People vs.
Godoy There has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely
GR No. 115908-09
PLAINTIFF: Judge Eustaqio Gacott
DEFENDANT: Mauricio Reynoso, Eva Ponce De Leon
DATE: March 29, 1995
PONENTE: J. Regalado
TOPIC: Rule 71
Facts:
 This is a separate resolution from an incident arising from these criminal
cases (People vs. Godoy – rape case) under automatic review by the court
 Judge Gacott of RTC, Palawan filed a complaint for indirect contempt
against the respondents Reynoso and Ponce De Leon publisher and
chairman of the editorial board of the Palawan Times
o That on an article written by Reynoso in his column “On the Beat”
was published on July 20, 1994
o That the pertinent portions of the article were with alleged
contemptuous statements
 Petitioner avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle,
downgrade and degrade the administration of justice
o That the article contains averments which are disrespectful,
discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory
o That it cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as judge and on his ability to administer justice
 Respondent in his Comment, contended that his article does not intend to
impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was
published under after Judge Gacott had promulgated his decision
o Also contended that it will not affect appeal to the SC because
Palawan Times was being circulated in Puerto Princesa only
o Claims that it is an exercise of freedom of expression and press
o Claims that he was just giving a reaction to the Interview given by
Judge Gacott in the show “Magandang Gabi Bayan” where he
defended his decision in the said case
Issue: W/N the Reynoso and De Leon can be held liable for Indirect Contempt, NO
Ruling:
What is involved is a situation where the statements have been taken out of context.
No reason for contempt proceedings, because such only constitutes mere fair
criticisms.
The article written by Reynoso does not deal with the merits of the case but rather,
with the public accusations being made by Judge Gacott that he is receiving death
threats from Godoy. It is a report of rumors, not presented as facts. He merely gave a
reaction, not to the decision made in the case, but to the interview given by Judge
Gacott in Magandang Gabi Bayan. Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos do no
necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable in Rule 71, ROC.
serious and imminent as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficiently disregard
freedom of speech and press.
As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the
relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is
primarily compensatory or remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or
quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts,
and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the
power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for
disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal
proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a
crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of
the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In
general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is
consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that
the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal
contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in
regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be
strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any
particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature;
that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a
remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a
proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a
private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended
to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of
its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a
special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be
obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience.
The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal
prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been
held that a proceeding for contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a
proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation of a court
order in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in contempt
or proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the order. It has been held,
however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out
of the original case, it is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it
involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of new
process.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or
his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In
criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real
prosecutor.

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is

presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond
reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although
the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond
reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It
has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere
between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance"
burden.

