Social Relations

Social Relations in Human and Societal Development
Also by the Editors
Charis Psaltis
INTERACTION, COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: Psychological

Development as a Social Process (co-author, 2014)
Alex Gillespie
BECOMING OTHER: From Social Interaction to Self-reflection (2006)

TRUST AND DISTRUST: Sociocultural Perspectives (co-editor, 2007)
TRUST AND CONFLICT: Representation, Culture and Dialogue (co-editor, 2011)
RETHINKING CREATIVITY: Contributions from Social and Cultural Psychology
(co-editor, 2014)
Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont
ARGUMENTATION AND EDUCATION: Theoretical Foundations and Practices

(co-editor, 2009)
APPRENTICE IN A CHANGING TRADE (co-author, 2011)
JEAN PIAGET AND NEUCHÂTEL: The Learner and the Scholar (co-editor, 2008)
Social Relations in Human
and Societal Development
Edited by
Charis Psaltis
Assistant Professor of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Cyprus
Alex Gillespie
Associate Professor of Social Psychology, London School of Economics, UK
Professor Emeritus, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland
Editorial matter, introduction, conclusion and selection © Charis Psaltis, Alex
Gillespie and Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Social relations in human and societal development / [edited by] Charis
Psaltis, Alex Gillespie, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-349-48626-7
1. Interpersonal relations. 2. Social interaction. 3. Social psychology.
I. Psaltis, Charis. II. Gillespie, Alex. III. Perret-Clermont, Anne Nelly.
HM1106.S647 2015
302—dc23 2014049916
To Maximos, Lyla, Arlo, Noé, Léna, Amelia and all the
children of the world
Contents
List of Figures ix
Preface and Acknowledgements x
Notes on Contributors xiii
1 Introduction: The Role of Social Relations in Human and

Societal Development 1
Charis Psaltis, Alex Gillespie and Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont
Part I Social Relations in Cognitive and Sociomoral

Development: Piaget and Beyond in Education
2 Education for Democracy: Cooperation, Participation
and Civic Engagement in the Classroom 19
Wolfgang Edelstein
3 The Development of Intersubjectivity: Cognitive, Affective

and Action Aspects 32
Monika Keller
4 The Architecture of Social Relationships and Thinking

Spaces for Growth 51
5 Genetic Social Psychology: From Microgenesis to

Ontogenesis, Sociogenesis . . . and Back 71
Charis Psaltis
Part II Social Relations and Conflict

Transformation: Intergroup Contact and Reflection
6 Non-Transformative Social Interaction 97
Alex Gillespie
7 Conflict Transformation and Homodiplomacy 114

Costas M. Constantinou
vii
viii Contents
8 Social Relations and the Use of Symbolic Resources in

Learning and Development 134
Tania Zittoun
Part III Social Relations of the Economic Culture

and Financial Crisis: Social, Cross-Cultural and
Cultural Psychological Perspectives
9 The Role of Economic Culture in Social Relationships and
Interdependence 149
Ayse K. Uskul
10 Social Simulations as a Tool for Understanding Individual,

Cultural and Societal Change 165
Deborah Downing Wilson and Michael Cole
11 Social Relations, the Financial Crisis and Human

Development 194
Stefano Passini
12 The Importance of Social Relations for Human and

Societal Development 215
Index 243
Figures
8.1 Double recognition in teaching–learning interactions 142
ix
Preface and Acknowledgements
Social relations are central to both human and societal development.

In terms of human development, research has explored the importance
of cooperation, constraint, conflict and asymmetries in expertise in cog-
nitive development. In terms of societal development, researchers have
explored the role of interdependence, similarity, cooperation, conflict
and asymmetries of voice. Our ambitious aim here is to create a bridge
from child development to societal development by focusing on the
common denominator of social relations and social interaction.
This edited volume is interdisciplinary, with contributors representing
social, developmental, cross-cultural and cultural psychology, education
and international relations. It is divided into three parts, preceded by a
general introduction by the editors.
Part I explores the relevance of the legacy of Jean Piaget to the study
of cognitive and sociomoral development of the child. It underlines the
importance of the social psychology of Piaget and his insistence on the
distinction between social relations of cooperation and social relations
of constraint (Piaget, 1932/1965), and the repercussions of this distinc-
tion for educational policy by international organizations until today, as
well as the points of continuity of these ideas with the practical efforts
for world peace and conflict transformation through intergroup contact.
Part II deepens the discussion about intergroup relations and conflict
as it focuses on the role of intergroup contact for conflict transfor-
mation. In particular, it revisits Allport’s (1954) intergroup contact
hypothesis and enriches this approach with insights from George
Herbert Mead’s social psychology, international relations and cultural
psychology. All contributors to this part of the volume offer a nuanced
and complex understanding of the use of cultural artefacts, symbolic
resources and semantic barriers as mediators of internal dialogue and
reflection with the strange alterity in the imagination of alternative
futures beyond conflict while also stressing the obstacles and barriers
to such a transformation.
Part III extends the intergroup focus of the previous part by rais-
ing important questions that concern the interplay between intragroup
and intergroup processes at the meeting point of groups and cultures.
In particular, the contributors focus on how social relations, intergroup
contact, norms and values mediate the effects of the economic culture
x
Preface and Acknowledgements xi
of a society or group and the financial crisis from social, cross-cultural

and cultural psychological perspectives.
This part ends with a synthetic commentary by the editors, who
return to the themes raised in the Introduction. These concern the
fundamental question of the legitimacy of talking about development
and not merely change; the related critique of conceptualizations of
societal and human development by international organizations; and
the bidirectionality between societal change and human development.
Finally, the vision of genetic social psychology and Gerard Duveen’s pro-
posal to explore the heterogeneity of societies through an articulation
of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic processes are put forward
as a framework that can capture the complexity of the processes raised
by this volume.
This volume has been made possible because various individuals
and organizations collaborated with the same vision and values of
dialogue and mutual respect. It is mostly based on the contributions
made during an international symposium entitled “Human and Soci-
etal Development: The Role of Social Relationships” that took place on
9 May 2011 in the “no-man’s land” of the United Nations (UN) Buffer
Zone in the divided capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, for the inauguration
of the Home for Cooperation there. The contributions by Wilson and
Cole (Chapter 10) and Passini (Chapter 11) were written after invita-
tion by the editors as additions to the contributions available from the
symposium.
The symposium was made possible with the financial support of the
Cooperation Programme between Switzerland and Cyprus to reduce
economic and social disparities within the enlarged European Union
(EU) and with funding from the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) – Action for Cooperation and Trust (ACT) as part of
the Multiperspectivity and Intercultural Dialogue in Education (MIDE)
project of the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR).
We thank deeply the intercommunal AHDR in Cyprus for its enthusi-
asm in organizing this symposium on the inauguration day of its major
project, the Home for Cooperation, and for its commitment to the idea
of dialogue cooperation and world peace.
Charis Psaltis specifically wants to thank Chara Makriyianni, not only
for her vision and work along with the other pioneers to create the
Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, and the Home for
Cooperation in Cyprus, but also for her lifelong companionship and
support in the difficult writing-up period of this volume. Tracing the
history of this book and the opportunity that brought the contributors
xii Preface and Acknowledgements
to the symposium, it would literally not have been possible with-

out Chara’s dedication and self-sacrifice to transformative praxis for a
reunited Cyprus. We would like to thank little Maximos and Ioanna for
agreeing to be included in the cover photo, which was taken outside
the Home for Cooperation in the UN Buffer Zone of divided Nicosia.
We also thank Eleni, the mother of Ioanna, for her help in taking the
photo.
Many thanks also go to Nicola Jones, Elizabeth Forrest and Eleanor
Christie at Palgrave Macmillan for all of their help during the con-
tracting and publication of this volume. We also thank deeply all
the contributors to this volume for their patience, energy and timely
contributions. Without them this volume would not exist.
Last but not least, on the occasion of Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont’s
retirement, Charis Psaltis and Alex Gillespie would like to thank their
co-editor for her seminal work and an inspiring career that has left its
mark on the field of social and developmental psychology.
Contributors
Editors
Alex Gillespie is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the London

School of Economics and co-editor of Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour. He studies social interaction, specifically how it produces nov-
elty, distributes cognitive processes, creates our sense of self and enables
society to reproduce itself. He is the author of Becoming Other: From Social
Interaction to Self-Reflection (2006) and co-editor, with Ivana Marková, of
Trust and Conflict: Representation, Culture and Dialogue (2011). He is cur-
rently working on Imagination: Developing Culture and Minds with Tania
Zittoun.
Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont is Professor Emeritus at the Institute of

Psychology and Education, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. She
conducts research in developmental social and cultural psychology.
Being interested in the role of formal and non-formal educational set-
tings, she conducted some exploration in the transition from youth
to adulthood with special attention to vocational training. She is cur-
rently coordinating an interdisciplinary project on knowledge-oriented
argumentation. She is the author of Social Interaction and Cognitive Devel-
opment in Children (1980), co-author of Apprentice in a Changing Trade
(2011) and the editor of Argumentation and Education, Jean Piaget and
Neuchâtel and Joining Society: Social Interaction and Learning in Adolescence
and Youth.
Charis Psaltis is Assistant Professor of Social and Developmental

Psychology at the University of Cyprus. His research interests are
genetic social psychology, social interaction in learning and cognitive
development, social representations of gender, intergroup contact and
intergroup relations, intercultural education and integrated schools, the
development of national identities, and history teaching and collective
memory. He has published papers in Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, European Journal of Social Psychology, British Journal of Develop-
mental Psychology, Culture and Psychology and Human Development. He is a
member of the editorial board of British Journal of Developmental Psychol-
ogy and the associate editor of European Journal of Psychology of Education.
xiii
xiv Notes on Contributors
He is the co-author, with Anna Zapiti, of Interaction, Communication and

Development: Psychological Development as a Social Process (2014).
Authors
Michael Cole is Distinguished Professor of Communication, Psychology

and Human Development Emeritus at the University of California, San
Diego, USA. He is also the founder and Director Emeritus of the Labo-
ratory of Comparative Human Cognition. He is interested in the role of
culture in the development of human psychological processes. He brings
to this inquiry an interest in the development of cultural-historical,
activity-based approaches that are inspired by the work of Vygotsky,
Luria, Dewey and a number of Anglo-American cultural anthropolo-
gists. He is the author/co-author of several books, including The Cultural
Context of Learning and Thinking (1971), The Development of Children
(1989), Cultural Psychology (1996) and The Fifth Dimension: An Afterschool
Program Based on Diversity (2006).
Costas M. Constantinou is Professor of International Relations at the

University of Cyprus. His research covers diplomacy, conflict and inter-
national political theory, and this has been funded by, among others,
the EU’s 7th Framework Programme, the European Economic Area’s
grants, the Leverhulme Trust and the Leventis Foundation. He has pub-
lished extensively in peer-reviewed journals, is the author of On the
Way to Diplomacy (1996) and States of Political Discourse (2004) and
has co-edited Cultures and Politics of Global Communication (2008) and
Sustainable Diplomacies (2010).
Wolfgang Edelstein is Director Emeritus of the Max Planck Institute

for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. His research interests are
the development of social and moral competencies, on which he has
conducted major longitudinal studies in Iceland, China and in vari-
ous European countries. Further domains of interest are education for
democracy and school reform.
Monika Keller is a senior researcher at the Max Planck Institute of

Human Development, Berlin and an honorary professor at the Free Uni-
versity Berlin, Germany. She is a developmental psychologist and works
at the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition. Her field of research
and expertise is moral development in an interdisciplinary framework,
Notes on Contributors xv
integrating cognition (perspective-taking, theory of mind), affect (empa-

thy, sympathy, guilt) and behaviour (strategies of conflict resolution,
defensive excuses) in different cultural contexts. She has been involved
in longitudinal and cross-sectional studies exploring the understanding
of close relationships and moral rules in different Western and Eastern
cultures from childhood to adulthood. In her research on social ratio-
nality she has interconnected moral psychology with behavioural game
theory. She has explored fairness and selfishness in group negotiations
of sharing in different age groups and in different cultural contexts. She
is also involved in the field of education and social and moral competen-
cies. She has published widely in international journals and books and
has written two books about social competence and moral development.
Stefano Passini is an assistant professor at the Department of Education

Sciences, University of Bologna, Italy. His studies are focused on author-
itarian attitudes, obedience and disobedience to authority and crimes
of obedience, moral inclusion/exclusion processes, and human rights.
In recent years he has been studying when disobedience to author-
ity may constitute an advance for democracy and an enlargement of
human rights. He has published on these topics in journals such as
Culture and Psychology, European Journal of Social Psychology, Journal of
Community and Applied Social Psychology and Political Psychology.
Ayse K. Uskul is a reader in psychology at the University of Kent, UK.

Her primary research interests concern how different cultural settings
shape social cognition, conceptions of self and interpersonal relation-
ships, with a special interest in the socioeconomic basis of interdepen-
dence and cultural conceptions of honour. She has published widely
about these topics in journals such as Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Journal of Experimental
Psychology, Annual Review of Psychology, Proceedings of National Academy
of Sciences, USA and Social Science and Medicine. She serves as associate
editor for Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology and European Jour-
nal of Social Psychology. Her work has been funded by the National
Science Foundation, the Economic and Social Research Council, the
British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust. She held a British Academy
Mid-Career Fellowship in 2013–2014.
Deborah Downing Wilson teaches intercultural communication at the

University of Nevada at Reno, USA. Her research, writing and teaching
explore the intersection of psychology, communication, cultural studies
xvi Notes on Contributors
and education, with a particular interest in the way common under-

standings and systems of meaning-making practices develop within
small groups of people, in the genesis of group identity, in creating
optimal environments for experiential learning, and in the social and
intellectual development of university students. She is the author of The
Stone Soup Experiment (2015).
Tania Zittoun is a professor at the Institute of Psychology and Educa-

tion, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. A sociocultural developmen-
tal psychologist, she is interested in the conditions in which people form
a unique perspective along their developmental trajectories, in com-
plex social and cultural conditions. Her work has especially examined
the role of fiction and films in developmental transitions and is now
focused on imagination. Her most recent book is Human Development in
the Lifecourse: Melodies of Living (2013, with Valsiner, Vedeler, Salgado,
Gonçalves and Ferring). She is currently writing Imagination: Develop-
ing Culture and Minds with Alex Gillespie. She is the associate editor of
Culture and Psychology.
1
Introduction: The Role of Social
Relations in Human and Societal
Development
Development of the individual and society
Human development is mostly concerned with the sociomoral and

cognitive development of a person during their lifespan. Societal devel-
opment involves varying changes in resources, societal institutions, the
spheres of the economy, education and health, technologies, values,
social and gender relations, and power distribution, in historical time.
The questions posed by human development, concerning the path, rate,
breadth, variability and source of individual change, are also important
issues for societal change.
Discussion of societal development is more contested, with the direc-
tion, outcomes and mechanisms being less certain. Although child
development is far from predictable, it is nevertheless given direction
by the fact that children are socialized into a society (they invariably
become competent actors in their own culture, not an alien one). Soci-
eties, on the other hand, do not have a macroguidance structure into
which they are socialized; rather, they must find their own way in the
world. Debate about societal development focuses on distinguishing
regressive from progressive change, and the extent to which change is
driven by structural, cultural, religious, economic or scientific and tech-
nological processes. An exploration of the links between human and
societal development is, however, the main thrust of this volume, which
focuses on the role of social relations (i.e. forms of social interaction) in
human and societal change.
1
2 Introduction
From the social to the individual

Directionality between human and societal development is one of the
most controversial and longstanding – but also exciting – issues in
social science. The dominant sociological approach is to move from
the social to the individual. That is to say, broad societal changes at
the macrolevel have their effects on individuals through the way in
which they affect the quality of social relations between individuals and
groups in societies. A number of researchers from the sociocultural tradi-
tion of psychology took a similar stance when they argued that changes
in the sociodemographics and the socioeconomic structure of a society
(Rogoff, 2003; Greenfield, 2009) affect its cultural values; and these in
turn change the learning environment and form of social relationships
which eventually influence human development at the individual level.
Greenfield (2009), for example, draws on sociological writings about
modernization going back to Durkheim, with the transition from
mechanical to organic solidarity, and Tonnies (1887/1957), with the
difference between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (soci-
ety). Her argument is that changes in the economic structure and
sociodemographics of societies precede changes in values and learn-
ing environments for children, thus constituting new developmental
pathways for children (Greenfield, 2009). The kinds of societal shift
which she considers include industrialization, urbanization of rural
communities, the move from informal to formal education, and recent
technological changes. Social relations in her theorization thus vary
between societies. In Gesellschaft, she argues, individuals have multiple
ties to the outside world and many opportunities for transitory relations
with strangers, whereas, in Gemeinschaft, individuals are closely related
to their kin in more stable and lifelong relations.
The emphasis on the role of the socioeconomic conditions in human
development through the mediation of social relations is particularly
relevant in exploring the repercussions of the current financial crisis on
human development, which is one of the timely themes that are tackled
in this volume. For example, the financial crisis which began in around
2008 has not only reduced economic growth rates and resulted in more
people in unemployment and poverty in various countries, but also
exacerbated individual prejudice against minorities and marginalized
groups and the breeding of conspiracy theories against powerful groups
(Becker et al., 2011; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Thus macrolevel trans-
formations can lead to antagonistic and even anti-democratic social
relations or internal tensions and strife, with grave consequences for
all spheres of society.
Psaltis et al. 3
Another type of change with dire consequences, which is rarely

discussed in sociocultural theories of development, is ethnic or reli-
gious conflict and state-to-state violence and war. The international
community is increasingly coming to a realization of the importance
of responsive and fair institutions, and increased social cohesion, to
building community-level resilience and to reducing the potential for
conflict to break out, as attested by the conclusions of the latest Human
Development Report published by the UNDP (2014).
From the individual to the social

A second, more psychological approach to the general topic of this vol-
ume moves from the individual to society. For example, it has been
argued that changes in individual values lead to political and struc-
tural changes through changes in our orientation to others (Ingelhart &
Wenzel, 2003). The models of modernization and democratization,
proposed by political scientists such as Ingelhard and Welzel (2003),
challenge elitist and institutional notions of democracy. They argue
that democracy, gender equality and responsive government are ele-
ments of a broader human development syndrome (Inglehart & Welzel,
2003). They attribute a central importance to values of self-expression
for societal change, suggesting that change in democratic values and
attitudes measured at the individual level predicts the establishment of
democratic institutions in societies (see Muller & Seligson, 1994).
Underlying efforts to resolve issues of the directionality of change
between the individual and society is the perennial tension between the
individual–society antinomy and the agency-structure debate, which
becomes particularly relevant in discussions in the public sphere during
times of radical societal change and crisis.
This volume will offer a third way in such discussions, transcending
the individual–society antinomy by looking at the role of social relations
and social interaction in processes of individual and societal change.
Interdisciplinary work between psychologists and cultural anthropol-
ogists (Haslam & Fiske, 1999) called for a paradigm shift that will
focus on the role of social relations. However, such formulations failed
to depart from methodological individualism to the extent that they
argued that people in all cultures use just four relational cognitive mod-
els, as schemata, to generate most kinds of social interaction, evaluation
and affect. The four models proposed by Haslam and Fiske (1999) are
communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching and market
pricing. People, it is argued, use these four structures to organize labour
and to endow objects, land and time with social significance. Such an
4 Introduction
approach is reducing co-constructed social relations into relatively static

descriptions and cognitive schemas, thus failing to recognize that the
diversity and valorization of such schemas are dependent on ideological
struggles and on particular sociocultural configurations. In this sense,
for example, these four types are not written in stone, and a fifth type
might be formed in the future by societies.
Social relations in genetic epistemology: Beyond psychological or

sociological reductionism
An early attempt to transcend the debate of “psychologism vs. soci-
ologism” was the genetic epistemology programme of Jean Piaget. He
avoided the perils of both sociological holism and individualism by
proposing to take as social facts of study the interactions between
individuals and their social relations (Kitchener, 2009). Simplifying
somewhat, Piaget (1932/1965) described social relations as occurring on
a dimension from constraint to cooperation. In his sociological stud-
ies (Piaget, 1977/1995) he also offered a more subtle social exchange
theory of values, but still it was based on reciprocity and social rela-
tions of cooperation as a significant departure from cost–benefit or
game theoretical individualistic economic models. The distinction that
he offered, inspired by Bovet (1925/1951), is between social relations
of constraint, premised on unilateral respect, with relations between
adults and children as the prototype and social relations of coopera-
tion premised on mutual respect with peer relations being the prototype
(Piaget, 1932/1965; Psaltis, Chapter 5; Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis
et al., 2009). Piaget clearly privileged relations of cooperation, with the
free exchange of points of view, as the basis of decentration, knowledge
construction, and cognitive and moral development of the individual.
Piaget argued that if we knew all possible types of social relation, then
we would have the so-called composition laws that would allow us to
explain not just individual development but also societal development
(Kitchener, 2009). He claimed that societies that were characterized
by their rigid adherence to traditions and strict hierarchies were con-
straining the development of rationality and autonomous morality, and
once such societal obstacles were removed there would be predictable
development through which logic and morality would develop. This
was his orthogenetic principle of development. In that way, Piaget was
making a very clear link between the forms of asymmetrical social rela-
tions in a society and a form of thinking that had been identified before
him by Lévy-Bruhl (1910/1985) as magical thinking in traditional soci-
eties (for a detailed discussion of this issue, see Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
Psaltis et al. 5
This emphasis on the social relations of cooperation as promoting

decentration and avoiding egocentrism at the individual level, and
sociocentrism at the group level, runs through all of Piaget’s work. It was
certainly a basic premise of his contribution as the director of the Inter-
national Bureau of Education (IBE) in Geneva from 1926 to 1967, which
was later incorporated into the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), his endless calls for international cooperation,
and his critique of nationalism and ethnocentrism. This basic idea, that
cooperative, symmetrical and essentially democratic forms of social rela-
tion are a basis for non-distorted knowledge construction, was further
developed and applied to the societal level more recently by Habermas
(1983/1990).
Part I
This part comprises four contributions – by Edelstein (Chapter 2), Keller

(Chapter 3), Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) and Psaltis (Chapter 5) – all
inspired by Piagetian theory and with direct relevance to educational
processes. All of them offer a more complicated and nuanced discussion
of the role of social relations and social interaction for both the cogni-
tive and the moral development of the child compared with the original
Piagetian theorizing.
Edelstein sets the scene for a discussion of direct links between human
and societal development through the mediation of democracy educa-
tion for students. His discussion hales from the long vistas not only
of a deep and assimilated understanding of Piagetian theory but also
of a practical and broad understanding of the policy of international
organizations such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EU, and their
emphasis on democracy education and cooperative relations as an inte-
gral element of promoting societal development in both developing and
developed countries.
It is worth remembering that 2015 is the deadline for reaching the mil-
lennium development goals (MDGs) and the year of their replacement
with a new set of goals. In support of this effort, the EU decided to name
2015 as the European Year for Development. It is hoped that the unique
perspective developed in this volume, and the emphasis on social
developmental aspects of social relations, will contribute to ongoing dis-
cussions regarding the setting up of new goals in the post-2015 period.
Indeed, the recent 2014 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2014),
which is highly dependent on developmental psychological insights,
6 Introduction
makes clear the fact that discussions about societal development keep
drifting away from the application of crude economic indices, such as
the gross national income per capita or years of study in formal edu-
cation to a more human-centric conceptualization of strengthening the
capabilities of individuals.
Thus the identification of the constraints and facilitative conditions
of the development of human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000) needs to
take centre stage in any future discussions of societal development, and
we argue that an understanding of social relations and social interaction
is crucial in this endeavour. As various researchers in this volume sug-
gest, from a social constructivist perspective, human capabilities could
be seen as the outcome of both specific forms of social relations and
forms of external and internal dialogue, but also in turn as supportive
of particular forms of social interaction.
Keller (Chapter 3) reviews her research programme, discussing a cru-
cial element of social relations and social interaction – that is, the
development of intersubjectivity through the lens of a “naïve theory of
action”. She addresses children’s understanding of actions and relation-
ships, and the rules and expectations governing them. In her work, the
ability to differentiate and coordinate the perspectives of the Self and
the Other is seen as a core capability that develops in childhood. The
naïve theory of action interconnects social (descriptive) and moral (pre-
scriptive) reasoning and integrates cognitive, affective and behavioural
aspects. The development of the components of the theory is exempli-
fied in reasoning about close relationships (e.g. friendship) on the basis
of longitudinal and cross-sectional data from childhood to adolescence
in different cultures. Her data reveal universal and differential aspects of
sociomoral development. It is further shown that sociomoral reasoning
is relevant for interaction, and that the theoretical framework provides
a teaching method for discourses about conflicting claims in relation-
ships and for broadening moral awareness beyond close relationships
and ingroup boundaries.
Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) traces the historical roots of Piagetian
genetic epistemology in Switzerland and the way it influenced his work
in international organizations of education. He and his colleagues, in
a time of worldwide international conflicts, were committed to con-
tributing to educational perspectives that could promote international
understanding and peace. Perret-Clermont suggests that this has some-
thing to do with the innovative perspective of Piaget positioning the
social relations of cooperation as central to his theory. She also draws
on her experience from her years in Geneva as a student of Piaget,
Psaltis et al. 7
and later her work on the first generation of research on peer interac-
tion and cognitive development along with Willem Doise and Gabriel
Mugny (Doise et al., 1976). Finally, she discusses the more recent work
that she initiated and led in Neuchâtel, to offer some critical theoretical
insights beyond Piaget’s legacy. Cooperation, she says, does not hap-
pen in a “social vacuum”. In consequence, she addresses the following
question: What types of social relationship and institutional frame are
supportive of the development of cooperative social skills, for thinking,
learning and citizenship? The question is open and more complex than
it might seem at first glance because she convincingly explores the issue
at various “levels of analysis”, as originally suggested by Doise (1986).
Psaltis (Chapter 5) extends the discussion by Perret-Clermont and
the tradition of post-Piagetian work on social interaction and cogni-
tive development as he draws on Piaget’s social psychology, Moscovici’s
social psychology and the later work by Doise, Perret-Clermont and
Mugny and the work in Neuchâtel by reviewing a research programme
termed “the Cambridge strand” of a third generation of research on
peer interaction and cognitive development. The theoretical approach
is called genetic social psychology, the aim of which is to explore
the articulation of the microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis of
both social representations based on belief and social representations
founded on knowledge (see Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014) in the field of cog-
nitive development, but also peace and reconciliation in relation to
intergroup contact in post-conflict societies. The work of Psaltis intro-
duces a crucial role of gender and ethnic identity dynamics into our
understanding of how representations are transformed through social
interaction, making the case that microgenesis is the motor for both
the ontogenesis and the sociogenesis of representations. At the same
time, from this perspective it becomes clear that any microgenetic pro-
cess is itself constraint by the social representations that were previously
formed by sociogenetic processes.
Part II
The role of intergroup relations in peace and conflict has been recog-
nized by the international community as one of the more important
vulnerability factors for the development of human capabilities. The
impacts of conflicts on human development are felt by individuals, fam-
ilies, communities and countries: higher mortality, productive resources
diverted to destruction, losses of economic infrastructure and social
capital, insecurity and uncertainty (UNDP, 2010).
8 Introduction
The international community has not yet fully appreciated the role
of intergroup contact and social interaction as a factor that could
potentially diminish the possibility of future conflict as well as facili-
tate the peace process and conflict transformation in the post-conflict
period. However, there is evidence of increasing recognition of this
fact. For example, the UNDP-ACT in Cyprus has funded the construc-
tion and validation of a social cohesion and reconciliation (SCORE)
index in collaboration with the non-governmental organization (NGO)
SeeD,1 which aspires to be an innovative tool that will serve as a
barometer, an early-warning tool and a policy-oriented application for
social cohesion and reconciliation with global aspirations. A large part
of SCORE is measurements at the individual level of the quantity
and quality of intergroup contact between various groups in a single
society.
People in any interaction have a partially shared understanding
of their respective group memberships (Tajfel, 1978) and position-
ing in terms of gender, occupation, age and other status asymmetries
(Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007). The dynamics
of communal sharing, as described by Fiske (1992), can be seen in vari-
ous domains of social life in the way in which people orient to ingroup
and outgroup members differently (Dovidio et al., 2009).
Intergroup relations are Janus-faced. One can see the benign face of
group cohesion when ingroup members have an increased sense of sol-
idarity, sharing and commonality or sense of collective continuity in
time, which could promote a sense of wellbeing (Sani et al., 2008). How-
ever, communal relations also have a negative face when it comes to
cultivating internal dynamics of conformity (Asch, 1956), “blind patrio-
tism” (Staub, 1997), intergroup essentialism depicting members of other
groups as subhuman (Moscovici & Perez, 1997), or the identity pro-
cesses of differentiation and deindividuation (Tajfel, 1978). The positive
and negative faces of intergroup relations can be seen in the experi-
ence of the reunification of Germany and societal change in Northern
Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement, when heightened solidarity
between former foes was combined with increased xenophobia towards
new outgroups (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001).
Most of the findings of intergroup relations research converge on the
central role of categorization and social identification processes (Tajfel,
1978), as well as the role of emotions in the form of threats – either
realistic physical threats or symbolic threats to identities, worldviews
or values (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). Such threats are often highly cor-
related, suggesting that behind any essentialized or reified difference
Psaltis et al. 9
between categories one can detect an asymmetrical configuration of

ingroup-object (power/money)-outgroup (Psaltis, 2012a), where other
groups are seen as controlling material resources that the ingroup
should justly own. Recent theories of collective action suggest that sub-
jective injustice, strong identification with the ingroup, and efficacy
are key predictors of collective action on behalf of the ingroup (Van
Zomeren et al., 2008). It was even argued that the promotion of such
strategies of emancipatory action are incompatible with the promotion
of cooperative relations between the groups and the well-established
paradigm of research on prejudice reduction through intergroup con-
tact (Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Tausch et al., 2010)
because prejudice-reduction interventions might be working towards
regimenting an unequal structural inequality in society by reconciling
the oppressed with the oppressor (Dixon et al., 2012). Indeed, the same
mediators of prejudice reduction through intergroup contact (threats,
intergroup anxiety, stereotyping) (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) could be
used in the collective action paradigm to enhance solidarity and cohe-
sion within the dominated group, thus facilitating sacrifices for the
ingroup. In that sense the revolt model of social relations that is implied
by the collective action paradigm (probably applicable to dictatorships
as we have recently seen in the Arab Spring revolts) is also different from
the Moscovician formula of minority influence since Moscovici’s model
was largely based on convincing the population (and potential voters
in Western democracies) of the stance of the minority in a struggle
for recognition, and a change of social representations (Psaltis, 2005b)
that results in democratic reforms rather than the overturning of an
authoritarian regime.
What collective action theorists failed to discuss is the applicability of
such a model to Western democracies, post-conflict or divided societies,
and the similarities of forms of representation produced through col-
lective action with historically well-rehearsed doctrines and ideologies,
such as nationalism, fundamentalism and extremism. For example, in
divided societies such as Northern Ireland and Cyprus, “two can play the
game of collective action” that will eventually either lead to stalemate or
the escalation of conflict, without compromise or reconciliation (Psaltis,
2012a). The critics of the “prejudice reduction” paradigm also failed to
recognize the existence of joint ingroup-outgroup collective action for
the benefit of both groups by segments of both groups, which is actu-
ally premised on intergroup contact and cooperation (Psaltis, 2012a;
Chapter 5). Still, intergroup contact is not a panacea for the reduction of
prejudice (Hewstone, 2006), and Gillespie (Chapter 6) takes up the task
10 Introduction
of exploring the ways in which people and groups protect themselves

from being changed by intergroup contact.
In particular, Gillespie argues that social interaction does not lead
inexorably to either individual or societal development. While we often
focus on the factors in social interaction that lead to change, it is also
important, as he says, to understand the ways in which social inter-
action can be blocked from achieving its transformative potential. He
examines non-transformative social interaction – that is, how people
can meet and interact without being changed by the interaction, where
differences are assimilated in pre-existing representations and do not
require transformation or accommodation in Piagetian terms. Gillespie
begins by examining the contact hypothesis, and the conditions under
which social interaction can lead groups in conflict to change their
representation of the Self and the Other. Then the concept of “seman-
tic barriers” that was originally proposed by Moscovici (1976/2008) is
theoretically further elaborated, as means of representing the Other in
such a way as to make what they do or say explicable in terms of
pre-existing representations, such that nothing the Other does or says
demands a change in existing representations. Gillespie draws on ideas
of inoculation theory from McGuire to develop the idea that distrust is a
powerful semantic barrier to genuine engagement with the perspective
of the Other. In contrast, the existence of trust within a social interac-
tion can be conceptualized as an openness to being changed by that
social interaction.
Constantinou (Chapter 7) makes a bold attempt to reinvigorate the
field of diplomacy and international relations through a genealogy or
archaeology of ideas in various religious traditions and classics. He
suggests that conflict transformation would benefit from an alterna-
tive culture of diplomacy, an everyday diplomacy between lay people
that often remains unacknowledged, and one that constantly seeks to
mediate conflictual relationships and deeply held views about danger-
ous Others through Self/Other transformation. Constantinou reframes
diplomacy as the mediation of estrangement, where estrangement
includes not only alienation from other people and other cultures but
also from one’s labour, environment and god(s). His proposed concept
of homodiplomacy would be about the mediation of sameness, internal
mediation, as a condition for, as well as a neglected aspect of, the medi-
ation of the estranged. In homodiplomacy not only the Other but also
the Self become strange, a site to be known or known anew. This notion
of transformation as the result of self-reflection is a crucial element of
Piagetian genetic epistemology discussed by Gillespie (Chapter 6) and
Psaltis et al. 11
the pragmatism tradition of George Herbert Mead. In Constantinou’s

notion of homodiplomacy, self-reflection is successfully inserted in the
problematic of international relations and diplomacy.
Zittoun (Chapter 8) deepens the discussion about internal reflection
through semiotic means. She examines under which conditions learning
can lead to a better recognition of the Other, and vice versa. She argues
that if the teacher recognizes the student as Other, as an individual with
their own experience, thoughts, emotions and so on, then the student
makes much more out of the symbolic resources that are offered by the
teacher.
Zittoun argues that teaching-learning situations can lead to
transformative results when they conjugate the meeting of two per-
sons together with a cultural artefact, such as a novel or film. This
might then become a symbolic resource that allows, through imagi-
nation, to expand one’s understanding, and therefore to overcome a
simplifying representation of the Other. Drawing on classroom observa-
tions and interviews with adolescents, Zittoun shows that young people
might learn to use symbolic resources when they are both taught by a
teacher in an asymmetric relation, and recognized as unique and full
sense-making persons in a symmetric relation.
Part III
This part reminds us that social relations are part and parcel of valorized
structured activities and practices in society. Thus human and societal
development is always mediated by the use of cultural resources, which
can be material or symbolic (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010), in the con-
text of both intragroup and intergroup contact that could take the form
of external or internalized dialogue. These questions resonate with the
rationale of the work of Greenfield (2009), which was discussed earlier,
and which made links between the sociodemographic structure of soci-
eties that reach the level of human development through the mediation
of changes in values and learning practices of societies.
Uskul (Chapter 9) focuses on how the economic environment may
shape social interdependence, thereby leading to certain ways of think-
ing and behaving. Summarizing two lines of research, she discusses the
role of social interdependence that is shaped by economic requirements
for consequences for cognitive tendencies in three economic groups
(fishermen, herders, farmers), and for responses to others’ social exclu-
sion experiences among children in two economic communities (farm-
ers, herders). In a third line of research, she highlights the important
12 Introduction
role that certain individuals play in the economic livelihood of certain

groups (e.g. strangers) by demonstrating relevant psychological con-
sequences thereof for responses to social exclusion. The summarized
research provides evidence that economic activity, shaped by ecology,
is associated with important differences in different aspects of human
psychology and that it contributes to the limited psychological research
that is conducted with understudied communities outside Western
cultural contexts.
Downing Wilson and Cole (Chapter 10) present an innovative
methodology describing a ten-weeks cultural simulation involving two
groups of university students. After a period of autonomous develop-
ment, the groups interacted with each other as “strangers”. The activities
were organized to ensure that all participants provided documentation
of the invention of group artefacts, narratives, cultural practices and
shared values as they collectively created and performed their micro-
cultures. This research/teaching methodology provides an insight into
the ways in which culture weaves together individuals, the role of social
interactions in larger “societal level” processes, and the development
of individual identity during intergroup and intragroup interactions.
The use of such simulations shows how people create social worlds
and actively shape their own development, as well as the sources and
challenges of intergroup interaction.
In the final chapter of Part III, Passini (Chapter 11) explores the cor-
rosive effects of financial downturns and crises as a societal change
with significant effects on human development through the media-
tion of changes in the quality of intergroup relations within a single
society. Indeed, he shows how people may be driven to see others as
a threat with the consequence of an exacerbation of intergroup hos-
tility under such conditions. Moreover, concerns about the economic
situation may lead people to distrust the authorities and to support
those extremist movements that promise social change even to the
detriment of other social groups. Passini also brings to the surface a
negative aspect of economic development in a society as he is critical
of the recent consumer boom which he sees as having some negative
effects on everyday interactions with others as well. Consumerism often
enhances those individualistic tendencies that see others as a restric-
tion to personal achievement. Passini finally discusses how overcoming
the negative effects of the ongoing financial crisis may be possible by
creating new forms of intergroup solidarity and enhancing a sense of
common responsibility.
Psaltis et al. 13
In the concluding contribution (Chapter 12), Psaltis, Gillespie and

Perret-Clermont return to the importance of social relations and social
interaction for human and societal development, which are seen as the
bridge from human to societal development and vice versa. They do this
by discussing two overarching themes and three topics that correspond
to the three parts of the volume. It is concluded that all contributions
offer a process account of development, opening the “black box” of
social relations and social interaction as they mediate between societal
and human development. This analytical distance inserted between the
macro and the micro, the authors claim, is essential to rendering intelli-
gible bidirectional influences between the two types of development in
various spheres of our social life (education, economy, conflict trans-
formation). Finally, as they argue, there is a need to understand the
processes of change at various levels of analysis and to get a better grasp
of the ways in which microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic pro-
cesses are articulated, or what Gerard Duveen saw as the vision of genetic
social psychology (Moscovici et al., 2013; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
Across the volume, underlying the dynamics of both individual
and societal change, is social interaction. Yet what social interac-
tion is remains heterogeneous. The forms of social interaction vary
between social contexts, cultures and ongoing projects. The outcomes
of social interaction for both individual and societal development are
not linearly related to inputs; what people are trying to achieve, the
resources that they use and the contingencies of the situation all medi-
ate the outcomes. Thus, while we can confidently assert that social
interaction underlies human and societal change, we also discover that
the process through which this occurs is not suited to prediction or
control. Rather, understanding human and societal change as arising
through patterns of social interaction requires, in each case, a distinct
contextual, cultural and historical analysis.
Note
1. http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/index.php/research/score/blogs.
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Part I
Social Relations in Cognitive and
Sociomoral Development: Piaget
and Beyond in Education
2
Education for Democracy:
Cooperation, Participation
and Civic Engagement in
the Classroom
Wolfgang Edelstein
Democratic schools: European educational policy
In 2007 the EU, according to the understanding laid down in the

so-called Lisbon Accord, defined democratic citizenship and human
rights, together with social cohesion and sustainable economic progress,
as some of its fundamental goals, a cornerstone of its ongoing and future
development as one of the most advanced regions of the world. Ten
years earlier, in 1997, the Council of Europe, the agency of political
and cultural cooperation of more than 40 European nations, launched
a programme that was designed to support and evolve democratic cit-
izenship education in schools across Europe. Starting with the study
of exemplary projects and schools, it continued from 2002 onwards
with a programme of education for democratic citizenship developing
local, national and transnational initiatives, curricula and standards,
and publishing handbooks and teaching materials (Bîrzéa et al., 2004).
The programme reached a new level of intensity with its European Year
of Citizenship Through Education in 2005. In the wake of this program-
matic high point, a new phase was launched in 2006 under the heading
Learning and Living Democracy for All; a centre for democratic educa-
tion, the Wergeland Centre, was established in Oslo with the support of
the Norwegian government to organize and coordinate European action
in the field of democracy education and school-based action for demo-
cratic development. In May 2005 the heads of states and governments
19
20 Cognitive and Sociomoral Development
in Europe agreed upon action according to the so-called Warsaw Action

Plan to implement the following three lines of action:
• education policy development and implementation for democratic

citizenship and social inclusion;
• democratic governance of educational institutions’
• new roles and competencies of teachers and other educational staff
in a common programme enterprise of Education for Democratic
Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE).
On 11 May 2010 the Committee of Ministers of Education adopted

a Council of Europe Charter on EDC/HRE. This sums up the history
of the endeavour and provides a serious and substantive set of defi-
nitions, objectives and principles, as well as detailed policy measures,
with a special focus on social cohesion, social inclusion and respect
for human rights, with particular attention to the democratic gover-
nance of schools, calling for a special effort to disseminate knowledge
and best practice, to foster research in the field to establish a satisfac-
tory knowledge base, and, finally and most importantly, to develop
“sustainable frameworks and mechanisms that make EDC/HRE part of
everyday practices and processes at all levels of society”. Section 13
of the charter aptly sums up the main goals of the programme under
the heading “Skills for promoting social cohesion, valuing diversity and
handling differences and conflict”:
In all areas of education, member states should promote educational

approaches and teaching methods which aim at living together in
a democratic and multicultural society and at enabling learners to
acquire the knowledge and skills to promote cohesion, value diversity
and equality, appreciate differences – particularly between different
faith and ethnic groups – and settle disagreements and conflicts in a
non-violent manner with respect for each others’ rights, as well as to
combat all forms of discrimination and violence, especially bullying
and harassment.
(European Charter on EDC/HRE)
We have travelled a long distance from the prevailing forms of political

instruction and traditional citizenship education, the mostly teacher-
centred dissemination and memory-directed acquisition of bits of infor-
mation about formal procedures and the institutional structures of
government in a more or less marginal time slot of the timetable in
Wolfgang Edelstein 21
middle classrooms, usually between ages 12 and 16 (Torney-Purta et al.,

2001).
The charter text conveys a definite message: A democratic school is no
luxury. Learning democracy is not just an extension of the usual busi-
ness of learning at school; it is the serious business of learning for a life
of social solidarity (called “social cohesion” in the text of the Lisbon
Accord); what it aims for is a habit of peaceful cohabitation, of diver-
sity and participation, in a co-constructive model of social regulation.
As such it must be a core goal of education in school. The questions
then arise: How shall we proceed when organizing the corresponding
learning processes? What are the operational characteristics of such
processes?
The OECD: The call for competencies

At this point it is useful to direct our attention to the third voice
claiming education for democracy in Europe – and beyond: the OECD.
Parallel to the Lisbon process and the Council of Europe’s EDC/HRE pro-
gramme, the OECD’s group of educational experts developed its concept
of “key competencies” for a successful life and a well-functioning soci-
ety (Rychen & Salganik, 2003), to become the basic orientation for the
OECD’s educational policies and performance evaluations (known as the
Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) across its member
states. These key competencies – instrumental capabilities to deal with a
complex world (Sen, 1993) – enable individuals to respond to complex
situations and challenges, to navigate in a heterogeneous social space,
to deal with differences and contradictions, and to take responsibility
for themselves as well as others (Rychen & Salganik, 2003). They repre-
sent promising tools or instrumental capabilities that enable individuals
to act according to the norms, and in view of the goals defined in the
Lisbon Accord and the Council of Europe’s Charter: the norms of democ-
racy and human rights. The OECD defined three key competencies that
are taken to be instrumental for these goals:
• The ability to interact in socially heterogeneous groups. Here, integra-

tion, networking, partnerships, solidarity and cooperation are the
operational constructs that are most frequently used to define the
concrete meaning attached to the process. This implies the ability to
relate to others, to cooperate, and to manage and resolve conflict.
It is thus a basic operational capability for action and interaction
in a democratic process and for a democratically structured social
world.
• The ability to act autonomously. This implies that individuals are

empowered to navigate in the social space and to manage their
lives in meaningful and responsible ways to experience self-efficacy
and exercise control over their lives and their working conditions
(Rychen & Salganik, 2003, p.91). It calls for the ability “to play an
active, reflective and responsible part in any given context” (Rychen
& Salganik, 2003). It refers to the individual’s ability to act within
the big picture – that is, to think globally and to act locally, and to
understand the role one plays as well as the roles played by others.
And this again means understanding the rules of the game, the social
norms and moral rules that relate to the context of action.
• The ability to use tools interactively. This involves the more conven-
tional identification of abilities and skills acquired in the course of
processes of education-for-competence, yet stresses their interactive
use beyond the traditional: using language, symbols and texts; and
using information and information technologies cooperatively.
These key competences certainly provide for innovative processes of

transformation of traditional ways and means of education in the ser-
vice of human, social and societal goals; in the terms used by OECD, for
a successful life and a well-functioning (i.e. democratic) society.
Children’s rights in a democratic school

What then is the combined message of the three political agencies that
determine European policies: the EU in its Lisbon Accord, the Coun-
cil of Europe in its Charter for Democratic Citizenship and Human
Rights Education, and the OECD with its key competencies for a suc-
cessful life and a well-functioning society. The overall message is a
call for a psychologically grounded and socially validated competence
orientation towards achieving the goal of democracy, both in schools
and in social life, in line with children’s rights as defined by the UN
Covenant – a plea consistent with the OECD’s explicit dedication to
the normative principle of human rights as a guide to the commu-
nity’s political commitment. Children’s rights, therefore, must shape the
opportunity structures that determine children’s lives in the schools.
Children’s rights accordingly call for the democratic empowerment of
children to participate in and influence the institution in which they
spend the time that is their lifetime and that largely determines the
future course of their lives. Schools, therefore, are called upon to pro-
vide the cognitive, social and moral resources required to develop, in the
young generation, the democratic habits and competencies that serve to
build and to maintain a democratic system of governance. And, as a part

of these resources, they are called upon to design the kind of lifeworld
that is conducive to the democratic empowerment of the children who
attend the schools in the present. Schools are called upon to provide a
democratic form of life – in other words, to organize their lifeworld as
a democratic and participatory form of institutional life that provides,
and works with, the key competencies required for a successful life in a
democratic society. Schools must organize themselves as structures that
provide opportunities of learning to live democratic forms of life. The
question therefore must be: How can schools organize the learning pro-
cesses required in order to construct the competencies that we need to
conduct successful lives in a well-functioning democratic society?
In fact, “learning democracy” is not a single task with a well-defined
outcome. Rather, it consists of a variety of different yet interconnected
tasks:
• learning about democracy, in order to become a knowing and con-

scious democratic actor in (future) situations of social and political
choice and decision (Rawls, 1971);
• learning through democracy, by the experience of participation in
a democratic school community and thus, through experience, to
acquire sustainable democratic habits (Dewey, 1938/2004; Dewey,
1916/1963);
• learning for democracy, including the construction and ongoing
development of democratic forms of life, based on cooperation
and participation in local, national and transnational contexts (cf.
Himmelmann, 2007).
These processes refer to practices which are rooted in dispositions, skills

and convictions that persons must acquire. These dispositions, skills
and convictions are grounded in social competencies that require edu-
cational cultivation from early on. Without these social competencies,
there will be no perspective-taking, no participation, no cooperation
and no responsibility for others – the skills of social action that are the
prerequisites of democracy (Yates & Youniss, 1999). In a variety of ways,
these skills, practices and learning processes are experientially linked in
learning communities that are embedded in a participatory school cul-
ture. Piaget, already in 1934, described these processes in his essay on
“self-government” of children in the schools (Piaget, 1934/1998). There,
in a “scaffolding environment” (Vygotsky, 1934), under “responsive
conditions” (Habermas, 1983), children will encounter “the existential
and social experience” that, according to John Dewey (1963), grounds a

democratic form of life. First, this existential experience is the recogni-
tion and appreciation experienced by children and adolescents in par-
ticipation processes. Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1994) follows both logically
and psychologically from the experience of being accepted, recognized,
and appreciated. Responsibility (for tasks as well as for persons) follows
from shared social action towards a common goal. The triple quality –
recognition by others, self-efficacy and responsibility – is thus grounded
in the participatory processes on which a democratic school culture is
based. But none of these “capabilities” (Amartya Sen’s term for the com-
petencies unfolding in social action and interaction) will develop unless
the school community provides concrete organizational arrangements
for the activation of democratic citizenship practices and the social com-
petencies that an activating school environment will typically both rely
on and bring about, such as taking the perspective of the Other (Selman,
1980) and engaging in discursive practices (Piaget, 1932, 1934/1998;
Habermas, 1983; Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4 and Psaltis, Chapter 5,
this volume). To achieve this goal, schools must work towards turn-
ing formal membership in the institution into active participation in a
community. A collectively shared sense of recognition and responsibil-
ity arising from the experience of belonging to a community of purpose
will transform the closely regulated life of an educational institution
into a democratic school culture characterized by reciprocal recognition,
by the self-efficacy of motivated actors and by the shared responsibil-
ity of cooperating members – the principles guiding participation in
school as a moral community (Kohlberg, 1986; Althof & Stadelmann,
2009).
Varieties of democratic practice

There are, of course, a variety of practices that can contribute to the
development of the three interrelated tributaries of sociomoral resources
and capabilities required for the growth of a democratic culture in
the schools – recognition and acceptance by others, self-efficacy and
responsibility. Such practices, to be effective, will combine efforts and
methodologies that are conducive to learning about democracy, to
learning through democracy and to learning for democracy. They will
construct, in the classroom and across classrooms, the framework for
Dewey’s “existential and social experience” that is basic to both insight
and habit. Such practices range from cooperative learning and peer
mediation to theatre projects and service learning, from school councils
to community initiatives and soup kitchens. They combine experiences
of discursive planning, cooperative action and collective feedback, and

thus provide an experience of the democracy that they are designed to
prepare.
The apparently limitless variety of socioeducational practices can,
however, be usefully classified under three major headings: democratic
self-government, social projects and civic engagement.
A number of such practices have been identified and illustrated
by case reports in the useful publication on citizenship education in
Europe, Schools for society: Learning democracy in Europe, written by
Susanne Frank and Ted Huddleston – a project promoted by Initiative for
Learning Democracy in Europe of the Network of European Foundations
and supported, in the context of the Council of Europe’s programme
of Democratic Citizenship Education, by the Freudenberg Foundation
in Germany and the Citizenship Foundation in London. Three types of
democracy-enhancing action can be identified across these programmes:
classroom councils as a prototype of democratic self-government; ser-
vice learning as a prototype of the democracy-enhancing social project;
and volunteering as a prototype of civic engagement.
Classroom councils
We turn first to the organization of direct democracy in the class-
room. Classroom councils originated as a discursive device developed
by the French school reformer Celestin Freinet in the early years of
the 20th century, with the purpose of discussing issues of instruction
with the class and organizing classroom practice in the homeroom
(Freinet, 1965/1979). It can be defined as a particularly effective vari-
ety of cooperative self-government, as described by Piaget. In a number
of schools that are intent on the reform of instruction and pedagogy
in Germany, it has since developed into a major example of demo-
cratic self-regulation within the classroom (Kiper, 1997; Friedrichs, 2009;
Edelstein et al., 2009). The classroom council is the site of collective
responsibility for the life of the group. The teacher acts as a coach,
rather than as a teacher monitoring the class, while the group practices
self-determination regarding life in the classroom and the goals of com-
mon action by its members. At regular intervals and with fixed slots
in the weekly timetable, the group discusses rules and regulations for
the class; confers about its plans and projects; and defines the duties of
members, their tasks and their obligations. Votes are cast, decisions are
taken, conflicts are adjudicated, and projects are planned on the basis
of discussions led by an elected president and his or her aids or sub-
stitutes. Various roles and tasks are carried out by elected officers or by
commissions that report to the plenary assembly about their activities

and efforts. Conflict mediation and negotiation processes are in place
to solve conflicts and to negotiate participation in the power struc-
tures of the institution. Where a school assembly exists, the class, in
council, will elect one or more delegates to represent the class in that
assembly. In schools that are organized along participatory lines, the
conference of teachers, the headmaster and the teacher/parents coun-
cil will invite student representatives who have been elected by the
classroom councils to participate, and to share both discussions and
responsibilities. The councils are thus simultaneously, yet on separate
occasions, institutions of self-government and representational bodies
that train their members for participation and social responsibility, as
well as for collective conflict resolution and representative government.
The foundational process for all of these functions is the discursive
practice of the regular classroom council with all members of the class
attending as voting members. The council trains participants from early
on to speak and to listen; to take the perspective of the other and to
assess the power of arguments; to seek and to maintain agreement and
to resolve conflict fairly where agreement fails; to negotiate rules and to
evaluate these in the light of experience; and to plan and to participate
in collective actions and common projects. In schools that are geared
to participatory schoolroom practice, the classroom council is the space
of choice for instructional and institutional feedback that is likely to
enhance both understanding and performance. Few institutional set-
tings are better suited to developing the sociomoral competencies and
individual capabilities for cooperation and reciprocity on which the
development of the basic democratic virtues depend (Eikel & de Haan,
2007).
Service learning
The second type of educational project that serves the development of
democratic habits among children and adolescents in school is iden-
tified by its traditional US name of “service learning”. This form of
social action has undergone noticeable development towards a tool for
democratic action in the course of transfer from the USA to Europe,
especially Germany (Sliwka & Frank, 2004; Sliwka, 2008). In service
learning projects, students take responsibility for the common good and
the welfare of others by turning to a social problem, by working on
a solution and by responding to a challenge in the community. This
will mostly be a hometown problem, but students may also choose
to engage in a school project in the third world or join a cooperative
network designed to respond to a general ecological need. In the tra-

ditional model, service learning projects work on two fronts. On the
level of practice they attempt to solve a “social problem” – for example,
helping senior citizens to cope with computers, running a soup kitchen
for a poor neighborhood or planting trees in a living quarter while
informing citizens about climate change. Simultaneously, the problem
will be a topic of instruction so that the project combines responsi-
bility in the communal context with social learning in school, and a
topic of social action with a rational discussion of the aim and the con-
text of action. The cooperation of a teacher (or several teachers) is, of
course, essential. When this model of service learning is placed in a
classroom with a classroom council, the council is recognized as the
collective actor pursuing the practice of social entrepreneurship in a
community context. Successful action of this kind will likely initiate
strong reciprocity between the school and the community – certainly a
case of both learning through experience and developing the sociomoral
resources of democracy. The projects call for shared action, negotiation
and agreement on a common goal, rationally planning and conducting
action together, a meaningful evaluation and documentation of results
and a public presentation – in sum, participation and cooperation of
the entire group. In their developed form, projects of service learning
productively confront the group with social reality, the teacher with
the students, a social problem with the requirements of instruction,
the flow of project time with the regulated timetable, and the school
with the community – a working ground simultaneously for individual
development and democracy.
Volunteering
As a third type of involvement in the practice of democracy – beyond the
classroom council and beyond the social projects of service learning –
projects of civic engagement or civic commitment are highlighted,
which in English may be approximately rendered by volunteering or
community service. There is clearly no definite limit that separates vol-
unteerism from certain types and goals of service learning projects.
Volunteering may, indeed, be understood to transfer responsibility taken
within the school to an arena outside and beyond the school. Obviously,
the development of the capability to volunteer in the service of the com-
munity and public welfare is a worthy goal of education in schools, and
training young people for thoughtful commitment to issues of public
welfare is a contribution to education for democracy, where action is
paired with understanding.
Basically, civic engagement or volunteering can turn in two direc-

tions. First, when adolescents start to articulate political and analytic
interests, they will become sensitive to the structural problems of the
school’s neighbourhood, ready to confront the social, cultural and eco-
logical problems of the community, to search for potential strategies
of action and to raise the public awareness of communal issues of
discontent or failure. When a classroom council engages in this kind
of action, it may organize some kind of public deliberation about an
issue of common concern (Sliwka, 2008). Public deliberation is a hotbed
of democracy development, both individual and social. When schools
engage systematically in such initiatives of civic engagement, they can
be seen as educating for active citizenship in the communitarian sense
of the term.
A second strategy involves turning to the community with a some-
what different goal in mind. Instead of carrying the group’s preoccupa-
tions into the community, it may focus on the task of mobilizing citizens
to civic involvement for the school and together with the school. This
strategy will lead the group to an attempt to activate citizens, experts,
business leaders, social workers or artists to participate in actions in the
service of the school – citizens’ actions that, ultimately, turn the civic
ownership of the school over to those who are active in the service of
its development, and make it their school.
In this text we have described three types of democracy-enhancing
activity in schools:
• the classroom council as an instrument of democratic self-regulation;

• service learning as a social project that combines social action with
the contribution of instruction;
• the practice of civic engagement or volunteering as a basis for
developing and cultivating the competence required for community
organizing and democratic action in the local community.
All require and simultaneously provide the sociocognitive and

sociomoral competencies on whose practice the democratic virtues
thrive. In the context of a democratic school culture, there is an obvi-
ous advantage in granting the classroom council a privileged position
as a strategic centre of action, with organizing and planning the social
projects and volunteering initiatives of the class as an exercise in social
entrepreneurship, where students are trained to cooperatively and dis-
cursively practice and develop their social-cognitive and sociomoral
competencies in the service of the socially desirable aims of citizenship
and democratic empowerment.
Concluding remarks
The school-based institutions and processes described above appear

to be potentially powerful strategies for the construction, among the
young, of the sociomoral resources needed to develop and maintain
democracy as a normative value and as a functional way of life. Sharing
exercises of democratic participation and deliberation as exemplified by
classroom councils, service learning and social volunteering projects –
most effectively by combining them in a social entrepreneurship ver-
sion of the classroom council – young people are empowered to acquire
the social competencies needed to engage in democratic and social
practice and to develop initiatives of their own, without expecting pri-
vate profits in return. Social competencies and democratic habits are
thus matched with the ability to engage in socially productive practices
and commitments which help participants to preserve their identities
and their self-respect, even when faced with the social challenges of
poverty and precarious positions on the labour market. Social com-
petencies and democratic habits are the social capital of tomorrow.
They may even contribute importantly to economic capital, as some
exceptional economists such as George Soros, Mohammed Junus or
Amartya Sen believe, whose capability approach has been important for
the present argument (see Walker & Unterhalter, 2007; Otto & Ziegler,
2010). The psychological roots of this argument, however, derive from
concepts of social cognitive development formulated by Piaget, Selman
and Kohlberg.
To summarize the gist of the argument, democratic self-regulation
and democratic projects in schools serve the development of social
competencies – the sociomoral resources required for processes of demo-
cratic deliberation and decision-making, of conflict resolution, and of
responsible cooperation and participation. On the other hand, these
competencies are essential for maintaining democratic forms of life.
Democratic school cultures generate democratic habits among its mem-
bers, enabling them to participate responsibly in democratic institutions
as adults. The classroom council is a central device for the development
of a democratic school culture. However, in addition, its aims of prepar-
ing democratic forms of life, the practices that characterize democratic
schools, improve the present atmosphere of these institutions, enhance
pupils’ motivation and performance, and generate a sense of belonging
and empowerment. It turns out that – almost unintended – these are
milestones on the path to more efficient schools.
Democratic schools are inclusive schools that foster social cohesion
and successfully integrate poor children into the school community.
Inclusive schools work towards integrating children of migrant origin

into both the school and the social community. Democratic schools
are the best defence against the transmission of poverty from one
generation to the next.
Democratic convictions thrive on experience. Nothing will contribute
more to the stability of democratic ways of life and institutions than the
commitment of the young generation rooted in the experience of active
participation and empowerment. Whereas democratic schools are called
for on normative grounds as both a consequence and a prerequisite of
children’s rights, on empirical grounds and based on reliable evidence
they also promise to be the better schools.
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3
The Development of
Intersubjectivity: Cognitive,
Affective and Action Aspects
Monika Keller
Introduction
Navigating successful and satisfying interactions in a complex social

world is a developmental task that children manage surprisingly well.
Through interacting with Others, they increasingly come to under-
stand the particularities of social situations in terms of the relationships
and perspectives of the persons involved in them, including the Self
and Others (e.g. interests, needs and feelings, as well as the (moral)
rules and expectations governing relationships and social interaction).
In this chapter, these achievements will be outlined as the develop-
ment of a naïve theory of action, including social (descriptive), moral
(prescriptive) reasoning, based on the differentiation and coordination
of perspectives of the Self and Others. I will describe a developmen-
tal sequence of sociomoral reasoning from childhood to adolescence,
which integrates cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of the Self
and Others’ awareness (e.g. the ability to coordinate perspectives of the
Self and Others, emotional concern for others and action strategies).
This will be documented in two contexts: the development of moral
awareness in close relationships, focusing on close friendship; and moral
awareness in a situation of sharing with anonymous others. Finally,
I will discuss briefly how the theoretical framework provides a teach-
ing method for discourses about conflicting claims in relationships, and
for broadening moral awareness beyond close relationships and ingroup
boundaries.
32
Monika Keller 33
Perspective coordination as the basis of relationship

understanding
In the cognitive-developmental tradition, a sequence of distinct

developmental levels of social and moral perspective-taking has been
outlined from childhood to adolescence and adulthood (Kohlberg,
1976). They include the understanding of the Self and relationships
(Selman, 1980), moral judgements of fairness (Kohlberg, 1976) and
action strategies to balance conflicting claims or rebalance the rela-
tionship when responsibilities have been violated (Keller, 1984). These
levels are seen as domain-specific social-cognitive competencies that
build upon each other successively but do not necessarily develop syn-
chronously. When they are achieved varies according to the specific
task, type of relationship, and social and individual influences.
The ability to differentiate and coordinate perspectives of the Self and
Others is seen as the core social-cognitive competence underlying these
different developments (Selman, 1980). The sequence proceeds from the
level 0 egocentric focus on the perspective of the Self, to level 1 differ-
entiation of individual subjective perspectives, level 2 coordination of
the Self and Others’ perspectives, level 3 third-person or observer per-
spectives and level 4 generalized social system perspectives. Each higher
level coordination allows for more differentiated and coordinated cate-
gories of understanding the psychological world of the Self and Others.
In particular, the achievement of level 2 refers to a metaperspective that
Gillespie (Chapter 6, this volume) describes as fundamental for social
interaction: “that we approach the other not only with our own per-
spective but also with assumptions about the others’ perspective”. While
Gillespie and also Uskul (Chapter 9) are focusing on interaction, this
chapter elaborates on the (development) of meaning-making structures
that the developing person brings to and transforms into interaction.
This metaperspective is seen as the basis for interaction, independent of
the type of relationship – for example, symmetrical or asymmetrical, or
ingroup or outgroup. However, children interact before they have estab-
lished this metaperspective, and I analyse in more detail how it develops
from childhood to adolescence in terms of structure and content of
reasoning in the domain of close relationships.
I define sociomoral reasoning as the development of a naïve theory
of action, persons and relationships integrating descriptive and pre-
scriptive reasoning (Keller, 1984, 1996; Keller & Reuss, 1985; Keller &
Edelstein, 1991). Solving conflicting (moral) claims in relationships
requires a descriptive social understanding of what is at stake in this
situation, such as motives, feelings, intentions, expectations of persons

involved in the situation, including the “interpersonal moral facts” of
the situation (e.g. a promise given or standing in a particular relation-
ship), and prescriptive moral reasoning of evaluating the situation and
actions in terms of what is right in light of general standards of fairness
and responsibilities in particular relationships. In a moral dilemma, the
Self interprets the situation and chooses a line of action by prioritiz-
ing different claims of the Self and Others. Understanding and moral
evaluation are intricately interconnected in decision-making because
the interpretation of a situation brings forth an intuitive moral eval-
uation (Haidt, 2001). Reversely, the intuitive moral evaluation of the
situation influences the perception of the facts. Cognition and feelings
are interconnected, as a situation may elicit immediate strong feelings
that influence its interpretation, and reversely.
Developmentally, understanding relationships implies the increasing
awareness of obligations and responsibilities, and the awareness of a
necessity to balance the claims of the Self and Others and rebalance
the relationship in the case of a violation of responsibilities. Persons
gradually acquire a more sophisticated naïve theory of action in terms
of the understanding of the psychological world of the Self and Oth-
ers, of general moral obligations (e.g. that one ought to keep promises
or not cheat on others) and of particular interpersonal responsibilities
(e.g. how one should feel and act as a good and loyal friend); an increas-
ing understanding of the (short- and long-term) consequences of the
violation of obligations and responsibilities for relationships (e.g. feel-
ings and evaluations of the Self and Others); and an understanding of
action strategies that balance or compensate moral violations. When
failing morally, the person experiences an increasing necessity to justify
and compensate such violations in order to maintain or rebalance the
relationship between the Self and Others (Keller & Reuss, 1985). How-
ever, the growing moral awareness may also be used in a defensive way
for strategic interaction, moral disengagement and the justification of
immoral actions (Bandura, 1999). The Machiavellian person and the
sociopath are extreme examples of people whose behaviour involves
the manipulation of others in order to pursue selfish goals. Such per-
sons have moral knowledge of obligations and of the consequences of
violating responsibilities without experiencing the appropriate moral
concerns for others. The process of moral disengagement, be it the
pursuit of selfish interests, social exclusion or violence against other
persons, is accompanied by defensive processes of denial of respon-
sibility and justifications that render immoral behaviour as morally
Monika Keller 35
adequate, such as acting in line with superordinate goals or values

and/or blaming the victim by defining them as being responsible for
the situation.
Following from this, basic components of a moral and responsible Self
can be defined:
• a disposition of emotional concern for others, such as empathy

with Others’ needs, feelings and expectations as well as sympa-
thetic and pro-social action tendencies (Gibbs, 1987; Hoffman,
2000);
• a personal commitment to moral norms and responsibilities, such
that the Self feels responsible for the welfare of Others and for the
consequences of their actions on Others (Blasi, 1983);
• a disposition of moral feelings, such as shame and guilt when the
Self has failed responsibilities towards Others, or when Others,
for whom the Self feels responsible, have violated responsibili-
ties; moral anger is the emotional reaction towards Others who
have failed moral responsibilities, while guilt is the moral emo-
tion of the Self; in both cases, the Self experiences empathy with
the victim of the violation or vicarious guilt feelings for the
perpetrator;
• a disposition to compensate for the violation of responsibilities,
but also to avoid the violation of responsibilities towards Others
by discursive strategies or negotiations; correspondingly, the vic-
tim of a violation – Self or Other – has a responsibility to forgive if
appropriate excuses have been offered or actions for compensation
have been taken (Enright, 1991).
Emotional concern for others and the disposition of morally blaming

the Self or Others who have morally failed are the basis for compen-
sation and moral restitution to those who have been treated unfairly
or irresponsibly. Reversely, the Self can morally demand that Others
take the Self’s legitimate interests and expectations into account in
situations of conflicting claims. This implies also that a balance has
to be found between (legitimate) self-interest or personal autonomy
and interpersonal responsibilities towards others. These components are
analytical, and it is an empirical question in which types of relationship
and with which concrete Others the Self functions consistent with the
components described above.
The goal of my empirical research was to outline the developmental
levels of the naïve theory of action in the context of close relationships.
I see these relationships as developmentally the first relationships in

which perspective coordination occurs. I chose two types of relationship
that are prototypical in the process of socialization: the asymmetrical
parent–child relationship and the symmetrical peer relationship of close
friendship that Piaget (1932) confronted as morality of constraint vs.
moral autonomy (see also Perret-Clermont and Psaltis, Chapter 5, this
volume). I have argued elsewhere about the idealization inherent in this
distinction, in particular in modern times (Keller et al., 2005). However,
both types constitute relationships of intensive emotional bonding that
provide the earliest opportunities for the development of perspective
coordination, the naïve theory of action and the development of moral
sensitivity.
As recent developmental literature shows, level 0 egocentrism
may never exist because simpler tasks than the interviews used
in the cognitive-structural tradition demonstrate various aspects of
perspective-taking and a theory of mind already from younger preschool
age on, and even earlier in the observation of social interaction
(Tomasello et al., 2012). Another question refers to situation and per-
son variables that influence structure and content of the naïve theory
of action. Some chapters in this book discuss conditions that would
also be of influence for the development of relationship understand-
ing. Gillespie (Chapter 6) argues that trust and trustworthiness facilitate
interaction and the transformation of knowledge. Uskul (Chapter 9)
shows how the degree of interdependence of a social group depends
on the economic environment, and how it influences psychological dis-
positions of persons and the ability to understand and interact with
outgroup members. The distinction between ingroups and outgroups
discussed by Uskul is also very relevant in the discussion of the basic
components of the moral Self, as outlined above. While the develop-
ment of empathy and moral responsibility for ingroup members may be
the result of evolutionary processes and the affective bonding in close
relationships, the generalization of such an orientation to outgroup
members does not result from these experiences but needs different
socialization processes. Greater experience of contact with outgroup
members seems to be one important condition for this achievement.
A developmental model of relationship understanding:

Findings from our longitudinal and cross-cultural studies
In the following I will outline the development of the naïve theory

of action and the different components of moral sensitivity, based on
interviews about an interpersonal moral dilemma in a close friendship.
Monika Keller 37
Knowledge of this developmental course and the description of develop-

mental levels can also be seen to provide a diagnostic and an interven-
tion instrument for educators: to become aware of interpersonal and
moral deficits in development and as a means to foster children’s and
adolescents’ moral sensitivity in relationships.
Female and male children (7 and 9 years of age), adolescents (12 and
15 years of age) and young adults (18 years of age) from different cul-
tures (Western and Asian) in two longitudinal studies (N = 270) and
cross-sectional studies of different sizes (overall about 500 participants)
were interviewed individually about: (1) their general understanding of
relationships and social and moral norms; and (2) a morally relevant
conflict in a close friendship and in a parent–child relationship (Keller,
1996, 2006). In the following I will present examples from the context
of close friendship and promise-keeping. In the dilemma presented, the
protagonist (male or female with whom the person is asked to iden-
tify) has promised to visit the (same sex) best and long-term friend on
their special meeting day and the friend mentions that they want to
talk about and show something new. At exactly this time, the protago-
nist later receives an interesting invitation from a third (same-sex) child
of the same ethnic origin. This child is new in the class and the friend
does not seem to like them. Further psychological details complicate the
situation somewhat.
The general understanding of close friendship and promise-keeping
was explored by questions such as: Why is it important to have a close
friend? What makes friendship really close? Why should a promise
be kept? What happens if a person does not keep promises (Selman,
1980; Keller & Wood, 1989)? In situation-specific reasoning about the
dilemma, the perspectives of the different persons had to be recon-
structed in terms of descriptive-social cognition (psychological under-
standing of interests, motives, feelings, relationship, norms and actions
strategies) and in terms of prescriptive moral cognition (what is right in
this situation). The issues addressed were:
• the spontaneous definition of the problem;

• the action choice and reasons for choice and alternative;
• the consequences of different options for the feelings of the Self and
Others;
• the evaluation of choice;
• the action strategies after (or before) choice.
The topics address the person’s sensitivity to the psychological, social

and moral particularities of the situation (Keller, 1984; Keller & Reuss,
1985); decision-making in light of conflicting claims of the Self and

Others (e.g. selfish interests and obligations/responsibilities); taking
into account the consequences of different lines of action for Others
affected by the actions (empathy) and for the Self (moral feelings);
and the capacity to engage in moral discourse in order to avoid or
compensate for negative consequences of actions (e.g. excuses, justifi-
cations and compensations) when the Self has failed to take Others’
concerns into account. In the course of development, these com-
ponents are increasingly differentiated and coordinated. However, it
depends on affective-motivational aspects as to whether the person
gives priority to selfish concerns or to obligations and responsibilities
in the situation, and whether they construct the dilemma as a con-
flict of self-interest with obligations (interesting invitation vs. close
friendship) or as conflicting obligations (close friendship vs. helping a
newcomer).
The examples presented for the developmental levels are based on
the longitudinal study with Icelandic children and a scoring manual
in which each of these components was scored separately (Keller &
Wood, 1989; Keller, 1996). However, they also represent typical argu-
ments given by the participants from our cross-cultural studies. Some
exceptions regarding the Chinese participants will be discussed later.
As mentioned above, the different issues are scored separately so that
persons usually score at more than one level – a mix that is an impor-
tant aspect of developmental dynamics and reorganization (Berkowitz &
Keller, 1994).
At level 0, children have no understanding of the psychological and
moral aspects of the conflict and of the consequences of various lines of
action and the feelings of the Self and Others. None of our seven-year-
old children scored predominantly at this level.
At level 1 the problem is defined as a conflict between two options
of equal or unequal hedonistic gratification. Reasons for choices are the
subjective interests of the protagonist/Self who wants to have a good
time. Emotions of the Self are good or bad depending on whether sub-
jective interests are realized. Accepting the interesting invitation from
the new child leads to positive feelings for the Self (if the movie is good),
while accepting the friend’s invitation may lead to feelings of boredom
(because the toys are not as interesting). The emotional consequences
for Others focus on external aspects of the situation (e.g. the friend is
waiting or has nobody to play with). Anticipation of the friend’s neg-
ative reaction can lead to fear of revenge (e.g. that the friend hits or
stops playing). This anticipation can lead to strategic behaviour, such
Monika Keller 39
as hiding the action from the friend, but also to simple explanations of
the action choice. No need is seen for compensating strategies; friends
will just forget and play again. While children at this level may express
that a promise must be kept, they do not feel committed by the act of
promising. Similarly, they do not really understand relationship respon-
sibilities. However, children may opt for the friend because they like to
play with them and because they like them, because they realize that
the friend is alone at home and has nobody to play with or because
they see it as nice to go because the friend invited them. Seven-year-olds
frequently scored at this level.
At level 2 of perspective coordination, mostly scored at ages 9 and 12
years, children have achieved a metaperspective. They understand the
normative aspects of the situation resulting from both the moral rule of
promising and the relationship itself. The problem is defined in terms
of the promise and the close friendship, which are seen to conflict with
subjective hedonistic interests. The violation of obligations (not keeping
a promise) or of interpersonal responsibilities (not meeting the friend
at the special time or when they want to talk) is morally evaluated as
betrayal, and a person acting like this is defined as a traitor or a bad per-
son/friend. Obligations and responsibilities can be taken into account in
the action choice (e.g. not wanting to leave out a best friend and to make
them sad or disappointed). However, negative consequences for the best
friend may also be cognitively seen as consequences if selfish concerns
gain priority. The violation of moral and relationship responsibilities
leads to consequences for the Self and the friend: from the perspective
of the friend, the betrayal is interpreted in terms of moral anger and
disappointment; from the perspective of the protagonist, it is connected
with feelings of guilt and the anticipation of possible long-term nega-
tive consequences for the relationship. In order to cope with both, the
person has two possibilities: either to make up for the violation of the
moral balance or to neutralize the choice defensively. Compensation
strategies indicate the moral awareness when excuses and explanations
are given to the friend, and an appeal to their understanding is made
either before a decision or post hoc in order to re-establish the moral
balance. From a moral point of view, the person is aware that they have
to provide “good” or mutually acceptable reasons as to why the pursuit
of self-interest is a legitimate line of action (e.g. the exceptionality of
the offer). However, as self-interest is rarely seen as an adequate moral
reason, lying about the action and pretending about a competing obliga-
tion, such as “having to go downtown with one’s mother”, can be seen
as a strategic form of moral disengagement that serves to maintain peace
in the relationship. Guilt feelings in this case indicate the awareness of

a moral failure.
At the centre of level 3, usually achieved in adolescence around
15 years of age, the person is aware of generalized norms of reci-
procity, such as trust, trustworthiness, dependability and reliability of
the person. The moral Self involves an evaluative system that guides
decision-making in situations of moral conflict. The consequences of
the violation of moral and interpersonal obligations are seen as a fail-
ure of the moral Self and as a violation of trust and faithfulness in
relationships. Loyalty and reliability are the most important values in
relationships in general, and in particular in friendship. Because of the
intimate sharing of thoughts and feelings, the particular situation of a
close friend becomes the most important concern in a conflict situa-
tion and gains priority over selfish interests and even over conflicting
interpersonal responsibilities towards an outsider. The hypothetical role
switch is a means to assess what is right and responsible, or irrespon-
sible and morally illegitimate. This implies that a conflict cannot be
negotiated after having created facts, but the friend’s consensus has to
be achieved before a decision is made. Strategic interaction is excluded,
and it also happens only very infrequently that the role switch is used
post hoc in a defensive way in order to justify self-interest: “the friend
should understand a decision to go to a movie because she or he would
have done the same”. As has been shown in the literature, the strat-
egy of blaming the victim is otherwise a frequently used strategy to
deny responsibility or to justify moral violations (Semin & Manstead,
1983).
The 18-year-olds predominantly used level 3 arguments when rea-
soning about the conflict. Conceptually, they elaborate the idea of the
moral Self and personal responsibilities in relationships, and they under-
stand that basic moral norms, such as trust and trustworthiness, are
not only important in establishing and maintaining relationships but
are also the basis for them. Besides intimacy, they value autonomy
and openness in relationships and are more competent in negotiating
conflicting claims.
The findings from our cross-cultural studies in different Western soci-
eties and in China demonstrate that children progress through the same
developmental sequence of sociomoral understanding. However, they
vary considerably in the weight given to different aspects of the sit-
uation (Keller et al., 1998; Keller, 2006). The most salient difference
between most Western and Chinese children concerns how the claims
of the third child are balanced with those of the close friend. While the
Monika Keller 41
Western children and adolescents are mostly focused on the hedonistic

offer made by the third child (e.g. the interesting invitation), Chinese
children focus on an altruistic obligation and empathize with the sit-
uation of the new child. Interestingly, for the youngest children, this
empathy is based on an authority rule in school “to help somebody who
is new in school” and only later on the anticipation of the feelings and
the situation of the new child – for example, that this child is alone and
has no friends. Furthermore, younger Western children frequently opt
for the new child in spite of a moral evaluation that it is right to visit the
friend as promised. Because of this inconsistency, strategic interaction,
such as lying, occurs with some Western children in order to avoid nega-
tive consequences for the Self. This type of moral inconsistency does not
occur with the Chinese children, who nearly always judge their action
choice also as the morally right one. Concerning moral emotions as a
consequence of choice, Western children and adolescents feel positive
most frequently when they opt for the close friend, while the Chinese
children and adolescents feel predominantly bad whatever their choice
is. Thus they interpret the situation as a conflict of two different obliga-
tions – friendship loyalty vs. altruism – while the Western participants
interpret it as a conflict of selfish-interest vs. moral and friendship obli-
gations. Resisting hedonistic selfish-interests therefore leads to positive
moral feelings. Interestingly, adolescents in all societies included in our
study gave priority to the close friend in both their practical decision-
making and their moral judgement. They emphasized the necessity of
trust and interpersonal loyalty in adolescence and valued friendship as
the most important relationship. However, in spite of this similarity,
the conceptual understanding of close friendship is somewhat differ-
ent. While friendship for Western participants is a personal and intimate
relationship, Chinese participants view this relationship as embedded in
a societal context (Keller, 2004).
Also, in spite of the criticism that has been raised against (Western)
individualism and (Asian) collectivism or interconnectedness accord-
ing to which persons from these cultural backgrounds have been
distinguished (Turiel, 1998), our findings are rather in line with this
distinction and show how the social environment influences indi-
vidual development (similarly Uskul, Chapter 9) and how society is
present in the individual. However, the similarity in emphasis on close
friendship in adolescence in both cultures shows that differential cul-
tural socialization and universal developmental experiences, such as
the importance of peers in adolescence, are both important factors
that have to be considered in the development of moral awareness.
As has been pointed out frequently, close friendship is a special rela-

tionship for the development of awareness, and adolescence seems to
be a specifically important period. This socioemotional developmental
achievement may first be established in close relationships and may not
be established in Machiavellian and sociopathic persons who seem to
have a split between cognition and affect. On the other hand, it is also
an important further developmental achievement to generalize moral
awareness from close relationships and ingroup members to outgroup
persons and those who are not emotionally close to the Self. This is espe-
cially necessary when intergroup tensions have to be overcome (Killen,
2007). Granting equal moral rights to all persons is the basis of the uni-
versal morality as defined by Kohlberg (1976) and the Human Rights
Charter. Being charitable to those who are in need, even if they do not
belong to the ingroup, is an achievement of a generalized empathy. The
development of moral awareness includes the ideas of both justice and
charity.
Sociomoral reasoning and action
Persons vary in the intensity of feelings they experience concerning

empathy, guilt and (moral) anger. Research into the friendship dilemma
has revealed its diagnostic sensitivity for aggressive children. Malti
(2003) could show for younger Swiss children aged between 7 and
12 years that aggressive children scored at lower levels of sociomoral
friendship reasoning and focused exclusively on the hedonistic aspect
of the situation in action choices and motives. Less frequently, they
also attributed guilt feelings to the protagonist when they violated
the friend’s concerns. Similarly, in situations of moral violation with a
non-friend (e.g. stealing, bullying another child), they more frequently
neutralized the feelings of the victim and of the Self as the violator com-
pared with less aggressive children. In their social interactions in a play
situation, the aggressive children also used lower-level impulsive and
aggressive action strategies more frequently than non-aggressive chil-
dren. Similarly, the attribution of guilt feelings to a moral transgressor
predicted less externalizing symptoms in elementary children (Malti &
Keller, 2009) and more pro-social behaviour (Malti et al., 2009).
Research on aggression and bullying has shown that juvenile delin-
quents are particularly deficient in emotional concern for others (Gibbs,
1987). Arsenio and Lemerise (2001) have distinguished different types:
One type is the person with general deficits in sociomoral under-
standing. The second is the strategically competent Machiavellian
Monika Keller 43
or sociopath mentioned above. This type of person can be social-

cognitively competent in understanding other persons’ perspectives and
in manipulating them for the achievement of their own goals (Gasser &
Keller, 2009). They even “know” about the morally adequate feelings
in situations of rule violation, but they do not really feel them (Blair
et al., 1997). Rather, their social and moral knowledge is used strate-
gically in order to maintain the image of a moral person. A third
type distinguished by Gasser and Keller may be persons with prob-
lems of emotional control in all or specific types of situation who use
developmentally lower-level power-oriented action strategies.
Fostering moral awareness in relationships:

An educational approach
Several different approaches have been proposed as an answer to the

question of how to overcome cognitive and emotional deficits in social
interaction. In the social-cognitive and moral tradition, the discussion
of dilemmas (hypothetical and real life) has been used as a means to
develop sociomoral competencies. These discussions have also to take
into account the emotions arising in a situation because the influence
of cognition and emotion in interpreting the meaning of a situation
is reciprocal. The interpretation of a situation elicits feelings, but feel-
ings also activate cognitive processes, and these in turn activate new
emotions. According to Izard (2002, citing Damasio, 1994), emotions
may also have some independence of cognitive processes resulting from
personality factors such as temperament or emotionality. This concerns
both altruism and violence (Baumeister, 1996), which can be triggered
by emotion information (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001). Interventions that
promote the development of moral awareness and socioemotional com-
petence have to take such non-cognitive components into account so
that sociomoral reasoning can be transformed (Gillespie, Chapter 6).
Sociomoral dilemma-discussions represent a context in which per-
sons can recognize and experience the importance of perspective-taking,
empathy with Others’ concerns and the definition of consensual goals.
The different components of the naïve theory of action can be system-
atically reconstructed in order to enhance the capability to understand,
morally judge and solve interpersonal conflicts in (1) the spontaneous
understanding of the situation; (2) the discussion of the various lines
of action that are possible in the situation; and (3) the consequences
arising from the different options and the action strategies to avoid
or rebalance consequences. The feelings of the persons involved and
their relationship to each other as well as obligations or responsibili-

ties are important considerations in these reflections. It is important to
develop the awareness that there is more than one choice in a situa-
tion and that choices can be evaluated according to what is fair and
responsible in light of the (legitimate) interests of the Self and Oth-
ers, and different types of obligation and responsibility in the situation.
In such discussions, persons come to understand the complexity of
interpersonal situations in terms of psychological particularities as well
as the relevant moral principles, and the action strategies to negotiate
and to solve interpersonal conflicts (Keller & Reuss, 1985). Dilemma-
discussions among peers (Keller & Becker, 2015) and role-playing can
be used as methods to make persons not only cognitively but also affec-
tively aware of the different perspectives in conflicts (Scheithauer & Bull,
2009). This implies switching roles of the Self and Others, such as “vio-
lator” and “victim”, in order to experience the corresponding emotions.
Thus a violator has to take the perspective of the victim in order to
stimulate an empathic awareness of the effects of their actions on the
victim and a feeling of responsibility for their actions. Such hypothetical
discussions and role-plays, as well as the reflection of one’s own interac-
tions (Selman & Demorest, 1984), attempt to foster morally responsible
action and conflict resolution in social interactions.
The context of close friendship seems particularly suited to fostering
the emotional understanding of others and to overcoming a self-centred
instrumental exchange that Kohlberg (1976) and Gibbs (1987) describe
as a characteristic of the level 2 morality of instrumental exchange.
In friendship, persons experience it as important to take each other’s
perspective into account and to find mutually satisfying solutions to
the conflict that allow the maintenance of an affectively close relation-
ship. Thus conflict resolution in close friendship fosters the integration
of cognitive and affective aspects in the process of conflict resolution
because friendship naturally involves a care for the other and excludes
purely instrumental interaction.
Selman and Shultz (1990) have used friendship in therapeutic inter-
ventions for youths with interaction problems. Based on this work,
Adalbjarnardóttir (1999) has developed a sociomoral intervention pro-
gramme in schools of which friendship is an important part. However,
it is an equally important task for prevention programmes to develop
an emotional concern for Others who are not close to the Self. There-
fore it is important to transcend the close relationship of friendship and
to foster moral awareness for others who are excluded and/or treated
with hostility, or even violently (Killen, 2007). Consistent with other
Monika Keller 45
research, Gummerum, Takezawa and Keller (2009) have shown that

only minimal cues are sufficient to create feelings of an ingroup, and
stereotype others as an outgroup, with the consequence of being less
charitable (see below). These issues of stereotypes and prejudice can be
dealt with as early as kindergarten, as anti-prejudice programmes have
shown (Wagner, 2008).
Perspective-taking, empathy and fairness are also central to conflict-
mediation programmes in which peer mediators help to solve everyday
conflicts (Montada & Kals, 2001). In this approach, the persons involved
in a conflict have to understand that they cannot solve it without
taking each other’s perspectives into account when negotiating a non-
aggressive and consensual solution. The conflicting parties have to
define a (minimal) common goal as a basis for a solution of the con-
flict. As in hypothetical discussions of a dilemma, solutions have to be
found to which all of the persons concerned can agree. However, in
these real-life situations, the conflicting parties necessarily have to take
each other’s views into account in order to find a compromise and to
progress towards a consensual solution of the conflict.
Economic games as a learning context for cooperation
In this context I want to include a very different line of research that

has not been considered in social-developmental research, but that may
be interesting for teaching moral awareness and the value of cooper-
ation in relationships that are not close (Gummerum & Keller, 2008).
In behavioural economics, it has been documented that persons are
not exclusively oriented towards the maximization of self-interest as
implied in the traditional conception of “economic man” (Camerer,
2003). It could rather be shown that persons are sensitive to issues of
fairness in relationships and have “other-regarding” or fairness prefer-
ences in situations of sharing with anonymous others. However, on the
one hand, persons vary in the strength of other-regarding preferences
(Keller et al., 2013) and, on the other hand, aspects of the situation are
of influence. Adults and children prefer to cooperate with others who
have acted fairly and they punish those who violate fairness, even if
they have to pay a cost themselves (Fehr & Gächter, 2000), and present-
ing others as ingroup members increases sharing (Gummerum et al.,
2009).
In a variety of experimental tasks or games, it could be shown that
persons treat others more fairly when they have to cooperate with them
in the future. This would explain Uskul’s finding (Chapter 9) of more
positive relationships with strangers in herders compared with farmers.

In order to establish and maintain cooperation, the norm of reciprocity
and mutual trust is very important (see Gillespie, Chapter 6, for a discus-
sion of the importance of trust). The most successful strategy for main-
taining cooperation is the reciprocity strategy of “tit for tat” (Axelrod,
1984) in which the cooperation of one partner leads to the cooperation
of the other. In the long run, cooperation is better for both partners
than to defect, even if defection may serve the self-interest of each part-
ner better in the short run. Trust in the cooperation of Others motivates
cooperation in the Self, so building a trusting relationship serves a recip-
rocal need fulfilment in the long run. Mutually acknowledging each
other’s concerns and goals helps to build cooperative solutions, which
will be good for both partners. In contradistinction, feelings of being
exploited, being manipulated strategically or being treated unfairly pro-
duce moral anger, destroy trust and thus prevent further cooperation.
While it seems to be important for the ongoing cooperation to forgive
defection once (“tit for tat with one forgiving”), the repeated pursuit
of unilaterally oriented self-interest will prevent successful cooperation.
In this case, both partners will lose in the long run.
As we have discussed before, emotions play an important role in
this context. The violation of fairness norms produces moral feelings
of anger and indignation in victims and observers. These feelings of
anger lead to animosity and revenge, such as sanctions, and prevent a
future willingness to cooperate if the violator does not show true regret.
In the case of fairness violation, the violator as a moral agent recipro-
cally should experience and indicate guilt and make up for the violation
by strategies of compensation, such as excuse, asking for forgiveness
or material compensation. Thus moral awareness for the concerns of
others is an important factor in social life and the maintenance of
relationships.
Persons lacking moral awareness, in particular Machiavellian or socio-
pathic persons, who strategically pursue self-interested actions or may
even feel justified to do so, not only have to learn that there are moral
rules that forbid the immoral treatment of others, something they may
even know cognitively, but also they have to learn the appropriate
feelings, such as empathy with others or guilt when violating their con-
cerns. Cooperative games provide particularly good means to develop
this understanding also in the selfish person. They can make it clear
to them that cooperative strategies may serve one’s own interest in a
better way than pursuing self-interest and treating others in a manipu-
lative way to achieve one’s own goals. Thus they can make the person
Monika Keller 47
understand that it is more “rational” to cooperate than to defect (e.g.

be manipulative) in social situations and to establish trust in relation-
ships. The discussion of these situations might help to transfer this
understanding to interpersonal conflict situations in which it is neces-
sary to understand and acknowledge each other’s conflicting interests,
claims and feelings in order to find mutually satisfying solutions with
which all persons involved in the situation can be content or at least
can live with.
Conclusion
I have presented an integrative approach of the development of relation-

ship understanding that includes cognitive, affective and behavioural
aspects. Based on social-cognitive theories, I have described the ability
to coordinate perspectives as a basic cognitive competence. I have also
shown how feelings and moral judgements are intimately connected
with this competence by elaborating the developmental sequence of
relationship understanding. Reasoning about morally relevant conflicts
allows for reconstructing descriptive social and prescriptive moral rea-
soning. It has further been shown that sociomoral awareness is related to
interaction and that deficits in this awareness lead to behavioural prob-
lems. The method of moral-dilemma discussion is an important means
of teaching relationship understanding and solving interpersonal con-
flicts. It is argued that friendship, as an important type of relationship in
development, is particularly suited for teaching cognitive and affective
aspects of moral awareness. However, moral discussions also have to
foster the development of moral sensitivity for those who are not so
close to the Self in order to overcome prejudice and stereotypes. The
inclusion of experimental tasks that have been developed in the field
of behavioural economics are proposed as a means to develop moral
awareness and cooperation in general, particularly for those who have
emotional deficits in this development.
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4
The Architecture of Social
Relationships and Thinking
Spaces for Growth
Introduction
Psychologists who spend a lot of time observing children know how

much effort it requires from their parents, teachers and others to help
them develop the capacity to listen, to make their own points and
desires clear, and then to find ways to negotiate perspectives and actions
that can satisfy all partners and not only their immediate wish. This
is a long way towards the managing of frustration and the discov-
ery of the world. It requires the learning of both self-control and the
understanding of social order. In doing so, individuals interiorize the
expectations and moral values of their family and group of belonging.
Under certain circumstances, they are likely to develop a critical reflec-
tion of these concepts. This social and cognitive development starts with
play and toys, personal belongings and common properties (Rosciano,
2008); includes making friends (Selman, 1980); and continues with joint
activities (Rubtsov, 1989), exploratory talk and dialogue in school situa-
tions (Mercer, 2000; Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Littleton & Howe, 2010),
group work (Schwarz et al., 2008; Howe, 2010; Tartas et al., 2010; Buchs
et al., 2013), informal spaces of cooperation (Ghodbane, 2009) and
involvement in youth based organizations (Heath, 2004). Only with
the careful training of their social and cognitive skills and with rich
“symbolic resources” (Zittoun, 2006) can young people be raised into
cooperative adults patient enough to invest time in discovering ways
to resolve their conflicts or overcome disruptive events with “imagi-
nation” (Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013) and hence to expand their futures.
51
Emotional competence develops within the cradle of emotionally secure

situations in which lessons learned from past experiences can be turned
into resources to build the future. Of course, adults have to pave the
way for that, not only by the strength of their own personalities but
also because they have experience in managing difficult situations, in
mediating conflicts, and in creating open spaces for dialogue and joint
work – issues that this chapter will address.
First, to return to the legacy of Jean Piaget and of his own Swiss mas-
ters, I will try to examine critically their present relevance. Then, in
order not to dismiss their useful contributions despite criticisms regard-
ing their limits, in line with the efforts of the other contributors to
this book, I will reconsider them within a larger theoretical perspec-
tive that not only centres on individual or interindividual processes
(as Piaget usually did) but also considers other levels of analysis, includ-
ing the embeddedness of sociocognitive processes in intergroup rela-
tions, norms, values, semiotic resources, social representations, power
and economic asymmetries. These are absent from Piaget’s perspective
but importantly structure the “architecture” of the growing children’s
environments and the meaning that events can have for them. In these
structured contexts, children are not just “interchangeable individuals”
but persons who take an active part in the construction of their own
understandings and meanings.
However, sociocultural influences extend beyond the analysis of the
child’s environment. The efforts of the researchers who try to advance
their theories and observations are equally permeated by current trends
in their scientific disciplines, by norms and representations of their
milieu, and by their own concerns. In the present case, it is interesting to
consider what the concerns are in two contexts: the present one (a con-
tribution to a book imagined in the Home for Co-operation of the UN
Buffer Zone in Cyprus in May 2011) and the past one of Piaget and his
own masters (in Geneva in the early 20th century). It is interesting to see
that they are different, and yet joined by some common lines of thought
and of commitment: a concern for peace and mutual respect even in
conflicting situations that are emotionally loaded; the role of education
in the development of mutual understanding and in particular in the
learning of conflict-management skills; and the quest for a better under-
standing of what allows knowledge-building and meaning-making. Both
contexts have in common the important dedication of researchers who,
as persons, are not only concerned with the cognitive impact of their
results but also equally interested in the consequences for society and
peace of what they learn. They take the responsibility to promote
Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont 53
actions and institutions, and to sustain such goals: intercommunity con-

tacts nowadays in Cyprus (see Psaltis, Chapter 5, this volume); and in
the past in Geneva, foundation of the Institute Jean-Jacques Rousseau1
(1912) and the International Bureau of Education2 (after the First World
War). During the 2011 meeting in the Buffer Zone of Cyprus, a zone
that is under the guard of the UN, it was impossible not to remember
that some of the active founders of the International Bureau of Edu-
cation were themselves in contact with the founders of the League of
Nations, the predecessor of the UN. It was striking also to hear how the
original ideas of Piaget had attracted the attention of a new generation
of Cypriot researchers concerned with present problems of education,
epistemology and intergroup relations, and making important theoret-
ical advancements (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Psaltis, 2012; Psaltis &
Zapiti, 2014).
The social, cultural and political context of Piaget’s study

of social relationships and psychological development
When Edouard Claparède, Adolphe Ferrière and Pierre Bovet invited

Piaget to Geneva in their newly founded institute named after Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, they were not only offering him a way to continue
his promising academic research but also expecting him to contribute
scientifically to their own project: the promotion of peace and respon-
sible citizenship via education – not any kind of education, but pro-
grammes sustaining a respectful socialization of the growing child
(Martin, 1986; Oelkers, 2008; Perret-Clermont, 2012). These intellec-
tuals were active in Geneva, the city that was hosting the Red Cross
(since 1863), the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906, 1929) at the core of
humanitarian laws, and the newly founded Society of Nations (1920).
They were themselves involved in several international organizations
sharing concerns for peace, education, development and social welfare.
Pierre Bovet had become a member of the Society of Friends, a religious
organization promoting horizontal relations of cooperation between
human beings, and non-violence, with special attention to education
and to the art of conflict mediation (on this point, see Greco Morasso,
2011, p. 149). The same Pierre Bovet was translating Baden-Powel into
French, to promote his Scouting movement – a youth-based organiza-
tion that trains young people in self-government and life skills. The
International Bureau of Education (of which Piaget was the first direc-
tor) was founded to convene ministries of education from all over the
world in order to join efforts in developing an education sustaining
citizenship and international cooperation. It is in this atmosphere and

with these concerns that Piaget and his colleagues developed their inno-
vative perspective on child development and education that is now
known internationally (Perret-Clermont & Barrelet, 2008b).
In Geneva, Claparède, Bovet and Ferrière were important protagonists
of the New Education Movement. Pierre Bovet is said to have coined the
term “active education” (Robert-Grandpierre, 2008). After the troubled
years of the First World War and the fear created by the Russian Revolu-
tion, they were concerned with the promotion of an active education
that would contribute to the development of autonomous, reflective
and responsible adults who could contribute to the construction of
world peace. They considered that teachers needed to be trained in child
development and that research, both in psychology and education,
could help to clarify the extent to which the social milieu could pro-
vide opportunities for the personal growth and proper socialization of
children. Intellectual development meant for them a capacity to develop
one’s curiosity and interests, to take initiatives, and to critically reflect
in order to depart from fearful submission to authority and ideologies.
Called to Geneva to contribute to this project, Piaget became actively
involved in empirical observations of the growing child. He formal-
ized a theory that accounts for the different steps that a child has to
go through, starting as an active but dependant toddler and ending
as a reflective, autonomous citizen. The active child is encouraged to
feel and explore, to stop and anticipate his actions (and her actions,
though Piaget never paid specific attention to gender differences), to
express his understandings and interact with others, to explore the
world with trials and errors, and to be attentive to the feedback of expe-
rience. From these basic conducts the growing child gradually learns
to deal with contradictions, to understand them not as failures of his
intelligence but as teasing his curiosity. Contradictions are not barri-
ers to his understanding but obstacles that the dynamic course of life
encourages him to jump over. The goal of education is not to repress
children’s initiatives and questions but, on the contrary, to support
them. Initiatives and questions are the “motor” of children’s constant
movement towards a better understanding of themselves, others and
the wider world. More fundamentally, this dynamic “equilibration pro-
cess” – as Piaget used to call it – not only helps the child to develop as
a “discoverer” of the world but also as a “builder” of cognitive tools
(“mental operations”) to comprehend the world. Hence the general
movement that Piaget and his colleagues describe and want to sustain is
a development from heteronomy and passive obedience to authority, to

a capacity to autonomously think of oneself, society and the world as a
concrete present occurrence of “a possibility among others”. An essen-
tial step towards the capacity to reflect on the present, anticipate the
future and understand the past is to be able to imagine alternatives
and hypothetical worlds (Harris, 2000; Zittoun, 2012). Hypothetical and
imaginative thinking frees humans from their immediate dependency
on the contingencies of the here and now, and opens the space to
critically reconsider prejudices, pseudodeterminisms, philosophies, and
“laws” of nature and of society, and to invent alternatives. Although he
would not express this very often publicly, Piaget was also a commit-
ted person, neither naïve nor only “academic”, but moved by the desire
to be an active and responsible citizen in a time of totalitarianism and
fascism (Perret-Clermont, 2008) – an awareness stemming from the spe-
cific political experience that he had gained by growing in a small and
decentralized democratic country (Piaget, 1976).
Another important legacy from the early days of Genevan psychology
is the concern for the skills of self-government reflected in Piaget’s writ-
ings about sociology and education, and particularly in those addressing
the issue of the development of moral judgement in children. Piaget
considered “cooperation” to be a central process for individual develop-
ment and for society. During the same period, the Russian psychologist
Vygotsky was researching the importance of interindividual coordina-
tion. Joint activities imply social interactions in the zone of proximal
development and common use of semiotic tools, which are essential for
the development of higher psychological processes.
However, all of these processes can occur only if children and adults
are given opportunities for cooperation. This implies raising children
with a sense of Self and a respect for Others, with opportunities to dis-
cover the “Otherness” of Others and the multiplicity of perspectives
within an environment whose architecture offers such opportunities.
Authoritarian schools based on competition and extrinsic rewards don’t
have space for such an education. Children have to experience the
benefit of coordinating efforts. Piaget liked to repeat how important
decentration from one’s own perspective is to learn to encompass the
partner’s point of view, and that it requires both social and cognitive
skills that are interdependent. His (1932) studies reported, for instance,
how taking part in collective decisions about the rules of a game pro-
vides children with an opportunity not only to get along much better
when playing together but also to have a feeling of what a rule should
be – not an arbitrary imposition by an authority against which the only

way to express oneself is to rebel, but a basic instrument of social life
(i.e. a “contract” – Piaget had Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract
in mind) that can be modified by both parties when needed. If young
people are invited to be active in setting rules, they will be given the
opportunity not only to organize their own behaviour but also to mod-
ify their social environment and society. They can then experiment, by
trial and error, with the consequences of their choices and reflect criti-
cally on them to learn to adapt their norms, expectations and contracts.
Piaget experienced this in the Friends of Nature, a youth-based organiza-
tion founded by Pierre Bovet (Vidal, 2008). Nowadays, with the intense
changes brought about by globalization, world tensions, new social
needs, nuclear catastrophes and climate change, these sociocognitive
skills are central but probably still underestimated: youth-based organi-
zations are not numerous; and school policies (as seen, for instance,
in the Programme for International Student Assessment (Rychen &
Salganik, 2003), seem to favour the basic competences of individuals
rather than the advancement of interindividual cooperation.
Piaget, after his contribution on cooperation, turned to other inter-
ests, notably his commitment to rationality as a light for humanity (see
Piaget, 1916, in which he depicts his youthful and almost mystical belief
in such a mission) and thereafter never investigated again empirically
his hypothesis about the fundamental role of cooperation. He appeared
to view cooperation as the sole explanation of whether advancement
could, or could not, take place. Present studies – for instance, on the
social mediation of disputes, show that things are not so easy. Of course,
goodwill and good faith, as well as communication, have to be presup-
posed for mediation and conflict resolution to happen. But if partners
have conflicts of interests and hence have difficulties cooperating, what
can they do and how can they be helped? How can the communicative
exchange be restored in such a way as to make it possible for long-
standing disputants to work together and build a common solution?
Greco Morasso (2011) offers a very interesting description of the setting,
and of the conversational and argumentative processes that a conflict
mediator can initiate in order to sustain adult partners in an effort to dis-
cover their common interest beyond the present conflict, and to develop
appropriate skills and attitudes to overcome breakdowns in cooperation.
Mediators make a cautious yet firm effort to scaffold the parties’ pro-
cess of regaining mutual respect and to construct a path towards their
responsible cooperation. But how does it work with children? Cooper-
ation skills are not a given but the fruit of psychological development,
education, culture and properly adjusted social frames. Cooperation is

not a state but a dynamic process. Piaget made important theoretical
pleas towards engaging children in cooperative activities but has left
wide open questions about when, how and under what conditions chil-
dren agree to cooperate in sociocognitive tasks and can learn from them.
In our present society with competition as a dominating ideology, often
students do not understand cooperative activities as possible win-win
games (Butera et al., 2006).
Piaget only minimally studied the role of cooperation. If he had con-
ducted more empirical studies, he would have had to face the limits of
his theoretical model (Piaget, 1932; Piaget and Smith, 1995) because it
considers only two extreme situations, which are quite unlikely to occur
as such:
either the adult imposing by authority his knowledge on a dependent

child. But children, even when they are in the “heteronymous stage”,
usually tend to interpret what is being said actively and in their own
way – they are not just passively appropriating the statements;
or two autonomous minds, equal in status, involved in a symmetri-

cal relationship, just discussing the correctness of their judgements
independently of any other motive, goal or power game. Yet reality
seldom provides the opportunity for such symmetrical relationships.
Minds are not just “pure minds”: they belong to individuals who
have more than just epistemic needs. They fight for their interests;
they are in search of identity, social position, and security. They
try to manage their emotions. Their goals are multiple and they are
accountable towards others in networks of solidarity.
To study real-life cooperation (and not reduce it to logics of “co-

operation” as Piaget did), the “situatedness” of social relationships
has to be considered: partners, context, cultural expectations, norms,
stakes and power asymmetries. A model of multiple “factors” (or “vari-
ables”) cannot account for it because individuals and groups are not
just manipulated by external factors or only by unconscious elements
but are also actively engaged in meaning-making and interpreting
situations. They elaborate their own meanings and these cognitive, emo-
tional or strategic understandings of what is at stake in turn modify
the situation. To approach this complexity, it is important to consider
that cooperation does not happen in a “social vacuum” (Tajfel, 1972).
In consequence, the question becomes: What architectures of social
relationships are supportive for the development of cooperative social

skills, for the development of thinking, for mature citizenship? Here,
“architecture” is a term borrowed from Rommetveit (1976), who uses it
in his studies of communication. It serves to point to the interpersonal,
institutional, cultural and conversational implicatures that prestructure
an interaction and its communication contract. We extend its use here
to encompass not only verbal acts and their intersubjectivity but any
type of interpersonal activity, including cooperation.
I will now invite the reader to further studies of this architecture by
presenting some examples of empirical research that address questions
that were left open by Piaget. I will organize them according to the four
“levels of analysis” suggested by Doise (1986; Perret-Clermont, 2004a).
Better understandings of what are the affordances of an architecture of
relationships that can promote cooperation and dialogue, can help to
document and improve formal and informal spaces intended for youth
development (Perret-Clermont, 2004b) and inspire the establishment of
new ones.
The architecture of the social relationships that allow for

shared thinking, cognitive development and cooperative
social skills
Level 1: The individual in cooperation

Piaget used to say that “operation” and “cooperation” are “two sides
of the same coin”: to cooperate means for him to operate with others,
and this entails mastering reciprocity both on the cognitive and the
social plane, one feeding the other. It would then be sufficient to under-
stand what the operatory level of the individual is to account for his
social conduct. But, as Vygotsky and cultural psychology often state, it
could also be that social coordination precedes the individual’s compe-
tence: it is then the collective practice in which the child grows up that
is gradually appropriated by the participants. Hence it is the study of
interpersonal relations and semiotic resources that can open the way to
understanding the individual’s behaviour. To take side in this Piagetian
and Vygotskian dilemma is probably similar to choosing between egg
and hen to decide which came first.
We know that an individual competence (a socioculturally acquired
individual competence) is a prerequisite to cooperation (Perret-
Clermont, 1980) as in the following example: Four-year-old children
from kindergarten were invited in dyads to share chocolate drops among
themselves in a fair way. Each dyad was composed of a non-conserving
child and a more advanced partner who was mastering conservation

of number. They were both unaware of their partner’s cognitive level.
Both children would usually engage in such a sharing activity easily. The
conservers tended to use counting when they wanted to demonstrate
that they had shared fairly. As predicted by Piaget, most non-conservers
were not really convinced that counting helped: for them the quan-
tities were changing according to the perceptual configurations of the
chocolates laid on the table. Hence the dyads had a hard time coming
to a joint decision about the fairness of the shares. But a closer look at
the results showed that there was a major difference between two types
of non-conservers: those who knew the “counting rhyme” (one, two,
three, four, five . . . ) and those who did not. The former participated in
the counting (even if they tended to keep the opinion that the quan-
tities were changing) and the latter were not capable of joining in on
the counting. Counting offered opportunities for more profitable inter-
actions because, with a closer look at the one-to-one correspondence
between the two sets of chocolate drops (reached in joint counting), the
object under discussion was more focused. As a result, the performances
in a delayed post-test of the non-conservers who could count improved,
several of them reaching full mastery of conservation. The semiotic
tool (“counting rhyme”) sustained the conversation, focused the shared
attention and helped to make more explicit what the sociocognitive
conflict was about and, as a result, facilitated some cognitive progress.
Of course, the counting rhyme is a semiotic tool that had been learned
before (within other social interactions, themselves rendered possible by
other former cognitive gains: a spiral move between cognitive and social
growth).
Hence, contrary to Piaget, we think that cognitive and social pro-
cesses scaffold each other and that there is no gain to confuse them as
“two sides of the same coin”. Social skills can be learned that will help
one to become an efficient participant in cooperative work. In return,
participating in social interactions opens the way to decentration, to
discovering other perspectives and developing more complex cognitive
tools to grasp the object under scrutiny.
Taking seriously this question of the individual competences allow-
ing for better sociocognitive exchanges, Mercer (e.g. 2000 and 2007)
offers teachers strategies to enhance the language and social skills of
their young students (taking the other into account, listening, taking
turns, rewording, asking questions for further comprehension, etc.).
Children then become capable of taking part in collective activities.
Mercer reports large cognitive gains in these programmes in which
children learn to think together. It is important to note that teachers

not only teach skills but also introduce the children into the experience
of enacting certain values: mutual respect, courage to take I-positions,
and obedience to certain rules that protect individuals by guaranteeing
space for each person. Teachers who sustain the development of such
social skills always rely on rules that frame the relationships and the
social game. Cooperation is not only a matter of individuals developing
proper social skills. In the programmes just mentioned, teachers also
intentionally promote values and rules that establish (or make more
explicit) some elements of architecture that frame the type of social
relationships that they want their students to experience.
Level 2: Interpersonal relationships

Studies both in animal ethology and in child development offer evi-
dence in favour of an interdependency between cognitive growth and
the need to maintain long-term relationships: safeguarding social rela-
tionships requires the development of proper strategies, and if these
are not only instinctual they have to be developed using psychological
means (Hinde et al., 1985). This echoes Sherif’s famous pioneering study
(also mentioned by Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 11 and Psaltis,
Chapter 5, this volume) that established how, in some cases, a new social
challenge can spur changes in cognition (Sherif et al., 1961).
Unusual events (e.g. transitions from one milieu to another, changes
in the environment, personal growth, contradictions, and clashes due
to differences of opinion) can be invitations to change reactions and
minds, especially if there is social support to do so. And this can be
observed not only in historical transitions or in designed simulations
(Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 5) but also in short-term formal set-
tings, such as tests. For instance, in revisitations of the Piagetian task
of the conservation of quantities of liquids when poured into glasses
of unequal shapes (Donaldson, 1978, 1982; Perret-Clermont, 1980;
Rijsman, 1988/2001, 2008; Light & Perret-Clermont, 1989; Muller-Mirza
et al., 2003; Sinclaire-Harding et al., 2013), it has been observed repeat-
edly how much children’s conceptual level is dependent on the meaning
that they attribute to the social context of the task and the conversa-
tion about it. Children are likely to act as conservers or non-conservers
depending on whether the talk is an abstract requirement from the
adult in an isolated face-to-face relationship or a common reflection on
a previous experience (e.g. sharing juice fairly among peers, sharing a
narrative or repairing a disrupted situation). We have observed that dur-
ing the pretest (i.e. the first conversation with the adult), some children
(especially those from the same educational milieu as the experimenter)

were progressing and others were not. The latter were likely to change
their minds later, as if the social relationship with the adult in the
pretest was not a good opportunity for them to reflect, on the spot,
here and now, on the quantities: their energy seemed to be invested
first in trying to make sense of the social components of what seemed
to them a strange conversation, with unclear requirements (Arcidiacono
& Perret-Clermont, 2010; Greco Morasso, et al., in press). How the inter-
personal relationship is established and understood is very important
for cooperation. In the example just cited, the children did not under-
stand that they had been invited to think together with the adult. They
believed that they had to give responses to questions whose aims they
did not understand. In contrast, when they were confronted with a
peer and were trying to work out how to share juice fairly with glasses
of unequal shapes, they got involved in quite different socio-cognitive
processes. These were more fruitful for their own learning.
Peers who are invited to interact on a task are not necessarily cooper-
ating in a horizontal (symmetric) relationship. In our research on joint
activity with Kohs’ cubes (Tartas & Perret-Clermont, 2008, 2012; Tartas
et al., 2010), as well as in the work of other researchers (e.g. Schubauer-
Leoni, 1990; Grossen et al., 1996; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006; Darnon,
Butera & Harackiewicz, 2007; Schwarz et al., 2008; Buchs & Butera, 2010;
Zapiti & Psaltis, 2012), very different patterns of social interactions and
of learning can be observed, depending on how the partners understand
their relative expertise, their roles, their gender status or the goal of the
“social game” in which they are involved. Some children are assertive,
some more empathic, some are careful to take their turn one after the
other (even irrespective of the advancement of the task and the errors
made), some, on the contrary, want the lead and give way only when
they obviously fail; some imitate their partners because they think they
are experts or, on the contrary, try to make them fail with the hope of
demonstrating their own superiority; some pick up a friend’s suggestion
and try it out; and others appropriate it without understanding it and,
as a consequence, “learn” errors.
Of course, fortunately, children do not always rigidly adhere to these
attitudes. For instance, observing a dyad of adolescents working together
to solve a rather difficult problem involving proportions, Schwarz et al.
(2008) found a turning point in their cooperative problem-solving pre-
cisely when one of the children, who had given up on defending his
point of view, appropriated the other’s doubt through a (momentary)
concession, relieving his peer of the burden of defending his point: this
meant for the peer the possibility of decentring without losing track of
what he was thinking or losing face, and he then moved ahead in his
thinking.
The interpersonal relationship can be facilitated by the pleasure of
working with a friend. But, from a cognitive perspective, interacting
with a best friend might not always be the most stimulating experi-
ence, because experiencing a cognitive conflict was likely to be felt as
a threat to the friendship and hence was carefully avoided (Dumont
et al., 1995). This is a “semantic barrier” quite different from the one
described by Gillepsie (Chapter 6) and yet probably with the same effect
of preventing any cognitive change. When are interpersonal relation-
ships and friendships likely to be strong and secure enough to allow
for the management of differences? When are they sufficiently pro-
tected from external pressures to permit the children to take the risk
of acknowledging and discussing disagreements? This is likely to be the
case when there is a proper “framing” of the setting and of the rela-
tionships (Goffman, 1974; Grossen & Perret-Clermont, 1992; Zittoun &
Perret-Clermont, 2009) that offers guarantees to the interactants. This
framing itself is (or is not) supported by still another frame acting as
a “frame of the frame”, itself embedded in larger social contexts (e.g.
institutions, shared cultural norms, representations and values). These
frames and their adjustment or tensions, together with the interpersonal
and intergroup relations (within and outside these frames), constitute
the architecture. For instance, Uskul (Chapter 9, this volume) shows
how social interdependence shaped by cultural attitudes and experi-
ences, and know-how towards economic and ecological requirements,
may shape social relationships in specific ways, thereby leading to
different forms of socialization in children of different milieu.
Level 3: Status and intergroup relations

Mark, six years old, conscious of being in his school’s first grade ahead of
Jenny, five years old, and asked to divide the juice with her in unequal
glasses, turns to the researcher and says: “but she will not understand!
She is much too young!” We have observed that children might feel
offended if they think that they have been paired up with a person who
is “unworthy” of their status. In order to invest in the interpersonal rela-
tionship and to care for the other’s opinion, or in order to take the risk
of identifying or granting credit to others’ perspectives, children and
young people (perhaps adults, too) need the relationship to be secure
enough to guarantee that what is at stake is not mere face-saving, a
threat to identity or a comparative assessment of respective merits. If the
interactants are embedded in intergroup relationships that invite them

to defend their positions or status, to win in a competition (Nicolet,
1995; Nicolet & Iannaccone, 2001; Darnon et al., 2006) or to adopt
negative expectations towards the other, perceived, for instance, as less
competent, it is quite probable that those worries and goals will be dealt
with in priority before any investment into cooperative thinking, even if
requested by the experimenter or the teacher who organizes the meeting
(Grossen & Perret-Clermont, 1996; Mugny & Quiamzade, 2010).
The architecture of the relationship that affords cooperation – to think
together – offers some mental and social space to deal with these issues.
A secure space allows for trust and security (see Gillespie, Chapter 6).
Sara Greco Morasso (2011) explores this question in her study of argu-
mentation in dispute mediation. She sheds light on the role of the third
party – the mediator – and on their very special status. The mediator’s
role is not that of the author of the solution, yet it is an active role – that
of rendering possible for the persons in conflict to move ahead, step by
step, discovering, one move at a time, their common interests, and the
kind of social relationship that managing them requires. The premise
on which this common good rests, and the arguments by means of
which the dispute can be resolved, have to be progressively discovered
“within the conflict”. Relying on close observation of the interactions
between the mediator and the disputants, Greco Morasso shows how
cognitive moves are possible only when a certain social space is created.
In turn, these cognitive moves themselves will enlarge the possibilities
of re-establishing proper rules in order to better cooperate within this
social space. The mediator then acts as a “guardian” (Grossen & Perret-
Clermont, 1992) of this sociocognitive space. This is possible only if
the interlocutors feel that they can be respected in their own interests
and involved towards a common superordinated goal. In research with
children conducted by Psaltis (2005a, Chapter 5, this volume), evidence
suggests similarly that an interaction with a peer can offer opportunities
for new understanding only if asserting and defending one’s own point
of view is considered to be legitimate. And this will not be the case if
social representations about the respective roles (in Psaltis’ case, gender
roles) undermine this legitimacy. This brings us to level 4 of the analysis.
Level 4: Values, norms and social representations that sustain

cooperative and productive interactions
In Greco Morasso’ s study of mediation, in Schubauer-Leoni’s studies
of the ruptures of the didactic contract, and in Grossen’s observation
of the implicit contract between subjects and researcher, a common
fundamental feature appears – that is, the importance of certain values

such as good faith, and trust in the goodwill and commitment to ratio-
nality of the partner in the argumentation. If this is not the case,
communication and relations are deeply affected and cooperation in
thinking is impossible. Grossen’s six-year-old participant at one point
stops and asks: “Is there a trick”? (Grossen, 1988). Schubauer-Leoni’s
school students feel deeply cheated because the teacher has asked them
to solve a problem (the age of the captain), which at a first glance seemed
easy but was in fact absurd (Schubauer-Leoni & Ntamakiliro, 1994).
Heath (2004), studying youth-based organizations, points to the
importance for marginalized youth to experience trust in older peers
with whom they can identify and who introduce them to framed activ-
ities (e.g. basketball, theatre) in which they are listened to. They benefit
there from a secure space to learn how to socialize, respect rules, and
take initiative and responsibilities. In such circumstances, they don’t
only act and think but also reflect on their emotions, their actions and
thoughts, exploring in new ways the external world and its relation to
their personal internal worlds, developing simultaneously their sense
of being, their higher psychological processes and their social skills.
Such open and secure spaces exist only if the rules that permit them
are obeyed and only if credible persons enforce them. The elder peers’
role is also to guard the frame. To keep with this role, these guardians of
the frame themselves have to be recognized and respected not only by
the participants but also by elements (persons with power or authority,
institutions, cultural customs) that serve as “frames of the frame” and
grant credibility to their authority according to values, norms and social
representations shared by a larger part of society.
Knowledge or skills acquired in a given frame are interesting only if
they are relevant to the given frame and also to further frames and set-
tings. The transition from one frame to the other is not only a matter
of personal adjustment but also of recognition by a larger part of soci-
ety of the similarity between the frame and hence the legitimacy of
the transfer. A young person, for instance, can be proud of achieving
a success in their youth-based organization, but even prouder to dis-
cover that their newly acquired knowledge or skill is relevant in other
settings – for instance, making friends or getting a job (Ghodbane, in
preparation). Moving from one frame to another is a transition that
solicits adjustments, with changes in identity and cognition (Zittoun &
Perret-Clermont, 2009). What will the person change and what can they
keep constant and transfer? Social markings and social representations
will influence their perception of similarities and differences among the
frames, and hence sustain or hinder transfer. And frames themselves

(often because of the institutions that back them up) are more or less
open to being negotiated or, in contrast, resistant to change. This will
depend on the power, interests and goals of the individuals and groups
that guard and defend them (Kontopodis, 2012). Frames “survive” only
if they adapt to the evolution of society, adjusting themselves in rela-
tion to other frames within the larger architecture. For frames to adapt,
it is important that the practices, norms and values that sustain them
are discussed, particularly in the face of alternative emerging stakes that
need to be dealt with (new circumstances, new comers, etc. but also the
maturation of the growing children themselves).
Conclusion
Can young people be raised to become peace-minded and skilful adults

who are patient enough and with the mature cognitive and social skills
and attitudes to sort out unavoidable conflicts of interests, social prob-
lems, disruptive ecological events or other major issues? Psychology, and
in particular social and cultural developmental psychology, has accumu-
lated increased knowledge to address this question. In the early days of
child psychology, Vygotsky was interested in the role that education
could play in the development of children in a post-revolution context,
being particularly conscious of the importance of cultural transmis-
sion. Claparède, Ferrière, Bovet and Piaget and their partners in Geneva
looked for ways to offer children alternatives to the strict authoritar-
ian education that was prevailing, and free them from the weight of
rigid cultural and educational traditions. They were looking for active
citizens of a democracy, capable of interacting in horizontal relation-
ships between equals, usefully critical of the state of science and society
in order to advance it, and happy to contribute to a dialogue between
nations in the search of peace.
In this chapter I have tried to show that, today, research relies heavily
on the contributions of these authors but offers a greater understand-
ing of the complexity of the social architecture within which thinking
takes place. Education can help children to develop sociocognitive
competencies, useful experiences, adaptive transfers, respectful relation-
ships, and skills to manage conflicts and address important problems
constructively. But education cannot be meaningful and successful with-
out considering the sociocultural context in which children take part.
It makes demands on them, it transmits specific cultural resources and
it shapes, via a series of frames, their access to relations, resources,
identities and a possibility of experiencing agency. The social milieu

of children comprises schools in which they spend a significant part
of their life. Is the architecture of schools offering students a milieu
that promotes the kind of relationships that allow for the sociocognitive
development that we would like to expect? This question would benefit
from further exploration in the light of the modern trends in research
and with an understanding of the demands, hopes and fears of life in
the 21st century in different places on Earth.
Notes
A preliminary version of this chapter, more closely related to the oral presentation
to the symposium entitled Human and Societal Development: The Role of Social
Relationships, Home for Cooperation UN Buffer Zone, Nicosia, Cyprus, on 9 May
2011, has been published in the working papers Cahiers de Psychologie et Education
(Université de Neuchâtel), 2011, 47, 7–17.
1. http://www.unige.ch/archives/aijjr/institut/.
2. http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/about-the-ibe/who-we-are/history.html.
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5
Genetic Social Psychology: From
Microgenesis to Ontogenesis,
Sociogenesis . . . and Back
Charis Psaltis
Introduction
As recently argued by Valsiner (2013, p. ix), psychology is in deep crisis

because of its success in amassing large quantities of empirical evidence
but rarely addressing the question “What for?” Valsiner refers to the life
work of the late Gerard Duveen as “a good illustration of what kind of
scholarship could bring psychology out of its crisis of limited generaliza-
tion value”, even going so far as to state that genetic social psychology,
is “the idea that will live” (Valsiner, 2013, p. ix). Moscovici (2010) states
that the work of Duveen inspired some of his writings (see Moscovici,
1990), and that Duveen “had been able to raise fundamental epistemo-
logical questions and to propose some elements of answer on which we
must reflect further” (p.2.4).
Duveen’s vision of genetic social psychology was a particular form of
social developmental psychology based on a dual commitment to think
with and against both Jean Piaget and Serge Moscovici (Duveen, 2001;
Moscovici et al., 2013). It is uniquely situated to transcend the current
fragmentation, which often resembles the well-documented effects of
ingroup/outgroup differentiation between the two subdisciplines: social
psychology and developmental psychology.
This chapter reviews and builds on two lines of research, that pro-
pose some of the building blocks of genetic social psychology. The first
explores the role of social interaction in cognitive development in the
educational context. It is directly related to the legacy of Gerard Duveen
(see Moscovici et al., 2013) and his work in Cambridge, which was
71
recently expanded upon at the University of Cyprus forming one strand

of the “third generation of research in peer interaction and cognitive
development” (Leman & Duveen, 1999; Psaltis, 2005a; Psaltis & Duveen,
2006, 2007; Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis et al., 2009; Psaltis, 2011a,
2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Zapiti, 2012; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
In a series of studies, we observed peer interaction in the educational
context of collaborative problem-solving but related these social inter-
active processes to the sociocultural and historical context of social
representations of gender, while retaining the strengths of a structural
analysis of Piagetian constructivism. This series of studies explored the
interplay of representations and identities through the articulation of
intrapersonal with interpersonal, intergroup and ideological/social rep-
resentational dynamics (Doise, 1986; Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4, this
volume), building on Piagetian insights into the role of social relations
in cognitive development (Piaget, 1932/1965) and his social psychol-
ogy (Kitchener, 2009), together with the seminal work of the Social
Genevans on peer interaction and cognitive development (Doise et al.,
1976; Perret-Clermont, 1980).
The second line of research was initiated at the Oxford Centre for the
Study of Intergroup Conflict in 2005 and it is currently being continued
at the University of Cyprus. It explores the role of social interaction in
the reduction of prejudice based on Allport’s (1954) contact hypoth-
esis and its recent developments. Here we have been exploring the
effects of social interaction (termed “intergroup contact” in the field)
between Turkish Cypriots (TCs) and Greek Cypriots (GCs) on the reduc-
tion of prejudice and the promotion of trust at different ages (Tausch
et al., 2010; Psaltis, 2012a). More recently we have also embarked on
interdisciplinary work with history educators and historians, exploring
the interplay between representations of history and contact (Lytra &
Psaltis, 2011; Psaltis et al., 2011; Psaltis, 2012a), as well as deepening
the exploration of the internal heterogeneity of social identity posi-
tions within conflicting societies as they produce and valorize cultural
artefacts as symbols of intergroup relations (Psaltis et al., 2014), or struc-
ture the oral historical accounts about life in formerly mixed villages in
Cyprus (Psaltis et al., 2014).
This chapter suggests ways in which the genetic social psychological
framework, which aims at the articulation of microgenetic, ontogenetic
and sociogenetic processes, could be applied to the field of intergroup
contact and the reduction of prejudice in the light of accumulated
evidence from these two lines of research.
Charis Psaltis 73
Genetic social psychology
In viewing social representations theory as a genetic theory, Duveen and

Lloyd (1990) argue that a genetic perspective is implied in the concep-
tion of social representations, in the sense that the structure of any par-
ticular social representation is a construction and thus the outcome of
some developmental process. Three types of transformation associated
with social representation as a process are proposed: (1) microgenesis,
which concerns the evocation and (re)construction of social represen-
tations in the microtime of social interactions; (2) ontogenesis, which
concerns the development of individuals in relation to social represen-
tations during their lifetime; and (3) sociogenesis, which concerns the
construction and transformation of the social representations of social
groups with regard to specific objects in historical time.
Microgenesis as the motor of ontogenesis and sociogenesis

People communicate in social interaction and thus social representa-
tions are evoked through the social identities asserted in the activity
of individuals. A process of negotiation and (re)construction of social
representations of Self, Other and Object is also taking place in social
interaction. From the genetic point of view, microgenesis holds a priv-
ileged and central position as it is the motor for the ontogenesis
and sociogenesis of social representations (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990).
Microgenesis can thus be seen as “the genetic process in all social inter-
action in which particular social identities and the social representations
on which they are based are elaborated and negotiated” (Duveen &
Lloyd, 1990, p.8; Psaltis, in press).
Duveen and Lloyd’s (1990) definition is focused on change as a form
of construction through sociocognitive conflict in social interaction,
but it is unique because it implicates in this process social identity
and social representations. According to this perspective, the evocation
of social representations in social interaction occurs when individuals
construct an understanding of the situation and position themselves
and their interlocutors as social psychological subjects in the field of
social representations. This process can run smoothly along the lines
of the “taken for granted” but it can also lead to ruptures (see Zittoun
et al., 2003) that cause doubt and reflection in the social psychological
subject.
The microgenesis of a social representation implies reorganization
leading to the formation of a holistic structure with a certain coherence
since the basic function of social representations is to make the unfa-

miliar familiar. Such processes of microgenesis are situated in groups
and they are reciprocally shaped by sociogenetic processes, implicating
public and mass-mediated communication within and across groups in
historical time (Wagner, 2003).
In the first line of research we did not have the chance to explore
sociogenetic processes. We instead concentrated on the links between
microgenesis and ontogenesis in childhood, exploring the interplay
between social representations of gender and the coconstruction of
new knowledge about cognitive Piagetian tasks in 6–7- and 10–11-
year-olds (see Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014 for an overview). The lack of
emphasis on sociogenetic processes in our first line of research left
us open to a critique raised by Nicolopoulou and Weintraub (2009) –
namely, that the third generation of research in peer interaction and
cognitive development did not yet offer a comprehensive sociocul-
tural framework for the study of human development. In what follows,
after presenting the first line of research, a window is opened onto
the study of sociogenetic processes through the study of longer-term
changes that take place in historical time in the context of prejudice
reduction through intergroup contact. The exploration of such historic
processes and changes became possible after the opening of check-
points on 23 April 2003 in the UN-patrolled buffer zone in divided
Cyprus.
From microgenesis to ontogenesis: The role of social identities

The social developmental approach of genetic social psychology takes
the social-psychological subject as the unit of analysis and provides
theoretical insights into the ontogenesis of social representations of
gender (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990), the relations between social represen-
tations and identities (Duveen, 1997, 2001) and empirical evidence of
the microgenesis of social representations and the importance of dis-
tinctions between varieties of communication or social interaction and
their links with forms of learning or cognitive development (Leman &
Duveen, 1999; Duveen, 2002; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007; Duveen &
Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis et al., 2009).
In this work the experimental microgenetic paradigm of the Social
Genevans is applied in order to explore how children at the age of 6–7
years old interact under conditions in which an asymmetry of gender
status is crossed with an asymmetry of knowledge about cognitive tasks
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007; Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis, 2011a;
Psaltis, in press; Psaltis, 2014; Psaltis et al., 2009). The effects of such
Charis Psaltis 75
criss-crossing of asymmetries on conversation types and on the change

of the representation of the conservation of liquids and the village
task (see Doise & Mugny, 1984) was explored (for reviews of and com-
mentaries on this work, see Simao, 2003; Ferrari, 2007; Martin, 2007;
Nicolopoulou & Weintraub, 2009; Psaltis et al., 2009; Maynard, 2009;
Castorina, 2010; Jovchelovitch, 2010; Leman, 2010; Marková, 2010;
Psaltis, 2011b; Sorsana & Trognon, 2011). In this kind of work one can
clearly see the interplay between two processes of representation: the
process of socially representing gender and the process of evoking and
actively renegotiating the representation of the cognitive task. This is a
dual opportunity for the reconstruction of knowledge of representations
of the task and of gender in social interaction. From this perspective,
both representations could be rightfully termed social representations.
Positioning in the collaborative dyadic problem-solving of a cogni-
tive task in 6–7-year-olds can be either consistent with or in conflict
with expectations about habitual, and mostly unreflective, ways of
positioning the gendered self derived from presuppositions of social
representations of gender. These are the same “presuppositions buried
under the layers of words and images”, as discussed by Moscovici (1994,
p. 168). A girl positioned as a novice by a boy asserting himself as an
expert may find this situation all too familiar, while a boy who finds
himself positioned as a novice by a girl may find that this conflicts
with his expectations of an expression of a certain traditional masculin-
ity. Indeed, this is exactly what is shown through our studies with the
empirically well-established “Fm effect” (Zittoun et al., 2003; Psaltis,
2005a, 2005b, 2011a; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007; Duveen & Psaltis,
2008; Psaltis et al., 2009; Zapiti & Psaltis, 2012; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
We have consistently found that the conflicting nature of gender status
and knowledge asymmetries in dyadic interaction of the female expert–
male novice (Fm) creates a more balanced communication between the
interlocutors. Such communication is linked with more flexible and
novel forms of knowledge, interiorization of operations and in-depth
understanding of the object under discussion. Jovchelovitch vividly
describes the “Fm effect” in Duveen (2002, p. 148), saying “what the
girls are doing is they are bringing the boys an apple, and when the
boys bite into it, it becomes new knowledge for them”. This effect
resonates with the Vygotskian method of “double stimulation”. It is
unfortunate that Vygostkian scholarship has failed to address the role of
status asymmetries in interaction and their role in the zone of proximal
development. There are many reasons for this, not least mistransla-
tion (Cole, personal communication, 5/2/2013) of the comments by
Vygotsky (1978) on Piaget’s distinction between relations of constraint

and relations of cooperation in Piaget (1932/1965) (see Psaltis & Zapiti,
2014 for an extended discussion of this point).
Another innovation of the third generation of research is the intro-
duction of a more molar level of analysis of unfolding communication
going beyond the coding of singular conversation moves towards the
coding of extended microgenetic time by distinguishing different types
of conversation or interaction types. Rather than analysing particular
speech acts or sequential patterns of speech acts, this analysis has con-
sidered the conversations across the interaction as a whole, and has
differentiated four conversation or interaction types that can be related
to different forms of social recognition between the interlocutors. For
example, in the conservation of liquids task, the following conversation
types were identified:
• Non-conserving: The non-conserving child was able to persuade

their conserving partner to agree on a wrong joint response of
non-conservation. Most of the cases took the form of passive
acceptance of the non-conserving position by the conserver.
• No Resistance: Here, conversations began with an assertion of con-
servation by the conserving child to which the non-conserving
child offered no resistance. It is thus a reverse kind of passive
acceptance compared with the previous type.
• Resistance: In these conversations the non-conserver offered an
argument in support of their position at least once during the
interaction.
• Explicit recognition: These are conversations in which the non-
conserving child gave some explicit indication that they had
grasped the idea of conservation, or even a conserving argu-
ment, forming a kind of intersubjectivity in a temporarily shared
world (Rommetveit, 1974), where both individuals became explic-
itly aware not only of the other’s perspective (metaperspective),
but also of the fact that the other’s metaperspective agreed with
their own (forming a joint metametaperspective) (see Gillespie,
Chapter 6, this volume). Such a conversation type is characterized
by a form of recognition of the original non-conserver as a think-
ing subject (Psaltis & Duveen, 2007) or an autonomous agent, and
the influence taking place here is bidirectional.
The coding of interaction at this molar level of analysis provided a

clearer and stronger pattern of relationships between this feature of
Charis Psaltis 77
the interaction and the outcome for the original non-conservers in

the post-test. Progress in the post-test was observed for almost every
child who participated in an explicit recognition conversation (Psaltis &
Duveen, 2006), but never for those from non-conserving conversations.
And while about half of the children from no resistance and resistance
interactions made progress in the post-test, they did so without produc-
ing any novelty in that test. Novelty was almost exclusively observed
in the post-tests of children who had participated in explicit recognition
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2006).
On the contrary, in incorrect answer and no resistance there appeared
to be at play a form of instrumental recognition where one of the partners
was relegated by the Other to an object that either just filled in the slots
offered by the other or was not taken into account at all. The influence
was unidirectional. Finally, resistance seemed to be a form of categorical
recognition where there was a limit to the unidirectional influence that
could be achieved by the Other due to their social category membership.
Most of these studies had 6–7-year-old Greek Cypriot elementary
school students as their subjects. However, children of different ages
reconstruct and enact social representations of gender differently
(Leman, 2010), and for this reason the research programme has recently
expanded towards exploring the same questions with older children
of 10–11 years (Zapiti, 2012; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014) and adolescents
(Psaltis, Panayi & Zapiti, in preparation) in Piagetian formal operational
tasks. The corresponding findings in older children of both 10–11 and
14–15 years confirm the existence of the “Fm effect” and the same links
between the four conversation types and progress. However, prelimi-
nary evidence suggests that in older children, gender identity dynamics
are no longer detectable in social interaction but only in the individual
internalized dialogue in the post-interaction period.
Having already explored the contours of a model of transition from
pre-operational to operational thought in children through the study of
varying forms of communication, such processes could be expanded to
produce a more general model of the role of social relations and commu-
nicative forms (Duveen, 2002; cf. Castorina, 2010; Jovchelovitch, 2010;
Leman, 2010; Psaltis, 2012b, 2012c) in the transition from representa-
tions of belief to representations of knowledge1 in the public sphere (see
Moscovici, 1998/2000) and sociogenetic processes. One field of research
that affords the exploration of sociogenetic processes in historical time
is that of conflict transformation in societies, and changing represen-
tations of conflict and its roots. In this sense the Cypriot context of a
divided and post-conflict society is an ideal setting for the expansion
of these ideas into an exploration of sociogenetic processes, especially

the contact between members of the two communities that was made
possible in divided Cyprus after the partial lifting of travel restrictions
in 2003.
Intergroup contact and the reduction of prejudice

in Cyprus
This second line of research relates to the exploration of social interac-

tion as the motor of sociogenetic changes in relation to societal change.
In situations of intergroup conflict it is well known that divisive social
representations in the conflicting societies are characterized by nega-
tive stereotypes, prejudice and distrust. Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005), for
example, argue that an infrastructure of conflict is often found in pro-
tracted conflicts that consists of shared societal beliefs about the ethos of
the conflict, collective memory and emotional collective orientations.
These beliefs are the result of conflict but at the same time they
could cement or even further escalate conflict if they were to become
polemical representations since then they would become a fine exam-
ple of what Moscovici (1998/2000, p. 136) calls social representations
“whose kernel consists of beliefs which are generally more homogenous,
affective, impermeable to experience or contradiction, and leave little
scope for individual variations”. The example of the official or master
narratives of history promoted by the educational system under such
conditions showcases these characteristics (Makriyainni & Psaltis, 2007;
Carretero, 2011).
So a major question that arises from a conflict-transformation per-
spective concerns how such representations can be transformed into
social representations, that Moscovici describes as being “founded on
knowledge”, “which are more fluid, pragmatic, amenable to the proof
of success or failure, and leave a certain latitude to language, experience,
and even to the critical faculties of individuals” (Moscovici, 1998/2000,
p. 136).
One of the most prominent and influential approaches in the field
of intergroup relations has been the work on “contact hypothesis” pro-
posed by Gordon Allport (1954). The notion of cooperation is found in
Allport’s2 contact hypothesis as one of the necessary conditions for con-
tact to take place that would lead to societal change through prejudice
reduction between conflicting groups. In his book The nature of prejudice,
he hypothesizes that contact between members of different groups with
a history of conflict, mistrust and prejudice could lead to the reduction
of prejudice provided that four conditions are met. In his words,
Charis Psaltis 79
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the indi-

vidual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and
minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly
enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e.
by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that
leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity
between members of the two groups.
(Allport, 1954, p. 281)
More recent empirical research on intergroup contact has not only

verified Allport’s hypothesis (Hewstone & Brown, 1984; Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000; Pettrigrew & Tropp, 2006) but also explored when con-
tact works and why it does. Researchers have tried to do this by testing
linear models of causality from contact to the reduction of prejudice
or promotion of trust through the mediating role of a host of vari-
ables, such as the reduction of intergroup anxiety, the reduction of
feelings of threat (realistic and symbolic) (Stephan & Stephan, 1985),
perspective-taking and categorization.
Intergoup contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish

Cypriots in Cyprus
This research programme comprises more than 20 studies in total
that are currently summarized in the form of a meta-analysis (Psaltis
& Ioannou, in preparation). The studies cover children aged 9 years
and over, and they follow various methodologies: cross-sectional ques-
tionnaire large-scale surveys (Tausch et al., 2010; Psaltis et al., 2011;
Lytras & Psaltis, 2011; Psaltis, 2012a), longitudinal (Psaltis & Lytras,
2012) and qualitative (Psaltis, Beydola, et al., 2014; Psaltis, Cabrera et al.,
2014).
Ontogenetically, there is evidence that prejudice in the GC commu-
nity becomes established from early childhood, first by towards Turks,
and indirectly and only later towards TCs (Makriyianni, 2006). The lev-
els of prejudice of 12-year-olds towards TCs stay more or less the same
up to the age of 15, with only a slightly decreased tendency after that
with further reduction during the university years. The general trend is
that half of the children have negative feelings (although only about
10–15 percent show extreme negative feelings), about one-third show
neutral feelings and about 20 percent show positive feelings (rising to
30 percent for 15 years and over).
More interesting, however, is the relationships between forms of iden-
tification and prejudice for these age groups. Children, even up to
10–11 years of age, often have difficulties with multiple classifications
when it comes to abstract categories such as dual national identity.

In Cyprus, Makriyianni (2006) found that GC pupils had a problem con-
ceptualizing the dual identity of a “Greek Cypriot” and of a “Turkish
Cypriot”.
About 20–30 percent of 12-year-olds identify with the dual identity
(GC) while most (55–60 percent) prioritize their superordinate identity
(Cypriot). The feeling of pride associated with the dual identity (GC)
at this age is, however, negatively related to identification with the
superordinate category of Cypriot. Pride in being a GC is also linked
with prejudice towards TCs and other groups (Kapetaniou, 2013). But
this functional relationship between national identification with the
dual identity and prejudice is only found at age 12 and re-emerges at
age 15, when a sense of continuity with the Greek nation, often accom-
panied by adherence to the motto of extreme right-wing circles that
“Cyprus is Greek”, is incorporated into the definition of GC identity
for these individuals. In line with this is the finding that 10–15 percent
of children who show extreme negative feelings towards TCs and Turks
often entertain exclusive forms of identification and prioritize Greekness
over Cypriotness, identifying with the term “Greek”.
The dominance of rather negative feelings towards TCs is also
reflected in the ingroup norms of children regarding friendships with
TCs. When 12–15-year olds were asked whether their friends would sup-
port and approve of them having a TC friend, most responded that their
friends would disapprove of this move. Such norms, to an extent, reflect
the ideological struggles and political party positions concerning the
strategies for resolving the Cyprus issue and the attitudes of teachers
themselves who are often ambivalent (Zembylas, 2011), if not outwardly
hostile, to the idea of promoting intergroup contact in the educational
system (Psaltis, in press).
Nevertheless, all studies covering children aged 9 and over demon-
strate that contact in Cyprus has had a positive effect not only for the
reduction of prejudice between the two communities, but also for the
promotion of trust, with mean effect sizes comparable to the ones pre-
sented by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) for various parts of the globe. The
quality of contact in all studies is one of the stronger predictors of both
prejudice reduction and increase in trust.
In all of our studies we used a measure of quality of contact that
comprised both a dimension of symmetry-asymmetry of perceived sta-
tus and a dimension of positivity-negativity of contact. As expected,
the dimension of positivity-negativity significantly correlates with
the dimension of symmetry-asymmetry, and often items from both
Charis Psaltis 81
dimensions load on the same factor in factor analysis. Thus the Piagetian
distinction between relations of cooperation and relations of constraint
is very relevant for this field, as predicted by Allport (1954).
Importantly, research showed that politically oriented ideological
positions that are historically rooted in the ideological struggles and
nationalist aspirations of the two communities, which see Cyprus as
part of Greece (called Hellenocentrism) and Turkey for TCs (discussed in
the Cyprus problem literature as Turkocentrism) (see Peristianis, 1995)
were consistently positively related to prejudice and distrust in both
communities after the age of 15.
These orientations sometimes moderate the effects of intercommunal
contact (the quantity and quality of contact) on the reduction of prej-
udice in adults. But interestingly, when such moderations take place,
they go in the opposite direction in the two communities. In the GC
community, the direction of moderating effects depends on the age and
characteristics of the sample. Sometimes those with Cypriocentric ori-
entations and supporters of federation, or the view that Cyprus is a
common country for both GCs and TCs, show greater transformation
of their prejudice levels since they show more prejudice reduction com-
pared with GCs with more Hellenocentric orientations or those rejecting
the idea of a federal solution to the Cyprus issue. In contrast, in the
TC community, whenever the effects of contact are moderated, they
indicate that the more Turkocentric and resistant they are to the ideal
of a federal or a unitary state, the more they show prejudice reduc-
tion due to contact (Psaltis & Ioannou, in preparation), which resonates
with recent findings by Hodson (2011) that more “hawkish” individuals
benefit more from contact compared with “doves”.
All of these findings lead to three conclusions. Firstly, it is not possible
to extract a general universal model of contact that reduces prejudice
when it comes to understanding the moderating effects of contact with
ideological positions. Secondly, such moderating effects seem to vary,
depending on the age of the participants. Thirdly, there is a need to
explore both contact effects and the social representations of contact,
and in particular whether contact is valourized, stigmatized or promoted
by the governmental policy and parties or not, as originally proposed by
Allport (1954).
Having said this, as already noted in the meta-analysis by Pettigrew
and Tropp (2006), the present findings support the argument that con-
tact is quite resilient to the moderating effects discussed above since
in the majority of the studies there is no moderation by ideological
orientation of contact effects on prejudice reduction. It needs to be clear
that the moderating effects that sometimes emerge are of a nature that
suggests reduction or augmentation of the transformative potential, and
in no case did we find contact leading to an increase in prejudice or
hardening of positions.
Theoretically it is worth exploring further the counterintuitive mod-
erating effects in the TC community that suggest the existence of a
“sociocognitive conflict” effect. Generally, TCs have been led for many
years by nationalist leaderships to think that they cannot live together
with GCs, because GCs want to suppress and even annihilate them.
So usually the views of TCs about GCs are rather negative, accompa-
nied by a lot of mistrust (Psaltis, 2012a). Also, many TCs feel that GCs
look down upon them, so with the backdrop of these expectations any
positive or even neutral contact would comprise a positive violation of
expectations. In contrast, in the case of GCs, and despite the somewhat
negative feelings about TCs and high levels of distrust, the official dis-
course has been that “we have always lived in peace with TCs and we
can do it again”, or “we have no problem with TCs, the problem is occu-
pation by Turkey” (see Psaltis et al., 2014). In this light we should not
expect a great violation of expectations in the case of GCs when a pos-
itive or even neutral contact does take place. Another possibility to be
explored by future research is that TCs are more reflective of the ideolog-
ical struggles concerning history in their community since TC teachers
are rather anti-nationalist (see Psaltis et al., 2011) and thus reflective
of the “naïve realism” position of their official narrative. In Israel such
awareness was recently found to make subjects with hawkish positions
more open to positive change (Nasie et al., 2014).
Representations of the past and intergroup contact

The meanings described above usually have a direct connection to the
past. So it becomes obvious that more attention needs to be paid to
the relationship between social representations of history and how they
relate to intergroup contact. This is an innovative turn in the field
since it brings the study of social representations of history within
the purview of contact theory, breaking new ground, and it resonates
with ongoing discussions in the field of history teaching in relation to
national identity (see Carretero, 2011), as well as recent research on
the relationship between official historical narratives, collective mem-
ory and prejudice in post-conflict societies (see Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006;
Nasie et al., 2014).
As predicted, intergroup contact in many cases from adolescence
onwards was an opportunity for the transformation of social
representations of the past. The changes went in two directions:
Charis Psaltis 83
• First was the direction of decentring, to the extent that the revised
views reduced the rejection of ideas from the official viewpoint of
the other community and showed increased empathy with regard to
the victimization of the other community.
• The second kind of change concerned those that supported a more
anti-imperialist discourse for TCs and the reduction of a sense of con-
tinuity of Hellenism in Cyprus in the case of GCs, which is more
characteristic of a leftist discourse in both communities of Cyprus.
Longitudinal, cross-lagged analyses also suggest that accumulated

contact can reduce adherence to the historical narrative six months
later. In addition, adherence to the official narrative was predicting
reduced quality of contact six months later, which is in line with the
more general findings regarding the vulnerability of quality of contact
in relation to various variables that are usually explored as outcomes
rather than predictors of contact (e.g. prejudice, trust, the wish to live
with the other community).
Such findings suggest a spiral of societal change and stability. On a
positive spiral of change, prolonged and good-quality intergroup con-
tact reduces adherence to official narratives, which in turn enhances the
quality of future intergroup contacts. The corresponding negative spi-
ral is that of adherence to the official narrative, reducing the quality of
contact, which probably further reduces the possibilities for revision of
the official narrative during social interaction. The latter negative spiral
seems to become more likely with strategic use of contact as a weapon
against reconciliation; on the contrary it becomes less likely if individ-
uals are helped to reflect on the naïve epistemological bases of official
historical narratives (cf. Nasie et al., 2014).
In order to explore the role of representations of history as forma-
tive influences on intergroup relations, we created a new variable which
captured adherence to the official historical narrative of the commu-
nity because this is usually depicted in the history textbooks, and then
tested its effects on prejudice reduction, trust-building and the wish to
live again with members from the other community in a representa-
tive sample taken from former inhabitants of mixed villages of both
communities.
We also tested the following as possible mediators: symbolic threat
(Stephan & Stephan, 1986), group esteem threat and intergroup anx-
iety (Lytra & Psaltis, 2011). The results for the GC community were
very clear. Adherence to the official historical narrative was inflating the
feeling of threat and anxiety, which in turn resulted in a reduction in
trust, the wish to live together again with the other community and an
increase in prejudice towards TCs.
In the TC community the results for representations of the past were

largely unrelated to all of the aforementioned variables but this prob-
ably has to do with the special and symbolically strategic nature of
mixed villages for TCs, which is discussed later.3 The amount of current
contact with members from the other community and past friendships
in the village, on the contrary, was significant in predicting a reduc-
tion in threats and anxiety, and through these routes the promotion
of trust, the wish to live together with members of the other commu-
nity as well as prejudice reduction. This latter finding applied to both
communities.
Further research using a representative sample from both commu-
nities (Psaltis & Lytras, 2012) tested a comprehensive Structural Equa-
tion Model in which the quantity of contact and adherence to the
official narrative were predictors, and realistic threat, collective group
esteem and intergroup anxiety were mediators that in turn predicted
trust and prejudice. All of these mediators then predicted the wish to
live again with members of the other community. The models worked in
exactly the same way in both communities, which in effect implies that
contact and adherence to official narratives work in antagonistic ways.
In the same study we tested cross-lagged associations between a number
of predictors (quantity of contact, quality of contact and adherence to
the official narrative) and outcomes (prejudice, trust, wish to live with
members of the other community). The results for the GC community
suggested direct paths from all predictors to all outcomes.
However, in the case of quality of contact it was clear that recip-
rocal models were better at representing the data. This resonates with
the strategic valourization of contact in the GC community that appar-
ently reduces the quality of contact, as would be predicted by Gillespie’s
(Chapter 6, this volume) notion of semantic barriers to contact. For TCs
there were direct paths from quantity of contact to all outcomes, and
a reciprocal model in the case of a wish to live with GCs, which again
resonates with the strategic reduction in the value of contact by those
not wishing to live together with GCs in mixed areas.
One of the important extensions of the work on intergroup contact
is what has recently been called exploration of the secondary transfer
effects (STEs) of intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 2009) and the medi-
ating processes through which it takes place. The STE refers to the
phenomenon in which the beneficial effects of contact with a pri-
mary outgroup are generalized to other outgroups that are uninvolved
in social interaction that is perceived as similar to the primary out-
group. This work is important for societal change because it is also
Charis Psaltis 85
supported by a mediating process of extending the ethical horizon of

the ingroup to encompass a more inclusive complex and multicultural
view of society and a less provincial view of the world (Pettigrew, 2009).
Indeed, in a comparative piece of research (see Tausch et al., 2010)
with data from Cyprus, Northern Ireland and the USA, we were in a
position to identify for Cyprus both deprovincialization and attitude
generalization from the primary to secondary outgroup as mediators
of STEs.
Theoretical implications for contact research and extensions

As in the case of the first line of research described earlier, it appears that
there is more need for attention to the alignment or conflict of actual
positions taken in social interaction and expectations keep furnished at
the social representational level. This hypothesis of sociocognitive con-
flict between the actual and the expected as having a transformative
role in social interaction is thus worthy of further exploration and
points to the need to study the content of representations, as suggested
by Gillespie (Chapter 6). Another suggestion by Gillespie in this vol-
ume is the exploration the role of meta- and metametaperspectives in
intergroup contact. For example, we found that when GCs believed that
TCs thought of them with contempt (a metaperspective), then contact
was not having any effect on them, and this was found to apply only to
GC women. This is probably due to the existence of stereotypes of TCs
having traditional patriarchal views about gender equality that would
make GC women particularly defensive.
In special populations in both communities that see themselves as
guardians of a national cause and of the official historical narrative
(a number of GC teachers and TC inhabitants of formerly mixed vil-
lages), we found evidence of a strategic conception of contact being
evoked. For example, GC teacher trade unions back in 2009 sent a cir-
cular that forbade headteachers from accepting visits from students and
teachers of TC schools, as they saw it as a form of indirect recognition
of the internationally non-recognized state in the occupied areas. Simi-
larly, TC former inhabitants of mixed villages in their vast majority do
not want to live in mixed areas in the future (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011). As a
result they are particularly strategic in avoiding offering descriptions of
good-quality intercommunal relations of the past in their villages in
oral history accounts (Psaltis et al., 2014). And when they accept that
such relations did exist they usually follow a strategy of dissociating the
importance of good intercommunal relations for a future solution of the
Cyprus issue.
In short, the more strategic people become in their metathinking

about contact, the more likely it is that they could employ what
Gillespie calls “semantic barriers” to inoculate themselves and others
from the transformative effects of contact. Still, even in the context of
such populations in Cyprus, we found that contact does reduce preju-
dice. The dissociation concerns the relationship between adherence to
the official narrative and prejudice, not the relationship between con-
tact and prejudice. This finding suggests an instrumental and superficial
adherence to the official narrative, as a thin layer of beliefs as Piaget
(1932/1965) would argue, mastered but not appropriated, which was
not consequential for their attitudes towards members of the other
community since many participants just paid lip service to the official
narrative without having internalized or functionally integrated it into
their thinking.
Questions raised from the genetic social psychological

perspective
On the whole the findings of both lines of research advocate a more

socioculturally situated understanding of the transformation of repre-
sentations through the articulation of microgenetic, ontogenetic and
sociogenetic processes. This is the vision of genetic social psychology as
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. From this perspective, cur-
rent social developmental theories that attempt to explain prejudice are
overly focused on either the projection of cognitive developmental the-
ories on the understanding of the development of prejudice (Aboud,
1988; Bigler & Liben, 2007) or the application of classical social psy-
chological theories, such as that of Social Identity Theory in children
(Nesdale, 2004). These approaches can be criticized for a number of rea-
sons: (1) they leave the “black box” of social interaction unopened and
they are thus “non-developmental”, to use Valsiner’s (2013) expression;
(2) they are premised on the cognitivist reading of Piagetian theory as
individualist and stage theorist (Hsueh, 2009), systematically downplay-
ing the social psychology of Piaget (Kitchener, 2009; Psaltis & Zapiti,
2014); and (3) they do not recognize the socioculturally situated and
emergent nature of self and agency through the dual process of identi-
fication and being identified, as well as the role of resistance (Duveen,
2001).
The need to revisit Piaget and Weil’s (1951) work

The genetic social psychological framework raises the need for some
fundamental rereading of Piaget (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014), since Aboud’s
Charis Psaltis 87
(1988) reading of Piaget and Weil (1951) in terms of the ontogenesis of

prejudice (which influenced all subsequent researchers) suppressed the
social psychological theory of Piaget, and extracted only the structural-
ist aspects of his theory (ethnic constancy from conservation, multiple
classification from class inclusion, the shift away from egocentrism to
more decentred views). But for Piaget and Weil (1951), gradual devel-
opment was constantly exposed to deviations relating to the mode of
social relations that the children were engaged in (relations of con-
straint or relations of cooperation). It was only through the latter that
a norm of reciprocity could emerge. However, Piaget and Weil (1951)
themselves were silent regarding the varying forms that such social
relationships could take depending on the hostile or friendly rela-
tions between groups as the children went on to late childhood and
adolescence.
Social relations within the ingroup (contact with a close circle of
ingroup members) could have different consequences for norms com-
pared with contact with both ingroup members and strangers of the
ingroup, or even strangers from outgroups, not to mention the enemy
“other”. Social norms developed by the group, under conditions of
intergroup tension and conflict, are expected to be different from the
norms developed under cooperative conditions between groups. The
way in which an individual conforms, resists, internalizes or interior-
izes social relations with both ingroup and outgroup members needs to
be better understood.
It is possible, for example, that explicitly expressed prejudicial views
in early childhood will not be consequential for social interaction
(Nesdale, 2004). On the contrary, implicit measures might be more pre-
dictive of social interaction and exclusionary behaviour. Such implicit
forms of prejudice, as in the case of gender, could be formed quite
early, premised on a very simple binary distinction between ingroup
and outgroup that is at the same time valourized, which is the figura-
tive nucleus of the social representations of gender in younger children
(Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). At the same time it is possible that specific
forms of conversation types (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006) taking place dur-
ing intergroup contact could be differentially related to the reduction in
implicit or explicit measures. Thus there is certainly a need for compli-
cated experimental designs of the form of pretest, interaction with both
immediate and delayed post-tests and control groups (and both implicit
and explicit measures of prejudice) so that transient and superficial
changes can be disentangled from more permanent and more gener-
alizable prejudice reduction of both kinds of prejudice and in different
age groups.
The need to understand identity as the dual process

of identification and being identified
Identity is not only about identification but also about being identified
(Duveen, 2001; Psaltis, 2012a). In this sense the relational aspects of
contact and stereotypes (see literature on metastereotypes, Shelton &
Richeson, 2006; West & Dovidio, 2012) also need to be considered. For
example, it is worth exploring not only the perspective of the research
subject on the quality of contact, but also their metaperspective of the
assumed evaluation of contact by their partner in social interaction and
their metametaperspective that concerns what they make of the other’s
interpretations of their own evaluations of contact.
What we have identified in the third generation of research is that
different conversation types incorporate varying forms of recognition of
Self by Other (e.g. “instrumental” or as a “thinking subject”) (Psaltis &
Duveen, 2006) and resistance. Such forms of recognition and resistance
might not be reflected upon in the same manner across ages and them-
selves refer to different orders of reflection. We have argued in the past
that social representations of gender might not be reflectively thema-
tized in the interaction of 6–7-year olds, but older children do become
capable of such reflection (Zittoun et al., 2003; Martin & Gillespie,
2010; Psaltis, 2012b). This suggests that identity threats evoked in social
interaction based on metastereotypes might not be present for younger
children but only for older children, if not only for adolescents, so
future research needs to explore the level of reflection on the quality
of social interaction and its consequences for prejudice reduction at
different ages.
The need to acknowledge the complex interplay of varying

sources of asymmetry in social interaction
The dynamics of communication in cross-ethnic interactions are
expected to be influenced not only by the belonging of a child to a
group, by their partner’s belonging to the same or a different group or
by the asymmetry of knowledge on the task that they are working on,
but the interaction of all of these factors that bring to the surface the
opposite dynamics emerging from the conflicting or, on the contrary,
aligned nature of asymmetries of status and knowledge in cross-group
social interactions (see Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007; Psaltis & Zapiti,
2014). Such complex experimental dyadic designs will not only greatly
advance our understanding of the differential impact of contact on
both majority and minority members (cf. Levy & Killen, 2008), but also
allow questions such as: When an interlocutor improves their attitude
Charis Psaltis 89
towards the other, what happens to the partner? This kind of design will
also allow for the use of dyadic models and analysis such as the Actor-
Partner Interdependence Model that was previously used in the first line
of research (Psaltis, 2005a; Zapiti, 2012) and that is now starting to be
applied in the field of intergroup contact (West & Dovidio, 2012).
To sum up, there is a need to conceptualize intergroup contact as
a complicated form of communication in the triad of Subject-Object-
Other (Zittoun et al., 2007). In this triad, any link between the compo-
nents can become an element of reflection or sociocognitive conflict,
and it is such moments of reflection that become opportunities for
reconfiguring the whole triadic configuration – in other words, the
transformation of a social representation.
Notes
1. Moscovici’s (1998/2000, p. 136) distinction is between a) social representa-
tions “whose kernel consists of beliefs which are generally more homogenous,
affective, impermeable to experience or contradiction, and leave little scope
for individual variations” and b) social representations founded on knowledge
“which are more fluid, pragmatic, amenable to the proof of success or failure,
and leave a certain latitude to language, experience, and even to the critical
faculties of individuals” and clearly relates back to his social influence model
of minority influence and through that to Piaget’s (1932; 1967/1995) social
psychological model of relations of constraint vs. relations of cooperation.
2. It is worth noting that Allport was only a year younger than Piaget; he
had travelled in Berlin in 1922 and Cambridge in 1923, and he also visited
Freud and he must have met Piaget at least twice: firstly when Piaget was
awarded his first honorary doctorate at Harvard in 1936, and then in 1960
when Piaget was invited to Harvard by Jerome Bruner to give a talk. Jerome
Bruner (1983) recalls that in the 1940s at Harvard, “We all knew about Piaget.
I cannot remember a time when I didn’t!” The extent to which Allport appre-
ciated Piaget’s work is questionable, though, since as the Chairman of the
Department of Psychology at Harvard in 1935 he did not nominate Piaget for
the honorary doctorate. Rather, the nomination came from members of the
central executive committee for the honorary degrees that comprised a mul-
tidisciplinary group that was closely affiliated with the work of Elton Mayo
and the human relations movement in the Harvard Business School and their
work on the Hawthorn experiments (see Hsueh, 2009).
3. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the same variable was found
to predict all of the variables of the model in a representative sample of the
whole TC community (Psaltis & Lytras, 2012).
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Part II
Social Relations and Conflict
Transformation: Intergroup
Contact and Reflection
6
Non-Transformative
Social Interaction
Alex Gillespie
Introduction
How do people protect themselves from being transformed or changed

through social interaction? While we often assume that changes
brought about through social interaction are positive, leading to human
and societal development, it is also the case that people can feel threat-
ened and thus resist change. Moreover, in contemporary societies, peo-
ple are confronted by such a bewildering variety of perspectives that one
could argue that stability is more of a problem for research than change
itself (Gergen, 1991; Grossen et al., 2011). The aim of this chapter is to
analyse the semiotic mechanics of resisting the transformative potential
of social interaction.
Ichheiser (1943) pointed out that to understand social interaction
we need to understand not only what each party thinks about them-
selves and the Other, but also what each thinks the Other thinks of
them. That is to say, we approach the Other not only from within our
own perspective but also with assumptions about their perspective. How
might these metaperspectives (Laing et al., 1966) mediate the process of
interaction? The main argument elaborated here is that distrusting the
Other, representing them as untrustworthy or suspecting that they have
a malevolent intent (i.e. a meta-perspective) effectively shuts down the
possibility of a transformative social interaction.
I will start with a brief review of research on the contact hypothesis
and draw out three criticisms. First, the literature has sought an essen-
tialist theory of contact and thus neglected the broader context in which
any social interaction is embedded. Second, it has focused upon statisti-
cal averages while neglecting the microgenetic possesses through which
representations are transformed (or not transformed). Third, although
97
98 Conflict Transformation
it is recognized that successful contact should change representations

of Self and Other, the actual meaning (i.e. content) of these represen-
tations has been ignored. The second half of the chapter attempts to
move beyond these criticisms by advancing some ideas as to how we can
study the process and content of interacting representations of Self and
Other. The focus is on the processes which facilitate and inhibit change
through contact. The concept of “semantic barriers” will be introduced
to theorize how representing the Other as untrustworthy can protect the
Self from a transformative encounter with the Other.
Points of contact: Context, process and content
It is often assumed that social interaction and dialogue can overcome

disagreements and even intergroup conflict. However, since Gordon
Allport’s (1954) demonstration that groups living side by side tend to
be more hostile to each other than groups living further apart, there has
accumulated a huge amount of evidence which challenges the simplis-
tic idea that contact alone can overcome conflict. Allport recommended
that contact could be beneficial if the people in contact were of equal
status, if they shared a common goal, and if the contact were supported
by norms and laws.
His initial questioning of the contact hypothesis has burgeoned into
a substantial field of research, repeatedly demonstrating that contact
through social interaction is no simple solution to conflict, only work-
ing under certain conditions (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2006). One key finding is that for contact to be beneficial, the
group members must meet each other as representatives of each group,
with group identities being salient rather than personal identities. This
categorization is important because it means that when behaviour that
is inconsistent with the group stereotype occurs, it has a chance to
change the group stereotype (Rothbart & John, 1985). It also helps when
there is a superordinate goal (Sheriff, 1958) which preserves each group’s
distinctiveness (Brewer, 1996). The literature also shows that the suc-
cess of contact varies with individual differences, frequency of contact,
forms of institutional support, the degree to which people volunteer
for the contact, the extent of stereotyping, the extent of disconfirm-
ing behaviour, the degree to which the contact is direct or indirect, the
degree to which the contact is superficial or intimate, and the extent to
which the contact is face to face in contrast with being mass mediated.
Important effects have also been found for the type and extent to which
alternative categorizations are made salient, such as superordinate and
Alex Gillespie 99
mixed categorizations. And some researchers have recommended that

the enabling conditions should be broadened to include a common
language and a prosperous economy (Wagner & Machleit, 1986).
While this accumulation of research, qualifying and extending
Allport’s initial propositions about the contact hypothesis, could be
interpreted as rapid scientific advance, it is also possible that it is
indicative of a problem. Newell (1973) has argued that psychology is
prone to producing fragmented lists of findings because the method-
ologies employed, especially experimental methods, are suited to “hair-
splitting” research – that is, always further breaking findings down into
subconditions (i.e. does the finding work under this condition, with that
population or this age group). Indeed, this point about the failure to pro-
duce a substantial and generalizable conception of what contact is has
been pointed to by Pettigrew (1998; see also Gillespie, 2012).
Pettigrew (1998) identifies four criticisms, two of which I want to
highlight and further elaborate. I will also add to these two my own
third criticism (Gillespie, 2012). Taken together, these three criticisms
will lay the foundation for an approach to studying dialogue and
contact as a semiotic and dialogical phenomenon.
Context
Pettigrew (1998, p. 69) criticizes the literature on the contact hypothesis
for having become “an open-ended laundry list of conditions – ever
expandable and thus eluding falsification”. The problem is that new
studies keep turning up new situational factors for optimum contact, in
part because the previously assumed set of factors proved to be ineffec-
tual. Thus variables are added based on empirical evidence. But adding
variables weakens the theory at a conceptual level. Each new variable
explains why the basic mechanism (contact) does not work in this or
that particular case. That is to say, the ever-growing list of qualifications
begins to make the basic idea unfalsifiable. Moreover, contact can also
be beneficial when only some of the so-called conditions are met. That
is to say, most of the variables identified are important only sometimes.
Pettigrew’s proposed solution is to distinguish between facilitating fac-
tors and essential conditions. Thus there would emerge a core set of
variables which would be seen to be essential for contact to reduce prej-
udice, and these would be complemented by a secondary set of variables
which would enhance the effects of contact but which would not be
seen to be essential.
Pettigrew’s (1998) suggestion that we need to distinguish essen-
tial conditions from facilitating factors assumes that there is a
context-independent and fundamentally invariant structure of benefi-

cial contact which can be abstracted out of/from the varieties of possible
forms of contact. But what are the grounds for assuming a set of
context-independent “essential” conditions underlying successful con-
tact? These so-called essential conditions are never empirically evident
in isolation. Indeed, one could argue that context is the only essential
factor because no interaction is possible outside a context. Maybe what
is essential in one context might not be essential in the next. If one
accepts Pettigrew’s argument and values abstract knowledge over con-
textual “noise”, then one risks privileging abstract knowledge over local
knowledge and quantitative knowledge over qualitative knowledge (for
the same problem in health psychology, see Cornish & Gillespie, 2009).
Accordingly, I argue that it is not the commonalities across the empiri-
cal studies which are most important; rather, the key lies in that which
is particular to each context.
For example, one of the defining particularities of the distrust in the
relation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is that the violent
conflict occurred almost 40 years prior to the opening of the check-
points which made the possibility for contact possible (Psaltis, 2012a).
For decades after the conflict there was almost no contact between
the two sides. This longstanding segregation between north and south
Cyprus means that there is little ambiguity about defining the groups.
The problems of distrust, in the Cypriot context, are largely a function
of the fact that parallel systems of governance, media and education
have evolved, each of which sustains a divergent perspective on the
issue. But in other contexts, such as Northern Ireland, contact was com-
mon. Unionist and Republican communities lived, and still live, in close
proximity, often working side by side. In the Northern Ireland context,
people learned how to hide their political leanings, such that there could
be everyday contact without it being framed in intergroup terms, and
thus without intergroup contact as such. It is a peculiar case of contact
without contact because often people did not know each other’s group
membership.
Process
Pettigrew (1998, p. 70) criticizes the literature on intergroup contact
for ignoring “the processes by which contact changes attitudes and
behaviour”. The “laundry list” does not theorize why change occurs
(or does not occur) under the various conditions. It identifies “when”
contact will lead to positive transformation, but it remains silent about
Alex Gillespie 101
“how” that transformation actually occurs. Pettigrew’s own approach to

this limitation is to argue that contact can reduce prejudice and conflict
by having positive effects on the representation of the outgroup, the
representation of the ingroup, behaviours and emotional ties. Positing
these four mediating variables between the conditions of contact and
the outcome of contact, he maintains, provides an account of “how”
contact produces its potentially positive transformations.
However, Pettigrew’s conception of “process” is limited. He conceptu-
alizes process as variables inserted into a statistical model, as mediators
or moderators between the inputs and the outputs. A stronger con-
ception of process can be found in Blumer’s (1969, p. 39) insistence
that researchers study “what is actually going on”, in Valsiner’s (1998)
insistence that the bedrock of psychology will always be idiographic
studies, and Duveen and Lloyd’s (1990) theorization of microgenesis as
the motor of transformation. What these approaches share is a radically
empirical approach to process. That is, process is what actually hap-
pens in “real time” – this is precisely not a statistical abstraction. This
alternative conception of process focuses upon the empirical details of
a specific case, and the actual sequence of observable events which lead
from the start of the instance of contact to the end and the subsequent
outcomes. This empirical reality of the process of “what actually hap-
pened” retains its truth value even if it is a one-off, peculiar to the case
and never repeated.
From the standpoint of this revised conception of process it makes
no sense, for example, to state that “contradictions lead to distrust”.
It is possible that the reverse could occur in which not contradictions
but a lack of contradictions could lead to suspicion. Imagine a case in
which the lawyers for a person accused of murder try to plead insan-
ity. In this case, contradictions in the defendant’s behaviour might be
taken as indicative that the murder was not a premeditated plan but a
result of an irrational outburst, and thus the defendant’s plea of insan-
ity should be trusted. The prosecution might seek to reinterpret the
defendant’s behaviour as a non-contradictory, rationalized course of
action. The absence of contradictions in such a case might make the jury
distrustful of the plea of insanity. The point is thus not only that contra-
dictions can be classified as neither essential for nor facilitating distrust,
but that in order to understand what contradictions do in a given situ-
ated interaction one needs to analyse the actual process through which
the contradictions mediate the sequence of events (and this process is
deeply contextual, which links back to the first critique).
Content
The third problem with the literature on intergroup contact, which
Pettigrew (1998) overlooked, is the neglect of representational content.
This refers to what people’s ideas or beliefs actually are – that is, what
they think about the world, themselves and each other. Pettigrew’s
search for “essential conditions” is modelled on the natural sciences. But
while one can legitimately discuss the essential conditions for a chem-
ical reaction, one cannot sensibly discuss the essential conditions for
reducing prejudice or increasing trust. Unlike the objects studied by the
natural sciences, humans are subjects with their own representations of
events. The chemist studying a chemical reaction does not need to con-
sider what the chemicals think about the reaction. However, when social
scientists study an interaction, they need to understand not only the
context and process but also what each party in the interaction thinks
about themselves, each other and the interaction as a whole.
The issue here is that humans are reactive, they have ideas about
the world, themselves and each other, and these ideas are consequen-
tial (Gergen, 1973). Moreover, these ideas are consequential regardless
of their veracity. This basic idea was famously articulated by Thomas
(1928, p. 572), who wrote: “If men define situations as real, they are real
in their consequences.” Accordingly, he advocated studying “the total
situation” which includes both “the situation as it exists in verifiable,
objective terms, and as it has seemed to exist in terms of the interested
persons”.
The same point was made by Koffka (1935; Farr, 1996) using
somewhat different terminology. He distinguished the geographic envi-
ronment from the behavioural environment, the latter being the envi-
ronment which includes the interests, perceptions and ideas of the
behaving organism. Again, he insisted on the need to study both the
objective geographical environment and the behavioural environment.
Thomas’ theorem and Koffka’s concept of the behavioural environment
are consolidated in Moscovici’s (1984) concept of social representation
as environment. Representations, in Moscovici’s sense, are not simply
constructs in the mind; rather, they are the environments within which
people live and act. Each of these theoretical approaches grapples with
the content of people’s ideas, beliefs or representations.
Of course there is a relationship between structure and con-
tent. The content of beliefs is shaped by the geographic environment, by
the structure of thinking and the structure of social processes. Equally,
the content of beliefs shapes not only the way they act and interact
but also the way in which they think and talk. For example, as will be
Alex Gillespie 103
demonstrated later in this chapter, semantic content which represents

the Other as untrustworthy enables people to ignore and dismiss the
point of view of the Other, with the psychological process following the
logic of content. Indeed, beliefs also shape the perception of the material
world (Tajfel, 1957) and the actual future configuration of the environ-
ment (Gergen, 2015). The key point here is not to consider content as
a domain unto itself but, rather, to emphasize that no account of social
life will be complete if it analyses processes or structures without taking
account of the semantic content of people’s beliefs.
Pettigrew (1998) is correct when he writes that the main outcome of
contact can be a change in the representations of the outgroup and the
ingroup, but he fails to take due account of what those representations
actually are. As Bauer and Gaskell (1999, p. 175) write, “a represen-
tation without content is an oxymoron”. It is not enough to know
whether these representations become more or less prejudiced. There are
many different ways in which people can be prejudiced or distrustful.
To understand change through contact, one needs to engage with the
actual content of the representations – that is, what new beliefs or ideas
emerge out of a given social interaction, and how they might interact
with future events.
The semantic immune system: Defending against

destabilizing ideas
Taking account of the context, process and especially representational

content can provide new insights into why contact often does not lead
to any transformation. A genuine encounter with the Other, with alter-
ity, entails an openness to be transformed by the other (Levinas, 1991).
Specifically, it entails representing the outgroup as something beyond
the ingroup, and representing the ingroup as unfinalized, and thus
open to transformation by the Other (Cooper et al., 2012). However,
change can be threatening and, accordingly, semantic systems, such as
the representation of Self and Other, will often work to resist change and
maintain pre-existing meanings (Zittoun, 2006). The literature on con-
tact has been so keen to identify the conditions for positive change that
there has been little consideration of when and why no change occurs –
indeed, the lack of reconciliatory transformations has continually been
seen as the exception to transformation. But maybe transformation is
the exception to stability? The question I want to address is: Why does
contact often not produce any transformation in the representation of
the ingroup or the outgroup?
Meaning structures, such as social representations, are socially pro-

duced, replete with consequences for social relations and future actions.
These symbolic environments are rich with personal and group invest-
ments and they create identity positions for both Self and Other, for
the ingroup and the outgroup (Howarth, 2006). It is because of these
tangled investments that transforming representations of Self or Other
is often resisted. There is, in short, a conservative tendency to avoid
destabilizations of the semantic environment.
However, in the contemporary world it is increasingly difficult to
avoid contact with destabilizing points of view (Moscovici, 1984).
Encountering alterity is a defining feature of late modernity. This
increasing content with alterity is not translating into more tolerance.
People and groups protect their meaning structures from destabilizing
alternatives (Gillespie, 2008). Indeed, the symbolic systems which sur-
vive and thrive in later modernity tend to be those which are effective
at neutralizing and resisting alternative semiotic structures (Valsiner,
2011).
The way in which threatening meanings, alternative meanings which
destabilize established meanings, are resisted can be conceptualized as
analogous to the human immune system (see Gillespie, 2012). The
human body has, broadly speaking, three layers of defence against for-
eign bodies, such as diseases. The first is the skin, which is the basis of
the physical and psychological distinction between Self and Other (Farr,
1997). If pathogens breach the skin, then the second layer of defence,
the innate immune system, provides immediate but not specific defence.
The innate immune system causes inflammation, and provides support
for antibodies and white blood cells. The third layer of protection is the
adaptive immune system. This adapts to the specific and often novel
features of the pathogen, but it takes time to evolve suitable resistance.
It is this third layer which provides a powerful metaphor for under-
standing resistance to threatening meaning structures. The adaptive
immune system “remembers” pathogens and stores defences against
them. Non-self cells express antigens that the adaptive immune system
is able to distinguish from the antigens expressed by Self cells. When the
adaptive immune system activates B and T cells to replicate and fight
off a pathogen, a minority of these offspring will become memory cells
with a long lifespan. Thus, after the attack, the body contains a small
number of memory cells for the specific pathogen, and, should the same
pathogen be encountered, these memory cells will be triggered and repli-
cate rapidly, thus quickly neutralizing the now familiar threat. Vaccines
develop the adaptive immune system by presenting it with an agent
Alex Gillespie 105
that resembles a disease-causing microorganism such that the adaptive

immune system can evolve resistance, thus becoming prepared for the
actual pathogen.
The adaptive immune system was used as an analogy by McGuire
(1961) for his theory of resistance to persuasion, known as inoculation
theory. Writing during a high point in the Cold War, McGuire and his
colleagues were very keen to understand how to win the ideological
battle against communism. They found that people could be “inocu-
lated” against ideological persuasion by, first, warning the receiver of
an impending attack on their beliefs or attitudes, and, second, ensuring
that the attacking arguments are strong enough to exercise the defences,
but not strong enough to overcome them. It has been shown that the
more active the receiver becomes in the defence process, the more their
pre-existing views are strengthened. It has also been found that inocula-
tion confers resistance to arguments that are not even in the inoculation
message (Pfau et al., 1990). In explaining the findings from inoculation
theory, McGuire and Papageorgis (1962) write:
Just as we develop the disease resistance of a person raised in a germ-

free environment by exposing him to a weakened form of the virus
so as to stimulate, without overcoming his defenses, so also we would
develop the resistance to persuasion of a person raised in an ideolog-
ically aseptic environment by pre-exposing him to weakened forms
of the counter-arguments, or to some other belief-threatening mate-
rial strong enough to stimulate, but not so strong as to overcome, his
belief defenses.
(McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962, p. 25)
While the basic idea behind inoculation theory is very convincing, and
the findings are robust, the research tends to suffer from the same short-
comings as the contact hypothesis outlined above. First, the context has
been neglected: it makes a difference who is trying to persuade whom of
what, with what interests and consequences. Second, process has been
neglected: the research tells us nothing about the microgenetic mechan-
ics of how the persuasion message is resisted. Third, the content of the
persuasive messages and the inoculations have been largely ignored, and
all messages intended to persuade are treated as interchangeable.
In the next section I will attempt to take forward the impetus of inocu-
lation theory while also addressing these critiques. Specifically, the focus
will be on how semantic structures, such as ideas leading to distrust, can
lead social contact and social interaction to be non-transformative.
Semantic barriers: The content of resistance
Semantic barriers refer to the processes through which semantic con-

tent blocks incoming meanings, or alternative ways of thinking, which
are potentially destabilizing. Moscovici (1976/2008), Gillespie (2008),
Kadianaki (2014), and Sammut, Clark and Kissaun (2014) have begun to
identify the nature and function of semantic barriers which are used to
resist alternative and potentially transformative representations. They
have identified the creation of rigid oppositions, negative associations,
prohibitions and taboos, separations, stigmatization, undermining the
motive of the Other, and bracketing the Other’s perspective as mere
“beliefs” and “thoughts” as mechanisms through which alterity is neu-
tralized. Sammut and Mohammad (2012) have also argued that the
attribution of ignorance should be considered as a semantic barrier
because it undermines the content of ideas coming from an “ignorant”
source. The key point is that these are the semantic processes through
which genuine dialogue is undermined (Cooper et al., 2012). To return
to the analogy of the adaptive immune system, one could say that
semantic barriers are the B and T cells of the semiotic immune system;
they are the mechanism for attacking and isolating alien meanings from
having any undesirable or destabilizing effects.
The concept of semantic barriers has been used to understand a
variety of phenomena. Kus, Liu and Ward (2013) show how they are
used in Estonia to enable intolerance while acknowledging a plural-
ity of viewpoints. Coudin (2013) has shown how, in the context of
the breakdown of a hegemonic representation of madness in Africa,
increasingly polemic representations have emerged which in turn have
necessitated semantic barriers so that people can live in among polemic
representations without being transformed by them. Andreouli (2013)
has explored the rigid opposition between East and West for identity
construction, and the potential effect that this has on the dialogue
which might occur between these two identities within the same
person. However, semantic barriers are not always “bad”; sometimes
they offer protection from ideas which might be threatening or stig-
matizing. Sammut, Clark and Kissaun (in press), for example, show
how people use a phrase, such as “I don’t care”, to dismiss com-
ments or ideas which might be inhibiting a course of action. More
directly, Kadianaki (2014) has shown how immigrants living in Greece
are actively able to resist potentially stigmatizing ideas which they
attribute to locals, by dismissing the people who have such ideas as,
for example, “crazy”. The process here seems to be similar to the
Alex Gillespie 107
finding that messages which come from groups that are perceived to be
“psychologically imbalanced” have much less influence (Papastamou,
1986).
One of the most basic ways in which the transformative potential of
an interaction is inhibited is by representing the Other as fundamen-
tally not worth interacting with. Such beliefs enable people to avoid
alterity, and thus avoid interactions which might lead to any change in
their beliefs. This type of semantic barrier is very clear in Raudsepp and
Wagner’s (2011) insightful analysis of the conflict between Estonians
and Estonian-Russians. The Estonians refer to the Estonian-Russians as
unchanging wolves and wild beasts, as essentially barbaric and fascist.
The Russians are said to lack “logical reason” (p. 114) and possess fun-
damentally different brains. One Estonian even writes that the Russians
have the “Mongol gene of robbing, killing and hating work” (p. 114).
By conceptualizing the difference in terms of deep-seated oppositions,
such as human/animal and civilized/barbaric, and emphasizing that
this is a difference of blood, brains and genes, the opposition is made
natural and immutable. This opposition is a semantic barrier to trans-
formation because on the one hand the Other is represented as being
so different that their view on the world is irrelevant, and on the
other hand because the opposition between Self and Other is so rigid
that it presents little scope for change. The Estonian-Russian Other is
not even endowed with an alternative representation worthy of being
engaged with.
In the modern world, most people do not block out alterity in this
basic way – they are more subtle. There are semantic mechanisms which
allow people to actually engage with and acknowledge alterity, while
also protecting the Self from any of the transformative potential of the
interaction. There are semantic barriers which enable one to engage with
alternative meanings while also holding the transformative potential of
that meaning in “quarantine”. Distrust, I want to argue, is one such
barrier. One can talk about the perspective of a distrusted Other, but
that perspective is neutralized by virtue of being distrusted (Markova &
Gillespie, 2012).
Distrust between Irish nationals and asylumseekers
I will illustrate the operation of distrust as a semantic barrier with ref-

erence to research that was originally reported by Gillespie, Kadianaki
and O’Sullivan-Lago (2012; O’Sullivan-Lago, 2009; Kadianaki, 2014).
This study includes an examination of how Irish nationals represent
asylumseekers. In the following excerpt, Aidan, an Irish national from

Cork, gives his rather blunt justification for refusing even to talk with
asylumseekers:
I just don’t like to talk to most asylum seekers, like, especially

you know that most of them are either on the run from the law
in their own country and if they go back to their own country
they’ll get prosecuted for this or that, and our country doesn’t
wonder why they’re so afraid to go back to their own coun-
try, “oh they’ll probably get killed” or something like that, you know
they make up all these excuses.
Aidan justifies avoiding talking with asylumseekers because he distrusts

their motive. He speculates that they have come to Ireland to escape
legitimate punishment for grievous crimes. He is even willing to give
voice to the alternative viewpoint (underlined) – namely, that if the
asylumseekers are returned “they’ll probably get killed”. But even the
starkness of this alternative point of view is insufficient to permeate
Aidan’s semiotic defences. Such claims are, Aidan contends, “excuses”,
and thus he is able to dismiss the most legitimate reason for asylum.
Given his assumption (that asylumseekers are trying to avoid legitimate
punishment in their home countries), he is able to dismiss whatever
an asylumseeker might say because such people would say anything to
escape deportation. This particular semantic barrier, however, has con-
tent tailored towards undermining the asylumseekers, and as such it
might not be so effective against arguments coming from other sources.
Another common alternative ulterior motive, voiced by the Irish
locals, is that immigrants and asylumseekers are only in Ireland for gen-
erous social welfare payments. In both cases the representation creates a
fundamental distrust of the Other which not only ossifies the Self/Other
boundary but also makes it very difficult for the Other to challenge the
distinction: their protestations, no matter how sensible, are not given
any credence because of the block, boiling down to a suspicious “they
would say that, wouldn’t they”. This powerful semantic block halts
further elaboration of the justification (Valsiner, 2002) because it neu-
tralizes the transformative potential of the Other as nothing that they
say can be trusted.
Openness to dialogical engagement entails perceptions of mutual
trust and respect. It is difficult to be open unto the Other if one per-
ceives the Other to be stigmatizing, distrustful or dismissing. This is
Alex Gillespie 109
particularly evident among migrants who feel that their new commu-
nity of residence is closed to them: this representation, in turn, closes
them to their new community of residence. Consider the following
excerpt from Alike, who came to Ireland from Nigeria to seek asylum:
They think of us as pests, as bodies. That’s what they think of us.

At times when I go to the post office to pick up my weekly payment
I feel ashamed of myself because even if they are not looking at me, I
feel their eyes on me saying, “Look at them, they are one of those
people who come.” So we are bodies to them. That is my belief.
In as much as I know that not all of them think that of us, but we
know it is a general thing that they feel. They feel that the asylum
seekers are no good . . . that we are bodies who have come to use up
their tax-payers’ money without contributing anything.
(Alike, 32, Nigerian, 1 year in Ireland)
This quotation illustrates how stigmatization and overgeneralization

(“that’s what they think of us”) inhibit dialogue with alternative points
of view which might lead to a more nuanced conception. According to
Alike, all Irish people see asylumseekers, including her, as “pests” and
mere “bodies”. The alternative representation (underlined) of the Irish,
that “not all of them think that of us”, makes a brief appearance, and
if elaborated it might have created points of commonality, but it is cut
short by an overgeneralized feeling (Valsiner, 2002) that is reflected in
the utterance “but we know it is a general thing they feel”.
Clearly, one response of the semiotic immune system to alterity is to
stigmatize it, thus discounting or isolating the semiotic content. How-
ever, this stigmatization itself might lead the other party to counter
with further stigmatization. For example, we have seen how Aidan
stigmatizes the voices of people such as Alike, and also how Alike
responds to that stigma with counterstigmatization. This can be the
basis for escalating semiotic barriers that propel the social relation
towards conflict.
It would be overly simplistic to equate the use of semantic barriers
with a move towards conflict. As argued above, one needs to consider
the context, process and content of the representations. For example, it
might be that the semantic barriers are used to resist semantic content
that is stigmatizing or likely to lead to conflict (Gillespie et al., 2012).
That is to say, what matters is not just that semantic barriers are being
used but rather what they are being used for.
Conclusion: Semantic contact
This chapter has not argued that trust should be added to the “laun-
dry list” of variables associated with the contact hypothesis. Trust is
neither necessary nor sufficient for transformative social interaction.
Rather, I have argued that distrust is often an effective semantic barrier
to transformative interaction. The trust/distrust distinction is a means
to guide action (Valsiner, 1998). That which is distrusted is treated dif-
ferently from that which is trusted. It is a hypergeneralized marking
(Valsiner, 1998) of the alternative point of view. If an alternative set
of meanings is tainted with distrust, then it is, in a semantic sense, in
quarantine and its transformation inhibited.
Although the present chapter has focused upon trust as a seman-
tic barrier to the transformative potential of social interaction, there
are many semantic barriers which can also inhibit transformation
(Gillespie, 2008; Moscovici, 2008; Gillespie et al., 2012). Also, there are
doubtless semantic mechanisms for protecting against transformation
which not only have not yet been identified but also have yet to be used.
These semantic defences are evolving, cultural, processual and contex-
tual. Moreover, identifying the means through which ingroups dismiss
outgroups, and making the ingroups aware of these processes, might
increase the transformative potential of intergroup contact (Nasie et al.,
2014).
The contribution of the present chapter is to try to refocus the study
of contact in contexts of social conflict on the actual (i.e. microge-
netic) process of interaction, on what actually happens at the point
of content. Zooming in on the point of contact reveals, quite starkly,
that social interaction itself does not necessarily entail what might
be termed “semantic contact” – that is, the meeting of ideas or rep-
resentations. Equally, social interaction or physical co-presence is not
actually needed for semantic contact. It can occur when one person
or group mentions the representations of another group, when the
ideas of the other group are allowed to mingle with the ideas of the
ingroup. Transformative social interaction occurs at the point of seman-
tic contact and, equally, semantic barriers are the means of neutering
the transformative potential of social contact.
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7
Conflict Transformation
and Homodiplomacy
Costas M. Constantinou
Introduction
In the literature of international relations, the term “conflict

transformation” has emerged over the last couple of decades in paral-
lel with the more established term “conflict resolution”. The two are
not antithetical and the notion of transformation is often presented
as a stepping-stone to resolution, especially in the case of protracted
conflicts, and even as a path to peace transformation (Galtung, 2000).
Transformation implies that conflict continues to occur but takes a radi-
cally different form than before, entering a more constructive mode. For
example, it can move from violent to post-violent conflict, or from cold
peace to transitional peace settlement and a new constitutional state of
affairs, where conflict may still persist in the broad sense of the incom-
patibility of positions between subjects, yet where conflict relationships,
interests and discourses may be transformed (Miall, 2001, p. 4).
In this chapter I argue that it is important to view conflict transfor-
mation not as a singular event or a top-down process but as a daily
occurrence. From this perspective – and without underestimating peace-
building ideology and initiatives or their criticisms (Richmond, 2008) –
I suggest that conflict transformation would also benefit from an
alternative culture of diplomacy, an everyday diplomacy that often
remains unacknowledged, one that constantly seeks to mediate conflict-
ual relationships and deeply held views about dangerous Others through
Self/Other transformation. Let me start with an illustration from the
Cyprus conflict.
Among the many stories of people crossing to the other side of the
divided island of Cyprus (following the opening of the barricades after
almost three decades in April 2003), a particular event struck me as an
114
Costas M. Constantinou 115
exemplar of reconciliation at the human level. Returning to a church

that had been turned into a mosque, a bitter symbol of occupation and
ethnic cleansing, a Christian Greek-Cypriot man headed for a charged
encounter with the Other. The imam in place, however, welcomed him
as a most honoured guest, unfolding a red carpet so that he could walk
inside the church/mosque without removing his shoes. Behind a white
curtain, he unveiled the altar where the Christian relics were safely kept
for the return of the dispossessed. Occupation and religious exclusivity
aside, it was clear that the unused church was carefully modified into
an interim mosque. The imam explained his past and present actions
through a spiritual genealogy, for “We are all descendants of Adam
and Eve, all brothers, one body”, meaning that it was his and indeed
everyone’s foremost responsibility, irrespective of religion and ethnic-
ity, “to love, respect and help each other as our Creator intended”.
Capturing everything on camera and deeply moved by the event, the
Greek-Cypriot man admitted to an epiphany, “a feeling that Cyprus
expanded” and became more accommodating (Demetriou, 2003).
The experience of new or expanding space, opening up unthought-
of possibilities and promising alternative ways of relating to others,
characterizes what I will be discussing in terms of human diplomacy
and spirituality. Specifically, the imam exemplifies such a practice by
being an emissary of humanity, someone who in mediating the eth-
noreligious Other extends the normalized space of diplomatic action,
elevates Self and Other to a spiritual realm and transforms hostile or
potentially hostile relationships. To explore this, I have coined the term
“homodiplomacy”, seeking to bring together two neglected aspects of
historical as well as contemporary diplomatic practice.
The first aspect concerns the non-professional dimension of diplo-
macy, by which I mean the interpersonal dealings of Homo sapiens or, if
you like, the non-technical, experimental and experiential diplomacy of
everyday life. The second aspect concerns the transformative potential
of diplomacy – that is, a (more spiritual) form of diplomacy that engages
in heterology to revisit and rearticulate homology, whose mission is
not only the knowledge and control of the Other but fundamentally
the knowledge of the Self – and crucially this knowledge of the Self
as a more reflective means of dealing with and transforming relations
with Others. This may take the route of sociocognitive conflict between
interlocutors reaching intersubjectivity as explained by Perret-Clermont
(Chapter 4), Gillespie (Chapter 6) and Psaltis (Chapter 5) in this volume,
but also more dialogical encounters that move beyond intersubjective
consent and challenge the structures of hegemonic power (Jabri, 1996)
or cultivate reflexivity through more object-oriented ontologies and

relationships (Latour, 2005).
In underscoring the value of homodiplomacy, my assumption is that
conventional approaches to diplomacy (i.e. approaches that view diplo-
macy as merely an intergovernmental affair, as management of inter-
state relations or as primarily the pursuit and negotiation of national
interests) are not able to account for either the rich history or the current
complexity of the diplomatic world. In terms of broaching the concept,
I have found insightful James Der Derian’s (1987) reframing of diplo-
macy as the mediation of estrangement, where estrangement includes
not only alienation from other people and other cultures but also from
one’s labour (cf. Passini, Chapter 11, this volume), the environment and
god(s). Within this context, homodiplomacy would be about the medi-
ation of sameness, internal mediation, as a condition for as well as a
neglected aspect of the mediation of the estranged. In homodiplomacy
not only the Other but also the Self become strange, a site to be known
or known anew. Self becomes strange so as to creatively deal with
alterity, overcoming the diplomatic fixation of clear and unambiguous
identity, which renders mediation a one-dimensional external process
(Kristeva, 1991; cf., Sofer, 1997; Neumann, 2005; Gillespie 2006).
Diplomacy, spirituality, alterity
What does this double estrangement entail? How does the mediation
of sameness operate? And how does it enable an alternative culture of
diplomacy? My interest in these questions follows from my past research
in the history and theory of diplomacy. I have examined elsewhere the
forgotten diplomacy-philosophy intertext that is encapsulated in the
ancient Greek practice of theoria – specifically, how the term theoria not
only meant philosophical contemplation, methodical scheme or ratio-
nal statement of principles (as we generally understand the notion of
theory today), but also had a twofold diplomatic sense. First, theoria was
a name for the solemn or sacred embassy sent to consult the oracle (like
the embassy to Delphi or Delos). This form of diplomacy was therefore
philognostic, charged with receiving cryptic missives and reflecting on
their implications for the polis. Second, theoria was a freelance or ecu-
menical embassy of prominent citizens of the polis, “sent abroad to see
the world” with the purpose of finding out the laws and political ways of
other peoples (non-Greeks) and bringing back this knowledge to inform
and suggest reforms in the polis. This form of diplomacy was eminently
philobarbaric, seeking to learn from non-Hellenic Others, from known
and unknown foreign cultures. What these forgotten aspects of theoria

have in common is the idea of sending an embassy as a mission of
problematization to bring back new knowledge (a prophesy, alterna-
tive views, revaluations, strange ideas) that can then be used to open
up, rethink and reinvigorate the Self, to reconsider dominant norms
and provide new frameworks for deliberating political action. In short,
theoria was an ancient diplomatic practice, or within my current termi-
nology a homodiplomatic instrument, charged with knowledge of the
Other as a means of knowing oneself (Constantinou, 1996, 2004).
This culture of diplomacy is not limited to ancient Greece. It is indeed
part of other Western and non-Western traditions that see “realist” inter-
national relations as problematic and diplomacy not in isolation but in
conjunction with spirituality. For example, Herbert Butterfield (1954)
suggested how a spiritual qua Christian revival of diplomacy could more
effectively address human problems in post-Second World War interna-
tional relations. According to Butterfield, this diplomacy would have
to fully embrace the principles of Christian charity as a way of deal-
ing with diabolical agencies and political plots contaminated by raison
d’état. A Christocentric diplomacy enhances the recognition that “it is
human understanding itself that needs to be enlarged” and that ulti-
mately “real apprehension” involves “giv[ing] something of ourselves”
(pp. 8–9), sacrificing precious identities, positions and perceptions (cf.,
Hall, 2002; Sharp, 2003). In this respect, the biblical notion of forgive-
ness (sun-cho-ro) has been suggested not as painless work or egocentric
charity but literally as a struggle with oneself to “make space in one’s
heart so that the other can fit in” (Neophytos, 2004, p. 9).
Afzal Igbal (1975) explored the “moral diplomacy” that adheres
to early Islamic principles and rejects the use of power domination,
ambiguous discourse, cunning and guile, vain actions, and laborious
and impressionistic protocol. From this perspective the diplomacy of
the prophet of Islam is presented as encouraging the constant use of
modus vivendi (“Allah will bring us together and unto him is the journey-
ing”) and underscoring reflection on the means to an end, the former
as always open to ethical scrutiny, the latter not as the yardstick of
diplomatic success. Diplomatic teleology in the form of foreign pol-
icy objectives is seen as being subservient to diplomatic methodology,
the conduct through which one pursues global goals, and becomes the
real test of a truly Islamic diplomacy (Igbal, 1975). One could also add
in relation to reflective Islamic diplomacy the practice of the “greater
jihad” (contrasted with the “lesser jihad” associated with military strug-
gle and militant violence), which is a spiritual struggle seeking to stretch
and break one’s limited Self or enemy within as a means of self-discovery

or union with God.
Other works have pronounced religion as “the missing dimension of
statecraft” or “faith-based diplomacy” as a means of “trumping realpoli-
tik” (Johnston, 2003; Johnston & Sampson, 1994). In a recent work
identifying global problems as spiritual as much as material crises, David
Wellman (2004) responded by mixing religion with ecology to pro-
pose a practice of “sustainable diplomacy”: “Practitioners of Sustainable
Diplomacy will not only share in the political, economic and consular
duties current diplomats undertake, but they will also be conveyers
and receivers of culture – including the stories of marginalized peoples
and lands” (p. 41). Integrating “ecological footprint” (the impact that
individual communities have on the earth) with Islamic and Christian
precepts of relating with Others and the environment, Wellman offers
common ethical principles through which relations between Moroccans
and Spaniards can be reassessed and managed in people-to-people
encounters, especially in religious and quasireligious conversations that
transcend secular and egotistic interests – for example, the need to
reflect on the common ontological relationship between the human,
the earth and its creations; encountering the Other and through this
recognizing “the truth about ourselves” and “our common Divine ori-
gin”; offering hospitality, help and sustenance to strangers as a religious
responsibility; and recognizing how the “stranger we encounter could
in fact be God or an emissary of God” (Wellman, 2004, pp. 165–166).
The latter is especially interesting for it recasts the stranger from an
intriguing “problem” of secular political relations to a most crucial agent
of homodiplomatic practice, bearing gnostic material and testing one’s
spiritual resilience.
Such mediation alternatives, however, are not limited to mainstream
spiritualities. Richard Sidy (1992), for example, put forward a peda-
gogical proposition for a “world diplomacy” inspired by the teachings
of Torkom Saraydarian. This is a diplomacy that is not based on the
maximization of separatist interests but rather on the enhancement of
“the common good of all humanity” (p. viii). Saraydarian has already
called this elsewhere “new diplomacy”, “real diplomacy” or “high diplo-
macy”, where one seeks to “raise the political consciousness” of Self and
Other as a way of mediating conflict and estrangement. The driving
principle of such practice is “Know yourself, and know other people,
and know God, and know that all three are one and not separate.”1
To that extent, Saraydarian seems to be revisiting the “kinship diplo-
macy” of ancient times, concerned with re-establishing broken familial
relationships among humans, and between them and their gods (Jones,
1999). Following Saraydarian, Sidy has redefined diplomacy as being
“beyond personal or national gain or loss. Diplomacy is the process of
understanding Divine Will” (p. 100). In effect, this seeks to reintroduce
to diplomacy the kind of gnosis pursued in theoria.
Within and beyond the diplomacy of new age spirituality, one should
not neglect the impact of secular spiritualities too. On the one hand,
the holistic approaches of new physics (as developed from quantum
mechanics and relativity) have challenged Newtonian presumptions of
linearity, objectivity, monism and causal determinism. Especially by
combining with Eastern mysticism, they have been used to develop
novel scientific understandings of the interconnectedness of all things,
of undivided wholeness, of consciousness-based reality, of “living sys-
tems” and of “multiple worlds” that necessitate a radical shift in
diplomatic discourse and perspective (Capra, 1975, 2002; Gunaratne,
2005). On the other hand, there are those humanist spiritualities that
animate “unofficial”, “citizen” or “track two” diplomacies and are asso-
ciated with specific conflict resolutions. There are, of course, many
illustrations of how such non-state, non-governmental mediations and
workshops have brought about cross-ethnic togetherness and political
catharsis, including a remarkable change in perspective and/or recon-
ciliation among previously suspicious or hostile parties. Yet it has been
suggested that the application of “foreign” methodologies and spiritual-
ities into local conflicts can be another form of cultural domination and
“civilizing mission”, be it in the form of Western (and often expensive)
conflict-resolution workshops that are treated as universal panaceas or
Quaker missions mediating the Indo-Pakistani conflict. One could also
add a general defensive tendency among these approaches, seeing them-
selves as at best supplementary to the “official” or “track one” process
(despite being occasionally distrusted and vilified by state diplomats),
which means that their diplomatic purview tends to be limited. This
should not, however, underestimate their contribution to interethnic
and international relations (Berman and Johnson, 1977; Sharp, 2001;
Richmond, 2002).
In the case of Cyprus, which has had its fair share of such track
two efforts, the opening of the barricades brought about intensification
but also a new dimension to the reconciliation effort at the human
level. The crossings made possible less organized and more contin-
gent encounters across the ethnoreligious divide without the presence
of third-party mediators as in the recent past. The abstract Other was
humanized en masse: old enemies acquired faces (and even became
friends) and old friendships were renewed. Since the opening of the bar-
ricades, Cypriots experienced (either personally or vicariously through
friends and the mass media) an ambivalent shift from heterodiplomacy
to homodiplomacy. By this I mean a shift from projecting ethnoreligious
Otherness as something that needs to be managed through foreign pol-
icy at the governmental or professional level (or be it at the so-called
track two, or citizen diplomacy level) to the notion that the ethnoreli-
gious Other is also part of the collective Self, of another Self (a forgotten
Self); a concealed sameness that Cypriots need to confront and come to
terms with at the human-personal level on a daily basis. Frankly, it has
been the experimental and experiential homodiplomacy that proved
more fruitful in mediating intra-Cypriot estrangement and transforming
visions of Other/Self; perhaps that is only for some people, or temporar-
ily, or for short periods, begging the need that this form of diplomacy
should be enhanced. By contrast, the heterodiplomacy or traditional
diplomatic practice has been largely responsible for demonizing the
Other and in this respect effectively for decades of mobilized hostility.
What then are the conditions of possibility of this transformative
diplomacy? What different methods do homodiplomatic practices
entail? My assumption is that to account for the richness and complex-
ity of these ad hoc mediations, we need to develop “new” diplomatic
concepts, which at least in my understanding and approach also means
that we need to come to terms with and reimagine “old” concepts of
diplomacy. Exploring homodiplomacy requires a willingness to look to
the history of ideas and so beyond traditional international relations
knowledge. I therefore propose three interrelated sites on which we
can rethink the diplomatic and retrieve the homodiplomatic – namely,
introspective negotiation, reverse accreditation and gnostic discourse.
I am not arguing that these three sites are either essential prerequisites
or exhaustive of homodiplomatic features. I would rather treat them as
rough guides or exploratory tools through which we may begin to orient
ourselves in terms of homodiplomacy.
Introspective negotiation
Homodiplomacy enhances introspective negotiation. This notion of

negotiation moves away from the idea of it being essentially bargaining,
simply the business of pursuing one’s national or self-interest through
“talks” or “exchange of concessions”. Such a mental shift in negotiation
is possible by taking stoicism seriously, especially the works of Cicero
and Seneca. The Latin negotium had the general sense of “business”, “not
to be idle” (neg-otium), and more specifically to engage in public affairs.

However, the stoics introduced a radical two-fold inversion of this sense
of negotiation, underscoring in parallel with public business the need
for private self-analysis.
First, as Cicero (1913) put it, there is a critical form of negotiation that
is not pursued in social and political engagements but paradoxically in
leisure (in otio de negotiis). In this regard, Cicero idealized Publius Scipio
Africanus (a famous Roman general and ambassador) who “was never
less idle than when he had nothing to do” and who “used to com-
mune with himself when alone” (3:1). The periodic withdrawal from
the public world, the calculated withdrawal from business, far from an
epicurean move of idle pleasure, constituted for the stoics a deliberate
exercise in shifting perspective. It promoted a form of “creative idle-
ness”, where the stoic was forced to confront oneself, give an account
and come to terms with one’s problematic views, identifications and
position in the world. As an inward move of negotiation, in otio de
negotiis called on humans to account for and negotiate their human-
ity and disposition towards the world and so functioned as an active
unsettling of the claims and assumptions upon which humans came to
practice outward, public negotiation.
Seneca (1932a) built on Cicero’s notion of in otio de negotiis in his
treatise De Otio (On Leisure). He provided a second radical modification
of the concept of negotiation, suggesting that the purpose of negotium is
not to benefit oneself but rather to be useful to others. Stoic negotium is
primarily other-serving:
It is of course required of a man that he should benefit his

fellow-men – many if he can, if not, a few; if not a few, those who
are nearest; if not these, himself. For when he renders himself useful
to others, he engages in negotium. (3.5)
Seneca’s notion of negotiation, however, also transgresses the conven-

tional borders of Self/Other when viewed in the context of his scheme
of the two commonwealths:
Let us grasp the idea that there are two commonwealths – the one,
a vast and truly common state, which embraces alike gods and
humans, in which we look neither to this corner of earth nor to that,
but measure the bounds of our citizenship by the path of the sun; and
the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of
birth. (41)
Leisurely or introspective negotiation benefits this greater common-

wealth by reflecting on what it means to be a citizen of the cosmopolis
and by that promoting “interests” that transcend those defined and
assigned by the accident of birth – namely, city-state or imperial inter-
ests. Stoic negotium fulfils its public role privately (in privato publicum
negotium agit) by cultivating the mind, instilling the virtues of the
greater commonwealth, and bringing forth a realization that human
affairs and problems are not independent of the mind but “born from
nothingness they go back to nothingness” (Seneca, 1932b, 3.4, 15.4).
It is therefore a technique through which one not only deconstructs
one’s constructed views and interests but also learns “to accept calmly
the ways of the public and the vices of man, and be thrown neither
into laughter nor into tears” (Seneca, 1932b, 15.5). Thus stoic negotium
is meant to undermine the pursuit of exclusively self-serving or vain
human goals and to help one to become attuned to the needs of the
Other as well as the fluctuations of human and political affairs.
One can perhaps picture this stoic notion of negotiation in the actions
of the imam that I quoted in the beginning of this article. On the
one hand are the depictions of a greater heavenly commonwealth that
involve adherence to higher duties and responsibilities and that in many
ways neutralize ethnoreligious dogmatic interests and demands. On the
other hand is the attempt to “negotiate” by being useful to others; not
simply to negotiate the needs of one’s religious community as one is
officially charged to but also to negotiate the needs of the Other, of the
so-called opposing religious community if and when it returns to claim
that converted space of worship.
Yet introspective negotiation is not the privilege of a Western philo-
sophical tradition. It has animated, for example, the diplomatic prac-
tices of the Native American native, specifically in the smoking of the
calumet or “pipe of peace”. This was a ritual that regulated intertribal
relations and subsequently also their relations with the settler commu-
nities. For the natives it was a means through which they sought to
enter a spiritual dimension prior to discussion of intertribal affairs, per-
ceiving this collective chain-smoking as a way of inviting good spirits
and ancestral prototypes to their meetings and chasing away bad ones.
For the European settlers it was more of a symbolic ceremony when
peacefully negotiating with natives, though the inhaling of who knows
what substances may have effected a different perspective of the Self
and a weakening of the pursuit of exclusively self-serving interests, as it
did for the natives. This ritual was thus deemed “a necessary prepara-
tion for having a good talk together” (Numelin, 1950, p. 224) and could
be seen as part of ceremonial preliminaries aiming to establish a “psy-

chological connection” between parties and for the “drawing together
of minds” (Foster, 1985, see also Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4, Gillespie,
Chapter 6, and Psaltis, Chapter 5, this volume). It was, in other words,
the first step upon which a successful mediation was subsequently
built and so employed as a “passport” by ambassadors and travellers.
Furthermore, the pipe of peace was institutionalized “in ceremonies
designed to conciliate foreign and hostile nations and to conclude last-
ing peace, to ratify alliances of friendly tribes; to attest contracts and
treaties which could not be violated without incurring the wrath of
the gods” (Numelin, 1950, p. 222). It was, in short, a medium through
which Native Americans sought to negotiate vertically with their gods
and ancestors, and introspectively within themselves, inviting spiritual
powers to become involved and change the perspective of their daily
horizontal relations with Others.
Reverse accreditation
Homodiplomacy functions by reverse accreditation. The credentials

of the homodiplomat are not conventionally provided, empirically
handed over by an authorizing sender, but bestowed by the recipient
of the message. In terms of historical practice, reverse accreditation is
derived from the Paulian missionary work to the Gentile nations. Paul
is a revolutionary figure in the history of diplomatic thought and crucial
to homodiplomacy for, based on his epiphany on the road to Damascus,
he anoints himself “apostle to the nations” (apostolos being the one who
is sent) despite never meeting Jesus or partaking in the Last Supper as the
core circle of disciple-apostles.2 Paul’s credentials are rather suggested to
lie in the revelation he brought to the spiritually estranged humans,
who then become a commendation in view of the help they receive
(2 Corinthians 3:1–3; cf., Galatians 1:1).
From this perspective, Paul issues a radical challenge to the con-
ventional missionaries, “those who are esteemed” because of some
unverifiable authorization by God. He challenges the notion of the lord
or king who historically or empirically dispatches the apostle to deliver
a revealed truth. By openly disseminating the gospel in public forums,
Paul also seeks to democratize the ancient mysteries and their elite initi-
ations (Steiner, 1972). By reserving “divine” authority for the recipient,
the one who experiences (or not) the effects of the revelation or mys-
tery, the kingdom of god comes to symbolize not yet another regime
of power imposed from above but a state of transformed consciousness
experienced from below.3 In this way, Paul heralds the possibility of a

new Self, a new consciousness for those who deep down already sus-
pect its critical necessity; a new consciousness triggered by receiving
an apostolic deputation that they have mystically and paradoxically
already dispatched. Paul is in his own words “an ambassador of Christ”,
“an ambassador in chains” (uper christou oun presbeuomen: 2 Corinthians
5:20; uper ou presbeuo en alusei: Ephesians 6:20). He is not an esteemed
envoy destined to some royal court where he is to be given his due
honours, but he is freely enslaved to deliver the mystery of the gospel,
labouring the earth in great discomfort to bring the “good news” not
only to Jews but also Gentiles, all estranged from God:
Though I am free and belong to no man, I make myself a slave to

everyone, to win as many as possible. To the Jews I became like a Jew,
to win the Jews. To those under the law I became like one under the
law (though I myself am not under the law), so as to win those under
the law. To those not having the law I became like one not having
the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s
law), so as to win those not having the law. To the weak I became
weak, to win the weak. I have become all things to all men so that by
all possible means I might save some.
(1 Corinthians 9:19–22)
Paul’s ecumenical embassy functions as a precursor of universalism,

working to cast off differences:
Paul demonstrates in detail how a universal thought, proceeding on

the basis of the worldly proliferation of alterities (the Jew, the Greek,
women, men, slaves, free men, and so on), produces a Sameness and
an Equality (there is no longer either Jew, or Greek, and so on).
(Badiou, 2003, p. 109)
Paul mediates Otherness by getting the faithful to see “that differences

carry the universal that happens to them like a grace” (Badiou, 2003, p. 106).
Living through your otherness, experiencing your internal and external
estrangement as that which unites you rather than separates you from
Others, it will be possible to reconcile yourself with humankind, with
all those estranged Others also in search of a new Self.
Reverse accreditation should be seen in conjunction with the dissem-
ination of the gospel. Indeed, the notion of delivering the gospel or
“good message” (to euaggelion) can be recovered and reclaimed for diplo-
macy rather than reserving it exclusively for the apostolic mission of the
Church and the modern so-called evangelists (in fact, one could argue
the need to rescue it from the latter). The marginalization or down-
grading of the evangelical disposition of diplomacy – namely, the good
message embassy – has been effected by the secularization of diplo-
matic theory and practice, the formalization and monopolization of
diplomacy by the Westphalian interstate system. By re-employing the
evangelical disposition in homodiplomacy, the emancipatory discourse
that characterizes the good message may be regained. Note that Paul’s
good message embassy, heralding the advent of a new Self, had the spe-
cific purpose of freeing the faithful from the religious (Judaic) regime
of power, liberating them from “the curse of the law’ (Galatians 3:13) –
that is, emancipating them from practising a sterile canon, the hypocrit-
ical economy of good works and salvation that conventionally mediated
one’s inner self as well as one’s relations with others.
This originary sense of the good message as that which liberates the
recipient from a particular state of being is, however, a pre-Christian
term and can in fact be traced back as far as Homer. In the Odyssey, the
term euaggelion is related to the good news of Odysseus’s final return to
Ithaca, freeing the island-polity from the rule of the suitors, and specif-
ically for Odysseus heralding the release from the bondage and trials
of voyeurism as the obsession of looking at new things. The goodness
of the good message lies therefore in the freedom that it brings to the
recipient, citizen and king alike. Christian euaggelion repoliticizes this
freedom but also radicalizes it. Delivering the good message becomes
the urgent need for the spiritual renewal of sinful humanity estranged
from God, a means to bring about earthly peace and heavenly salvation.
John thus proclaims in typical evangelical fashion: “You shall know the
truth and the truth shall make you free” (John 8:32). Freedom from
your old Self; freedom to invent new Selves, develop a new conscious-
ness that will be spiritually reconciled with God and the world. That is
what the Christian good message embassy promises, unlike the ancient
Greek euaggelion whose liberating promise remained more mundane.
In the medieval and modern world, the Church becomes the main
vehicle for the dissemination of the Christian good message to all
nations. An important actor in this regard has been the Holy See, whose
temporal diplomacy is actually presented as an apologia for fulfilling
its spiritual mission (Pope Paul VI, 1970/1976). Its apostolic exhorta-
tion Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) views evangelization as the mission of
granting to the evangelized recipient “a total interior renewal which
the Gospel calls metanoia; it is a radical conversion, a profound change
of mind and heart”. Yet, authorization to deliver the good message is
institutionalized in the Catholic Church, changing from the ad hoc and
reverse accreditation of Paul to mandated ministers and missionaries

who have to “pass it on with complete fidelity”. Within the Christian
Catholic dogma, true interior renewal is no longer possible through the
recipient’s encounter with the strange apostle but can only be chan-
nelled through the formally designated envoy, the “true” and “credible”
evangelizer. The proclaimed evangelism establishes an embassy relay,
for they who have been evangelized are under a duty to evangelize
others, yet crucially it forecloses the possibility of the evangelized indi-
vidual becoming the recipient of a renewed gospel from a different
tradition (the ecclesiastical rejection of Latin American liberation the-
ology due to its influence by the thought of Karl Marx, whom Nietzsche
once pointedly described as “the last of the Jewish prophets”, is a case
in point). In short, institutionalized evangelism brings the practice of
reverse accreditation to an end. Ad hoc embassies outside the faith are
no longer to be, or only figure as, bogus or heretic.
But contra Papal diplomacy, the good message embassy in the form
of a promise of spiritual freedom and reconciliation, can indeed be
found elsewhere and anywhere (again, remember the Christian man’s
encounter with the agent of another faith, the imam’s words and deeds,
in the opening story) – that is, as long as one keeps recalling that the
stranger whom one encounters may bear a divine message, in words,
actions or through their mere presence, a call for self-knowledge and
self-liberation, and so willing to accredit their “embassy” in reverse.
Gnostic discourse
This brings us to the third site of homodiplomacy: gnostic discourse.

