander and Buell was compelled


,

to adopt the line proposed by the ofi cer who was


his superior in rank but not in abil ity
, Halleck .

final l y g ave a tar dy consen t to Buell s plan after


the latter had beg un Operations on the Memphis


Chattan ooga lin e but it was now too late ; for B ragg
, ,

who had concentrated and refitted h is army at

o cealing
c n his movemen ts , sen t Kirby Smith north

to n ,Kentucky and threatening Cin cinnati With


, .

his own force B ragg now menaced Nash ville and , ,

q uickl y m ov ing by his rig ht ma rched for


, Louis ville .

There was nothing for Buell but to follow suit and ,

a race of the tw o armies for Loui sv ill e now followed .

It might seem at firs t sig ht that the situation was


reciproc al, and that while the Confedera te Army

was marching ag ainst B uell s commun ications the



,

latter commander mig ht similarly move against


those of Brag g But such was not the case ; for
.

Bragg woul d have struck the line to Louis ville while


Buell was yet merely moving against the Con
federate commun ications Moreover B ragg oper , ,

ating rapi dl y in a frien dly coun tr y coul d be more ,

independen t of reg ular supplies than coul d poss ibly


have been the cas e with Buell Hence the race for .

Lo uisvill e the possession of which by Buell mean t


, ,

above all things supplie s for his army and the los s
,

of which me a nt want and disas te r .

Time will not permit me to g i ve even a sketch


of the intere sting camp aign of B uell and B ragg ;
S TR A TEGY . I 7

an d s how how the latter influenced bv political


,

con siderations and himself hampered by precarious


supplies failed to profit by his interpos ition at Mun
,

fordville between Buell and L ouisville Buell reached .

Louisville Brag g retired followed by the Union


, ,

army , and the battle of Perryville fought near ,

B ardstown thoug h app arently a drawn battle com


, ,

p ell ed the Co nfedera tes to retrea t from Ken tucky ;


for B uell s army was now full y suppl ied and his

commun ic ations were in no danger while Bragg , ,

found it impo ssible to supply his army at such a


distance from his base and it was out of the ques tion
,

to live on the country in the face of an undefeated


enemy in numbers superior to his own army The .

retrea t was made in good order and with sufficient


,

leisure to demonstra te that Bragg thoug h foiled ,

was not defeated .

Ag ain the question of supply dictated the course


of the campaig n Hal leck urged B uell to make
.

eas tern Tennessee the theate r of Operations The


project was dear to the heart of President Lin
coln for that region was the home of the stronges t
loyal element in the South Considerations of grat
.

itud e and sympathy for our friends demanded that


they shoul d be succored as speedily as possible ,

and milit ary policy coul d not ignore the fact that

the possession of that p art of the State meant the


addition t o our army of many valuable recruit s

drawn from a population reno wned for its warlike


qualities But the military objections to the pro
.

p o se d p l an of campaign were gra ve an d they were


,
I8 S TR A TEGY .

clearly pointed out by Buell This plan woul d have .

required an a d van ce of mo re than two hun dred

miles from the base ove r a mountainous an d d iffi


,

cul t country the supply of the army depending


,

upon ordin arv wagon roads and thes e roa ds in an ,

almo st impas sable con dition whil e the enemy coul d

cover his own communications an d be secure in the


all importan t matter of supply
-
B uell not only .

objected to the plan [but knowing that it could not


, ,

po ssibly be c arried out unh esitatin gly concentrated


,

his comman d on the line of the Louisville and N ash


ville road between Bowlin g Green and Nashville
, ,

preparatory to moving forward from the latter bas e .

He was promptly relieved and General R osecran s ,

was appoin ted to comman d the army which was ,

henceforth to be kn own as the Army of the Cum


berland It is impossible to a void the concl usion
.

that Buell was hardl y treated ; but he shared the


fate of strategists who offer views inheren tly so un d
but unpalat able to those in authority .

The new comman der was n o more tractable than


his pred ecessor but as he was fre sh from the laurels
,

of Corinth and high in popul ar favor his views were ,

received with more cons ideratio n —a conditio n doubt

less facil ita ted by the opportun e mo vement of B ragg


to Murfreesboro about thirty mil es south of Nas h
,

Mo ving forward from N ashville R osecrans en ,

countered Bragg in the three days battle of Stone s -


R iver one of the most fiercely conte s ted fi eld s of


,
'

modern times Though tactic ally a drawn battle
.
,
S TR ATEGY . 19

R iver was all



Stone s to
intents and purposes an
, ,

irnportant victo ry for the Union arms ; for B ragg


withdrew left the field in the possession of his oppo
,

nen t and took up a purel y pass ive defensi ve


, Y et .
,

thoug h the Ar my of the Cumberlan d had al l the


prestige of victory ; though it was well organized ,

well trained well equipped and in excellent moral e


, ,

we find it remaining s tationary for six months .

W hat was the c ause of this ' R osecran s w as not


lacking in energy or enterprise ; the President was
impa tient popul ar sentiment demanded an advance
, .

It was simply bec ause the ceaseless activity of Mor


g an a nd Fo r re st who de,s troye d r ail ro a d s bur ned ,

bridges blew up tunn els and captured convoys


, , ,

rende red R osecra ns communication s so insecure


that it was not until sufficient reinforcemen ts prin ,

cip all y cavalry and moun te d infantry co ul d be pro ,

v id ed to g uard the routes of supply that the Un ion

army w as reliev ed from its paral ysis and enabled

to resume the offen si ve .

H is supplies assured R osecrans again moved ,

forward and in a series of able maneuvers


,

the Confederate left so menaced the comm unications


of Bragg as to compel him to aban don Chattanooga .

This place was one of great strategic val ue furnish ,

ing a strong base on the Tenn essee R iver and com ,

manding the gateway of the mountains of north


ern Ge orgia It was in fact too impo rtant to be
.
, ,

defin itively relinquished without the most strenu


ous efforts for its recove ry ; and B ragg merely fell

back to a strong position on Chickamauga Creek ,


zo S TRA TEGY .

where he awaited reinforcemen ts and prepared for


battle with R osecrans R eal izing the perilous sit
.

uation the Confederate Government detached Long


,

str eet s corps from Lee s army in Virginia and sen t

it in haste by rail to join Bragg in his attempt to


, ,

crush the Army of the Cumberland The battle



.

of Chickamauga followed a desperate struggle in

which each army lost a third of its streng th B ut .


,

though the Confed erate s retained po ssession of the


field their hard earned victory was a barren one
,
-

R osecrans fell bac k to Chattanooga followed by ,

Bragg who took up a strong po sition at Lookout


,

Mountain and Missionary R id ge R osecrans was .

supers eded in comman d by Thomas and the Army ,

of the Cumberlan d was reinforced by the victorious

army from Vicks burg and by two corps from the


Army of the Potomac B ragg was d efeated by these
.

combine d forces under Ge neral Gran t Chattan ooga ,

was secure in the possession of the Union armie s ,

and it now con stitu ted a third an d mo st iInportant

bas e for future operations .

Grant having been appointed lieutenant general


and ordered to the East Sherman was placed in ,

comman d of the for ces as sembled at Chattanooga


Completely outfitting his ar my an d gathering a
vast store of supplies at Chattano oga he adva nced ,

earlv in the spring of I 864 against the Co nfede rate


'

army which w as now station ed at D alton under


,

Johnston who had superseded Bragg N aturally .

