1883 PEOPLE V NIAFATAN

Date: 1 February 1999 GR Number: 107964-66 Ponente:

Martinez, J
Article 3, Section 22 Wayne Michael L. Novera
Petitioners: People of the Philippines Respondents: Hon. David Nifatan

Doctrine: A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank.
Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as
evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing
obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a
deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.
Facts:
1. Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to quash
the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as
B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check
which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan,
ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued
the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, the appeal.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Is a memorandum check within the coverage of B.P. 22? 1. YES

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis:

A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum",
"memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay
the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. Such a
check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be
presented, has the same effect as an ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be
valid in his hands like any other check.

A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. A
memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not
matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of
indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation,
for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for
which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a
guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.

A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the
bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. However, with the
promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to
exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance
from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding
would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation
of unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks
changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing
checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from
the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors
to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment.

To determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial
value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
communities acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion. It further noted
that the petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting
the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in
esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. This consequently exempts the act from the
writ's limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper
object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not
to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction."

As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on the
permissibility of appeal after a verdict of acquittal in view of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy.

In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy

faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case,
verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases
of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v.
Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy
behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant,
who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression
through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United
States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty."
 Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco where the Court likewise dismissed a similar
petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by the lower court was
not reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of
said petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

In Velasco, we clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a
sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on
the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of
Appeals
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