One could start by repaying a compliment to the Cypriot imam, show-
ing how Islamic Gnosticism can provide both a transgressive politology
and a critical theory of international relations. Consider the following
Qur’anic verse on the so-called Medina deputations, which is also the
preamble of the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights:
O Humankind! We created you from one, into male and female,

and divided you intonations and tribes, so that you may know one
another.
(Qur’an, 49.13)
Homodiplomacy is enhanced by accepting that the division of humans

into nations and tribes does not constitute a genealogical break but has
a specific divine and knowledge purpose. Such envisioning supports,
first, the position that the ethnic and national Other is always part of a
wider single Self. Second, it implies that self-knowledge is not an indi-
vidualistic or solitary exercise but rather the product of an encounter
with Others and a reflection on heterology. Third, it intensifies the need
of internationalizing the Umma, the community of believers, which
through the Islamic notion of “the people of the book” can turn the
polis into a cosmopolis (I refer here to the esoteric traditions of Islam
that see in “the people of the book” not only the Christians and the
Jews but anyone who follows in life a sacred scripture).
To appreciate what the notion of “knowing one another” entails,
it is important to understand that Islamic “knowledge” (ilm) means
not just scientific and religious knowledge but gnosis (Rosenthal, 1992;
Akhtar, 1997). Bridging the chasm between the Self, the Other and the
divine, seeing all three as identical, gnosis amalgamates knowledge of
Self/Other with knowledge of God. Gnosis is thus another word for the
archaic sacred embassy. Yet knowing one another is not a singular event
but lifetime education, not a momentous revelation but a desire to trans-
late into a practice of ethical engagement what it means to be spiritually
this or that Self as related to this or that Other.
Beyond Islamic Gnosticism, self-problematizing and self-knowing can
be a way of returning diplomacy to its Hermetic tradition, its his-
torical link to the mystical and the esoteric (Constantinou, 1996).
Hermes is the celebrated god of diplomacy but also of language and
gnosis. The Hermetic mental disposition underscores a coming to terms
with the hermeneutics of human knowledge, the interpretive dimen-
sion in the constitution and mediation of identities. Hermes warns those
who are engaging in diplomatic representation that there is no unmedi-
ated reality, that apparent meaning can never be trusted, prompting
them not to rush to accredit an ultimate interpretive version of events
and phenomena and to realize that every identification is a form of self-
forgetfulness. Here Hermetic “untrustworthiness” (Hermes is a known
trickster) has a great value, constantly reminding the recipients of
knowledge of what is politically at stake in unproblematically accept-
ing at face value “identities”, “interests”, “facts” and so on, and thus
shying away from introspective negotiation. The Hermetic disposition
indicates that the discourse of diplomacy, including the quest for knowl-
edge of Self and Other, should remain open to the work of hermeneutics
while accepting the possibility of hermetism – that is, the possibility
that something always remains hidden. A part of Self and Other always
remains strange to us even when (or precisely because) that part is
represented to us as most “familiar”.
That is not a licence, however, for diplomatic discourse not to try to

come to terms with the “mercuriality” of the stranger within. Indeed,
one should lament the scarce collaboration between the disciplines of
diplomacy and psychoanalysis with respect to the study of the human
unconscious (“the language of the Other” as Lacan put it) and its
impact on interethnic and international relations. Beyond the problem-
atic use of psychoanalysis in public relations and political marketing,
the insights of post-Freudian group psychology have had little applica-
tion in the study of modern diplomacy. Insights, for example, regarding
how others are used as “reservoirs” to project the negative aspects of
the Self, or the subtle interchanges of individual and large group iden-
tities, or how the nation or state can become a psychological substitute
for the nurturing mother, or how the leader can become an idealized
father who can even sublimate into loyalty negative feelings and initial
jealousies (Volkan, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c).
My preference, however, is to employ Jungian rather than Freudian
psychoanalysis to inform homodiplomatic practice. That is not only
because of the historical and spiritual depth of the Jungian study of
archetypes (the psychic propensities of the collective unconscious) but
also because it seems to me less liable to psychoanalytic hierarchy and
more open to gnostic narratives and experimentation. Jung actually
reserves a special psychological place for the tutelage of diplomacy,
Hermes or Mercurius. He sharply distinguishes Mercurius from Christ
by suggesting that “Christ appears as the archetype of consciousness
and Mercurius the archetype of the unconscious” (Jung, 1967, p. 247).
On the one side, Christ, the son of God, epitomizes the depth and
potential of conscious human knowledge but which in its secular ver-
sion can reach the Cartesian fallacy of cogito ergo sum – a “deification”
of the modern sovereign reasoning Man. On the other side, Mercurius
and its Christian version, Lucifer, the light-bringing angel, challenge the
Cartesian claim. Lucifer or Mercurius is the one who lightens the dark
side of the psyche: “Mercurius is by no means the Christian devil – the
latter could rather be said to be a “diabolisation” of Lucifer or Mercurius”
(Jung, 1967, pp. 247–248). Mercurius as the “light of darkness” illumi-
nates the contradictions, the complexes, the strange demons that are
always hidden inside humans. As Jung put it, “One does not become
enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making the darkness
conscious. The latter procedure, however, is disagreeable and therefore
not popular” (1967, pp. 265–266). To seriously worship Mercurius is not
to engage in naïve mysticism but effectively in “primitive” psychoanal-
ysis to seek to reveal and experience the power of the unconscious and
how it impacts on individual and collective beliefs, thus overcoming the

illusion of a unity or sovereignty of consciousness:
Mercurius, that two-faced god, comes as the lumen naturae [the light
of nature], the Servator and Salvator, only to those whose reason
strives towards the highest light ever received by man and who do
not trust exclusively the cognitio vespertina [the human knowledge].
For those who are unmindful of this light, the lumen naturae turns
into a perilous ignis fatuus [the foolish fire], and the psychopomp
into a diabolical seducer. Lucifer, who could have brought light,
becomes the father of lies whose voice in our time, supported by press
and radio, revels in orgies of propaganda and leads untold millions
to ruin.
(Jung, 1967, p. 250)
Consequently, for Jung the knowledge currently circulating in the mass

media, the public diplomacy of spin and propaganda, is a “devilish”
appropriation of Mercurius, or a corruption of an important diplomatic
and psychological archetype whose mission is primarily gnosis – that is
to say, not “fast” learning but carefully attending to Self paradoxes and
complexes, reconciling opposites and seeking to transform them into
self-knowledge.
In this regard, Jung supports a two-fold move that is relevant and
promising for homodiplomacy. First, by employing Mercurius as a guide
to self-analysis, he elevates the human unconscious to a modern secu-
lar oracle. This is now where the most solemn human embassies must
be directed. This is the barbarian that must be befriended and listened
to. This is where the effort of translation and interpretation ought to
concentrate, thus seeking to understand psychic conflict and limiting
its negative impact on interpersonal and international relations. Within
this context, diplomacy is not only concerned with mediating separate
Selves, groups or identities but primarily with the exposition and medi-
ation of conscious or unconscious goals, fears and needs, on the basis of
which the mediation of separate Selves takes place.
Second, unlike Freud, Jung wants the individual and not the pro-
fessional psychoanalyst to take the primary charge of this mission.
He suggests that this can be done through “active imagination” (as
distinguished from passive fantasy or daydreaming; see also Zittoun,
Chapter 8 this volume) – that is, for each human to directly and
seriously attend to and engage with the representations of their uncon-
scious, such as meticulously noting down and attempting to analyse
dreams, persistent images and symbols, word associations, slips of the

tongue and so on. By actively making unconscious propensities con-
scious (here Jung also supports the use of the creative arts if the individ-
ual finds this means of expression helpful), individuals can self-manage
or be assisted to bring about a new consciousness, outgrow problems
or resolve external conflicts with which they pathologically identify.
Working with Mercurius, actively mediating the “stranger within” and
the affectations that it brings about for the human thus becomes an
effective means of mediating the “stranger without”.4
Concluding remarks
The gnostic way is contrasted with the “unimaginative” Cartesian tradi-

tion where “modern man is so darkened that nothing beyond the light
of his own intellect illuminates his world” (Jung, 1967, p. 250). Within
the Cartesian tradition, human knowledge passes off as self-knowledge
with disastrous consequences in terms of moral self-righteousness and
for empowering policies based on total truth and total evil. This has
spiralling effects for the practice of diplomacy as the mediation of
estrangement.
In this chapter I have suggested a possible remedy. By looking at
more personal and experiential forms of diplomacy, I have argued that
diplomatic theory and practice can be informed and enriched by exper-
imenting with spirituality. Specifically, I have proposed that the stoic
idea of introspective negotiation, the Paulian notion of reverse accred-
itation and the gnostic dimension of encountering Otherness can be
means of conceptualizing and enhancing homodiplomacy. By this I cer-
tainly do not want to suggest that human diplomacy should be limited
to these specific spiritual traditions or that these traditions can be effort-
lessly and idealistically appropriated. Rather, the crucial point I wish to
underscore is experimentation.
Some authors have already suggested experimentation as an impor-
tant feature of diplomacy (Keens-Soper, 1975; Latour, 2004), and this is
a view that I fully share. The issue is how far we are willing to extend
diplomatic experimentation, skill and innovation beyond brokering
alliances, packaging agreements and drafting constructive ambiguities.
Are we willing, for example, to experiment with the parameters of
individual and collective identity by way of mediating difference and
self-interest? Are we willing to accredit ad hoc diplomats who help us to
escape “realist” notions of who we are or what we must be? Are we will-
ing to innovate with and politicize discourses that reflect on the spiritual
dimension of Otherness and its value in knowing and even changing the
Self? The positive answer to these questions is, I believe, a step forward
in the theory and practice of human diplomacy as well as a step towards
the enhancement of conflict transformation.
Notes
This is an expanded version of an article that has been published in Space and
Culture 9.4 (2006): 351–364.
1. An interview given to Leon Fermanian in 1991 at http://www.tsgfoundation
.org/downloads/TSinterview.pdf.
2. As Alain Badiou (2003) put it,
What exactly does “apostle” (apostolos) mean? Nothing empirical or his-
torical in any case. In order to be an apostle, it is not necessary to have
been a companion of Christ, a witness to the event. Paul, who claims his
legitimacy only from himself, and who, according to his own expression
has been “called to be an apostle”, explicitly challenges the pretension of
those who, in the name of what they were and saw, believe themselves
to be guarantors of truth . . . An apostle is neither a material witness, nor a
memory. (p. 44)
3. As Paul put it to the recipients of his gospel, ‘We have no dominion over your
faith but are helpers of your joy’ (2 Corinthians 1:24).
4. On the different ways and means that this can be done, including word asso-
ciation, dream interpretation, dance, music, painting, theatre and poetry, see
Jung (1997).
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8
Social Relations and the Use of
Symbolic Resources in Learning
and Development
Tania Zittoun
Introduction
Social relations unfold between people, in specific societies. Doing so,

they participate both in the making of people and societies, and, in
times of tension and war, in the unmaking of groups or the harming
of individuals. Yet social relations are never immediate, or naked. In a
world of culture, they appear as always mediated. In effect, people’s rela-
tionships are made through exchanges of words and objects, are filtered
by beliefs and expectations, and are facilitated by phones and books. Yet,
interestingly, these mediations – be they material tools or more semiotic
mediation – mostly have a double mode of existence. Not only do they
actually mediate a social relation between two people – as when a flag
is passed from one hand to another – but also they are mostly likely to
mediate, or trigger, or facilitate a more symbolic dynamic, as when a
flag is used by one person to remind them of their childhood home, or
for the other to think about possible conquests for their group. In other
words, a cultural psychology invites us to examine the cultural elements
which mediate human relationships. These, which usually have a mate-
rial and a semiotic dimension, have both an existence in the present –
the here and now of an interaction – and also a more virtual one,
opening memories or worlds of possibilities.
In times of intergroup conflict, education is seen as one means by
which teachers might bring children to imagine a world beyond the
limitation of stereotypes, mistrust and violence. Teaching about democ-
racy, civic rights, personal or collective history appear as means to go
beyond the here and now, the difficult and the painful, and to support a
134
Tania Zittoun 135
movement that could, ideally, allow children to recognize the perspec-

tives of others (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Daiute, 2010, 2013; Keller,
Chapter 3, this volume). But in what ways can teaching help young
people to go beyond mistrust, the fear of Otherness and the uncer-
tainty of the unknown, and to reflect on their situation in the world
and their relationship to others and the social world? My starting point
here is to consider that teaching-learning is a mediated activity: at its
core lie objects of knowledge, cultural elements or artefacts (Cole, 1996;
Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 10). Therefore, to understand how
teaching-learning can bring the recognition of the Other, or to reflect on
one’s relationship with the Other, one needs to consider the dynamics
that take place with and through these cultural elements in their double
mode of existence. These objects can on the one side be the vehicle for
the transmission of facts and historical narratives, while on the other
side, and simultaneously, they are likely to awake a more personal, emo-
tional and imaginary engagement. In this chapter I therefore examine
the role of cultural elements, as these trigger imaginary experiences, in
people’s development of a better understanding of Self and Otherness in
teaching-learning situations.
Imagination and territorial conflicts
The social sciences in studying intergroup conflict have in general

shown the negative, if not destructive, role of imagination in dealing
with Otherness. Classical social psychology shows that two groups in
a situation of competition each tend to develop simplified and stereo-
typical views of the other group, which emphasizes differences and
reduces similarities (Tajfel, 1981). Such representations can also lead
groups to be immune to any change towards an openness to the other
(Gillespie, Chapter 6). Current studies on geographic imaginations show
how, in the case of territorial conflicts – such as in the Israeli-Palestinian
situation – imaginary dimensions prevent negotiations and the search
for compromises. Indeed, mythical narratives of the past or religious
projects are heavily emotional and value-laden. Consequently, when
two groups hold contradictory “geographic imaginations” of a place,
these are often deeply mutually exclusive (Newman, 1999). Such studies
also suggest that actual negotiations can only start when the inter-
locutors leave the plane of imaginary narratives to focus on pragmatic
problem-solving. On the other hand, a few studies also suggest that
imaginary productions might actually participate in a positive transfor-
mation of the representational field in the case of intergroup conflict.
Studies of the evolution of mural painting in Ireland (Gillespie, 1999),

or of the role of poetry in the same country (Reid, 2008), suggest that fic-
tion and imagination can have a role to play in the resolution of conflict.
Such studies are promising and demand a better understanding of the
processes involved. I will thus consider young people’s uses of fiction –
focusing not on intergroup relationship (as in Downing Wilson & Cole,
Chapter 10) but on interpersonal and intrapsychic dynamics.
Sociocultural approach to learning and development
My perspective here is a sociocultural, developmental psychology

(Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1996; Valsiner, 2007). Sociocultural psychology sees
our society as a world of circulating webs of meaning that have strong
canalizing functions. People live in social frames as well as symbolic net-
works that favour some modes of thinking and action and render others
almost inconceivable. Yet this psychology also sees people as having
unique perspectives in that world. The person has a history, they feel,
they have memories, desires and imagination, and they have experi-
ences and activities in the world. As a person acts and interacts with
others (present or imaginary, specific or generalized) and with objects
that result from the experiences of others, they internalize some of the
socially shared meanings and discourse, but also appropriate them and
create a unique understanding – their personal culture. On this basis,
they also externalize meaning in a unique manner, by which they will
contribute to the symbolic fields and shared discourse. Through this
ongoing dynamic, the person can thus define a unique melody of liv-
ing (Zittoun et al., 2013). My focus here is on semiotic processes – that
is, processes by which we understand the signs in the world and how
these shape our mind, and how our mind, through signs, transforms
the world.
Uses of symbolic resources
Children and young adults – as well as people throughout life – find

many occasions for learning and change in their daily lives. People inter-
act with others, learn with them, reflect on their own action and learn by
experience; they also play and so explore new possibilities for actions.
Finally, they spend a lot of time interacting with “imaginary worlds”
offered by fiction: they read and are read stories, watch cartoons and
movies, listen to songs, and see drawings and paintings. Let us call these
films, novels, comic books and so on “cultural elements”.
Tania Zittoun 137
Interacting with them, children and adults engage in a fictional, imag-

inary experience, supported by the language, images and sounds, and
demanding from the child to “nourish” the fiction with their own
knowledge of the world and their own feelings. One needs to mobi-
lize one’s own experience of forest to understand Little Red Riding
Hood. One also needs to draw on one’s understanding of the relation-
ship of plausible causalities. On the other hand, imagination demands
to follow new paths, and enter into an “as if” mode: one reasons
not only with what is – it is dangerous to be a child in the forest –
but also with what could be the case: What if the child meets the
wolf? What if the wolf is in disguise? And so forth (Vygotsky, 1971;
Miller et al., 1993; Harris, 2000). Imagination triggered and guided
by cultural elements thus demands both a strong emotional commit-
ment and also the exploration of alternatives to what is known. These
explorations are “safe” in the sense that even strong emotions trig-
gered by a story (the pleasure of killing the wolf) have no actual
consequences.
In addition, people very often have the opportunity to reflect about
these cultural experiences when they talk about them with parents and
friends or remember them in new situations. Cultural elements are thus
likely to be used by children and adults as symbolic resources (Zittoun,
2006, 2007, 2014). As such, they are mobilized not only for what they
actually say or represent but as means to do something else – to reflect
about oneself, to capture and understand one’s emotions, or to under-
stand better other people’s actions or the world. In past studies I have
thus shown that in daily life, people use symbolic resources in such a
way that they might redefine their identity, learn new ways of doing
things or confer a new sense to a given situation. For these reasons, uses
of symbolic resources might be candidates for transforming Self–Other
relationships.
Philosophy, literature and movies as symbolic resources

Michele Grossen and I have explored how upper secondary school stu-
dents could relate to philosophical and literary texts encountered in the
classroom, and in what contexts they could possibly use them as sym-
bolic resources. We studied three secondary schools in the same Swiss
canton, the project including 230 young people in 15 group classes.
We observed 56 lessons, interviewed teachers (N = 16), asked students
to complete a general questionnaire (N = 205) and interviewed some of
them alone (N = 20) or in focus groups (N = 6). Each type of data was
analysed as a corpus, and we also built case studies, bringing together
data related to one teacher and their class (see e.g. Zittoun & Grossen,
2012; Grossen et al., 2012).
From the interview data it appears that young people from our sam-
ple are very likely to use symbolic resources in school and out of
school. In what follows I take some examples of uses of symbolic
resources, with a specific emphasis on those that might change how
young people see themselves, or their group of belonging, in rela-
tion to others. For instance, asked about literature or movies that he
particularly liked, Ismaël, a young man in a vocational school, men-
tioned the movie Remember the Titans, which describes the victory of a
mixed white and Afro-American football team. In that case, he spon-
taneously thought of a film that he had discovered at school a few
years earlier, when a teacher presented it to a class after a racist inci-
dent had occurred. One of the cues suggesting that this movie is used
as a symbolic resource is the fact that Ismaël watches it often, and so
the interviewer asked what triggered Ismaël’s need to watch the movie
again:
Interviewer: Could you say when [NB: at what moments] you feel like
seeing the moving again?
Ismaël: For example, mornings, when I am watching Euro News, and
I see bomb attacks or so, in the evening I might feel watching a bit
of it
Interviewer: You see bits . . . what are the bits which . . .
Ismaël: Impressed me most, it’s when they enter on the football field
because they decided to make a song together in order to show
everyone that they could associate together with that song
The film appears as a symbolic resource that Ismaël uses when he is

exposed to the violence of world news – suicide bombers and attacks,
which can be seen as caused by intergroup conflict or racial hatred. The
movie represents intergroup conflicts and violence. In addition it offers
an alternative resolution through the reunification in a common song,
which makes the group stronger. One might therefore think that Ismaël
finds there a representation, in a transposed way, of violence and cru-
elty. The fictional world thus invites him to reflect upon the real world
and to consider alternative resolutions. A few turns later, the interviewer
returned to the antiracist nature of the movie:
Interviewer: How come do you resonate with the movie – did you
experience racism personally?
Tania Zittoun 139
Ismaël: Actually, when I was younger, during a period I had a cousin

who was a racist and he was always telling me that I was, well, that if
one is not a racist one cannot be a good Swiss or so; so I told myself
I could be a racist too, I sort of thought that it was a matter of style;
but then after seeing that movie, I reflected and I told myself that I
didn’t need to do that
Watching the film, Ismaël seems first to have recognized something

he had experienced himself. Following his cousin, he used to define
himself as a “racist”; at the beginning of the film, he “recognises”
some closeness to the most racist character. This is the first step for a
transformative process. A form of “resonance”, based on some kind of
similarity (in characters, emotional situations, structure of events, etc.)
between personal experience and the fictional world triggered by the
cultural element, is one condition to start using it as symbolic resource
(Zittoun, 2013). In effect, after this first identification, the fictional reso-
lution seems to have invited Ismaël to reflect upon his real-life position
and identity, and to see that there is an alternative to it. Of course, the
fact that the movie was presented at school in the context of an activity
intended to get students to reflect about racism probably supported that
movement. I’ll return to this later.
Using a symbolic resource on the basis of a personal resemblance, and
in order to reflect about oneself, is often the first step to other uses, such
as uses of symbolic resources to question the social environment, or the
world in which one lives (Zittoun, 2007). Gaëtane is a young woman
who was also moved by an Asian movie which, she felt, reflected some
aspects of her difficulties in dealing with her parents’ divorce and which
she watched often (Zittoun & Grossen, 2012). This led her to see more
Asian movies, to learn some martial arts, and to explore Asian culture
and history:
Through these films precisely I learn Asian culture and . . . otherwise

historical movies I . . . like history so watching them even if there is a
love story in the story but there is a historical movie behind or . . . a
real story about war, I like it. It is because it always teaches me some-
thing, and then I look for more information, I go on Internet or I buy
books about things the story was talking, and so I can deepen my
knowledge on the topic.
Not only is the movie used as a symbolic resource but also it brings
the young woman to a more systematic enquiry, in which she explores
more cultural elements so as to have the mastery of an organized field of
knowledge. Thus she refers to this exploration as “learning” and “deep-

ening her knowledge”. In such a case we might say that uses of symbolic
resources are generative – they inspire a self-sustaining dynamic of
searching, exploring cultural elements, using them as symbolic resources
and so forth.
We also found many occurrences of uses of literary texts as symbolic
resources in the classroom. Asked about a book that might have moved
her, Monica speaks about a personal use of resource oriented towards
self-understanding:
It happened to me with a recent book, I was reading it, and I said

to myself, I felt I saw myself . . . six months ago, and it disturbed
me, I didn’t expect to find myself in such a book by Emile Zola
[L’assommoir] . . . Let’s say . . . the woman in the book, she felt totally
abandoned, she was upset against everyone and it was nobody’s fault,
if someone was guilty it is herself, and she was falling in depression,
so I thought . . . I reacted similarly . . . only at the end she dies, and
I managed to reverse the spiral.
Marc read another book by Zola and used it to reflect on a social and
political situation that he was experiencing as a member of a workers’
union during a strike in the company in which he did his apprentice-
ship. Hence here, as outside school, symbolic resources can be used to
think about one’s location in the world, and the world itself. This is also
very clear in Gaëtane’s description of her courses in history, which had
become a semiotic resource to think about one’s own environment:
I have a teacher that often makes connections with the past and the
present and it enables us to understand realize that sometime we crit-
icize, for example, people who could not – for example, during World
War II, we criticize people who failed to see that Hitler was a bit mad,
but one could do the same with us because we don’t react about Iraq
or things like this so . . . I like this teacher’s way of teaching because
I . . . become aware of more things and I open the eyes on the present
and the future, yes.
Symbolic resources, whether they are met in daily life or at school,

enable imaginary explorations of spheres of experiences offered by
cultural elements. These can be seen as a semiotic construction made to
evoke or transmit the experience and perspective of other people upon
Tania Zittoun 141
the world. In that sense, using a symbolic resource is always a confronta-

tion between one’s knowledge and experience, and that proposed by the
fiction, and part of the reflective movement supported by the symbolic
resource is given by this junction of perspectives (Gillespie, 2006, 2007).
Yet in most uses of symbolic resources there is the presence of a real,
social Other.
Symbolic resources and social relationships
In what contexts can young people use symbolic resources that are dis-
covered in daily life or at school? In daily life, people’s first encounters
with cultural elements that are likely to turn into resources often take
place within a personally significant relationship. A mother read tales
to her daughter for many years before she started to develop a passion
for a certain type of literature (Zittoun, 2010); a friend introduced a
teenager to a pop band whose lyrics changed her life at a moment of
deep sorrow (Zittoun, 2007); a father tried to share his passion for cin-
ema with his son (Zittoun, 2006). In the case mentioned above, Gaëtane
shared her passion for Asian culture with a cousin. In these situations,
the adult, or the Other person, often simply exposes someone to the
cultural element; there is probably a shared understanding of what it
is about, but also there is interpersonal trust and mutual recognition.
In such situations there is usually an implicit recognition that, beyond
the shared meaning of the cultural element, each person is actually
developing a personal sense of it. Uses of symbolic resources are likely
to start as people discuss the cultural element that is commonly expe-
rienced, while reflecting on the personal meaning that it has for each
of them.
When people encounter cultural elements during classroom activities,
the situation is slightly different: the teacher–student or peer relation-
ships do not have the same emotional quality. In addition, the task of
the school is to aid students in developing a historical knowledge of a
certain domain, to be able to develop a metalanguage – to talk about
the evolution of style or language – and to analyse the texts or argu-
mentative structures. The role of teachers is thus more or less explicitly
to enable students to develop a shared, if not conventional, way of talk-
ing about literature or philosophy. Can the teacher both support the
necessary transmission of formal knowledge about texts and the sort of
acknowledgement of personal sense-making that might facilitate uses of
symbolic resources?
A close analysis of teachers’ ways of talking about their work, their

own uses of symbolic resources, interactions in the classroom, and what
students said about what they learned from them suggests that students
are likely to develop a personal way of using symbolic resources at school
when they experience a form of safety (as in a “thinking space”) (Perret-
Clermont, 2004, Chapter 4). Such forms of reappropriation appear in
two main relational configurations. In a typical modality, the teacher
simply gives their class, with a clear focus on the shared meaning of cul-
tural elements, leaving space for the children to work on their own but
with no allusion to the potential personal “sense” that these might have.
In a more proactive modality, the teacher creates a situation in which
they clearly mention the fact that they have developed a personal rela-
tionship with the text – they like it, find it interesting, for their own rea-
sons, without necessarily saying why. In turn, they invite the students to
develop their own personal relationship with the object for knowledge,
although they don’t need to know what it is. This is at times conveyed in
expressions such as “I love the book. I hope you will love it too, although
you might love it for different reasons than me.” Yet, in parallel, the
teacher focuses the work on the shared meaning of the cultural ele-
ments – how it is made, to which tradition it belongs and so on (Zittoun,
2014). In this way a double relationship seems to exist (Figure 8.1).
In this configuration, two different intersubjective dynamics take
place. On the one hand, a “learning–teaching” interaction takes place
along the dotted horizontal line in Figure 8.1. This is clearly an asym-
metrical relationship because the teacher has more expertise regarding
the texts than the students. They can also transmit knowledge about
Symetrical relationship
Sense of text for Sense of text for

teacher student
Teacher Text Student
Asymetrical relationship
Figure 8.1 Double recognition in teaching–learning interactions

Tania Zittoun 143
it and help them to develop specific skills. On the other hand, there is
a symmetrical relationship (upper curved line), by which it is openly
recognized that each participant has their own personal relationship of
sense to that text (Zittoun, 2013). My hypothesis is that such a double
relationship enables a real structure of recognition. In the symmetrical
relationship, the learner feels recognized “as a person”, as a full human,
with a private life, wishes and desires, problems and worries about the
world. In the asymmetric relationship there is the possibility of a mutual
recognition – of the teacher’s capacities by the student, of the student’s
capacity to learn from the teacher. These two relationships might pre-
cisely coexist as they reinforce each other: when a young person feels
recognized, or acknowledged as a person, and thus in return acknowl-
edges the teacher as a person, they might be more ready to acknowledge
them as a more knowledgeable person. And when such a structure of
recognition exists, learners are more likely to engage in a dialogue with a
cultural element encountered in the classroom, and to accept using it as
a symbolic resource to reflect about themselves, others and the world –
and thus be changed by it.
Facilitating uses of symbolic resources for peace
In this chapter I proposed to give theoretical and empirical support

to the idea that imaginary discourse – as in fiction – might be used
by people to develop a better understanding of themselves, in their
relationships with others and with the social world.
If we look at what people concretely do with fictional texts, we see
that they very often use them to think about issues which are problem-
atic to them. When they feel concerned, or moved by a movie, song
or novel, they are likely to find some resonance between them and the
fictional world, and they might consequently confer a personal sense to
it. After the experience, people are likely to reflect on why they were
moved by that cultural element. In this moment of post-hoc reflec-
tion, people often explore the imaginary world proposed by the fiction,
and go back and forth between what is, and what has been represented
as alternative – what could be – in the world of fiction. This sort of
dialogical movement enables thinking about the relationship between
present and past, and often present and possible futures. Such uses of
symbolic resources are the source of all forms of reinvention: changing
one’s gaze on Self and on Others, and therefore changing one’s under-
standing of Others and their motivation. Uses of symbolic resources
can be extremely powerful means to transform one’s understanding and
action in Self–Others relationships. However, the conditions in which

such self-reflection and understanding, mutuality and critical thinking
take place are quite frail. Yet these naturally occur in daily, informal
situations, and sometimes in the classroom. My analysis of these sit-
uations suggests that some modalities of social relationships facilitate
such constructive uses of symbolic resources. These include an uncondi-
tional recognition of the specific perspective of the Other as Other when
the same cultural element has been mutually recognized. Hence mutual
recognition in teacher–learner, adult–child interaction, or generally in
interpersonal relationships, might be a prerequisite for people to engage
in using fiction as symbolic resources to develop new, cooperative and
peace-oriented understandings of Others.
Note
This chapter appeared previously in the university journal Cahiers de psychologie
et education (Zittoun, 2011).
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Part III
Social Relations of the Economic
Culture and Financial Crisis:
Social, Cross-Cultural and
Cultural Psychological
Perspectives
9
The Role of Economic Culture
in Social Relationships and
Interdependence
Ayse K. Uskul
Introduction
Culture is a broad term with a plethora of meanings. Thus any

discussion of how it shapes human psychology must lay the ground-
work by defining the parameters of the analysis. In this chapter, I situate
culture within economic environments, asking how certain socioeco-
logical features in a given economic community shape interactions to
affect social psychological and cognitive outcomes. Instead of situat-
ing culture within individuals and considering how culture is perceived
or construed by them, I focus on culture as it exists in objective cir-
cumstances that are observable to anyone (for a similar distinction, see
Jahoda, 2011). This approach draws on Oishi’s discussion of socioecolog-
ical psychology (Oishi, 2010, 2014; Oishi & Graham, 2010) and Medin’s
references to a cultural ecosystem (e.g. Medin et al., 2013), both of
which emphasize the systemic interactions between, or mutual consti-
tution of, social/ecological environments and human mind/behaviour.
It also bears a resemblance to cultural-ecological (e.g. Berry, 1979;
Whiting & Edwards, 1988; Keller, 2011; Adams et al., 2012) and socio-
cultural (e.g. Plaut et al., 2002; Maynard & Greenfield, 2003; Adams,
2005) approaches to the study of the interplay between culture and
psychology.
Although I recognize the mutual constitution of social/ecological
environments and human mind/behaviour, and I acknowledge the
importance of studying how human psychology may shape economic
systems, I limit the present discussion to research on the relationship
149
150 Economic Culture and Financial Crisis
between economic systems and a few select cognitive or social psycho-

logical outcome variables to highlight the role of the macroenvironment
in human psychology. In particular, I focus on how the economic envi-
ronment may shape social interdependence, thereby leading to certain
ways of thinking and behaving.
Cultural context and social interdependence: The case

of economic circumstances
How culture shapes social interdependence has been at the centre of

cultural psychological theory for decades. It attracted growing empir-
ical attention after Triandis (1989), and Markus and Kitayama (1991)
noted the role of culture and associated degrees of individuality or
sociality in the shaping of the Self. Since then, different sets of cul-
tural attributes have been shown to shape people’s interdependencies
with other individuals and groups, such as residential or geographical
mobility and population density (for reviews, see Markus & Hamedani,
2007; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Oishi, 2014). Some researchers have also
considered how socioeconomic status (e.g. Lachman & Weaver, 1998;
Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens et al., 2007) and the level of eco-
nomic development (Loucky, 1976; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Greenfield
et al., 2003; Kağıtçıbaşı & Ataca, 2005) or material abundance (Adams
et al., 2012) within a culture shape social interdependence among its
members.
In this chapter, I focus not on economic differences between groups
that arise from variations in the amount of accumulated wealth or pat-
terns of resource distribution, but those that stem from engagement in
different types of economic activity that require different kinds of social
interdependencies. In particular, I ask how a certain economic activity
and the resulting structure adopted in the groups practising this activity
may shape the nature of their social relations and how this, in turn,
influences cognitive and social psychological outcomes. I summarize
recent research where my collaborators and I studied groups earning
their living from different economic activities. When discussing the link
between economic activity and cognitive styles, I use findings from stud-
ies with members of fishing, farming and herding communities. When
discussing the link between economic activity and responses to social
exclusion, I rely on research conducted with members of farming and
herding communities. The relevant communities are in a single region
of the eastern Black Sea district of Turkey. This design feature of the
study allows us to match groups with regard to important variables such
Ayse K. Uskul 151
as ethnicity, language and religion, and helps to reduce the number

of potentially confounding variables that may explain observed differ-
ences. This permits us to address, at least to some extent, one of the
limitations of two-culture comparisons (i.e. Western vs. Eastern cultural
groups) – namely, that the observed cultural differences often cannot be
interpreted.
Some details about these particular economic communities may be
helpful at the outset. The farmers make their living from growing tea
and are located in villages near the city of Rize, which is known for pro-
ducing approximately 75 percent of the tea in Turkey. They generally
harvest three or four crops each year. Production is typically managed
by families who own small- to medium-sized fields. The labour needed
to maintain the plants and harvest the leaves is, where possible, pro-
vided by family members but, increasingly often, outside help is hired,
especially if the area of land is large.
The fishermen are also located in villages near Rize. In addition to its
substantial tea production, Rize ranks fourth in the country’s fish pro-
duction. These fishermen mostly do open sea fishing and catch small
fish such as anchovy, mackerel and red mullet. Ethnographic work in the
region (Knudsen, 1995, 2006) suggests that most of the fishing-related
tasks are handled by the immediate family. Finally, there are herding
communities located in the villages of Artvin and Erzurum, close to Rize.
In this region, in the absence of agricultural land (primarily due to alti-
tude), animal husbandry has developed as the main source of income.
Community members herd smaller animals, such as goats and sheep,
and bigger animals, such as cows and oxen.
Cultural differences in social interdependence

and economic requirements
Past research has concentrated on how making a living from farming vs.
herding influences the level of social interdependence within a cultural
group. For example, farming often requires group collaboration, and
farmers are tied to the land they cultivate and, thus, to fixed commu-
nities. In contrast, herding activities require less cooperation and they
rely on individual decision-making and autonomy. Herders are typically
not tied to particular plots of land; their capital can be moved to any
location that offers sufficient nutrition for their animals.
Some suggest that these lifestyles will lead to interdependence
among farmers (perhaps by reinforcing responsiveness to social
contingencies) and independence among herders (perhaps by rewarding
goal-directedness) (see Kitayama, Duffy & Uchida, 2007). And, in fact,

research findings indicate that farmers show a high degree of social
interdependence, resulting in stronger emphasis on conformity (Barry
et al., 1959; Berry, 1967), consultation among members and collec-
tivist action (Edgerton, 1965), higher degrees of compliance, consci-
entiousness, and conservatism in child-rearing practices (Barry et al.,
1959); in their cognitive patterns, they show a greater tendency to per-
ceive objects, not in terms of their uniqueness but in terms of their
larger social context (Berry, 1966). By way of contrast, herders show
a lesser degree of social interdependence, resulting in individualistic
social orientations (Edgerton, 1971; Witkin & Berry, 1975), indepen-
dent decision-making (Barry et al., 1959; Berry, 1967), individualism
and assertiveness in child-rearing practices (Barry et al., 1959), and
a greater ability to separate objects from the social context (Berry,
1966).
Fishing communities are less frequently studied but are typically
viewed as sharing the characteristics of hunting societies, leading some
to suggest that this economic activity encourages independence (Barry,
et al., 1959), but we suggest that certain fishing activities could require
social interdependence. If fishing is carried out as a solitary activity,
it could be expected to lead to an independent orientation. However,
if fishing involves task interdependence (as, for example, fishermen
coordinating their efforts to catch a whale), then it may promote inter-
dependence (e.g. Henrich et al., 2001). In the case of the fishermen we
studied, the tasks required group engagement on medium-sized boats
on a daily basis that involved cooperative activities, such as catching the
fish, delivering it to the purchaser, and maintaining the equipment (e.g.
nets). Moreover, leaving the fishery and the port to which one belongs to
seek another location can be a socially costly decision (Knudsen, 1995).
It follows, then, that fishing exercised as a cooperative activity will foster
social interdependence.
In the section below, I summarize findings from two sets of studies
my collaborators and I conducted on how particular economic settings
foster varying degrees of social interdependence, looking specifically at
(1) generalized cognitive tendencies and (2) responses to social exclu-
sion. The first set looks at Turkish adults in the abovementioned fishing,
herding and farming communities who report one of these three activ-
ities as their main source of income. The second set includes research
conducted with children from the same communities whose parents
have herding or farming as their main source of income.
Ayse K. Uskul 153
Consequences for cognitive tendencies

There is ample evidence that members of East Asian cultures with
relatively interdependent and collectivistic orientations show holistic
perceptual tendencies, while members of North American cultures with
relatively independent and individualistic orientations show analytic
perceptual tendencies (for a review, see Nisbett, 2003). This means that,
compared with Americans, East Asians are more likely to perceive the
existence of a relationship between a focal object and the larger social
field within which it is embedded and to explain events on the basis of
such relationships (e.g. Nisbett et al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2010). Nisbett
and colleagues call this holistic thinking. Americans are more likely to
detach focal objects from their context, to focus on attributes of the
object and categorize it, and to use generic rules about the category
to explain and predict the object’s behaviour. This is called “analytic
thinking”.
We are not the first to ask whether social orientation in a given
economic setting has consequences for cognitive functioning. In his
pioneering work with Temne of Sierra Leone and Inuit of Baffin Island,
Berry (1966) found farmers more likely than hunters and gatherers to
be unable to separate objects from their context. We examined this in
a single region, hoping to find that the type of economic activity and
not another variable leads to any differences that we found in cognitive
tendencies.
We administered tests to members of the fishing (N = 51), herding
(N = 45) and farming (N = 49) communities in Rize, Turkey. These were
designed to assess holistic/analytic tendencies in three cognitive tasks –
attention, categorization and reasoning – and to determine whether,
as we had hypothesized, members of farming and fishing communities
were more holistic in their thinking than members of herding commu-
nities. To examine group differences in attention, we used the Framed
Line Test (FLT) (Kitayama et al., 2003). The FLT contains two tasks,
the absolute and relative tasks, involving reproducing lines in squares
of different sizes (for details, see Kitayama et al., 2003). The absolute
task is facilitated by the ability to decontextualize or ignore the square
frame and, thus, is interfered with by holistic thinking. In contrast, the
relative task is facilitated by the inability to ignore the square frame.
We measured performance errors in millimetres averaged separately for
each task. The results showed that the overall performance was better in
the relative than the absolute task. In line with our prediction, we also
found that in the relative task, farmers and fishermen drew the lines
with greater accuracy than herders, whereas in the absolute task, herders
were more accurate. This suggests that the farmers and fishermen were
more able to focus on the object (the line in the square) in relation to its
context (the square) than the herders, who paid more attention to the
object, independent of the context.
The tests we employed to examine group differences in categorization
and reasoning showed similar results. Using a triad task developed by
Ji, Zhang and Nisbett (2004), we observed that when asked which two
of three objects in 18 triads (e.g. glove, scarf and hand) went together,
farmers and fishermen created a larger number of functional/contextual
groupings (e.g. glove and hand), attending more holistically to rela-
tionships and similarities among objects than herders, who focused
relatively more on the category membership of objects and used rules
of categorization (e.g. glove and scarf). Finally, to examine the use of
similarities vs. abstract rules in reasoning, we used a task developed
by Norenzayan, Smith, Kim and Nisbett (2002), asking participants to
view ten sets of stimuli consisting of a target set against two groups of
four objects and to decide which group of objects the target object most
resembled. In this task, herders were more likely to use rule-based rea-
soning (i.e. making decisions based on all objects sharing one feature)
than farmers and fishermen, who preferred similarity-based reasoning
(i.e. making decisions based on overall similarity – objects sharing a
large number of features with the target object but no one feature being
shared by all members).
These findings support the prediction that economic activities requir-
ing a higher level of social interdependence are associated with holistic
cognitive tendencies (Uskul et al., 2008). Specifically, farmers and fish-
ermen who rely more extensively on the assistance of other members
of their communities are more likely to process their world in terms
of similarities and relationships, thus exhibiting a higher level of holis-
tic cognitive tendency than herders, who are more likely to carry out
the required economic activity independently. These findings replicate
those of Berry (1966) in the work mentioned above with Temne and
Inuit.
Consequences for responses to social exclusion among children

There are two ways in which interdependence might be related to
responses to ostracism situations. On the one hand, given the impor-
tance of social relationships for individuals who define themselves
interdependently, being subjected to social exclusion might mean social
death (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991). On the other hand, being
Ayse K. Uskul 155
reminded of one’s social ties helps to restore a sense of belonging (e.g.

Twenge et al., 2007), and individuals who define themselves interde-
pendently may be able to protect themselves from the negative conse-
quences of social exclusion by being aware of their social connectedness
with others.
In socially interdependent cultures, group members form close bonds
with those around them, encouraging tight-knit networks and mutual
obligations. In less interdependent cultures, individuals form much
weaker social bonds and thus display greater autonomy (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). Similarly, individuals with a chronically interdepen-
dent self-construal have a larger number of social connections imme-
diately accessible to them than those with a chronically independent
self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Several researchers have
recently investigated the possibility that the level of social interdepen-
dence within a culture may shape responses to ostracism, and they
have shown over a series of studies that social interdependence may
play a protective role in experiences of social exclusion. For exam-
ple, Gardner and colleagues (Gardner et al., 2005; Gardner et al.,
2014) hypothesized that strong social bonds should serve as a pro-
tection against the negative psychological consequences of ostracism
because an individual’s other social connections should act as a
buffer. Their converging evidence across five studies shows that within
Western cultures, chronically interdependent self-construal functions
as a buffer against the negative effects of social exclusion. For exam-
ple, individuals who define themselves in terms of their social rela-
tionships and group memberships report a less negative mood and
less impairment in cognitive performance after an incident of social
exclusion.
Exploring a similar question at the cultural level with members of
individualistic (German) and collectivistic (Turkish, Chinese, Indian)
cultural groups, Pfundmair, Aydin, Du, Yeung, Frey, and Graupmann
(in press) found that the individualist participants (German) showed
decreased levels of belonging, self-esteem, mood, meaningful existence
and control after experiencing an incident of social exclusion, but
the collectivist participants (Turkish, Chinese, Indian) were affected to
a lesser extent. This difference was also observed at the physiologi-
cal level, with more individualistic participants (German) showing an
increased heart rate when excluded, and more collectivistic partici-
pants (Chinese) demonstrating no change. In related research, Ren and
colleagues (2014) demonstrated that individuals with interdependent
self-construals recover more quickly from the pain of ostracism.
Thus initial evidence suggests that cultural background is likely to

play a role in responses to ostracism, and these responses are likely
shaped by the degree of social interdependence experienced at the
individual and/or cultural level.
In our work (Over & Uskul, submitted), we built on these initial
findings and other research that has shown that young children are
sensitive to ostracism threats (Over & Carpenter, 2009; Watson-Jones,
Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014), and they are able to make moral
decisions about social exclusion (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Will et al.,
2013) by asking whether there are cultural differences in how painful
ostracism is perceived to be and how ostracism events are morally eval-
uated. Based on previous work that demonstrates a protective effect of
social interdependence in the face of ostracism, we predicted that indi-
viduals living in communities with high levels of social interdependence
would estimate ostracism as being less painful than individuals living in
communities with lower levels of interdependence. We also hypothe-
sized that if ostracism has less negative consequences for individuals
from interdependent communities, these persons will sympathize less
with victims of ostracism and judge those who ostracize less harshly.
We tested these predictions on the children of Turkish farmers (N = 30)
and herders (N = 30).
To test whether farmers’ children evaluate ostracism as less painful
than herders’ children, we presented members of both groups with a
scenario depicting a child being ostracized by a group of children and
asked them to estimate how sad they thought the child would feel.
Farmers’ children estimated that the ostracized child felt significantly
less sad than did herders’ children. This group difference held for both
the younger (4–5 years old) and the older children (6–8 years old) in our
sample. In a separate study, we replicated this finding and also showed
that individual differences in parents’ level of social interdependence
predicted their children’s responses to the ostracism situation, namely
the more relational parents were in their self-concept, the less painful
children estimated ostracism to be.
Next, to test our prediction that farmers’ children would sympathize
less with the victims of ostracism and punish those who ostracized
others less harshly than herders’ children, we presented all children
with the same description of ostracism. In one trial we asked them to
distribute five stickers between one member of the ostracizing group
and a neutral child, and in a second trial we asked them to distribute
five stickers between the previously ostracized child and a different
neutral child. We found that across cultural groups, participants gave
Ayse K. Uskul 157
more stickers to the target child in the ostracized-neutral trial than in

the ostracizer-neutral trial, indicating a general tendency to sympathize
with the ostracized child and punish the ostracizer. Importantly, we also
observed differences between the two groups. We found that farmers’
children (N = 28) punished ostracizers less harshly, distributing signif-
icantly more stickers to them relative to the neutral child than did
herders’ children (N = 30). Again, this pattern replicated among both
younger and older children. In summary, farmers’ children not only
judged ostracism as less painful than did herders’ children but also
judged ostracizing others as less worthy of punishment.
These interesting findings suggest that economic culture is likely
to shape psychological outcomes. Studying children with different
parental economic activity, we found significant differences in responses
to ostracism situations and discovered that these differences emerge
early in development. In these cases at least, it seems that the family’s
economic culture shapes not only how children perceive the pain of
ostracism but also how they judge the ostracism decisions of others.
Cultural differences in economic reliance on strangers
As summarized in previous sections, most of the existing research on

economic groups has concentrated on how making a living from a spe-
cific economic activity (e.g. farming or herding) shapes the degree of
social interdependence in a given community, with considerable atten-
tion being paid to differences in the required level of cooperation to
perform the economic activity. However, other aspects of the dominant
economic activity may have implications for social interdependence
and merit similar attention.
For example, in recent research (Uskul & Over, 2014), we focused on
another difference between farming and herding communities that we
expected to shape the type of interdependence experienced by members
of a community – namely, the extent to which the pursued economic
activity requires reliance on strangers (individuals outside one’s imme-
diate social circle). As in our previous work, this research was conducted
with farmers and herders in the Eastern Black Sea region in Turkey where
clear differences exist in the extent to which members of the respective
economic communities have to rely on competition, negotiation and
interaction with individuals they don’t know or know only superficially.
How do these differences come about? Tea is a consumer staple in
Turkey, hence the government is heavily involved in the regulation
of the tea industry. Although competitive transactions have become
more common with the establishment of private tea companies in

recent years, most tea is still purchased and handled by a state-owned
company, with some transactions being overseen by local cooperatives.
As a result, farmers in this region tend to be producers only and do
not typically engage in competitive, commercial activity with individ-
uals outside their immediate social circle. In contrast, herders are both
producers and commercialists; they sell cattle and dairy products to fac-
tories and commercial enterprises, as well as to local people at weekly
markets in neighbouring towns. Consequently, they regularly interact
with strangers or people whom they know only superficially.1 Given
the importance of these interactions for their livelihood, we expected
herders to feel motivated to pursue positive relationships with strangers
to ensure that they remain respected, recognized and valued, even after
experiencing social problems with them.
In short, living in different economic settings with different reali-
ties should foster different types of interdependency. For farmers, social
interdependencies are likely to be stronger with close Others than dis-
tant Others, whereas for herders the boundaries between close and
distant Others are likely to be less clear cut.
Consequences for responses to social exclusion

Given these group differences in the nature of social interdependen-
cies grounded in economic activity, we asked whether members of
farming and herding communities would be differentially affected by,
and respond to, social exclusion by close others and strangers. Specif-
ically, we tested the hypothesis that, in this region, herders would be
more negatively affected by ostracism from strangers than would farm-
ers, and herders would be more likely to engage in reparative actions
such as endorsing affiliative responses to ostracizers and naïve Others
(individuals who are not involved in the social exclusion incident but
are encountered after the incident) following exclusion by strangers.
Based on field observations which indicated that members of both com-
munities have very close social ties with members of their families,
neighbours and other residents in their village (see early ethnographic
work in this region by Hann, 1990; Bellér-Hann & Hann, 2001), we
also predicted no differences between herders and farmers’ reactions to
ostracism induced by close Others.
Before testing our hypotheses, we asked members of herding and
farming communities to indicate the number of unfamiliar individuals
with whom they had interacted for work purposes since the beginning
of the year and verified that members of the herding communities do
Ayse K. Uskul 159
indeed interact with more individuals (21.40 on average) unknown to

them than do members of farming communities (4.8 on average). Next,
we checked whether the members of the two communities had simi-
lar conceptions of ostracism. We confirmed that they understood the
concept of ostracism, and the behaviours and emotional consequences
associated with it, in similar ways. These verifications gave us confidence
to test our hypotheses.
In two studies, one using a recall method asking participants to
remember a past incident of social exclusion, and the other using
vignettes asking participants to imagine being subjected to an incident
of social exclusion, we found that herders showed greater sensitiv-
ity to being ostracized by strangers than farmers, reporting a higher
level of belonging, more meaningful existence threats and more neg-
ative mood. Next, using scenarios depicting individuals subjected to
social exclusion, we asked participants how they thought this per-
son should behave. As we expected, compared with farmers, herders
were more likely to suggest affiliative responses following ostracism by
strangers. This social norm may allow them to repair a relationship
with a stranger and thus maintain their important economic connec-
tions. By way of contrast, farmers, who are less reliant on relationships
with strangers, advised withdrawing from interactions with strangers
following ostracism, presumably because they are less invested in the
relationship.
Finally, we asked whether group differences would still hold when
recommending actions to targets that interact with naïve Others in
interpersonally negative situations (e.g. an accident that causes slight
annoyance or an incident that involves rude behaviour) following a
social exclusion incident by strangers. We found that herders recom-
mended more affiliative and fewer aggressive actions in the face of
the negative incidents to targets who experienced social exclusion by
strangers. Importantly, we showed that the amount of time spent with
strangers mediates group differences in the extent to which affiliative
and aggressive actions are recommended following social exclusion by
strangers.
These findings support the prediction that members of a herding
community, who rely more on unknown others for their livelihood
and are negatively affected by exclusion from them, have a greater
motive to undo the pain associated with being excluded by strangers
by interacting positively with naïve individuals.
By focusing on the everyday economic realities of these particular
farmers and herders, we have uncovered novel evidence that sheds light
on the kinds of action that individuals take after social exclusion. Specif-
ically, our findings suggest that relationships with strangers and the
perceived cost of exclusion matter more to herders whose livelihood
depends heavily on their positive interactions with strangers. In this
finding we contribute to a small but growing literature on the mod-
erating role of individual and situational factors in social exclusion
experiences (for a review, see Williams, 2007), and to the understanding
of the role of economic structures and associated interactional patterns
in human psychology.
Overall, these findings indicate the importance of the cultural context
(i.e. herders’ reliance on strangers for economic reasons) in explaining
group differences in social relationships. This approach emphasizes the
role of economic systems in creating behavioural norms and bridges the
gap between the psychological and the societal (Cohen, 2007; Markus &
Hamedani, 2007).
Conclusion
The findings point to the different ways in which economic activity

shapes human psychology. Different ecologies can give rise to different
economies, and these different economies shape individuals’ psycholog-
ical make-up (see also Edgerton, 1971; Kohn & Schooler, 1973; Witkin &
Berry, 1975; Triandis, 1994; Konner, 2007). The findings also highlight
the overlap between economic groups and cultural groups. In fact,
throughout our research, we have adopted a definition of culture that
focuses on how psychological processes may be shaped by the socio-
cultural worlds that people occupy (e.g. Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952;
Adams & Markus, 2001, 2004; Adams, 2005; Markus & Hamedani, 2007;
Medin et al., 2013; Oishi, 2014) and defined economic groups as cultural
groups, as we believe that they prescribe certain meanings, institutional
practices and ways of being (see also Berry, 1979; Berry et al., 1986).
Note that our results should not be generalized across all farming,
herding and fishing communities. We do not take a universalist posi-
tion, assuming that living in any farming, fishing or herding community
will shape human psychology in similar ways. Rather, the amount of
technology or labour used and/or the level of interaction required out-
side the immediate social circle may shape the psychological dynamics
differently in other farming, herding or fishing communities.
In this work we have focused on the everyday realities of sociocul-
tural/economic settings that provide the material basis for psychological
outcomes rather than emphasizing internal variables such as attitudes
Ayse K. Uskul 161
or values. In this way our work provides evidence of the role of external
practices (or activity in Cole’s (2010) terms), a topic largely unexamined
in conventional psychological theory and research. At the same time,
we contribute to previous research employing cultural-ecological (e.g.
Berry, 1979; Whiting & Edwards, 1988; Keller, 2011; Adams, et al.,
2012), sociocultural (e.g. Markus, & Lachmann, 2002; Plaut et al., 2002;
Maynard & Greenfield, 2003; Adams, 2005), socioecological (Oishi,
2014) and ecosystem (Medin et al., 2013) approaches. In this fashion
we are able to link the psychological with the societal.
Note
1. These observations originate primarily from my fieldwork conducted in this
region and conversations held with officials at the provincial centres over-
seeing agricultural activities in the region associated with the Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Livestock and members of the herding families them-
selves (see also early ethnographic work in the same region by Hann, 1990;
Bellér-Hann & Hann, 2000).
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10
Social Simulations as a Tool
for Understanding Individual,
Cultural and Societal Change
Deborah Downing Wilson and Michael Cole
Introduction
In approaching the topic of the role of social relations in the linked

processes of individual and societal change, we take it as axiomatic
that these relations are constituted in the medium of culture. Greatly
influenced by the work of scholars in the cultural-historical tradition,
particularly Vygotsky (1978) and Luria (1979), as well as a number of
American and Western European scholars (for a relevant summary, see
Cole, 1996), we believe culture, the accumulated social inheritance of
the social group and humanity as a whole, is central to understanding
how social relations enter into the process of both individual and soci-
etal change. Social interactions, in this view, are conceived of as “joint
mediated activity”, people acting together in a cultural medium.
It is a basic assumption of this approach that processes of change,
in our case processes that are understood as processes of development,
must be studied over time, a principle that is more often honoured
in breach than in practice; it is not an easy matter to study the
development of individuals in a cultural medium over significant peri-
ods of time. As a consequence, cultural historical scholars, and other
developmental scientists who adopt some form of this methodological
principle, have largely restricted themselves to individual case stud-
ies, large quantitative “lifespan” studies, or cross-cultural studies in
which the cultural variation is also considered to be a historical vari-
ation (see e.g. Luria, 1979; Baltes, 2006). A small but important group
of studies have managed to follow a single group of people over an
extended period of time during which important cultural historical
change has occurred, a process that traces change occurring over decades
165
(i.e. Greenfield et al., 2003; Rogoff, 2011). In this study we turn to

a different means of analysing the interplay between individual and
social development as it occurs over time in culturally mediated social
interaction.
We adopt a methodology which we believe provides considerable
insight into the ways in which culture weaves together social interac-
tion among individuals, the role of those interactions in larger “societal
level” processes, and the development of individual identity. Our obser-
vations are grounded in a cultural simulation that took place over a
period of 10 weeks among a group of university students who simulated
two different cultural groups that came into interaction with each other
as “strangers”.
During the course of the simulation we were able to observe the devel-
opment of two contrasting “idiocultures” (Fine, 1979). Because of the
relatively long duration of the activities, we could also trace the emer-
gent consequences of the interaction of the two groups with each other.
These circumstances allowed us to document, from the perspectives of
all of the participants, the invention of group artefacts, narratives, cul-
tural practices and shared values as they engaged with each other in
creating and performing their cultural norms. The use of such simu-
lations can, we believe, illuminate the processes by which, in living
their everyday lives, people create social worlds and actively shape their
own development. It re-enacts, in some respects, the pioneering work
of Sheriff and Sheriff (1953) and others on intergroup conflict and its
resolution, although in our case it appears that the conflict, however
seemingly simulated and inconsequential, had surprising and enduring
psychological consequences
The simulation we used allowed us to retain many of the elements
of “real-life” cultural work, particularly unscripted interactions among
the participants, unpredictable responses, and the emergence of arte-
facts and relationships that would be free to develop reflexively over
time. At the same time we were free to manipulate the game’s parameters
and factors in order to make certain kinds of cultural and psychological
phenomena more accessible for observation.
The simulation also highlights a number of related issues that need
to be considered in addressing the role of social interaction in develop-
ment. Paramount in this case is the importance of play, emotions and
intergroup interaction. Once engaged in the simulation, what begins
as a game becomes real, enabling participants to draw conclusions that
they generalize to their everyday life experiences outside the simulation.
We return below to discuss these general theoretical issues, but first
Deborah Downing Wilson and Michael Cole 167
we need to describe the simulation and enough facts about its opera-
tion to provide the reader with a foundation upon which to judge the
usefulness of our approach.
The simulation: A brief overview
The simulation we devised was based on the BaFa’ BaFa’ cultural sim-
ulation game designed by Gary Shirts (1977), which has been widely
and successfully used for more than three decades as a tool for teaching
cross-cultural sensitivity (Sullivan & Tu, 1996). The idea behind BaFa’
BaFa’ in its earlier applications was to give participants an opportunity
to experience cultural border crossing in a safe space, and to reflect on
and unpack their experiences without the prejudices and constraints
that real-life cultural border crossing often entails.
In the original version of BaFa’ BaFa’, participants are divided into
two groups. (In our case, the first author led one group, and a grad-
uate student confederate, Rachel Pfister, the other, while the second
author observed and assisted in dealing with unexpected and potentially
experiment-ending difficulties as they arose). In the original BaFa’ BaFa’
simulation, each group spends about an hour learning a different set of
cultural norms. The groups then exchange members for short periods of
time in an effort to learn about the other group’s culture. The goal is to
learn as much as possible about the other group’s values and customs
without directly asking questions – much as we are forced to learn when
we travel to a foreign country where we do not know the language.
Because the two cultures in the BaFa’ BaFa’ simulation are vastly dif-
ferent (“Alpha culture” is geared towards community spirit and sharing,
while “Beta culture” is focused on personal achievement), there is ample
potential for misunderstanding when a person moves from one group
to the other. During the simulation, each culture develops hypotheses
about the other, which are tested when participants in the two groups
come together at the end to talk about their experiences.
The rules of BaFa’ BaFa’ are few and easy to learn – just enough to deal
with the situations that were likely to arise in the half-day seminars for
which it was initially designed. The rules of this initial form of the sim-
ulation also suited our purposes especially well, precisely because they
were inadequate to meet the demands of prolonged social interactions
and would require elaboration and embellishment as the simulation
progressed.
BaFa’ BaFa’ was designed as a short-term training experience
where highly educated Americans were being prepared to work in
economically “underdeveloped” countries among populations with

strikingly different worldviews as well as world circumstances. We
needed to draw out the process in order to allow participants time to
develop the rudimentary cultural “starter kit” that we prepared for each
cultural group, and to explore at greater length the process of intergroup
interaction. In place of a half-day exercise, we extended the timeframe
to cover the ten weeks of a university quarter system, where solutions to
problems arising in one meeting could be accumulated and passed on
in the next. During this time the participants met twice weekly. In the
first three weeks they generated shared cultural experience, in weeks four
through six interactions between the two cultural groups took place, and
the final four weeks were intended to be joint, collaborative reflection
on the simulation events.
We also built in self-reflexive documentation – all participants, includ-
ing the organizers, were required not only to simulate being a member
of a particular culture but to document their experience as participant
observers in weekly fieldnotes.
Planting the seeds of culture: The Alphas and the

Betas become the Stoners and the Traders
Frederic Bartlett (1932) wrote that the acquisition of socially constructed

knowledge is always grounded in an initial affective experience. This
first impression results in an aligning attitude or perspective that is
difficult, if not impossible, to erase. With this in mind we worked to
establish affective climates that would be salient enough, and different
enough, to launch the two cultural groups off in different directions.
The formation of the two groups took place in parallel. We recount their
development in the intertwined fashion in which we, and the students,
experienced them.
The initial setting and origin myth

On the first day of class, the students (who had expected a standard lec-
ture class, where they would sit and take notes, read and take exams)
were given a cursory introduction to the simulation. As preparation for
the next class session, the 40 students were randomly assigned to the
cultural group that they would participate in. As apprentice ethnogra-
phers they would be asked to write fieldnotes after every class session.
Their first assignment was to write a fieldnote describing their impres-
sions of this introduction and their predictions about how the course
might unfold.
The students were surprised and baffled, but willing:
I have to admit that the acting childish and playing games does
concern me a little. It seems like it would be weird acting like this
especially in front of other students that I don’t really know. I am not
sure how such rudimentary child games or systems will be able to
provide any revolutionary data or results, but I am willing to follow
the rules of the game and try to help out with providing the results
we are seeking.
(Sam)
In the next class session, the students (now divided into two groups,
which were temporarily labelled “Alpha” and “Beta”) met in two differ-
ent conference-style classrooms on adjoining floors of the same building
on campus. When the Alpha group found their room they were greeted
warmly by Mother Rachel, who served toasted raisin bread and apple
juice. The conference room furniture had been rearranged to create a
casual and homey atmosphere. “Good Vibrations” by the Beach Boys
was playing softly in the background.
By contrast, the Beta group entered a “business meeting” conducted
around a large table in the centre of the room. They were greeted by Mrs
Wilson, the “banker”. Beta participants were treated with professional
courtesy, issued preprinted nametags and seated at the conference table.
Self-service water, coffee and donuts were arranged on a side counter.
In addition to being exposed to core cultural practices through these
spatial/symbolic means, each group was provided with a bare-bones
mythic fable from which their cultural narratives could be launched.
The folk tale “Stone Soup” was chosen for the Alpha culture, the more
communal of the groups. In this classic legend, a traveller enters a vil-
lage of hungry people. Instead of asking for food he produces a stone
from his cloak, drops it into a pot of boiling water and begins to smack
his lips over the delicious soup he is preparing. As he attracts the atten-
tion of the townspeople he convinces each of them to add a little of
whatever bits of food they have in the house to his cauldron. In the end
there is indeed a lovely pot of soup for everyone to enjoy.
A tale based on the Old Testament “Parable of the Talents” was writ-
ten for the Beta group, where individuality and personal achievement
were honoured. In this legend, the aging leader of a financial institution
entrusts each of three valued employees with a large sum of money.
Their task is to use the cash as they see fit, and to report back at the end
of the year on the status of their investments. The first employee builds a
more impressive bank, the second saves the cash and the third, through
hard work and shrewd trades, doubles their investments. It is this third
employee who is chosen as successor to the leader of the group.
The two classic tales exemplified two different sets of values. They
would provide different cultural frames of reference through which the
students approached the tasks and situations they encountered in the
simulation, and serve as ethical anchors for the two developing cultural
groups. In order to ensure that the students “got the message” from each
of the parables, and to establish from the outset the practice of integrat-
ing the simulation events with the participants’ larger life narratives, the
students’ homework assignment for this day was to write their own one-
page story, either actual or fabricated. This story should capture some
element of what they considered to be the “spirit” of their group.
Initial results
The students’ responses were our first bits of evidence that this initial
cultural experience had been effective in communicating the core dif-
ferences between the two cultures. We were fairly certain, given reports
of the initial BaFa’ BaFa’ simulations, that some such process would take
place, but we had little idea of how much cultural learning would occur.
Nor could we anticipate what the students would, in particular, write
about. The results quickly indicated that the contrasting cultural systems
were discernable across a variety of narrative contents.
Alpha participant Vivian submitted a true story about being rescued
by a group of helpful citizens when her mother’s car broke down on
a rainy night, with six-year-old Vivian, her younger twin brothers and
her grandmother on board. A man in a red pickup stopped to help, but
Vivian’s mother was afraid and sent him away. The man returned with
his wife, but her car was too small to fit the family in and Vivian’s mum
wouldn’t hear of splitting them up. He recruited his neighbour with
a van, and his son who had some mechanical expertise, and together
they were able to get the car running and the family to safety. In the
final paragraph of her story, quoted below, note the explicit connections
that Vivian draws between the Stone Soup parable, her childhood mem-
ory and her own personal development in terms of how she intends to
incorporate this new information into her future actions:
The man and his son must have figured out what was wrong with
the car because they all showed up at Wendy’s before we were even
finished eating. I have kind of forgotten all about that night, but my
mom still talks about it sometimes, so I’m not sure if I remember the
night or just her stories about it. When I heard the Stone Soup story
yesterday I started to think about the fact that our bad situation that
night was too complicated for one person to solve but it could only
be solved if everyone did something. The man with the stone was
kind of like the man in the red truck. He got a bunch of people to
come together to help us. I think I will always remember that now
and try to pitch in when I see people in need of assistance even if
someone else is already trying to help out because sometimes we all
need to be in this life together.
(Vivian)
Beta culture’s Bruno also tells a true family story about his great-
grandfather, who owned a small salt company in Korea. One day, as his
great-grandfather was waiting to unload his salt from a barge in Inchon
harbour, it began to rain. In the rain a huge snake slithered up on the
deck, causing the workman to run before unloading the salt. It rained
for several days while Bruno’s great-grandfather worked frantically to
keep his inventory covered and dry. When the skies cleared, grandpa
saw that the snake had actually been a large rope that had washed up,
and that all of the other merchants’ salt, which had been unloaded in
the rain, had melted away. In his closing comments below, Bruno credits
the happy outcome to his great-grandfather’s “persistent nature”, which
is a central value of Beta culture:
Only our great-grandfather’s salt was safe on his boat. The price of
salt skyrocketed that day, more than four times the usual price. That
day our great-grandfather made a large fortune thanks to the “snake”
and the rain, and his persistent nature most of all.
(Bruno, FTC, 4/3)
After reading the students’ stories, we were satisfied that they had
adopted the moral and aesthetic moods of their respective cultures and
were able to generalize them across a range of social situations. These
cultural currents would underlie the norms and practices that they
would engage in as the simulation progressed.
Enculturation: The acquisition of shared cultural practices
Our next task was to present each group with a bare-bones “cultural tool-
kit”. These initial artefacts would serve two purposes in the simulation.
First, they could be easily tracked as they were selectively deployed and
adapted to meet the challenges that the participants would encounter

as the simulation evolved. Second, the two sets of materials and proce-
dures would prescribe unique ways of interacting that could be readily
learned by each group but that could not be easily deciphered and dupli-
cated by outsiders. The Alpha culture involved rigidly regulated social
interactions, and work/games that required little expertise. In the Beta
culture, participants were free to interact socially as they wanted, but
their work/card game was complex and competitive. Descriptions and
instructions were minimal, providing space for differential interpreta-
tion, expansion, and evolution of the rules and behavioural norms as
the two cultures emerged.
The work of a Stoner is all play

The Alphas learned that their society was a benevolent matriarchy where
warmth, affection and tolerance were valued above all else. Alphas were
instructed to stand close, touch often and show genuine concern for
each other’s welfare. They were never, under any circumstances, to be
impatient, unkind, angry or aggressive. Alpha etiquette required clan
members to greet each other fondly, and then move immediately into
concerned inquiries and detailed discussions about the health, achieve-
ments and wisdom of each other’s grandparents and other ancestors.
Polite Alphas should pay full attention to each other in conversation.
Newcomers wishing to join a conversation in progress should listen qui-
etly for a while to be sure that they can contribute appropriately, and
then wait to be invited before speaking.
Bob Marley singing “Don’t worry, ’bout a thing” in the background
pretty much sums up the rhythm that emerged inside the Alpha cul-
ture. We should not have been surprised when the Alphas immediately
named their group “Stone Soup” and began referring to themselves
as the “Stoners”. The Stoners learned that theirs was a wealthy tribe.
In fact, resources and money were so abundant that neither worry nor
work would play a visible role in daily life. A large pot of “gold” coins
was displayed prominently in the centre of the room. The Stoners were
told that they should take anything they needed from it, but to be sure
and put back whatever was left at the end of the day. The hoarding of
money or any display of attachment to, or particular interest in, money
was considered extremely rude.
The Stoners were divided into four “families” and issued explicit rules
about appropriate inter- and intrafamily conduct. Their days were spent
enjoying each other’s company. The room which the Stoners called
home was stocked with “comfort food” as well as a variety of craft
supplies, such as rough woven cloth, needles and thread, yarn, mark-
ers and glue, all or none of which the players could use as they wished.
Stoners could eat and drink, play their card game, listen to music, sing
and dance or engage in craft projects, but they should never forget to
value friendship and camaraderie above all.
For Betas it’s all about the money

Betas learned that their worth was determined during the 15 minutes
that they would spend on the trading floor each day. A successful Beta
must be honest, consistent, persistent and able to drive a hard bargain.
Students would discover on their own that time management was an
important element of Beta success, as the more transactions that could
be accomplished during a single trading session, the more opportunities
a Beta would have to increase their wealth.
While the Stoners were making nice, the Beta group chose the name
“Fair Trade Cartel” and began calling themselves the “Traders”. The
Traders were grouped into four trading teams and, while personal
achievement was their ultimate goal, success was only possible through
in-team cooperation and between-team competition. The majority of
their time was spent trying to gain the competitive edge that was
necessary to be successful on the trading floor.
Trading cards were distributed, along with a warning: the trading lan-
guage and the rules of trade that were about to be orally shared with the
group were closely held secrets that conferred huge advantages on the
trading floor. This insider knowledge was never to be written down or
shared with anyone who was not a Trader. Any leakage of these details
would greatly jeopardize the success of the group and limit the players’
earning potential. It’s important to note that no penalties or procedures
for enforcing the rules were introduced, or even suggested. This left the
players free to create, or not, whatever means of policing each other
they felt was necessary.
The Traders learned that all business transactions must be accom-
plished using a special set of words. This system sounded complex when
heard for the first time, but it was actually quite simple when under-
stood. There were only 13 permitted words: six for colours and seven
for numbers. The card game that the Traders were about to learn was a
lot like “Go Fish” and would require the players to describe the colour
and number of the cards that they were looking for. When asking for a
card, the first thing to do was to designate its colour. Colours were com-
municated by using the first letter of the English word for the colour
(R for red, B for blue, Y for Yellow and so on), followed by any vowel
sound. So when asking for a red card, a player would begin his query
with “Ra”, “Re”, “Ri”, “Ro” or “Ru”. The listener ignored the variation in
vowel sounds and listened only for the initial consonant. Numbers were
communicated using the first and last letters of the player’s own name
followed by any vowel sound, repeated to create the number of sylla-
bles equal to the number of the card that was being requested. A person
with the initials D.W. would communicate the number four by saying
“DaWa DaWa”. An informed listener ignores the sounds themselves all
together, needing only to count the number of syllables that were spo-
ken. A request for a red five would sound like this: “Ro, DaWa DaWa Da”.
“Ro” (which could also have been “Ra”, “Ri” or “Ru”) to designate the
colour red, followed by the five syllables, “DaWa DaWa Da”, to indicate
the number five.
An uninformed listener might walk into an animated trading con-
versation, which sounded terribly complex due to the almost infinite
possible combinations of first initials and vowel sounds. In reality,
only 13 different words were being communicated. After a few awk-
ward attempts, most of the students picked up producing the language
quickly. Understanding each other was a different skill all together and
took a little longer to master, but before long all of the Traders became
fluent in “Tradolog”, as one Filipina student dubbed the language.
The original stacks of ten cards that each player received were pur-
posely scrambled to contain excessive amounts of some colours and
numbers, and few or none of others. Trading involved striking deals
with other players that would be beneficial to both, or that would help
both players to assemble complete card sets. What the Traders were not
told was that, in the cards that were distributed to them, certain neces-
sary cards (threes and fives) were extremely scarce. In the following days
they would discover that the visiting foreigners were quite rich in these
valuable resources.
This concluded our first week of the simulation. As classes were
dismissed on Thursday, passersby would have mistaken the departing
Stoners for a group of close friends leaving a party, complete with hugs
and fond farewells. The Traders strode out of the door with apparent
purpose and direction. Tim was singing “ ‘Ain’t nothin’ ” gonna breaka
my stride . . . ” to the great amusement of his teammates.
As Rachel, the Stoners’ facilitator, arrived on campus the following
week, she walked past a cluster of Traders. She was surprised by their
mild but clearly antagonistic taunts: “oooo here comes the leader of the
Stoners” and “Traders are best!” While this behaviour was annoying and
disturbing, we took it as evidence that the students were identifying
with their cultural group, and found it consistent with the large body of
research by Henri Tajfel and colleagues who show how little it takes to
provoke ingroup vs. outgroup behaviours (Tajfel & Turner, 1978; Tajfel,
1982.).
Stoners and Traders performing the worldviews

of their cultures
Already stoned! No-shows, tardiness, boredom and lack of purpose

Despite our insistence on punctuality, and the students’ understanding
that there would be a quiz on the assigned reading at 8:00 a.m., seven
Stoners were missing at 8:15 a.m. Five students would show up before
the class was over, but two just didn’t bother to attend. The beginning
of class had been designated as the only time when the cultural rules
could be explicitly discussed. This meant that absent and tardy students
might miss out on some of the information necessary to participate fully
in their culture; they might never become fully contributing members
of it. This could seriously jeopardize the students’ progress and that of
the entire simulation. We were left to question how, in a culture that is
intended to be relaxed and anything but time-conscious, we could instil
a desire in the students to be on time for a class that meets at 8:00 a.m.
Already into it! Present, punctual, engaged

On the same day the Stoners were dealing with lateness and no-shows,
the facilitator for the Traders arrived at 7:45 a.m. to find an animated
group waiting outside the door of the conference room, eager to begin
the simulation. As soon as the door was unlocked, the students rushed
in and began rearranging the furniture to create a “trading floor”. Each
of the small trading teams clustered in a different corner of the room.
When donuts arrived, the students quickly helped themselves from the
table in the back of the room and returned to their corners without con-
versing with anyone outside their immediate group. Sam hurried in at
8:03 a.m. He was winded and apologized profusely because his bus had
been late and he had sprinted across campus to get there as soon as pos-
sible. Everyone else had arrived on time. The Traders cleared the centre
of the room and retrieved their sample sets of trading cards from the
banker’s file boxes. A small silver counter bell was introduced to mark
the beginning and end of the exchange sessions. When the bell was
tapped three times in quick succession and the announcement “The
trading floor is now open” was made, everyone immediately sprang
from their seats and the negotiations began. We were more than a little
surprised at how unselfconscious the students seemed to be about using

the rather silly language and body gestures that proper trading required.
In both cultures we were able to see the rapid appropriation of local
cultural practices were consistent with the “cultural starter kits” we
had provided. In the weeks to follow, the interactions between the two
groups produced unexpected ruptures in the easy flow of the activities.
These revealed many ways in which culture mediates both social inter-
actions, and the linkages between social interactions, and the societal
processes of which they are a part and which they constitute. We provide
a few of many examples of this phenomenon at work.
A Thief among us: The emergence of local moral norms

and the transformation of money
In week four of the quarter we began the “cultural exchange” phase of

the simulation. During each class period one family of Stoners and one
team of Traders would leave their home culture and spend time inside
the “foreigner’s territory”. The travellers were instructed to observe and
attempt to interact as best they could, without asking direct questions
about the cultural norms of their hosts. The hosting cultures were
instructed to carry on as usual. We were surprised when the first group
of Traders to visit the Stoners’ territory returned proudly displaying a
gold coin that Tyler had pocketed during his stay. While his team was
supportive of the theft, the members of the other groups were at first
silent and then disapproving. The general consensus was that stealing
was simply not compatible with the underlying ethics of fair trading.
Because the class period was coming to an end, the subject did not get
the airing it deserved, so the Traders decided to address the incident and
how to deal with the offender at our next meeting.
The research team was thankful that Tyler had revealed the stolen coin
during the last five minutes of class because this meant we had two days
to read the students’ fieldnotes and to formulate a plan for going for-
ward. The notes revealed that the Stoners who witnessed the crime were
as unsure as the Traders had been about how to proceed. The Stoners
had remained silent until Tyler and his team had left the premises, and
even then had been reticent about reporting the incident to Rachel, not
wanting to get anyone in trouble. Contrast this with Tyler’s jubilant
account of the event:
I think that our society will definitely have the upper hand. I was
a spy for the first group. It was so easy to figure out things of the
other culture. I even got to steal another dollar from them (dou-
bloon?). They were very immature compared to our culture. They
spoke English, and I don’t think they are very into the project. I will
be able to crack them within two weeks.
(Tyler, FTC, 4/10)
We had expected certain infractions to occur. Actually, we hoped that

they would occur so that we could witness the formation and enforce-
ment of group rules. The research team had spoken before the simu-
lation began about leaving the students to do their own policing and
penalizing within their groups, but we had not anticipated any cross-
cultural crimes. Now we agreed that the theft afforded an unexpected
opportunity for us to observe any differences in the ways in which the
two groups addressed a sticky moral issue. We decided that the facilita-
tors would open the subject for discussion with each group at the start
of the next class session.
From profit to prohibition

In Trader territory, emotions (in anticipation of the impending trading
session) were already running high when Deborah introduced the sub-
ject of the theft. Immediately the atmosphere shifted from a state of
high energy to one of high anxiety. Luckily a number of the Traders had
mentioned in their fieldnotes that they were uncomfortable with Tyler’s
actions, finding them incompatible with the group’s ethic of honesty
and fair trade. Many had called for sanctions against stealing, and also
against cheating, which they identified in their notes as secretly trading
outside the designated trading period and using English on the trading
floor.
Deborah read fieldnote excerpts out loud, providing a balanced
overview of the students’ individual comments. There was a flurry of
conversation before members of one highly competitive trading team
took charge. They suggested that there were three separate issues on the
table for consideration: (1) How should the Cartel deal with a thief?
(2) How should the Cartel deal with a cheater? (3) What should be done
with the Stoners’ money that Tyler had stolen?
Tyler’s team immediately came to his defence. Kelley appointed her-
self as Tyler’s counsel and took charge of a defence team. They began
by expressing disbelief that anyone could see Tyler’s act as a crime. Tak-
ing the coin was not stealing, they argued, but a legitimate part of the
information-seeking mission that Tyler had been a part of. Tyler brought
this point home by producing the stolen coin and turning it over to the
banker, suggesting that it should be used for “charity”. One of his team-
mates quickly amended Tyler’s offer to: “We want it to go on display
to show other people what Stoners’ money looks like.” Furthermore,
they pointed out that the Cartel had given the Stoners who visited some
Trader’s currency to take back with them. Tyler sums up his response to
the accusations in his fieldnotes for the day:
It seemed just like it would be an ordinary day in the Fair Trade cul-
ture. I then was shocked to find the teacher writing our discussion
topics on the board. The first topic was “Cheating and Stealing”. The
main topic for discussion was my stealing of the coin that I got from
the table when I was doing spy work in the Stone Soup territory!
As far as the cheating, I had heard some normal English, but not too
much. I mean, it’s expected that in a new learning environment like
this, people will talk the way they are used to. Personally, I was kind
of surprised to hear the others say that I should be put on “trial” for
helping out our culture in stealing the coin. I did not understand
what the problem was for doing very good recon work, and doing
everything in my power to help out our culture. I would understand
if I were to be put on trial for doing something to my own benefit,
but the stealing of the coin was done in selflessness, and not for mon-
etary gain. That is why I was surprised that it was even an issue, and
for me to be questioned in front of our culture.
(Tyler, FTC, 4/15)
Those outside Tyler’s team were not immediately convinced. There

was a difference between the Stoners going home with money that had
been offered to them and what Tyler had done. Surreptitiously conceal-
ing currency that belonged to someone else, and then taking it without
their permission – that sure sounded like stealing. Haley suggested that
we should turn Tyler over to the Stoners and let them deal with his
infraction as they saw fit. They were, after all, the injured party and the
crime had taken place on their grounds. The idea got a little traction at
first but then Harry objected: “Turning Tyler over to them will just mess
it all up for the rest of us. It will turn into a big stinky international inci-
dent. They’ll never trust us and we have to trade with them next week.”
The motive for this argument seemed clear enough: the other teams
were still waiting their turns to visit (and exploit?) the Stoners and they
certainly did not want anything to interfere with this before it could
happen. These sentiments were met with words of support and nods of
agreement. That was when the group learned that there had been Stoner
witnesses to the theft, and that they were unsure themselves about how
to handle the infraction. Silence, followed by moans from all corners of
the room.
On the issue of which culture should have jurisdiction, it was decided
that the incident should be dealt with strictly in-house, so as not to fur-
ther disrupt the fledgling relationship between the two cultures. In the
end the act was judged to be a theft, not a legitimate reconnaissance
activity, and to be contrary to the Traders’ code of conduct. Tyler’s case,
however, was ruled to have mitigating circumstances. While the group
could not condone Tyler’s actions, neither could they impose a penalty
when the crime had been committed prior to the rule being enacted.
The stolen coin was accepted by the banker and put on display, not so
much as an artefact of the Stoners’ culture but as a reminder of and
warning about the Traders’ standards of conduct.
Folded, spindled and mutilated

We were expecting the Stoners to express anger, or indignation, and
to demand retribution, or at the very least compensation for the theft
of the coin. Instead, the crime appeared to be a non-event. The Stoners
listened quietly while Rachel read from the fieldnotes that had described
the theft, and they were immediately unified in expressing feelings of
disgust and pity for the thief. “If money was that important to him,
well, let him have it. We have lots more where that came from.” That
was it. They had nothing more to say on the subject and quickly moved
on to more important things, like line-dancing and jewellery-making,
and, true to the reputation that all Stoners share, eating.
However, they, like the Traders, used, and transformed the meaning
of, money – the money given to them by the Traders when they visited.
The first family of Stoners to visit the Cartel had been appalled by the
Traders’ obsession with monopoly currency and the lengths that they
would go to to acquire more of the stuff. When each of them was handed
a stack of bills to take home, they were confused about what they should
or could do with the money. The Stoners didn’t need any more money.
Other than its novelty, and of course its meaning as a gift from the
foreigners, the Trader’s currency had no real value in Stoner territory.
Everyone agreed that it did not seem right to set it aside. Some-
how it should be displayed, as one does with a cherished gift, to show
the Traders that their offering was appreciated. Jaime suggested that it
should be used to make jewellery that could be worn proudly by the
Stoners or gifted back to the Traders. And so it was. The dollar bills were
coloured with markers, folded into rings, twisted and tied into bracelets
and necklaces, and shaped as feathers in headdresses. At first, Rachel and

I took these activities at face value – a thoughtful gesture on the part of
the Stoners that was in keeping with their ethic of valuing kindness over
money. Once the fieldnotes started coming in, however, we realized that
this was a not-so-subtle form of aggression. Jaime’s notes articulate the
Stoners’ thinking perfectly:
The souvenir of this experience was a wad of one-dollar bills, which

were the least valuable in the Traders’ culture. Rachel inquired as to
what we should do with this currency. Knowing that it would prob-
ably and most definitely anger the Traders if we tampered with their
money, I suggested we do something wild with it besides leaving
them untouched. Someone mentioned using these bills as gifts to
give back to the Traders, essentially giving it back destroyed to show
them how little their money meant to us. This gift process then trans-
lated to a decoration party of folding and coloring the bills. In our
table we did origami. Actually, after seeing what one guy did with
his money, all of us at the table asked for a dollar ring. He became
the maker of money rings! Afterwards we colored the rings with our
family colors. Other families made earrings, making use of the string
on our identifiers. The less our creations looked like Trader money,
the happier we all became. My grandmother would look so pretty in
Stoner Jewelry.
(Jaime, SS, 4/15)
The Stoners jumped wholeheartedly into their craft of folding, colour-

ing, threading and spindling the Traders’ currency in the production of
jewellery and various other hand-crafted items. On the surface this was
done in the spirit of creativity and generosity – most of the pieces were
given away to the visiting Traders. Underlying this industry, however,
was the smug knowledge that the Stoners were belittling that which
the Traders valued most. The Stoners had perfected the art of passive
aggression in a socially sanctioned way.
A ritual soon developed: the Stoners fashioned treasures and “inno-
cently” bestowed them upon the greedy Traders; the Traders feigned
delight and responded with profuse gratitude, before slipping away
to hastily destroy the Stoners’ handiwork in order to cash in the
currency.
We see here, clearly, how the consequences of the significance of a
commonly understood action – a theft – came to have different moral
significance in the two cultures. The Traders concluded that, while valu-
able, the Stoner’s money could not be treated as money, so instead
converted into a symbol of the value of fairness. The Stoners, by con-

trast, attributed no value to the money at all, so they appropriated it
into the value system of Stoner culture and made it a decorative artefact,
and ultimately a subtle means of aggression.
Cultural misunderstanding and the inversion of values: Grandma!

The word “grandma” was first used habitually in Stoner activities where
it retained its conventional English meaning but was employed in very
specific ways to help to achieve group cohesion. “How is your grand-
mother?” was the traditional Stoners’ greeting, to be gotten out of the
way before any other business could be attended to. Parting words
always included wishes for grandma’s continued health and longevity.
It was also customary for Stoners to pass the time telling stories to one
another. Having just greeted each other with a reference to grandma, it
was only natural that she would, more often than not, become a central
character in these stories. The tales usually started out simple, but, in an
effort to keep things interesting, they became more and more fabulous
as the simulation progressed. Thus it’s not surprising that the notion
of an eccentric grandmother, one whose escapades were fun to recount
and could be counted on to draw appreciative or astonished responses
from the audience, readily took hold.
Many of these stories began as factual accounts of the lives of the
students’ ancestors which were then lavishly embellished with each
retelling. One Canadian grandmother, described as a retired second-
grade teacher during the first week of class, evolved into a hippie living
in a forest commune, singing, dancing and “sending out vibrations of
peace to the world”. There was an affluent Chinese grandmother who,
in week one, spent her days playing golf, mahjong and blackjack. After
a couple of retellings, she became a dragon-lady tycoon who marketed
her secret family recipes for noodles and oxtail soup, and used the pro-
ceeds from her new business to fight crime lords in Hong Kong. The
most fantastic story was about a Korean grandmother who, when first
introduced, employed herbal remedies to heal her family’s ailments. She
quickly transformed into “a magical medicine woman” who miracu-
lously grew younger each year; but when she regressed to the age of
13, she reversed direction, growing older each year, and lived on until,
at the age of 666, she told everyone she had had enough and just sat
down and died.
The Stoners’ emphasis on grandmothers served to link the classroom
cultural experiences with the students’ home lives and home cultures
in ways that we did not expect. All of the in-class fabricating about
grandmothers appeared to be stimulating a lot of real-life reminiscing
about them as well, as Bernice’s unsolicited add-on to her fieldnotes

suggests.
Being born in a wealthy family, raised by well educated parents, and

fortunate to attend college in the US, my grandmother is a very
bright, elegant, and sophisticated woman. Since she is the eldest
daughter in her family, she has always been a great sister loving
and caring for her younger brothers and sisters. She has the soul of
unconditional giving and the heart of forgiveness. Her compassion is
magnificent. Rarely will she refuse to help others, especially her love
ones. She feels she has the obligation to protect her family and the
responsibility to take care of all the family matters. My grandmother
is very outgoing and family oriented. Every Sunday, she says, is a fam-
ily day. Everyone in my family gathers together and spends the whole
day with each other. Usually, we have lunch in a dim-sum restaurant
and after lunch we either go watch a movie if there is something
good showing on the Movie Theater or go shopping and then after-
noon tea at the mall. During her leisure time, my grandmother goes
golfing with her friends or invites them over to her house to have
dinner and plays Mahjong and Black Jack. Her life is full of colors
and excitement. Every time I visit her, I see a happy face. The only
times I see an unhappy face are when any of her family members
and friends are anxious, irritated, bothered, and pessimistic over the
matters of money and relationships. Every time, if anything happens
that money is the only solution to resolve the problem, my grand-
mother, without hesitations, gives out her emergency money to help
them. When she sees her love ones are hurt from a relationship, she
tries to cure them by manifesting the power of forgiveness. To me,
my grandmother is an angel. I love her so much.
(Bernice, SS, 4/10)
The Stoners’ grandmothers also worked their way into almost every
other aspect of their lives. When food was shared, whether it was Oreo
cookies, apples or tortilla chips, grandmother had cooked it herself, cre-
ated the recipe or sent it along (from Tokyo, Taiwan or Toronto) with
her best wishes. All of the Stoners’ craft projects became reproductions
of things grandmother used to make. Songs and dances (like the Stoners’
rendition of Michael Jackson’s “Beat It!”) had all been passed down
from grandmother. Card games were played by grandmother’s rules,
and Stoner norms for polite social interaction were maintained because
grandmother said we should do it this way.
We were surprised at how deeply the Stoners took this part of the
simulation to heart. As Mona’s notes indicate, the lines between in-the-
flesh grandmothers and the simulated versions of them became very
blurred:
The other finding I got from this class is the memory of my grand-
mother. My grandmother died when I was really little, I barely know
anything about her. However, many members from Stone Soup cul-
ture share their stories to me about their grandmothers make me
feel as if my grandmother had the same characteristics or experi-
ences as their grandmothers. By listening to my members’ stories
about their grandmothers, whether they are true or not, I construct
my own grandmother in my mind by embracing their information.
I do not feel awkward or uncomfortable when they talk about their
grandmothers because my memories toward my grandmother are
inextricably entwined with how the people around me feel about
theirs. The reason is that we can understand ourselves only through
our relationships with others. Even though everyone’s grandmother
is not all the same, I believe that the characteristics of grandmother,
for example, kind and loving to their own grandchildren, are the
same. I really appreciate my new “family members” because they
help me to create my grandmother’s image by sharing their stories
with me. Therefore, I will not hesitate or be confused when some-
body asks my “how is your grandmother?” because she IS doing well
somewhere I cannot reach but she is always in my mind.
(Mona, SS, 4/17)
So varied were their stories – some fantastic, some descriptions of actual

events, including their grandmothers – that the Traders were convinced
that the use of the word “grandma” must be part of some secret Stoners’
language or code, much like the nonsense words used in the Cartel’s
trading language. Their puzzlement is captured nicely in the following
excerpt from Aaron’s visit to Stoner territory:
Semi-mockingly, I asked how their grandma was and what she was
cooking. They responded deceptively and each told a story of non-
sense. One said her grandma was climbing Everest and she was at base
camp and how it was dangerous and a lot of people die attempting
to climb it, etc. As the TA [teaching assistant] came by, a member of
the table asked her how her grandma was and she told another unbe-
lievable story. But it didn’t always seem completely nonsense as one
member (Japanese) mentioned his grandma still lived in Japan on a

farm with chickens, etc. His story sounded semi-plausible so I am not
sure if all the stories are completely made up or not, and I have no
idea what they might really mean. For all we know the Stoners might
be cannibals. When they talk about soup, they might be saying “let’s
have Aaron for dinner”.
(Aaron, FTC)
The class agreed with Aaron’s assessment and offered a flood of collab-
orating evidence. In class one day, Harry abruptly yelled over the din:
“I’ve got it! We’ve been looking for some way to accuse people of cheat-
ing. Let’s use the word ‘grandma’ to announce that someone has broken
the rules. Whatever ‘grandma’ means to the Stoners, I know it’s not
‘you’re a cheater’. That will really confuse them!” And so it was decided
that, when Traders wanted to accuse someone of breaking the rules, they
would point at the offender and yell “Grandma!” Soon an accompa-
nying practice was established: if the accused did not agree that they
had broken a rule, they would counter by barking “Grandpa!” Any wit-
nesses could support one or the other by echoing either “Grandma” or
“Grandpa”, and if the accusation was upheld, the cheater would forfeit
one card to the accuser and pay $50 to the banker.
The habit of chastizing each other with the word “grandma” turned
out to be a far more aggressive act on the part of the Traders than
anyone imagined at the time. Once the Traders had appropriated the
word, “grandma” took on a totally new set of meanings and a life of its
own. It wasn’t long before Traders who were caught overstepping any
sort of boundary were labelled “grandmas”. This practice spread rapidly
and expanded to include all varieties of mistake and infraction. When
Deborah forgot to bring in a day’s quiz, when a student was unable to
answer a question about one of the readings, or when someone acciden-
tally hit the light switch in the windowless room, they “got the grandma
word” (a phrase that featured often in the fieldnotes, along with “used
the grandma word”, which was sometimes shortened to “used the
G-word”). Spilling drinks, and dropping food or game cards, earned one
grandma status, as did losing track of time in the trading game. One
(male) student arriving late for class muttered: “I’m such a grandma”.
Here we see with particular clarity how a valued practice or belief in
one culture can be misinterpreted in another culture that is grounded
in a different value system, inverting its meaning and converting what
was a highly prosocial lexical item and associated practices into a neg-
atively valenced tool of approbation and scorn. Moreover, we see in
striking form the amazing creativity of the participants in generalizing

the new, negative and culturally idiosyncratic lexical item. Now devoid
of its common everyday meaning in the lives of the participants, it is
now an example of the broad category of negatively sanctioned actions.
Simulation? Lessons from the entangled lives of Stoners

and Traders
Our expectation at the start of the simulation was that it would be a

rough analogue to the Robber’s Cave experiment conducted by Sherif
and Sherif (1953). However, the differences are instructive. The Sherifs
set out to trace changes in ingroup social structure as two more or less
identical groups formed in isolation from each other. We set out to trace
how individuals, relationships and societal norms, inside two distinctly
different cultures, develop and change when these cultures come into a
dynamic relationship with each other.
Like the Sherifs, we found that our cultural simulation of the two
groups revealed a process that took place over time, although in our case
the changes were evident within a very brief exposure to the experience.
However, the intensity of the us–them relationship between the two
groups caught us completely by surprise. At one point in the course
of the simulation, in an episode that is too lengthy for this chapter,
a student cheated on the rules of the simulation, which threatened to
destroy the entire experiment. The resulting intervention that allowed
the simulation to go on had consequences that fed the fuel of intergroup
rivalry. Unlike the Sherifs, we did not have a ready-made solution to the
problem – we didn’t imagine that we would need one.
The simulation continued until the end of the sixth week of class.
At that point the class started meeting together as a single group under
the ordinary norms of the university. By reading common articles about
intergroup interaction and the ways in which groups misinterpret and
devalue each other, and by applying these to our experiences in the
simulation, we assumed that students would be led to a deeper, more or
less common, understanding. We were completely wrong.
The continued mutual denigration of each other that characterized
the second half of the simulation carried over into the presumably unit-
ing intellectual discourse that followed, up to and including the last
moments of the class. This continued influence of the simulation was
not only apparent in the ways in which the students readily identi-
fied themselves as either Stoners or Traders, but also in the ingroup
bias and outgroup depreciation that played central roles in all of the
presumably common daily activities. While there were times when the
mood in class was light, even jovial, the ingroup vs. outgroup hostility
never let up. The two groups were cordial enough to make the meetings
bearable, but the class remained polarized. Long after the simulation
portion of the class was over, seating charts, which we had maintained
from the first day of class, showed that, with the exception of those who
wandered into class late, the students always sat with their own “kind”.
Two contentious threads wove their way through all of the class activ-
ities and surfaced as minor spats between the Stoners and the Traders
several times each day. The first reflected the Stoners’ perception of the
Traders as “money grubbers”. In fact, even on the last day of class, we
overheard one of the Stoners saying: “We’re surrounded by Traders –
guard your money!” The second sore point was the way in which the
Traders characterized the Stoners as “spoiled and lazy”. Bruno’s parting
comment after the party on the final day was: “You guys didn’t work
nearly as hard as we did. You should all get at least one grade lower
than us.”
In sum, not only did members of the two cultural groups draw
different conclusions about the same event but they used those (misun-
derstandings) to paint deeply negative pictures of the opposite culture
and highly flattering pictures of their own. The Stoners ended the course
with a narrative about an exceptionally evolved, peace-loving society
which struggled to maintain its gentle ways against the invasion of
a coarse and greedy band of Traders. The Traders’ narrative, on the
other hand, was about an intelligent, civilized, industrious group of
entrepreneurs who stumbled across a hapless clan of hippies, kind and
gentle, but too lazy and backward even to value or protect their own
resources.
An imagined world made real: Simulations and the work

of romantic science
At the conclusion of our simulation, 37 of the 40 students reported that
they felt that they had been placed in the right culture for their personal-
ities, even though these assignments had been entirely random. It seems
to us pretty certain that all participants on the course, including the
instructors, had collectively created two distinct cultural systems that
changed dynamically over time. Moreover, as the two systems devel-
oped in mutual (antagonistic) interaction with each other, we were able
to participate in the process of ingroup cultural formation “in isola-
tion”, and we were able to observe the crucial role that between-group
interactions play in shaping ingroup dynamics and societal norms.
Our method of planting the seeds of culture and then taking part in
its growth also gave us access to the intensely personal and emotional
quality of participating in the simulation. Our data indicate clearly that
within the first weeks of the simulation the events began to feel unbe-
lievably real to all of us. No one in the project predicted the intensity of
the emotional investments that we and the students were making. Anna
sums up perfectly what the rest of the participants were saying in their
fieldnotes:
I know that this culture and these games (somehow the word “game”
sounds wrong here) were not real, but they were not NOT real either.
I was really there, in that real room, holding those real cards with my
real fingers. I was really doing those things, really speaking that lan-
guage with my real lips. I was really having those thoughts with my
real brain. (hmmm? How can I get that money?) I was really feeling
those feelings of greed and frustration, and then guilt. This class has
made me wonder. Where does a game like this stop and “real life”
begin? Is one living inside the other?
(Anna, FTC, final reflection)
Anna’s observations and questions would have pleased Jean

Baudrillard. He suggests that we construct simulations because we can-
not obtain the information that we want from the target entity directly,
so we proceed indirectly by creating a model, which is sufficiently
similar to the original that we are confident that it will reveal the infor-
mation that we are looking for. Problems arise when we begin to test the
reaction of society to our simulations:
The network of artificial signs will become inextricably mixed up

with real elements . . . . You will immediately find yourself once again,
without wishing it, in the real, one of whose functions is precisely to
devour any attempt at simulation, to reduce everything to the real –
that is, to establish order itself . . . order always opts for the real.
(Beaudrillard, 1994, pp. 20–21)
As Beaudrillard pointed out, it can be practically impossible to isolate

the process of simulation from the force of the “real” that surrounds us.
But in cases such as we have recounted, the simulation is distinguishable
enough (the students have graduated from the university, the course has
stopped, the class is over, new circumstances have arisen “to push the
experience into the past”) that it can be extremely useful for articulating
the complex relations between culture, individual development, social

interaction and society.
We believe that this form of simulation also provides a good example
of the process of research that Alexander Luria (1968/1972) referred to
as “romantic science” (a term that is traceable at least back to Goethe
(1988)). In Luria’s view of romantic science, investigators involve them-
selves with the object of their research over relatively long stretches
of time, ranging from weeks to several years. Deep understanding
comes from the ongoing process of deep engagement in problems of
mutual concern, albeit concerns that differ in their points of view and
individual trajectories.
In this regard, the BaFa’ BaFa’ sociocultural simulation functioned per-
fectly as a romantic science method in this project. The game not only
allowed us to expose the social processes that we were seeking to under-
stand (sometimes in preplanned ways, sometimes as a response to local
contingencies) but also engaged the participants and elicited feelings in
ways that permit us to draw plausible connections between events in
the research setting and those that we encounter in naturally occurring
life experiences.
We had created and lived for a while inside an imagined world,
which is exactly the way two very influential thinkers describe culture.
Evolutionary psychologist Henry Plotkin (2003) titled his book on the
evolution of culture The Imagined World Made Real. He suggests that
human culture can be distinguished from the cultures developed by
other living things in that all of our cultural artefacts existed first in our
imaginations. Lev Vygotsky had expressed the same idea almost a cen-
tury earlier: “All that is the work of the human hand, the whole world of
culture, is distinguished from the natural world because it is a product
of human imagination and creativity based on imagination” (Vygotsky,
2004).
But was it good education?
We cannot end without addressing an important issue that we have

bypassed in our focus on the simulation. It was part of a university class
that was supposed to induce students to be more reflective about their
attribution of personal traits to members of another culture without
having a deep understanding of that culture “from the inside”. In this
respect the class could be considered a total failure.
Marshall Kitchens’ ideal of intercultural interactions that promote
mutual understanding fits our own views. He contends that in order
to develop a better understanding of culture, people must be able see

their own strangeness through the eyes of Others:
They have to take on this role of alien or “Other” as a way of see-

ing the familiar as strange. At the same time, they need their insider
status in order to understand the exotic as familiar. They have to
see both difference and sameness and establish a very careful com-
bination of both insider and outsider . . . . Without a balanced and
informed perspective, the result is either a naïve celebration of one’s
own culture from the inside, or a shallow critique of the “Other”
from the outside, both failing to achieve a sympathetic and rich
understanding of culture”.
(Kitchens, 2006, p. 1)
We hadn’t come anywhere close to a “balanced and informed perspec-

tive” that would provide a “sympathetic and rich understanding of
culture”. The students’ notes revealed very little evidence that they had
made any effort at all to take the Others’ perspective. Instead, all of
us, including the instructors (who simultaneously shared and lectured
about balanced and informed perspectives) were, in Kitchen’s words,
naïvely celebrating our own cultures from the inside. The two groups
never came to a shared understanding of what it meant to be a member
of one culture or another.
However, in many important ways, the course was a great success. For
one thing, the students rated it very highly. For another, as the field-
notes sprinkled across this chapter attest, they engaged in sophisticated,
reflective analysis of their very complex experiences. Moreover, there is
ample evidence in our data corpus that the personal commitment that
the students made to their involvement as a Stoner or a Trader had an
impact on their engagement in the academic portion of the class as well.
Surprised at how heavily invested they had become in their fabricated
cultures in a few short class meetings, the students were eager to learn
how such a change in their personal commitments was possible. Earlier
we discussed the deliberate measures that were taken to establish partic-
ular affective environments or moods for the two cultures, but we were
also, equally deliberately, creating academic atmospheres.
Parker Palmer (2010) writes that there are ways of teaching that create
community, but these require a virtue that is not always found in uni-
versity classrooms – hospitality. A lack of hospitality in the classroom
has been ubiquitous in these students’ previous experience. Even in
seminar-style classes, they learn early on to keep an intellectual straight
face. It is rare to hear an honest question, to say nothing of an admission

of ignorance. Instead, students ask questions that are designed to let the
professor know that the lesson has been heard and understood. Palmer
notes that university classes should be hospitable spaces not merely
because kindness is a good idea but because real education requires rigor.
In a counterintuitive way, hospitality supports rigor by supporting com-
munity. A hospitable learning space is one where students can disagree
with the professor, argue with classmates and admit ignorance.
In the BaFa’ BaFa’ simulation class, ignorance was the starting point
for everyone, and learning had less to do with acquiring a body of
knowledge from other more learned authors than with creating a body
of knowledge along with other ignorant souls. It seemed impossible to
remain outside the issues that we were addressing. Anything we might
have taught about cultural processes from a text would certainly have
been less compelling than reading those texts while engaged in prac-
tices where the sights, sounds and feelings of cultural creation were
inescapable elements of the educational experience.
In their term papers the students all spoke with confidence about the
theories that we interrogated through our experiences in the simulation,
and wrote with feeling about the changes that they had experienced in
their attitudes about themselves and each other, as well as about culture
and life in general. As researchers, we came to realize, rather belatedly,
that despite the bumps and diversions, or perhaps because of them, this
was exactly the kind of research and educational outcome of which we
had dreamed.
Epilogue: Culture mediates the process of intercultural,

social interaction
In writing our chapter we did not have an opportunity to read and think
about the relevance of our work to the concerns of the other authors
in this volume, who were concurrently writing their own chapters.
We completed our research, motivated by its own theoretical concerns,
more or less isolated with respect to its current, richer context.
After we had prepared our chapter the editors suggested that, where
possible, we should indicate linkages between our own work and that of
our fellow authors. We thought this a fine idea but to carry out such a
task properly would have meant more rewriting than we felt was possi-
ble at the time. Rather than make a few “drive by references” to our co-
authors, we have latched on to an issue that appears broadly represented
in all of the chapters, but most pointedly in those by Alex Gillespie

(Chapter 6) and Tania Zittoun (Chapter 8). We offer this condensed form
of cross-referencing with apologies for its incompleteness.
Gillespie sets out an explanation for conditions under which social
interaction leaves the parties unchanged. Its an important undertaking
because of the one-sided way in which developmentalists typically see
change as progress, often framed in terms of age norms or academic
performance. Gillespie summarizes the process of “non-influence” very
clearly right at the start, as he:
“examines non-transformative social interaction – that is, how

people can meet and interact without being changed by the
interaction, where differences are assimilated and do not require
accommodation”.
(Gillespie, Chapter 6)
We would like to suggest that the phenomena that emerged in our cul-
tural simulation strongly argues for cultural historical mediation as a
central process in the creation of what appears to be assimilation, as
ordinarily conceived in the Piagetian literature. We focus here on two
of the example interactions that we offered in our chapter where pro-
cesses of intergroup conflict made their presence felt: the role of play
money as either currency or object of art, and the meaning of the word
“grandma” as either a beloved family member or a way of express-
ing disapproval with another’s actions. Each illustrates the process of
social-cultural mediation in a very striking way that shows the transfor-
mation of a social representation (money or family relation) in terms
of the meaning system of the receiving culture. For this process to occur
there must be an active, imaginative transformation of the meaning that
enables a seemingly common token (money or family relation) to come
into common use in a group’s interactions – the meaning of the token
is inflected to fit the nature of the interaction between the groups. This
process of culturally conditioned meaning inflection and inversion is
critical in mediating the processes that are identified as assimilation and
accommodation.
This process, we believe, reflects the kind of cultural psychology that
Tania Zittoun (Chapter 8) calls for in her contribution:
A cultural psychology invites us to examine the cultural elements

which mediate human relationships. These, which usually have a
material and a semiotic dimension, have both an existence in the

present, the here and now of an interaction, yet also a more virtual
one, opening memories, or worlds of possibilities . . . My focus here is
on semiotic processes – this by which we understand the signs in the
world and how these shape our mind, and how our mind, through
signs, transforms the world.
(Zittoun, Chapter 8)
In our case the cultural elements were an origin story, a set of “culture-
specific” activities that were consistent with the value system of the
origin story, and the cultural understandings brought through prior
experience of the participants. What resulted was in fact a “virtual”
world. The participants were routinely opened up to new memories of
old events connected with their everyday lives. And they were certainly
absorbed into a world of possibilities opened up by their participation
in the given idioculture. In this world of possibilities, paper monopoly
money could become either a powerful measure of one culture’s social
success, or emotionally laden materials to be manipulated into symbols
intended to belittle that culture’s interpretations of success.
It is clear that semiotic processes are central to the examples that we
have provided. Whatever these processes are, they exert enough influ-
ence to make us stop and think hard about the tenacity of the kinds
of real-world conflicts to which several of the chapters, and everybody’s
concern, are directed. These processes of meaning inflection and inver-
sion are necessary, we believe, as a condition for the assimilation about
which Gillespie writes. We refer to this process as appropriation (not
internalization), a culturally mediated, dialogic process.
Our data also call attention to the ways in which these social represen-
tations, in their transformed, appropriated form, can spread throughout
the cultural group (grandma among the Stoners, where grandma pro-
vided the dances and the Oreos) or be used in a relatively straightfor-
ward, instrumental way (grandma among the Traders, where the word
“grandma” was used to accuse players of committing a crime) in line
with the idiocultural system of which it is a part.
The most sobering conclusion from these results, if they are in fact
generalizable beyond the special conditions that we created, is that once
a foreign term has been inverted and adopted, each occasion of interac-
tion between the conflicting parties is likely to increase the intensity
of the conflict between them. Each new (doubly misconstrued) inter-
action is another occasion to be confirmed in one’s (misconstrued)
interpretation of the other.
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11
Social Relations, the Financial
Crisis and Human Development
Stefano Passini
Introduction
Early in 2014, via a referendum proposed by a national conservative

and right-wing political party and mobilized by far-right movements,
Switzerland approved a motion to impose a quota on immigration with
a view to curtailing the phenomenon. The motion runs counter to
the principle of the free movement of workers between the EU and
Switzerland. While a statement issued by the European Commission
declared that it was “disappointed” about this result in favour of immi-
gration curbs, the Swiss outcome was acclaimed by the growing extrem-
ist wings of European politics. These Eurosceptic and anti-immigration
parties and movements have frequently linked the increasing immigra-
tion in the EU with the recent economic and financial crises of the
host countries. The recent expansion of the EU has indeed entailed
an exponential increment in immigration towards Western European
countries, in particular from the new Eastern European member states.
This expansion of multiculturalism has coincided with a major crisis
affecting the European economic system that has especially affected
the Mediterranean countries (namely, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain and
Portugal). The coincidental overlapping of these two events has led
people to mistakenly attribute the crisis to immigration. Hericourt and
Spielvogel (2012, p. 2) have noted that “the crisis threatens to revive
opposition to immigration and foster anti-immigrant feelings”. The con-
sequence is a strengthening of the polarization of “us” vs. “them” (i.e.
ingroup vs. outgroup), by which more prosperous nations are becoming
worried that their welfare systems will be unable to handle an influx
of workers from other economically poorer countries – a polarization
often used by political forces for the capitalization of votes. For instance,
the recent Italian campaigns are full of instances where immigration
194
Stefano Passini 195
is used as a scapegoat for the economic crisis and the rise in unem-
ployment. In particular, the right-wing party “Lega Nord” has based its
success on social concerns and insecurity, directly evoking the xenopho-
bia of a society that is unprepared for immigration (Volpato et al., 2010).
Thus the financial crisis may have some effect on social interactions and
intergroup relationships by which people may be driven to see others as
a threat rather than an opportunity for individual development. This
perception of threat can indeed lead to a climate of intergroup hostil-
ity and conflict that may take the form of increased prejudice towards
certain outgroups, intergroup discrimination and violence (Becker et al.,
2011). Moreover, concerns about the economic situation may lead peo-
ple to distrust the authorities and institutions in office and to support
extremist movements with xenophobic and ultranationalist ideologies.
Going back to the past century, between 1929 and 1933 under the
Weimar Republic, Germany suffered a collapse of its economy and a
dramatic increase in its unemployment rate due to the 1929 Wall Street
Stock Market crash. The collapsing economy led to a political crisis with
the escalation of extremist parties, specifically the Nazi Party, which was
particularly successful among the ranks of the unemployed youth, the
lower middle classes and the rural population. Thus, as we will see in
the next section, the economic crisis may bring people to seek security
in authoritarian leaders and movements, with the consequence of an
exacerbation of intergroup hostility and a derogatory attitude towards
other social groups.
At the same time, such countries that are more specifically affected
by the global economic and financial crisis (i.e. so-called Western coun-
tries) have been characterized in recent decades by a large expansion
of consumerism and by an emphasis placed on consumption and ego-
individuality as a way of life (see Bauman, 2007; Passini, 2013). This
emphasis has promoted a cultural transformation by which many peo-
ple have elevated consumption to being one of the purposes of their
existence. This is a “compulsion” to consume which may have dele-
terious effects on the way in which individuals relate to other people.
Indeed, as I will show, many aspects of contemporary life are clear indi-
cations of a change in the way people interact (see Benasayag & Schmit,
2003; Bauman, 2007; Ehrenberg, 2010; Passini, 2011, 2013). In particu-
lar, social relations are often marked by a partial loss of responsibility
towards others and a “possessive individualism” – by which people
conceive themselves as the sole owners of their skills and they believe
that they owe nothing to society for them (Macpherson, 1964) – is on
the rise.
Both the consumer boom and the more recent economic crisis may
be having an effect on everyday interactions with others. Indeed, both
of these events may lead people to keep their distance from others and
may exacerbate those individualistic forces that see other people as a
restriction to personal achievement. In the first part of this chapter I will
analyse both issues (i.e. the financial crisis and consumerism) from a
sociopsychological perspective. In particular, I will try to consider the
effects that these contingencies may have on social interactions and
human development. Then I will discuss some factors that may promote
a sound ethic of social relationship between people and social groups.
The effects of the economic uncertainty on

social relations
A financial crisis started in 2008 with the US subprime mortgage market

and it hit many Western countries and in particular EU member states.
The resulting increase in individual economic uncertainty has led to at
least three related consequences in the relationship between individu-
als and society. First, people start to perceive themselves and their social
group as being unfairly disadvantaged and deprived as compared with
other people and social groups. There is a perception of relative depriva-
tion (Runciman, 1966) by which the economic crisis is seen, rightly or
wrongly, by means of increasingly unfair social comparison. Second, it
led to an erosion of trust and support from the population for the polit-
ical system and for government authorities and institutions in power.
As Polavieja (2013) pointed out, dissatisfaction with the economic situ-
ation of one’s own country and the perceived governmental inefficacy
in combating this financial crisis have spawned a widespread feeling
of political distrust and disaffection. Third, people’s need and search
for security has increased. That is, economic uncertainty brought many
people to feeling a strong attachment to those authorities and leaders
who promise an economic recovery even through the implementation
of authoritarian populist measures. All of these three consequences (i.e.
relative deprivation, distrust in the institutions in office and the search
for security) may have a cumulative effect on bringing people to blindly
and uncritically support those movements that promise a “new” social
contract, even at the expense of minority and disadvantaged groups,
with the consequence of an increase in prejudicial attitudes and intol-
erant social relations. Indeed, as we will see, the crisis may favour
support for extremist movements that galvanize and legitimize preju-
dicial intergroup relationships and one’s own group favouritism with
Stefano Passini 197
harmful effects on equity and social justice. These movements capitalize

on the discontent towards the authorities in power by using populist
propaganda. I will briefly introduce the concepts of relative deprivation,
political distrust and search for security, and the recent studies that anal-
yse them. For each of these concepts, I will assess the effects on social
relationships.
Relative deprivation
Runciman (1966) defined the concept of relative deprivation as a per-
ception of individuals of being unfairly disadvantaged as compared with
other people, groups or even themselves at different points in time. It is
a subjective state that leads people to believe that they do not have what
they deserve and that shapes emotions, cognitions and behaviour (for
a review, see Smith et al., 2012) – for example, anger and resentment
that support intolerant and aggressive actions. Relative deprivation is
defined by three steps (Smith et al., 2012): social comparison made by
an individual; a perception of a comparative disadvantage; and a belief
that this disadvantage is unfair and that the individual or their group
deserves better.
Runciman identified two types of deprivation (Aleksynska, 2011): on
an individual level by which social comparisons occur within a group;
and on a group level by which people compare their group’s relative
position with that of other groups. As Smith and colleagues (2012)
pointed out, individual relative deprivation is associated with individual
serving attitudes and behaviour (e.g. achievement of higher academic
levels or law-breaking actions). Instead, feelings of a group’s relative
deprivation are associated with ingroup serving attitudes and behaviour
(e.g. collective protest and outgroup prejudice). Reactions to relative
deprivation may indeed take the form of improving one’s personal or
one’s own group situation both with legitimate and non-legitimate eth-
ical actions (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright, 1997; Ellemers, 2002).
These conducts may take the forms of detrimental actions towards other
people and groups. Given that they are based on a social confrontation
by which the other people and social groups are perceived as unfairly
advantaged and privileged, both deprivations may thus have an effect
on social relationships and interactions with others.
As Becker et al. (2011) claimed, since their effect involves whole seg-
ments of the population and not just single individuals within a social
group, events such as financial crises are more probably perceived on
an intergroup (rather than an individual) level. That is, they elicit social
comparisons between social groups and categories (e.g. rich vs. poor,
natives vs. foreigners, employed vs. unemployed) rather than within

a social group. For this reason they more likely elicit perceptions of
group relative deprivation (instead of relative individual deprivation).
The effects of such deprivation stemming from economic crises are
mainly identified on the one hand in the support of political protest
and collective action in the form of willingness to sign petitions and
join strikes (e.g. Grant, 2008; Smith et al., 2008; see Smith et al., 2012)
in order to cope with the disadvantaged position of one’s own group. On
the other hand, such a feeling of deprivation may increase intergroup
prejudice and intolerance (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Walker & Smith,
2001; Pettigrew et al., 2008). These two consequences are connected
by the fact that protests enacted to resolve an ingroup’s perception of
relative deprivation usually support, rather than diminish, intergroup
conflict. That is, even if these protests take the form of civil disobedi-
ence promoting fairer and more equitable policies (as I will discuss later),
individuals often support such protests that promise social change to the
detriment of other social groups. Indeed, research has shown that feel-
ings of relative deprivation may lead people to support extremist and
intolerant protest groups (e.g. Fesnic & Viman-Miller, 2009). This has
an effect on the spread of prejudices against outgroups to justify such
unfair measures.
In an interesting research study on the effects of the recent financial
crisis on intergroup relations, Becker et al. (2011) have argued that eco-
nomic and financial crises elicit an unspecific and diffuse threat since
they are based on complex and often obscure (at least for the common
citizen) causes and they cannot simply be attributed to a specific agent.
Thus people will seek explanations and causal attributions for the uncer-
tainty elicited by societal crises by directing their attention towards a
scapegoat. In particular, with the aim of eluding personal and one’s own
group’s responsibility, they will tend to put the cause of the financial
crisis down to some scapegoat outgroups, increasing prejudices towards
their members. The choice of these scapegoats was not arbitrary but was
based on mutually shared stereotypes within a specific societal context –
for instance, those concerning immigrants (e.g. Butz & Yogeeswaran,
2011). Immigrants are indeed often characterized by political parties and
news media as being law-breakers, idle, as burdens on the social welfare
system and as people who simply steal jobs from local people (Galliker
et al., 1998). Thus relative deprivation deriving from the economic
and financial crisis may cause people to join protest movements that
cope with the threat by exacerbating intergroup relationships and by
enhancing prejudicial attitudes and behaviours against some scapegoats’
Stefano Passini 199
social groups. Moreover, intergroup relative deprivation is connected to

ingroup favouritism – that is, a tendency to give more positive judge-
ments to the ingroup than to the outgroup (Coull et al., 2001). As many
studies have shown (see Brewer, 2001), ingroup favouritism is related to
intergroup conflict and outgroup derogation.
Political distrust
Another consequence of economic and financial crises, in some ways
connected to relative deprivation as well, is political distrust. Indeed,
people who perceive their socioeconomic situation as deprived are likely
to feel politically dissatisfied and to oppose established parties (Werts
et al., 2013).
Many studies have analysed the effects of political trust (and dis-
trust) on the functioning of democratic systems (see Levi & Stoker,
2000). Political trust is classically defined as “a basic evaluative orienta-
tion toward the government” (Hetherington, 1998, p. 791), considering
“whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing
in accordance with the normative expectations held by the public”
(Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 368). In the empirical studies, political trust
(or distrust) is measured in terms of whether people trust the govern-
ment and politicians to do the right thing or in terms of the confidence
that people have in the political institutions (Tan & Tambyah, 2011).
Political distrust may thus be defined as a loss of people’s basic confi-
dence in the political institutions or in the officials whom they have
elected (Kunovich, 2000).
Recently, many scholars have pointed out an increase in attitudes of
political distrust in Western democratic societies (e.g. Newton & Norris,
2000; Niemi & Weisberg, 2001; Dalton, 2004). These studies have mainly
focused on those consequences of political distrust that are linked to a
decline in political participation (e.g. Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005). How-
ever, other studies have shown that political distrust may lead to a shift
in the political engagement towards other ways of political participation
and not just its collapse. Indeed, in the long term, political distrust and
discontent can lead to protest and even revolutionary actions aimed at
changing the societal system (Pattyn et al., 2012). Even if these protests
take the form of civil disobedience, studies (e.g. Bergh, 2004; Bélanger &
Aarts, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Pattyn et al., 2012; Werts et al., 2013) have
shown that political distrust often leads people to support extreme, and
at times undemocratic, protest movements. That is, political distrust
is related to supporting and voting for extremist and populist protest
parties.
The effects of political distrust on the relationships between individu-

als may be similar to those seen for relative deprivation. Indeed, political
distrust (perhaps via the adherence to extremist political forces) may
lead to exacerbating group relationships and to an increase in prejudi-
cial attitudes and behaviours, as shown by some recent research (e.g.
Pattyn et al., 2012) which found a positive correlation between political
distrust, authoritarianism and racial prejudice. That is, political distrust
may be exploited by some “new” political movements that will shift the
dissatisfaction with the system to a general distrust in the relationship
with other social groups by indicating the latter as scapegoats for the
political and economic crisis.1
It should be noted that political distrust may have the consequence
of increasing indifference towards political issues as well. However, the
effect of such indifference on social relationships may be similar to that
produced by the adherence to extremist and radical policies. Indeed,
some authors (e.g. Bauman, 1989) have pointed out that the popula-
tion’s indifference and silence, and not just their obedient attitudes
towards movements that promote arbitrary policies, are relevant fac-
tors that contributed to perpetrating severe abuses (e.g. Jews victimized
by Nazis) as well. Recent research (Passini, 2014) suggests that indiffer-
ence towards political issues may be related to prejudicial attitudes and
behaviours. The results show that indifferent people are characterized
by authoritarian and conformist attitudes as well as by high scores on
subtle forms of prejudice towards immigrants. These data show that peo-
ple who wittingly or unwittingly assume an indifferent stance towards
other social groups whose rights are threatened by the authority have
a role in supporting such arbitrary policies akin to such people who
more directly obey and support them. Similarly, we can expect that the
general growing distrust in institutions and authorities (see the inter-
esting analysis of Cook & Gronke, 2005) and the consequent increase
in indifference towards politics and policies probably play a role in all
of those dynamics that affect intergroup relationships. Political distrust
may indeed have the effect of increasing levels of indifference towards
everything that concerns politics, including policies that affect minority
and disadvantaged groups. As some authors (e.g. Pettigrew & Meertens,
1995; Ellemers & Barreto, 2009) have pointed out, such indifference can
take on the face of the modern expressions of bias.
Search for security

Concerns over the individual economic situation may also elicit in
people a stronger attachment to those political forces and authorities
Stefano Passini 201
that promise to resolve and diminish their uncertainties. As Oesterreich

(2005) pointed out, in uncertain and threatening situations, people tend
to give their allegiance to those individuals who seem to provide them
with security. That is, they follow and support those who seem to have
the power and means to solve problems, to reduce their feelings of anx-
iety and insecurity, and to restore personal security and safety. Research
into authoritarianism (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996) has shown that feelings of
uncertainty and feeling threatened may lead people to embrace authori-
tarian ideologies and political systems. In Fromm’s (1941) classical work
Escape from Freedom, authoritarianism is indeed one of the three mech-
anisms that people use to escape from freedom and regain a sense
of security. People decide to submit part (or all) of their freedom to
someone else (an authority or a leader).
Thus a threatening situation may bring some people to escape free-
dom so as to reduce uncertainty and to support those authoritarian
procedures and ideologies that restrict freedoms, while at the same time
decreasing insecurity. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2001 ter-
rorist attack in the USA, many citizens supported government efforts
to promote security as opposed to protecting individual liberties and
civil rights (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). In this sense, by enhancing
a sense of personal insecurity, events such as a financial and economic
crisis may lead people to search for a renewed form of security in new
authorities and political forces which are not considered to be respon-
sible for the uncertain situation that they experience and that at the
same time promise to restore personal security and safety. As authori-
tarian studies have suggested, these political movements often promote
extremist, populist and scapegoating political ideologies. As seen previ-
ously with relative deprivation and political distrust, the effect can be a
worsening of the relationships between social groups and an increase in
ingroup favouritism, and prejudicial attitudes and behaviours towards
outgroups.
Pro-social and anti-social protests

As we have seen, economic and financial crises may lead people to
lend their support and participation to protest movements and parties
that promise to resolve the economic drift with populist, nationalist
and, at times, undemocratic solutions. The three consequences analysed
indeed have a cumulative effect which may push people to embrace
populist and, at times, extremist and xenophobic ideologies. However,
if the increasing popularity of extremist and nationalist movements has
become a consolidated fact over recent years in Europe, we should not
suppose that support for protest movements will always lead to the
embrace of such ideologies. Protest against the political system in power
may take on the form of anti-social or pro-social disobedience. Passini
and Morselli (2009, 2013) have indeed distinguished between pro-social
disobedience (enacted for the sake of the whole society, including all
of its different levels and groups) and anti-social disobedience (enacted
in favour of one’s own group in order to attain specific rights). Both
forms of disobedience promote a certain social change. However, pro-
social disobedience promotes a form of social change that is addressed
to everyone, while anti-social disobedience is not directed to society at
large and it preserves or reproduces social inequality (Merton, 1968).
Thus, while a social and economic crisis may lead people to finding
relief in protest movements that favour one’s own group to the detri-
ment of the other social groups (i.e. anti-social disobedience), other
people may participate in protest movements that aim to restore truly
democratic and equitable principles (i.e. pro-social disobedience). What
leads people to supporting pro-social or anti-social protest movements?
An interesting theory, yet largely overlooked by social psychology, that
may help to answer this question is the political orientation theory
of Kelman and Hamilton (1989; Passini & Morselli, 2011). They have
identified three individual orientations which represent three ways by
which the legitimacy of political authorities is generated, assessed and
maintained by individuals – that is, rule, role and value orientation.
Rule-oriented citizens tend to support policies that contribute to their
sense of security and they expect the authorities to protect their basic
interests and ensure societal order. Their participation tends to be pas-
sive and only aims to protect their interests. Role-oriented citizens tend
to support policies that contribute to enhancing their sense of status
and they expect the authorities to ensure their high-ranking status.
Value-oriented citizens tend to be active in formulating, evaluating and
questioning national policies and they expect the authorities to pursue
policies that uphold and reflect the fundamental and universal val-
ues of a just and fair society (Passini & Morselli, 2011). This theory
may be extended in order to understand attachment to protest move-
ments. In particular, as some studies (see Passini & Morselli, 2010a,
2011) have shown, a value orientation should bring people to support
those movements which call for a social change that is addressed to
everyone. Instead, both rule and role orientation should support poli-
cies that just address the protection of one’s own or one’s own group’s
security (rule-oriented) and status (role-oriented). In this sense, during
economic crises, people with a value orientation should more likely
Stefano Passini 203
support pro-social protest movements which aim to overtake the crisis,

promoting intergroup solidarity instead of intergroup conflict.2
Consumerism, dissatisfaction and individualism
As we have seen, a financial crisis may have some detrimental effects

on social relationships by increasing intergroup conflict, ingroup
favouritism and outgroup derogation. Interestingly, the ongoing global
economic crisis has hit those countries which have recently largely
embraced a capitalistic system based on a market economy and on the
spread of a culture-ideology of consumerism (Sklair, 2002). As I have
recently observed (Passini, 2013), this emphasis on consumerism has
had some effects on social interactions as well.
In line with some recent analyses (e.g. Bauman, 2007; Ehrenberg,
2010), the 21st century can be characterized by a certain emphasis on
consumption as a way of living, at least regarding so-called Western
culture. Even if this emphasis on consumption does not involve every-
one, consumerism is somehow changing society’s values and culture
(Lury, 1996; Bauman, 1998). Consumerism may indeed support an
ego-individuality that is characterized by a deresponsibilization of the
individual towards the other people as well as a utilitarian approach
to life. Ehrenberg (2010) pointed out that individualism has permeated
Western societies over the last few decades with the effect of depriv-
ing individuals of a sense of collective membership and belonging, and
by enhancing their nihilistic hedonism. In particular, two effects of
consumerism have for some people changed their way of approaching
others – that is, the search for instant gratification and an increase in
narcissistic tendencies.
A first effect of consumerism is that of enhancing the search for an
instant, immediate and rapid way to achieve gratification. As Bauman
(2007) has pointed out, if in the past the gratification from consumer
goods consisted in their long-term efficacy, nowadays consumer satisfac-
tion may be a threat to the market. Indeed, the constant search for new
gratification is the essential engine that drives the lucrative mechanism
of the economic system (Hayward & Hobbs, 2007). This search for an
instant present-time gratification may enhance a tendency to be moti-
vated more by present than future goals in making decisions (Simons
et al., 2004). Indeed, capitalist societies and markets need a present-time
compulsive consumer rather than a wise economizer, promoting the
“nowist culture” that was theorized by Bertman (1998) where actions
are driven more by the urge to have everything right away than by
the possibility of forfeiting something now to have something in the

future.
Such present-time orientation and the search for an instant gratifica-
tion may have an effect on social relationships. Indeed, some studies
(e.g. Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999; Kairys, 2010) have shown that a present-
time perspective is negatively correlated with some personality traits,
such as agreeableness (i.e. being cooperative) and conscientiousness
(i.e. a tendency to act dutifully and to planned rather than impulsive
behaviours), and positively to openness to experience (i.e. novelty-
seeking) and extraversion (i.e. a tendency to seek stimulation). Thus
present-oriented people seem to search for superficial interpersonal
interactions which tend to be mainly based on one’s own enjoyment
and profit – a utilitarian view of the Others that seems to serve the
gratification of the Self with less consideration for the social exchange
and the coconstruction of reality. Similarly, other studies (Lang &
Carstensen, 1994; Joireman et al., 2006) have shown that people with
a shallow future-time perspective invest less in social relationships and
are less oriented towards pro-social behaviours.
Moreover, the search for instant gratification and the propensity not
to project oneself in the future is connected to a tendency to act impul-
sively and to a low sense of responsibility for one’s own actions and
for others (Passini, 2013). This is hyperindividualism, “characterized by
disconnection from society, but not from the self; individuals feel free
to satisfy personal needs without considering the consequences of their
actions on the rest of society” (Huang et al., 2010, p.42). Today, Western
culture is in effect focused on a blinkered, individualistic worldview
where responsibility for one’s own actions often lies outside the indi-
vidual and it is generally shifted onto others (see Finkel & Moghaddam,
2005; Passini, 2011). In this sense, consumerism has promoted a new
concept of responsibility that does not include others but is only referred
to in self-realization (Bauman, 2007). This responsibility shift recalls
the distinction between objective and subjective responsibility, as pro-
posed by Piaget (1932). Objective responsibility is a strict adherence to
rules with no reflection on their sense and it characterizes relations of
constraint between individuals. In contrast, subjective responsibility is
based on a reflective capacity focused more on the spirit than on the
letter of the law and it characterizes cooperative relations. To this end,
consumerist societies exacerbate competition over cooperation between
individuals, and identify in the concept of performance the only byword
for evaluating a person. This heightened competition and emphasis on
performance often leads people to feel dissatisfied with what they have
Stefano Passini 205
and are, entailing some consequences for social interactions as well.

Indeed, the Others might be seen not as subjects along with construct-
ing one’s own future but more as obstacles, or at least as something to
use for the purposes of one’s own self-achievement (Passini, 2013).
Another effect of consumerism on social interactions is what we can
call a “narcissism boom”. Ehrenberg (2010) has stated that in the last
20 years, social interactions changed from an Oedipus to a Narcissus
characterization. That is, a certain crisis of the authority principle has
coincided with an increase in a narcissistic way of relating to others
and society. This is not to say that the old authoritarian education sys-
tem should be rehabilitated. Authority should not indeed be simply
identified either with the exercise of power or with a relationship of
subordination. It should instead be defined as the result of a relationship
between two or more social actors, in which one exerts an influence over
the other(s) with the aim of promoting equality (see Morselli & Passini,
2011). However, as Benasayag and Schmit (2003) have noted, with the
crisis of authority today, people obey only in the name of personal suc-
cess and affirmation. This is a utilitarian worldview in which the only
authority and hierarchy accepted are those determined by success and
personal power. Consumer societies have indeed promoted a worldview
in which personal success (also at the expense of others) is the way
to become an accomplished person. The crisis of the authority princi-
ple paradoxically favours the emergence of authoritarianism. A society
whose authority mechanisms are undermined does not indeed start an
age of freedom but a period of confusion and arbitrariness that can easily
degenerate into a restriction of freedom (see Passini & Morselli, 2009).
As we have seen regarding the effects of the financial crisis, the crisis
of the authority principle may indeed lead people to search for a new
sense of security in authoritarian rather than democratic leaders and
procedures.
In parallel with the crisis of the authority principle and consequently
to the emphasis on success and competition (rather than on educa-
tion and respect for others) as essential characteristics for individual
development, the spread of a narcissistic personality has grown. Some
scholars (e.g. Lipovetsky, 2006; Bauman, 2007) have actually analysed
consumerist culture as the arena for a narcissistic cult of the Self. This
mania for self-exhibition and for seeing and evaluating themselves
through the mirror image of the Others is paradoxically linked both
to a separation from the Others and to poor self-knowledge (Passini,
2013). Indeed, narcissism is negatively linked with seeking out or creat-
ing long-term relationships that have qualities of closeness and empathy
(Campbell & Foster, 2002) and is positively associated with using rela-
tionships only as opportunities, or as a forum for self-enhancement
and for appearing popular and successful (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008).
In this sense there seems to exist a perfect collusion between a culture
of narcissism – that attaches relevance to certain values such as social
success and autonomy from any strong and binding relationship – and
some individual and social difficulties in relating to others and dealing
with concerns and doubts (Lowen, 1983).
As Kilbourne (2006, p. 12) pointed out, “the consumer culture encour-
ages us not only to buy more but to seek our identity and fulfilment
through what we buy, to express our individuality through our ‘choices’
of products”. The association between psychological identity and prod-
ucts is neither good nor bad in itself since consumer goods effectively
embody one’s own personal and social identity and communicate them
to the Other. However, as Dittmar (2007) stated, consumer culture can
become a “cage” by preserving a number of myths (e.g. the idealized
image of the “good life”), and revealing one’s own dissatisfaction and
loneliness. This cage may constitute a wall that isolates individuals, and
separates them from the Others and from constructive social relations.
Escape from scapegoats: From intergroup conflict

to intergroup solidarity
As we have seen, economic and financial development – in both boom

and bust periods – may bring people to separate from Others in everyday
interactions. However, even if the risk is high (as shown by the litera-
ture analysed), competitive social interactions might not always be the
case. That is, we can recognize some variables which may lead people
to cooperate rather than compete with one another. Some people may
indeed prefer to construct collaborative social relations and to promote
intergroup solidarity rather than pursue myopic, self-maximizing strate-
gies in their relations with the Others. I will briefly analyse some of these
variables.
As we have seen, both consumerist boom and crisis have led many
people to embrace a sort of overindividualistic responsibility by means
of which they solely pursue their own interests and do not feel respon-
sible for the consequence of their actions on others. Therefore, contrari-
wise a sense of social responsibility may cause people to understand
that one’s own personal achievement is based on a mutual respect and
a common plan. This responsibility is based on a conception of indi-
vidualism that is close to Dewey’s concept of democratic individualism
Stefano Passini 207
(Dewey, 1930), by which one’s own freedom is only guaranteed by the

respect for the freedom of others and by which free individuals con-
tribute to the liberation and enrichment of the lives of others. In this
regard it may be relevant to consider two notions identifying a respon-
sibility that goes beyond one’s own immediate personal profit and that
are instead referred to the future and respect for others – that is, the con-
cepts of vertical responsibility (Jonas, 1984) and generativity (Erickson,
1950). The first identifies a responsibility for one’s own actions with
regard to the future insomuch as it defines a sense of responsibility for
a world yet to come and for unknown future generations. Similarly, the
second describes a sense of responsibility for the enlarged community
and future generations (Erikson, 1950). As some studies have suggested
(see Morselli, 2013), those people who attach high relevance to verti-
cal responsibility and generativity should be more inclined to overcome
economic crisis by promoting those cooperative values addressed to find
a common and not an individualistic solution. Similarly, these people
will experience the economic booms with great attention not to over-
consuming all of the present resources and with strong consideration of
the consequences of consumerism on future lives and societies. In both
cases a focus on these concepts should have positive effects on social
relations and should bring a stronger sense of communitarianism which
underpins every society.
Another individual variable which may support cooperative social
relationships during economic positive and negative circumstances is
that of values. Schwartz (1992) defined values as trans-situational goals
that vary in importance and that serve as a guiding principle in one’s
own life. Values shape the way in which people perceive and interpret
events, situations and the society around as well as the preferences, atti-
tudes, choices and actions that they carry out in their everyday lives3
(Knafo et al., 2011). Schwartz detected the basic motivations that charac-
terize people in any society and distinguished between ten content types
that represent these motivations. These are universalism (protection for
the welfare of all people); benevolence (preservation of the welfare of
people with whom one is in frequent personal contact); conformity
(restraint of actions that violate social expectations); tradition (respect
for traditional customs); security (safety and stability of society); power
(social status and control over people and resources); achievement
(personal success); hedonism (pleasure and self-gratification); stimula-
tion (excitement and novelty in life); and self-direction (independent
thought and action). These ten value types are distributed along a cir-
cular structure organized within a two-dimensional space: openness
to change (self-direction, stimulation) vs. conservation (conformity,

tradition, security), and self-transcendence (universalism and benev-
olence) vs. self-enhancement (power, achievement). As some studies
have suggested, people who attach importance to openness to change
over conservation and self-transcendence over self-enhancement val-
ues should probably use these values as protective factors against the
emergence of a possessive individualism and the collapse of positive
and cooperative social relationships. These values are indeed linked to
less authoritarian and prejudicial attitudes (Duriez & Van, 2002) and to
a willingness to engage in pro-social activities, even in economic and
financial crises (De Groot & Steg, 2007). In this sense the promotion of
values that are focused on equality and intergroup solidarity, in both
economic booms and busts, may be a relevant protective factor against
overindividualism and the loss of positive relations with the others.
In conclusion, a remedy for shifting individualism from a possessive
to a more democratic way of expressing itself, and for constructing a new
trust in politics and the society that overcomes populist and separatist
propaganda, should go through an education that emphasizes coop-
erative vs. competitive social relations. An education that highlights
that personal achievement can only be accomplished by a respect for
the freedom and rights of others. Indeed, as the concept of democratic
individualism points out, one’s own freedom is guaranteed by a strong
sense of responsibility to respect everyone’s liberties. As Etzioni (1991)
pointed out, the balancing of individual rights with social responsibil-
ity is indeed an essential requirement for every civil society and for
every democracy (Gibson, 2011; Passini, 2011). In this sense, overcom-
ing the ongoing financial crisis may be possible by creating new forms
of intergroup solidarity and by enhancing a sense of common responsi-
bility. Indeed, if the literature on realistic group conflict (Sherif & Sherif,
1966) suggests that in times of crisis there is a push to pursue one’s own
group’s interests in opposition to those of the other social groups, this
“strategy” has no long-term future. That is, an emphasis on ingroup
profits and an increase in intergroup conflict will bring about a col-
lapse of those values of collaboration and mutual aid on which every
society should be based, thereby generating a societal crisis. Instead, as
Helliwell, Huang and Wang (2014) point out, in those countries where
policies against the economic crisis are based on solidarity and social
sharing, there is a significant increase in individual levels of happi-
ness and self-confidence. That is, solidarity and commonality are an
added value which allow people to feel safer and happier even during
economic crises and which for those reasons may give them a renewed
drive to overcome them.
Stefano Passini 209
Notes
1. This chapter is just focused on political distrust. For an interesting analysis
of the effect of interpersonal distrust (i.e. distrusting other people) on preju-
dice and discrimination see Chapter 6 by Gillespie in this book. Distrusting
others is conceived by this author as a “semantic barrier” which has a quite
significant impact on the increase of prejudicial attitudes and behaviours.
2. It is interesting to note an intriguing parallel between Kelman and Hamilton’s
theory and the three clusters identified by Psaltis (2012a) in his research on
intercommunal relations in Cyprus (see Psaltis, Chapter 5, this volume). The
“Pro-Reconciliation” cluster seems indeed to resonate with a value orientation
position. In particular, this cluster describes a more inclusive identification by
which people define themselves and the others as members of the same com-
munity. This is in line with the analysis of value orientation as characterized
by a high importance attached to moral inclusion attitudes (see Passini, 2010;
Passini & Morselli, 2009, 2010b). Another stimulating parallel may be with the
three processes of communication identified by Moscovici (1961) in his classic
study on the reception of psychoanalytic ideas in France. In particular, it may
be interesting to see whether the three individual orientations are character-
ized by different communicative patterns. In this sense, given that propaganda
fosters stereotypes, this type of communication should be more used by role-
oriented people; given that propagation is based on beliefs established by a
central authority that limit the individual creativity, this type should be more
distinctive of rule-oriented people. Finally, diffusion – characterised by the vol-
untary association of independently minded individuals – should characterize
value-oriented people.
3. The influence of people’s ideas or beliefs about the world on how outgroups
are considered is also analysed, from the social representation theory’s per-
spective, in Chapter 6 by Gillespie in this book. The author underlines how
these beliefs have indeed an effect on supporting positive vs. negative social
interaction with outgroups’ members.
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12
The Importance of Social
Relations for Human and
Societal Development
Introduction
In this concluding chapter we structure a discussion around two

overarching themes that we believe are pivotal in an investigation of
the role of social relations for human and societal development, and
three topics that correspond to the three parts of the volume. The first,
overarching, and more fundamental, theme concerns the question of
whether it is still relevant and useful to talk about development and not
merely change in both fields. The second concerns the directionality of
change from the societal to human development, a theme that is raised
in the Introduction (Chapter 1).
Then we open the black box of social interaction on the three spheres
of social life covered in the three corresponding parts of the volume. Part
I concerned the role of social relations and social interaction in cognitive
and sociomoral development. Part II looked at the role of social rela-
tions in conflict transformation and Part III focused on social relations
in relation to economic structure and the recent financial crisis.
In a final section we conclude that all three parts of the volume facil-
itate an interdisciplinary exploration of our topic and underline the
need to understand the processes of change at various levels of analysis
(Doise, 1986). We also examine the ways in which microgenetic, onto-
genetic and sociogenetic processes are articulated, through external and
internal dialogue, and the use of both material and symbolic resources,
or what Gerard Duveen saw as the vision of genetic social psychology
(Zittoun et al., 2007; Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010; Moscovici et al., 2013;
Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
215
Development or change?
As we argued in the Introduction, although child development is far

from predictable, it is nevertheless given direction by the fact that chil-
dren are socialized into a society. It is, for example, inconceivable that
a child brought up in society A would end up socialized into society
B. Societies, on the other hand, don’t have a macroguidance structure
into which they are socialized; rather, they must find their own way
in the world. It is thus unsurprising that societal development is more
contested than human development.
From a broad view of human development, especially from the
Piagetian tradition, many studies show that more complex, powerful,
reflective and decentred views in various domains of the child’s capabil-
ities are adaptive to living in a world of increasing complexity (Piaget,
1965/1968).
However, the closer we get to an examination of societal develop-
ment, the more difficult such claims are to sustain. Most notably there is
ideological contestation around what constitutes the ideal direction of
societal change, not to mention experience of the destructive history of
the 20th century and climate change due to human-made causes. The
apparently less contested nature of human development might explain
the international community’s efforts to shift discussions of societal
development away from economic growth and towards human capa-
bilities and the factors that promote resilience or lead to vulnerabilities
in human development (UNDP, 2014).
However, the direction and outcomes of human development could
be contested too, especially when such individual “progress” is premised
on individualism. What schools and middle-class education values as
“good” development could in fact have plenty of very negative side-
effects. For example, Pulfrey and Butera (2013) show how neoliberal
values of self-enhancement can lead to cheating; and Pulfrey et al.
(2011) demonstrate how the supposedly mature goal of being dedicated
to schoolwork in order to obtain good grades could have detrimen-
tal effects. Crouzevialle and Butera (2012) have interesting results that
show how the present competitive ideology, by putting pressure on
the individual to outperform others, can hinder cognitive performance.
This is in line with Toma and Butera’s (2009) data on the differen-
tial impact of cooperation and competition on strategic information-
sharing and use in group decision-making tasks. Competition is likely
to hinder social interaction capabilities and, as a result, cognitive
competencies.
Psaltis et al. 217
But there is also another critique that could be made: that Piaget
overestimates “abstraction” as a competence downplaying the “con-
crete”. Hundeide (1991), for example, makes the case that education
programmes in slums that socialize young people on school tasks deal-
ing mostly with formal thinking might distract them from opportunities
both to acquire the concrete skills required in the daily life of their envi-
ronment and to reflect on them. This critique points to the possibility
that formal operational thinking might not be a more advanced way of
thinking but just a different kind of thinking. And even if the intention
of this critique is just to point to a certain Western-centric point of view
in Piagetian thinking, it is also worth considering whether this kind of
argument could be misused to support a reified notion of culture, which
ends up lowering the expectations of specific groups to learn a kind of
thinking that is currently demanded for excellence in the sciences and
technological innovation in any state.
There is also a methodological critique to be made. The distinction
between formal reasoning and concrete operations is not so clear when
dealing with complex tasks (Perret & Perret-Clermont, 2011). It is not
clear what development really is, and our methodologies to declare that
some child is more developed than another are constantly under fire.
It also depends on what situation they are in, what rules they have to
obey to according to their socialization, what the meaning of display-
ing competence is for the child or whether they have understood what
is expected in the test situation, as clearly shown by Perret-Clermont
(Chapter 4, this volume). It should be noted that the uncertainties when
it comes to the idea of “learning” in the educational context are even
greater: Is imitating, adopting some ideas, changing behaviour, pleas-
ing the teacher and so on learning? How can we be sure that a student
has learned? The methodological problems are numerous, especially if
we care about transfer of knowledge from one context to the other
(Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4; Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, 2009).
The empirical findings and interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks
presented in this volume offer the basis for a more informed discussion
of critiques that have also been levelled from post-structuralist, post-
colonial and post-development literatures in relation to the notion of
“development” itself. For example, Burman’s (2008b) critique concerns
both the notion of societal development and also the way in which soci-
etal development is empirically collapsed with human development at
the individual level, as two sides of the same coin. This can be seen
in the Human Development Reports of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme. Regarding the first type of critique, she criticizes the
following points: (1) the Euro/Western-centric view of “development”,

which implies a loss in diversity of the world towards a “Westernization”
of increasing individualism; (2) the projection of adult–child relations
of power to the North–South relations at the international level that
leads to an infantilization of the South (meaning the poor countries); (3)
the increasing inflation of the concept of “development” (sustainable
development, human-centred development, integrated development),
which leads to the word becoming empty; (4) the sanctification of
development to such an extent that any foreign intervention in a
poor or conflict country can lay claims to legitimacy in the name of
development as a “higher good”; and (5) the capitalist and neoliberal
agendas that are implemented through structural adjustment plans in
the name of development but that end up intensifying the inequalities
in societies.
Edelstein (1999) at the turn of the 21st century touched on the
same tension in the sphere of studying the cognitive development of
individuals in societies across time:
The century has seen spells of sociopolitical, institutional, and cog-

nitive regression on a grand scale. Progressivists today suffer from
acute hangover. Complexity, it now is apparent, works both ways:
increasing pressure for assimilative response is but one; destruc-
tive regression, the violent simplification of complex structures, is
another. In the face of regression, it is difficult to maintain confi-
dence in an everlasting unfolding of individual cognitive competence
as an assimilative response to the ever-growing cognitive complexity
of social systems.
(Edelstein, 1999, p. 6)
The critique by Burman (2008b) of the way in which international

organizations operationalize societal development as economic growth,
longevity and academic attainment is indeed valid. The Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2014), which the international commu-
nity uses as the yardstick of societal development, for example, is a
crude macrostructural composite measure that is far removed from the
experience, social relationships and social interactions of people.
When international organizations, as a reaction to such criticisms,
shift their attention from the societal to the individual then the dis-
course of “skills and capabilities” takes precedence, which is redolent
with the methodological individualism at the other end of the horn of
the individual–social antinomy.
Psaltis et al. 219
This is not to deny the importance or relevance of the indices and

capabilities being measured. There are not many people in this world
who would deny that humanity should collectively strive for healthier
and more educated human beings. To be sure, to the extent that the
HDI is used to channel international help where it is most needed, its
use has to be applauded.
It is certainly worth discussing whether the direction of economic
growth is one promoting cooperative relations and mutual respect in all
spheres of life or one of deepening the inequalities produced by the cap-
italist and neoliberal system. An even more basic question is whether
economic growth is indeed reflected in health and education in these
countries. In other words, it is always worth asking: Whose development
are we talking about? Who else benefits from this development? Who
wants these changes? Are changes at the societal level in any way related
to the development of individuals? If yes, through what processes?”
All of this leads to the conclusion that one could indeed withhold
characterizations of “development” or “regression” when discussing
societal change. This would maybe have the benefit of better under-
standing both processes of change and stability or non-transformation
(Gillespie, Chapter 6; Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 10; Zittoun,
Chapter 8) at the societal level. But at the same time we should never
lose sight of potential repercussions of such stability or change for
human development (Psaltis, Chapter 5).
For example, one of the major tensions of educational policy in the
modern nation state comes from the inertia of its traditional role as
a galvanizer of national identity, national pride and patriotism. One
could debate the legitimacy or the need for stability or change regarding
the goals of an educational system from the perspective of interna-
tional politics and the nation state, but this should be done without
losing sight of the possible negative repercussions of such decisions for
the pedagogical role of the school promoting the cognitive and moral
development of the child and the cultivation of a self-reflective crit-
ical thinking individual. The discussions around the aims of history
teaching in nation states, for example, capture this dynamic perfectly
(Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Carretero, 2011; Psaltis, Chapter 5).
Bidirectionality and the need for analytical distance
In the Introduction we showed how various theoretical approaches

that discuss relations between human and societal development pri-
oritize either the individual (Inglehard & Welzel, 2004) or the social
(Greenfield, 2009). As we have seen in Part I, one answer to this ten-

sion was Jean Piaget’s parallelism between cognitive development and
social development. When he was asked what came first he would often
reply that this amounted to the chicken and egg problem.
But what the contributors to this volume suggest is that broad par-
allelisms between the individual and the social, or collapsing the one
over the other, can be unproductive, as long as such views leave the
“black box” of social relations and social interaction unopened. In this
volume, all contributions transcend individualism without at the same
time taking the extreme position of sociological holism.
The authors converge on their understanding of psychological devel-
opment as a social process and offer a detailed view of social relations
and social interaction as what mediates between societal change and
human development. This is done in a way that the importance of the
notion of development, and even progress, is reinstated in Part I, when
this is warranted, in relation to cognitive development in ontogenesis
(Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4; Psaltis, Chapter 5) or sociomoral devel-
opment (Edelstein, Chapter 2; Keller, Chapter 3). At the same time it
becomes clear, as we see in the other parts of the volume, that complex
sociogenetic processes relating to the economic structure of a society
(Uskul, Chapter 9), changes in the social representations about alter-
ity in times of upheaval due to financial crisis (Passini, Chapter 11)
or conflict transformation (Constantinou, Chapter 7) can have forma-
tive influences on human development through the formation of social
relations with specific characteristics between and within groups.
Part I
The contributors to Part I reminded us that it is worth revisiting the

Piagetian tradition and Piaget’s unique project of genetic epistemol-
ogy going beyond the usual misinformed readings of Piagetian theory
as a cognitivist and individualist “stage theorist” (Kitchener, 2009;
Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). In particular, his distinction between relations of
constraint and relations of cooperation, the bedrock of his genetic epis-
temology that influenced Habermasian theorizing (see Psaltis, 2007),
remains crucial and relevant more than 70 years after his proposal
(Piaget, 1932/1965). In times of financial crisis, and increased xeno-
phobia, racism, fascism and religious fanaticism across the globe, his
vision for the promotion of social relations of cooperation and decen-
tration away from monologic and dogmatic perspectives becomes more
relevant than ever.
Psaltis et al. 221
The crucial element in cooperative relationships is mutual respect,

which translates into a norm of reciprocity and practically means a situ-
ation of social interaction where both Self and Other feel free to express
their own point of view and allow the other space to express their
view also (Cooper et al., 2012). Under such conditions, decentration
from egocentric perceptions and consequently the co-construction of
mutual understanding become possible. Reflection on the Self’s actions
and views is also facilitated in a social interaction premised on mutual
respect. This transforms the coordination of the Self’s and Other’s
perspectives into a new perspective-transcending representation that
comprises a more equilibrated form of thinking compared with the
previous one.
Piaget’s Self and Other, however, were both epistemic subjects and
not social psychological subjects (see Duveen’s writings in Moscovici
et al., 2013; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014), which hinders our understanding
of the complicated social psychological processes that mediate between
societal and human development. As we saw, Piaget’s vision of the pro-
motion of social relations of cooperation is one that resonates with the
contributions to all three parts of this volume, albeit in a revised form
that is aware and critical of power structures, asymmetries and dynamics
at various levels of analysis that might hinder (Sinclaire-Harding et al.,
2013) or even, at times, paradoxically facilitate the establishment of
equilibrium and cognitive development (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Greco
Morasso et al., in press).
Wolfgang Edelstein is one of the influential figures in the study of
human development who never abandoned the notion of human and
societal development or even that of progress. As he argued, it is one
thing to critique the claims of progressivism and limit it to a position
that is compatible with a more realistic and, at the same time, dialec-
tical view of sociocognitive progress, but it is quite another thing to
abandon the notion of cognitive progress altogether (Edelstein, 1999).
He maintains that societies are peopled by reasoning individuals, who
have to reconstruct cognitive traditions and assimilate the schemata of
their culture in their own individual but collectively validated ways.
Edelstein’s contribution (Chapter 2) adds support to the aim of inter-
national organizations such as the EU, the Council of Europe and the
OECD to cultivate certain capabilities for democratic citizenship and
respect for human rights, but he also suggests practical steps for civic
education, educational processes and practices relating to social rela-
tions and social interactions that promote these outcomes. We are
reminded by Edelstein that democracy needs to be cultivated in schools
and that a crucial element of this cultivation is the promotion of coop-

eration. He describes strategies to provide democratic experiences and
to foster social competencies in schools: classroom councils as tools for
democratic self-government and as sites for cooperation and discursive
sociomoral learning (Keller, Chapter 3). All of these projects are firmly
rooted in the Piagetian tradition of promoting international cooperation
and world peace (Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4). Edelstein additionally
suggests service learning in the community, which can be successfully
organized by classroom councils and early experiences of civic engage-
ment in community contexts as part of democratic classroom practice.
Such practices aim to learn about democracy, through democracy and
for democracy.
From a perspective that prioritizes social relations and social interac-
tion, it is encouraging to read in Edelstein’s contribution (Chapter 2)
that the OECD recognized that the cultivation of the skills, attitudes
and capabilities for democracy are premised on the ability to (1) inter-
act in socially heterogeneous groups, (2) act autonomously and (3) use
tools interactively, but it is worth noting that, for the time being, these
dimensions are not yet measured in the PISA studies of the OECD, as
discussed earlier.
The Piagetian vision is also reasserted in the chapters by Perret-
Clermont (Chapter 4) and Psaltis (Chapter 5). But this is done as part
of an empirical tradition that explores the role of social interaction
in cognitive development beyond the ideal forms described by Piaget,
who never empirically studied the role of social interaction for cognitive
development. Since the mid-1970s, when this line of research was initi-
ated by Willem Doise, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont and Gabriel Mugny
(Doise et al., 1976), the importance of sociocognitive conflict in social
interaction as an important element for the promotion of cognitive
development has been reasserted time and again (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
And this sociocognitive conflict is both enabled and constrained by var-
ious factors that could be described at the intrapersonal, interpersonal,
intergroup and ideological/social representational level (Doise, 1986).
Perret-Clermont in her own research programme in Neuchâtel offered
a critique of the methods of an underlying individual-social method-
ological dualism of the first generation of research in Geneva. This led
her to suggest a paradigmatic shift that she described as a second genera-
tion of research (Perret-Clermont, 1993; Tartas & Perret-Clermont, 2008;
Psaltis et al., 2009). The hallmark of this second generation of studies
was her emphasis on the need to open the “black box” of communica-
tion. In other words, the emphasis on the outcomes of social interaction
Psaltis et al. 223
dominant in the first generation went into the background and into the
foreground came questions such as: How is intersubjectivity between
the experimenter and the child constructed in the pre-test, or post-test?
More recently, a third generation of research in Neuchâtel expanded its
focus to the study of what was termed the study of the microhistory of
individual cases moving towards the direction of idiographic method-
ologies where the focus shifts into the study of a series of phases of
testing and social interaction with a variety of tasks, even going back
into an understanding of the experiences that take place before the
immediate context of the experimental context. The interest here is
in the issue of the transfer of newly acquired knowledge from phase
to phase, setting to setting, institutional frame to institutional frame,
object to object and partner to partner (Tartas & Perret-Clermont, 2008;
Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, 2009), and in this sense the original ques-
tions of the first generation of research about the outcomes of social
interaction are brought again into the foreground, although with an
enriched understanding of communication processes.
Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) poses a crucial question: “What archi-
tectures of social relationships are supportive for the development of
cooperative social skills, for the development of thinking, for mature cit-
izenship?” Architecture is a term she borrowed from Rommetveit (1974),
who used it in his studies of communication. The notion of “architec-
ture” serves to point to the interpersonal, institutional, cultural and
conversational implicits that prestructure an interaction and its com-
munication contract. Perret-Clermont extends its use to encompass not
only verbal acts and their intersubjectivity but any type of interpersonal
transaction, including cooperation.
Keller (Chapter 3) describes the developmental sequence of
sociomoral reasoning from childhood to adolescence in her “naïve
theory of action” in a way that integrates cognitive, affective and
behavioural aspects of the Self and Others’ awareness (e.g. the ability
to coordinate perspectives of the Self and Others, emotional con-
cern for Others and action strategies). The ability to differentiate and
coordinate perspectives of the Self and Others is seen as the core social-
cognitive competence underlying the development of sociomoral think-
ing (Selman, 1980), a theme that is found in both Piaget (1932/1965;
1977/1995) and Mead (1934). The developmental sequence described
by Keller is as follows. It starts from what is called a level 0 (egocen-
tric focus on the perspective of the Self), to level 1 (differentiation of
individual subjective perspectives), level 2 (coordination of the Self and
Others’ perspectives), level 3 (third-person or observer perspectives) and
level 4 (generalized social system perspectives). She shows that each

higher-level coordination allows for more differentiated and coordi-
nated categories of understanding the psychological world of both Self
and Others.
Keller’s level 2 coordination is similar to what Gillespie (Chapter 6;
Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) describes as a coordination of metaperspec-
tives, which are central to both communication and the emergence
of human agency. This is reminiscent of what Rommetveit (1974)
described as two interlocutors reaching a temporarily shared world,
which was also identified by Psaltis & Duveen (2006; 2007) as the
conversation type of “explicit recognition”, which is directly linked
not only to the cognitive progress for non-conservers who become
conservers on a Piagetian conservation of liquids task but also to
the use of novel arguments by them in subsequent post-tests (Psaltis,
Chapter 5).
In his discussion of his first line of research, Psaltis also made clear
that a big lacuna in both the Piagetian and the Vygotskian theories
is the absence of an exploration of the role of social identity dynam-
ics in cognitive developmental theory. In the empirical findings of the
Cambridge strand of the third generation of research of social interac-
tion and cognitive development there is clear and consistent evidence
that both the establishment and the resolution of sociocognitive con-
flicts is formed under the influence of various sources of asymmetry
in the classroom (developmental level, gender, academic reputation,
popularity) that either conflict or align in social interaction. It is this
sociocognitive conflict of asymmetries that productively structures the
outcomes of the interaction at the individual level for children.
For example, a consistent finding is what was named the “Fm effect”
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). This denotes a sit-
uation where a more developmentally advanced girl interacts with a less
developmentally advanced boy. Under these conditions a more symmet-
rical discussion emerges which is the result of two sources of asymmetry
in conflict (gender and developmental level) that result in the boy’s
resisting to be positioned as less knowledgeable. While in Piagetian
terms this situation would probably be described as pseudoequilibrium
(Piaget, 1977/1995) and not predictive of lasting consequences, the fact
that the effect is found from early childhood to adolescence, and in
various cognitive tasks, suggests that identity dynamics and status asym-
metries should become an integral part of any cognitive developmental
theory.
Psaltis et al. 225
Part II
The role of social interaction in conflict transformation in the context

of intergroup conflict was discussed by Psaltis (Chapter 5) in his sec-
ond line of research and by all contributors to Part II. Psaltis’ point
of departure is the contact hypothesis and the reduction of prejudice
(Allport, 1954), but he expands his outlook to the study of social repre-
sentations of cooperation, conflict (Psaltis et al., 2014a), symbols (Psaltis
et al., 2014b) and history (Psaltis et al., 2011; Psaltis, in press) in relation
to reconciliation processes in post-conflict societies, studied in vari-
ous age groups. One central characteristic of the work of Psaltis is his
insistence on the need to capture the heterogeneity of social/national
identity positions within a single society or “culture” (Psaltis, 2012a,
2012b) and their relationship to intergroup contact. This is a response
to Duveen’s (2007) call to study heterogeneity in social psychology and
the recent critiques of the reification of culture (Duveen, 2008; Psaltis,
2012b) from the perspective of genetic social psychology. This move
resonates with the re-evaluation of the ideas of cultural coherence and
consistency on the part of several anthropologists, who maintain that
analyses of any particular culture require attention to conflicts, diversity
and transformations over time.
This line of research suggests that the field of social psychology study-
ing intergroup contact needs to shift its attention to how these internal
perspectives of a society interact within themselves and also with per-
spectives from other societies, thus multiplying the forms of interaction
to be studied (Psaltis, 2012a, 2012b). It also points towards the need
to study not only how social representations are reconstructed through
microgenetic processes but also how social representations of contact
itself and its valorization in the sociopolitical context moderate the
effects of social interaction on reconciliation processes.
A critique of the way in which most research premised on Allport’s
(1954) contact hypothesis is currently done is also articulated by
Gillespie (Chapter 6). He first argues that the literature has sought
an essentialist theory of contact and thus neglected the broader (and
usually quite diverse) contexts in which any social interaction is embed-
ded. He is more interested in unearthing the dialogical processes that
undermine the potential of intergroup contact to engender prejudice
reduction. Gillespie expanded the original theorization of Moscovici
(1976/2008) and his concept of “semantic barriers” as ways of represent-
ing the Other in such a way as to make what they do or say assimilated
into pre-existing representations and explicable, such that nothing that

the other does or says demands a change in existing representations.
In Piagetian terms, the words and actions of the Other are assimilated
into existing knowledge structures, without any accommodation to the
incoming information.
Gillespie underlines the importance of intergroup trust, suggesting
that distrust is a powerful semantic barrier to genuine engagement
with the perspective of the Other. In contrast, the existence of trust
within a social interaction can be conceptualized as an openness to
being changed by that social interaction. One theoretical point made by
Gillespie with methodological repercussions for the study of intergroup
contact is that when social scientists study an interaction, not only do
they need to understand the context and process but they also need
to understand what each party in the interaction thinks about them-
selves, each other and the interaction as a whole. That is to say, along
with Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) and Keller (Chapter 3), Gillespie is
emphasizing the deeply intersubjective nature of both interpersonal and
intergroup interaction.
Constantinou (Chapter 7) is also concerned with Self–Other relations
in the context of conflict transformation. He argues that it is important
to view conflict transformation and diplomacy not as a singular event
or a top-down process but as a daily occurrence. His proposal is a way
to transcend approaches that view diplomacy as merely an intergovern-
mental affair, as the management of interstate relations or as primarily
the pursuit and negotiation of national interests.
This move by Constantinou resonates with the recent importance
given in the field of international relations to understand the local at
the grassroots beyond elitist notions of track one diplomacy. In his theo-
rization the spiritual aspect is incorporated into conflict transformation
through an example from the Cypriot context where an excerpt from a
documentary film is discussed. For him this excerpt becomes a symbolic
resource (see Zittoun, Chapter 8) to show how a spiritual leader elevates
Self and Other to a spiritual realm of social interaction where both Self
and Other are seen as creations of one and a single god, thus promoting
reconciliation.
The unique emphasis of Constantinou is on the transformative poten-
tial of this homodiplomacy, whose mission is not only the knowledge
and control of the Other but fundamentally the knowledge of the Self –
and crucially this knowledge of the Self as a more reflective means of
dealing with and transforming relations with Others. This transforma-
tion, as he writes, may take the route of sociocognitive conflict between
Psaltis et al. 227
interlocutors reaching intersubjectivity, as explained by Perret-Clermont

(Chapter 4), Gillespie (Chapter 6) and Psaltis (Chapter 5).
Given the recent global rise of militant Islamism, it is worth under-
lining the fact that Constantinou’s proposal resonates with a notion
that is found in Islamic diplomacy of the practice of the “greater jihad”
(contrasted with the “lesser jihad” associated with military struggle and
militant violence), which is a spiritual struggle seeking to stretch and
break one’s limited Self, or enemy within, as a means of critical discov-
ery of the relationship between Self and Other, inducing a self-discovery
or union with God. His proposal of the connection between Self and
Other through the mediation and active imagination of either God, the
unconscious or the inner stranger, nourished by various religious tradi-
tions and classical literature brings to light the importance of cultural
objects as mediators between Self, Other and Object.
Sign mediation and its material repositories, such as novels and films,
are theorized in more detail by Zittoun (Chapter 8), who argues that
teaching-learning situations can lead to better recognition of the Other
when they conjugate the meeting of two persons together with a cul-
tural artefact, such as a novel or a film. Such cultural artefacts might
then become symbolic resources that allow, through imagination, one
to expand one’s understanding and therefore overcome simplifying
representations of the Other.
To understand how teaching-learning can bring recognition of the
Other, or a reflection on one’s relationship to the Other, one needs
to consider the dynamic that takes place with and through cultural
resources in their double mode of existence. These cultural artefacts
become symbolic resources for the individual to the extent that they
trigger imaginary experiences in people’s development of a better under-
standing of Self and Otherness, in teaching-learning situations. But
there are artefacts that can block conflict transformation functioning
as semantic barriers, not to mention that they can even exacerbate
conflict. Zittoun reminds us again of the destructive role of historical
narratives in conflict and post-conflict societies. Mythical narratives of
past and future (and even more so when they are instituted as religious
discourses) are heavily emotional and value-laden. Consequently, when
two groups hold contradictory “geographic imaginations” of a single
place, these are generally mutually exclusive (Makriyianni & Psaltis,
2007; Psaltis et al., 2011). However, at the same time there is use of
symbolic resources that can facilitate conflict transformation.
Cultural artefacts such as movies, games, books and philosophies are
often used by adolescents in their efforts to think about alternative
worlds, hypothetical visions and strategies to transform the world. They

are mobilized not only for what they actually represent but as a means to
do something else: to reflect about oneself, to capture and understand
one’s emotions, or to understand better other people’s actions in the
world. Zittoun (2006) has shown that in daily life, people use symbolic
resources in such a way that they might redefine their identity, learn
new ways of doing things or confer a new sense to a given situation. For
these reasons the use of symbolic resources also transforms Self–Other
relationships.
Importantly, Zittoun claims that in the situation of teacher–student
interactions, two different intersubjective dynamics take place. On the
one hand, a “learning-teaching” asymmetrical relationship, as the
teacher has more expertise in the texts than the students and can also
transmit knowledge about them, and help them to develop specific
skills. On the other hand, there is a symmetrical relationship in this
situation since it is openly recognized by both that each participant has
their own personal relationship of sense to that text (Zittoun, 2013).
Part III
The contributions to Part III by Uskul (Chapter 9), Downing Wilson

and Cole (Chapter 10) and Passini (Chapter 11) offer the opportunity
to reflect on the role of social relations mediating between material con-
ditions (ecology, economy, land and property, financial downturn, tools
and technology) and human development from social, cross-cultural
and cultural psychological perspectives.
Uskul discussed how the economic environment affords different
forms of social interdependence, and thereby also different ways of
thinking and behaving. In particular, she shows how a certain economic
activity and the resulting structure adopted in the groups practising this
activity put constraints on the nature of their social relations and how
this in turn influences cognitive and social psychological outcomes (and
vice versa).
In her research programme she compared herders, farmers and fish-
ermen in Turkey in relation to their cognitive abilities and the ways in
which both adults and children responded to social exclusion. For exam-
ple, farming often requires group collaboration, and farmers are tied to
the land that they cultivate in fixed communities. In contrast, herding
activities require less collaboration and rely on individual decision-
making and autonomy. Farmers are found to exhibit a high degree of
social interdependence, resulting in stronger emphasis on conformity,
Psaltis et al. 229
consultation among members and collectivist action, higher degrees

of compliance, conscientiousness and conservatism in child-rearing
practices. In their cognitive patterns they show a greater tendency to
perceive objects not in terms of their uniqueness but in terms of their
larger social context (Berry, 1966). This finding seems to be aligned with
Nisbett’s findings that collectivistic orientations are related to holistic
perceptual tendencies, while members of North American cultures with
relatively independent and individualistic orientations show analytic
perceptual tendencies (Nisbett, 2003).
Uskul’s findings support the prediction that economic activities
requiring a higher level of social interdependence are associated with
holistic cognitive tendencies (Uskul et al., 2008). These empirical find-
ings could be linked directly to Piagetian predictions provided that
Piaget is not read as the individualist stage theorist, as was the case
back in the 1970s and 1980s (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). Unfortunately,
this misreading of Piagetian theory (Hsueh, 2009) obstructed the the-
orists, who in the past tested Piagetian theory in a cross-cultural context
(Greenfield, 1966) from recognizing the central role of Piagetian social
relations of cooperation in the societies and particular context studied
as the relational form that was promoting the achievement of concrete
operations, even if their empirical findings were interpretable in that
way (for an extended discussion of this point, see Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
Uskul’s findings are a step towards this recognition in that the impor-
tance of interdependence is recognized within a single cultural context,
but we feel that there is a need for further refinement of the various
meanings of interdependence in relation to what Piaget described as
social relations of constraint and social relations of cooperation. Having
said this, Uskul’s exploration of the extent to which the pursued eco-
nomic activity requires reliance on strangers (individuals outside one’s
immediate social circle) and the consequence of this for human develop-
ment open up a window to extend the Piagetian theory by exploring the
difference between the formation of cooperative relations in a familiar
circle vs. cooperative relations with a widened circle of social relations
that includes strangers and outgroupers, not to mention the traditional
“enemies”.
The theme of intergroup relations and contact with “strangers” was
simulated in the innovative method proposed by Downing Wilson &
Cole (Chapter 10), who transpose Bartlett’s method (Moscovici, 1990) of
studying social representations to the microgenetic field. They achieve
this by studying the intragroup and intergroup dynamics of two con-
trasting idiocultures as they were formed and came into contact. The
use of the simulation showed how people create social worlds and
actively shape their own development in turn through their own cre-
ations, a process that Valsiner (1999) once aptly termed: “I create you to
control me.”
From a methodological point it also points to the need for what in the
past Psaltis, Duveen and Perret-Clermont (2009) called an “experimental
ethnography” (cf. Maynard, 2009) that resonates with Sherif’s Robbers
Cave Experiment, where some basic constraints on the proximal context
of the interactions are set by the researchers, but then the dialogue, rela-
tionships, values and norms are left to emerge freely within the social
interactive context so that their consequences can be explored both
immediately and long after the social interaction at the individual level.
The set of values and the goals of the two experimentally induced idio-
cultures of Stones and Traders (communitarianism vs. personal achieve-
ment) resonate with the basic distinctions made by classical sociologists
such as Durkheim, who discussed mechanical and organic solidarity or
Tonnies (1887/1957), with his distinction between Gemeinshaft (com-
munity) and Gesellshaft (society) and the cross-cultural literature of
collectivism vs. individualism discussed by Uskul (Chapter 9). As we saw
in the Introduction, Greenfield (2009) discusses the transition between
the two as predictive of changes in the values of societies, the learning
environments and finally the cognitive abilities of the children in this
society. However, Downing Wilson and Cole (Chapter 10) avoid any
explicit valorization of one culture over the other, and their descrip-
tions of each group, Stoners and Traders, do not directly map onto the
configurations discussed by Greenfield and classical sociologists. In one
sense they are doing what Moscovici called anthropology of modern
societies (Moscovici, 1990). From the standpoint of values, both groups
are polyphasic and the authors challenge the traditional distinctions
on purpose. The Stoners idioculture is characterized as a benevolent
matriarchy where warmth, affection, close interpersonal relationships,
politeness and tolerance were valued above all else while being greedy
and materialistic was frowned upon. However, respect for, or even con-
formity to, the tradition was also a value for this group, as we would
expect from traditional societies.
As Downing Wilson & Cole (Chapter 10) discuss in their epi-
logue, their findings resonate with the processes described by Gillespie
(Chapter 6) and Zittoun (Chapter 8). They see their simulation results
as strongly arguing for cultural historical mediation as a central pro-
cess in the creation of assimilation, as ordinarily conceived in the
Piagetian literature. However, Downing Wilson and Cole term this
Psaltis et al. 231
process appropriation (not internalization), which they see as a cultur-

ally mediated, dialogic process. This was seen when intergroup conflict
between the two idiocultures made its presence felt: the role of play
money as either currency or object of art, and the meaning of the word
“grandma” as either a beloved family member or a way of expressing
disapproval with another’s actions. In both cases we witness the trans-
formation of a social representation (money or family relation) in terms
of the meaning system of the receiving culture. In this case “the mean-
ing of the token is inflected to fit the nature of the interaction between
the groups” (Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 10).
The semiotic processes around the material aspect of money in soci-
ety in relation to intergroup dynamics and the escalation of intergroup
conflicts in times of financial crises is clearly and convincingly presented
by Passini (Chapter, 11). He draws on classical social psychological the-
ories of intergroup relations and a critique of consumerism to show
the repercussions of the economic crisis on social relations and social
interaction.
Drawing on similarities with the situation of the Weimar Republic in
the early 1930s, Passini identifies three consequences of the economic
crisis (relative deprivation, distrust in the institutions in office and the
search for security) that in turn result in an increase in prejudicial atti-
tudes and intolerant social relations that could have a cumulative effect
in bringing people to blindly and uncritically support populist, xeno-
phobic, nationalist, extremist and even fascist movements as we cur-
rently see in Greece, France, Italy and various other countries of the EU
and beyond. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attack in
the USA, many citizens supported government efforts to promote secu-
rity as opposed to protecting individual liberties and civil rights that
led to the violation of human rights at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. A
worrying finding reported by Passini is that an apolitical stance and an
indifference towards political issues are empirically also related to preju-
dicial attitudes and behaviours. His results show that indifferent people
are characterized by authoritarian and conformist attitudes, as well as
by high scores on subtle forms of prejudice towards immigrants.
Finally, in Passini’s discussion of consumerism as a major problem of
Western individualist societies, he engages with the notion of responsi-
bility “for Other” and its changing nature. In line with Bauman (2007)
he sees a new concept of responsibility emerging from individualism
that does not include Others but it is only referred to self-realization.
That is, the individual is left alone with the reponsibility to care for
himself or herself and not asked to be responsible to care for others.
We are also reminded that Piaget (1932/1965) made a similar dis-

tinction between two forms of responsibility: objective and subjective.
Objective responsibility is a strict adherence to rules with no reflec-
tion on their sense and it characterizes relations of constraint between
individuals. In contrast, subjective responsibility is based on a reflec-
tive capacity focused more on the spirit than on the letter of the
law, and it characterizes cooperative relations. As Piaget (1932/1965)
showed, egocentric tendencies in the child are supported by social rela-
tions of constraint and both are two forms of disequilibrium. In one,
the Self dominates the group or assimilates the group to the Self,
whereas in the other the group imposes its will on the Self or assim-
ilates the individual. For Piaget, social relations of cooperation were,
again, the equilibrated ideal. Similarly, Passini suggests overcoming the
consequences of the economic crisis by promoting cooperative forms of
solidarity and pro-social protest.
Concluding remarks: Understanding both stability

and change in human and societal development
To return to the global perspective of the international community on

societal and human development, a major point of critique, in light
of the contributions to this volume, is its outcome-oriented outlook,
which is plagued by the same problem that Valsiner (2007) identifies in
developmental psychology, which ends up “non-developmental” due to
the lack of focus on the actual processes of development.
It could be argued that a lack of understanding of the complex socio-
genetic and ontogenetic changes that correspond to the complexifica-
tion of society (technical changes, globalization, pluralism of ideas and
worldviews, scientific advances, world wars, migrations, social changes,
climate change and religious fanaticism) is what contributed to cul-
tural relativism and post-modernism, often resulting in the dangerous
attitude of “everything goes”. If people don’t have rich/sophisticated
enough symbolic resources to deal with these complex issues, they tend
to reduce them in a dangerous way to binary problems (good/evil;
black/white; friend/enemy; ingroup/outgroup), resulting in dangerous
binary thinking and the emergence of destructive conflict. Having said
this, complexification per se should not be equated with having good
intentions.
In order to offer a comprehensive theoretical framework that cap-
tures bidirectional changes at various levels of analysis and articulates
microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic changes, Gerard Duveen’s
Psaltis et al. 233
vision of a genetic social psychology could be a useful guiding frame-

work (Zittoun et al., 2003; Moscovici et al., 2013; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).
This vision of Duveen was characterized by Valsiner (2013, p. ix) as
“The idea that will live” because, as he argued, the life work of the
late Gerard Duveen is “a good illustration of what kind of scholar-
ship could bring psychology out of its crisis of limited generalization
value” (Valsiner, 2013, p. ix). Moscovici (2010) stated about the work of
Duveen that it inspired some of his writings also (see Moscovici, 1990)
and that Duveen “had been able to raise fundamental epistemological
questions and to propose some elements of answer on which we must
reflect further” (p. 2.4).
As Duveen would argue, every child is born in a thinking society that
is already structured by social representations (Moscovici, 1976/2008)
about everything, including those social representations that institute as
meaningful “objects” categories such as “intelligence”, “gender”, “social
class” and “ethnicity”. These social representations furnish positions
of identity (Duveen, 2001), mapping Self-object-Other configurations,
and they are the result of a balance of social influence from various
sources. Representations of this thinking society are characterized by
both stability and change, and they are dependent on the ideologi-
cal, political and economic struggles for domination in society. They
can best be understood as representational projects (Bower & Gaskell,
2008) of various groups (actual or virtual) that differ, depending on
where the ethical horizons of the group are drawn in attempting to
determine who is included and who is excluded from the community
or the group (Gillespie et al., 2012; Psaltis, 2012a, 2012b). Such repre-
sentational projects often take place in culture zones of contact such as
those of immigration, migration, globalization, communication in the
public sphere and the social media. Such situations take dramatic forms
in case of a financial crisis or conflict, as we have seen in this volume.
This kind of contact certainly creates a feeling of uncertainty and loss in
continuity that leads to anxiety in the individual (O’Sullivan Lago et al.,
2008). However, responses could be both positive transformations, such
as developing a multicultural identity, or negative, simply by rejecting
change in a way that escalates conflict (Gillespie, Chapter 6).
As we have seen, practices that differ in their structure can be located
within communities of varying size, and they are supported by differ-
ent configurations of the Self-other-Object that can take the form of
cooperative, competitive, asymmetrical or symmetrical social relation-
ships. Interpersonal, public communication (Moscovici, 1976/2008) is
the main vehicle bringing the various perspectives on values and criteria
for exclusion and inclusion (Kadianaki, 2014) into contact. Contact can
be intragroup or intergroup but it entails a sociocognitive conflict (Doise
et al., 1976) that can lead to sociogenetic changes through microgenesis,
which is seen as the motor of both ontogenetic and sociogenetic change
(Duveen & Lloyd, 1990).
Sociocognitive conflict is a necessary condition because it can intro-
duce doubt and reflection in the correctness of Self’s understanding
(Duveen, 2002) but it is not a sufficient condition for microgenetic
change. This is seen by the fact that sociocognitive conflict does not
always result in the transformation of social representations. More
important are the modalities of its resolution and the conversation types
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2006,2007) formed in external dialogue, as well as the
employment of various semantic barriers (Gillespie, 2008, 2011) or sym-
bolic resources (Zittoun, 2006) in internal dialogue that can undermine
the coordination of opposing perspectives. The motivation to notice
and overcome the sociocognitive conflict is very important. People are
often more concerned about giving meaning to the emotions that they
experience and making sense of the changes that happen (crisis, new
relationships and other transitions) than with rational understanding.
Who am I? Who will demonstrate solidarity if I/we run into problems?
What is my agency? Can I secure my future? Can I/we be proud of our
past? These are existential questions that need respect and security to be
confronted in a non-violent way. How are young people socialized into
the practices of dealing with these questions that are not only cognitive
practices?
The relationship of these various groups and individuals with material
resources and power is important because it is the one that determines
their perceived status (majority or minority) in society and how much
they have a voice in the public sphere (Moscovici, 1976). The triadic
configurations of control (Psaltis, 2005a) between Self-Other-object take
the form of expectations about who owns or should own and con-
trol these various resources but also creates opportunities for resistance
(Duveen, 2001). As such they are sustained by feelings of relative depri-
vation, often leading to collective action for the benefit of the ingroup or
even conflict with outgroups. They also canalize the form of social inter-
actions and career paths around objects of knowledge, as is the case with
gender and various cognitive tasks in the fields of science, technology,
engineering and mathematics, for example.
A useful way to think about the various groups contesting in the
public arena, based on the present discussion, is to think of a matrix
defined by two dimensions. One dimension is the value orientation of
Psaltis et al. 235
groups in relation to the inclusiveness of their ethical horizon (Psaltis,

2012a). In the post-conflict and divided society of Cyprus, for exam-
ple, the three dominant positions are reconciliation, communitarian
and ethnonationalist. Kelman and Hamilton (1989) similarly discuss
more generally value, role and rule orientations for less conflictual soci-
eties. More refined differentiations might even be possible where the
ethical horizon is gradually widened, starting from care for the inter-
est of the Self only to care for the ingroup, to care for allies, to care
for both ingroups and outgroups, to care for humanity and finally care
for all species and the environment. The second dimension could be
based on who social interaction is taking place with for the forma-
tion of these value orientations, starting from self-reflexive thought to
close relatives, friends, acquaintances, strangers and even “enemies”.
The crossing of these dimensions produces various configurations of
contact and collective action at various levels of actual and projected
inclusion or exclusion. Such a conceptualization of collective action is
important since it departs from the narrow definition of it in most of
the current discussions in social psychology (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).
To return to the developmental narrative, the newborn will slowly
develop its representations of Self, objects and Other in their thinking
society, at first equipped with the bare minimum of some reflexes and
the help of its caregivers who are already active conforming or resist-
ing actors in this thinking society. Through interaction with objects and
Others, children will slowly develop their cognitive, affective and rela-
tional capacities. Material deprivation of the parents in these early age
groups makes children’s health and development particularly vulnerable
(UNDP, 2014).
In the process of human development, as Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4)
argues, cognitive and social processes scaffold each other and there is
no gain in confusing them as “two sides of the same coin”. She suggests
a spiral of development from individual capabilities or mastery of cer-
tain symbolic resources to social interaction and back. A similar spiral
of development was proposed by Psaltis & Zapiti (2014) in relation to
cognitive development, and Martin & Gillespie (2010) from a Meadian
perspective in relation to the emergence of agency.
The increasing diameter of the spiral directly refers to the increasing
differentiation and coordination of the relation between Subject-Object
and Subject-Other. The fact that a spiral passes through the same point
in an expanded form indicates that every stage or period of development
is premised on the reflection of the previous one on a higher plane and
that previously achieved capacities become functionally integrated in
the new plane. For Piaget (1964/1968) the relationships between sub-
ject and object were crucial in his genetic epistemology programme,
also inspiring Moscovici’s theorizing on minority influence and social
representations (Duveen, 2001; Psaltis, 2005b).
In every single stage of development, these relationships are chang-
ing. In the beginning the infant does not differentiate Subject from
Object and lives in an undifferentiated whole (although, of course, other
people, such as the parents, do differentiate the child from the social
and physical environment). Object permanence after the first year of life
means that the Subject is recognized as an object, and the same goes for
the perception of Others in their environment (Piaget, 1964/1968). Here
there is a congruence between the work of Piaget and Mead (cf., Piaget,
1965/1968, p. 72 fn. 18). In Mead’s terminology, as the child begins to
differentiate between Self and Other, and differentiate between differ-
ent types of Other, then their psychology becomes increasingly complex
and social. Higher mental functions and complex language abilities arise
with this internalized play of perspectives (Martin & Gillespie, 2010).
With the appearance of language after two years of life, the child
has the chance to reconstitute their past actions and anticipate future
actions through verbal representations. This also opens up the social
world of social interaction for the child and the world of representa-
tions that they have to master. While the hands enable the child to
act on the physical environment, words enable them to act not only
on the social environment but also on their own thoughts and feel-
ings. Thus language transforms development and thought to the extent
that it leads to new actions and a mastery over the ability to recall past
actions (Vygotsky & Luria, 1931/1994).
The use of language means that children are open to the vast world
of collective concepts and the child’s words can refer to past, present
and future acts so that acts can also be performed with words. However,
due to the unconscious egocentrism of children in this period, they are
often vulnerable to assimilating others in their own perspective. In this
transitional period, social interaction plays a crucial role in driving the
formation of concrete operational structures. This is the period when
the interplay between social identity dynamics and the negotiation of
knowledge is more clearly seen in the dynamics of social interaction
(Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). Social representations of gender, for example,
are symbolic resources for children but without the children reflectively
grasping the effect of gender dynamics on social interaction.
After 6–7 years, the children can engage in real cooperation, which
is premised on an understanding of, and coordination with, the
Psaltis et al. 237
perspective of the Other. In this period, children also start playing games
with rules that entail certain common obligations. Play and games are
evident in all human cultures (Edwards, 2000), and they have been
argued to be the basis for the emergence of perspective-taking (Bruner,
Jolly & Sylva, 1976). Specifically, Mead (1934) argued that games hold
the key to the development of perspective-taking. Unlike play, games
entail structured rules with distinct social positions (i.e. hider/seeker,
doctor/patient, winner/loser, attacker/defender, etc.), and the rules of
the game usually entail children moving between these social posi-
tions. Building upon Mead, it has been argued that this physical moving
between social positions is the developmental precursor to the psycho-
logical movement between perspectives (Gillespie, 2006). The key point
here is that by physically moving into the social position, or role, of the
Other, children gain externality on themselves; they become Other and,
in so doing, they come to see their former behaviour from the outside.
To become a self-reflective actor, Mead argued, entails becoming Other
to oneself – that is, approaching oneself from the outside. Exchang-
ing social positions within games (and in other activities) (Gillespie &
Martin, 2014) is one mechanism through which we become Other to
ourselves – that is, self-reflective.
A bit later, around 9–10 years of age, it is possible that they attain
a reflective grasp of how gender or social identities are indeed influ-
encing their social interactions, so more distance is inserted between
social interaction and themselves. However, there is an indication that
social identity dynamics go underground (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014) –
they become internalized, as Vygotsky (1934/1986) would say – when
thinking alone in the post-interaction period.
After 12 years of age, children are probably in a position to take a
system perspective through engaging in complex forms of perspective-
taking (e.g. metaperspectives and metametaperspectives). This is when
they start reflecting on social relations of cooperation vs. social rela-
tions of constraint in a more generalized form, pondering about their
consequences on their own learning and the learning of others. There is
evidence that formal operational thinking is greatly facilitated by the
social interaction of individuals with strangers and outgroupers, and
specifically from a reflective rejection of social relations of constraint
between groups in society (Kyriakidou-Kranou, 2013).
Engaging with the “as if” and hypothetical is a characteristic of for-
mal operational thinking and flexible use of symbolic resources (Zittoun,
2006), experimenting with virtual worlds and world views, ideolo-
gies for transforming or even conserving the values of their society,
which entails reflective resistance or conformity to various differenti-

ated positions in the thinking society described earlier. These positions
are structured quite early on from children in implicit and non-reflective
ways that structure their microgenetic and ontogenetic processes from
the first day of their lives.
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Index
Note: The locators followed by ‘n’ refer to note numbers.
Aarts, K., 199 Bauman, Z., 195, 200, 203, 204, 205,
Aboud, F. E., 86 231
Adalbjarnardottir, S., 44 Baumeister, R. F., 43
Adams, G., 149, 150, 160, 161 Becker, J. C., 2, 44, 195, 197, 198
adolescents, 11, 24, 26, 28, 37, 40–1, behavioural economics, 45, 47
61, 77, 88, 227 Bélanger, E., 199
aggressive children, 42, 45 Benasayag, M., 195, 205
Akhtar, S. W., 127 benevolence, 207–8
Aleksynska, M., 197 Bergh, J., 199
Allport, G., 9, 72, 78, 79, 81, 89n. 2, Berkowitz, M. W., 38
98, 99, 225 Berman, M., 119
Altemeyer, B., 201 Berry, J. W., 149, 152, 153, 154, 160,
alterity, 116–20 161, 229
Althof, W., 24 Bertman, S., 203
analytic thinking, 153 Beydola, T., 79
Andreouli, E., 106 Bigler, R. S., 86
anger, 35, 39, 42, 46, 179–80, 197 Bîrzéa, C., 19
Arcidiacono, F., 61 Blair, J., 43
Arsenio, W. F., 42, 43 Blasi, A., 35
asylumseekers, 107–9 Blumer, H., 101
Ataca, B., 150 Bovet, P., 4, 53, 54, 56, 65
authoritarian system, education, Boyd, J. N., 204
205 Brewer, M. B., 98, 199
autonomy, 35–6, 40, 151, 155, 206, Brown, R., 9, 79, 98
228 Bruder, M., 2
Axelrod, R., 46 Bruner, J. S., 89n. 2, 136, 237
Aydin, N., 155 Buchs, C., 51, 61
Buffardi, L. E., 206
Badiou, A., 124, 131n. 2 Buffer Zone, 52–3, 74
BaFa’ BaFa’ (cultural simulation Bull, D., 44
game), 167, 170, 188, 190 Burman, E., 217, 218
Baker, W. E., 150 Butera, F., 57, 61, 216
Baltes, P. B., 165 Butterfield, H., 117
Bandura, A., 24, 34 Butz, D. A., 198
Barrelet, J.-M., 54
Barreto, M., 200 Cabrera, C., 79
Barry, H., 152 Camerer, C. F., 45
Bar-Tal, D., 78, 82 Campbell, W. K., 206
Bartlett, F. C., 168, 229 Capra, F., 119
Baudrillard, Jean, 187 Carretero, M., 78, 82, 219
Bauer, M. W., 103 Carstensen, L. L., 204
243
244 Index
Castorina, J. A., 75, 77 Constantinou, C. M., 10, 11, 114, 127,

Cerchia, F., 51 220, 226, 227
Charter for Democratic Citizenship consumerism, 203–6
and Human Rights Education, 22 contact hypothesis, 10, 72, 78, 97–9,
children 105, 110, 225
aggressive, 42 conversation
Chinese, 41–2 explicit recognition, 76–7, 224
sociocognitive tasks, 57 incorrect answer, 77
sociocultural influences, 52–3 non-conserving, 76–7
see also conversation no resistance, 76–7
Cicero, 120, 121 resistance, 76–7
Citizenship Foundation in London, 25 Cook, T., 200
Clark, M., 106 Cooper, M., 103, 106, 221
classroom councils, 25–6, 29, 222 cooperation
Clegg, J. M., 156 contact hypothesis, 78
close friendship, 32, 36–9, 41–2, 44 cultural, 19
close relationships, 6, 32–3, 35–6, 42, cultural differences, 151, 157
44 democratic forms of life, 23, 29
humanitarian laws, 53
cognitive development
informal spaces, 51
coordination perspectives, 33, 58–65
interindividual, 56
Euro/Western-centric view, 218
operational capability, 21, 26
genetic social psychological
performance concept, 204, 216
perspectives, 86–9
“prejudice reduction”, 9, 81
human development, 1
reciprocity norms, 46, 87
learning forms, 74
in relationships, 45–7
levels of analysis, 7, 58–65
social relations, 4–7, 57–8, 60–1, 63,
social competencies, 29
76, 220–2, 229, 232, 237
social identity, 224 teacher’s, 27
social interaction, 222, 235 coordination perspectives
cognitive tendencies vs. holistic differentiation abilities, 33
perceptual tendencies, 153–4, 229 emotional concerns, 35
Cohen, D., 160 obligations and responsibilities,
Cole, M., 12, 60, 75, 135, 136, 165, 34–5
219, 228, 229, 230, 231 self and Others, 32–4, 37
collectivism, 41, 153, 229–30 Cornish, F., 100, 224
Committee of Ministers of Education, Coudin, G., 106
20 Coull, A., 199
conception of process, 101 Council of Europe, 5, 19–22, 25, 221
conflict resolution, 26, 29, 44, 56, 114, Crouzevialle, M., 216
119 cultural norms, 62, 166–7, 176
conflict transformation cultural simulation, students
alterity, 116–20 enculturation activities, 171–5
diplomacy theory, 116–20 exercises, 165–8
introspective negotiation, 120–3 first day, 168–70
non-professional dimension, initial results, 170–1
115–16 intercultural interaction, 188–92
reverse accreditation, 123–6 romantic science, 186–8
spirituality, 116–20 Stoners and Traders, 175–86
Index 245
value inversions, 181–5 Duriez, B., 208

see also BaFa’ BaFa’ (cultural Duveen, G., 4, 8, 13, 61, 71, 72, 73, 74,
simulation game) 75, 76, 77, 86, 87, 88, 101, 215,
cultural psychological theory, 150 221, 224, 225, 230, 233, 234, 236
cultural resources, 11, 65, 227
economic culture
Daiute, C., 135 human psychology, 149–50
Dalton, R. J., 199 social exclusion, 158–60
Damasio, A. R., 43 social interdependence, 151–7
Darnon, C., 61, 63 Edelstein, W., 5, 19, 25, 33, 218, 220,
De Groot, J., 208 221, 222
de Haan, G., 26 Edgerton, R. B., 152, 160
Demetriou, E., 115 education
democratic citizenship, 10–20, 22, authoritarian system, 205
24–5, 221 cultural understanding, 188–90
democratic habits, 22–3, 26, 29 democratic individualism, 208
democratic school European policy, 19–30
children’s rights, 22–4 intergroup contact, 80, 134
civic engagement, 25, 27–8, middle-class values, 216
222 moral awareness through, 43–5
classroom councils, 25–6 OECD policies, 21–2
European educational policy, 19–21 peer interaction, 72
learning process, 23 socialization, 53–5, 217
service learning, 26–7 Education for Democratic Citizenship
variety of practices, 24–5 and Human Rights Education
volunteering, 27–8 (EDC/HRE), 20–1
Demorest, A., 44 Edwards, C. P., 149, 161, 237
Der Derian, J., 116 egocentrism, 5, 36, 87, 236
Dewey, J., 23, 24, 206, 207 Ehrenberg, A., 195, 203, 205
disputants, 56, 63 Eikel, A., 26
distrust Ellemers, N., 197, 200
absence of contradictions, 101 emotional competence, 43, 52
in conflicting societies, 78 emotional concern, 32, 35, 42, 44,
cultural domination, 119 223
economic situation, 12, 195 emotions, 8, 11, 38, 41, 43–4, 46, 57,
between Irish nationals and 64, 137, 166, 177, 197, 228,
asylumseekers, 107–9 234
perspective of Other, 10, 97 empathy, 35–6, 38, 41–3, 45–6, 83,
political, 196–7, 199–201 205–6
semantic structures, 105, 107, Enright, R. D., 35
110 Erickson, E. H., 207
Dittmar, H., 206 Escape from Freedom (Fromm), 201
Dixon, J., 9 Etzioni, A., 208
Doise, W., 7, 58, 72, 75, 215, 222, European educational policy
234 democratic school, 19–28
Donaldson, M., 60 Warsaw Action Plan, 20
Dovidio, J. F., 8, 79, 88, 89 European Year of Citizenship Through
Duffy, S., 152 Education in 2005, 19
Dumont, M., 62 experimental ethnography, 230
246 Index
fairness, 33–4, 45–6, 59, social identities, 74

181 social representation, 73, 233
Farr, R. M., 102, 104 Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906,
Fehr, E., 45 1929), 53
Ferrari, M., 75 Gergen, K. J., 97, 102, 103
Fesnic, F. N., 198 Ghodbane, I., 51, 64
financial crisis Gibbs, J. C., 35, 42, 44
consumerism, 203–6 Gibson, S., 208
political distrust, 199–200 Gillespie, A., 1, 9, 10, 11, 13, 33, 36,
protest movements, 201–3 43, 46, 63, 76, 84, 85, 86, 88, 97,
relative deprivation, 197–9 99, 100, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110,
search for security, 200–1 115, 116, 123, 135, 136, 141, 191,
value orientation, 207–8 192, 209n. 1, 209n. 3, 215, 219,
Fine, G. A., 166 224, 225, 226, 227, 230, 233, 234,
Finkel, N. J., 204 235, 236, 237
First World War, 53–4 Goethe, J. W., 188
Fiske, A. P., 3, 8 Goffman, E., 62
Foster, C. A., 206 Graham, J., 149
Foster, M. K., 123 Grant, P. R., 198
Frank, S., 26 Graupmann, V., 155
Freinet, C., 25 Greco Morasso, S., 53, 56, 61, 63, 221
Freudenberg Foundation, 25 Greek Cypriots (GCs), 72, 79, 81–5,
Frey, P., 155 100
Friedrichs, B., 25 Greenfield, P. M., 2, 11, 149, 150, 161,
Friends of Nature, 56 166, 220, 229, 230
Fromm, E., 201 Gronke, P., 200
Grossen, M., 61, 62, 63, 64, 97, 137,
Gächter, S., 45 138, 139
Gaertner, S. L., 79 guilt, 35, 39–40, 42, 46, 140, 187
Galliker, M., 198 Gummerum, M., 45
Galtung, J., 114 Gunaratne, S. A., 119
Gardner, W. L., 155
Gaskell, G., 103, 233 Habermas, J., 5, 23, 24
Gasser, L., 43 Haidt, J., 34
gender Hall, I., 117
intergroup relations, 8 Hamedani, M. G., 150, 160
Piaget on, 54 Hamilton, V. L., 202, 209n. 2
social interaction patterns, 61, 87, Hann, C. M., 158, 161n. 1
224, 237 Harackiewicz, J., 61
social representations, 7, 72, 74–5, Harris, P. L., 55, 137
77, 88, 233, 236 Haslam, N., 3
societal change, 1, 3 Hayward, K., 203
genetic social psychology Heath, S. B., 51, 64
cognitive developmental Hellenocentrism, 81
theories, 86 Helliwell, J. F., 208
cultural coherence, 225 Henrich, J., 152
definition, 7 Hericourt, J., 194
social developmental psychology Hetherington, M. J., 199, 201
vs., 71 Hewstone, H., 9
Index 247
Hewstone, M., 79, 98 cultural backgrounds, 41

Himmelmann, G., 23 methodological, 3
Hinde, R., 60 notion of responsibility, 231
Hobbs, D., 203 possessive, 195, 208
Hodson, G., 81 sociological studies, 4
Hoffman, M. L., 35 transcend, 220
holistic thinking, 153 Westernization, 41, 218
homodiplomacy Inglehart, R. F., 3, 150
experimental and experiential, inoculation theory, 10, 105
120 Institute Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 53
gnostic discourse, 126–30 intergroup conflict, 78, 98, 134–5,
introspective negotiation, 120–3 138, 166, 191, 198–9, 203, 206,
non-professional dimension, 208, 225, 231
115–16 intergroup contact
reverse accreditation, 123–6 educational system, 80
value of, 116 genetic social psychological
Howarth, C., 104 perspective, 225
Howe, C., 51 Northern Ireland context, 100
Hsueh, Y., 86, 89n. 2, 229 in post-conflict societies, 7–8
Huang, H., 208 prejudice reduction, 9, 72, 74,
Huang, J.-J., 204 78, 87
Huddleston, T., 25 representational content, 102
human development semantic mechanisms, 110, 226
cognitive development vs., 235 social representation and, 82–5
global perspectives, 232 triadic configuration, 89
Piagetian theory, 221, 229 intergroup relationships, 62–3, 136,
social interactions and, 196 195–6, 198, 200
societal development vs., 1–2, 216 International Bureau of Education, 5,
socioeconomic condition, 2 53
stability or changes, impact on, Ioannou, S., 79, 81
219–20 Islamic Declaration of Human Rights,
Human Development Index (HDI), 126
218 Islamic Gnosticism, 126
Human Development Report, 3, 5, 217 Ivarsflaten, E, 199
human rights, 10, 20–2, 221 Izard, C. E., 43
Human Rights Charter, 22, 42
Hundeide, K., 217 Jabri, V., 115
Jahoda, G., 149
Iannaccone, A., 63 Ji, L. J., 154
Ichheiser, G., 97 John, O. P., 98
Igbal, A., 117 Johnson, J., 119
Imhoff, R., 2 Johnston, D., 118
individual development, 4, 27, 41, 55, Joireman, J., 204
188, 195, 205 Jolly, A., 237
individualism Jonas, H., 207
child-rearing practices, 154 Jones, C. P., 119
cognitive performance, 216 Jovchelovitch, S., 75, 77
collectivism vs., 230 Jung, C. G., 128, 129, 130, 131n. 3
consumerism, effects on, 203–6 Junus, Mohammed, 29
248 Index
Kadianaki, I., 106, 107, 234 Lemerise, E. A., 42, 43

Kairys, A., 204 Levi, M., 199
Kals, E., 45 Levinas, E., 103
Kapetaniou, I., 80 Levy, S. R., 88
Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç., 150 Lévy-Bruhl, L., 4
Keens-Soper, M., 130 Liben, L. S., 86
Keller, H., 149, 161 Light, P., 60
Keller, M., 5, 6, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, Lipovetsky, G., 205
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 135, 220, Lisbon Accord, 19, 21–2
222, 223, 224, 226 Listhaug, O., 205
Kelman, H. C., 202, 209n. 2, 235 Littleton, K., 51
Kessler, T., 8 Liu, J., 106
Kilbourne, J., 206 Lloyd, B., 8, 73, 75, 87, 101, 234
Killen, M., 42, 44, 88, 156 Loucky, J. P., 150
Kim, B., 154 Lowen, A., 206
Kiper, H., 25 Luria, A., 165, 188, 236
Kissaun, G. D., 106 Lury, C., 203
Kitayama, S., 150, 152, 153, 154, 155 Lytras, E., 72, 79, 83, 84, 85, 89n. 2
Kitchener, R. F., 4, 72, 86, 220
Kitchens, M., 189 Machleit, U., 99
Kluckhohn, C. K., 160 Macpherson, C. B., 195
Knafo, A., 207 Makriyianni, C., 53, 79, 80, 135, 219,
Knudsen, S., 151, 152 227
Koffka, K., 102 Malti, T., 42
Kohlberg, L., 24, 29, 33, 42, 44 Manstead, A. S., 40
Kohn, M. L., 160 Marková, I., 75, 107
Konner, M., 160 Markus, H. R., 150, 154, 155, 160, 161
Kontopodis, M., 65 Martin, J.-M., 53, 75, 88, 235, 236, 237
Kristeva, J., 116 Maynard, A. E., 75, 149, 161, 230
Kroeber, A. L., 160 McGuire, W. J., 10, 105
Kunovich, R. M., 199 Mead, G. H., 223, 236, 237
Kus, L., 106 mediators, 9, 45, 56, 83–5, 101, 119,
227
Lachman, M. E., 150, 161 Medin, D., 149, 160, 161
Laing, R. D., 97 Medina deputations, 126
Lalonde, R. N., 197 Meertens, R. W., 198, 200
Lang, F. R., 204 Mercer, N., 51, 59
Latour, B., 116, 130 Merton, R. K., 202
learning and development Miall, H., 114
learning-teaching interaction, 142 microgenesis
sociocultural approach, 136 genetic point of view, 73
symbolic resources, use, 136–44 motor of transformation, 101
Learning and Living Democracy for representation theory, 73
All, 19 social identities, 74
Learning Democracy in Europe of the social representation, 73–4
Network of European sociogenetic changes, 234
Foundations, 25 theoretical approach, 7
Legare, C. H., 156 millennium development goals
Leman, P. J., 72, 74, 75, 77 (MDGs), 5
Index 249
Miller, A. H., 199 Ntamakiliro, L., 64

Miller, P. J., 137 Numelin, R., 122, 123
Moghaddam, F. M., 204
Montada, L., 45 Oelkers, J., 53
moral awareness, 6, 32, 34, 39, 41–7 Oesterreich, D., 201
moral judgements, 33, 47 Oishi, S., 149, 150, 160, 161
moral reasoning, 34, 47 ontogenesis
moral Self, 36, 40, 130 cognitive development, 220
moral violations, 34, 40 of prejudice, 86–7
Morselli, D., 202, 205, 207, 209n. 2 social identities, 74
Moscovici, S., 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 71, 75, social representations, 7, 73
77, 78, 89n. 1, 102, 104, 106, 110, sociogenetic process, 73–4
209n. 2, 215, 221, 225, 229, 230, openness, 10, 40, 103, 108, 135, 204,
233, 234, 236 207–8, 226
Mugny, G., 7, 63, 75, 222 Organisation for Economic
Muller, E. N., 3 Co-operation and Development
Muller-Mirza, N., 60 (OECD) policies, 5, 21–2, 221–2
Mummendey, A., 8 ability to act autonomously, 22
mutual respect, 4, 52, 56, 60, 206, 219, ability to interact in socially
221 heterogeneous groups, 21
ability to use tools interactively, 22
Nadeau, R., 199 ostracism
naïve theory of action economic culture, 157
cognitive-structural tradition, 36 psychological consequences, 155
developmental levels, 35–6 social exclusion, 159
interpersonal responsibilities, 34 threats, 156
longitudinal study, 36–42 O’Sullivan-Lago, R., 107, 233
sociomoral reasoning, 33, 42–3 Otto, H.-U., 29
Nasie, M., 82, 83, 110 Over, H., 156, 157
nature of prejudice, The (Allport), 78
Nesdale, D., 86, 87 Palmer, P., 189, 190
Neumann, I. B., 116 Papageorgis, D., 105
New Education Movement, 54 Papastamou, S., 107
Newell, A., 99 parent–child relationship, 36–7
Newman, D., 135 Passini, S., 12, 116, 194, 195, 200, 202,
Newton, K., 199 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209n. 2,
Nicolet, M., 63 220, 228, 231, 232
Nicolopoulou, A., 74, 75 Pattyn, S., 199, 200
Niemi, R. G., 199 peer interaction, 7, 72, 74
Nisbett, R. E., 153, 154, 229 Pèrez, J. A., 8
non-transformative social Peristianis, N., 81
interaction Perret-Clermont, A. N., 1, 5, 6, 7, 13,
content, 102–3 24, 36, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61,
context, 99–100 62, 63, 64, 72, 115, 123, 142, 215,
immune system concept, 103–5 217, 220, 222, 223, 226, 227, 230,
process, 100–1 235
semantic barriers, 106–7 Pettigrew, T. F., 80, 81, 84, 85, 98, 99,
Norenzayan, A., 154 100, 101, 102, 103, 198, 200
Norris, P., 199 Pfau, M., 105
250 Index
Pfundmair, M., 155 psychologists, 3, 51, 55, 188

Piaget, J. Pulfrey, C., 216
classroom councils, 25
genetic epistemology programme, Quiamzade, A., 63
4–5, 220
individual in cooperation, 58 Raudsepp, M., 107
interpersonal relationships, 60 Rawls, J., 23
on learning democracy, 23–4, 222 Red Cross, 53
objective and subjective Reid, B., 136
responsibility, 204, 232, 236 Ren, D., 155
on peer relationship, 36 Reuss, S., 33, 34, 37, 44
relations of cooperation and Richeson, J., 88
relations of constraint, 81 Rijsman, J. B., 60
role of social identity, 224 Robert-Grandpierre, C., 54
social cognitive development, 29, 52 Rogoff, B., 2, 166
social-cultural mediation, 191 romantic science, 186, 188
social psychology, 86–7 Rommetveit, R., 58, 76, 223, 224
on social relationship, 53–8, 229 Rosciano, R., 51
societal development, 216 Rothbart, M., 98
sociogenetic processes., 74, 77 Rubtsov, V. V., 51
structural analysis, 72 Runciman,W. G., 196, 197
Western-centric view, 217 Russian Revolution, 54
see also Self and Others Rychen, D. S., 21, 22, 56
Plaut, V. C., 149, 161
Polavieja, J., 196 Salganik, L. H., 21, 22, 56
Pope Paul VI., 125 Salomon, G., 82
possessive individualism, 195, 208 Sammut, G., 106
prejudice, 55, 167, 198 Sampson, C., 118
contact hypothesis, 72, 74, 99 Sani, F., 8
economic crisis, impact on, 195 Scheithauer, H., 44
implicit forms, 87 Schmit, G., 195, 205
individual, 2, 197 Schooler, C., 160
intergroup contact, 78–82, 102, 198 Schools for society: Learning democracy
racial, 200 in Europe (Frank and
reduction interventions, 9, 45, 83–4, Huddleston), 25
86, 88, 101 Schubauer-Leoni, M. L., 61, 63, 64
Program of International Student Schwartz, S. H., 207
Assessment (PISA), 21, 56, 222 Schwarz, B., 51, 61
promise-keeping, 37 Scouting movement, 53
see also close friendship secondary transfer effects (STEs), 84
Psaltis, C., 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 24, 36, Self and Others
53, 60, 61, 63, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, coordination perspectives, 32–4, 37
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, lines of action, 38
85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 89n. 3, 100, obligation and responsibility, 44
115, 123, 135, 209n. 2, 215, 219, sociomoral reasoning, 223–4
220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, self-efficacy, 22, 24
229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237 self-enhancement, 206, 208, 216
psychological development, 53–8, 56, selfish interests, 34, 38, 40–1
220 self-transcendence, 208
Index 251
Seligson, M. A., 3 gender identity, 75, 77

Selman, R. L., 24, 29, 33, 37, 44, 51, genetic social psychological
223 perspectives, 86
semantic barriers Genevan psychology on, 55
alternative meanings, 107 identity threats, 88
definition, 106 intergroup contact, 8, 78, 84–5, 206
distrust as, 107–9 naïve theory of action, 32, 36
Semin, G. R., 40 non-transformative, 10, 105
Sen, A., 21, 24, 29 post-Piagetian work, 7
Shelton, N., 88 “romantic science”, 188
Sherif, C. W., 185, 208 social identities, 73–4
Sherif, M., 60, 185, 208 social relations and, 1, 3, 5–6, 13
Shirts, G., 167 Stoner norms, 182
Silverman, R. A., 197 transformative, 10, 97, 110
Simão, L. M., 75 social interdependence
Simons, J., 203 cultural context, 150, 155–6
Sinclaire-Harding, L., 60, 221 economic environment, 11, 62, 150,
Sklair, L., 203 154, 228–9
Sliwka, A., 26, 28 farming vs. herding influences,
Smith, E. E., 154 151–2, 157
Smith, H. J., 197, 198 ostracism, 156
Smith, L., 57 socialization, 36, 41, 53–4, 62, 217
Snibbe, A. C., 150 social orientation, 152–3
social action, 23–4, 26–8, 35 social relationships
social capital, 7, 29 individual in cooperation, 58–60
social-cognitive theories, 47 interpersonal, 60–2
social cohesion, 21 status and intergroup relations, 62–3
social competencies, 23–4, 29, 222 values and norms, 63–5
social contexts, 13, 60, 62, 152, 229 social representations theory, 73
social contract, 56, 196 social space, 21–2, 63
social entrepreneurship, 27–9 societal development
social exchange theory of values, 4 in developed countries, 5
social exclusion, 11–12, 34, 152, 154, in developing countries, 5
156–8, 160–2, 228 international communities on, 218
social identity, 72–3, 86, 206, 224, post-modern, 232–8
236–7 progressivism, 221
social interaction Society of Friends, 53
aggressive children, 42 Society of Nations (1920), 53
conflict resolution, 44 sociocognitive conflict, 59, 73, 82, 85,
consumerism, 203, 205 89, 115, 222, 224, 226, 234
contact hypothesis, 98, 103 sociocultural influence
cross-group, 88 child’s environment, 52, 65, 74
cultural mediation, 165–6, 172, 176, educational context, 72
190–1 genetic social psychological
different patterns of, 61 perspective, 86
economic crisis, 195–6 human psychology, 149, 160–1
educational context., 71–2 individual competence, 58
emotional deficits, 43 learning and development
exclusionary behaviour, 87 approach, 136
252 Index
sociocultural influence – continued Tu, E., 167

romantic science method, 188 Turiel, E., 41
societal development, 2–4 Turkish Cypriots (TCs), 72, 79–85, 100
sociogenesis, 7, 73 Turner, J.C., 175
sociomoral, developmental dynamics
level 0, 38 Uchida, Y., 152
level 1, 38–9 universalism, 124, 207–8
level 2, 39–42 University of Cyprus, 72
reasoning, 6, 32–3, 42–3, 223 Unterhalter, E., 29
Soros, George, 29 Uskul, A. K., 11, 33, 36, 41, 62, 149,
Spielvogel, G., 194 150, 154, 156, 157, 220, 228, 229,
Stadelmann, T., 24 230
Staub, E., 8
Steg, L., 208 Valsiner, J., 71, 86, 101, 104, 108, 109,
Stephan, C. W., 9, 79, 83 110, 136, 230, 232, 233
Stephan, W. G., 9, 79, 83 Van, H. A., 208
Stephens, N. M., 150 Van Zomeren, M., 9, 235
stereotyping, 9, 45, 47, 78, 85, 88, 98, Varnum, M. E. W., 153
134–5, 198 Vidal, F., 56
Stoker, L., 199 Viman-Miller, R., 198
Study of Intergroup Conflict (Oxford Volpato, C., 195
Centre), 72 Vygotsky, L. S.
Sullivan, S., 167 child’s environment, 23–4
Sylva, K., 237 on imaginary experience, 137, 188
symbolic resources on interindividual coordination, 55
for children, 236 relations of constraint and relations
complex issues, 232 of cooperation, 76
cultural elements, 136–41, 227–8 on social identities, 237
flexible use, 237 on social interactions, 165, 236
peace-orientation, 143–4
social relationships and, 141–3 Wagner, P., 45
sociocognitive conflict, 234 Wagner, U., 99
teaching-learning situations, 11, 51 Wagner, W., 74
Walker, I., 198
Tajfel, H., 8, 57, 103, 135, 175 Walker, M., 29
Takezawa, M., 45 Wang, S., 208
Tambyah, S. K., 199 Ward, C., 106
Tan, S. J., 199 Warsaw Action Plan, 20
Tartas, V., 51, 61, 222, 223 Watson-Jones, R. E., 156
Tausch, N., 9, 72, 79, 85 Weaver, S. L., 150
teaching-learning situations, 11, 51 Weil, A. M., 86, 87
Teichman, Y., 78 Weiler, J. D., 201
Thomas, W., 102 Weintraub, J., 74, 75
Toma, C., 216 Weisberg, H. F., 199
Tomasello, M., 36 Welzel, C., 3, 219
Tönnies, F., 2, 230 Werts, H., 199
Torney-Purta, J., 21 West, T. V., 88, 89
Triandis, H. C., 150, 160 Whitehouse, H., 156
Tropp, L. R., 79, 80, 81, 98 Whiting, B. B., 149, 161
Index 253
Will, G.-J., 156 Zapiti, A., 4, 7, 13, 53, 61, 72, 74, 75,
Williams, K. D., 160 76, 77, 86, 88, 89, 215, 220, 221,
Witkin, H. A., 152, 160 222, 224, 229, 233, 235, 236, 237
Wood, P., 37, 38 Zembylas, M., 80
Wright, S. C., 197 Zhang, Z., 154
Ziegler, H., 29
xenophobia, 8, 195, 201, 220, 231 Zimbardo, P. G., 204
Zittoun, T., 11, 51, 55, 62, 64, 73, 75,
Yates, M., 23 88, 89, 103, 129, 134, 136, 137,
Yogeeswaran, K., 198 139, 141, 142, 143, 191, 192, 215,
Youniss, J., 23 217, 219, 223, 226, 227, 228, 230,
youth based organizations, 51, 56, 64 233, 234, 237

Social Relations

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Social Relations in Human and Societal Development

Also by the Editors

INTERACTION, COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: Psychological

BECOMING OTHER: From Social Interaction to Self-reﬂection (2006)

ARGUMENTATION AND EDUCATION: Theoretical Foundations and Practices

Preface and Acknowledgements x

Notes on Contributors xiii

1 Introduction: The Role of Social Relations in Human and

Part I Social Relations in Cognitive and Sociomoral

3 The Development of Intersubjectivity: Cognitive, Affective

4 The Architecture of Social Relationships and Thinking

5 Genetic Social Psychology: From Microgenesis to

Part II Social Relations and Conﬂict

7 Conﬂict Transformation and Homodiplomacy 114

8 Social Relations and the Use of Symbolic Resources in

Part III Social Relations of the Economic Culture

10 Social Simulations as a Tool for Understanding Individual,

11 Social Relations, the Financial Crisis and Human

12 The Importance of Social Relations for Human and

8.1 Double recognition in teaching–learning interactions 142

Social relations are central to both human and societal development.

of a society or group and the ﬁnancial crisis from social, cross-cultural

to the symposium, it would literally not have been possible with-

Alex Gillespie is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the London

Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont is Professor Emeritus at the Institute of

Charis Psaltis is Assistant Professor of Social and Developmental

He is the co-author, with Anna Zapiti, of Interaction, Communication and

Michael Cole is Distinguished Professor of Communication, Psychology

Costas M. Constantinou is Professor of International Relations at the

Wolfgang Edelstein is Director Emeritus of the Max Planck Institute

Monika Keller is a senior researcher at the Max Planck Institute of

integrating cognition (perspective-taking, theory of mind), affect (empa-

Stefano Passini is an assistant professor at the Department of Education

Ayse K. Uskul is a reader in psychology at the University of Kent, UK.

Deborah Downing Wilson teaches intercultural communication at the

and education, with a particular interest in the way common under-

Tania Zittoun is a professor at the Institute of Psychology and Educa-

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Human development is mostly concerned with the sociomoral and

From the social to the individual

Another type of change with dire consequences, which is rarely

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of exploring the ways in which people and groups protect themselves

the pragmatism tradition of George Herbert Mead. In Constantinou’s

role that certain individuals play in the economic livelihood of certain

In the concluding contribution (Chapter 12), Psaltis, Gillespie and

Bovet, P. (1925/1951). Le sentiment religieux et la psychologie de l’enfant.

Moscovici, S. & Pérez, J. A. (1997). Representations of society and prejudice.

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in Europe agreed upon action according to the so-called Warsaw Action

• education policy development and implementation for democratic

On 11 May 2010 the Committee of Ministers of Education adopted

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