Sherman s grea test anxiety was in regard to the


supplytof his army The stores accumul ated at


.
S TRA TEGY .

Chattanooga coul d indefinitely but must


not last
be renewed constantly from the bases farther in
the rear Forrest was again a disturbing element
.
,

an d Sher man was fearful tha t he would collect a

large c avalry command in Mississippi cross the ,

Tenn essee R iver an d break up the railroad below


,

Nashville So g rea t did this d anger seem that an


.

t Forres t and when it had met with a d is


ag ain s ,

as trous defea t at Guntown a secon d expedition


, ,

consis ting of t wo divisions under General A J .

Smith was organized to operate against the trouble


,

with troubles of his own and Sherman s communi


,

ca tions were secure from a ttack from that quarter .

The ques tion of supply was the paramount


cons ideration wi th bo th Sherman and John ston ,

an d it furn ishe s the key to the st rateg y of e ach .

Sherman s objective was Atlanta though of course


his first and gre atest object was the defe at of John
st o n
. In moving upon his objective he was com
p ell ed to depe n d fo r the su pply O f h is a rmy on a

sin gle li ne of r ailroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta ,

a distance of I I 0 miles . To keep this line open


was a matter of vit al importan ce and to do so re ,

quired the con stant detachment of men to g uard it .

Johns ton depended on the same line from Atlanta ,

but it lay in a region friendl y to him and was ex


p o sed to l ess d an ge r . It is eviden t tha t as Sher m an
22 S TR A TEGY .

a dvanced his effective streng th would constan tly


diminish with the lengthening of his line of commu
nic ations whil e the effective s trength of Johnston

would increase as the latter fell back towards his


base In fact although Sherman received d uring
.
,

the campaign reinforcements considerably in ex


cess of his losses his eff ective strength when he
,

reached Atlan ta was much les s than when he left

Chattanooga From the very nature of things it


.
,

was John ston s object to stan d for decisive battle
near Atlan ta an d Sherman s object to force the

decision near Chattanooga If the battle were .

fought near Dalton for instance and Sherman were


, ,

defeated he coul d merely step back as it were to


, , ,

his bas e at Chattanooga r efit his army await re , ,

inforcements an d resume the c ampaign ; whereas if


, ,

John ston were defea ted he might be beaten to pieces


,

in his long retreat to Atlanta Similarly if Sher .


,

man were defea ted near Atlanta his army might


be ruin ed before it coul d reach Chattanooga ; while
Johnston s defeat near that city woul d mean simply

the loss of Atlanta which he woul d surely lose as


,

the resul t of a defeat anywhere on the line between


the two cities forming the respective bases of the
two opposing armies .

Unfortun ately for John ston his strategy was ,

n ot appreci a ted by his Governmen t This seems .

al l the more r emarkable as the Con fe d er ate Pres i


,

dent was him self an educated soldier who had had ,

experience in war Possibly the disapproval of Mr


. .

D avis was influenced by his well kn own unfriend -


S TR A T EGY 23

l iness to Johnston If so it is not the onl y in


.
,

stance in which the c areer of an abl e soldier has been

blighted by enemies in power for al l men are not ,

able to sin k personal animo sity in a con sideration

for the public weal Johnston was relieved at the


.

very time when he was prepared to make his d e


cisiv e ca s t in the militar y game ; an d his gal lan t

but inc apable successor Hood throwing away his


, ,

defensive advantages shattered his army in a fierce


,

ass aul t agains t the lines of his advers ary an d At ,

lant a was lost . While every true patriot mus t


rejoice in the remo val of John ston which con trib ,

uted so greatly towards the con clusion of the war


an d the restoration of the U nion it is impossible , ,

when we view the matter from the col d s tandpoin t


of profes sional interest to help feeling a pang of
,

regret that the Confederate gen eral was not allowed

to finish the great gam e of strategy which he had


pl ayed so ab ly with his b ril li an t an t ago nis t .

With the captur e of Atlan ta a four th bas e was ,

gained from which movements fur ther in advance


,

might be conducted ; but the strategic situation


was an embarrassing one Sherman was now
.

nearly fiv e hun dred mil es from h is primary base ,

and an enormous diss ipation of force was n eces sary

to protect the commun ications from Louisville to


Nashville fromNashvill e to Chattanooga and from
, ,

Chattanooga to Atlant a The line surely coul d not


.

be much fur ther exten ded if the army was to retain


sufficien t s trengt h to s trike a vigorous blow O ther .

considerations vexed the situation Hood was evi .


24 S TR A TEGY .

d en tly directing his my against Sherman s com


ar

munications and was aiming at N ashville To fol .


'

low him woul d be to abandon con quered terri tory


and gi ve an air of fail ure to the hard w on c amp aign -
.

Moreover Lee s army was the head and front of


the Confederate strength and with its destruction


the cause of the Sou th must fall Lee had long .

baffled the skill and power of his opponents and it ,

was de sirable that a sufficient forc e should be con


cent rated to c rush him The genius of Sherman
.

was equal to the situation He decided to detac h


.

a for ce un der Thomas to cope with Hood and with ,

his own army to push throug h the heart of the

A person ignoran t of military matters mig ht


wonder perhaps why Sherman having made this
, ,

decis ion d id not at once proceed by the most direct


,

route across no rthwe stern South C arolina and west


,

ern North C arolina in to Virg ini a But it require s .

the mere st glance to see that his line of communica


tions woul d have been so long and so dependen t on
ordinary roads as to rend er supply well nigh impos -

sible an d in c as e of defeat his army woul d be de


,

s troyed before it coul d regain its bas e He decided .

to des troy Atlanta aba n don his b as e make a gigan


, ,

t ic leap as it were ac ross the St ate of Georgi a and


, , ,

est ablish a new base on the sea This neces sitated .

living on the coun try ; but Sherman kn ew too well


the danger of relying solely on the resources of a
reg ion through which he must march a dis tan ce of

three hundred miles and while intending to make


,
S TR A TEGY . 25

war pport war he took with him a train bearing


su ,

twenty days full rations for his entire comman d


If he shoul d meet with serious opposition if he


should en coun ter unex pected obs tacles his command

coul d thanks to this provision en dure a d elav tha t


, ,

Arriving in the vicinity of Savannah Sherman


was able t o communicate w ith the Unio n fleet and ,

was only twen ty mil es from P ort R oyal S C which , . .

was in pos session of the Federal forces Here a .

a large qua ntity of supplies had been collected for

Sherma n s arm y ; but the transp orts an d na val ves


sels in Ossabaw Sound were un able to as cen d the

Ogeechee R iver which was ba rred by torped oes


,

and the gun s of Fort McAllister This fort could .

eas ily have been reduced by siege operations with


a trifling loss of life ; but time was press ing and the ,

necessity of the establis hmen t of a base w as too im

p e ra t ive to a dmit of dela y The for t w


. as there ,

fore immediatelv carried by Open infantr y assault


, ,

without artiller y preparation the torpedoes were ,

removed and the supply of Sherman S army was


,

assured A week after the captur e of Fort McAl


.

li ster Savamrah fell an d Sherman had a secure base


, ,

on the sea .

