2.

Territorial
Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of RPC, hence an exception to
the rule of territoriality in criminal law. Also, regardless of the law
EXCEPTIONS penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the world.

i. RA 9851 2. People v. Wong Cheng (1922)

FACTS:
ii. VFA, Article V
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal
iii. PD 1599 that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First
Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused
of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
VESSELS/PLANES English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two
a. English Rule v. French Rule and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the
1. People v. Tulin (2001) defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said
crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.
FACTS:
MT Tabangao while sailing off the coast of Mindoro was ISSUE:
suddenly boarded by fully-armed pirates, detained the crew and took Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime
complete control of the vessel. It travelled to Singapore and went back to committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
Batangas where it stayed at sea then eventually released the members of waters.
the crew. DECISION:

ISSUE:
Whether trial court has jurisdiction over the accused since the
crime was committed outside Philippine waters
DECISION:
Yes. The attack on and seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was
later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was offloaded,
transferred and sold. Although PD 532 requires that the attack and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo can be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed
part of the act of piracy, hence the same need not be committed in
Philippine waters.
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters
thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said
offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our
territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a
breach of the public order because it causes such drugs to produce
pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is
revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
3. People v. Elkanish (1951)
FACTS:
The defendant was a member of the crew of the S.S. Washington Mail of
American Registry on which 65 large boxes of blasting caps were found
and seized by the authorities while anchored in the port of Manila.
Two separate information were filed against him one on illegal
importation of the articles under section 2702 of the Revised
Administrative Code and the other illegal possession of the same articles
under section 1 of Act 3023.
The accused through the arraignment and entered the plea of not guilty
to quash the information of illegal possession on the ground that the
blasting caps are not lawful objects of commerce and prosecution for
importation is barred by the prosecution for illegal possession.
With the reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps,
the argument is inherent as to make the issues identical. The owner of
the merchandise at the time it enter the Philippine water is its importer
and possessor, while it is in transit does not incur criminal liability.
ISSUE:
Whether Or Not, The accused will be held liable on two identical charges?
HELD:
No, The importation and possession represents only one criminal intent,
one violation. Importation and possession played same auxiliary role
with reference to the object pursued. The Philippine Bill embodying the
principle that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of
the same offense in accordance with its letter and spirit.
4. People v. Lol-lo
FACTS:
Lol-lo and Saraw, Moros, took for themselves all of the cargo of the Dutch
boat, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women.
They were then arrested and were charged with the crime of piracy.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the case is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
HELD:
Yes. The respondents are found guilty of the crime of piracy.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction
of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
The provisions of the Penal Code are still in force in the Philippines. Spain
is mentioned in the Penal Code. Whenever “Spaniards” are mentioned,
the word should be substituted by the expression “citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands.”
5. Bayan v. Zamora supra
6. US v. Bull
Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of
animals named Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of
Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa
carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most
of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275
of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot
be filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where the
animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about
ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on
board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which
embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial
waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime
committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the
Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the
illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed
when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high
seas,
PROSPECTIVE
A. EFFECTS OF REPEAL
7. US v. Soliman
Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case
in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely
to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn
statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which
was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been
executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the
police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture.
The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on the
ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however,
guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697.
However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of
Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the
Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been
suggested that the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused
under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and the
repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and
extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the
provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the
Administrative Code.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new
and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury.
Held:
The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law,
not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases
the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language
of the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the
express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the
Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal
Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly
but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.
The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in
Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below
must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be
imposed.
8. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The residents of Kalookan City, charged respondent Macario Asistio, Jr.,
who is the incumbent Mayor, with having violated the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), alleged that during his incumbency
Asistio acquired wealth, or a total of P17,264,722.90, which he deposited
in his personal account. However, in his Sworn Statements of Assets and
