ARTICLE 68.

PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

PEOPLE V QUITORIO (G.R. No. 116765, January 28, 1998) ..................................................1
PEOPLE V SARCIA (G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009) ...............................................14
ATIZADO V PEOPLE (G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010) ..................................................25
PEOPLE V JACINTO (G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011) .....................................................33
PEOPLE V AISA MUSA (G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012) ..............................................44
PEOPLE V ROSAL HUBILLA (G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014) ..................................54

G.R. No. 116765, January 28, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JACOB QUITORIO, JAYSON

POMIDA AND PACIFICADOR CAMPOMANES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused-appellants were charged with rape with homicide in an amended information filed on
16 April 1993 (and docketed as Criminal Case No. 129) before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in Dolores, Eastern Samar. The accusatory portion
thereof read as follows:
On September 6, 1992 at about 12:00 o’clock midnight in Poblacion Dolores, E. Samar and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused unlawfully conspired
and helped one another and by means of force and intimidation have [sic] carnal knowledge
with one Elena Dacutanan y Gabane and with the use of deadly weapons inflicted injuries upon
said victim which caused the death of the latter.

Contrary to law.

Dolores, Eastern Samar, April 14, 1993.

(SGD.) CORNELIO M. UMIL II

Prosecutor I[1]
At the arraignment, each accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses for its evidence in chief: Benjamin
Dongsal, Yolanda Caspe, Dr. Yolanda N. Bacsal of the Dolores Community Hospital, Gil
Sobremonte of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Dolores, Eastern Samar, and Rodrigo
Gabane; while PNP Investigator Albert Donceras testified on rebuttal.

On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand and each raised the defenses of denial
and alibi. To corroborate their alibi, the following were presented: Gregorio Bantilan, for
accused-appellant Jayson Pomida; Basilio Pomarejo, for accused-appellant Pacificador
Campomanes; and Lito Librella, for accused-appellant Jacob Quitorio.

Accused-appellants likewise presented Romeo Campomanes, then Chief of Police of Dolores,

Eastern Samar and the brother of accused-appellant Pacificador Campomanes, Matilde
Cardona, Mrs. Patricia Almazan, Artemio Almasan and Engineer Agrifino Senubio.

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution’s evidence, and finding that the
People established accused-appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt, promulgated its
decision[2] on 14 July 1994, decreeing as follows:
Accordingly, this court do [sic] hereby sentence [sic] accused Jacob Quitorio and Jayson
Pomida each to Two [terms of] Reclusion Perpetua and each to an additional imprisonment
[term] of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.

If reclusion perpetua (though not synonimous [sic] [with] but distinct from life imprisonment and
an [being] indivisible penalty) is to be computed at thirty (30) years, then the total penalty for
each of the two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida would be as it is hereby ordered to
be seventy (70) years as minimum to seventy-seven (77) years and four (4) months, as
maximum.

The third accused, Pacificador Campomanes, who at the time of the commission of the crime
was only 16 years, 9 months and 9 days having been born only on November 27, 1975, as
evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth found on page 327 and Certification found on page 49
of the records, is a Youthful Offender.

Considering therefore his age of about 17 years only at the time of the commission of the crime,
he shall be entitled to a penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law.

The law provides that: “When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.” (Last par. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended
by RA 2638, approved June 18, 1960, and RA 411, approved June 20, 1964).
However, in the case of People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991:

The Supreme Court considered the death penalty as no longer impossible [sic] in consonance
with the provision of Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, hence, the death
sentence imposed on the accused-appellant has been automatically commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
As a consequence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua which should have been imposed on the
third accused, Pacificador Campomanes, is hereby reduced to one degree lower pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. That is, to reclusion temporal or 12 years
and 1 day to 10 years.

Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the accused Pacificador Campomanes for one count
and that is for himself alone is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

But having conspired with the other two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida in raping
and killing the victim Elena Gabane, he is further sentence[d] to two more [terms of] 10 years of
prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The total penalty therefore of accused Pacificador Campomanes is thirty (30) years, as
minimum to fifty-two (52) years, as maximum.

This court further orders the three accused herein to indemnify joint and several [sic] the heirs of
the victim Elena Gabane, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages for the death of the said
victim; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; P7,100.00 also
representing the total actual expenses in connection with the death of the victim Elena Gabane;
and to pay the cost [sic], also joint and several [sic], without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency ….

The accused, Pacificador Campomanes was released on recognizance while this case was still
pending for preliminary investigation before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, but with his
conviction his recognizance is hereby ordered cancelled and without anymore force and effect.
This accused, Pacificador Campomanes therefore, should be, as it is hereby ordered detained
until this case is finally decided by the higher court, should there be an appeal by the three
accused herein within the 15-day reglamentary [sic] period for appeal.

xxx

After a careful perusal and scrutiny of the records of this case, the same is wanting of an
“agreement” signed by the three accused herein to the effect that during their detention period,
they will abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

So in the event this decision of conviction against the three accused herein is affirmed on
appeal, should they appeal, the three accused shall only be entitled to four-fifth (4/5) of the time
during which they have undergone their preventive imprisonment, which commenced on
November 3, 1992, as evidenced by the “Receipt of Detainee”, found on page 46 of the records
of this case.

SO ORDERED.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, as
follows:
On September 6, 1992, Elena Gabane, a singer-guitarist of the United Pentecostal Church of
Dolores, Eastern Samar, told the family of Benjamin Donsal, a “brother” pastor with whom
Gabane had been staying, that she was going home later that night to Cadayao, Jiabong,
Samar. She was supposed to ride the Roureyjay bus bound for Catbalogan which normally
leaves at midnight (TSN, Oct. 26, 1993, pp. 2-3).

At about midnight, Yolanda Caspe was on her way home from the house of her friend Tilde,
where they were having a drink. At the corner of Tegio St. and the provincial road, she saw
three male persons carrying or dragging a woman with long hair and wearing a white jacket and
short skirt. She was not able to see the face of the woman who was partly covered but she was
able to recognize the three men. The area was well lighted by the fluorescent lamp in the street
and by the moonlight. Pacificador Campomanes was holding the woman by her left armpit while
Jacob Quitorio was supporting her by her right armpit. Jason Pomida was destroying the wire
fence of the school. Upon seeing her, Campomanes beckoned to her. Afraid, Caspe ran way
using a different route to her house. (TSN, June 29, 1993, pp. 2-7).

The following morning, a woman, who turned out to be Elena Gabane, was found dead in the
grounds of the Dolores Elementary School. She was raped and her body bore several fatal stab
wounds. The report of Dr. Yolanda Bacsal who conducted a post mortem of the cadaver,
contained the following findings:
“CHEST: Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 13 cms depth, clean cut edges, along the 3rd
intercostal space, parasternal area, left, directed downwardly, hitting the heart.

Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 5 cms depth, clean cut edges, along the 5th intercostal
space, parasternal area, left.

Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 5 cms depth, 3rd intercostal space, clean cut edges,
anterior axillary line, left.

Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 18 cms depth, clean cut edges, along 5th intercostal
space, midclavicular line, left.

Stab wound, 3 cms longest diameter, 8 cms depth, clean cut edges, 2nd intercostal space,
midclavicular area, right.
Stab wound 3 cms longest diameter, 18 cms depth, clean cut edges, 4th intercostal space,
directed upwardly parasternal area, right.

Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 8 cms depth, clean cut edges, 4th intercostal space
midclavicular, right.

Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 3 cms depth, 4th intercostal space, parasternal area, right.

GENETALIA: Right labia minora lacerated.

Vaginal canal, admits 2 fingers without difficulty.

Hymen lacerated at 6:00 o’clock, 5:00 o’clock. 12:00 o’clock, compared to the face of the clock,
V-shape in appearance.”
Caspe was able to identify the body of the victim as the same woman she saw the night before
in the company of the appellants because of her long hair and attire. She easily identified the
appellants in a line-up of ten men (TSN, June 30, 1993, pp. 15, 22, 27-28).[3]
The trial court convicted accused-appellants on the basis of the following circumstantial
evidence, which, when combined, sufficed “to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt,”
to wit:
(1) The positive identification by prosecution witness Yolanda Caspe of accused-appellants, i.e.,
from a distance of 15 to 20 meters, she clearly saw Pacificador Campomanes holding the left
arm of the victim by her armpit and his right arm holding a weapon; Jacob Quitorio holding the
victim’s right arm and armpit; and Jayson Pomida destroying and making an opening near the
corner of the hog wire fence of the Dolores Elementary School, Dolores, Eastern Samar.

2) The finding of Dr. Yolanda N. Bacsal that the victim suffered eight (8) serious and fatal
wounds and was raped, possibly by more than one person;

3) The fact that on the morning of 7 September 1992, the police found, within the premises of
the Dolores Elementary School, the corpse of a woman who was later identified as Elena
Gabane, the victim;

4) The admission of accused-appellant Jayson Pomida in his affidavit (Exhibit 3-B) that he
recognized the victim Elena Gabane as the woman being carried allegedly by PFC Oscar
Renomeron, Danilo Segubio and John Doe on the night of September 6, 1992; and

5) The rebuttal testimony of Albert Donceras, PNP Investigator, that at the PNP Headquarters in
Borongan, Eastern Samar, prosecution witness Yolanda Caspe pointed out Pacificador
Campomanes and Jacob Quitorio as the ones holding the left arm and the right arm,
respectively, of the victim Elena Gabane; and Jayson Pomida as the one destroying and making
an opening in the hog wire fence of the Dolores Elementary School; and that these accused did
not object after they were so pointed out.
The trial court further ruled that conspiracy among accused-appellants was sufficiently
established by their joint acts of carrying the victim and placing her inside the school compound.
In view thereof, the RTC held that each accused-appellant was liable for three separate crimes
of rape with homicide, namely, that personally committed by him and that committed by each of
the other two accused.