Much has been written related and sun g about


, ,

The March to the Sea Its object is clear to mil


.

it ary men but in ordinary histori e s it is made to


appear as simply a march of devast ation in which

the only object was to sweep the ho stile territory


with a besom of destruction It was a great and .
26 S TR A TEGY .

su cces sful chang e of bas e to which object all de


,

struction of the enemv s re source s was subo rdinate


an d incidental .

So far as Sherman was concerned Lo uisville , ,

Nashville Chattanooga an d Atlanta were now


,

merely names of retrospective interest H is sup .

plies were now brought to S avannah by sea ; from


this point he coul d set out on his northwar d march ,

and upon thi s point he coul d fal l back in case of ,

rev erse behind fortification s an d suppo rted by the

navy It was in fact the mos t secure base the


.
, ,

army had enjoyed sin ce it l eft Louisvill e But new .

bases would manifestly be necessary as the army


proceeded through the Carolinas Sherman moved .

upon Columbia an d the c apture of that city was


,

followed immediately by the evacuation of Charles


ton . This city had withstood a vigorous siege of
n ea rly two ye ar s by both army and navy each ,

using the mo st powerful enginery of war then in


existence ; but now its evacuation became neces
sary not only that its garrison might reinforce the
,

army of H ardee engaged in trying to stem the ad

vance of Sherman but because its supplies woul d


,

soon be completely cut off and s tarvation would


,

effect what shot and shell had tried in vain A .

new b ase w as now at Sherm an s service and in case


of reverse it woul d no longer be n ecessary to fall


back upo n Savann ah But the march was a long
.

one and it w as eviden t that neithe r S avann ah nor


,

Charleston would long sufiice as a base of supply .


S TRA TEGY 27

This had been foreseen and provision had been


made accordingly .

On the I sth of January 1 86 5 about the time


, ,

Sher man left S avannah on his n orthward march ,

Fort Fisher at the mouth of Cape Fear R iver was


, ,

captured by the Union forces under General Terry .

This for t g uarded the harbor of Wilmington which ,

had long been a shel tering n es t for blockade run ners -


,

and for this reason its c apture w as an i mportan t on e .

But there was another and still more impor tan t


re ason for it s c apture in the fact tha t Wilmington

would form a base of supplies for Sherman s ad ’

v ancing army The defeat of Hood having made


.

matters safe in the West Schofield with the 2 3 d


Corps was ordered from Nashville to Washing ton
mak ing the journey of fourteen hundr ed miles by
way of the Tennessee and Ohio rivers and thence
by rail Embarking at Washington he proceeded
.
,

to Fort Fisher and on the 2 2 d of Febr uary cap


, , ,

tured Wilmington Thoug h a new b ase was thus


.

gained for Sherman Schofield now prepared to es


tablish a still better line from Morehead City an d
Newberne towards Goldsboro Kins ton on thi s .
,

lin e was occupied (March I 4 I S6


, and the rail ,

way to that poin t was completed without delay .

When Sherman arrived at Fayetteville he commu ,

nicated with Wilmington ; an d pushing on and de

feating Johnston at Averasboro and Ben tonville ,

he entered Goldsboro where he effected a j unction


,

with Schofield an d obtained wel come s upplie s


,

from Kin ston Kinston was in fact his last base ;


.
, ,
28 S TR A TEGY .

for he continued to be supplied from this poin t


dur ing his march to R al eigh and Durham Station
At the latter place he received the surrend er of
Johnston s army and Le e having al so surrend ered

to Gran t the necessity for secure bases and well


,

It shoul d be n ote d that Wilming ton and Kinston

with bas es of operations and the lines thence to


Sherman s army are examples of lin es of supply not

coin cident with lin es of operations .

We have now briefly trac ed the course of the


Union armies from the Ohio to the Neuse throug h
more than three years of war and over an enormous
,

theater of Operations ; and we find the ques tion of


supply the deciding influence of the strategical

over the heavy draft on the fig hting strength of


,

an army by the n ecess ity of keeping open its com

municat ions In the spring of r 86 5 there were


.

in roun d numbers , men ac tually under


arms in the Un ion Army Of this grea t host there
.

were in cont act with the enemy s armies


,

men un der Grant in Virginia ; 90 000 men under Sher


man in North C arolina ; I 5 000 men un der Wilson in
, , ,

Georg ia ; and men un d er Canby at Mobile ,

a total of but little more than a quarter of a million

men Where were the rest ' With the exception


.

of comp aratively small forces eng ag ed in guarding

tions they were all employed in prote cting the


S TR A TEGY . 29

lines of communication and holding conquere d


territory in the enormous theater of operations ex
tending from the Potoma c to the Rio Grande and
from Ohio to the Gulf The extent of this a rea
.

can be best appreciated by compa ring it with the

theater of European wars The seven weeks war


.

in which Prussia broke the power of Austria and


sprang into the fron t ran k of military na tions was ,

fought on an area scarcely eq ual to half of the Sta te


of Kansas ; an d the Fr anco German w ar in which
-
,

the most renowned military nation yielded the


supremacy to the new Germanic empire was con ,

ducted upon a theater of similar area If in the .

former war a Prus sian army ha d penetra ted entirely

the latter a German my had pushed throug h


ar

'ran ce across the Pyren ees to Mad rid the distance


,

travers ed would in each c ase have been about equal


to that marched by the Union armies from Louis
ville to Sa vannah To complete the comparison
.
,

we should sup pose the European arm y in ea ch c as e


to be depen dent upon a s ingle line of railroad for
its supplies for nearly 5 00 miles of this distance and ,

to be en tirely without bas e or communications for


the remainder .

I would not abate one jot from the praise


d ue the South for its magnific ent str uggle In .

this contes t the Confederate Ar my consisted of


more than one tenth of the entire white population
-

including in the latter men women and children


helples s infan ts and totte ring old ag e ; whereas in ,
3 0 S TRA TEGY .

the strenuous efforts of the First French R epublic ,

when the country was declared in danger and all ,

Europe was combin ed ag ainst it the republican ,

armies con sisted of onl y one twentieth of the popu


-

lation of France I woul d not detract one iota


.

from the praise d ue to the genius of Lee or John


s ton or the heroic val or of the men who followed the

stan dards of those gre a t leaders But the plain.

milit ary fact shown irrefut ably by the map is that


,

the strategic situation was al together in favor of


the South and largely neutral ized the superior num
bers and resources of the North To the North .
,

too is praise then d ue for its stubborn and energetic


,

prosecution of the most difi cul t milit ary task the


worl d has seen since Napoleon undertook the con

All
t tegic combination s as already st ated
s ra , ,

are des ign ed to incre as e either the probability of

victory or to incre as e its consequences In the .

former cas e the movements have for their object


the concentration of a superior force at a decis ive
point ; in the latter the menacing or the intercep
tion of the enemy s communications is a paramoun t

con sideration The greatest consequences that can


follow a victory are the capture or destruction of
the defeated arm y and this can generally be ob
,

tained only by cutting o ff it s retre a t or completely


intercepting its supplies .

W hen a general is operating ag ains t two or


more armies of the enemy on lines that permit him
to concentrate his entire force and maneuver ag ainst
S TRA TEGY .
3 :

a ny one of the opposing armies in a shorter peri od of


time than woul d be required for the enemy s armies ’

to concentrate in superior force again st him he is ,

s aid to be Operating on in terior lines In this case.

he is in the best possible situation to maneuver so


as to incre ase the prob abilitie s of victory ; for he

c an le a ve a relatively s mall force to hold in check

or
'
contain one of the enemy s armies while he’

throws the bul k of his force against the other De .

feating the latter army he can then leave a small


,

force to conduct the pursuit or hold the groun d


g n
ai e d, r et urn to reinf o r ce his fo rme r det a chmen t ,

throw his weight upon the second hostil e army ,

and thus al tern ate his blows from one side of the

theater to the other his force at the decisive points


,

being superior to that of the enemy even though ,

his aggreg ate force be much les s In this manner


.

N apoleon in the campaig n of I 7 9 6 in Ital y first


, ,

s truck Beaulieu the n Colli ; an d skill fully al tern ating


,

his blows drove them as unde r compelled the c apit


,

ul ation of the latter an d dr ove the former in hasty


,

flight down the valley of the Po Similarly in the


.
,

Eckmiihl c ampaign in I 809 ma king a brilliant use


,

of his in terior lines he dro ve the Archduke Louis

to the south towards the Tyrol the Archduke Charles


,

to the north across the Danube penetrated be ,

tween the hostile ar mies thus dr iven asunder in


retre at and se ized Vienna
, . In a like manner when ,

McClellan was advancing up the Peninsul a against


R ichmond and Pope was moving from the Potomac
again st the same objective ,
Lee profiting by his
3 2 S TRA TEGY

in terior lines hurled McClellan ba ck to the James


,

menaced Pope and when McClellan (in obedience


,

to orde rs from Was hington ' had beg un his retro


grade movement to Y orktown threw his whole ,

weight upon Pope whom he heavily defeated be ,

fore he coul d be sufficiently reinforced from McClel


lan s arm

y to turn the tide In these cases it was .

the probability of victory that w as the firs t con sid


cra tion If Napoleon could have defea ted the com
.

bined armies of Beaulieu an d Colli the con sequen ces


of the victory might have been much greater than
they were ; but the only hOpe of victo ry lay in keep
ing the enemy s armies a sun der and beating them

in det ail So too in 1 86 2 Lee s situation woul d



.
, , ,

have been hopeles s had the Federal armies com


bined ; but encoun terin g them separately he was ,

able to fight McClella n t o a s tand s till and then in

fiict upon Pope one of the heavies t defea ts of the


'

whole war .

To util ize interior lin es with effect it is n ecess ary


that the thea ter of operations shoul d be suited in
size to the n ature of the opera tions If the theater .

were too large the containing force holding in check


one of the enemy s armies mig ht be completely

routed or captur ed before the main arm y coul d

return to its assistance and victory in one p ar t of ,

the thea ter would be neutral ized by defea t in the


other If on the other hand the theater were too
.
, ,

small the en emy mig ht be crus hed by a combined


,

attack by the two ar mies of the enemy as at Wate r ,

loo or KOnigg r atz [ Moreover in terior lines are.


,
S TR A TEG Y .
3

much more valuable in the case of comparatively


smal l forces than they coul d possibly be with very

l arge armies ; for celerity of ac tion is indispensable ,

an d of armies more than an yt hing el se it is t rue that

l arge bodie s move slowly Napoleon s most bril


' ' ’
.

li ant use of interior lines was made with small armies


— at le ast smal l when j udged by the s tandar d of

armies of the pres ent d av — his army in I 7 9 6 con


sis ting of about 3 5 000 men and his entire force in
, ,

the Eckmiihl campaign being about


Let us now consider the manner in which the
plan s of the strategist may aim to reap the greatest
consequences from a victory 'or this purpose .

no better illustration can be foun d than the cam

p g
a i n of M are n go .

In 1 800 an army of Austrians under ,

Melas occupied northern Italy from which the


m
, ,

French had been almost com etely expelled Of .

thi s army , men un der Ott were engaged


, ,

in besieging Mas sen a in Geno a ; men under ,

Elsnitz were operating on the V ar cove ring the


, ,

siege and opposing Su chet


, who with an inferior
, ,

force was barely able to hold his own an d keep the


,

enemy from invading Fran ce The rest of Melas .


arm y guarded the issue s of the Al ps from the Ape n

nine s to the St Go thard Pas s


. The Austrians were
.

based on the Mincio on which river were the two


strong fortresses of Mantua and Peschier a From the .

base their lines of communication extended from


Peschiera to B rescia where the roads divided one
, ,

going to Milan and the other to Pavia an d from '


34 S TRA TEGY .

Mantua to Cremona where the routes separated


, ,

one passing no rth of the P0 to P avi a and the other ,

oi g o th of th t ive m Pi ce

g n s u a r r a a nz a .

The object of Napoleon was to relieve Ge noa


an d s tri ke a decisive blow against Melas Several .

operations presented themselves to his choice He .

might reinforce Suchet and operate against Els nitz .

B ut Elsnitz could be promptly reinforced by Me


l as and at the best a French victory would merely
,

drive the Austrians back towards their bas e and


in falling b ack they would still cover the siege of
Genoa He might operate by way of Mont Cenis
.

again st the Austrian center ; but the Austria ns


coul d reinforce their center even more readily
than their left ; the for tresses of Tur in Coni and , ,

Al lesand ria were seri ous obs tacles in the way ; and
the Austrians if defeated would as in the former
, ,

case be able to fall back on their base The third


,
.

plan was to cross the Al ps at the Great S aint Ber


nard Pass con ce aling his mar ch as long as po ssible
, ,

seize Milan push on to Pi acenz a an d thus completely


, ,

out the Aus tri ans from their b as e In this plan .

the natural obst acles would have daunted almost


anyone but a N apoleon His chief of engineers
.

repo rted the pas sage of the Gre at S aint Bernard


Pass extremely difficul t Difi cul t I g ran t
. s aid , ,

Napoleon ; but is it pos sible '


'
I think so ,

was the reply ; but with extraordinar


'
effort y .

Very well then s aid the First Consul ; w e will


,

go . The army w as concentrated at Dijon Suchet .

was to make active demon strations against Elsnitz .


S TRA TEG Y .
35

A force of men under Thurreau w as to mak e


a fein t by w ay of Mont Cenis Moncey with 1
.

men w as detached from Morean s army in Switzer


land to cros s the S aint Go thard Pass and move ma


Bellin zona to eff ect a j unction in the valley of the


Ticino with the main army 3 , strong which , ,

under N apoleon in person woul d cross at the pas s


,

o f the Gre at S aint Bernard .

The famous passage of the Alps was effected


by Napoleon with strenuous exertions an d the ad ,

vance guar d consisting of infan try and c a val ry nu


, ,

d er Lannes reac hed Ivrea and c arried the place by


,

as sault . At the same time Thurreau emerged from


the Mont Cenis Pass The Austrian general mis
took this force which was accompanied by artillery
,

for the advance guar d of a l arg e army and Lannes ,

comman d as a detachment engaged in a mere di


version The main strength of the Austrians w as
,

a ccordingly co ncentrated to oppo se Thurreau and ,

a singl e small divi sion was sen t again st Lannes This .

division was defeated by Lannes who then ad ,

v anced to Chivasso where he o stent atious ly seized


,

boats a s if in tending to pas s the Po The main .

army con cen trated at I vr ea an d pushed towards

Milan Lannes force now forming a rear guard and


,

directing its march on Pavia The Austri an right


.

un der W ukassowitch confron ted by N apoleo n and


,

threatened on the right and re ar by Moncey aban ,

d oned the line of the Ticino a nd retreated beyon d


the Adda completely out of touch with Melas
, .
3 6 S TRA TEG Y .