On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well settled, it can be
safely concluded that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
on indirect contempt, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt.
Regalado vs Go
GR No. 167988
PLAINTIFF: Concepcion Regalado
DEFENDANT: Antonio Go
DATE: February 6, 2007
PONENTE: J. Chico-Nazario
TOPIC: Rule 71
Facts:
 The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal
filed before the Labor Arbiter be herein respondent Antonio Go against
Eurotech Hair Systems (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General
Manager Jose E. Barin – employed Atty. Regalado as their legal counsel
 LA ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from employment
 NLRC reversed LA, declared respondent Go’s separation from employment
was legal for it was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by
EHSI, Kunack and Barin
 Aggrieved, Go appealed to the CA
 CA, set aside the decision of NLRC and affirmed LA
 EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to receive a copy of the decision through
registered mail on July 17, 2003 while Go received his copy on July 21,
2003
 On July 16, 2003, after the promulgation of the CA decision but prior to the
receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle
the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of
the LA
o In view of the amicable settlement, LA, on the same day issued
an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice.
o After the receipt of a copy of the CA decision, Go through his
counsel filed a manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to
nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud,
mistake or undue influence
 Go through his counsel moved that Atty. Regalado be
made to explain her unethical conduct for directly
negotiating with respondent Go, without knowledge of
his counsel
 On 30 August 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution disregarding
petitioner Atty. Regalado’s defenses and adjudging her guilty of indirect
contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
o Even granting arguendo that petitioner Atty. Regalado did not
participate in the negotiation process, she was nonetheless under
the obligation to restrain her clients from doing acts that she
herself was prohibited to perform as mandated by Canon 16 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics. However, instead of
preventing her clients from negotiating with respondent Go who
was unassisted by his counsel, Atty. Regalado actively
participated in the consummation of the compromise agreement
by dealing directly with respondent Go and allowing him to sign
the Release Waiver and Quitclaim without his lawyer.
Issue: W/N the respondent can be held liable for indirect contempt, NO
W/N the the indirect contempt proceedings suffered a serious procedural defect, YES
Ruling: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be
complied with.
There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under
paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt. But were the proceedings conducted in convicting petitioner done in
accordance with law?
In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by respondent Go
through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.30 It was based on the aforesaid Motion
that the appellate court issued a Resolution31 dated 19 November 2003, requiring
petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt.
Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which
set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was
respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court the alleged
misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the
part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect
contempt charge without contradicting the factual findings made by the very same
court which rendered the questioned resolution.
In the present case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of
petitioner Atty. Regalado’s misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former.
The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention
with the categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting particulars and
documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the
motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be
cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance with the appellate
court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt
and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the
commencement of the indirect contempt action.
Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for
indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close
its eyes without offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we,
ourselves, had promulgated.
Fortune Life Insurance Company vs. COA
GR No. 213525
PLAINTIFF: Fortune Life Insurance Company
DEFENDANT: COA, Provincial Government of Antique
DATE: November 21, 2017
PONENTE: J. Bersamin
TOPIC: Rule 71
Facts:
A party and its counsel who make offensive and disrespectful statements in their
motion for reconsideration may be properly sanctioned for indirect contempt of court.
We hereby resolve the following submissions of the petitioner, namely: (a) Joint
Explanation; (b) Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration; and (c) Second Motion for Reconsideration.
To recall the antecedents, the Court issued a resolution on January 27, 2015 denying
the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds, namely: (a)
failure to comply with the rule on proof of service; (b) late filing; (c) failure to file a
verified declaration under the Efficient Use of Paper Rule; and (d) failure to prove
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Audit (COA).
 That in the joint explanation, petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza both represented
by Aquilino Pimentel – apologized for the statements made in the MR
o But stated nonetheless that they have been constrained to attach
cut print-outs of registry receipt numbers because Makati City
Central Post Office stopped issuing registry receipts and had
adopted an automated system
o Thought that the Court in mentioning proof of service, had been
referring to the non-submission of the affidavit of service
o That Atty. Fortaleza had been lacking in finesse in the formulation
of his submissions
o Petitioner honestly believed that it had faithfully complied with the
requirements of the ROC on the service of pleadings
o Atty. Fortaleza, prayed that he be spared of disbarment
Issue: W/N Atty. Fortaleza can be held liable for Indirect Contempt, YES
Ruling:
Although the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza are now apologizing for their offensive and
disrespectful statements, they insist nonetheless that the statements arose from their
honest belief of having complied with the rule on proof of service. They also attribute
their procedural error to the supposed adoption by the MCPO of an electronic system
in the processing of mail matter.
The Court finds and declares the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza guilty of indirect
contempt of court.
The administration of justice is an important function of the State. It is indispensable to
the maintenance of order in the Society. It is a duty lodged in this Court, and in all
inferior courts. For the Court and all other courts of the land to be able to administer
and dispense evenhanded justice, they should be free from harassment and
disrespect.
The statements of the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza unquestionably tended to attribute
gross inefficiency and negligence to the Court and its staff. It is worse because the
statements were uncalled for and unfounded. As such, the statements should be
quickly deterred and gravely sanctioned for actually harming and degrading the
administration of justice by the Court itself. The wrong the statements wrought on the
reputation and prestige of the Court and its operating staff must by all means be
vindicated, and even undone if that was at all possible.
Moreover, we cannot but view and consider the attempt to shift the blame to the postal
system as the manifestation of the unwillingness of the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza
to take personal responsibility for their harsh and disrespectful statements. We must
reject the attempt, firstly, because it reflected their lack of remorse for a grave
contempt of court they committed, and, secondly, because their shifting of blame was
not even proved reliably. It appears, indeed, that they were content on relying solely
on the self-serving affidavit of a member of the petitioner's own staff who could not at
least profess having the personal knowledge about the change in the system
byMCP0.
The courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt that is reasonably
commensurate with the gravity of the offense. The degree of punishment lies within
the sound discretion of the courts. Ever mindful that the inherent power of contempt
should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive, principle, and that the
penalty should be meted according to the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of
punishment, the Court must justly sanction the contempt of court committed by the
petitioner and its counsel. Under Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the penalty
of fine not exceeding ₱30,000.00, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both
fine and imprisonment, may be meted as punishment for contemptuous conduct
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank. Upon
considering all the circumstances, the Court imposes a fine of ₱15,000.00 on the
petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza.