Uniwersytet Gdański

Wydział Filologiczny

Instytut Anglistyki

Katedra Językoznawstwa

Małgorzata Kaszak

Nr albumu: 003036

The senses of the morpheme for in English – a cognitive

account.
Znaczenia morfemu for w języku angielskim – ujęcie kognitywne.

Rozprawa doktorska napisana pod kierunkiem

dr hab. Olgi Sokołowskiej, prof. UG

Gdańsk 2018
 ABSTRACT

It is common knowledge that polysemy is a typical characteristic of lexemes occurring in

natural languages. In English, which is a relatively highly analytic linguistic system, one
morpheme in unaltered form can participate in more than one grammatical category. This is,
among others, the case of the morpheme for, which can function as a preposition (a free unit)
and as a prefix (a bound unit), while the senses represented in both uses are etymologically
related. In the present dissertation it is hypothesised and demonstrated that for is not a typical
English preposition as regards its basic semantic domain, which is not prototypically spatial,
but its main sense is that of purposiveness. What is also addressed in the present work is the
pivotal role of the other grammatical category in which the lexeme in question participates,
i.e., that of prefixes involved in the so-called for-prefixed verbs. It is proposed that the
meaning of such verbs should be understood in terms of conceptual amalgamates (blends) in
which an important role is performed by metaphorical construals of certain participants in
the conceptualised scenes. As regards the relation between both discussed roles of the
morpheme in question, it seems that it is the prefix rather than the preposition that has
retained the original notion of spatiality involved in their common historical predecessor.
That notion is imported into the overall senses of complex verbs, e.g., forgive, whereas in the
semantic representation assigned to the preposition it has evolved, in a motivated way, to the
notion of purposiveness.

Keywords: morpheme for, for-prefixed verbs, spatiality, purposiveness, network of senses

2
 Table of Contents

Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 1: The Cognitive Linguistics paradigm ............................................................. 10
1.1. The conceptions of language – from Aristotelian objectivism to conceptualism and
symbolism ......................................................................................................................... 10
1.2. Perception of the world as the result of human cognitive processing - the symbolic
and conceptual nature of language and meaning in the spirit of Cognitive Linguistics ... 13
1.3. The concept of a verb from the cognitive perspective ........................................... 19
1.4. The axiological evaluations of verbs and Krzeszowski’s axiological principle .... 19
Chapter 2: The nature of English prepositions ............................................................... 22
2.1. The syntactic properties of prepositions ................................................................ 22
2.2. Senses of prepositions as radial categories ............................................................ 24
2.3. On universality and variability in the semantics of spatial adpositions – spatial
relations of prepositions .................................................................................................... 26
2.4. Polysemy of prepositions in the context of related senses .................................... 28
2.4.1.The Principled Polysemy Model and its aim ....................................................... 30
2.5. Detecting the central sense of a preposition .......................................................... 31
Chapter 3: The story of for ................................................................................................ 33
3.1. The polysemy of over ................................................................................................ 34
3.2. The polysemy of for............................................................................................... 37
3.2.1.The earliest attested meaning of for ..................................................................... 38
3.2.2.Quirk and Greenbaum’s account of for ................................................................ 40
3.2.3.Jackendoff’s categorisation of the senses of for .................................................. 43
3.2.4.The recipient for and the benefactive for ............................................................. 44
3.2.4.1.For as a syntactic marker of the benefactive case ......................................... 44
3.2.4.2.Motion in the benefactive scene .................................................................... 47
3.2.5. A lexicographic account of the polysemy of for ............................................ 49
3.2.6. FOR & TO – directionality with intention vs. directionality .............................. 51
3.3.A network of the senses of for .................................................................................... 56
3.4. For as an expression of purpose and cause ............................................................... 58
3.4.1. The semantic relation between the ‘goal’ and ‘cause’ senses of for .............. 60
3.5. The senses derived from the Purpose Sense .......................................................... 62

3
 3.5.1. The Reciprocal Sense ..................................................................................... 62
3.5.2. The Destination Sense .................................................................................... 63
3.5.3. The Distance and the Duration Senses ........................................................... 64
3.5.4. The Intended Recipient Sense ........................................................................ 65
3.5.5. The Intended Function Sense ......................................................................... 65
3.5.6. The Benefit Sense ........................................................................................... 66
3.5.7. The Self-Sake Benefactive Sense ................................................................... 67
3.6. The self-sake benefactive construction with the preposition for ........................... 67
3.6.1. The self-sake benefactive construction as a subtype of the benefactive
construction ................................................................................................................... 68
3.6.2. The self-sake benefactive construction as a kind of reflexive construction ... 69
3.6.3. An analysis of the self-sake benefactive construction .................................... 71
3.6.4. The role of the verb in the self-sake benefactive construction ....................... 73
3.6.5. The role of modality in the self-sake benefactive construction ...................... 74
3.6.6. The self-sake benefactive construction in Smith’s classification ................... 75
3.6.6.1. An analysis of object phrases involved in benefactive construction ...... 76
3.6.7. The preposition for – recapitulation ............................................................... 77
3.7. The most significant accounts of the polysemous dla ........................................... 78
3.7.1. The network of the senses of dla .................................................................... 80
3.8. A recapitulation of shared and disparate meanings of dla and for ........................ 82
Chapter 4: The semantic evolution of for-prefixed verbs ............................................... 83
4.1. The cognitive approach to morphology and prefixation............................................ 86
4.1.1. A complex word .................................................................................................. 87
4.1.2. Prefixation in polymorphemic units .................................................................... 90
4.1.3. Prefixes of spatiality in English .......................................................................... 91
4.2. The etymology and polysemy of the prefix for- ........................................................ 92
4.3. The prefix for- as an adprep in the for-prefixed verbs............................................... 95
4.4. The semantic importance of the particle for- contributing to the overall meaning of
for-prefixed verbs ............................................................................................................. 96
4.4.1. The for-prefixed verbs as relics of the archaic method of referring to
directionality ................................................................................................................. 97
4.5. The Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) ................................................................. 98
4.5.1. Ungerer and Schmid’s account of conceptual integration .................................. 98
4.5.2. Fauconnier and Turner’s definition of conceptual blending ............................... 98

4
 4.5.2.1. The elements of conceptual blending ......................................................... 100
4.5.3. The criticism of the Conceptual Blending Theory and its application to the study
of for-prefixed verbs ................................................................................................... 100
4.6. Metaphorical extensions in the scenes described by phrasal verbs and for-prefixed
verbs representing conceptual blends ............................................................................. 102
4.7. Attenuation of the role of the Agent through metaphorisation in the semantic
evolution of for-prefixed verbs understood as conceptual blends .................................. 104
4.7.1. Forgive, forget and forgo .................................................................................. 111
4.7.2. Forbear and forfeit ............................................................................................ 121
4.7.3. Forsake and forfend .......................................................................................... 125
4.8. An action chain and the metaphor of a river/ a snake.............................................. 126
4.8.1. Forswear and forbid.......................................................................................... 127
4.9. The Polish equivalents of the for-prefixed verbs ..................................................... 131
4.10. Conclusions............................................................................................................ 133
FINAL CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 135
References ......................................................................................................................... 137
Streszczenie ....................................................................................................................... 146

5
 Introduction

The story of two morphemes or the semantic duality of the lexeme for

The present thesis constitutes a comprehensive comparative study of one phonological form
representing two distinct grammatical categories. The lexeme for, as a free morpheme, may
function as a preposition as well as an adverbial particle. As a bound morpheme, for- assumes
the role of a prefix, which means that the phonetic and graphic representation for stands for
both a preposition (for) and a prefix (for-). It can be claimed, therefore, that it is an instance
of homonymy. The present author, however, will attempt to demonstrate that in fact it is
polysemy that is dealt with in this case. In fact, the double polysemy of for can be observed
on two levels. The meanings of for as a preposition and the meanings of for- as a prefix are
multiple, with the senses of the morpheme in question in both grammatical roles being
related.

The first part of the present research (Chapter 1) serves as an explanation of the most
relevant terms and concepts vital for the thesis from the perspective of cognitive linguistics.
Chapters 2 to 4 revolve around the issues pertaining to the concept of a preposition from the
perspective of cognitive semantics, in general, as demonstrated by for example Tyler and
Evans (2001, 2003), and to the senses of the preposition for and a chosen self-sake
benefactive construction1 (as understood by Smith 2010), in particular, such as for the sake
of one’s health, where for plays the pivotal role.
Worth mentioning is the fact that the preposition for is not an example of a typical
spatial preposition. Thus, for, unlike the majority of English prepositions, which are
prototypically spatial, e.g., over (as described by Brugman 1981), also on, under, in, etc., as
hypothesised in the present thesis, points mainly to the purposive aspect of scenes represented
by a considerable number of utterances in which it is involved, with due importance given to
the benefactive sense. Therefore, such utterances as e.g., I’ve done this for you will be given
an in-depth examination in Chapter 3.
The second part of the present thesis (Chapter 4) constitutes an examination of the
prefix for- and its semantic import into the conceptualisations of the so-called for-prefixed

1
Constructions here are understood as explained by Goldberg, namely they are “stored pairings of form and
function, including morphemes, words, idioms, partially fixed and fully general linguistic patterns” (2003: 219).

6
verbs, for example the verb forgive. The semantic evolution of the aforesaid verbs, which are
considered to be ‘lexicogrammatical meaning-bearing units’2, will be presented in the form
of conceptual blends (as described by Turner and Fauconnier 1998, 2002). When it comes to
the Polish equivalents of for-, they appear in such a variety that accomplishing a systematic
analysis does not seem to be viable.

The meeting of two senses: purposiveness and spatiality - conceptual motivations

behind the constructions with the preposition for and the for-prefixed verbs

The present author’s intention is to point to two most significant aspects of the two
morphemes represented by the form for as regards their meaning, namely purposiveness and
spatiality in general and subjective motion in particular. Although it appears that the aspect
of spatiality is highlighted to a higher extent by the prefix and in the case of the preposition,
the sense of purposiveness is prevailing, those two senses seem to coincide as purposiveness
also prototypically involves movement, e.g. The ship made for its home port presumably
indicates that the concept of purposiveness can be a lower-order domain in the concept of
spatiality. Nevertheless, in the case of the preposition for, potential physical movement is
also involved. Thus, the similarity borne by both: the meaning of the preposition for (a free
morpheme) and of the prefix for- (a bound morpheme) consists in the fact that the main
semantic focus of the preposition is purposive, whereas the main semantic concern of the
prefix more clearly pertains to the concept of subjective motion, albeit only in a metaphorical
sense.

The preposition commonly informs about the purpose or function of a given thing or
person (the subject referent in a sentence) whereas the prefix tends to be indicative of a
withdrawal on the part of the indirect object referent. Attached to a root verb, it substantially
modifies the overall meaning of a particular for-prefixed verb. The verb give and its for-
prefixed variant are illustrative of the aforementioned alteration. The semantic make-up of
forgive is considerably different than the one of give. The prefix for- is assumed to serve the
function of the marker of movement of the indirect object referent away from the direct object
referent, as in I will forgive them this mistake, where ‘mistake’ is construed as an object being

2
Panther and Thornburg suggest replacing the term ‘grammar’ with the term ‘lexicogrammatical system’. They
claim that “the lexicon and grammar form a continuum, there is no clear-cut distinction between individual
lexical items, and more ‘grammatical’ or functional’ elements such as determiners and aspectual morphemes,
or parts of speech with an abstract type (class) meaning such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.”. All of those
aforementioned elements bear some kind of meaning, as Panther and Thornburg assume (2009: 14).

7
moved away from someone (‘them’) in the act of forgiveness. Thus, a ‘mistake’ is
metaphorically taken away from the person who has committed it. In this way, which
involves the aspect of spatiality. It can be claimed that the metaphoric construal of a mistake
(A MISTAKE (GUILT) IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT) results in the attenuation of the agentive
role of the subject (as specified by Langacker 2000), which is recognisable in the prototypical
scene described with the use of the verb give.

For as a preposition points to subjective, conceptualised movement of one landmark towards

the other, realised as the beneficiary or recipient, while the prefix for- signals movement
away from a landmark, whose realisation is the beneficiary or recipient. In Fig. 1 below, the
abbreviation TR stands for the trajector and LM, which not always needs to be profiled,
stands for the landmark. The broken line represents the direction of subjectified movement.
The circle indicates the initial co-location of elements. TR is the ‘controller’ of the scene,
LM1 stands for direct object referent and LM2 stands for indirect object referent.

(for) (for-)

TR LM2
LM2 TR
LM1 LM1

Fig. 1. The directionality of LM movement in the conceptualisations represented by for and for-

The prefix for-, thus, seems to function in a similar way as the preposition away since both
activate the concept of motion. It should also be emphasised, as was already elucidated, that
the spatial aspect is more evident in the case of the prefix for- than the preposition for. As
regards the spatiality of the preposition for, it is more relevant in the cases where the indirect
object referent is a recipient (of a thing), e.g. The chef is cooking his specialty for us, rather
than a beneficiary, e.g., She opened the door for Tom.

As regards the aforementioned self-sake benefactive construction, it can be illustrated

with the following sentence He moved to the seaside for the sake of his health, where the
referent of the agent noun is a beneficiary of his / her own conscious action. In this
construction the function of the preposition for as the syntactic marker of purposiveness
appears to be particularly observable. It is hypothesised that the meaning of the preposition

8
for in the analysed linguistic patterns is pervasive and appears to determine the overall
meaning of the expressions in which it participates. Although the benefactive sense of the
lexical item for does not constitute its most prototypical meaning, it is the one which is
commonly and readily associated with the preposition in question and best exemplifies the
purposive sense. This fact is corroborated by Smith, who claims that “a remarkable
phenomenon at the interface of benefaction and purpose is the potential of
benefactive/recipient/dative NPs to act as economical shortcut for the expression of
purposive relations” (2010: 135).

Despite the fact that there are many accounts of prepositions in specialist literature,
with Brugman’s milestone study of over (1981, 1988), as a much-quoted example the issue
of the preposition for functioning as the semantic marker of the benefactive case has not to
the knowledge of the present author been so far addressed in cognitive studies. The only
study that can be called upon is Niedzielski’s (1979) “Lexical realization of benefactive and
beneficiary in Polish and English”, which constitutes a comparative analysis of English
benefactive constructions and their Polish equivalents. The specific considerations of the
aforementioned author as regards various types of benefactives will be taken into account in
the course of the present thesis.

9
 Chapter 1: The Cognitive Linguistics paradigm

In the present chapter, the relevant aspects of the cognitive theory concerning the symbolic
and conceptual nature of language and meaning are discussed. In addition to this, the
following issues are covered herein: the notions of category and concept and Krzeszowski’s
axiological principle in relation to the concept of verb.

1.1.The conceptions of language – from Aristotelian objectivism to conceptualism and

symbolism

It is necessary to begin with Aristotle’s conception of language, in which, as Modrak (2001:

19) claims, natural language serves as a tool for understanding the objective world. According
to Modrak, Aristotle also assumed that “the basic categories of language, knowledge, and
reality are structural equivalents” (2001: 3). What is more, from the Aristotelian perspective,
“an adequate philosophy of language would distinguish between the language of thought
(universal concepts) and the spoken language (particular sounds)”. As Modrak asserts, “the
theory of meaning [by Aristotle] uses a symmetrical relation (likeness) to explain reference
and to indicate how the world determines the meanings of words” (2001: 28). Gärdenfors
holds that the cognitive prototype theory was a result of “a growing dissatisfaction with the
classical theory of concepts [by Aristotle]” (1999: 25). In the light of Cognitive Linguistics,
“concepts show prototype effects (instead of following the Aristotelian paradigm based on
necessary and sufficient conditions)” (Gärdenfors 1999: 25).

Another, worthy of mentioning theory as regards linguistic meaning is the medieval

speculative grammar. It is considered to be “a definite and distinct stage in linguistic theory”
(Robins 1997: 88). It was “the integration of the grammatical description of Latin as
formulated by Priscian and Donatus into the system of scholastic philosophy” (Robins 1997:
88). The term Modistae is used with reference to the masters of the late 13th and early 14th
century who were concerned with grammar, logic, and metaphysics within this tradition. The
aim of speculative grammar was to describe intra-linguistic relationships, but the Modistae
could not accomplish what they wanted without invoking to some degree the structure of
reality3.