Napoleon en tered Milan where he waite d four


days for the purpose of effecting a j unction with
Moncey who upon his arrival was stationed so
, , ,

as to guard the lin e of the Ticino from any attempts

that Melas might make to break thoug h Melas .


,

learning of the arrival of N apoleon at Milan the ,

retreat of W ukassowitch and the des cent of Moncey


,

into the val ley of the Ticino gave orders for the
concentration of the Austrian army at Allesan d ria .

Elsnit z was ordered to fall back from the V ar leav ,

ing only rear guards to oppo se Suchet an d Ott was ,

ordered to raise the siege of Genoa and hasten to


sei ze Pi acenza and defend the lin e of the Po But .

O tt waited to receive the surrender of Mas sena for ,

which negotia tions were then pending and thoug h ,

the French garrison surrendered he lost several ,

days of priceless value


In the meantime Napoleon ha d occupied Pavia
Belgiojoso and Piacen za and the communications
, ,

of Melas with the Austrian ba se were completel y

cut . Ott marching upon Piacen z a wa s defeated


, ,

by Lannes and Victor at Montebello and retrea ted


upon Allesand ria Napoleon now con centrated his
.

army about C as tegg io an d moved against Mel as ,

who was now at Allesand ria The battle of Mar .

eng o followed ; Melas was defeated and capitulated , ,

giving up the country as far as the Min cio with all


the fortresses but being allowed to march back
,

to the Min cio with his army Nor thern Ital y was
.

thus regained ; the surrendered force of Massena


was released the concentration of the French army
,
S TRA TEGY .
37

w as ed a nd the conditions were chang ed for


assur ,

the French from gloomy disaster to brill iant succes s .

By skillful strategy N apoleon placed his army


in a po sition wher e defea t mean t ruin to his ad ver
s ary but not to himself
, Melas when defeated .
, ,

had no al ternative except to capitulate or star ve ;


but N apoleon if defeated coul d at the very worst
, , , ,

h ave retreated up the valley of the Ticino and by


way of the St Gothard Pas s with perhaps the loss
.
,

tions of Napoleon g reatly increased the consequences


of victory they did not in crease the probability of
,

victory Indeed Napoleon came very near being


.
,

defeated at Mareng o and but for the opportune


ar ri val of D essaix who had been detached to Ri
,

valta the brilliancy of his strategy might have


,

been obs cured in tactical defeat .

Strategy in fact always culminate s in tactics


, ,

and the ables t strategic al combinations are useless

if they can not be clinched with success on the fiel d


of battle In 1 8 1 2 Mar mont had succeeded in ma
.

neuv ering Welling ton in to a position at Salamanca

such tha t the B ri tish lin e of retreat was in tercepted ,

and the Duke if defea ted woul d hav e been ruined


, , .

The French on the other hand whil e holding the


, ,

British communications by the throat covered ,

their own ; and in case of defeat they could fall


back on their natural line of retreat to their base .

Welling ton had clearly been outgeneralled by Mar .

mon t ; but he co mpensated for his stra tegical in


feriority by a brilliant s troke of tactical genius
3 8 S TRA TEGY .

which sen t his advers ary flying in rout from the


field extricated the Bri tish army from its perilous
,

situation and en abled it to pen etrate to M adrid an d


,

dri ve King Joseph from the Spanish capit al .

It h as ofte n bee n sai d that though the prin ciples

of Tactic s are constantly undergoing change those ,

of Strategy are fix ed an d immutable This is not .

the cas e Strategy has changed und er modern


.

con dition s ; not so much as Tactics but just as ,

surel y .It is remarkable that the two most potent


factors in producing stra tegical changes are tw o
invention s designed pri ma rily for the peaceful in
terests of commerce and hav ing daily application
in the affairs of the g reate r part of mankin d I refer
.

to the railroad and the teleg raph R ailroads en able


.

armies to be concentrated more rapi dl y than w as

formerly the cas e and what is even more impor tant


, , ,

to supply them with a fac ility formerly un dreamed of


The supply of the armies of Buell R osecran s and
, ,

Sherman very difficult by railroad woul d have been


, ,

impossible by ordinary wagon train ; and it is not


-

too much to say that we owe the pre servation of


the Union to the invention of the locomotive It .

is the genius of Stephenson that h as made the


United States a great n ation
B ut while railroads ren der pos sible the concen
tration an d supply of grea ter armies than coul d
for merly be main tained their influence en ds be
,

fore the cont act oi the armies takes place There .

will always be a space between the fronts of the


contending forces in which the railroads will prob
,
S TR A TEGY .
39

ably be broken up and in which even if the roads


, ,

be still existing in good condition their employmen t


, ,

would be too precarious to be seriously considered .

When the opposing armies are near each other they ,

must still mo ve by marching and must still depend


in a great measure or perhaps ent irelv on wag on
, ,

transportation for supply .

One of the most striking resul ts of the intro


duction of railroad s as a strategic element is found
in the enormous extent of territory to which in
ferior line s are now applic able The transfer of
.

Longstreet s corps on interior lines from Virginia


to Georg ia woul d have been i mpossible without


rail ro ads
. Superior railroad facilitie s may in a ,

large theater of operations give to exteri or lines


,

all the advan t age s of interi or lines ' or instance


.
,

if an army occupying a central position with its ,

vari ous parts at a much shorter actual dis tan c e


from each other than are the corresponding parts
of the opposing army on exteri or lines can coneen ,

trate onl y by m arching while its Opponent can


,

concentrate by rail it is manifest that the superiority


,

of concentration res ts with the latter But this .

can be the c as e onl y in a l arge the ater ; for the time

of entraining and detraining must be take n in to


con sideration ; and a full army corp s can eas ily
mar ch I 2 5 or I 5 0 miles in the time that it woul d
take it (coun ting en training an d detraining' to go
the same dis tance by rail .

In the transfer of Schofield s army from Nash


vill e to North C arolina the movemen t was made on


4 0 S TR A TEGY .

exterior lines ; but steam transport by river and ,

r ail , enabled it to be effected in less time than it


woul d have required the Co nfederates with their
broken railways to make a corresponding move
ment even if they had ha d troops available for
,

the purpose
The telegraph enables a co mmandin g general
to keep constantly informed of the Ope ration s of
his differen t forces ; to know what is occurring
s imult aneously in all p arts of an exten ded theater ,

and to combin e in a con s istent plan the Operations

of force s which would otherwise be compelled to


act in depen dently This too will affect the value
.
, ,

of interior lin es ; for if the two armies on exte rior

lines be in telegraphic commun ication the comman


d er again st who m the concen tration is made can
a t once n otify his colleague who can then move
immediately with confidence against the contain
ing force Opposed to him .

Another modification of the value of interi or


line s is c ause d by the increased power conferred
on the t actic al defensive by modern firearms
This to be sure will operate in favor of a contain
, ,

ing force but it will neces sitate the concen tra tion
,

o f a much l arge r body agains t the one of the e nemy s


armie s tha t is to be defe ated To profit full y by


.

interior lines a general must be able to di spose


,

quickly of the enemy s separated armies and the


prompt defeat Of an enemy who will surely make


use of hasty in trenchment s an d avail hims elf of all
the power of the modern defensive will not be an
S TRA TEG Y .
4 1

easy matter the numerical odds are enor


unl ess
mously in favor of the as sail ant We are there .
,

fore likely to find the containing force able to hold


,

its own again st one of the enemy s armies and the


main force repulsed by the other unless the army ,

O pe rating on in terior lines is of a strengt h practically

e qual to that of the co mbined armies of its adversar y .

Another new element introduced into Strateg y


as a resul t of the teleg raph is the daily newsp aper .

The popul ar demand for news c ann ot be ignored ,

and even un der the mo st rigoro us p ress censorship



information will leak out a detached item here
an d anothe r there from which inferen tial informa
,

tion can be obtained even when positive news is


l acking It is said that Von Moltke first learned
.

through the columns of a Belgian newspaper of


the eccentric movement of McMahon by way of ,

a .

zaine The press will be a powerful factor for both


.

good and evil in giving a commander information


of the movemen ts of his a dversary and in betraying

his own .

Let us imagine the Marengo campaign under


the present conditions The concentration of N a.

p ol eon s army

is repo rted to a German news pape r

in Col ogne an d the news is at on ce telegraphed


,

to Melas A spy ascertains that Thurreau has


.

only men and sends the information in a dis


,

guised dispatch to a confederate in Berlin who t e ,

pe ats it to the Austri an headquarters The ad .

van ce guard of Napoleon scarcely emerges from


4 2 S TRA TEGY .

the Great
St Bernard Pass before the news is tel
.

egr aphed t o Melas The orders for the Austrian


.

concen tration are sen t out by wire and the mo ve ,

ments directed are facilitated by rail Melas meets .

N apoleon in the angle between the Sesia and the


Po The Austrians have superior numbers an d
.

cover their communications ; in fact the strategic ,

advantag e is theirs Under existing condition s


.

N apoleon would never have adopted the pl an which


he carried out with such success What he would
'
.

have done it is idl e to guess We can be sure .


,

however that it would have been the right thing


, ,

an d that his genius with the aid of the railway and


,

the telegraph woul d have shone out more brightly


,

even than it d id Ind eed it is n ot too much to say


.
,

that if Napoleon had had railroads and telegraphs


at his comman d even his R us si an c ampai gn wo ul d
,

have been a success and St Helena would be kno wn


, .

to d ay merely as an un important speck on the map


-

of the Atlan tic Ocean .

We have seen that the employmen t of railroads


in w ar ren der s possible the con cen tration and main
ten an ce of l arger armies than were formerly known .

We have al so seen that the operation s of ho st il e


armie s in the proximity of e ach other are n eces sa

r ily effecte d by m ar ching These large armies will


.

n ecessarily move more slowly than smal ler bodies ,

an d if they live on the country wholly or in p art ,

the exhaustion of the region over which they


move will be more complete The question of .

unin terrup ted fsupply h as con sequently in cre as ed


S TRA TEGY .
43

in importance and strategic movements are more


,

than ever depen den t for their succes s on the cfh


ciency of the Quartermaster s an d Sub sis tence De

p a r t m e n t s
. A n ew di f fic u l ty in the m a tte r of sup

p l y w ill be en cou n te red in the greater e ase with

which partisan troops using smokeless powder


, ,

will be able to att ack and haras s convoys and ,

the guarding of communications will require more


troops and greater efforts than ever .

From the condition s mentioned it follows that ,

t here will now be more certainty in regard to the


pl ans of your opponent and less concealment in
regard to your own than in former times Strategic
.

surprise is practically a thin g of the p as t It is


.

more than ever necess ary to make correct plan s


in the beginn ing ; to make a wise choice of the ob
je c t ive a n d the be s t l in e s by w hi ch to reach it ; to

provide with all possible forethought for the supply


of the army and to make effective dispositions for
,

the protection of the lines of commun ication .

The choice of the objective in strategi c Oper


at ion s is influen ced by many con siderations The .

enemy s main army is a lways the true objective; but


there will often be intermediate objective s as nec


essary step s in reaching the ul timate obj ect Thus .

the objective may be a point where a new base can


be established as for in stance Chattan ooga in
, , ,

I 86 3 . The seizure of poin ts may be nece ssar y in


order that naval base s may be established or block
ad e runn ers
-
deprived of safe harbor These con .

sideration s in fluen ced the capture of the fort s a t


44 S TRA TEGY .

Hatteras Inlet N C Port R oyal S C Fort Pu


, . .
, , .

las ki Ga and New Orlean s


, . Political considera .

tions may also influence the choice of an objective


Thus in the Great W ar it was a mat ter of political
, ,

importance as afiecting the sentiment of foreig n


,

nations to be able to show that the Union troops


,

had established themselves in the territory of each


of the seceding States The possession of various .

points on the sea coast of the Confederacy taken


-
,

in connection with the coun try actuall y covered by


the operations of the Federal armies enabled th e ,

claim to be j ustly made in less than a year after ,

the outbreak of the war that the flag of the United ,

States floated in every one of the seceding States ;


thoug h three long ye ars of bitter war were s till to
pass before the triumph of the Union cause In .

a republ ic the choice of an obj ective may be decided

by popular demand In 1 86 3 a formida ble expe


.

dition was sent against Charleston S C and for . .


,

ne arly two years that city was the object of vigor

ous military and naval attack though it was not ,

intrinsically a st rategic point of any particular


val ue Public sentiment in the North had how
.
,

ever become so in tensified and embittered against


,

the city which was looked upon as the cradl e of


,

secession that the exped ition wa s sent in ob ed ience


,

to popular demand ; and at the presen t time it


seems to have been inspired by a Spirit of hatred

an d revenge rather than any true military consid

eration s A point possessing no inherent s trategic


.

v alue may become by accident an objectiv e of the


S TRA TEGY .
45

greatest importan ce Thus at the outbre ak of the


.
,

Spanish American war no sane strategist woul d


-

have selected Santiago as an objective The pos .

s es sion of the city woul d have conferred n o ad

vantage commen surate with the efforts necessary


for its reduction and the army po ssessing it would
,

not have been abl e to use it as a base for Operations

of an important nature in any direction But the


moment Cervera s fleet came to anchor in the har

bor of S antiago that place became an importa nt


strateg ic objective and the Ope rations in it s vicinity

were even decisive of the w ar .

That the enemy s main army shoul d be the


objectiv e of military operations seems the veriest


ax iom Yet Grant was the first of the Union g en
.

erals in Virg inia who see med to appreciate this

simple truth His pred ecessors sought to capture


.

Richmon d ; but his object was to crush Lee know ,

ing that with the destruction of the Army of N orth


ern Virginia not only Richmond but the entire
, ,

Southern Confederacy must fall He accordingly .

at once clo sed with Lee and for more than eleven
,

months kept absolute con tact with his enemy ,

giving and receiving blows until the Southern ,

army worn out and exhausted w as compelled to


,

yield The same priciple is seen clearly in the


.

campaigns of Von Moltke In 1 866 it was not .

Vienna but the army of Benedek that w as the


, ,

object of his operations Vienn a was considered only


.

when Benedek had retreated toward the Austrian


c apital In I 8 7 0 the gr eat German chief of staff
.
4 6 S TRA TEGY .

paid tention to Pa ris until he had captured


no at

McMahon S ar my and closely inve sted that of B azaine


in Metz The methods of these two great com


.

manders were in fact quite simil ar Grant s rule


, ,
.

was Always go ahead ; and in the Vicksburg


,
' '

c ampaign one of the con sideration s that in duced

him to go below Vicksburg and Ope rate from Grand


Gulf instead of concen tra ting at Memphi s and
,

moving upon his objective on the line of the Missis


s ippi Central R ail ro ad was that the former plan ,

would seem to be a continuation of the movement


al ready begun while the l atter would require a
,

retrograde movemen t for con cen tration Von Molt .

ke s rul e was : Having decided upon your plan


follow it energetical ly ; and so long as it is workin g


out sati sfactorily do not al low yourself to be at
,

tracted from it by any other plan however alluring ,

the la tter may be Y et no comman der ever showed


.

greater abil ity than Von Mol tke to change his plan
quickly when a new one became necessary It is .

s aid that Von Mol tke was at b re akfas t when he re

c eiv ed the first definite n e ws of the movement


of McMahon towards Metz via R heims and Sedan .

Orderi ng the dishes removed and c alling for his


maps he dictated before he left the table the
, , ,

orders which caused 2 00 000 German s marching , ,

towar ds Chal ons to change their direction from


,

west to north and enclose McMahon s army in the


'
circle of fire at Sedan .

It is clea r tha t the qualities of a strateg ist are


not altogether the s ame as those n eeded by a tac
S TRA TEGY .
47

t ician . The former can usual l y make his plans in


t he quiet of an office or at le ast in the comp arative
,

seclusion of his headqua rters ten t fro m which al l ,

interruption can be exclude d ; while the latter has


t o m ake or al ter his pl ans in the excitemen t and
turmoil of battle unde r circumstance s of pers onal
,

d anger and of emergency deman ding im mediate


'

a ction In some respects however the q ualities


.
, ,

needed are the sa me for both Each Shoul d be


.

able to form a correct esti ma te of his own and the

e nemy s con dit ion an d avail able resources ; an d the


strategi st as well as the ta ctician shoul d be a man

of courage ; for a timid man cannot so overcome his


n ature as to devise an aggress ive pl an even if it is ,

to be c arried out by another commander The .

s trateg i st shoul d have s ufficient imag ination to


a ppreciate the los se s an d demoral izing influences
'

from which his enemy is suffering and which are


beyond his sight as well as the similar distresses
,

of his own army which are nud er his immediate


obser vation Gran t in his Memoirs tells with
.
, ,

simpl e franknes s of his trepidatio n in his first in

dependent Operations when he was oppo sed to


,

the Confederate Colonel Harris and his great relief


,

when on seeing evidences of the enemy s hasty


,

withdrawal he disco vered that Harri s had been


,

as much afraid of him a s he had been of H arris .

This lesson was never forgotten by Grant ; but un ,

fortunately it was never learned by McClell an


, .

The la tter deeply versed in everything pert ain


ing to mil itary science and the art of war pos ,
4 8 S TRAT EGY .

e ed of a brilliant intellect endowed with physical


s ss ,

courage of a high o rder enjoying the confidence


,

an d devotion of his troop s was not a succes s be


, ,

cause he was so foreboding by nature that he mag


nified his own troubl es and lost sight of those of

his adversary If he los t ten thousand men he


.
,

was keenly aware of his loss ; but he coul d not real


ize that in inflicting this damag e Lee h ad probably
lost nearly as many and perhaps more If McClel .

Ian had been intelligently supported by the a d min


istr ation he woul d probably have captured R ich
,
a

mond ; if he had been a great commander he would ,

have captured it any way .

To achieve success a commander must have


,

something of the gambler in his nature He must .

be willing to take risks when hrs j udg men t convin ces


him that the probabilities are in his favor A g en .
'

eral who al ways plays for safety n ever a chieves de


cisi ve results H ad Fabius retained command of
.

the R oman army there woul d have been no bat


,

t le of Carma but H annib al woul d have rema ined


,

in Ital y until his dea th Napoleon never hesitated


.

to tempt Fortune bold l y but he tempted it with


,

careful j udgment an d not with rashness Some


, .

years ag o in an article in the Atla ntic M onthly Mr


,
.

John Codman R opes one of the ablest military


,

critic s of modern times curiously ignored this ele


,

men t of general ship in cormnenting on Sherman s


march to the sea He pointed out that if Hood


.

had defeated Thomas the Confederate flag woul d


ha ve been carried to the Ohio R iver while Sherman
'

, ,
S TRA T EGY .
9

at Sav annah would have been entirely out of the


,

theater of decisive operations and his army woul d


,

n ot have been avail able to s tem the tide of Con

fed erate invasion Thi s is all very true ; but Sher


.

man knew the ability of the general and the qual


ities of the troops to whom he in trust ed the task of
opposing Hood The result j ustified his action
.

an d demon strated his milit ary genius H ad he re


.

mained with his whole army to oppose Hood the ,

defeat of the latter woul d have been more certain ,

but the w ar wo uld probably have l as ted a year


longer .

The requi site qual ities of the strategist an d the


tactician are so diverse that it is not strange that
generals are rarely eminent in both capacities .

Wellington was one of the able st tacticians the


world has ever Seen He never lost a battle and
.

n ever even lo st a gun ; yet he w a s inferior to Soul t .

an d Massen a as a strategi s t ; he was outm aneuvere d

an d outg eneraled by Marmon t ; an d in the Water

loo campaign he failed completely to divine the


strategic plan of his gre at ant agonist Bliicher .
,

too w as a tactician of consummate ability H e


, .

w as the in carn ation of en ergy coolness and phys


, ,

ical and moral courage ; but he was incapable of


planning a campaign and it i s well known that his
,

strategi c brains W ere c arried in the skul l of Gneis

enau Sherman was one of the ablest strategists


.

of modern times ; but we may se arch the history of


the Gre at W ar in vain for the record of any import
an t b attle decided by his tactic al ability Napoleon
.
5 0 S TRA T EGY .

was both the g reatest strategist and the greate st


tactrcran ever known Marengo Ulrn Eckmiihl
.
, , ,

an d the camp aign of I 8 1 4 in Cha m pag ne are master


pieces of strategy ; an d Austerlit z Friedl and and ,

Wagram are equally brillian t examples of tact ics .

Gran t possess ed in an emin ent degree the q ualitie s


of the strategist and the tactieian To the coolnes s .
,

quick perception and prompt decision displayed


,

by him on the battle field he un ited the delibera te


-
,

j udgment and forethought needed in planning a


ca mpaign The Vicksburg campaign is the most
brilliant one recorded in his tory since the days of
Napoleon ; and the more c arefully the campaigns of
Grant are s tudied the more surely will he appear
as the pre eminen t America n gen eral
-
In making .

this estimate of Grant I am not tmmin dful of Shiloh ,

and Col d H arbor It was not because of these bat


.

tles but in spite of them that he must be given


, ,

the palm of American general ship The g reates t


general is not the one who makes no errors but the ,

one who makes the fewest an d the least impo rtant

ones Napoleon said : Show me a gen eral who never


.
'

mad e mistake s and I will Show you a gen eral who


,

n ever made war .

It is difficul t for a general who is not a strategi st


to conduct a c ampaign even when it is planned for
him ; unless as in the case of RIiicher and Gneis
,

enau the strategist is con stan tly at the elbow of a


,

will ingly listening commander In I 800 N apoleon


.

proposed a plan for the Operations of Moreau much ,

more bri lliant an d likely to produce more decisive


S TRA T EGY .
5 1

e t than the s cheme devised by the latter The


r sul s .

plan was too daring for Moreau s more pruden t ’

genius an d the First Consul appreciating this an d


, , ,

perhaps recogn izin g that Moreau s self love n atur



-

ally incl ined him to his own project wi sel y all owed ,

him to con duct will ingly an inferior plan rather


than compel him to undertake reluctantly one that
was inherently much better . In the campaigns in
Spain Napoleon prepared for his subordinate s stra
,

tegi c plan s admir abl y adapted to the situation ; but


while the master mind coul d plan the master was ,

not pre sen t to execute and n on e of his marshals


,

was able to take his place .

Critics ign oran t of military matters have been


known to characterize campaign s as devoid of
strateg y an d consisting of plain h ard fighting
, It .

is as absur d to spe ak of a campaign wi thout strategy


as it woul d be to spe ak of a ca mpaign without march

ing or fighting . The stra tegy may be good bad , ,

or indifferent ; it ma y be exerci se d con sciousl y by

an able co mman der or un con sciously by a military

ignoramus ; but it exists in every campaig n The .

veriest mil itary tyro or the most incompeten t com


mander uses strategy the moment he begins to
move hi s army against the enemy It may be very .

bad strategy but it is strateg y ne vertheless unless


, ,

the commander be too ignorant of his dutie s even to


try to defea t his adversary .

The mos t severe an d in toleran t critics of military


operation s are civilians They do not al ways ap
.

p recia te the e
p pr l ex itie s an d em bar ra s smen ts with
5 2 S TRAT EGY .

which a general is surrounded even u nder the mos t


,

favorable condition s ; they seem to expect a com


mander to be en dowed with supernatural prescience
and in tuition an d to demand of him a miracul ous
,

power of overcoming obstacles They do not al .

ways seem to realize that the ables t general ship is


merely human wisdom applied to human knowl
edge ; an d they often seem to forget that the grea tes t

human wisd om is not in fall ible and that the mos t


,

careful and intelligent person may be mi sinformed .

They do not take in to consideration that the ables t


plan s may misca rry through the inefficienc y indo
'

len ce or treachery of a subordinate or thr ough a


, ,

misun derstanding delay or loss of an orde r With


, , .

them Nothing succeeds like success


,
'
Mil itary .

critic s generall y d eal more j ustly with commanders .

Thev kn ow that success may be fortuitously achieved


by generals who are entitled to respect neither for
their military ability nor their personal worth ; as ,

for instance by Cleon of Athens or Horatio Gates


, ,

in our R evolution ; and they kno w that the ables t


generals are sometimes the victims of the sport
an d whim of outrageous Fortune If centurie s .

hence the history of Wa terloo should be forgot ten ,

an d some antiquarian shoul d dis cove r N apoleon s


plan of c ampaign wi thout learning the result of the


Operation s an able strategi s t woul d conclude afte r

re ading it that it must have resul ted in victory


, .

Never was a plan more deserving of success ; but


N apoleon co ul d not foresee the defec tion of Bour
mon t the unfortun ate wandering of D Erlon s
,
’ ’
S TRAT EGY .
53

c orps betwee n the two fields of Qua tre Bras and


Ligny the incapacity of Grouchy nor the almost
, ,

s uperhuman stubbornnes s of the B ritish infan try ;

an d the campaign brill iantly conceived an d aus pi


,

ciously begu n ter minat ed in a b attle the n ame of


,

which has become a synonym for complete and


irretrievable disaster .

To my mind one of the saddest of military c areers


was that of the Austria n general Ludwig von Ben
e dek. A gal lant and able soldier not of noble birth
, ,

he had risen by sheer pe rsonal merit in an army


where ind ividual worth was often blighted in the
cold shade of aristocracy He had won laurels
.
'

and achieved high rank in the Ital i an c ampaign s



o f 1 84 8 4 9
,
greatly di stingui shing himself in the
ba ttle of N ovara In the Italian war of I 8 5 9 he
.

h ad shown such conspicuous ability and in the battle ,

o f Solferin o he had han dl ed his wing of the d efe ated

army with such consumma te skill that he was the ,

o ne Austrian gen eral who eme rged from that dis

a s tro us w ar with increas ed renown W h en in I 866 .

the Emperor offered him the command of the army


in Bohemia he modestly replied
, Y our maje sty
, ,

I am no strateg ist but his sovereign insisting


, ,

he took the command which brought him agains t


the superior genius of Von M01tke The catastro .

phe of Koniggratz followed ; he was relieved from


command ; his past glOry and services were forgot
ten ; he was retired from a ctive service within three
months after his defeat an d he withdrew to his
,

estate in Istria to die of a broken heart Inci .


54 S TRA T EGY .

dentally this shows that ingratitude is not monop


olized by republic s .

If then a commander cannot control Fortune


,

he shoul d nevertheless do his best to merit its favors .

He should try to do al l that lies in the power


of human prevision to prepare for every contin
g e n cy th a t m ay ar i se an d,he sho ul d pro secute h i s

plans with energ y and with prudent vet daring


courage If then he succeeds he can enj oy the ap
.
,

p l au se o f his cou n t r yme n con scio


, u s th a t he h as

merited it ; if he fail s he can often have the conso


,

lation that he has d eser ved success even if he has ,

not achieved it an d he can al ways have the soldier s



,

highest reward , the consciousness of duty faith

I reg ret that time doe s not permit me even to


touch upon the influence exerted on strategic oper
ation s by the conformation of the b ases of Opera

tions the influence of na tural obstacles such as


, ,

rivers an d ranges of mo un tains in retarding or facil

itating strategic movemen ts the relation of fort


r es ses to the operations of ar mies and otherimport
,

ant topics in the g reat subject of which this l ecture

is merely an incomplete skeleton But I have .

alrea dy far exceeded the l i mits of my time and I ,

will conclude by stating what I believe to be the


correct rule of Strategy .

R emember that your object is to meet and de


feat the enemy and en deavor to take the most di
,

rect means to acco mplish this en d Look carefully .

to the supply of your arm y ; protect your flanks


S TRA T EGY 55

and g uardyour communications ; aim if possible


, ,

a t the flan ks and communic ation s of your ad v er

sary ; remember that the en emy has as much cause

to worry about you as you have to feel anxiety


a bout him H aving made your plan stick to it
.
,

unless compell ed to chang e. Plan c arefull y and


deliberately ; move quickly and strike hard .
TH IS B OOK IS 1
0173 ON TH E L AS T DATE
S TAM P S '' R BI-
OW

A N IN ITIA L ' IN E O' 2 5 C E N TS


W ILL D C A DD -GED 'O R ' A IL U R E TO R ETU R N
TH I' B O O K O N TH E D AT E D U E . TH E P EN A L TY
W ILL IN C R EAD E TO DO C EN T' O N Tl 'l l 'O U R TH
D AY AN D TO OL OO ON TH E D I V I N TH D AY
O V ER D U E
.