Liabilities for the period ending December 31, 1982 and December 31,
1984, said respondent had a total income of only P234,128.68 and
P255,324.02, respectively. The Ombudsman, indorsed the above case to
the Solicitor General for appropriate action, based on the provision of
Section 2, Republic Act 1379.
On April 28, 1989, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the aforesaid
recommendation of the Ombudsman, filed a Petition for Forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition for forfeiture and in ruling that it
is the Ombudsman who has the authority to file the same before the
court.
Issue:
WON the Solicitor General has the authority to file the petition for
forfeiture.
Held:
Yes, Solicitor General has the authority to file the petition for forfeiture.
It is a respected rule of statutory construction that "where a law which
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself
repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. “Hence, the repeal
of Presidential Decree No. 1486 necessarily revived the authority of the
Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1379.
The provision of Republic Act No. 1379 authorizing the Solicitor General
to file the petition for forfeiture, being a special and specific provision,
should prevail over Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and 1861.
9. US v. Cuna
FACTS:
Cuna, with a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine
Commission, committed of selling, opium to Apolinanaria Gumpal. He
was charged in violation of Sec. 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine
Commission known as the OPIUM LAW was in force, and continued to be
in force until the 17th day of October, 1907 and superseded by a new Act,
No. 176.
Cuna demurred on the ground that the said act was repealed by Act no.
1761 on October 10, 1907 and because having repealed during the
pendency of the case with no exception regarding the pendency, there
was no law in force thus no jurisdiction of any courts.
ISSUE:
Whether Cuna, who committed the crime before the repeal,
should be convicted.
HELD:
The trial court cited the American and English common-law
doctrine in their decision. The Supreme Court (SC), although they
consider it right, said that those laws were not in force in the country.
The SC said that no retroactive effect of the law shall take effect
except when the punishment will be more favorable to the accused.
Being that the new law penalized the same act in the repealed law, there
is no retroactivity. The old law should still be prescribed. The SC decided
that the Courts have jurisdiction over the case. The decision of the trial
court was reversed.
10. People v. Tamayo
FACTS:
Crisanto Tamayo was convicted for the violation of Sec 2,
municipal ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Ilocos Sur. The
conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. While his appeal was
pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 of municipal
ordinance no. 5. Such repeal provides that the act complained of is now
legal in that municipality.
ISSUE:
WON the subsequent repeal of municipal ordinance no. 5 would
destroy criminal liability
HELD:
Yes. The repeal of Sec. 2 of Municipal Ordinance no. 5 was
absolute and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. The legislative
intent as shown by the action of the municipal council is that such
conduct, formerly denounced, is no longer deemed criminal.
HABITUAL DELIQUENT
11. People v. Lacson
FACTS:
Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the
resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual
issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the
dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the
respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing
of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the
respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases
when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to
determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases
DECISION:
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions
for its applicability, namely:
1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of
them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3)court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal,
which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been
done.
The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements,
through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor
did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent
dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules
may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes
should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State
since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the
New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1
year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had
no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized
for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is
not to be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in
the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should
not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application
of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so
would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the
administration of justice.
12. Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
FACTS
Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under Art.
134 of the Revised Penal Code. Their offense was complexed with
multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become final and
executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the
Supreme Court. The Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder
cannot be complexed with rebellion because murder, a regular crime, is
necessarily absorbed by rebellion. Hence, without such complexion, the
penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon asserted that
a non-application of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of
a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. Gumabon
et al, nonetheless, were convicted by Court of First Instance but they
were convicted for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and
others were convicted – (The law under which they [Gumabon et al]
were convicted is the very same law under which the latter [Hernandez
et al] were convicted.) It had not and has not been changed. For the same
crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience,
allow Gumabon et al to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer
only prision mayor?
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition of Gumabon for habeas corpus be granted
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after
the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others
similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war
with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would
render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical
offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one
being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly
sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different
penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment,
then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people similarly
situated were not similarly dealt with.
13. People v. Pimentel
FACTS:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
Subversion under Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as
amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), a
warrant of arrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but it remained unserved
as he could not be found. June 5, 1990, seven years after, Antonio Tujan
was arrested on the basis of the previous warrant and upon arrest a 0.38
caliber revolver was found in his possession. Consequently, on June 14,
1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch
148).
Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under PD No.1866 on
the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted
for Subversion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge against Antonio under PD 1866 be
quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge
under RA 1700?
HELD:
No. Under Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised
Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal,
conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this
case, first case was not even arraigned yet. They are different offenses.
R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal
possession of firearms.
However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and
since this is favorable to the accused who was not a habitual delinquent,
we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise
this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of
firearms without furtherance of subversion
Hence, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 1991,
including the orders dated October 12, 1990 and December 28, 1990 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), National Capital Region
are reversed and set aside.
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A.
Tujan in Criminal of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is
dismissed.
The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion against the same accused
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, is amended to
Simple Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
14. Bernardo v. Balagot
Facts:
Pablo Bernardo was convicted of estafa in the MTC of San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija. He appealed to the RTC of Nueva Ecija, which affirmed
the decision with modifications. Petition for review with the Court
of Appeals sustained the latter.
On January 17, 1986, Bernardo filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, but this was not granted. He then filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court on November 16, 1986, which were
also denied.
On February 3, 1986, while his motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration was pending in the CA, Bernardo filed an
application for probation. On October 11, 1987, however, Municipal
Judge Francisco R. Andres denied it. The denial was based on Section
4 of P.D. 968 as amended by P.D. 1990, prohibiting the grant of
probation to an applicant who has appealed his conviction, and on
Bernardo's unsatisfactory conduct.
The petitioner contends that this last amendment cannot apply to
him because at the time of his conviction in 1984, he could appeal
without forfeiting his right to apply for probation. As he had no fore-
knowledge that P.D. 968 would be amended, he should not now be
prejudiced for having sought, before such amendment, a reversal of
his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Bernardo is entitled to apply for probation.
DECISION:
No. P.D. 1990 took effect on January 15, 1986 while the petitioner's
application for probation was filed on February 3, 1986, after P.D.
1990 had already become effective. Consequently, the petitioner
cannot invoke the original Section 4 of P.D. 968, as he is not among
"those who have already filed their respective applications for
probation at the time of the effectivity of P.D. 1990."
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests upon the discretion
of the court. Even if a convicted person is not included in the list of
offenders disqualified from the benefits of the decree, the grant of
probation is nevertheless not automatic or ministerial. The court
should, before granting probation, consider the potentiality of the
offender to reform, together with the demands of justice and public
interest, along with other relevant circumstances. Here, as the
municipal judge noted, the petitioner represented that he had earlier
filed his application for probation when he had not done so in fact. It
remains to observe that the favorable recommendation of the
probation officer is at best merely persuasive upon the courts in the
consideration of the application for probation. Both the law and
jurisprudence are clear on this point. The Supreme Court ruled that
the policy of liberality he invokes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law, which clearly call for the denial of
his application.
15. People v. Venus
FACTS:
On March 16, 1936, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila
filed with the Court of First Instance of that city an information
charging the defendant, Bienvenido Venus, with the crime of
robbery in an inhabited house. The information alleges that on or
about the 9th day of March, 1936, Venus entered the house then
occupied by Zoila de Talaban at 1328 M. Natividad Street, Manila,
Philippines, with the intent of gain and without the consent of the
owner, various personal properties belonging to Zoila de Talaban of
the total value of one hundred and eighty-eight and fifty centavos.
Moreover, in the same information, it further alleges "that the said
accused is a habitual delinquent, having previously been convicted
by final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for the crime
of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the
date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934."
 crimes, (2) of the last conviction or release, and (3) of the other
Venus pleaded guilty to the information whereupon the trial court previous convictions or release of the accused. Informations filed in
rendered judgment imposing upon him an indeterminate prison these cases should be sufficiently clear and specific to avoid the
sentence ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to improper imposition of the additional penalty on a plea of guilty to
three years, three months and twenty-one days of prision a general allegation of habitual delinquency, no less than the
correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to frequency with which hardened criminals escape the imposition of
indemnify the complaint Zoila de Talaban in the amount of P97.50, the deserved additional penalty.
which represents the value of the personal properties not recovered
from the accused, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of Hence, the Court ruled that Venus cannot be considered as a habitual
insolvency, and to pay the costs, The articles recovered from the deliquent but only a recidivist.
accused were ordered returned to the complainant.
The trial court, in imposing the prison sentence upon the Venus, took
into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism because the
date of the conviction of the accused for the crime of theft is specified
in the information, but it refused to consider Venus a habitual
delinquent under the provisions of article 62 of the Revised Penal
Code for the

"That the said accused is a habitual delinquent, he having previously

been convicted by final judgment rendered by a competent court,
once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and
once for theft , the date of his last conviction being November 14,
1934"

ISSUE:
WON Venus can be considered as an habitual deliquent

RULING:
The Court ruled that the circumstance of multirecidivism, known in
our law as habitual delinquency, can not be taken into account in the
present case because of the insufficiency of the allegation on this
point in the city fiscal's information. In order that former convictions
may constitute an element of habitual delinquency, they must
precede the commission of the crime charged.

It is therefore urged upon prosecuting attorneys that in the

prosecution of cases of this nature, they should not content
themselves with a general averment of habitual delinquency but
should specify the dates (1) of the commission of the previous