Accused-appellants then seasonably interposed the instant appeal.

In our resolution of 5 August 1996, we dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Pacificador

Campomanes for failure of his bondsmen to surrender him, thereby failing to comply with the
resolutions of 22 May 1995, 13 December 1995 and 6 March 1996. Judgment on the bond was
thereafter entered. This appeal then proceeds only insofar as accused-appellants Jacob
Quitorio and Jayson Pomida are concerned.

In their Appellants’ Brief, accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred:
I

… IN CONVICTING [THEM] OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE BASED SOLELY ON

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

… IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS YOLANDA

CASPE.
Accused-appellants discuss these assigned errors jointly and, in the main, denounce the
credibility of the testimony of Yolanda Caspe, thus:
Her testimony is unworthy of belief. She does not even know the family name of Tilde whom she
considers as her friend (TSN, p. 13, June 29, 1993). She does not really know the actual time
she went to Tilde’s house, the time they started drinking and the time they finished drinking
because she did not have a time piece then (TSN, p. 5, June 30, 1993), and besides she does
not know how to tell the time and neither can she tell how long is one minute or one hour (TSN,
p. 8, Oct. 12, 1993). How was she able to tell that they started drinking at 11:00 o’clock and she
went home at 12:00 o’clock? Was she coached to state that particular time in order that her
testimony will jibe with the testimony of Dr. Yolanda Bacsal, the doctor who conducted the post
mortem examination, that the victim died probably at 12:00 o’clock midnight or at about 12:30
o’clock? (TSN, p. 12, July 28, 1993)

It is also quite intriguing that a woman, single at that (although she testified on cross-
examination that she had children, TSN, p. 8, Oct. 12, 1993) would be out of her house for a
drinking spree during such unholy hour when there was even no occassion [sic] to celebrate
(TSN, p. 6, June 30, 1993).

Witness Yolanda Caspe went on to testify that on her way home, she saw, at a distance of
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters, the three accused, namely, Pacificador Campomanes, Jacob
Quitorio, and Jayson Pomida. Accused Pacificador Campomanes was holding the left arm of a
woman, whom she later came to know as Elena Gabane; accused Jacob Quitorio was holding
the right armpit of Elena Gabane; and accused Jayson Pomida was destroying and making an
opening at the wire fence of the Dolores Elementary School. The three accused then tried to
place the victim inside the wire fence. The accused then noticed her presence and one of them,
Pacificador Campomanes in particular, beckoned her with a weapon and so she took another
street and ran home, took her supper and slept.

On cross-examination, she even described the attire of the victim (TSN, p. 27 & 28, JUn [sic] 30,
1993) and each of the accused as follows:

1. Accused Pacificador Campomanes was wearing white shorts, white sando,

and white hat;

2. Accused Jacob Quitorio was wearing maong pants, gray T-shirt the sleeves
of which were detached, and wearing slippers (tsenelas); and

3. Accused Jayson Pomida was in fatigue pants cut on the knee with
sleeveless white T-shirt. (TSN, p. 25, June 29, 1993)
The foregoing testimony is incredible. If said witness had in fact seen such shocking incident
where she herself was frightened by one of the accused, it is so surprising that she could relate
in detail not only each and every act of the accused but even theirrespective attire. Is this not a
[sic] proof of a coached and rehearsed witness? Of a prevaricated story?

Furthermore, if the herein accused were the perpetrators of the crime charged and had in fact
noticed the presence of Yolanda Caspe, will it not be more in harmony with human nature that
herein accused would have exerted every effort to eliminate the witness and not merely frighten
her? In this jurisdiction well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must proceed not
only from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself as when it
conforms to the common experience and observation of mankind. (People vs. Jalon, 215 SCRA
680).

xxx

Furthermore, the prosecution failed to rebut the testimony of Patricia Almazan that there was no
electric bulb at the area where the incident happened. This is very material to the prosecution.
Considering the time of the incident which is 12:00 o’clock midnight and the distance of the
alleged eyewitness from the place of the incident which is about 15 to 20 meters (or even 30
meters, as declared on cross examination, TSN, p. 9 & 16, June 30, 1993) the illumination
coming from the moonlight would not give the witness a clear view of the incident much less of
the identity of the accused. The witness having also consumed two bottles of “beer grande”
together with her friend, the same surely affected her senses, particularly her vision. As such,
there is serious doubt on the identification made of accused-appellants as the culprits. It has
been held that the identity of the offender like the crime itself must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Jalon, supra).
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to affirm the
challenged judgment as the guilt of accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt;
further, there is no reason to disturb the findings and conclusion of the trial court as to the
credibility of Yolanda Caspe, who had no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellants.
Although there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of rape and the killing of the victim,
the OSG asserts that the following circumstantial evidence clearly linked accused-appellants to
the crime, viz:
(i) a body of the woman was found dead in the grounds of the Dolores Elementary School; (ii)
the body bore several fatal stab wounds and had been sexually molested; (iii) there was no sign
of struggle or blood (except where she was lying) in the area where she was found, indicating
she was killed elsewhere; (iv) her death occurred at about midnight of September 6, 1992; (v) at
about that time, she was seen by eyewitness Caspe in the company of appellants in the vicinity
of the school where her body was found dead; (vi) appellants were carrying or holding the
woman in a way that created suspicion, as they were holding her by the armpits; (vi) [sic] in the
area where the victim was last seen alive near the corner of the school, blood stains were found;
and (vii) appellants were easily identified by Caspe in a police line-up. All the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, point to appellants as the culprits.
A scrutiny of the evidence convinces us that accused-appellants deserve to be acquitted, not
necessarily because they did not commit the crime charged, but in light of the prosecution’s
failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and inability to overturn the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.[4] In criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind,[5] with evidence which stands or falls on its own merits and which cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [6]

Indeed, a conviction in this case could only have been had on the basis of circumstantial
evidence which, under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient to convict
provided the following are present:
 1. There is more than one circumstance;

2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.

As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence may

be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person; i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.[7]

In the instant case, we note that only the fact of the victim’s death was sufficiently proven, as the
evidence to prove the commission of rape is weak. The presence of hymenal lacerations, as
found by Dr. Yolanda Bacsal, was not sufficiently shown to be due to the insertion of the male
organ under circumstances that would qualify as rape. In the first place, Dr. Bacsal admitted that
her examination of the victim was the first of this type she conducted since becoming a doctor,
and that her only basis for concluding that the victim was raped was the presence of the
hymenal lacerations. Yet, Dr. Bacsal admitted that the mere presence of hymenal lacerations
due to sexual intercourse did not necessarily mean that the victim had been raped.[8] Likewise,
the doctor’s qualification as an expert was unconvincing as she could not even answer the
questions as to her basis for stating that it was possible that more than one person raped the
victim; and as to the period of time that had lapsed from the infliction of the lacerations until she
conducted the examination at 10:00 a.m. of 7 September 1992, thus:

Q What is then your basis in telling the court that the victim could
have been raped?
A There were lacerations at 6:00 o’clock, 5:00 o’clock to 12:00
o’clock.

Q Since you became a doctor, this is your first of a medical case,

am I correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q In other words, you have not yet examine any other victim who
have suffered the same thing as the victim in this case, am I
correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q Your findings doctor under exhibit “A-3” under the heading

Genitalia says that the vaginal canal admits 2 fingers without
difficulty without resistance and the hymen lacerated at 6:00
o’clock, 5:00 o’clock to 12:00 o’clock, compared to the face of
the clock, and V-shape in appearance, according to your
testimony you said that the victim was raped, am I correct,
doctor?
A Yes, sir.

Q If a woman who suffers sexual intercourse with a man suffer

hymenal laceration without necessarily been rape?
A Yes, sir.
 Q What is again your basis doctor in telling the court in your direct
testimony that it is possible that more than 3 or more than 1
person raped the victim?
A (No answer).

Q Is it also possible that she was rape[d] by only one person?

A Yes it is possible.

Q You told the court that this hymenal laceration were [sic]
compared to the face of the clock, V-shape in appearance and
when asked by the Prosecutor you told the court that these are
fresh wounds, did I get you right?
A Yes, sir.

Q Could you determine to the court, how many hours had lapse
from the time these lacerations occured [sic] until you
conducted your examination at 10:00 o’clock in the morning of
September 7 if you remember?
A (No answer).

Q You are not in a position to tell doctora?

A (No answer).[9] (underscoring supplied)

Worse, when asked what her basis was for concluding that the victim was a virgin at the time
she was “raped,” Dr. Bacsal merely replied, without any further qualification, that the vaginal
canal admitted two fingers, thus:

Q Was Miss Gabane virgin at the time she was raped?

A Yes, sir.