3
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/the-cambridge-history-of-later-medieval-philosophy/speculative-
grammar/95BE86AD4B78A5E6F1FEC915719883F1

10
 Traditionally, before the advent of cognitive sciences, language was thought to be
independent of human experience and to reflect categories which exist objectively,
independently of human perceptions. The objectivist psychology and objectivist linguistics
are based on objective categories. One of the appearances of the idea of language-as-mirror,
i.e., a development of the objectivist stance took place during the Enlightenment period.
According to Descartes, language is a mirror of thoughts, which are revealed in words and
deep structures of language are represented in the human mind. As Lifschitz (2012: 29) states,
“following the traditional theory of language as mirroring or merely representing mental
ideas, Descartes saw signs as tools for the communication of already formed concepts”.
Before the cognitive ideas of language began to be introduced, the Universal Grammar
approach prevailed in linguistics for about fifty years. Chomsky’s idea was that human
languages, which diversify superficially, are similar in the most fundamental aspects, which
can be attributed to inborn rules unique to language: that in fact there is only one language
used by humans in a number of variants (Chomsky 1995: 131).

In the Cognitive account of language, there is recognised a difference between semantic

and encyclopedic aspects of linguistic (lexical) meaning. Some of the assumptions of
cognitive semantics differentiating it from the aforementioned linguistic theories are the
perspective on meaning with the rejection of a clear-cut borderline between semantic and
pragmatic knowledge represented by language units. In the present investigation, the author
attempts to demonstrate that it is domains of encyclopedic knowledge that can be referred to
in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of the sense of the preposition for. The central
notions which find their expression in the description of the polysemy of the preposition for
are those of a prototype and natural categorisation. In the cognitive account, grammatical
structures are not assumed to be determined by derivation, they are just schemas in terms of
which to express the construals of a semantic content.

The aim of Cognitive Linguistics is to recognise and describe the cognitive principles
that motivate the formation and use of linguistic expressions of varying degree of complexity
and schematicity. When it comes to schematicity and specificity of symbolic units of
language, one of the fundamental assumptions of cognitive linguistics made by Langacker is
that “the elements traditionally ascribed to grammar tend to be quite schematic, whereas those
assigned to lexicon tend toward greater specificity. Yet the difference is clearly one of degree,
and any particular line of demarcation would be arbitrary. Numerous elements usually

11
considered “grammatical” – e.g. modals, demonstratives, prepositions – are obviously
meaningful in many of their uses” (2000: 18).

The observation of the abundant uses of the preposition for seems to provide strong
support for the above-presented theoretical claims. The meaning of any language structure is
recognised as a conceptualisation. Conceptualisations may differ from one another, as
explained by Langacker:
Since linguistic meaning incorporates both content and construal, a visible
linguistic semantics cannot neglect the latter. There are many aspects of
construal, which cognitive linguists have categorised in alternate ways.
Selected here for illustration are specificity, direction of mental scanning,
viewing arrangement, background, metaphor, and prominence. The first
dimension of construal to be considered is the level of specificity
(conversely, the level of schematicity) at which a situation is characterised.
This is a matter of ‘granularity’ or ‘resolution’, i.e. our manifest capacity to
view a scene with widely varying degrees of precision and detail. Thus, the
same creature could be described by any of the expressions: cocker spaniel
> spaniel > dog > canine > animal > creature > thing (…) Obviously, the
world does not come structured at a particular level of specificity /
schematicity (2000: 27).

The specificity / schematicity dimension, along which symbolic units of language differ from
one another, constitutes a continuum. Langacker’s assumption is that language is an
inventory of symbolic units and the grammar of a language or grammatical knowledge is
comprehended as “a structured inventory of conventional symbolic units”. Another
contributor to the cognitive theory of language, Evans claims that
it is only once an expression has been used sufficiently frequently and has
become entrenched (acquiring a status of a habit or a cognitive routine) that
it becomes a unit. From this perspective, a unit is a symbolic entity that is
not built compositionally by the language system but is stored and accessed
as a whole. Furthermore, the symbolic units represented in the speaker’s
grammar are conventional. The conventionality of a linguistic unit relates
to the idea that linguistic expressions become part of the grammar of a
language by virtue of being shared among members of a speech community
(2006: 501).

12
What Evans clarifies is the fact that what becomes a language unit does not depend on a
language itself but it is a matter of conceptualisation and it is the use of a unit by the speakers
of a language that decides about its conventionality.

1.2.Perception of the world as the result of human cognitive processing - the symbolic
and conceptual nature of language and meaning in the spirit of Cognitive Linguistics

The present thesis adopts the paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics as the framework within
which to accomplish the analysis embarked upon. That is why a few remarks about the
conceptual nature of meaning should be expressed. Thus, one of the fundamental
assumptions is that it cannot be stated that what people experience directly is the objectively
real world. What is experienced by people is affected by their conceptual organisation, and
the sense-perceptory input is unconsciously subject to it. This fact was pointed out by Putnam
(1991) and Dennett (1981), who developed the idea already placed as the theoretical
framework of Cognitive Grammar by one of its founders, Lakoff (1982, 1987). Moreover,
Tyler and Evans’ fundamental assertion is that “as humans we segment our perceptions of
the world” and “we experience it into spatial scenes”. They believe that “these spatial scenes
result from entities in the world – which exists independently of human beings” (2002: 27).
As they also claim, “in essence, the patterns and organization we perceive as reality do not
in fact exist independently in the world itself, but are largely the result of our cognitive
processing” (2002: 19). To illustrate this standpoint, they, after Rubin (1915), provide a
picture which can provoke two possible interpretations by the viewer. They conclude that
what people actually perceive is based on their unconscious organisation and the effort to
make sense of the input coming from the real world. That is why, depending on one’s
unconscious organisation of the input, one can conclude that a white vase in the image below
(Fig. 2) is a figure and the rest of the image is the ground. Another possible interpretation is
that the two black faces constitute the figure and the space between them is the ground. The
entity which stands out as a figure in the relational profile, is referred to as the TRAJECTOR
(TR). Any other entity in the relational profile constitutes a LANDMARK (LM), which
provides a salient point of reference for situating the TR within a particular cognitive domain
(Langacker 2000).

13
Fig. 2. The image illustrating the assumption that what people perceive as reality does not exist
independently in the world itself, but to a significant extent is the result of human cognitive processing
(based on Tyler and Evans 2002: 19), after Rubin (1915).

As Ungerer and Schmid (1996-2006) claim, the notions figure and ground “have always been
essential components of cognitive-linguistic thinking, and from the very beginning they have
been linked to the study of prepositions, in particular those of them expressing direction, such
as in, out, up and down or across, over and under” (2006: 332). Stating so, they follow the
ideas originally put forward by Brugman and exploited by Lakoff and Langacker. The co-
existence of graphic representations of figure and ground, or as Langacker terms the notions,
of trajector and landmark, serves a tangible access to the topic, which can be supported by
numerous visualisations. Ungerer and Schmid also add that “the network representation of
prepositional senses should have a beneficial effect in an area of language use regarded as
notoriously unordered” (2006: 332). That is why it seems that also the senses of for should
be elaborated upon in a similar way, since there has not been much interest devoted to this
topic in the professional linguistic literature concerned with spatial prepositions.
While revealing the senses of the preposition for and the prefix for-, the present author
will use some of the Langackerian terms, such as profile, by the nature of which a lexical
item’s grammatical class is determined. Aunt, for example, is a noun because it profiles an
entity conceptualised as a thing, i.e. a region in a cognitive domain bounded in space (even
though the relations it participates in are crucial to its characterisation), whereas in front of is
a complex preposition because it profiles a certain kind of spatial relationship between two
entities. A preposition involves a reference to two focal participants, its prototypical trajector
and landmark being the concepts of things (Langacker 2000: 9-10). When it comes to
profiling the relationships, in every relational predication an asymmetry can be observed
between the profiled participants. One of them, called the trajector (TR), is privileged from
the point of view of a conceptualiser and is characterised as the figure within a relational
profile. According to Langacker, “the term trajector suggests motion, and in processual

14
predications describing physical activities (presumably the prototype for relations) the
trajector generally does move through a spatial trajectory” (1987: 217). Langacker indicates
that the definition makes no reference whatsoever to motion, either physical or abstract, so
this schematic description is applicable to both static and dynamic relations. Landmarks
(LM), in turn, are called so because they are naturally viewed (in prototypical instances) as
providing points of reference for locating the trajector (1987: 217). Tyler and Evans concur,
after Langacker, that TR and LM can be constituted by any entities (both physical and non-
physical) (2003: 84). The asymmetry pertaining to the internal structure of a relation profiled
by a predication is connected with the cognitive salience of its participants. As already
indicated, the status of the participants is not equal, as one of them is a conceptual figure,
whereas the other salient participants, often referred to as secondary figures, are called
landmarks. The very term landmark is motivated by the fact that in prototypical examples
these secondary figures serve the function of “providing points of reference for locating the
trajector” (Langacker 1987: 217). It should be noted, however, that landmarks may
occasionally be unprofiled, an illustration of which is the sentence John left, where the initial
location of John is unprofiled.

As Langacker claims, “language is symbolic in nature. It makes available to the speaker

– for either personal or communicative use – an open-ended set of linguistic signs or
expressions, each of which associates a semantic representation of some kind with a
phonological representation” (1987: 11). As he indicates, his thinking departs from the
classic, Saussurean conception of a sign (Langacker 1987: 12). He refers to “the pervasive
influence of analogy and subtle forms of sound symbolism as constant contributory factors
in the gradual evolution of lexical stock” (Langacker 1987: 12). Langacker’s conception of
language as symbolic in nature “extends beyond lexicon to grammar” (1987: 12). He argues
that “morphological and syntactic structures themselves are inherently symbolic, above and
beyond the symbolic relations embodied in the lexical items they employ” (1987: 12). He,
furthermore, holds that:

From the symbolic nature of language follows the centrality of meaning to

virtually all linguistic concerns. Meaning is what language is all about; the
analyst who ignores it to concentrate solely on matters of form severely
impoverishes the natural and necessary subject matter of the discipline and
ultimately distorts the character of the phenomena described (1987: 12).

15
In line with the afore-quoted assumptions and Cognitive Linguistics ideas in general is the
view expressed by Fauconnier who observes that:

when language expressions reflect objective events and situations, as they

often do (and often do not), they do not reflect them directly, but rather
through elaborate human cognitive constructions and construals (1997: 8).

Fauconnier’s observation stands in contrast to the notion of truth-conditional semantics

which in its traditional form does not seek to reveal and describe the actual meanings
expressed in languages functioning in different cultures, as observed by Wierzbicka (1996).
She, furthermore, indicates that truth-conditional semantics is interested not in meaning, but
in the logical properties of sentences understood as propositions such as entailment,
contradiction, or logical equivalence (1996: 8). The truth-conditional approach assumes that
much of language directly reflects and refers to the physical world.

Jackendoff, in turn, points out that one of the most important insights to emerge from the
work on perception is that viewing and conceiving of the world by humans is determined
largely by conceptual organisation, which is imposed on the sense-perceptory input. That is
why people’s direct experience of the world does not seem to be objective. The input from
the external world is experienced by humans via a conceptual organisation (1983, 1990,
1992). Thus, from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics, language serves the function of
an instrument which organises, processes and conveys information. Cognitive Linguistics
aims to explain the creation of language and the process of learning it, as well as its usage,
with reference to concepts formed in the mind. It holds that the emergence of syntactic
language patterns largely depends on the mental operations carried out by the human mind.
The central importance is attached to meaning, embodied in experience and explained with
reference to human cognition (Hamawand 2011: 15).

As Tyler and Evans observe, “[…] cognitive approach to meaning construction holds
that the interpretation of language is integrative, elaborative and inherently conceptual in
nature”. Meaning is not constructed by adding linguistic items in a compositional way and
“utterances, namely lexical items and the syntactic configurations in which they occur,
provide only minimal prompts for meaning construction”. Another claim of Tyler and Evans
is that it is extremely difficult to assume that “meaning is largely linguistic in nature, rather
than conceptual”, even while interpreting the simplest utterances (2003: 8-9). Their further

16
assumption is that “semantic representation prompts for a conceptually mediated
representation of the world, [it] also provides powerful insights into, and accounts for, many
uses of spatial particles which have previously been labelled as arbitrary” (2003: 21). Thanks
to the recognition of the fact that language is conceptual in nature, it can be observed that
each of the following utterances represents a distinct conceptualisation of the same scene
Jane stood in the flower-bed versus Jane stood on the flower-bed (2003: 21). If it is suggested
that there is a direct relation between the real world and language, as in truth-conditional
approaches, there is no explanation for why English speakers can describe the event of a
person standing in such a way that her feet are in contact with the piece of ground designated
as the flower-bed, using either on or in. Although according to traditional approaches, the
examples such as those above are not claimed to differ semantically, it can be observed that
each sentence stands for a distinct conceptualisation (or construal in the sense of Langacker,
e.g., 1987) of an objectively identical scenario. Thus, Jane stood in the flower-bed conveys
the idea that Jane stood in the middle of the flower-bed and she was surrounded by the flowers
(and she might have been gardening), whereas Jane stood on the flower-bed implies that Jane
stood on the flower-bed, as opposed to a piece of grassy area.

As concluded by cognitive linguists, it is possible for the semantic value of a lexical

item to be equal to a specific concept. Tyler and Evans indicate that “this conclusion has now
been reached by an increasing number of scholars who have recognised the fundamentally
conceptual nature of language and conceptual representation” (2003: 20). The dominant view
of cognitive linguists, expressed by one of the founders of this current, Langacker, is that the
form of a linguistic item is secondary to its meaning, i.e., the conceptualisation that it
represents:

[…] semantic structures [meanings] are conceptual structures established

by linguistic convention – the form which thoughts must assume for
purposes of ready linguistic symbolisation. Thus, semantic structure is
conventionalised conceptual structure (1991: 108-9).

17
The conceptual nature of the meaning associated with an individual lexeme is also a basic
tenet of Tyler and Evans’ approach. Their account is as follows:

A basic tenet of our approach (and the cognitive linguistic enterprise more
generally) is that the meaning associated with an individual lexeme is
conceptual in nature. The meanings associated with words are instantiated
in semantic memory not in terms of linguistic or semantic features, nor as
abstract propositions, but rather meaning prompted for by symbols such as
words, morphemes and grammatical constructions (in the sense of
Goldberg, 1995) constitutes a redescription of perceptual information, at
some level related to external sensorimotor experience (2003: 30).

In a similar manner, what Langacker proposes is that “grammar itself, i.e. patterns for
grouping morphemes into progressively larger configurations, is inherently symbolic and
hence meaningful” (1987: 12). Numerous researchers, e.g., Hamawand, support the basic in
CG opinion expressed by Langacker (1987) that language is symbolic in nature and its task
is to clarify the interaction between form and meaning in the make-up of linguistic
expressions (Hamawand 2011: 16). As Evans and Green state, a symbolic assembly is a
conventional linguistic unit, which means that it is a piece of language that speakers recognise
and ‘agree’ about in terms of what it means and how it is used. A conventional unit can be a
meaningful subpart of a word, i.e. a morpheme, a whole word, a string of words that ‘belong’
together as a phrase or as a whole sentence (2006: 12). Another term for a symbolic assembly
that is employed by some cognitive linguists is construction (e.g. Goldberg). Her definition
of a construction is as follows:

Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect

of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component
parts or from other constructions recognized to exist. In addition,
patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as long
as they occur with sufficient frequency (2006:5).

Similarly, Panther and Thornburg define constructions as ‘meaning-bearing units’ within the
‘lexicogrammatical system’ (2009: 14). Their approach to the concept of lexico-grammatical
construction will be elaborated upon in the final chapter of the present thesis with regard to
for-prefixed verbs.

18
1.3.The concept of a verb from the cognitive perspective

The prototypical sense of the class of verbs is the archetypal conception of an asymmetrical
energetic interaction, specially an event in which an agent does something to a patient.
Among the basic cognitive abilities involved in cognition, two are essential for characterising
the verb-class schema, namely the ability to establish relationships and the ability to scan
sequentially through a complex structure. It is claimed by Langacker that every verb profiles
a process, defined as a relationship that evolves through time and is scanned sequentially
along this axis. A process might also be called a temporal relation where temporal refers to
both its evolution though time and the sequential nature of its scanning (Langacker 2000:
10). An expression that profiles a relationship confers varying degrees of prominence on its
participants. There is usually a primary focal participant, called the trajector (tr), and often
a secondary focal participant, the landmark (lm). Like profiling, trajector/landmark
alignment is an aspect of linguistic meaning with important grammatical consequences.
Specifically, it is claimed to provide the conceptual basis for the notions of subject and object.
A subject is characterised as a nominal expression (referring to a conceptual “thing”) that
specifies the trajector of a profiled relationship, and an object as one which specifies a
landmark (another “thing”) (Langacker 2011: 182). Taking this into consideration, the present
author intends to discuss the profiles, trajectors and landmarks in the relations represented by
the for-prefixed verbs.

1.4.The axiological evaluations of verbs and Krzeszowski’s axiological principle

The considerations pertaining to the axiological aspect of English verbs seem to be relevant
as regards the verbal element participating in what constitutes the focus of interest within the
present work, i.e., the patterns of both the self-sake benefactive construction, e.g. He moved
to the seaside for the sake of his health (analysed in Chapter 3). Due importance should also
be attached to the axiological aspect of the for-prefixed verbs, e.g., forgive, forget, etc.
(examined in Chapter 4).

Krzeszowski (1990) claims that different types of words, especially content words, are
sensitive to axiological evaluations. When it comes to nouns, those referring to natural,
concrete, material objects are almost always neutral (e.g. names of plants, minerals, animals
and their various parts). By comparison, man-made objects and notions related to humans,
such as emotions and abstract phenomena are referred to by nouns which tend ‘to assume an

19
increasingly conspicuous amount of axiological load’. He also observes that verbs, similarly
to nouns, vary along the good-bad scale as regards their axiological charge. However, in the
case of verbs, “the concrete-abstract parameter does not seem to be so decisive in determining
their sensitivity to the axiological assessments as in the case of nouns” (1990: 149). This
statement is illustrated with the verb to kill, which, at least in civilised cultures, is situated
near the ‘bad’ pole of the scale, in spite of the fact that in its most literal sense it refers to
very concrete, physical actions that may have resulted in, e.g., obtaining food. Nevertheless,
there is a tendency for verbs to assume an increased level of sensitivity to axiological
assessments, especially when they refer to mental states and processes, rather than concrete
physical actions.

Krzeszowski refers to aforementioned tendency as the axiological principle, and he

formulates it as follows: Words have a tendency to be axiologically loaded with ‘good’ or
‘bad’ connotations in proportion to the degree of the human factor associated with them. The
axiological principle explains the fact that metaphorical concepts are more likely to be
axiologically loaded rather than non-metaphorical ones (1990: 149-150). It should be noted
that the meanings of verbs also subscribe to the axiological principle. Many of the verbs with
a high ‘good’ or ‘bad’ charge are only used in sentences whose subjects refer to human
agents. The verbs which are highly negatively charged, are, among others, the following:
abandon, banish, beat, blacken, blame, bore, bother, colonize, complain, deceive, forget,
grumble, pretend, refuse, reprehend, tease. All of them are within the proximity of the ‘bad’
pole. The verbs which, in turn, are highly positively charged are, among others, the following:
advise, approve, care, celebrate, compose, congratulate, encourage, explain, flatter, flirt,
guarantee, help, hope, inform, insure, invent, invite, love, marry, offer, own, please, polish,
prepare, present, produce, promise, provide, remember. They are within the proximity of the
‘good’ pole. A significant number of these verbs can be used with subject nouns referring to
non-human agents, but only when their meanings are metaphorically extended, as in the case
of personifications. Thus, they become charged with a high level of axiological load only if
they occur with subjects referring to human agents. Likewise, a much higher degree of
axiological load is evident in some lexical items when they are used metaphorically or when
the human factor is involved in the conceptualised scenes to which they refer (1990: 151-
152). As Krzeszowski claims, “in many instances, an axiologically neutral verb acquires
some charge when it is used in the sense expressing a voluntary and man-controlled action”.
He exemplifies this situation with the verb to change, which lies in the proximity of the

20
‘good’ pole only when it expresses a voluntary, deliberate action of a human being. He also
adds that “what motivates deliberate changes is the human desire to improve things with
respect to some axiological scale” (1990: 151-152). Some of the for-prefixed verbs analysed
in the present thesis are highly negatively charged, such as the aforementioned forget, to
which Krzeszowski refers in his classification of negatively charged verbs.

21
 Chapter 2: The nature of English prepositions

In the present chapter, the nature of the English prepositions in general will be briefly
delineated. It should be stated that spatial prepositions have been a major field of interest to
Cognitive Linguistics over the years. Brugman (1981), for example, has offered a detailed
semantic analysis of the senses of over in terms of a radial category. Its slightly changed
version is found in Lakoff (1987) and a detailed revision has been proposed by Dewell
(1994). Another account of over has been provided by Tyler and Evans (2003).

2.1.The syntactic properties of prepositions

The present chapter should be commenced with the specification of rudimentary syntactic
issues concerning prepositions, which are relational predication (cf. Langacker 1987),
namely, they express relation between two entities, one of which is represented by the
prepositional complement and the other by another nominal expression in a sentence. Words
which formally look like prepositions but do not take complements are adverbial particles
or prepositional adverbs (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 603-604). Consequently, four main
types of relational meanings of prepositions can be identified. As Quirk and Greenbaum
claim:

In the most general terms, a preposition expresses a relation between two

entities, one being that represented by the prepositional complement. Of the
various types of relational meaning, those of PLACE and TIME are the
most prominent and easy to identify. Other relationships such as
INSTRUMENT and CAUSE may be also recognised, although it is difficult
to describe prepositional meanings systematically in terms of such labels.
Some prepositional uses may be best elucidated by seeing a preposition as
related to a clause, e.g., The man with the red beard, The man who has the
red beard; my knowledge of Hindi and I know Hindi (1973: 143).

Quirk et al. argue that central prepositions can be negatively defined with reference to three
syntactic criteria. In their view, prepositions cannot be complemented by: a that-clause, an
infinitive clause, and a subjective case form of a personal pronoun, such as he, she (1985:
658-659). Referring to other types of characteristic syntactic behaviour of prepositional
phrases, according to Quirk et al. (1985: 657), they can perform the following syntactic
functions:

22
 • postmodifiers in a determiner phrase (The people on the bus were singing),
• adverbials:
o adjunct (In the afternoon, we went to Boston),
o subjunct (From a personal point of view, I find this a good solution to the
problem),
o disjunct (In all fairness, she did try to phone the police),
o conjunct (On the other hand, he made no attempt to help her),
• complementation of a verb, also in prepositional verbs (We were looking at his awful
painting),
• complementation of an adjective (I’m sorry for his parents).
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 603) enumerate the three most distinguishing syntactic
properties of prepositions:

• the characteristic complements they take (noun phrases, noun clauses, verb phrases,
prepositional phrases),
• the functions they have in the sentence (postmodifiers in a determiner phrase,
adverbials, complementation of a verb, complementation of an adjective),
• the ability to take certain adverbs, such as right, nearly, as modifiers.
The typical prepositions take nominal prepositional phrases as complements, e.g., under the
bed. There is a group of prepositions which take non-expandable content clauses as
complements, in other words those clauses which do not permit the subordinator that, such
as, for example We left before the meeting ended, where the preposition before heads the
phrase with the non-expandable clause as a complement since the insertion of that before the
clause yields the ungrammatical sentence. In general, most prepositions license a
complement of one of two kinds. All prepositions can head prepositional phrases which may
play the role of non-predicative adjuncts in a sentence, and many can head prepositional
phrases in a complement role. As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 604) claim, there is also a
large group of prepositions which accept adverbs, such as right and straight, as modifiers,
e.g., in the expressions straight on, right away. A prototypical preposition heads a
prepositional phrase and a complement composed of a determiner and a noun phrase, which
is the feature that distinguishes prepositions from adverbs, as the latter do not take
complements, and adjectives, out of which only four take a noun phrase complement, that is,
worth, due, like, unlike. Noun phrase complements are, therefore, reserved for prepositions

23
and verbs, and prepositions are generally easily distinguished from verbs by means of the
function and inflection of the latter (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 604). Quirk et al. observe
that as part of complements of verbs and adjectives, prepositions are more closely related to
those verbs or adjectives that determine their choice, than to the nouns that complement them
(1985: 657). A good illustration of this situation seems to be the following sentence, She
looked at her daughter, where at is more closely related to the verb which precedes it.

2.2.Senses of prepositions as radial categories

Another step due to be taken in the present study is to refer to prepositions as radial
categories. To analyse them in such terms it is necessary to mention the notions of category
and concept, which, according to many cognitive linguists, are not always distinguishable.
Even though Croft and Cruse (2004) as well as Ungerer and Schmid (1996) admit that
categories are sets of referents and not reservoirs of knowledge about them, they use the terms
category and concept interchangeably, whereas Evans (2010a) does not make use of the
notion of category at all. From the point of view of Langacker, a category is a set or a class
of elements judged equivalent for some purpose (2008: 93). He claims that categories can be
established for any facet of language. In cognitive semantics, alternate senses of a lexical
item, represented by the same phonological realisation, are believed to constitute a radial
category and the preposition for seems to be no exception. As indicated by Brenda:

if a given structure belongs to a category, it can be further used to categorize

another structure, which can become a category member. Linguistically, the
act of categorization involves using a particular morpheme, word or
construction in relation to the experience to be communicated. The
comparison of that experience to prior experiences and the judgement that
it belongs to a group of prior experiences to which a particular linguistic
expression applies constitute the basis of the categorization process (2014:
20-21).

Nevertheless, the practice of blurring the distinction between the concept and the category,
as Croft and Cruse claim, should be avoided as, clearly, they constitute distinct cognitive and
linguistic phenomena although, admittedly, categories and concepts have a common
denominator as the former is a list of entities and the latter the knowledge about those entities.
As Tyler and Evans hold, a category is so called because:

24
 it is possible to provide necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for determining
that an entity belongs to a particular category. Examples of such categories include
BACHELOR and ODD NUMBER. Nevertheless, since the advent of Eleanor
Rosch’s work on Prototype Theory it has become clear that even classical categories
exhibit typicality effects. For instance, some members of the ODD NUMBER
category such as 1, 3, 5 and 9 are typically judged as being better examples of the
category than high odd numbers such as 1001 (2007: 15).

For instance, the category DOG comprises phenomena related to one another by family
resemblance. From the cognitive point of view, the concept DOG represents the knowledge
language users have about dogs and it refers to their experience with this stereotypical kind
of animal. In the cognitive view of linguistics, the notion of a natural category is based on
family resemblance.

As assumed in cognitive lexical semantics, lexical items (words) represent conceptual

categories (i.e. conceptualisations) as is proposed in the conceptualist theory of meaning.
Moreover, a word stands for a category of distinct meanings, which are related in one way or
another and “exhibit typicality effects”. Lakoff (1987), like Brugman (1981), expresses the
view that lexical items represent the radial type of category. In the centre of such a category
there is a prototype, to which other category members are related in motivated ways which
can be conventionalised. An often-quoted example of such a radial category is the preposition
over, which represents a conceptual category of distinct but related senses, i.e., is
polysemous. Lakoff also indicates that non-central senses are related to the prototype by
elaboration or metaphorical extension and points to the motivations of the emergence of non-
prototypical senses.

Likewise, in the present thesis the preposition for is considered to represent a radial
category with a central, prototypical sense, to which other senses or category members are
related. As claimed by Langacker, “linguistic expressions are not meaningful in and of
themselves, but only through the access they afford to different stores of knowledge that
allow us to make sense of them” (1987: 155). Therefore, as Tyler and Evans hold, after
Langacker, lexical items should be treated as points of access to conceptual knowledge, since
“this reflects what we know about how a particular linguistic expression is used and our
knowledge of that aspect of the conceptualized world which the entity it prompts for inhabits”
(2003: 17). The same authors add that one can access this kind of knowledge with the use of

25
‘various inferencing strategies’, which, in turn, enable language users to create complex
conceptualisations dependent on and related to their experiences of the world (2003: 17).

Also Boers (1996: 205) analyses polysemous lexical items and indicates that they may
be conceived of as radial categories structured around ‘prototypical’ or ‘central’ schemas.
The central schemas are clearly distinct, but the peripheries of categories may exhibit some
overlap. This holds for the prepositions under and below, over and above, behind and beyond,
before and in front of, and so on. The different senses of a preposition can usually be traced
back to one central schema. This central schema is felt to be the most typical case of the
category and it is usually the most frequently used one.

2.3.On universality and variability in the semantics of spatial adpositions – spatial

relations of prepositions

An important work that should be referred to within the present thesis is “On universality and
variability in the semantics of spatial adpositions” by Bruce Hawkins, which is aimed at re-
introducing the issue of universality into the research programme of cognitive linguistics.
The author examines semantic structures in the domain of spatial relations, attending most
directly to the question of what semantic structures characteristic of English spatial
prepositions may be considered universal. He does so within the theoretical framework of
Cognitive Grammar as established by Langacker (1983), including its assumptions that
meaning should be considered from the encyclopaedic perspective and that the meanings of
linguistic units are inherently connected to ‘a complex web of linguistic and extralinguistic
contexts’ (Hawkins 1993: 327). Hawkins recalls the Langackerian idea of the concept of
cognitive base, which according to Langacker, is ‘a certain body of conceptual content’
selected by an expression as ‘the basis for its meaning’. He describes a ‘conceptual base’ of
an expression as ‘its maximal scope in all domains of its matrix (or all domains accessed on
a given occasion)’. He continues that

[…] construed more narrowly, its base is identified as the immediate scope
in active domains – that is, the portion put ‘onstage’ and foregrounded as
the general locus of viewing attention. Within this onstage region, attention
is directed to a particular substructure, called the profile. Thus, an
expression’s profile stands out as the specific focus of attention within its
immediate scope. The profile can also be characterised as what the

26
 expression is conceived as designating or referring to within its base (its
conceptual referent) (…) In fact, it is quite common that two or more
expressions evoke the same conceptual content yet different in meaning by
virtue of profiling different substructures within this common base (1987:
66-67).

Langacker, as Hawkins indicates, touches briefly on the issue of universality in his discussion
of the base in a semantic structure (1987: 149). He claims that every base involves
specifications in one or more cognitive domains and that some of these domains may be
conceptual primitives, hence they can be expected to be universal. Although he refers to these
as basic cognitive domains, he suggests that the search for universals among the inventory of
profile structures is outside the scope of CG (1993: 328). According to Hawkins, an adequate
description of the set of semantic structures profiled by English spatial prepositions
necessitates three fundamental parametres of semantic structure:

• basic relations,
• configurations instantiable by the prepositional trajector,
• configurations instantiable by the prepositional landmark (1993: 329).
As recognised by Hawkins, there are only two basic relations which are profiled by
spatial prepositions in English, those of ‘coincidence’ and ‘separation’. In other words, the
specifically relational content of the conception represented by any spatial preposition in
English can be identified as either ‘coincidence’ or ‘separation’. The essential defining
characteristic of ‘coincidence’ is referred to explicitly in the principal definition of the verb
coincide provided by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, which specifies its
meaning as ‘to occupy the same place in space’. The crucial word here is same; all other
terms in the definition simply indicate that the relation involves a location in space. The word
same identifies the quality of this spatial relation – spatial co-occurrence, two entities
perceived as occupying one physical space. In contrast, the defining characteristic of
‘separation’ is difference. In any case of ‘separation’, there are two (or more) entities
perceived as occupying two different physical spaces. A natural consequence of this is that it
is possible, indeed, logically necessary, to perceive a spatial gap between the entities in a
‘separation’ relation. No such spatial gap can be perceived in a ‘coincidence’ relation
(Hawkins 1993: 329).

27
 As was mentioned earlier, the structure of English sentences confirms in fact that
spatial prepositions describe relations between ‘things’, e.g., the ball on the hill, or between
a processual ‘relation’ and a ‘thing’, e.g., the ball rolled down the hill (Hawkins 1993: 331).
Furthermore, Hawkins mentions two commonly recognised types of spatial prepositions, i.e.,
directional and locative ones. A directional preposition presupposes some path as part of its
TR configuration. Furthermore, having posed the question: If the path image is the defining
characteristic of directional prepositions, what is the TR configuration characteristic of
locative prepositions?, he states that the recognition of these two categories can be sufficient
as regards the set of English spatial prepositions (1993: 334). When it comes to landmark
configurations, the relational potential of ‘medium’ is describable as enclosure, inclusion, or
containment. The relational potential of ‘surface’ includes such concrete physical relations
as contact, support, resistance, and contiguity. The ‘channel’ image is characterised by a
relational potential that can be defined as passage, conveyance, or transmission. He refers to
this functional characteristic of the LM configurations as relational potential because the
concrete relations actually occur only when the particular LM configuration is found in a
‘coincidence’ relation. When the same configuration is found in a ‘separation’ relation, the
relational potential remains unrealised (Hawkins 1993: 336). Considering Hawkins’ criteria,
for would be defined as directional preposition with relational content of the conception
represented by it identified as ‘coincidence’. In Tyler and Evans’ terminology, in turn, for is
a spatial particle of orientation because it involves the oriented TR (2003: 146).

2.4.Polysemy of prepositions in the context of related senses

One of the important issues in cognitive grammar is the observation that a frequently-used
morpheme or lexical item represents a variety of interrelated senses (Tyler and Evans 2003:
35). The senses or, in other words, ‘highly complex structured categories of meanings’ are
word meanings stored in the mental lexicon (Evans, Bergen, Zinken 2007: 15). With
reference to lexicon, Langacker’s observation is that a lexical item in a natural language is
typically polysemous, which means that it does not have just one meaning, but stands for a
variety of related senses with varying degrees of entrenchment. Thus, some of them are more
powerful, more prototypical than others. These senses constitute a network, whose elements
are linked by two kinds of relationships. The first type refers to those senses, which arise by
extension from other, more central values. The second type distinguished by Langacker
encompasses senses which instantiate (or elaborate) other, more schematic values (2000: 4).

28
 Lakoff notes that the mental representation of a word constitutes a ‘family of related
senses’ (1987: 416). On the basis of considerations concerning the verb leave, he concludes
that the basic sense might be stored in mental lexicon and is inherently related to spatial uses.
Lakoff carries on explaining that the verb leave ‘could refer to movement out of an enclosed
space or to movement away from an entity, typically another person; the two senses are
closely related and both may sometimes be implicated’. Lakoff’s conclusion as regards leave
is that the concept constituting the meaning of this verb may be perceived as ‘a cluster of
closely related senses, some of which mutually entail each other, some of which highlight
certain facets which are downplayed or are irrelevant in other cases, none of which, however,
can be regarded as constituting the ‘basic’, or ‘true’ meaning of the verb’ (Lakoff 1987: 416).
The present author intends to describe the concepts represented by the for-prefixed verbs in
accordance with the afore-mentioned claims put forward by Lakoff.

According to Langacker or Croft, any conceptualisation presupposes a conceptual

network of interrelated knowledge and a domain is any coherent network of knowledge
which provides the necessary background for understanding a concept (Langacker 1987;
Croft 1993). Langacker calls the domains rooted in directly embodied human experience
basic ones (1987: 148), whereas non-basic domains are abstract domains. The relation
between an abstract domain and a basic domain it presupposes is not a taxonomic relation or
a schematic relation, as Langacker refers to it (1987). As he claims, “it is a relationship of
concept to background assumption or presupposition” (1987).

Taking into account and having been inspired by Langacker’s assumptions and Tyler
and Evans’ work on English prepositions and their interrelated senses (2003), the present
author intends to prepare graphic schema of two networks of senses, one represented by the
preposition for, and the second one represented by its Polish equivalent dla, with
incorporation of a spatial vantage point (Langacker 2000: 5) as an inherent aspect of its
meaning. It is difficult to create a network analogous to Brugman’s network of over. The
reason is that in the expressions such as for his health or for democracy it is a challenging
task to decide whether metaphoricity4 pertains only to the object or it is extended to the
preposition for.

4
Lakoff and Johnson (1992) are the pioneers in ascribing a completely new characteristics to metaphor
and changing its traditional account. Lakoff provides a new vision of metaphor coming through a complicated

29
2.4.1.The Principled Polysemy Model and its aim

Another phenomenon to be elucidated is that of Principled Polysemy, which is a model of

lexical representation developed within cognitive lexical semantics. The idea of Principled
Polysemy was developed by Vyvyan Evans and Andrea Tyler in response to the full-
specification model of polysemy, which, according to them, is not a satisfactory one and there
are some shortcomings about it. The main purpose of the Principled Polysemy model, as the
authors claim, is to develop a lexical semantic analysis that would be methodologically
motivated and conducted in a principled way. In that case the polysemy fallacy, which is
explained as follows, could be avoided.

A fallacy in reasoning is committed by some scholars who take a cognitive

lexical semantics approach, particularly as evident in the full-specification
model of polysemy. Dominiek Sandra, who coined the phrase, argues that
to view all context-bound usages of a particular lexical item as instances of
polysemy is to commit what he calls the polysemy fallacy. The fallacy can
be paraphrased as follows: because a lexical item exhibits distinct semantic
contributions in context, each distinct semantic contribution is due to a
distinct underlying sense of lexical concept. According to Sandra this
reasoning is fallacious as it does not follow that all or even many distinct
instances associated with a lexical item provide evidence for distinct senses
stored in semantic memory. The polysemy fallacy then serves to underplay
the role of context in providing a linguistic unit with a semantic value
(2007: 164).

The Principled Polysemy Model is aimed at developing clear decision principles that make
semantic network analyses as objective and verifiable as possible. Two goals can be achieved
due to these decision principles. First of all, they should serve to determine what counts as a
distinct sense and thus distinguish between senses stored in semantic memory and context-
dependent meanings constructed ‘on-line’. Another most significant goal is to establish the
prototypical or central sense associated with a particular radial category.

path from the source domain to the target domain. The concept of metaphor is described by Lakoff as: “a cross-
domain mapping in the conceptual system. The term ‘metaphorical expression’ refers to a linguistic expression
(a word, phrase, sentence) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping” (1992: 203).

30
 The Principled Polysemy model has been successfully applied to a range of lexical
classes including prepositions, nouns and verbs (A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics, Evans
2007: 170). At this point it is important to distinguish between a sense and an elaboration of
a lexeme. While a sense constitutes a distinct and identifiable lexical concept or meaning
(based on criteria to be adduced), an elaboration, on the other hand, pertains to the nature of
the semantic content appropriated by a particular sense, which serves to structure a particular
sense (Evans 2005: 39). The primary tasks that a model of studying the polysemy exhibited
by spatial particles should attend to are:

• to establish what information is most appropriately included in the

representation of the individual lexical entry and what information is
appropriately represented as arising from cognitive processing and
general world knowledge;
• to model the systematic processes through which on-line contextually
determined interpretations of spatial particles arise;
• to model the systematic processes through which meaning is extended
and through which the distinct senses – represented in long-term
memory – become part of a lexical item’s semantic network (Tyler and
Evans 2003: 7).

The afore-quoted ‘tasks’ have been taken into consideration during preparation of the
network of senses of the preposition for.

2.5.Detecting the central sense of a preposition

Sandra and Rice (1995) pay attention to problems concerning any analysis of a polysemy
network, including the recognition of what constitutes the primary sense. According to them,
detecting the primary sense is relatively arbitrary and reflects each analyst’s own preferences
or imagination. However, Langacker seems to have been arguing persuasively that there are
various kinds of evidence that help discover and verify the structure of a complex category
(1987: 376). Tyler and Evans propose a set of criteria that they believe provides a more
principled, intersubjective method of determining the appropriate primary sense of individual
prepositions. They refer to one sense among the many distinct ones, termed by Langacker
(1987: 157) the sanctioning sense, from which other senses may have been extended (Tyler
and Evans 2001: 108). The criteria used in specifying the sanctioning sense encompass:

31
 • time of appearance in language (the earliest attested meaning),
• predominance in the semantic network,
• relations to other prepositions,
• grammatical predictions (Langacker 1987: 157).
As regards the first criterion, Tyler and Evans claim that, contrary to other word classes, “the
earliest attested sense for many prepositions is still a major, active component of the
synchronic semantic network of each particle”. Predominance in a semantic network means
that the sense most likely to be the sanctioning one will be the sense whose cognitive domains
(lower-order conceptions in a matrix) appear most often in other separate senses, related to
the primary one. When it comes to the criterion of relations to other prepositions, “certain
clusters of prepositions appear to form compositional sets that divide up various spatial
dimensions”. The authors mention above, over, under, and below, which seem to belong to
“a compositional set that divides the vertical dimension into four related subspaces”. They
also distinguish other compositional sets, including in and out, on, as well as off, up and
down. The last criterion concerns grammatical predictions. If it is recognised that the now
distinct senses were at one time derived from and related to a pre-existing sense and became
part of the semantic network through ‘routinization’ and ‘entrenchment of meaning’, it can
be predicted that a number of the senses should be directly derivable from the primary sense
(c.f. Tyler and Evans 2001: 108).

It seems that the aforementioned authors were concerned predominantly with

prototypical examples of the category of prepositions (i.e. most representative). They did not
pay attention to ones applying to less clearly distinguishable spatial dimensions, such as of,
with, about and for. Only Tyler and Evans (2003) attempted to present the main senses of the
particle for in a systematic way, which will be elaborated upon in the next Chapter.

32
 Chapter 3: The story of for

As already mentioned, the theoretical paradigm assumed in the present thesis is that of
Cognitive Linguistics, where much attention is devoted to the category of prepositions, which
prototypically refer to spatial relations (Brugman 1981, 1988). That is why it is immensely
important to take into account the cognitive idea of prepositions for the purposes of the
present study, which was briefly presented in Chapter 2.
It is vital to commence with a deeper insight into the phenomenon of polysemy of
prepositions, which was addressed, among others, by Brugman (1981) or Tyler and Evans
(2003). As Turewicz (2004) explains:
the poly-semantic nature of prepositions has been discussed in linguistic
literature and confirmed by linguistic data. In the majority of research
within cognitive linguistics, prepositions have been approached as
predicates organising entities in space, with less attention paid to the search
for a meaning schema sanctioning the numerous uses.
Although, as Turewicz claims, less attention has been paid to organising systematically
different uses of prepositions, Tyler and Evans (2003), as well as, earlier, Brugman (1981)
attempted to present systematic analyses aimed at determining the sanctioning sense as
regards the preposition over. The authors also assert that “Cognitive Linguistics offers an
alternative perspective, suggesting that the many distinct meanings associated with a
particular preposition are related in systematic, principled ways” (Tyler, Ho and Mueller
2011: 182-183). Thus, the senses of both the prefix for- and the preposition for will be
presented in the form of network in an effort to recognise the respective sanctioning senses
and to demonstrate the relatedness between all nodes presented in both networks. Although
it may seem to be a demanding task, taking into consideration Lakoff’s claim about
incompatibility of the senses of a particular lexeme in two languages, the present author
hypothesises that the sanctioning sense of the preposition for is the same in two languages,
such as English and Polish.
It appears to be of paramount importance that the lexicon be conceived in terms of a
highly complex and elaborate network of form-meaning associations in which each form is
paired with participants in a semantic network or continuum. Under such an analysis, the
relations within the lexicon are to a higher degree motivated and far less arbitrary than has
traditionally been assumed (Tyler and Evans 2003: 31). In addition to this, polysemy
networks form as a result of speakers’ perceiving communicatively useful connections

33
between the primary sense and a non-primary use. The central issues facing a principled
theory of polysemy networks, then, are to model (1) the appropriate representation of the
primary sense and (2) the relationships among the elements in the network (Tyler and Evans
2003: 32).

3.1. The polysemy of over

As reported by Schmid and de Gruyter (2012: 157), when it comes to the ongoing, originally
Brugman’s, Story of Over, it is still uncertain what is the basic, or central sense of the
preposition, the sense from which other uses can be most feasibly derived, and by what means
they are derived, i.e., “by the active zone phenomenon, by metaphor, by metonymy” or other
means. The question, which remains unanswered is “whether over is basically a place
preposition, designating the higher location of the trajector”, as argued by Tyler and Evans
(2001), or whether it designates a complex configuration, combining the senses of above and
across, as proposed by Brugman (1981) and Lakoff (1987). If the latter is assumed, another
question arises, i.e., whether the preposition is indifferent as to the shape of the trajectory, or
is it associated with a distinctive arc-like up-down configuration, as proposed by Dewell
(1994)? According to Taylor (2012: 156, after Deane 2005), “an alternative is that the basic
sense of the word is to be understood in terms of the location of an entity intervening between
a usually unnamed observer and a landmark”. Nevertheless, the afore-described deliberations
on the problematicity of determining the basic sense of the preposition over have constituted
a point of departure for the identification of the main sense of the preposition for presented
in the forthcoming part of the current section.

Thus, it is Tyler and Evans’ linguistic expertise and study that serves as a reference
point in an attempt to distinguish the senses of the preposition for undertaken within the
present work. The polysemy network, which has been created to give an account of the most
prominent senses of the preposition in question and to demonstrate the relations holding
between them is based on the example of the network represented by over (Fig. 3 on the next
page).

34
Fig. 3. The semantic network for over (Tyler and Evans 2003: 80)

Tyler and Evans provide numerous examples of the senses of over included in the above-
provided network. As regards the protoscene, i.e. the basic, primary sense of the preposition
it is one in which ‘the TR is higher than but within a region of potential contact with the LM’
and ‘the TR and LM are within each other’s sphere of influence’, as in The picture is over
the mantel (2003: 65-66). To illustrate the use of one of the other senses, for example ‘the
Excess I Sense’, they provide the following sentence The arrow flew over the target and
landed in the woods, where the specific sense of over is used as predicted by the proto-scene
but with the additional implicatures that the LM represents an intended goal or target and that
the TR moved beyond the intended or desired point’ (the additional element is ‘path’) (2003:
83). When it comes to other senses, for example ‘the Completion Sense’, it is illustrated with
The cat’s jump is over [=finished/complete] and an example of ‘the Transfer Sense’ is Sally
turned the keys to the office over to the janitor, where “the conceptualization constructed is

35
of a TR moving from one point to another” and “this is a consequence of understanding the
spatial scene as one involving the transfer of a TR from one location, namely point A, to a
new location, point C” (2003: 85-87). The festival will take place over the weekend is an
illustration of ‘the Temporal Sense’, where “over mediates a temporal relation between a
particular TR and a period of duration” (2003: 88). The last sense described by Tyler and
Evans is ‘the Repetition Sense’, which, as they claim, “adds an iterative meaning component
to the use of over” and it is exemplified by the sentence After the false start, they started the
race over.

Taking into account Tyler and Evans’ methodology, it seems that the first step to be
taken before preparing the network of the senses of for should be the identification of the
proto-scene functioning as the main sanctioning sense5 of the preposition in question, from
which other ones have been diachronically derived in a principled way. What is more, as
assumed in the study, some instances of the main sense should be recognised independently
of context. To put it briefly, the prototypical sense should not be inferred from another sense
or from the context in which it occurs (Tyler and Evans 2001). Nevertheless, to create an
adequate model of polysemy, it is not sufficient to describe the senses that exist in the
network. It should also be explained how they emerged and how they are distinct from locally
constructed meanings arising in mental spaces dynamically established in the course of
language use, which are not recorded in memory (Tyler and Evans 2003: 64). Their
assumption is not that words contain meaning, but rather, in the spirit of lexical semantics
proposed by such scholars as Fauconnier (1997), Langacker (1987) and Turner (1991), that
words prompt highly complex conceptualisations (2003: 17), rather than ‘carrying’
independent meaning, as is suggested by the accounts of lexical semantics compliant with
the conduit metaphor.

Fig. 3 above, in accordance with Langacker’s idea of symbolic unit (see Chapter 1),
reflects the already mentioned assumption that “there is a single primary sense associated
with a preposition and that the other senses are derived from this primary sense in a principled
way” (Tyler and Evans 2001: 108). A similar network provided in the forthcoming sections
portrays the interrelatedness of the senses of the preposition for. In accordance with the
already quoted claim of cognitive semantics, polysemous lexemes, such as English spatial

5
It should be elucidated that ‘scene’ stands for an image schema whereas ‘sense’ is a meaning.

36
particles, form semantic polysemy networks. Such analyses have traditionally attempted to
model the lexicon in terms of ‘a radiating lattice structure’, reflecting the working assumption
adopted by cognitive semanticists, which views the lexicon as a ‘mental coordinate system’
(Rice 1993: 206). Within a semantic polysemy network, a lexical item is treated as a
conceptual category, which subsumes a variety of distinct but related (i.e., polysemous)
meanings or senses. Each sense is treated within the network as a node. Such networks are
typically diagrammed with one central sense, from which other senses are derived in radial
fashion (Tyler and Evans 2003: 31).

Tyler and Evans also observe that in some cases, “a distinct, conventionalized sense
arising from the conceptualization is prompted for by another conventionalized sense, rather
than directly from the proto-scene”. An example of this is ‘Excess Sense I’, which “is
represented as arising from the conceptualization associated with ‘the More Sense’ rather
than arising directly from a conceptualization in which the proto-scene of over occurs”.
‘Excess Sense I’ can be illustrated by Most students wrote over the word limit in order to
provide sufficient detail (Tyler and Evans 2003: 84). It is, therefore, possible to group more
closely related senses into clusters, which are sets of senses established “when a complex
conceptualization gives rise to multiple senses”. In their graph they are represented by an
open circle, and a single distinct sense is represented by a shaded sphere. In the heart of the
network, the proto-scene is located (2003: 79-80).

3.2.The polysemy of for

After presenting the relevant theoretical assumptions concerning polysemy in general and the
polysemy of prepositions in particular, the issue of the preposition for with its interconnected
senses, or in other words meanings, should be addressed. First, the interrelated senses of this
preposition, which are viewed as a representation of a radial category, will be distinguished,
in the mode proposed by Brugman (1981). To determine the ‘core sense’ or ‘sanctioning
sense’ (the terms suggested by Langacker 1987) or the proto-scene (the term introduced by
Tyler and Evans 2003) in terms of a conceptualization of the sanctioning sense of for, the
criteria set by the latter authors (2001: 108) that will be taken into consideration. The present
author also finds support in Quirk’s authority (1985: 696-7), and in the categorisation of the
senses of for provided by Jackendoff (1990: 184). Other reputable sources referred to are the
following dictionaries:

37
 • The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,

• Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English,

• The Cambridge Dictionary (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/),

• Online Etymology Dictionary (http://www.etymonline.com/)

3.2.1.The earliest attested meaning of for

It is with reference to the above-mentioned sources that the study of the polysemy of for has
been accomplished within the present work. When it comes to the first task of determining
the sanctioning sense, according to Tyler and Evans (2003), the earliest attested meaning,
which is crucial in the identification of the primary or sanctioning sense of the preposition in
question should be recognised. Thus, the earliest attested ancestor of the preposition for was
fore, representing the sense similar to that of before, i.e., ‘preceding’ as in the words forefoot,
forerunner, forename, forecast, foreman, foresee, forefinger, where the senses of fore are
spatial or temporal, i.e., metaphorical in the case of the latter. It must also be noted that for
shares its etymology with the German für, meaning ‘for’, ‘on behalf of’, ‘by the standards
of’, ‘in order to’, and serving as the expression of purposiveness, which seems also the main
sense of the preposition for in Modern English, as will be demonstrated in the course of the
current work. However, in contrast to the German language, where there exist two distinct
albeit related forms, i.e., the preposition für and the prefix ver-, in English one form
comprises the roles of both a preposition and a prefix, hence may be considered an instance
of homonymy. Nevertheless, Webster’s Dictionary Third College Edition points to the Proto-
Indo-European root *per- as the predecessor of both the preposition for and the prefix for-.

According to the Online Etymology Dictionary, for as a preposition appeared in English

in the 1580s, yet earlier it occurred in a different form in various phrases borrowed from
Latin and French. However, the earlier French and Latin forms were not for; the preposition
evolved from the Latin and French root in accordance with Grimm’s laws, changing the
initial phoneme /p/ into the phoneme /f/. Thus, it is a word which derives from the Latin per
meaning ‘through’, ‘during’, ‘by means of’, ‘on account of’, ‘as in’, descending, in turn, from
the PIE root *per-, which generally serves as “base of prepositions and preverbs with the
basic meanings of ‘forward’, ‘through’, and a wide range of extended senses such as ‘in front
of’, ‘before’, ‘early’, ‘first’, ‘chief’, ‘toward’, ‘against’, ‘near’, ‘at’, ‘around’” [The American

38
Heritage Dictionary Indo-European Roots Appendix, Watkins6]. Its cognates are the Sanskrit
pari- ‘around’, ‘about’, ‘through’; the Latin pro “before, for, on behalf of, instead of”; the
Old English fore as a preposition meaning “before, in front of”; as an adverb “before,
previously”; the Old English fer-.7 In Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English
(1989: 526), the preposition for is claimed to be akin to the German für. The meaning of für
is, as already specified, ‘for, on behalf of, by the standards of, in order to’.

As can be observed, all the etymologies collated above point to a specific aspect of the
meaning of for, i.e. its spatial dimension. In Tyler and Evans’ Semantics of English
Prepositions (2003), the etymology of the spatial particle for, as they call it, is also
considered. Thus, the Old English for, was used rather as a modifier interchangeably with
fore, both of which had derived from the same Old Teutonic root meaning ‘in front of’. By
the beginning of the Middle English period, for and fore had developed distinct meanings to
the effect of the two forms no longer being interchangeable. While fore retained the ‘in front
of’ sense (cf. forehead, etc.). This meaning became obsolete with for, also in the temporal
aspect. Taking these facts into consideration, Tyler and Evans claim that in the case of for,
the earliest attested sense cannot be considered to be evidence for identifying the primary one
in the case of the preposition in question. The reason is that the ‘in front of’ sense, the
historically earliest one, is no longer in any way associated with the synchronic network of
for, therefore this sense cannot be considered to be the primary one in the synchronic
network.

In modern English the spatial sense of the preposition for is obsolete. As can be
observed, the largest number of senses in the semantic network represented by for relate to
the notion of purpose. In the past, the spatial dimension of for was more prominent whereas
at present for is typically used to refer to purposiveness. Since predictability and
preponderance of senses are two key criteria for determining the synchronic primary sense
(the proto-scene) the functional element of purpose has been recognised as a key notion in
the proto-scene represented by the preposition in question. As Tyler and Evans suggest, “this
coheres with the foregoing discussion concerning the notion of intentionality associated with
uses of for” (2003: 149).

6
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/indoeurop.html
7
http://www.etymonline.com/

39
3.2.2.Quirk and Greenbaum’s account of for

The following uses of for, which is a simple, monosyllabic, commonly used lexical unit, are
discussed by Quirk and Greenbaum (1985: 665). Thus, the preposition in question is
employed to express:

1) duration,
2) cause,
3) purpose, intended destination,
4) recipient,
5) support,
6) standard,
7) spatial measure,
8) reason.

Although Quirk and Greenbaum do not state which use is the prototypical one, it seems to be
clear that according to them, for is primarily used within the scope of the duration sense, as
this one is mentioned first of all. In their categorisation of prepositions, Quirk and Greenbaum
describe them with regard to the senses they represent, i.e., according to semantic criteria. As
they note, the sense of duration is the one usually expressed by for, which can be exemplified
by the sentence We camped there for the summer. They also acknowledge the use of for in
the duration sense in certain idiomatic phrases, e.g. forever, for good, for years (and years)
(1985: 665). Other examples with for referring to a stretch of time provided by Quirk are We
stayed there (for) the whole week, where for can be omitted or I haven’t spoken to her for
three months, where it is used obligatorily since the verb is dynamic, i.e. denotes a
state/action capable of changing, and “the action of the verb is clearly not continuously
coextensive with the period specified” (1985: 694). They also specify that the adverbs which
most commonly function as complements of the preposition for are then, today, yesterday,
now, tomorrow, tonight, after, afterwards, later, ever, once and long. All of them are adverbs
whose meaning involves the notion of the passage of time.

When it comes to the purpose / reason (cause) spectrum, Q&G explain that at its one
end, “we have prepositions expressing either the material cause or the psychological cause
(motive) for a happening. Phrases of cause, reason, and motive answer the question Why…?”
(1985: 695). Furthermore, some of the uses of for, where its function is mainly restricted to

40
the expression of motive, i.e. psychological cause, may be illustrated by the following
sentence I hid the money, for fear of what my parents would say. Q&G also add that “for is
found with a relatively small number of expressions, e.g. for fear, love, joy, sorrow”, whose
meanings fall within the scope of psychological cause (1985: 696). Moreover, Q&G
recognise the sentence They left early for fear (that) they would meet him as an instantiation
of the causal use. However, the sense of for therein expressed appears to be similar to that
involved in I hid the money, for fear of what my parents would say, which the authors classify
as an instance of ‘negative purpose’ (1985: 1107). It can, thus, be noted that Q&G put two
sentences involving the same for phrase under two different labels, which seems to be a signal
of the phenomenon of fuzziness of the distinction between these two aspects of the meaning
of for, namely that referring to cause and that referring to purpose. Indeed, Q&G do indicate
that the sense of cause overlaps with the sense of purpose. As they appear to hold, the
causativeness and purposiveness of the preposition are not clearly distinguishable. To
illustrate the use of for as a means to express purpose, Q&G provide examples quoted below.
It should be indicated, though, that, as demonstrated by the paraphrases8, the complements
can be interpreted as referring to purpose as well as cause.

• He’ll do anything for money (He will do anything because he is after money so much /
He will do anything in order to get money)
• Everyone ran for shelter (Everyone ran because they needed shelter / Everyone ran in
order to find shelter)
• For the journey, they packed three large picnic baskets of food (Because they were
going on a journey they packed three large picnic baskets of food / They packed three
large picnic baskets of food in order to use them on a journey) (1985: 696).

Thus, if for is used in this way, it is possible to formulate paraphrases including the expression
in order to, as in the examples above, e.g. for money (in order to gain money), or for shelter
(in order to reach shelter) (1985: 696). However, it seems that paraphrases including because
are also possible, which proves that there is no clear-cut distinction between those two senses.

Within the scope of ‘purpose’ Q&G also include the for expressing intended spatial
destination, where for goes with the following verbs of movement: run, sail, head, e.g. He
headed for London. Moreover, according to Tyler and Evans, other verbs typically co-

8
The paraphrases are provided by the present author.

41
existing with the preposition for also refer to motion, e.g., set out, start, leave, depart. All of
these verbs mark the beginning phase of a journey and entail the necessity to select a
particular destination, thus, the aspect of intentionality is highlighted (2003: 147). One
expression in this group, which, however, does not refer to the beginning of the path of
motion but to its middle part is make for, as in We made for home, where made for means
‘headed for’. One more aspect of the meaning of for that can be found in the aforecited source
is that of spatial measure expressed as distance, e.g. She had driven for fifty kilometres (Q&G
1985: 480).

Two more examples involving the rather marginal use of the preposition in question
provided by Q&G, are the following: My publisher sent it for me to comment on (it) and They
left the door open (in order to) for me to hear the baby, where in order to is a “more explicit
subordinator of purpose” than for (1985: 1107).

Q&G also observe that “when for is followed by noun phrases designating persons or
animals, the meaning is rather one of intended recipient”. What is specified as the goal
(purpose) is the intended recipient/experiencer:

• He laid a trap for his enemies

• She made a beautiful doll for her daughter
• He cooked a dinner for her” (1985: 696-7).

As regards the sentences above, “denoting intended recipient (the daughter may or may not
have actually received the doll), the complement of the preposition can be identified as an
indirect object “her daughter” like in She gave a beautiful doll to her daughter or “her” in He
cooked her a dinner” (1985: 697). Moreover, the concept of support (‘in favour of’) can also
be conveyed by the preposition for, as in the question Are you for or against the plan? (1985:
702). This use also seems to involve a sense of directionality. For-phrases are also used to
settle down a norm, a standard, e.g.:

• He’s not bad for a youngster (considering the “normal”, stereotypical behaviour of
youngsters),
• That dog is long-legged for a terrier (bearing in mind an image of an average terrier),
• For an Englishman, he speaks foreign languages remarkably well (referring to a popular
opinion concerning the foreign language skills of English people),

42
 • It’s a dreadfully expensive toy for what it is (it is not worth its price) (1985: 711).

Q&G also provide the example of for used in clearly recognisable clauses of reason,
e.g. Much has been written about psychic phenomena, for they pose fascinating problems
that have yet to be resolved, where the clause introduced by for can serve as an example of
formal language register. Quirk explains that “more peripheral uses of reason clauses express
an indirect reason. The reason is not related to the situation in the matrix clause but is a
motivation for the implicit speech act9 of the utterance”. An illustration of this can be the
following sentence Percy is in Washington, for he phoned me from there.

3.2.3.Jackendoff’s categorisation of the senses of for

An account of the considered lexeme, which is in line with the topic of the present work is
demonstrated by Jackendoff, who, on his part, distinguishes two kinds of for, i.e. the for of
exchange and the for of benefit (1990: 184). As he explicates, “the for of exchange always
goes to the Source of main clause while the for of benefit goes to either the Actor or the
Beneficiary of the main clause”. He observes, though, the ambiguity which the preposition
can cause when it is used in a sentence like Bill obtained some food for his dog, which is
caused by the indeterminacy between the beneficiary and the exchange senses. When for is
interpreted as the expression of exchange, the sentence suggests that Bill traded his dog for
food. If it is assumed that the construction is of the beneficiary type, then the interpretation
that Bill obtained food with the intention of giving it to his dog becomes valid. This ambiguity
seems to be specific to English as it is not recognized in, e.g., Polish, where the two senses
are rendered by two distinct prepositions: za (exchange) and dla (beneficiary). In
Jackendoff’s account, other for’s involving intended goals or purposes are exemplified by
the following sentences:

• Bill headed for home. (spatial/purpose)

• Bill tried for a new job. (purpose)
• Bill looked for Harry. (purpose)
• Bill aimed for the target. (purpose)
• What is this machine for? (purpose)

9
The sense in which Quirk uses the term ‘implicit speech act’ seems to be that of ‘implicature’. An implicit
speech act, according to Austin (1962, 2005), is one accomplished by an utterance with no performative clause.

43
 Some marginal types of for classified by Jackendoff are the temporal senses of the
preposition, as in The movie lasted for six hours, and another sense of for, which Jackendoff
is “not sure how to characterize” is illustrated with the sentence What do you do for a stiff
neck? (1990: 184). It seems, however, that it might be suggested that the aforementioned
uncertain for be called the for of contingency since What do you do for a stiff neck? could be
paraphrased as What do you do if you have a stiff neck. However, it could also be interpreted
as an ellipted clause of purpose, e.g., for relaxing a stiff neck (1990: 184).

3.2.4.The recipient for and the benefactive for

The two most important kinds of for distinguished by Weissenborn, Goodluck and Roeper
(1992), are the recipient for and the benefactive for. The following examples illustrate the
use of the former: The architect is drawing a plan (for the clients) and The chef is cooking
his specialty (for us), where the clients and us are indirect objects (representing the intended
recipient semantic role), and the for-phrases including them function in these sentences as
adjuncts. The sentences representing the use of benefactive for-phrases are the following:
You risked your life for us and She opened the door for Tom.

3.2.4.1.For as a syntactic marker of the benefactive case

At this point it is important to stress the role of for as a syntactic marker of the benefactive
case, which is of special significance in the present work. Comrie (1981) defines the category
of case typologically as a morphosyntactic strategy for marking relations between core clause
arguments (e.g., agent, subject, and patient), or between clause and oblique arguments
(oblique arguments mark such roles as the possessive, benefactive, or comitative ones). In
many languages, case is marked morphologically by an inflectional affix, but in English, an
analytic language, relations between core clause arguments are marked by word order, and
in particular by prepositions. Thus, for marks the benefactive case, e.g., while for example
with marks the comitative or instrumental ones. As O’Dowd claims:

Case-marking is grammaticized in English by means of several

prepositions, such as to, for, with, and of, which are structurally assigned to
mark specific case relations. Used in this way, they have very little situating
capability: they do not predicate states by themselves, and they are not used
as particles, except in a few rare, idiomatic cases (Let’s take it with; push
the door to; etc.) (1998: 109).

44
 In Webster’s New World College Dictionary 5th edition, the lexeme beneficiary is
defined as ‘holder of a benefice, anyone receiving benefit, a person named to receive the
income or inheritance from a will, insurance policy, trust, etc., a person for whose benefit a
trust has been created’10. As regards the term beneficial, its first-specified meaning is
‘producing benefits; advantageous; favourable’, and the second meaning is ‘receiving
benefit, which is, in turn, defined as ‘anything contributing to an improvement in condition;
advantage, help’ (WNWDAE 1989: 129).

In English, the benefactive semantic role is typically expressed by the preposition for,
which, as already indicated, is derived from the spatial and/or temporal root meaning ‘in
front’ and ‘before’ (from the Germanic * fore ‘before in place or time’). This shift in meaning
was probably motivated by the language-independent principle of reasoning: objects that are
in front of a person are better perceptible and easier to access, so potentially beneficial to this
person. As Langacker claims (2000: 6), “an optimal description of language structure requires
a notion of conceptual reference in which not just thing-like entities but also relationships are
capable of being profiled. The preposition near, for example, profiles a relationship of
proximity (prototypically in space) between two entities”. Drawing on the Langackerian
concept of profile, it might be suggested that the preposition for profiles a relationship of
benefactivity that results from an act of giving, i.e. a transfer of an entity in space, from a
giver to an intended recipient. In the sentence, He gave her a book, the indirect object her
could be considered a Goal since it is the spatial destination of the referent of the direct object,
namely, the book. The argument her could also be considered to instantiate the benefactive
semantic role since the entity it stands for receives something.

As for other accounts of the considered semantic roles, Niedzielski’s (1979)

comparative study of lexical realisations of the benefactive and the beneficiary in Polish and
English constitutes an important and thought-provoking contribution to the subject of
beneficiary constructions with the focus on the preposition for as a syntactic marker of
benefactivity. Smith (2010) considers benefactives as ‘metonymic devices in the expression
of purpose’. He also notes that “a remarkable phenomenon at the interface of benefaction and

10
http://www.yourdictionary.com/beneficiary#websters#YL07bCGtIaJPF2SD.99

45
purpose is the potential of benefactive/recipient/dative NPs to act as economical shortcut for
the expression of purposive relations” (2010: 135). For example, he considers the purposive
for, explaining that the phrase He has gone for lunch is the reduced form of He has gone in
order to have/for having lunch. Smith states that for lunch stands for the whole verbal
situation in which having/eating lunch is a participant (Langacker would call it a landmark).
He continues with the following proposition, “given that an argument thus represents the
whole semantic structure of which it is part, one may best characterise this morphosyntactic
construction in terms of a metonymy” (2010: 136). At this point it should be indicated, after
Niedzielski (1979: 165), that “benefits are relative and must be considered from the point of
view of pragmatics”. While analysing the sentence, The policeman gave Tom a ticket, he
concludes that “only time will tell whether the ticket Tom got should be construed as a
positive benefit or a negative benefit (a loss)”. Niedzielski pays attention to the fact that
“benefactive is sometimes defined as a verbal aspect expressing that the action or state
denoted by the verb is performed or brought about by someone for his or her own benefit or
that of another person” (1979: 165).

Niedzielski distinguishes three main types of benefactive constructions:

• intrinsic benefactives, e.g., Mary gave Tom the tickets,

• semantico-syntactic benefactives, e.g., Jane wrote a letter for Christina,
• datives and benefactives, e.g., Tom bought Mary a car (1979: 166-178).

As for the semantic roles involved in a prototypical benefactive situation, the subject refers
to an actor-benefactor (TR), and the indirect object to the beneficiary affected by the
benefactum - benefit (LM) resulting from the benefactor’s (represented by the subject
referent) (Lechmann et al. 2000: 68) action. As regards the first group, Chafe (1970: 147 ff)
distinguishes three basic types of intrinsically benefactive English verbs describing
benefactive situations in which someone benefits from whatever is communicated by the rest
of the sentence. All these verbs are obligatorily accompanied by an object NP. All intrinsically
benefactive utterances obligatorily contain a verb describing benefactive situations. Most of
these verbs can be replaced by phrases involving have, get, such as come to have or cause to
have / get (Niedzielski 1979: 166-170).
When it comes to semanto-syntactic benefactives, it appears possible to observe
benefactive expressions containing a verb which is not intrinsically benefactive, e.g., it may

46
only be implied by Jane wrote Christina a letter that the recipient has benefitted from the
agent’s action. The verbs appearing in in this type of construction include those referring to
actions as well as states in general, or processes as understood by Langacker (1988). In the
example above, the beneficiary is referred to by the noun directly following the verb, but it
can also appear “as a sentence-final noun preceded by the preposition for” (Chafe 1970: 151),
e.g. Jane wrote a letter for Christina in the case of which the advantageousness of the action
is not implied, but clearly indicated.

As proposed in the account of datives and benefactives offered by Brown (1973: 8), a
beneficiary is someone who profits from a state or process including possession, e.g. Mary
has a convertible (a car) because Tom bought Mary a car. As Niedzielski indicates, for is not
the only preposition used to introduce the beneficiary and “the beneficiary is not always
expressed through a surface structure dative”. The choice of a preposition introducing a case
appears to depend on some intrinsic features of the verb with which it co-occurs (1979: 171).
Generally, in all semanto-syntactic benefactive sentences containing for, it might seem that
in addition to the features indicated above an important aspect of benefactor is intentionality.
This feature is particularly clear in a sentence like Do it for the sake of your family
(Niedzielski 1979: 172). If the benefactor and the beneficiary are co-referential, the
construction is semantically and syntactically reflexive, e.g. I work for myself (Niedzielski
1979: 172). The sentence I shave myself for my wife, where reflexivisation can also be
observed, probably exhibits all the above-mentioned features best. It indicates that more than
one beneficiary can be recognised for a single benefactive action, i.e., the performer of an
action as well as his wife. Thus, the referent of the subject shaves for himself and for his wife.
As Niedzielski states, reflexivisation appears possible with all types of semanto-syntactic
benefactive constructions (1979: 172).

3.2.4.2.Motion in the benefactive scene

In English and in other languages, spatio-relational morphemes are regularly exploited to

describe non-spatial relations and domains. In fact, spatial particles serve as the most
convincing evidence of the complex interaction between human physical experience of the
world, thought and language. Thus, these linguistic elements not only code the relational
architecture of physical space but, as Tyler and Evans claim, they also “embed that rich spatial
understanding into the very fabric of language and grammar”. What the authors also indicate

47
is that “their use and ubiquity are testimony to the far-reaching influence of the human
experience of spatio-relational configurations on more complex conceptualization” (2003:
27). Cognitive linguistics advocates the experientialist approach to meaning (Lakoff 1987).
The semantics of linguistic expressions, and, in particular, lexical items, reflects the
conceptualisations or mental representations of entities or states of affairs in extralinguistic
reality (Taylor 1993: 131).

According to Tyler and Evans, the spatial scenes are inspired by physical phenomena
in the world, which exist independently of human beings – first perceived, then analysed and
understood in ways which are wholly dependent upon the neural structure of the human brain,
the particularities of the human body and the way these bodies interact with the external
reality. Hence, a spatial arrangement coded linguistically by the clause The cup is on the table
is conceptually constructed when a cup and a table are understood as sharing a particular
spatial relation in which there is direct physical contact between the referents of both noun
phrases, and functionally one object (the table) supports the other (the cup) (Tyler and Evans
2003: 28). As the authors claim, “The spatial relation involving contact between two such
objects is meaningful. It is meaningful precisely because this spatial configuration has
important consequences. After all, if a cup is let go of without placing it on a larger object,
then it will fall to the floor potentially smashing and hence becoming functionally useless”
(2003: 24).

As can be observed, much attention has been devoted to spatial prepositions in

cognitive linguistics, which allows for developing a better insight into the nature of the
concepts represented by such lexemes bringing about the conclusion that they encode rich
and various information of both grammatical and semantic character (Brugman 1988,
Niedzielski 1979 – for as a semantic marker). The conceptualisation of the spatial domain,
i.e. of the surrounding space, the movements in space, and of (the relation between) objects
in space takes up a privileged place because it constitutes a basic domain in terms of which
more abstract domains (e.g. the domain of emotion) can be conceptualised (Lakoff 1987;
Johnson 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff & Turner 1989).

48
3.2.5. A lexicographic account of the polysemy of for

The numerous senses of for presented above are captured in a variety of ways in three
different reliable dictionaries, namely:

• The Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English (1989),

• The Cambridge Dictionary (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/11),
• Wielki Słownik PWN Oxford (“The Great PWN Oxford Dictionary”), which is a
bilingual dictionary chosen to illustrate the most prototypical and the most significant
meanings from the perspective of a Polish learner.

The three main senses of the preposition in question are those of:

• purpose,
• benefactivity,
• reason.

Some examples of uses involving the purposive sense, as listed in The Webster’s New
World Dictionary of American English, are the following:

• ‘having the purpose of’, e.g., the books are not for sale, I need some money for tonight
or This pool is for the use of hotel guests only,
• ‘in place of; instead of’ illustrated by the phrase to use blankets for coats,
• ‘with the purpose of going to’ illustrated by to leave for home,
• ‘as the representative of’, e.g., in the interest of to act for another,
• ‘with regard to; as regards’, which is illustrated by the utterances concerning a need
for improvement and an ear for music,
• ‘in order to be, become, get, have, keep, etc.’, e.g., to walk for exercise, to fight for
one’s life.

The uses of for listed in The Cambridge Dictionary, which can be read as relating solely to
the benefactive senses are defined as:

11
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/for

49
 • ‘meant to be received by a specified person or thing, or to be used in a specified way’,
e.g., flowers for a girl, money for paying bills, a phone message for you, buy
something for the new baby,
• ‘intended to help or benefit, to do something for somebody’, e.g., you risked your life
for us,
• ‘intended to belong to or be used by’, as in who are the flowers for? or to buy
something for somebody.

Another use of for, which also refers to some extent to the benefactive sense, can be observed
in such sentences as Let me carry those bags for you, Hello, what can I do for you?, or My
sister will take care of the dog for us while we’re away.

The uses which can be interpreted as pertaining to both the purposive sense and the
benefactive sense are the following:

• ‘in defense of; in favour of; to fight for a cause’, e.g., to vote for a levy,
• ‘in honour of’, e.g., to give a banquet for someone,
• ‘with the aim or purpose of”, e.g., to carry a gun for protection,
• ‘having the function of”, e.g., it is for removing stains.

When it comes to the sense of reason, it is clearly observable in such expressions as, I don’t
eat meat for various reasons, The things you do for love!, I didn’t say anything for fear
of(=because I was frightened of) offending him, where for can be paraphrased as ‘because of
or as a result of something’.

Other uses of for may serve as a lexical means to express such senses as:

• the concept of support, e.g., Most of the Republicans voted for the measure
(related to benefactive sense),
• the concept of getting or achieving something, e.g., I’ve applied for a job with
another computer company (related to the sense of purpose),
• the concept of extension in time, as in to walk for an hour, an appointment for
two o’clock or I haven’t play tennis for years,
• in expressions involving a comparison of one thing to other of the same type,
as in For a man of his wealth he’s not exactly generous,

50
 • the concept of responsibility, as in She knew the driver of the other car was not
responsible for her son’s death,
• in phrases meaning ‘in relation to’, e.g., That jacket looks a little big for you,
He felt nothing but contempt for her,
• in expressions referring to methods of payment, as in She sold the house for a
lot of money or The mechanic said he'd repair my car for £300 and can be
defined as ‘the for of exchange’ (after Jackendoff, see section 3.2.3. in the
present chapter),
• the concept of representing someone or something, as in She works for a charity
or He swam for the United States in the 2000 Olympics,
• the concept of direction or destination, e.g., They looked as if they were heading
for the train station or Just follow signs for the museum,
• in expressions referred to when one intends to point to the meaning of
something, as in What’s the Spanish word for vegetarian?.

The fact that the sense of purposiveness seems to be predominant over other ones in the
network is undeniable. The reputable sources mentioned above provide more examples of for
expressing purpose than for expressing other senses, which is suggestive of the primacy and
prototypicality of this very sense. Moreover, the sense of purposiveness is subsumed in other
separate senses, related to it, like, for example, for sale, where it means that the purpose of a
brand or a company is to sell some product, also: vote for, head for, etc.

3.2.6. FOR & TO – directionality with intention vs. directionality

At this point, the problem of differentiating between the proper use of the preposition for,
favouring the context of intentionality alone, and the preposition to, slightly favouring the
context of directionality over intentionality, should be tackled. The present author advocates,
after Bergen and Chang (200012), the idea that “crucial details of how a sentence is construed,
including the scope of the action and the granularity at which the landmark is viewed, can
hinge on the choice of preposition”. B&Ch illustrate this statement with the following
examples, Harry walked to the café and Harry walked into the café. As is claimed, the two
different prepositions are involved in each distinct interpretation with respect to the action of
walking asserted of. In Harry walked to the café, the entire location inclusive of its vicinity

12
http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nchang/pubs/BergenChang.pdf

51
(the café) is construed as the endpoint, or goal, of the trajectory, which does not necessarily
include the interior, while it is some more specific point in the interior of the café that plays
this role in Harry walked into the café. Inferences about the starting point of the action also
exhibit a subtle difference in focus, as Harry walked to the café seems to suggest a source
location away from the café, while Harry walked into the café indicates that the source is
some point exterior to the café but close to it. The observed pattern of inferences can be
explained in terms of different image-schematic bases of the concepts represented by the two
prepositions. While into (at least in its central sense) evokes both the CONTAINER and the
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (SPG) image schemas, to evokes only the SPG schema (Johnson
1987, Lakoff 1987). In a similar manner, it seems possible to draw a distinction between the
preposition for and the preposition to, since in certain contexts, e.g. important to me or
important for me, it may be disputable whether for or to should be used. In the course of the
thesis it will be demonstrated that for is used to express intentionality combined with
directionality, whereas to is used to express just directionality.

According to Niedzielski (1969: 174), to is the second, after for, most widely used
preposition to mark the beneficiary semantic role in English. He claims that some of the
definitions of to are almost identical with those formulated to explain the meaning of for.
While for may be used in at least six different types of constructions, to, introducing an object
referring to a beneficiary, may be used only in one pattern, where the preposition to is
preceded by an adjective, as in the following sentence He was (very) good to us. Niedzielski,
however, suggests that it is probably more advisable to distinguish these two prepositions
(for and to) semantically, as to emphasises the spatial aim or direction of an action (or
process) while for, apart from direction, stresses its intentionality. Quirk, in turn, claims that
“in contrast to the notion of intended recipient expressed by for, the preposition to expresses
actual recipient in sentences such as She gave a beautiful doll to her daughter” (1985: 697),
which can be contrasted with She bought a beautiful doll for her daughter, in the case of
which it is unspecified whether the indirect subject referent was the actual recipient. At this
point, the preposition for should be collated with the preposition to. It is presupposed that the
former is used to emphasise or introduce the aspect of intentionality on the part of the
trajector, whereas the latter highlights directionality of the trajector’s action. Nevertheless,
according to Tyler and Evans (2003), in certain contexts, to and for seem to share a high
degree of semantic overlap, as evidenced by the following pair of sentences:

52
 • He ran to the hills
• He ran for the hills.
Despite the apparent synonymousness, there is, however, a difference in the construals of the
scene represented by the examples. Thus, both of them involve a TR set in movement directed
toward a LM. The TR appears to have a goal which involves reaching the LM. With reference
to Tyler and Evans’s (2003: 146) account, the TR is in motion and hence following some
trajectory, as indicated by the verb, the semantic scope of which contains information
concerning the nature of the process referred to. Thus, in the sentence He ran to the hills, the
object hills represents the primary physical goal or objective. By contrast, in the sentence He
ran for the hills, reaching the prepositional object referent, i.e., the hills is viewed as a means
to an end, rather than the end in itself, e.g., in the case of warfare, where hills might afford
cover or shelter from the enemy, then reaching the hills would serve the purpose of providing
safety (c.f. Tyler and Evans 2003: 146). In the sentence He ran to the hills and back every
day, to appears to profile a LM that constitutes a physical goal (primary goal), whereas for
in He ran for the hills and back every day13 appears to relate the TR to an ulterior purpose,
contingent upon reaching a particular LM (2003: 146). What is more, Tyler and Evans
provide the following sentences The timekeeper whistled / gestured / signaled / called to the
referee and The timekeeper whistled / gestured / signaled / called for the referee to
demonstrate that the prepositions for and to can be used to describe scenes which do not
involve the TR moving towards the LM at all (Tyler and Evans 2003: 146). To conclude, for
appears to suggest intentionality and its use indicates that reaching some point is, contrary to
the indication provided by to, just a means to an end, rather than the end in itself, as has
already been demonstrated.

Because the degree of prominence, as understood by (Langacker 1991, 2008), of the

LM is lower in the sentences containing for, in comparison to those in which to is used, it
can be accordingly described as the oblique goal. The sentences The timekeeper whistled /
gestured / signaled / called to the referee and The timekeeper whistled / gestured / signaled /
called for the referee also illustrate the difference between the primary goal versus the
oblique goal. The scenes depicted by each of the examples differ quite considerably; in the
sentence with to, the TR directs the sound of the whistle or signal at the referee, without the

13
Peculiar as it may sound, this sentence is the original illustration of for relating the TR to an ulterior purpose,
provided by Tyler and Evans (2003).

53
aid of any intermediary. The sentence with for allows for the interpretation that the referee is
not in the TR’s immediate vicinity and might be contacted via an intermediary (Tyler and
Evans 2003: 147). Interpreting a LM as an oblique goal that serves some ultimate purpose
points to a salient element of intentionality on the part of the TR. For instance, to head for
the hills in order to avoid the enemy reflects a level of calculation and purposeful planning
that goes beyond simply determining the hills as the endpoint of one’s daily run.
Intentionality is an important aspect of the functional element associated with for but not with
to. The hypothesis about the relatively higher degree of intentionality is supported by
examples where for is semantically anomalous while to is acceptable, as in the following:

*The ball rolled for the wall versus The ball rolled to the wall

*The balloon floated for the ceiling versus The balloon floated to the ceiling

The ball and the balloon refer to inanimate entities whose movements are predominantly
controlled by human independent physical forces such as gravity or wind. If ball is the subject
of a sentence, the role of the factor initiating the motion of a ball or a balloon is only implied.
That is why their rolling or floating can be construed as self-initiated or undertaken by entities
capable of purposeful and / or intended action only partially. It is in this sense that for requires
a purposeful or intentional TR (and hence involves intentionality) (Tyler and Evans 2003:
147).

Both types of predications analysed in the present thesis, i.e. the self-sake
benefactives and for-prefixed verbs involve in their prototypical spatial scenes trajectors
characterised by the above-specified properties. Therefore, for is acceptable only with verbs
expressing intended, conscious motion, e.g., set out, start, leave, sail, depart. Each of them
refers to the beginning phase of movement along a path and relates to an intentional process
of selecting a particular destination, choosing a mode of progress and, presumably
consciously, selecting a certain course (Tyler and Evans 2003: 147). The aspect of
intentionality is pointed out by Tyler and Evans as well as by Niedzielski (1969).
Consequently, Tyler and Evans present the proto-scenes of for and to by means of the
following graphs (2003: 148) (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 on the next page).

54
Fig. 4 The proto-scene of spatial to

Tyler and Evans propose that in its proto-scene to denotes a spatial relation in which an
oriented TR is directed towards a profiled LM. Within this spatial configuration, represented
in Fig. 4, the LM is interpreted as a primary target or goal. That is why the functional element
associated with to is the LM construed as goal in itself. In the sketch, the shaded circle
represents the TR, the arrow represents the orientation of movement and the bold vertical line
represents the LM. The functional element associated with the proto-scene is the LM
constituting the primary goal (Tyler and Evans 2003: 148).

Fig. 5 The proto-scene of spatial for

In Fig. 5, illustrating the proto-scene of for used in the spatial sense, the shaded circle
represents the TR, the arrow represents the orientation of movement and the vertical broken
line represents the LM. Tyler and Evans (2003: 148) state that ‘the functional component
associated with the proto-scene of spatial for is the oblique or secondary nature of the LM,
that is, the notion that reaching or attaining the LM facilitates reaching the primary purpose,
which is contingent upon or facilitated by attaining the LM’, yet it is unprofiled. This is
illustrated by the arrow reaching beyond the broken vertical line.
Thus, the linguistic behaviour exhibited by to and for discussed above suggests that both
to and for feature scenes which involve TRs oriented with respect to LMs, but the status of
the LM associated with each respective spatial particle is not the same. A consequence of
these differences in status of the LMs is a difference in the arrangement of functional
elements of the scenes associated with each particle.

55
3.3.A network of the senses of for

As already indicated, in the cognitive linguistics account the multiple meanings of

polysemous lexemes representing all grammatical categories, including prepositions, can
effectively be described in terms of a network of senses or usages. While Langacker’s
description covers only the schematic senses of selected lexemes, the most representative
examples of this attitude are Brugman’s (1988) study of the senses of over and Tyler and
Evans’s insight into spatial prepositions. The senses or usages within such a network are
demonstrated to be related to one another by means of general cognitive principles, such as
metaphor, metonymy, generalisation, specialisation, and image-schema transformations.

For the purposes of the present thesis, the idea of a category prototype as assumed by
Langacker (1991), after Rosch (1976) and Lakoff (1987), will be applied. As Langacker
states, “a speaker’s knowledge of the conventional value of a lexical item cannot in general
be reduced to a single structure, such as the category prototype or the highest-level schema –
that is why the conventional meaning of a lexical item must be equated with the entire
network, not with any single node” (1991: 3). Therefore, it is intended to work out a network
of distinct, yet interrelated senses of the preposition for. The data culled from the English
sources have been taken into account to prepare the network presented below (Fig. 6). The
graph is comprised of nodes standing for the senses which appear to be represented by for
most frequently. The detailed comments to the network are provided in subsequent sections.
It seems that in the case of for there are not so many nodes as in the case of over since,
contrary to over, the function of for is exclusively that of a preposition and it does not function
as an adverbial particle (except for the for-prefixed verbs) which will be discussed
subsequently. It should be added that Brugman’s analysis does not discriminate between the
uses of the morpheme over and as a preposition, as in The balloon flew over the house, and
as an adverbial particle modifying the meaning of the preceding verb, as in The log rolled
over. Historically the postmodifying adverbials developed out of OE prefixed verbs (cf.
Baugh).

As illustrated in Fig. 6 below, the central sense is the Purpose Sense, as in The dogs fought
for the bone (concrete purpose) and A certain amount must be deducted for depreciation
(abstract purpose). The Cause Sense can be exemplified with the sentence I buy it for
freshness. The Reciprocal Sense of for is evident in the sentence Bill obtained some food for

56
his dog. As regards the Destination Sense, it is represented by The train leaves for Dublin.
The Distance Sense and the Duration Sense are illustrated with She had driven for fifty
kilometres and for years/for months, respectively. For in the Intended Recipient Sense is
expressed in the sentence Susan bought the gown for Carol, whereas the Intended Function
Sense of for is in This machine is for washing dishes. When it comes to benefactive senses,
namely the Benefit Sense and the Self-Sake Benefit Sense, they are exemplified with the
sentences They sang for each other and He bought that house for himself / He moved to the
seaside for the sake of his health, respectively.

INTENDED FUNCTION

BENEFIT

INTENDED RECIPIENT SELF-SAKE BENEFIT

RECIPROCAL PURPOSE

DURATION DESTINATION

DISTANCE PURPOSE

CAUSE

Fig. 6 The semantic network of the senses of for

57
3.4. For as an expression of purpose and cause

As regards drawing the network of the senses of the English preposition for, the crucial issue
was to resolve whether the prime use of for is to express cause or purpose. Indeed, in many
cases, the recognition whether for is the expression of the former or the latter is challenging,
which is an issue already addressed within the present work. The following sentences provided
by Quirk and Greenbaum to illustrate each of the senses can serve as an illustration of this
semantic ambiguity. In They left early for fear (that) they would meet him, the meaning of for
is interpreted as cause, whereas in I hid the money, for fear of what my parents would say, the
meaning of for is interpreted as an instance of ‘negative purpose’ (1985: 1107). Another
sentence from Q&G, where for is classified as a ‘subordinator of purpose’ is They left the door
open for me to hear the baby, could as well be considered to contain an adverbial clause of
reason. This points to the fuzziness of distinction of both senses, and their considerable semantic
overlap.

In the English Oxford Living Dictionaries14, the meaning of the lexeme purpose is defined
as ‘the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists’ or ‘a
particular requirement or consideration, typically one that is temporary or restricted in scope or
extent’, whereas cause is explained as ‘a person or thing which gives rise to an action,
phenomenon, or condition’ and ‘reasonable grounds for doing, thinking, or feeling something’.
It is also referred to as ‘a principle, aim, or movement to which one is committed and which
one is prepared to defend or advocate’. As can be observed, the dictionary definitions often
resort to one term to explain the other. Despite the fact that the blurriness of the two considered
senses of for within the cause-purpose distinction is obvious, the present author, after taking
into account a variety of criteria, has decided to choose the sense of ‘purpose’ as the prevalent
one. The analysis of entries from the selected dictionaries as well as Quirk’s, Jackendoff’s and
Tyler and Evans’ accounts of for, seems to lead to the conclusion that the primary or sanctioning
sense of for is that of purpose. This seems to be corroborated by the fact that the spatial sense
of purpose (e.g. head for) does not allow for a counter-interpretation.

As already indicated, the preposition for is etymologically related to the German für,
meaning ‘for’, ‘on behalf of’, ‘by the standards of’, ‘in order to’, with the last sense being a
prototypical expression of purpose. It is also worth mentioning that one of the earliest attested

14
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/purpose

58
meanings of the preposition for points to the Benefactive Sense or the On Behalf Of Sense as
the sanctioning one, as is also the case with the German für. The fact that the reputable sources
referred to so far in the thesis are more abundant in examples of for expressing purpose than
for expressing other senses is suggestive of the primacy of the Purpose Sense. Therefore, the
fact that the sense of ‘purpose’ is predominant over other ones in the network seems to be
undeniable. What is more, the conception involved in it also appears to be subsumed in other
distinct but related senses. What follows is an account of the major senses of the preposition in
question specified in Fig. 6 above. It should be also taken into consideration that for typically
indicates directionality in prepositional verbs in which it participates, as was already pointed
out.

The example instantiating the primary Purpose Sense is He’ll do anything for money. As
was acknowledged earlier, Tyler and Evans’ recognition of the Purpose Sense as the primary
one is corroborated by evidence constituted by the lexicographic data gathered by the present
author. According to Tyler and Evans, in the proto-scene of this sense, ‘the LM, which is
closely related to the TR’s purpose or the entity sought, is in focus’, and, furthermore, ‘for
denotes a relation in which an action by the TR is associated with a particular purpose’. In the
interpretation provided by Tyler and Evans (2003: 153), this sense encompasses also the sub-
senses distinguished by the author of the present thesis. The exemplary sentences representing
them provided by Tyler and Evans are the following: He arrived at 7:30 for dinner, She
returned for the prize, She held on for dear life, She prayed for a miracle (2003: 153). As
regards the Purpose Sense, the aforementioned authors also consider the example He ran for
the hills, stating that “the act of running serves to achieve a particular purpose, namely reaching
safety. As such, the act of running for the hills correlates with the “ulterior purpose”. Once the
conception of purpose associated with motion has been established, this meaning is free to be
generalised to activities that have an “ulterior purpose”, irrespective of whether they involve
physical motion or not. As Tyler and Evans assert, “the Purpose Sense is derived from the
correlation between motion accomplished by the TR and the achievement of an ulterior
purpose” (2003: 153).

According to Smith (2010: 136), the purposive meaning of for can be illustrated by the
sentence He has gone for having lunch, where the goal NP comes to stand for the whole relation
in which having lunch is a participant, the other one being the referent of the main clause subject
NP. Its reduced form can be He has gone for lunch, in which the thing rather than the entire
relation is profiled as LM. Given that the object of the preposition represents a whole semantic
59
structure of which its referent is part, one may best characterise this morphosyntactic
construction in terms of metonymy. By completing a verb denoting a directed action with a
goal NP, a whole purposive situation, or more precisely, the cognitive model or frame15 of that
situation can be evoked, as in the just quoted case, where lunch represents a whole semantic
script of the activity of consuming a midday meal. Smith claims that “a remarkable
phenomenon at the interface of benefaction and purpose is the potential of benefactive /
recipient / dative NPs to act as economical shortcut for the expression of purposive relations”
(2010: 135). Thus, nouns in the benefactive semantic role serve as metonymic devices in the
expression of purpose.

At the opposite end of the reason (cause)-purpose continuum which can be represented
by for, the Cause Sense is distinguished. The use of this sense can be exemplified by the
sentence I buy it for its freshness, where there is a relationship between a default recipient and
the cause of action of buying. As regards prototypical scenes described by the causal sentences,
both TR and LM are distinct entities and the relation between them is horizontal, i.e. of the
source-goal type.

3.4.1. The semantic relation between the ‘goal’ and ‘cause’ senses of for

In a general account of the general category to which the preposition in question belongs, Quirk
states that

a preposition expresses a relation between two entities, one being that

represented by the prepositional complement. Of the various types of
relational meaning, those of SPACE and TIME are easiest to describe
systematically. Other relationships such as INSTRUMENT and CAUSE may
also be recognized, although it is difficult to describe prepositional meanings
systematically in terms of such labels (1985: 673).

It is assumed within the present work that for, when it functions as a spatial preposition,
represents a dynamic relational schema. The very notion of a dynamic relational schema has
been adopted from Tyler and Evans (2001: 7). In the prototypical scene it represents the

15
The concept of frame is adopted from Fillmore, who states that every experience, which people are able to
memorize, appears in a meaningful context because the person, who experiences it, ‘has some cognitive schema
or frame for interpreting it’(1976: 26-27).

60
movement from the giver to the receiver and is assumed as involved in the relation profiled by
the preposition for (as illustrated by Fig.7 below, after Kreitzer 1997: 305).

giver receiver

a thing being given

Fig. 7. The movement of a thing from the giver to the receiver

As was already mentioned, examples of dynamic uses of for can be found in such expressions
as He ran for the hills (Tyler and Evans 2003: 146), leave for home, or go for lunch, where for
is used with the so-called motion verbs, such as start, head, leave, etc. as pointed out by Q&G
(1985) and T&E (2003).

Radden (1985: 193-194), while considering the following sentences,

a) I bought a new suit for my brother’s wedding (concrete purpose)

b) The dogs fought for the bone (concrete purpose)
c) A certain amount must be deducted for depreciation (abstract purpose)

points out that the relation between the abstract domains of ‘goal’ and ‘cause’ is in the first
instance metonymic, i.e., an event stands for activity of wearing a suit on a certain occasion.
Subsequently, he offers the following explanation: in the scenes described by the sentences
above, the landmark of the relation represented by for can be interpreted as the goal of the action
expressed by the verb and, at the same time, as the factor causing that action. In example (b),
due to the relation between the dogs’ fight and the bone, represented by for, the bone is both
goal and cause of the animals’ activity. In I bought a new suit for my brother’s wedding, the new
suit has been bought with a view to wearing it at a wedding. Therefore, if it had not been for
the planned participation in a wedding ceremony, the subject referent (TR) (I) would not have
bought the suit; in other words, the wedding ceremony is the causal factor in purchasing the
suit. The remaining example A certain amount must be deducted for depreciation) can be
analysed analogously but here the goal is abstract because depreciation must be taken into

61
account. The fact that both interpretations, i.e., for indicating the goal and for pointing to the
causing factor, are conceptualised simultaneously reflects the fact that the conceptual notions
‘goal’ and ‘cause’ should in the first instance be regarded as two components of one and the
same event-ICM, which are in a (conceptual) contiguity relation. Given this contiguity relation,
the notions of ‘goal’ and ‘cause’ may not only blend as in the senses instantiated by the
sentences above, but the notion of ‘goal’ may fade, giving rise to instances of the uses of for in
which only the causal meaning is recognisable, as in We could hardly see for [i.e., because of]
the mist. This fact is another piece of evidence that strongly testifies for the fuzziness between
cause and goal senses represented by the preposition for, which has been already discussed in
the previous chapters of the present thesis. It seems, therefore, that metonymy may be a
motivating factor in such usages of for as in examples (a) – (c) and that metonymy is a notion
useful in accounting for the semantic relation between the ‘goal’ and ‘cause’ senses of for,
because this relation is based on conceptual contiguity: entities functioning as the goal of an
event or action can at the same time play a causal role in that event, or take on the causal role
exclusively. This metonymic relation can be captured in terms of the formula GOAL FOR
CAUSE. It can be concluded that the default benefactive scene is naturally spatial because it
involves a physical transfer of the referent of the indirect object.

3.5. The senses derived from the Purpose Sense

As has already been elucidated, on the basis of the mentioned earlier, Tyler and Evans’ account
of the preposition for, Quirk’s examination of the preposition, and the meanings of for listed in
the selected dictionaries, the Purpose Sense is considered to be the prevailing, dominant sense
among all those represented by the preposition in question. That is why the present section is
aimed at introducing and briefly describing the subsidiary senses derived from the Purpose
Sense.

3.5.1. The Reciprocal Sense

The Reciprocal Sense, or the for of exchange, which has previously been discussed in Section
3.2.3. of the present chapter when presenting Jackendoff’s account of certain uses of the
preposition in question, derives from the Purpose Sense. It can be illustrated by the following
sentences: Copies are available for two dollars each or Bill obtained some food for his dog.
This sense extends from the Purpose Sense since it is clearly observable that there is a certain
purpose prompting the act of exchange. The scene represented by the Reciprocal Sense of the

62
preposition for as in the sentence Bill obtained some food for his dog as well as in Bill obtained
some food for his money, which can be paraphrased, respectively, Bill traded his dog for some
food or Bill expended some money and in return he obtained some food, is depicted in Fig. 8
below. The proto-scene of the reciprocal sense is quite complex, as illustrated in Fig. 8, where
a TR expends an entity (DO referent) to an unprofiled recipient, who, as a result, assumes the
role of secondary TR expending an entity (referred to by the prepositional object to the original
TR.

TR1
LM2
=
=
LM4
TR2

LM1 LM3

Fig. 8. The scene of the Reciprocal Sense of the preposition for

The broken line indicates that the element is unprofiled.

TR1 = LM4 – the original TR (Bill), which initiates the action and as a result becomes LM
LM2 = TR2 – the original recipient (unprofiled), which reacts to TR1’s action thus becoming a
secondary (unprofiled) trajectory
LM1 – DO referent (dog)
LM3 – prepositional object referent (food)

3.5.2. The Destination Sense

In other regions of the network of senses represented by for, the Destination Sense can be
distinguished to occupy an area extended from the one in which the preposition involves a
general purpose. It arises from the Purpose Sense and is understood mainly as a spatial relation,
as in The train leaves for Dublin. Both TR and LM involved in the conceptualised scene of this
sense are distinct and the relation between them is horizontal. A destination (LM) is a particular
place or an event occurring at a certain location, as in the sentence She came for the play, which
involves actual movement. The actual movement is represented by the solid line in Fig. 9 on
the next page. The black circle stands for TR and the solid line represents LM. In the latter case
of the Destination sense, the observed metonymy can be formulated as follows: EVENT FOR
PLACE.

