A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-
1. Verba Legis
a. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, (D)
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President
of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder.
October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President
Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada.
October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed
a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification
against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the
theory that "Former President Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."
ISSUE:
Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as
a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of
the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. It is well-entrenched that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute
there should be no departure. It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon
at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
b. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, (G)
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013
FACTS:
August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial
Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was included in TIDCORP’s
Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to the CSC –
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office.
September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s appointment because
the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBM’s Index of
Occupational Service.
TIDCORP’s Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De
Guzman’s appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to Tambanillo,
Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its Board of Directors to
create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its own compensation
and position classification system and qualification standards.
CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo’s appeal because De Guzman’s appointment
failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, which requires
that the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved
Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the position
of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service, de
Guzman’s appointment to this position must be invalid.
TIDCORP’s President and CEO Joel C.
David a Letter appealing Director Padilla’s decision to the CSC-Central Office (CO). Valdes
reiterated TIDCORP’s argument that RA 8494 authorized its Board of Directors to determine its
own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all existing laws
on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision that de Guzman’s
appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring that the position title
indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List and found in the
Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing
De Guzman’s appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director Bugtong was simply following the letter
of the law.
TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-CO’s decision, but this motion was denied, prompting
TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition asserted that the CSC-
CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No.
031037.
CA denied TIDCORP’s petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution No. 30144
and Resolution No. 31037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari was an improper
recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the procedural defect, ruling that the assailed
resolutions should still stand as they are consistent with law and jurisprudence.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, TIDCORP argued that the CSC’s interpretation of
RA 8494 is misplaced
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to the
Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position classification.
HELD:
No, under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and "to make an
effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. The use of "to
endeavour" in the context of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP’s exemption from laws
involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still strive to
conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as
closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavour to conform," recognizes that
the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position Classification Act, but it should still try to
hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP
to fully, exactly and strictly comply with the Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in
unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to conform to the
principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
2. Dura lex sed lex
a. OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, (A w/ Mod)
G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in
violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code.
June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, the
accused, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14
 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal
document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities.
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the PNP in Maasin, Southern Leyte,
testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas,
SPO3 Melquiades Talisic and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit to the house of petitioner to verify the report of
Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the necessary documents. They were not
armed with a search warrant on that day.They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties
lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner.
September 5, 1997, the RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the offense
charged and sentencing him.
August 23 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the
lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was legal.
HELD:
Yes, even without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut,
gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of the Forestry Code.
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police
officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership
of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and
that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession
of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The
law may be harsh but that is the law.
On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it necessary to discuss the matter. Violation
of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
b. ARNEL SAGANA v. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, (G)
G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009
FACTS:
December 13, 1994, petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled to Branch 99. Petitioner alleged that on 20 November 1992,
respondent Richard A. Francisco, with intent to kill and without justifiable reason, shot him with a
gun hitting him on the right thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred medical expenses and suffered
wounded feelings, and was compelled to engage the services of a lawyer, due to respondent’s
refusal to pay said expenses. Petitioner thus demanded payment of P300,000.00 as actual
damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00, exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
January 31, 1995, process server Manuel S. Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at
respondent’s address at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful. In his
Server’s Return, Panlasigui stated that he tried to personally serve the summons to respondent at
his given address. However, the occupant of that house told him that respondent is unknown at said
address. Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted to serve the summons but these
proved to be futile. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office
through registered mail. However, despite three notices, respondent failed to pick up the summons.
August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar again tried to serve the summons at the address
of the respondent but no avail. According to Iconar’s handwritten notation on the summons, he was
informed by Michael Francisco, respondent’s brother, that respondent no longer lived at said
address. However, he left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.
November 10, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that
despite service of summons, respondent still failed to file an Answer.
February 16, 1996, the trial court issued an Order finding that the summons was validly served
to respondent through his brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and allowed
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents
were furnished to respondent.
March 1, 1996, Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a
Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he was authorized to
receive summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply
with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
October 4, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and
Motion for lack of merit. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and hereby orders
defendant to pay plaintiff.
November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he
received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 9 November 1999; that the same was contrary to
the law, facts, and evidence, and praying that his appeal be given due course.
August 13, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed Decision granting the appeal
and setting aside the Decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that the service of summons
was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. Since it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, the trial court’s decision was void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons upon the respondent.
HELD:
Yes, there was a valid service of summons upon the respondent. The purpose of summons is
two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that
an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim
against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that respondent was duly apprised of the
action against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since respondent refused to disclose his true address, it was impossible to personally
serve summons upon him. Considering that respondent could not have received summons because
of his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an explanation of his purported "new" residence, he
must now bear the consequences.