Q As an expert witness, how did you come to the conclusion that

Miss Gabane was virgin at the time she was raped?
A Because the vaginal canal admits two fingers.[10]

However, that “the vaginal canal admits two fingers” is hardly proof of a rape victim’s virginal
state.

We now resolve the liability of accused-appellants.

There is only one circumstance which could have linked them to the brutal slaying of Elena
Gabane, viz., their having been seen dragging the body of a woman toward the premises of the
Dolores Elementary School, as testified to by Yolanda Caspe. The veracity then of Yolanda’s
claim depends entirely on her credibility, and accused-appellants, quite understandably, leave
nothing to chance to convince us that Yolanda’s testimony should not be accorded the slightest
bit of credence.

It is settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of witnesses, unless there appears, on record, some facts or circumstances of weight
and influence which the trial court overlooked and which, if considered, would affect the result of
the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical considerations. The trial
judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility since he personally heard the
witness and observed his deportment and manner of testifying. [11] Our reading of the transcripts
of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Yolanda Caspe reveals circumstances that cast
serious doubt as to her truthfulness or greatly impair her credibility.

First. It is doubtful if Yolanda, as she testified during direct examination, was in the house of
Tilde at 11:00 p.m. of 6 September 1992. In her statement[12] taken on 23 September 1992 by
PNP officer Albert Donceras, but subscribed and sworn to on 5 October 1992 before Municipal
Circuit Trial Judge Ricardo Lapesura, Yolanda declared that she was, at that hour, in the house
of Yolly who invited Yolanda for a snack because Yolanda was one of the sponsors at the
baptism of Yolly’s child. Yolanda’s explanation that she did not mention this to Donceras[13] is
lame. Moreover, as Yolanda likewise testified during direct examination, it was not a “snack” that
she partook of, but two “grande” (big) bottles of beer. Further, as Yolanda admitted on cross-
examination, she was not invited by Tilde nor Yoly; she invited herself. [14] We find this portion of
Yolanda’s testimony, however, at odds with the test of credibility in light of Yolanda’s admission
that said visit was her first to Tilde’s residence.[15]

Second. We likewise doubt whether Yolanda was in full possession of her physical and mental
faculties, given her admission that she drank two big bottles of beer with Tilde. There is no
evidence whatsoever that Yolanda was accustomed to this level of alcohol intake, and that
unlike a normal person, her having imbibed such a prodigious quantity of alcohol did not leave
her reeling. Notably, that Yolanda’s ability to perceive was affected by the beer she imbibed was
evidenced by her confusion as to the number of men she saw. In her sworn statement,[16] she
categorically declared that she saw four men and even mentioned their names, to wit: the three
accused-appellants and one Rommel Padro, with the latter serving as the look-out. Thus her
answers to the fifth and ninth questions in the sworn statement:

05.Q Did you recall any incident that occcured [sic] while you were
[on] the street?
A. Yes sir, while I was on my way home far from the house of
Yolly, who is my friend, and who invited me for a snack
because I was one of the sponsor[s] of her child in the
baptismal [sic], and while I was [o]n the street of the bacck of
the Dolores Central School Campus. I saw four (4) persons
carrying a woman, one person holding the left arm, one person
holding the right arm and a person was opening the hog wire
fencce of the school fence while another person was a look out
near the fence.

xxx

09.Q Who was the person holding the right and the left arm[s] and
the person who was opening the hog wire fence of the school
fence and the person to be [sic] the look out of those person[s]
if you know?
A Pacificador Campomanes was holding the left arm Jacob
Quitorio was holding the right arm while Jason Pomeda [sic]
was the one opening the hog wire fence of the school and
Rommel Padro was the look out man.

Yet, in her testimony in open court, she mentioned seeing only three men, namely, accused-
appellants herein.[17] And when confronted during cross-examination with her aforementioned
answers in her sworn statement, she attempted to justify the inconsistency by claiming that the
aforequoted question and answer No. 05 were not asked of her and were not given by her,
respectively, thus:
 Q You just identified in court your affidavit which according to you
were [sic] sworn before the Municipal Judge and the contents
were read and explained to you, I will read to you question and
answer number 5 in our exhibit “1” and I quote, “Did you recall
any incident that occured [sic] while you were [on] the street?”
and your answer is, “Yes, sir while I was on my way home from
the house of Yolly, who is my friend, and who invited me for a
snack because I was one of the sponsors of her child in the
baptismal [sic], and while I was [o]n the street at the back
portion of the Dolores Central School Campus, I saw 4 persons
carrying a woman, one person holding the left arm, one person
holding the right arm and a person was opening the hog wire
fence of the school fence while another person was a look out
near the fence”, do you remember having been asked that
same question and having given the same answer?
A I did not.

Q The question and answer which was just read to you, you just
said a while ago that you do not recall having been asked that
question and having giving the same answer, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q In other words, this particular portion of your affidavit was not

actually asked from you and you did not give the same answer,
is that correct?
A No, sir.[18]

Worse, aware of the difficulty of extricating herself from her web of falsehoods, Yolanda even
had the temerity to suggest that Donceras (or some other person) supplied the false information
that she saw four persons carrying the woman, and had likewise furnished the name of Rommel
Padro, whom she did not even know. Thus, while still on cross-examination, she testified:

Q Did you not say in your direct testimony that you saw these
three persons bringing a woman whom you do not know
whether it [sic] was dead or alive?
A Yes, sir.

Q You saw only three accused not four?

A The woman whom they were carrying was the … four[th].

Q I am asking you Mrs. Witness along [sic] the woman according

to you in your testimony, you saw only three not four?
A Three.

Q So, the fourth person that you saw was the woman?
A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know one Rommel Padro?

A No, sir.

Q Are you sure?

 A Yes, sir.

Q I will read to you question and answer number 6 in your

affidavit, exhibit “I”, the question read this way and I quote,
“Who were these persons if you know?, your answer was, “It
was Jacob Quitorio, Jayson Pomida, Rommel Padro and
Pacificador Campomanes,” my question is this, do you recall
having asked that question and having given the same answer?
A No, sir I only answered three.

Q So, that answer which was just read to you, the question and
answer number 6 on exhibit “I” of you affidavit is not true
because you just told now that there were three?
A I saw only three.[19]

The denial, simply put, leaves us incredulous. Yolanda’s statement was taken on 23 September
1993 by PNP officer Albert Donceras and subscribed and sworn to before Judge Lapesura on 5
October 1992. Donceras was clearly performing his official duty in taking Yolanda’s statement;
hence, in absence of any showing to the contrary, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed must stand.[20] Yolanda cannot then be heard to say that Donceras did not
ask question no. 05 of her and that she did not answer as therein stated. It is likewise to be
presumed that Judge Lapesura, in the performance of his official duty, must have satisfied
himself that, among other things, the answers to the questions propounded by Donceras were
indeed made by Yolanda, considering the solemnity of the oath he administered to her. As a
matter of fact, during the preliminary examination,[21] Judge Lapesura directed Yolanda to
examine and read her sworn statement, after which, she explicitly admitted it to be of her
making. Despite having been afforded ample opportunity to correct or complain about any
erroneous statements, she failed to disavow any of her statements.

Yolanda’s inclination to falsehood, however, did not last long. On the second day of her cross-
examination she, perhaps unwittingly, admitted that Donceras did in fact ask her the subject
questions and that she so answered them, thus:

Q So Sgt. Donceras conducted an investigation of your person at

Borongan, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q You were asked questions and you gave corresponding

answers?
A Yes, sir.

Q And those questions and answers which you made were

reduced by Donceras into writing?
A Yes, sir.

Q And as a matter of fact after it was reduced into writing you

were made to sign the same?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, I am informing you again that this Exhibit “I” is a sworn

statement of Yolanda Caspe taken by Albert Donceras at the
Borongan Prov’l. Headquarters of the PNP, on Sept. 23, 1992,
 now my question is, is this the same statement which according
to you just now was made and reduced into writing?
A Yes, sir.[22]

Third. We note yet another set of circumstances that does not augur well for Yolanda’s
credibility as a witness.

Yolanda estimated that she was 20 to 30 meters away when she saw the three or four
persons.[23] At that time, even with the moonlight and the fluorescent light which Yolanda
claimed to have illuminated the place,[24] we refuse to believe that she was able to take special
note, not only of the faces of the persons she saw, but likewise, how they were dressed and
even to the extent of being able to discern the color of their clothes, to wit: Jacob Quitorio wore
“maong” pants and a gray T-shirt with detached sleeves; Jayson Pomida had on fatigue pants
“cut on the knee” and a white sleeveless T-shirt; while Pacificador Campomanes wore white
shorts and a white “sando.”[25] If even to further tax her credibility, Yolanda added, on cross-
examination, that the “sando” of Campomanes had holes.[26] As to the attire of the victim,
Yolanda narrated that the woman she saw wore a short checkered black skirt and white
jacket,[27] despite the fact that earlier in her testimony, Yolanda admitted she was unable to see
the clothes of the woman since her view was obstructed by Jacob Quitorio, thus:

Q You were at a distance of around 20 to 30 meters so much so

that you saw the woman wearing a short skirt and a white
jacket, did you not say so?
A Yes, sir.

Q But when you were asked by the Court what you observed on
[sic] her dress or clothes you said you did not see because
somebody was covering the woman and this was Jacob
Quitorio, did you not say so?
A Yes, sir.

Q So, Jacob Quitorio was in front of the woman, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.[28]

Fourth. Yolanda exhibited conduct or behavior grossly contrary to ordinary human experience.
Despite allegedly seeing a woman, probably dead by the manner her body was being held and
dragged, and after even being threatened by one of the woman’s assailants, Yolanda simply
went home and did nothing but sleep. She then told no one of what she witnessed, although by
7:00 a.m. the following morning, she already knew that a woman had been raped and had
concluded that the rape victim and the woman she had seen the night preceding were one and
the same.[29] This deafening silence, despite the fact that Yolanda knew the barangay captain of
the place where the Dolores Elementary School was located and some policemen of Dolores, [30]
is beyond us. Likewise, as declared by her in her sworn statement and reiterated on cross-
examination, she saw policemen inspecting and investigating the crime scene, thus:

Q I will read to you again Mrs. Witness question and answer No.
14 on Exhibit “1” which is your sworn statement, I quote, “The
following day, September 7, 1992, what did you observed [sic]
from [the] people of Dolores, Eastern Samar?” And your answer
was, I quote, “At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of that day, I
learned from persons that there was a lady about 17 years old,
who was killed, and I saw some Policemen inspecting and
investigating the crime scene, and I learned later that the
 woman was raped.” Do you also recall having been ask[ed] and
having given the same answer?
A Yes, sir.

Q I will read again the next question and answer No. 15, I quote,
“What did you observed [sic] from the Police Investigator, if you
know?” Your answer was, I quote, “I observed that they
inspect[ed] and investigate[d] from [sic] the hog wire fence
where I saw the four persons in [sic] the night before that day of
September 7, 1992, carrying a woman.” Do you also recall
having been ask[ed] that question and having given the same
answer?
A Yes, sir.[31]

Yet, she opted to do nothing. True to form, however, she once more contradicted herself as
these answers were diametrically opposed to those which she had given just two (2) pages
earlier, reckoned by the pagination of the transcripts, to the effect that she did not see
policemen investigating the premises of the Dolores Elementary School on the morning of 7
September 1992, thus:

ATTY. GAVAN:…

Q Now, you just saw the body of the victim while [sic] being
alighted from the patrol car from the answer of yours, am I
made to understand that you did not go to the crime scene on
[sic] the following morning?
A I did not go to the school, sir.

Q You are also sure of your answer?

A Yes, sir.

Q So you did not see the policemen at the scene where you saw
the accused on [sic] the night before?
A No, sir.

Q Are you sure of our answer?

A Yes, sir.[32]

All told, we can hardly be blamed for harboring grave doubts as to Yolanda’s credibility as a
witness, resulting in our inability to reconcile our conscience with the verdict of the trial court.

Before we close, however, some observations regarding thr decretal portion of the appealed
decision are in order. First, it is the longest we have seen thus far in cases which have reached
us, the trial court discussing therein matters properly belonging in the body of the decision. In
criminal cases, trial judges must strictly observe Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court. Second, the trial court erroneously ruled that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was to be
computecd at thirty (30) years, and that accused-appellants Jacob Quitorio and Jason Pomida,
each sentenced to teo terms of reclusion perpetua and to an additional penalty of 10 years of
prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, should
each serve a total of 70 years as minimum to 77 years and 4 months as maximum. Under
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of reclusion perpetua is a from 20 years and
1 day to 40 years. The thirty-year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of
successive service of sentence under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. Third, assuming
that the trial court was correct in holding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime,
for which reason eacch accused was liable for three offenses, viz: that committed bu him and
those committed by each of his two-accused, then the penalty of accused-appellants Jacob
Quitorio and Jason Pomida should each be reclusion perpetua for that committed by Pacificador
Campomanes, and not the penalty imposed on the latter for the crime he committed since his
reduced penalty was due to the mitigating circumstances of minority under Article 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Mitigating circumstances are personal to an accused in whose favor they
are determined to exist and cannot be enjoyed by his co-conspirators or co-accused. Fourth,
while the trial court was correct in ruling that the prescribed penalty for rape was death, but that
could not, however, be imposed in view of the prohibition in Section 19(1) of Article III of the
Constitution, the RTC nevertheless erred in reasoning that the prescribed penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua, hence, the penalty next lower in degree was reclusion temporal. In
People v. Muñoz, we ruled that the constitutional prohibition did not alter the periods for the
penalty for murder for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty, i.e., the intent of
the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death penalty automatically reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The same thing may be said as regards rape with homicide. The penalty
of death provided under the governing law then was deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua;
however, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the mitigating circumstance
of minority, the penalty of death was still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty of accused Campomanes should have been reclusion perpetua. In any
event, this matter has been rendered moot by the passage of R.A. No. 7659, entitled An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for the Purpose the Revised
Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 129 of Branch 4 of the Regional
Trial Court, Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in Dolores, Eastern Samar, is hereby REVERSED on
ground of reasonable doubt, and accused-appellants JACOB QUITORIO and JAYSON
POMIDA are hereby ACQUITTED and their immediate release from detention is ORDERED,
unless their further detention is warranted for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall submit to this Court, within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of this decision, a report on the release of the abovementioned accused-
appellants.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RICHARD O. SARCIA,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On automatic review is the decision[1] dated My 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-
appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape [3]
committed against AAA,[4] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of
the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death
penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.

The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old
girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA's father filed a complaint[5] for acts of lasciviousness
against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.[6] The Information[7] dated
September 5, 2000 reads:

That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of

Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was
then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.[8] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father;
and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense
presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes
imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay.

On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision[9] finding the accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.

The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the
accused- appellant.[10]

Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's Brief[11] on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief[12] on December 15, 2004.

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[13] modifying the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to
this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.

As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court.
We quote the fallo of the CA decision:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y

Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of
(1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.

On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review. [14]

In our Resolution[15] of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit
their respective supplemental briefs. Accused- appellant filed his Supplemental Brief[16] on April
7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to
have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.

In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

[AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].

II

THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.

III

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD
SARCIA

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:

On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates],
was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.

Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologo's house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.

Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and underwear. He also removed
his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on
top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down
movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray."
She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.

[AAA's cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed
appellant's dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's]
mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA's] mother answered that
they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.

Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her
clothes. Appellant then left.

Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she
found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA] and asked
her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her
any further question and just accompanied her home.

At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that
her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating
sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA's cousin] came to
their house and told [AAA's] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down
movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA's mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAA's]
father was working in Manila.

Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it
was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2)
Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result of [AAAj's
examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health officer of
Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal
certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]'s medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital
vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits
little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars"
means, in layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is
a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain
trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical
instrument or penis.[17]

On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:

Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Dona Tomasa, Guinobatan,
Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAA's] parents, because sometimes they go to
their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father
retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in the
Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his
mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing
in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His
father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Dona Tomasa both of
Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was
between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan.
Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at
Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon after
school before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the
church in Dona Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a
stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting
other girls ... and was most surprised when he Vas accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling
Crisologo and the latter's place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed
Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was
imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against
him with the docile cooperation of [AAA's] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAA's] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger
and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two
(2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was
filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn
about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his
sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he
did not do such thing and recalled CA Record, pp. 77-105. telling his sister they can go to a
doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister
again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.

On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA's] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA
mother's] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of
money by his father to the AAA's family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against
him but the instigation of Saivacion Bobier.

Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay,
testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against
Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape
case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits relative to said
case.[18]

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA
and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and
time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case,
and the only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Saivacion Bobier get a conviction
of this same accused in a murder case filed by said Saivacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the
same Saivacion Bobier helped AAA's father in fding the said case for rape. Accused-appellant
also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation
to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital
bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound."

In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA's and
her cousin's testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time
of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited
her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw
accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a
loud voice contrary to AAA's testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started
the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the
latter's mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however
testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the
cousin testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that
there were only four of them who were playing at that time.

As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor

details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses
and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.[19] The alleged
inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It
is important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant
who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA
was sexually abused by accused- appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the
rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified,
they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and
their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit
mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young
witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is
more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.[20]

Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA's inability to recall the exact date when the incident in
1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication
of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential
and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. [21] In People v.
Purazo,[22] We ruled:

We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for
the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that
where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime
charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that
the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain
the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the
specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of
the court.

Also in People v. Salalima,[23] the Court held:

Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the
victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of
carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the
actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we
ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994" ''sometime
in the year 1991 and the days thereafter" "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions
prior and/or subsequent thereto'" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In this case, AAA's declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:

The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-
examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and date
in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA's] sworn statement mention the
month and date but only the year.[24]

Likewise, witnesses' credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against
accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant's claim that the only
reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this
same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."

The rape victim's delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of
her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused. In People v. Coloma[25] we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long
history of rape by the victim's father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the
complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show
that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the
complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA's parents to
immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainant's father in the latter's
testimony, thus:

Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife
told you that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.

Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during
that time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were
able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.[26]

Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof
that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the
girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal
knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of
these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free
consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.[27]

Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows:
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there
was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of
lacerations in the victim's sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its
absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape.[28] What is important is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility,
and that is sufficient to convict the accused.

Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have
ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over the appellants' defense of denial and alibi. [29] The shallow hypothesis
put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of
Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the
following conclusion:

...True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAA's] parents finally decided to file the rape case because
after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.

AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the
testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable
for a girl of complainant's age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had
she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of
tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious
as rape to any man if it were not true.[30] Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child
of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they
were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter's transgressor punished
accordingly.[31] Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss
now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, [32] was the
governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said
law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years
of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was
committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth
certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be
imposed.

However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot
agree with the CA's conclusion that the accused- appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2)[33] of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he
was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in
any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact
date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it
being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. [34]

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. [35] Thus,
the proper imposable penalty for the accused- appellant is reclusion perpetua.

It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code,
in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes,
the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of damages
should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.

A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in
order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is
included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:

Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall

include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a
third person by reason of the crime.

Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor[36] ratiocinated as follows:

The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party
as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza
that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party,
in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be
considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and
the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on
like considerations, the jurisprudenttal path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction.
Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended
law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not Jess than P75.000.00.
This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial
fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence
of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)

The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,[37] we held:

xxx Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation. are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)

In another case, this Court also explained:

What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages
awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815).[38] (Emphasis Supplied)

Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her
family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the
offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of
injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending
this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission
of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral
or evidentiary certainty of his minority.

In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to
depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape,
considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This
was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,[39] a case decided on July 28,
1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to
P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty
imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.

The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome[40]
and People v. Quiachon[41] is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.

Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for
increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:

The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:

"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 ... Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded
without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court's award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current
jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.

People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,
correctly awarded the following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the
crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty;
P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in
R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the
ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition
of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the
award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of
the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has
been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.[42] Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral
damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should
likewise be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[43]

In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should
be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be
likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award
of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 [44]
and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00. [45]

Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the
sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as
he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[46] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law[47] Accused-appellant is now approximately 31
years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and
transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they
were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application
of this Act. x x x

The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the
Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to
accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty
of the offense charged. It reads:

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by
the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.[48] The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply
to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does
not distinguish, we should not distinguish.[49] Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between
a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations[50] on
Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent
portion of which is quoted below:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could
be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration
of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied)

Nonetheless, while Sec, 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conilict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years, (emphasis ours)

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Sees. 38 and
40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. [51] However, accused-appellant
shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for
the confinement of convicted children as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
- A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate
disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.[52]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on
accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;[53] and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary
damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is
maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010

SALVADOR ATIZADO AND SALVADOR MONREAL, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners
of murder.[1] On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.[2]

The petitioners contest the CA's affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for
review on certiorari.

We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the
RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission of the crime.
We order his immediate release from prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby
modified. Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to
accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Antecedents

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the
petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following information,
to wit:

That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Bogña, Municipality of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without
any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot
one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994,[4] the
trial ensued.

The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major
Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona
(Herminia).

Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-
law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8
pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay;
that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the
sala of Desder's house, she heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and then two
successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona;
that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, that's enough!; that while
aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking
sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously
adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she
rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting;
and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.[5]

Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994, [6] based on
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in
Castilla, Sorsogon.

Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated
his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.[7]

Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses
of Llona.[8]

Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were
Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and
Lagonsing.

The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his
family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,

Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the
house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the
petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of
Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated only because of their being employed by
their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.

As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court
hereby sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency,
in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the
cost.

Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he
being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered,
unless he is charged of other lawful cause or causes.

Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the
service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court referred the petitioners' direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.[10]

On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado

and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[11]
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,[12] the petitioners now appeal.

Issue

The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a
credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandilla's testimony unreliable, namely:
(a) she had failed to identify them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually
witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the
assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the
autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to
Mirandilla's claim; (d) Mirandilla's testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e)
Mirandilla's account was inconsistent with that of Jesalva's.

Ruling

The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on
Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CA
are accorded respect

The RTC and CA's conclusions were based on Mirandilla's positive identification of the
petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them made during
her court testimony on March 6, 1995,[13] viz:
q Who were you saying `we sat together'?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.

q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala
and the house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.

q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting
arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront
of me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona

q How about Kdg. Jesalva?

a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in
otherwords, the door was at his back.

q Was the door open?

a Yes, sir.

q Was the door immediately found... Rather was this the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.

q And from the porch is the main stairs already?

a Yes, sir.

q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting
the persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.

q How about Kgd. Jesalva?

a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any
incident that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were
successive shots.

q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or
who was responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.

q Who is this Salvador Atizado?

a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.

q Can you be able to identify him?

a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered
Salvador Atizado.)

q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?

a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding
downward.

q Then after that what happened?

a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible `stop that's enough', and I
gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.

q Then after that what happened?

a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of
the gun.

q Then what did you do when you heard that?

a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at
that time I do not know his name.

q Then what did you see of him?

a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the
cylinder of the gun.

q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where
the gun was pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.

q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.

q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this
man?
a Yes, sir.

q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?

a Yes, sir.

q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?

a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the
person, the person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)

q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver
and he was moving backward, did you see other persons as his companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the
process of leaving the place.

q Who is the first name of this Atizado?

a Danilo Atizado

q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?

a Salvador Monreal was the one left.

Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandilla's positive
identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the petitioners
did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that
they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.

It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judge's evaluation of the
credibility of a witness and of the witness' testimony is accorded the highest respect because
the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him
to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not.[14] Such evaluation, when affirmed by
the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the disposition of
the case.[15] We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners have not called attention to
and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the
application of the rule is that Mirandilla's positive declarations on the identities of the
assailants prevailed over the petitioners' denials and alibi.[16]

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[17] Yet, the State did not have to
prove the petitioners' previous agreement to commit the murder,[18] because their conspiracy
was deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act. [19]
They had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community
of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable
as co-principals.[20] Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in
murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:

Article 248. Murder. -- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means
of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might
make.[21] For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders.[22] Moreover, treachery must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.[23]

The CA held that Mirandilla's testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that treachery
attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizado's shooting the victim at the latter's back had
been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreal's conspiracy
to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a
handgun that they had fired except that Monreal's handgun did not fire. [24]

We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly
assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an
altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim
provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be swift and
unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.[25] Such
manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured their unhampered
execution of the crime.

II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of
the RPC.[26] But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a
minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal's
minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was
not presented at the trial.

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was
committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that
he was 17 years of age.[27] Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he
was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.[28] Thirdly, Villafe's affidavit dated
June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident. [29] Fourthly, as
RTC's minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,[30] Monreal was 22 years old when he
testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,[31] which meant that he was not over 18 years
of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager
and young looking at the time of the incident.[32]

The foregoing showing of Monreal's minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the
norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined
from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents.
In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate
court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where
the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be
suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,[34] when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of
age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of
the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty
of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum
period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his
proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.

Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18,
1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreal's detention should be credited in
the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, [35] the revision of
the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.

In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic
Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and
services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-
integration, geared towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict
serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. - Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit
from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of Llona.
Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime stands, [36] despite the
reduction of Monreal's penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order to conform
to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as
actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death
indemnity and moral damages should each be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing
case law;[37] and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the attendance of treachery
should be further awarded,[38] to accord with the pronouncement in People v. Catubig,[39] to wit:

The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the
social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if
not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should
only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In
fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.

WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following modifications:

(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one
day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;

(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release
Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being
held for other lawful causes; and

(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona
P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of
Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days
from service.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victim's positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[1] For it to prosper,
the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to
have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[2]

Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final
and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence
on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic
Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and
Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,[3] appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this
Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction.[4]

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 2003[5] filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],[6] appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or
less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being
only five years old.[7]

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[8] During pre-trial,[9] the defense
admitted the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she
was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical
certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.

Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their
respective versions of the story.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The testimonies of AAA,[10] her father FFF,[11] and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito][12] may be
summarized in the following manner:

FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF's house is along the road.
That of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road,
appellant has to pass by FFF's house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every
minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He
bore no grudge against appellant prior to the incident.[13]

AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time -
playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his
way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident.[14]

At about past 6 o'clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter
CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned
without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her
aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].[15]

Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
Rum.[16] At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.[17] He was wearing sleeveless
shirt and a pair of short pants.[18] All of them left the store at the same time.[19] Julito proceeded
to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went
towards the direction of the "lower area or place."[20]
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants[21] when he
held her hand while on the road near the store.[22] They walked towards the rice field near the
house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].[23] There he made her lie down
on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. [24] Already half-naked
from waist down,[25] he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.[26] She felt pain and cried.[27] Afterwards,
appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.[28] She, in turn, went straight home crying.[29]

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.[30] She was without
slippers.[31] He found her face greasy.[32] There was mud on her head and blood was oozing
from the back of her head.[33] He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that
was already turning black.[34] She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud
on her vagina.[35] AAA told him that appellant brought her from the store[36] to the grassy area at
the back of the house of the Perochos;[37] that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her
panty, choked her and boxed her breast;[38] and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.[39]

True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.[40] He asked the appellant
what he did to AAA.[41] Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that
AAA followed him.[42] FFF went home to check on his daughter,[43] afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,[44] and boxed him.[45]

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the
house of Rita.[46] AAA and her mother MMM arrived.[47] AAA was crying.[48] Julito pitied her,
embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped
her.[49] Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.[50] Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you
really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.[51] Appellant's
aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded,
"Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees." [52] Julito did found
the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.[53]

On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident
blottered.[54] FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health
center.[55] Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical
certificate[56] dated 29 January 2003. It reads:

Injuries seen are as follows:

1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.