It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether
surprising that two competing values are usually discernable in every controversy – the principle
of dura lex sed lex versus the notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice.
In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges often struggle to find a balance between due process
considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just disposition of every action.
B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
1. Statutes must be capable of interpretation
a. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, (G)
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing
Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature
form, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own
expense and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it
is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes
of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
 omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law.
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein
that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose
amendments to the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
HELD:
No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution"
therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded
the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike
in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement
of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and
for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
2. Ratio legis est anima
a. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, (D)
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
FACTS:
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for
being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del
Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area
of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant
case.
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that
the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution
of this case.
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment.
They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet
existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the
proceedings in this case.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this
case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010..
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD:
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-
IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into
that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A.
No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00
for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence
as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming
a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as
if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
b. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their
desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in
the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court
adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings
in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-
list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them
from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being
obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
3. Literal import must yield to intent
a. AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. LINGAD, (D)
G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969
FACTS:
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad and the then
Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being named as respondents, appellant
Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged that it was duly incorporated on
January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation, its employees were paid on a daily and
monthly basis.
April 21, 1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents construed its
provision "in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all the monthly paid
employees of the petitioner to a minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to them is the
applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees.
Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of respondents
requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for employees paid on a monthly basis in
this wise: The petitioner believes that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly that portion prohibiting
the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum wage established in the Act
only refers and applies to employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment Act and that
the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as envisioned in Sec 19 should not be
applied prospectively to employers coming into existence subsequent to the effective date of said
Act.
The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that 'Any
provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent with any
provision of this Act is hereby repealed.' Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A.
No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No. 602
not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and impliedly re-enacted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court decided the matter correctly.
HELD:
Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly. Even if the plain legislative purpose so evident
on the face of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what the Constitution enjoins, still there
is no escape from an equally authoritative principle of statutory construction that bars acceptance
on what appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable interpretation. "It is fundamental
that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the
judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice
between conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with
its purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there was a
caveat against a construction that would tend 'to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.'
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then there would be a
negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law. That would
be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its policy. It must be rejected.
b. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO, (A)
15 Phil. 85 (1910)

FACTS:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao,
without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter
of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the
municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition
nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that
municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in section 30
and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse.
HELD:
No, The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft
and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed,
or stolen. If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the
appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and
record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in
large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally
would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30
and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
c. SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, (G)
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009
FACTS:
February 3 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation),
a family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a
letter to the corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) statingthat Felicidad Chan Sy did not make
cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus
the total bank remittances for the past years were less than reflected in the corporate financial
statements, accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any
responsibility over all corporate funds.
April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the accounting firm attributed to the
Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002.
April 15, 2003, a demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same date,
the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and other
important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and ceased
reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery
against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.
July 1, 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for
Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete
and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and
for the restitution of the said amount.The complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on
the ground of lack of authority.
September 9, 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party
Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy
Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate
funds.
October 8, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and
forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.
January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were
not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which resulted in their
having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus,
they instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.61The
appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
ISSUE:
Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules.
HELD:
No, the third-party complaint should be allowed. For while a third-party complaint is not
included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict
may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved
and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be
read with reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered
from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular
terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a reason for
expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the
entire act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and
operative to the widest possible extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law
determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according
to its spirit and intent
d. CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, (D)
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971
FACTS:
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time
before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand.
November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute
ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation
made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid
article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because
such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962,
noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965.
 The lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation
under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February
20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were
not spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the
deed of donation had been executed."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property
HELD:
Yes, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes
does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the
death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.
It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for
a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted
notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of
being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not
be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written,
this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective.
e. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v.
SEC. ANGELO REYES, (G)
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
FACTS:
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-
channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine
the area's underwater composition.
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
(IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application
for an ECC.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town
in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated
December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing
SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law
prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction.
HELD:
No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote
the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government
and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and
the revenues to the Philippine Government.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972,
before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should
be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service
contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
4. Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex
a. B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991
FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office
Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.
January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the
petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements
of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled
hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to
grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary Dismissal.
February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit
their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under
P.D. No.39.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge
was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge.
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the
state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39
ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the
withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result,
 the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.
5. Supplying legislative omission
a. CARROLL H. LAMB v. W.H. PHIPPS,
G.R. No. L-7806, July 12, 1912
FACTS:
Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due
to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and
Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his clearance certificate (showing that Lamb
has accounted for all property and funds under his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to
leave the Philippines without incurring criminal liability.
Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled his
accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit against
the government. However the records also show that Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging
payment from the government.
The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred
to by the auditor because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action.
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the SC
decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of
clearance of Lamb.
HELD:
No, the certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there is no
averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of government property and
funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded officer.
We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this court
in mandamus to the cases where there was no other adequate and speedy remedy in the
ordinary courts of law. It is our duty, therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction; such as
will effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion.
Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute unmeaning or
nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be
corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is obvious, and
the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole enactment.
It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere paper
accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government employees and to
issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so
desires and if he has any doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination
of the funds and property represented by such paper accounts or balances.
b. GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA,
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996
FACTS:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to
Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160).
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government
Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the authority and power to appoint
Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8,
1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the
other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.
June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo
warranto and prohibition.
July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent
Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.
ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas
where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent
Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is
entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by
member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial
governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,
respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and
not the provincial governor who appointed him.
6. Construction as to avoid absurdity
a. REYNALDO O. MALONZO v. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
G.R. No. 137718, July 27, 1999
b. PARAS v. COMELEC, (D)
G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,
well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall
election in view of petitioner's opposition.
December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order.
After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt
for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January
13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
 election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall election is valid.
HELD:
No, the recall is not valid. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election
once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is,
during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the
phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a
too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit
that vivifieth. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
7. Construction in favor of right and justice
a. KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
FACTS:
Karen E. Salvacion, herein petitioner, then 12 years old, was coaxed and lured by private
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott to go with him in his apartment, where she was detained for
four days from February 4 to 7, 1989; and was raped 10 times (once on February 4 and 3 times a
day from February 5-7). Aside from the criminal case for serious illegal detention and 4 counts of
rape filed by the Makati investigating fiscal, the petitioner along with her parents, file in Regional
Trial Court (RTC) a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment against Bartelli, which the
court then granted.
A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation, where the dollar account of
the private respondent was deposited, by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. But respondent bank
invoking Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it and later on
invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body. In a letter in
response to the inquiry of the counsel of petitioners to Central Bank, it is stated that the provision
in Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 is absolute in application and that it does not admit
of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
March 29, 1990, after hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners, Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit.
ISSUES:
Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in China Bank Corporation be exempted from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body
HELD:
No, the provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are hereby held to be inapplicable to
this case because of its peculiar circumstances and the Court requires respondents to comply with
the writ to execution and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would justify the judgment. In fine, the application of the law depends
on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of CB Circular
No 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court.
Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guessed like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended for right and justice to prevail. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous,
this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
8. Law does not require the impossible
a. PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC,
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008
FACTS:
December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of
money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected
was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was
still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be
located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s
motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the
publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of
respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to
petitioner’s last known address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons.
Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said
motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging
that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the
clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the same was filed
way beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed
grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, failure
to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over equity and
justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies
of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings
HELD:
No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to
Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos
was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify
him of the order simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his
last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could
not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence or
whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way
notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require
that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an
 impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic,
common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order
was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.
9. Number and gender of words
a. SANTILLON v. MIRANDA,
G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro
acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition
to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and
Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were
all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties;
(b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in
most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that
administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that
if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was
better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed
administrator of the estate.
March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of
partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the
New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal
share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him.
Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under
Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed
3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse
Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share
for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner
of the conjugal properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted as “child” in accordance
with Art. 892?
HELD:
Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art.
996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are
left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the
article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would
be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child".
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child
(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's
desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
b. SNYDER’S ESTATE V. DENIT,
72 A2D 757, 18 ALR2D 663 (1950)
C. IMPLICATIONS
1. Necessary implication
a. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) v. UNITED
PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC.,
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
FACTS:
July 26, 1993 - Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered into an
Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United Planners
Consultants, Inc. in connection with the LMB’s Land Resource Management Master Plan Project
(LRMMP). Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price
of P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding to the particular stage of
work accomplished.
December 1994 - Respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally accepted
on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in
the amount of P2,038,456.30.
October 25, 1994 - The Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services Office
Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This
notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its liability to
respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment at the soonest possible time.
For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated demands,
respondent instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Due to the existence of Arbitration clause, the respondent moved for the issue to be tried
through arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award)
in favor of respondent
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Arbitral Tribunal claimed that it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to the RTC its Report together with a copy of the
Arbitral Award
March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioner’s aforesaid motions, finding that copies of the
Arbitral Award appear to have been sent to the parties by the Arbitral Tribunal, including the OSG,
contrary to petitioner’s claim. On the other hand, the RTC confirmed the Arbitral Award pursuant
to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of the Special ADR Rules and ordered petitioner to pay respondent the costs of
confirming the award, as prayed for, in the total amount of P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner
did not file a motion for reconsideration.
June 15, 2011 - Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, to which no
comment/opposition was filed by petitioner despite the RTC’s directive therefor. In an Order dated
September 12, 2011, the RTC granted respondent’s motion. Petitioner moved to quash the writ of
execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to its monetary claims. It also claimed that the
issuance of said writ was premature since the RTC should have first resolved its May 19, 2010
Motion for Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted
them, thereby violating its right to due process.
In an Order dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to quash.
July 12, 2012 - Petitioner received the RTC’s Order dated July 9, 2012 denying its motion to
quash. Dissatisfied, it filed on September 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in confirming and ordering the execution of the Arbitral Award.
March 26, 2014 - The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely: (a) the
petition essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule 19 of
the Special ADR Rules and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been filed way beyond 15
days from notice of the RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order, in violation of Rule 19.2852 in relation to Rule
19.853 of said Rules which provide that a special civil action for certiorari must be filed before the
CA within 15 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be annulled or set
aside (or until July 27, 2012). Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules, resulting in
the dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.
HELD:
 The petition is DENIED, Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution
System (ADR System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption
by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of
resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines.
May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor of respondent. Under
Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new trial may be sought,
but any of the parties may file a motion for correction of the final award, which shall interrupt the
running of the period for appeal, Moreover, the parties may appeal the final award to the CA through
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
b. SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. v. HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA,
G.R. No. 116194, February 2, 2000
FACTS:
Association of professional supervisory office and technical Employees Union, a labor
organization affiliated with the trade Union Congress of the Philippines (APSOTEU-TUCP) file
petition for certification election of supervisory employees of SRBI.
The med-arbiter set the certification election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP.
SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition.
Respondent members were not managerial employees but supervisory employees which are
allowed to join, form or assist their own union (art 245 labor code).
Med-arbiter denied the motion.
SRBI appealed to the secretary of labor and employment about the med-arbiter's decision, but
then secretary denied.
Med-arbiter scheduled the certification election, the SRBI filed a motion to suspend but then, it
was denied.
SRBI seeking the cancellation of the respondents union registration before Dole regional office;
argued that APSOTEU-TUCP members are managerial and confidential employees who were
prohibited from joining, organizing unions, but then dole denied.
Then SRBI filed petition for certiorari and prohibition before the court for the annulment of the
resolution of dole in favor of the order of med-arbiter w/c denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
respondent union's petition for cert. election.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the members of the union are managerial and or highly placed confidential
employees.
2.) Whether or not the med-arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification of election upon
the filing of a petition for certification by a registered union despite the petitioner's appeal.
HELD:
Court denied the Petition.
Art 212 Labor Code defines managerial and supervisory employees. Petitioner failed to show
that the employees in question recommend the hiring and appointing of his subordinates well as the
power to recommend any promotions and or increase salaries, and other powers such as transfer,
suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline. Cashiers, accountants, and acting chief loans
department of
Art 245 of labor code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union
activities. However, in doctrine of necessary implication the disqualification of managerial
employees equally applies to confidential employees.
Petitioner does not state who among the employees has access to information specifically relating
to its labor and relation policies.
2. Grant of power includes incidental power
a. CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET,
G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988
FACTS:
During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent Lorenzo Timbol objected to the inclusion of
certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections,
he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first
district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987,
petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a
petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a
petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second
petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's
revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in
accordance with Sec 9 of the HRET Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is
misplaced. The COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art.
IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations
relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it,
is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by
the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of
any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before
the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET
to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on
historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the
Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period
prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
b. CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007
FACTS:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC) has two principal stockholders UCHC with shares amounting
to 60.51%, and petitioner Cemco with 17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were owned by BCI
with 21.31% and ACC with 29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of UCHC stocks. BCI
informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that it and its subsidiary ACC had passed resolutions
to sell to Cemco the BCIs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks in UCHC
equivalent to 29.69%. as a result of petitioner Cemcos acquisition of BCI and ACCs shares in
UCHC, petitioners total beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC has increased by 36%
and amounted to at least 53% of the shares of UCC.
As a consequence the PSE, inquired to SEC as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19
of the Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by
petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC.The SECs Corporate Finance Department responded to
the query of the PSE that while it was the stance of the department that the tender offer rule was
not applicable, the matter must still have to be confirmed by the SEC en banc. Thereafter, SEC
confirmed that the SEC en banc had resolved that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the
tender offer rule.
Feeling aggrieved by the transaction, respondent National Life Insurance Company of the
Philippines, Inc., a minority stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to
comply with the rule on mandatory tender offer. Cemco, however, refused. Respondent filed a
complaint with the SEC asking it to reverse its Resolution and to declare the purchase agreement
of Cemco void and praying that the mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its UCC shares.
In a Decision the SEC ruled in favor of the respondent by reversing and setting aside its Resolution
and directed petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares to respondent and other
holders of UCC shares similar to the class held by UCHC in accordance with Section 9(E), Rule 19
of the Securities Regulation Code.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the SECs jurisdiction to take
cognizance of respondents complaint and its authority to require Cemco to make a tender offer for
UCC shares, and arguing that the tender offer rule does not apply. The Court of Appeals rendered
a decision affirming the ruling of the SEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint.
HELD:
Yes, The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the
Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, to wit:
13. Violation
If there shall be violation of this Rule by pursuing a purchase of equity shares of a public
company at threshold amounts without the required tender offer, the Commission, upon complaint,
may nullify the said acquisition and direct the holding of a tender offer. This shall be without
prejudice to the imposition of other sanctions under the Code.
The foregoing rule emanates from the SECs power and authority to regulate, investigate or
supervise the activities of persons to ensure compliance with the Securities Regulation Code, more
specifically the provision on mandatory tender offer under Section 19 thereof.
Another provision of the statute, which provides the basis of Rule 19(13) of the Amended
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, is Section 5.1(n), viz:
[T]he Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions:
xxx
(n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well as those which may be implied
from, or which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the
Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.
The foregoing provision bestows upon the SEC the general adjudicative power which is implied
from the express powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably necessary to
carry out, the performance of the administrative duties entrusted to it. As a regulatory agency, it has
the incidental power to conduct hearings and render decisions fixing the rights and obligations of
the parties.
And as held by the Court of Appeals:
We must bear in mind in interpreting the powers and functions of the SEC that the law has made
the SEC primarily a regulatory body with the incidental power to conduct administrative hearings
and make decisions. A regulatory body like the SEC may conduct hearings in the exercise of its
regulatory powers, and if the case involves violations or conflicts in connection with the
performance of its regulatory functions, it will have the duty and authority to resolve the dispute
for the best interests of the public
c. ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but
he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions
or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Petitioner basically is not allowed to practice
optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
conditions and operated under the permit.
Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, lodged a
complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had
violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or
revocation of such permit. Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor conduct an investigation
through the City Legal Officer on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to
the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business
permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan
City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent city mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing the special
conditions in the permit
HELD:
Yes, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke,
withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to
restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals,[7] it was held that the power to license carries with it the authority to provide reasonable
terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be conducted. As the Solicitor General
puts it:
"If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader power,
it stands to reason that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express
power, i. e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain conditions, especially so that there
is no positive prohibition to the exercise of such prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any
particular official or body vested with such authority"
However, Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and
the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually
granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to
regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to
engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand,
is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her
profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage
in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the
practice of optometry as a corporate
body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice
optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of
optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically
empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations
Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
The regulatory power to issue licenses or permits extends only up to the regulation of a business
and not in the regulation of a profession. Therefore, the acts of the mayor are ultra vires and cannot
be given effect.
3. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
a. TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,
G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) was organized to provide domestic
water services in Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad, Benguet. Respondent La Trinidad Water District
(LTWD) is a government owned and controlled corporation, a local water utility created under PD
No. 198, authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purpose within
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water Resources Board an application for
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy.
Tawang LTWD claimed that under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. XII.
October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the latter cancelled TMPC’s CPC and held
that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid; that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is for the State,
through its authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain ultimate control
and supervision over the operation of public utilities. What is repugnant to the Constitution is a
grant of franchise exclusive in character so as to preclude the State itself from granting a franchise
to any other person or entity than the present grantee when public interest so requires.
November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by TMPC.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo,
prohibetur et per obliquum – Those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
Under Sec. 2 and 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, The President, Congress, and Court cannot
create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD)
of a water district and Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character. Sec. 47 of PD no. 198 is in conflict with the above-mentioned provision of
the Constitution. And the rule is that in case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
former prevails, because the constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to.