2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock position

Impression

MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

HYMENAL LACERATIONS

Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,[57] AAA submitted herself to another examination at
the provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of
the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January
2003,[58] the pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is
no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)[59]

Evidence for the Defense

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate
his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that
he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime. [60] Luzvilla even went further
to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. [61] In addition,
Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant's aunt, Gloria,[62] testified on the behavior of
Julito after the rape incident was revealed.[63]

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the
back of FFF's house.[64] He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order
to access the road or to fetch water.[65] He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for
FFF,[66] and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached
him.[67]

At about 8 o'clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle
Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant's uncle
sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the
house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had
a watch .[68]

Appellant's aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of
Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She
also observed that appellant's white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean. [69]

At 6:30 in the evening,[70] Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen
having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.[71] She went out to relieve
herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos. [72] From where
she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry
AAA.[73] AAA's face was covered and she was wiggling.[74] This did not alarm her because she
thought it was just a game.[75] Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.[76] Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,[77] running
towards the house of Rita.[78] AAA was slowly following behind.[79] Luzvilla followed
them.[80] Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to
her.[81] The child did not answer.[82]

Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified
that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the
appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This
time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant's uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF. [83]

On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o'clock in the evening, she was watching the
television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing
only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what
happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia's advice, Julito released her and went out of the
house.[84]
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o'clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at
him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8
o'clock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.[85]

On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,[86] the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA]
P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs[87]

The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that
appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old
when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.[88] The trial court appreciated the evidence
and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.[89] Thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is
amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty
impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in
view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.[90]

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to
indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. [91]

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant's Notice of
Appeal.[92] This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs.[93] Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.[94]

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
RAPE"[95] by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty
and will not suffice to support a conviction."[96]

Our Ruling

We sustain the judgment of conviction.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three
well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.[97]

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to
convict the accused.[98] More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings
of the examining physician.[99]

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime,[100] except when it is established that it was physically impossible for
the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[101]

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even
in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.[102]

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts
culminating in the insertion of appellant's organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the
medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

AAA testified:

PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else
did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.[103]

The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-
phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all -
she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is
essential to show that rape was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally
badges of truth and honesty.[105]

Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo[106] revealed that the hymenal
lacerations at 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an
object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of
the object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ. [107]

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration

conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.[108]

II

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the
commission of the crime are now in dispute.

The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.[109]

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good
look at him during the commission of the crime.[110] AAA had known appellant all her
life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the
situs criminus[111] that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her
hand and led her all the way to the rice field.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she
called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was
wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive.
The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else - one Julito Apiki, but the child, on
rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger,
and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.[112]

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court
of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the
opportunity to observe the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs
and the scant or full realization of their oath,"[113] unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted." [114]

Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

xxx His and his witness' attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to
someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant's positive identification of
accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus
corroborating the latter's testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from
the child."[115]

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his
denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even
destroyed the credibility of the appellant's very testimony.

Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy
Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long
before he bought Tanduay at the store.

This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape
incident because he was then at work.[116] He arrived from work only after FFF came to their
house for the second time and boxed appellant.[117] It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking session started only
after the appellant's errand to the store.[119]

Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary
to Gloria's statement that her husband was at work.

Luzvilla's testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia

Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla's claim that
Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution,
as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in
saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla's recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-
shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.

Also, contrary to Luzvilla's story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita's house three (3)
minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA
arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court's appreciation in
order. Thus:

xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father
that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among
strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the
child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only
later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a
look at her ? just as Julito Apiki said.[120]

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having
been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses
cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other." [121]

Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his
whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.

We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of
the crime.[122]

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was
so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[123]

In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission
of the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by
foot.[125] Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim,
this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast
asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have
merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout.[126]

In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the
appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise
disregarded by this Court in the following manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellant's part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant's sister-
in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant's physical presence in the fishpond at
the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellant's house
where the rape occurred, was a stone's throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that
the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is
unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost
four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting
and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters
away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the
way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to
the fishpond as if he never left.[128] (Emphasis supplied.)

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their
sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human
experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just
behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from
the road near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after
buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle's house. [129] Unfortunately,
the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the
immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.[130]

Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been
at the time and place of the commission of the crime.

All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the
crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131]

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still
under review.[133] (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment,
in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. [134]

We determine discernment in this wise:

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.[135] Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.[136]

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong.[137] Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor's cunning and shrewdness.[138]

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken
her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant's mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action.[139]

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA[140] shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that
she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law
prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old[141] applies.

The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the
imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; [142] and (2) the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing
the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code.[143]

Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of
penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.[145] Consequently, in its appreciation
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one
degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.[146]

We differ.

In a more recent case,[147] the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to
be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.[148] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Civil Liability

We have consistently ruled that:

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[149]

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.[150] The
respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are,
therefore, proper.[151]

Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of exemplary damages
should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the
Period of Suspension of Sentence

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of
conviction is pronounced. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of
Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, [154]
the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,[156]

overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in
conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. [157]

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations[158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this
Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could
be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's]
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)[159]

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in
Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same position.[160]

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no
longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with
the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[161] Section 40[162] of the law and
Section 48[163] of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five
(25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age
limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at
the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that
the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.[164]

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
- A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to
effect appellant's confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AISA MUSA Y PINASILO, ARA
MONONGAN Y PAPAO, FAISAH ABAS Y MAMA, AND MIKE SOLALO Y MLOK, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

This is an appeal seeking to nullify the February 28, 2011 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03758, which affirmed the October 7, 2008 Decision [2] in Criminal
Case No. 13536-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 163 in Taguig City. The RTC
convicted accused-appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling dangerous drugs.

The Facts

An Information charged the accused Aisa Musa y Pinasilo (Musa), Ara Monongan y Papao,
Faisah Abas y Mama (Abas), and Mike Solano y Mlok (Solano) with the following:

That, on or about the 1st day of June, 2004 in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with one another and acting as an organized or syndicated crime group, without
being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell and give
away to one PO1 Rey Memoracion one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
4.05 grams of white crystalline substance, which was found positive for Methamphetamine
hydrochloride also known as “shabu”, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution’s version of facts was anchored heavily on the testimony of Police Officer 1
Rey Memoracion (PO1 Memoracion). From the findings of the trial and appellate courts, We
synthesize his testimony, as follows:

On June 1, 2004, at or about 9:00 p.m., the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operating Task
Force of the Taguig City Police received a report from an informant about the selling of
prohibited drugs by Musa and her cohorts at Maharlika Village, Taguig City. The police
immediately organized a buy-bust operation which included PO1 Danilo Arago (PO1 Arago) and
PO1 Memoracion as team members. The police agreed that PO1 Memoracion was the
designated poseur-buyer; that five one-thousand peso (PhP 1000) bills with Memoracion’s
initials were to be used as marked money; and that Memoracion’s lighting of the cigarette was
the pre-arranged signal to signify the consummation of the transaction. The buy-bust team
submitted a pre-operation report to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and entered it in
the police blotter. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, along with the informant, proceeded to a
nearby shopping mall (Sunshine Mall) where the police had arranged PO1 Memoracion and the
informant to meet with the alleged drug dealers.

The buy-bust team arrived at the mall at around 9:45 p.m. The informant and Memoracion
alighted from the vehicle while the rest of the buy-bust team waited at the parking lot. The
informant then introduced Memoracion, as a potential buyer, to Abas and Solano. PO1
Memoracion then told Abas and Solano that he wanted to score shabu worth five-thousand
pesos (PhP 5,000) but the two replied that they do not have available stocks on hand. Abas and
Solano offered to accompany PO1 Memoracion to Musa who was at a nearby condominium unit
at Building II, Maharlika Village. Memoracion agreed and pretended to go to the comfort room in
order to inform PO1 Arago regarding the change of venue. PO1 Memoracion also changed the
pre-arranged signal from lighting a cigarette to a phone ring or “missed call” and asked the rest
of the buy-bust team to follow them.

Thereafter, the informant, Memoracion, Abas and Solano boarded a tricycle to Musa’s place.
They arrived at the condominium at around 10:30 in the evening and went to the 4th floor of the
building while the rest of the buy-bust team remained at the ground floor while waiting for
Memoracions’s call. The four met Musa at the hallway outside Unit 403. Abas introduced
Memoracion to Musa as the buyer. Musa then ordered Ara Monongan (Monongan) to count the
money. Afterwards, Musa took from her pocket one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet of shabu and
gave it to PO1 Memoracion. The latter immediately made the call to PO1 Arago who, together
with two (2) other police officers,[4] proceeded right away to PO1 Memoracion’s location, which
was about 15 meters away from the ground floor.[5]

Upon seeing accused-appellants, the police officers made the arrest. PO1 Arago confiscated
from Monongan the marked money of five PhP 1000 bills with Memoracion’s initials. PO1
Memoracion, on the other hand, marked the seized sachet of shabu with “APM” or the initials of
accused Aisa Pinasilo Musa. He then delivered the confiscated item to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City and requested an examination of the
substance. The PNP Crime Lab Report showed that the indicated substance weighing 4.05
grams tested positive for shabu.[6]

The prosecution likewise presented PO1 Arago, who stood as PO1 Memoracion’s back-up
during the buy-bust operation,[7] to corroborate the foregoing version of events.

Version of the Defense

In defense, each of accused-appellants denied the accusations against them and submitted
their respective alibis, as follows:

Accused Aiza Musa claimed that on June 1, 2004, she and her husband, Bakar Musa, went to
their friend Sonny Sagayno’s house, located at Unit 512, Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig
City, to discuss [their] forthcoming travel to Saudi Arabia and that while they were inside
Sonny’s house, two police officers barged into the house, while their companions stood outside,
and searched for prohibited drugs, but found no shabu. Aside from saying that Ara [Monongan]
was her neighbor, [she] denied knowing [her] and Faisah [Abas] that well.

Accused Ara Monongan averred that from the morning up to 12:00 noon of June 1, 2004, she
was with her aunt Habiba’s house at Unit 403, Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig City,
washing clothes and looking over her aunt’s children; that at about 12:00 noon of the same day,
a visitor, whose name was Norma, arrived and that at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
Sonny [Sagayno], Faisah [Abas] and the latter’s textmate, Angie, arrived; that at about 3:00 or
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, policemen in civilian clothes barged into the house, searched for
illegal drugs, but found none, and arrested her; that she went to stay in her aunt’s place only for
a vacation; and that it was the first time she saw Faisah and Angie. She testified that Aiza was
her neighbor but disclaimed knowing her; that she was 17 years old at the time of the
complained incident; and that her real name was Ara Nonongan and not Ara Monongan.

Accused Mike Solano alleged that on June 1, 2004 at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, his
cousin Faisah [Abas] requested him to accompany to Sunshine Mall to meet her textmate,
Angie; that while Faisah waited for Angie, Mike went to the 2nd floor of the mall for window
shopping; that Angie arrived together with two pregnant women but left at 12:00 o’clock noon to
go to a condominium in Maharlika Village; that after he and the two pregnant women had eaten
in Jollibee, a big man sat beside him, introduced himself as a policeman and ordered him to
come with him peacefully and to just explain in his office. He claimed not knowing Aiza [Musa]
and Ara [Monongan] and that he saw them for the first time only when they boarded in the same
vehicle.

And, finally, accused Faisah Abas claimed that on that particular day, she and her cousin Mike
[Solano] proceeded to Sunshine Mall to meet Angie; that she accompanied Angie to Building 2
of Maharlika Village where they met Angie’s cousin, Sonny [Sagayno], at the 5th floor and that
they all proceeded to the 4th floor; that when they were inside Sonny’s house, she saw Ara
[Monongan], another female person and three children; that after they had eaten their lunch, she
heard a gunshot and discovered that Sonny was not there anymore; that shortly thereafter,
three persons in civilian clothes barged into the house, introduced themselves as policemen,
poked a gun at her and frightened and handcuffed her; that two of the operatives went inside the
room and ransacked some of Ara’s belongings; that the policemen accused her of selling illegal
drugs; that no shabu was found in her possession.[8]

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found all the accused guilty as charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, accused Aiza Musa y Pinasilo, Faisah Abas y Mama and Mike Solano y Mlok,
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, 1st
paragraph Article II, RA 9165 in relation to Article 62, 2nd paragraph of the Revised Penal Code
and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Ten Million Pesos
(PhP 10, 000, 000.00) and to pay the costs.

Accused Ara Monongan y Papao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of PhP 500, 000.00 and to pay the costs. The period of preventive suspension is
credited in her favor.[9]

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO1 Memoracion. It found his testimony as “candid,
straightforward, firm, unwavering, nay credible,” since it was not shown that PO1 Memoracion
was “ill-motivated in testifying as he did in Court against all accused.”[10] On the other hand, the
RTC rejected accused-appellants’ defenses of alibi and denial because they failed to present
clear and convincing evidence to establish that it was impossible for them to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the buy-bust operation.[11]

As regards the penalty imposed, the RTC declared each of the accused liable as principal
because it found the presence of conspiracy among all four accused.[12] Citing Article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code,[13] it likewise imposed the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of PhP 10 million because of its finding that the offense was committed by an
organized/syndicated crime group. However, it reduced the penalty imposed against Monongan
because she was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, all of the accused assailed their conviction and faulted the RTC in finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the sale of dangerous drugs. In their Brief, accused-appellants
raised doubts on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and questioned
the ruling of RTC for rejecting their alibis. They also averred that the prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti of the offense and that the chain of custody rule under RA 9165 was
not complied with since no physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in
their presence or in the presence of their counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice and an elective official. Furthermore, they refuted the findings of the RTC
that conspiracy existed among them, and that they were members of an organized/ syndicated
crime group.[14]

Notwithstanding, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the penalty imposed on
Monongan, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 7, 2008 of the trial is affirmed, with
modification that the penalty meted upon accused-appellant Ara Monongan is life imprisonment
and fine of P10,000,000, but the case is hereby remanded to trial court for appropriate
disposition under Section 51, RA No. 9344 with respect to said accused – appellant.

The Decision is affirmed in all other respects.[15]

The CA ruled that the RTC erred in reducing the penalty of reclusion temporal in favor of
Monongan. It reasoned that the penalty of life imprisonment as provided in RA 9165 cannot be
lowered because only the penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code, and not in special
laws, may be lowered by one or two degrees.[16]

The Issues

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses?

II

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the ruling of the RTC in rejecting accused-
appellants denials and alibis?

III

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was compliance with the chain of
custody rule as required by RA 9165?

IV

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in imposing the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of ten million pesos (Php 10,000,000) against ALL of the accused?

The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the conviction of accused-appellants.

In determining the guilt of the accused for the sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution is
obliged to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. There must be proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and that the
corpus delicti be presented in court as evidence.[17]

In finding the existence of these elements, the trial and appellate courts in the present case
upheld the credibility of the testimony of PO1 Memoracion, as supported by the testimony of
PO1 Arago. In this regard, We find no sufficient reason to interfere with the findings of the RTC
on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses pursuant to the principle that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight and sometimes, even with
finality.[18] Where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some
material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s
assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better
position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. [19] The rationale behind this
principle was explained by the Court in People v. Dinglasan,[20] to wit:

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that
the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better
position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them
when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is
doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court
is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to
observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This
assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was
reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or
value that if considered might affect the result of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC are strengthened by an affirmatory ruling of the CA.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court
are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.[21] Absent any indication that the courts a quo
committed misinterpretation of antecedents or grave abuse of discretion, the facts as
established by the trial and appellate courts deserve full weight and credit, and are deemed
conclusive.[22]

As regards accused-appellants’ denial and claim of frame-up, the trial and appellate courts
correctly ruled that these defenses cannot stand unless the defense could show with clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired with ill motives or that
they were not properly performing their duties. The defenses of denial and frame-up are
invariably viewed with disfavor because such defenses can easily be fabricated and are
common ploy in prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.[23] Here, in
the absence of evidence showing ill motives on the part of the members of the buy-bust team,
accused-appellants’ denials and plea of frame-up deserve scant consideration in light of the
positive identification made by PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago.

Similarly, accused-appellants’ alibis failed to fortify their claim of innocence because, while they
insist on their own version of events, they failed to demonstrate compliance with the requisites
of the defense of alibi. In People v. Apattad,[24] the Court reiterated the jurisprudential rules and
precepts in assessing the defense of alibi:

One, alibis and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for
alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the
crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when
it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact
that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court — unless
patently and clearly inconsistent — must be accepted.

It is clear, therefore, that in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused should
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she was somewhere else when the
buy-bust operation was conducted, and that it was physically impossible for him or her to be
present at the scene of the crime either before, during, or after the offense was
committed.[25] It is on this thrust that the alibis made by accused-appellants failed to convince
since all of them admitted that they were within the vicinity of Building 2, Maharlika Village,
Taguig City, which, apparently, was the locus criminis of the offense. Furthermore, considering
that alibi as evidence is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. [26]

Anent the third issue, accused-appellants demand their acquittal on the ground that the chain of
custody rule under Section 21 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
was not complied with. The said section states:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

Corollarily, the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis
supplied.)

At this juncture, We reiterate that the essence of the chain of custody rule is to ensure that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same dangerous
drug recovered from his or her possession.[27] As explained in Castro v. People:[28]

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation
and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent clams it to be. This requirement is
essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts
regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking
of the movements and custody of the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the
police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its presentation in evidence in
court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about every link in the chain or
movements of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence.
It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is almost
always impossible to obtain. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since the “perfect chain” is almost always impossible to obtain, non-compliance with Sec. 21 of
RA 9165, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, does not, without more,
automatically render the seizure of the dangerous drug void, and evidence is admissible as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team.[29]

In the present case, accused-appellants insist on the police officer’s non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule since there was “no physical inventory and photograph of the seized items
were taken in their presence or in the presence of their counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice and an elective official.”

We, however, find these observations insignificant since a review of the evidence on record
shows that the chain of custody rule has been sufficiently observed by the apprehending
officers. Thru the testimonies of the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago, the prosecution was able
to prove that the shabu seized from Musa was the very same shabu presented in evidence as
part of the corpus delicti. The factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are
elucidating:

Here, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution showed that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the “shabu” was preserved. Contrary to the accused-appellants
allegations, the shabu specimen presented in court by the prosecution was the same item
received from accused-appellant Aiza Musa by PO1 Memoracion. The buy-bust operation
was conducted about 10:30 in the evening of June 1, 2004. Immediately thereafter, PO1
Memoracion marked the seized sachet of shabu with his initials “APM” at the masking
tape, and the accused-appellants were turned over to the police station for investigation.
At 1:55H of June 2, 2004, PO1 Memoracion delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
SPD Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, a Request for Laboratory Examination dated June 2, 2004,
together with the sachet of shabu seized form accused-appellant Aiza Musa. Stamped on
the right portion of the Request for Examination shows the time and date of delivery at “01:55H
02 June 04”, “RECEIVED BY: Nup Bacayan” and “DELIVERED BY: PO1 Memoracion.” Thus:
e) Evidence Submitted

One (1) transparent plastic sachet (heat sealed) containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu marked “APM”. (item purchased
from Aiza Musa)

At 0300H 02 June 2004, the PNP Crime Laboratory Southern Police District Crime Laboratory,
Fort A. Bonifacio, Taguig Metro Manila issued Physical Science Report No. D-439-04S
stating that the heat salad plastic sachet with markings “APM” containing 4.05 grams of
crystalline substance yielded positive for shabu.

Also it bears stressing that during the hearing on May 28, 2007, accused-appellants, thru their
counsel, stipulated on the testimony of the forensic chemist, Police Inspector Richard
Allan Manganib, with respect to his forensic examination of the subject sachet of shabu.
Clearly, the integrity of the sachet of “shabu” was duly preserved as it was duly marked
by PO1 Rey Memoracion and it was the very same item transmitted to and examined by
the PNP Crime Laboratory.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is likewise significant to note that a similar conclusion was reached in People v. Presas[31]
where the Court disposed, as follows:

In this case, the failure on the part of the MADAC operatives to take photographs and
make an inventory of the drugs seized from the appellant was not fatal because the
prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said illegal
drugs. The concurrence of all elements of the illegal sale of shabu was proven by the
prosecution. The chain of custody did not appear to be broken. The recovery and handling of
the seized drugs were satisfactorily established. Fariñas was able to put the necessary
markings on the plastic sachet of shabu bought from appellant immediately after the
consummation of the drug sale. This was done in the presence of appellant and the other
operatives, and while in the crime scene. The seized items were then brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination on the same day. Both prosecution witnesses were
able to identify and explain said markings in court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the fact that the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago did not make an inventory of the
seized items or that they did not take photographs of them is not fatal considering that the
prosecution in this case was able to establish, with moral certainty, that the identity, integrity,
and evidentiary value of the shabu was not jeopardized from the time of its seizure until the time
it was presented in court.

Furthermore, We find enlightenment in People v. Vicente, Jr.:[32]

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Oft-repeated is the rule that in cases
involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Absent any
indication that the police officers were ill-motivated in testifying against the accused, full
credence should be given to their testimonies.[33] (Emphasis supplied.)

As stated, the records are bereft of any showing that PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago were ill
motivated in testifying against accused-appellants. Neither was there any indication that they
were in bad faith nor had digressed from their ordinary tour of duty. There is, therefore, no
cogent basis to taint their testimonies with disbelief. Hence, We submit to the presumption that
both of them and the other police officers involved in the buy-bust operation had performed
faithfully the matters with which they are charged, and that they acted within the sphere of their
authority. Omnia praesumumtur rite esse acta (All things are presumed to have been done
regularly).

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the
RTC and CA in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating of Sec. 5,
RA 9165 for selling dangerous drugs.

Notwithstanding, We rule that the penalty imposed against the accused-appellants must be
modified.

With reference to accused-appellant Monongan, the RTC found her to be a minor or 17 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense.[34] Accordingly, it imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[35] On appeal,
the CA increased the penalty of Monongan to life imprisonment.[36]

However, We find these impositions contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. In the recent People v.
Mantalaba,[37] where the accused was likewise 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, the Court held, inter alia, that: (a) pursuant to Sec. 98 of RA 9165, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to
death when the offender is a minor; and (b) that the penalty should be graduated since the said
provision adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal
Code.[38] The Court in the said case established the rules as follows:

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in

fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules
stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua,
which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.
The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an
indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a
divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Therefore, the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Monongan should mirror the ruling of
the Court in Mantalaba in the absence of any mitigating circumstance or aggravating
circumstance other than the minority of Monongan. Consequently, the penalty of imprisonment
imposed on Monongan should be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As regards the fine imposed, the RTC sentenced accused-appellants the maximum fine of PhP
10 million on the ground that accused-appellants sold shabu as members of an organized crime
group[39] or a drug syndicate. It ruled that Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Sec. 23 of RA 7659, mandates that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. [40] These
findings were eventually affirmed by CA.[41]

The records, however, are bereft of any proof that accused-appellants operated as members of
a drug syndicate. By definition, a drug syndicate is any organized group of two (2) or more
persons forming or joining together with the intention of committing any offense prescribed
under RA 9165.[42] In determining whether or not the offense was committed by any person
belonging to an organized/syndicated crime group, We are guided by the ruling in People v.
Alberca[43] where the Court, after scrutinizing the deliberations held by Congress on what is now
Art. 62, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, held:

We hold that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant and his companions
constituted a syndicated or an organized crime group within the meaning of Article 62, as
amended. While it is true they confederated and mutually helped one another for the
purpose of gain, there is no proof that they were a group organized for the general
purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or
organized crime group.

xxxx
What emerges from this discussion is the idea of a group of persons; at least two in number,
which is organized for the purpose of committing crimes for gain.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Applying this principle in Alberca, the Court held in People v. Santiago:[44]

Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7659,
mandates that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. The same article defines an
organized/syndicated crime group as a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating, or mutually helping one another for the purposes of gain in the commission of
any crime.

xxxx

While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was duly
established, there was no proof that appellants were a group organized for the general
purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of the aggravating
circumstance of organized/syndicated group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)

We find the present case similar to Santiago. The existence of conspiracy among accused-
appellants in selling shabu was duly established, but the prosecution failed to provide proof that
they operated as an organized group or as a drug syndicate. Consequently, the aggravating
circumstance that “the offense was committed by an organized/syndicated group” cannot be
appreciated. Thus, the maximum PhP 10 million imposed by the trial and appellate courts upon
each of accused-appellants should be modified accordingly.

This is in consonance with the dictum in Criminal Law that the existence of aggravating
circumstances must be based on positive and conclusive proof, and not merely on hypothetical
facts no matter how truthful the suppositions and presumptions may seem. [45] Aggravating
circumstances which are taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the
penalty imposed must be proved with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as
criminal offense.[46]

Incidentally, a survey of recent jurisprudence[47] shows that the Court has consistently imposed
a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (PhP 500,000) for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165 in
the absence of any aggravating circumstance.

WHEREFORE, the February 28, 2011 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03758 finding
accused-appellants guilty of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) accused-appellant Ara Monongan y Papao is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; and (b) each of the accused-appellants shall pay a fine in the amount of five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP 500,000).

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will
ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, [1] and to apply the
principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict
with the law.[2] The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the
penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

Antecedents

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide
under the following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon,
Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a
knife , inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly causing his death, per
Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the
damage and prejudice of the deceased's heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

Acts Contrary to Law.[3]

The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows:

Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he,
together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching
the graduation ceremony of the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason
Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed
the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the victim, this
witness demonstrated that with the appellant's left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant
stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.

He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the
hospital.

Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito's companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the
testimony of Dequito on all material points.

Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the
[elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son
stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later,
however, when her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her
son's stab wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but died the
day after.

She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police authorities. She,
likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.

Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated
by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further,
stated that the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

He testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon
High School campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking
towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of
four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He
was not able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after
leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who
ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked
why he was in possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend,
Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He went home after the incident.

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay
hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the
person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it. [4]

Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and
funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[5]

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified the
penalty and the civil liability through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006, [6] disposing
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six years
of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as
maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount
of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php
16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the
victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on
December 7, 2006, decreeing as follows:[7]

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision
promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED
such that the judgment shall now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prison
correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount
of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php
16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the
victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for
appropriate action on the application for probation of, herein, appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing
the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to
the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the
lower courts as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1)
whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration
the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation
and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the
penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other
international agreements.

Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime,
being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30,
2000,[8] such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to
prision mayor.[9]

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional
(i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence,
prision mayor in its medium period - eight years and one day to 10 years -was proper because
there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years
and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to
enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.

The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic
Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal
penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC[10] (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding
principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is
that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the
personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.[11] Consistent with this principle, the
amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for
homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere
allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even
for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,[12] which disqualifies from probation
an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the
petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to
remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child
in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the
child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer
legally feasible or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a
child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international
agreements.

A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of
children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act
No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized,
subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for
the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the
letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the
petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements[13] supports the course of action taken herein. The
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines),[14] the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency
(Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Liberty[15] are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided
it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve
his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child's
best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the
order to remand the judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of
Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or
other training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.