63
Fig. 9. The scene of the Destination Sense of the preposition for

3.5.3. The Distance and the Duration Senses

The sense which arises from the Destination Sense is the Distance Sense, an example of which
can be found in the previously cited work by Quirk and Greenbaum, i.e. She had driven for fifty
kilometres (1985: 480) instantiating spatial measure. As is known, to cover a distance some
time is needed. Thus, it seems that the Duration Sense is motivated by the Distance Sense. The
mapping: A TIME PERIOD IS A DISTANCE can be observed here, therefore the Duration
Sense should be considered a metaphorical extension of the Distance Sense.

The preposition in question is found in numerous English adverbial expressions of time

related to purposive activities, such as e.g., for years, forever, for months. The sentence When
fermentation has finished, the ‘green beer’ is run into conditioning tanks for a few days (BNC
A0A 31) provided by Smith (2010: 137-138) illustrates the aforementioned meaning. The
Oxford English Dictionary labels such constructions as ‘intended duration’ uses of for, and they
contrast with ‘actual duration’ as in The two great parties … had for a moment concurred (1849
MACAULAY Hist. Eng. 1. 166; OED). It is challenging to trace the motivation in the historical
emergence of this polysemy. An account that derives actual from intended duration would be
broadly compatible with Traugott’s concepts of increasing subjectification and internalisation
in semantic change (Traugott 1989: 34ff). On this view, the temporal adverbial in a sentence
like I’m […] going back to Denmark for two weeks would actually refer to the duration of the
state resulting from deliberately going to Denmark. The implicated situation, therefore, is that
the person went back to Denmark for the purpose of staying / vacating there over a period of
three weeks.

64
3.5.4. The Intended Recipient Sense

In the Intended Recipient Sense, arisen from the Destination Sense, as Tyler and Evans put it,
“for introduces the intended recipient of a particular action”. For this reason, the potential
recipient is the motivator of that action. The examples given by Tyler and Evans are the
following: Susan bought the gown for Carol and Moosa prepared the curry for Donna (2003:
154). As the authors claim, buying or preparing something for someone are actions motivated
in part by the goal for which they are intended. That is why the intended recipient correlates
with the purpose as well as the destination senses. To illustrate this phenomenon, it should be
indicated that the purpose of buying the gown is to give it to Carol, and, similarly, the purpose
of preparing the curry is to serve it to Donna (2003: 154). A goal is typically animate and there
is presupposed the assumption of potential control over the direct object referent by the recipient
(the indirect object referent). The motion is subjectified, which is indicated by the broken-line
arrow in Fig. 10 below.

Fig. 10. The scene of the Intended Recipient Sense of the preposition for

3.5.5. The Intended Function Sense

This sense extends from the Destination Sense and the Intended Recipient Sense and points to
the function of an object, e.g. This machine is for washing dishes. In the following scheme, the
TR is represented by the shaded circle. The relational LM washing dishes is profiled, similarly
to Dublin in the Destination Sense. The horizontal arrow represents the orientation of the LM
and the fact that it is broken represents the mental nature, subjectification of the movement. A
goal is abstract. The horizontal orientation of LM indicates that it is relational (a process
occurring in time). In Fig. 11 on the next page the solid horizontal line represents a profiled
LM.

65
Fig. 11. The scene of the Intended Function Sense of the preposition for

3.5.6. The Benefit Sense

The next sense to be discussed is defined by the present author as the Benefit Sense, which
involves pointing to an advantage, benefit. The agent performs an action for the sake of
somebody else’s well-being. The solid vertical line in Fig. 12 represents a profiled LM.

Fig. 12. The scene of the Benefit Sense of the preposition for

In the case of the Benefit Sense, for designates a relation between a relational TR involving the
action predicated of by the verb, as in She raised money for charity, He scored for United or
They sang for each other. The difference between this sense and the Intended Recipient Sense,
as Tyler and Evans claim, consists in the fact that in the latter one, “the recipient is not entailed”,
which means that the recipient is only potential and does not have to be actually affected, while
in the Benefit Sense “the recipient does actually take receipt of the intended benefit”. That is
why in the Benefit Sense, “a particular action directly benefits a particular entity” (2003: 154).
The first motivation for the Benefit Sense in the aforecited examples may be “the correlation
between being an intended recipient and receipt of an entity or an action”. The second
motivation may be that “the purpose for performing a certain action, such as, for instance,
raising money, may be to benefit charity” (Tyler and Evans, 2003: 154). The benefactive for
can occur with a considerable number of ditransitive verbs. Some examples could be I beseech
you for the sake of my family not to reveal my secret; Let me explain it again for you (Adrienne
Lehrer 1988) or such phrases as write a book/a song for somebody, make tea / coffee for
someone, etc.

66
3.5.7. The Self-Sake Benefactive Sense

The Self-Sake Benefactive Sense arises from the Benefit Sense. Within the scope of this sense,
the agent does something / performs a certain action for the sake of him / herself, for his / her
own benefit. An example of this construction is the following sentence He moved to the seaside
for the sake of his health. As regards the conceptual schematisation of the sense, the trajector
performs an action directed at the trajector. This kind of reflexive construction, where LM can
be co-referential with the entire TR or part of it, can be illustrated as suggested by Fig. 13 below.
The case of the entire TR being the aim of a beneficiary action can be illustrated the following
sentence He bought that house for himself, as illustrated by Fig. 13A, where the TR is co-
referential with the entire TR, whereas He moved to the seaside for the sake of his health can
serve as an illustration of only a part of TR being involved, what can be observed in Fig. 13B.
The self-sake benefactive construction is dealt with more profoundly in the forthcoming section.

TR
TR = LM

LM

A) B)

Fig. 13. The scene of the Self-Sake Benefactive Sense of the preposition for

3.6. The self-sake benefactive construction with the preposition for

The aim of this section, which concerns the Self-Sake Benefactive Sense of the preposition in
question (see the previous section and Fig. 13), is to accomplish a semanto-syntactic analysis
of the English expression for the sake of. It is also referred to as the self-sake benefactive
construction and the analysis is based on an earlier study by the present author (2014). The self-
sake benefactive construction can also be qualified as a subtype of what Niedzielski (1979: 165-
180) names ‘semantico-syntactic benefactive sentence’, where the object phrases refer to the
state of physical and/or mental well-being, both of which are inherent aspects of human
condition. At the same time, the referents of agent nouns are beneficiaries of their own
conscious actions, e.g., moving to the seaside in the sentence He moved to the seaside for the
sake of his health is presented as beneficial to the health of the person referred to by the subject

67
pronoun. At this point the lexeme sake, functioning as a noun in the construction in question,
means ‘purpose’. It derives from the Old English noun sacu, whose senses are related to the
meanings of the following lexemes and expressions: ‘a cause at law’, ‘crime’, ‘dispute’, ‘guilt’,
and the Old English verb secan, which means ‘to seek’. Its PIE root is *sag-, whose modern
English counterparts are ‘to investigate’ or ‘to seek out’. It should be mentioned that the
occurrence in the for the sake of construction is the only way in which those OE stems survive
in Modern English.

3.6.1. The self-sake benefactive construction as a subtype of the benefactive construction

According to Smith (2010: 71-72), “prototypically, benefactive constructions express that

someone does an action for the sake of another”. Although there are many accounts of
benefactive constructions in professional literature, it is difficult to find any works specifically
concerning its afore-mentioned self-sake benefactive variety. The present author’s inspiration
to address the issues of the construction in question was Smith’s book Cross-linguistic
categorization of benefactive by event structure (2010), in which he deals with the self-
benefactive constructions, where the agents carry out actions for the benefit of themselves, such
as e.g. shaving one’s own face. As stated by Smith, “benefactive constructions explicitly
indicate an event as ‘good’ for a participant by using some kind of morphosyntactic means”
(2010: 73). The author emphasises the importance of syntax in putting across the meaning of
benefactive constructions by indicating that the sentences which “express benefactive scenes
strictly via lexical meaning, are not instances of benefactive constructions”, e.g., “he admires
me” and “we luckily arrived in time” (2010: 73).

Smith distinguishes three kinds of agentive benefactive syntactic patterns. The first one
is defined as “an unrestricted benefactive construction” with the preposition for as the central
element and no restrictions imposed on the beneficiary in the sense that it can be “either the
agent him/herself or another person”, as in, e.g., Do it for your family or He works for himself.
“Non-self-benefactives” constitute the second group which comprises descriptions of situations
in which X does something for the benefit of Y and the beneficiary cannot be the agent
him/herself, the beneficiary needs to be someone else than the agent, e.g., I did it for him (not
for myself). Finally, there are “self-benefactive constructions”, where the agent carries out an
action for the benefit of him/herself, and there is a necessary co-reference of agent and
beneficiary NP’s (2010: 77). Such a construction is reflexive, for instance, I started this
business for myself. However, Smith provides no examples of actions beneficial for the agent’s

68
internal, i.e., psychological state or other aspects of well-being than merely his / her overall
condition. Consequently, it seems possible to suggest the distinction of the self-sake benefactive
construction within the category of ‘self-benefactives’ where the agent noun refers to a human
being and the object noun refers to an internal (psychological, emotional) state of the agent.

Examples of semantico-syntactic benefactive sentences provided by Niedzielski include

such sentences as Jane wrote Christina a letter, where it is indicated that Christina benefits
from Jane’s action. Niedzielski claims that “the expression becomes semantically and
syntactically benefactive whenever an optional beneficiary NP is added” (1979: 168). In Jane
wrote Christina a letter the beneficiary is represented as a noun, which directly follows the
verb. However, the benefactivity seems to depend on the conditions of use (pragmatic factors).
People not always write letters which are beneficiary for recipients (e.g., a letter expressing a
refusal, dismissal, etc.). It should be noted that in the sentence Jane wrote Christina a letter
some ambiguity as regards the status of Christina as a beneficiary arises. This ambiguity
disappears, however, in the sentence Jane wrote a letter for Christina where the use of for
sanctions the existence of beneficiary.

The for the sake of construction is subsumed within the self-sake benefactive construction
in which the preposition for syntactically and semantically marks the Benefactive case and the
semantic beneficiary role, which is one of those listed by Fillmore (1971: 52), who seems to
have in mind those Benefactive phrases introduced by for which represent the entities for whose
sake an action represented by a verb is performed. This case seems to be a Benefactive, optional
in agentive sentences in which the Agent’s role is ‘deliberate or voluntary’ (Fillmore 1971: 52).
It is marked on a noun phrase, which represents a beneficiary, i.e., is the one who benefits from
an event or activity.

3.6.2. The self-sake benefactive construction as a kind of reflexive construction

It should be pointed out that the self-sake benefactives constitute a subtype of reflexive
constructions. This means that the trajector and the landmark are both recognised as the same
participant of the conceptualised scene and are referred to in terms of the grammatical
categories of subject and direct object, e.g., John washed himself carefully, where John is TR
and himself is LM, whereby TR=LM. The graphic way to illustrate the relations between the
referents of the subject and pronoun (himself) is specified by the verb in Figure 14 below. The
relation marked by the verb between TR and LM is illustrated by the dotted correspondence

69
line in the mode proposed by Langacker (1991: 369). It is also important to note, after
Langacker, that a reflexive pronoun marks a volitional construal (2000: 312).

TR

LM

Fig. 14. The illustration of the relations between TR and LM profiled by John

The integration of the referents of a nominal reflexive pronoun and the subject constitutes a
special case of the transitive construction involving a direct object. The difference between this
pattern and the typical SVO one, however, consists in the fact that the reflexive pronoun, e.g.,
myself, yourself, himself evokes a single participant relation, as in picture A below. The TR of
the process represented by the verb is also its LM. The situation depicted in graph A can be
illustrated with the following sentence, He moved to the seaside for himself, whereas the
situation in B can be exemplified with the following sentence, He moved to the seaside for the
sake of his health, which profiles only an aspect, i.e. a subpart of the TR.

A) B)
TR
TR = LM
LM

Fig. 15. The illustration of the integration of a nominal reflexive pronoun with the subject

70
3.6.3. An analysis of the self-sake benefactive construction

The semantic reflexivity involved in the analysed sentences [1] to [16] provided in the present
section is also reflected in syntax. The syntactic function of the for-phrases in sentences [1] to
[16] is that of adjuncts. This makes it possible for them to appear freely whenever their meaning
is compatible with that of the verbs involved, as in the following sentence provided by Lehrer
(1988), I beseech you for the sake of my family not to reveal my secret. Other linguistic examples
of the construction in question have been sourced from the BNC16 and are provided below.

[1] He moved to the seaside for the sake of his health.

[2] Relatives often want to separate from the person for the sake of their own sanity.

[3] She had forfeited most of her private life for the sake of her chosen career.

[4] We have to give some thought to them for the sake of our ambition and our dependants and

our own physical wellbeing.

[5] He leadeth me in the paths of righteousness for his name’s sake.

[6] For the sake of himself, he wanted Ramsey as his successor.

[7] Lord Hunter had been unable to free himself from the idea of Meehan as a participant any

more than Sir Daniel Brabin had been able to free himself from the assumption of Timothy

Evans’s guilt; neither could bring himself to admit, perhaps for the sake of the reputation of

their profession.

[8] Constanze Mozart spent much of the years 1789-91 in Baden for the sake of her health.

[9] Richard had chosen a long ascent from the Balmoral side for the sake of privacy.

[10] She won’t forgo a drink for the sake of her sport.

[11] That we forsake prudence, right conduct and dignity for the sake of our stomachs?

[12] I like him and it’s silly to pretend I don’t for the sake of pride.

[13] Counted multitudes of white Americans eschewed stupidities of racist reflex for the sake

of their own self-interest.

16
http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/

71
[14] All MPs must take advice on personal security very seriously for the sake of themselves.

[15] Well we should accept them for the sake of our own spiritual growth for one thing.

[16] We can accept Christ’s challenge for the sake of our own spiritual growth

The semantic roles performed by subject referents in the cited examples are generally those of
Agent and Experiencer, but it is not always possible to recognise their pure instantiations. In
fact, they appear to intertwine quite often, as many of the provided sentences illustrate, i.e., a
subject referent may both perform a physical action (Agent) and be affected by it (Experiencer),
while either role may be more or less prominent.

In Examples [2], [3], [4], [8], [14] it is the Experiencer role that seems to be dominant
over the Agentive one, and the latter cannot be excluded considering the situations described.
Thus, in [2] the experienced psychological speculation may result from physical separation,
e.g., going away; [3] apart from the mental commitment of subject referent, may point to her
physical activity, e.g., working for long hours in the office instead of dating; [4] apart from
mental considerations may involve physical actions undertaken by subject referents, such as
meeting and engaging in discussions; [8] describes engaging in physical activities resultant
from the experienced state of staying at a spa; [14] indicates that “taking advice on security” is
connected with performing certain activities, e.g., putting on bullet proof vests before
appearances in public, avoiding getting too close to bystanders, etc. Examples [6], [7], [12],
[15], [16] seem to involve the Experiencer role most clearly, even though they do not exclude
the possibility of certain physical activities performed by the subject referent, thus making the
Agentive role also traceable.

On the other hand, in examples [9], [10], [11], [13] it is the Agentive role that seems to
be relatively stronger and dominant. [9] points to the subject referent engaging in a physical
action but also experiencing its effects of walking upwards for a long time. In [10] experiencing
a drink results from the conscious, controlled action of accepting it; [11] concerns experiencing
the results of prudent and decent behaviour, even at the cost of failing to enjoy food; [13] also
points to the effects of undertaking certain actions, e.g., protesting against racism, avoiding
racist propaganda and ideology. In [5] the Agentive role of the subject seems to be at its clearest,
even though in [1] the role of Experiencer cannot be excluded. All these interpretations are
possible on the basis of pragmatic knowledge.

72
 When the roles of the subject referents in the construction in question have been
discussed, the roles performed by the object referents involved in the construction should be
analysed. Thus, at this point the difference between an intended recipient and a beneficiary, as
viewed by Tyler and Evans, will be recalled. As regards the intended recipient of a particular
action or an attitude, the noun instantiating this role is typically introduced by the preposition
for. For this reason, the potential recipient can be viewed as the motivator of the particular
action. As Tyler and Evans indicate, buying or preparing something for someone are actions
motivated in part by the purpose for which they are intended. That is why the intended recipient
/ goal correlates with the purpose (2003: 154). The only difference between the Benefactive
Sense and the Intended Recipient Sense, as Tyler and Evans claim, consists in the fact that in
the latter one ‘receipt is not entailed’, while in the Benefactive Sense ‘the recipient does actually
take receipt of the intended benefit’. This is the reason why in the Benefactive Sense, “a
particular action directly benefits a particular entity” (2003: 154). In the sentence Susan bought
the gown for Carol, expressing the Intended Recipient Sense, there is a correlation between a
particular recipient and the purpose of the action, whereas in They sang for each other,
illustrating the Benefactive Sense, there is a correlation between being an intended recipient
and actual receipt of an entity or an action (2003: 154).

3.6.4. The role of the verb in the self-sake benefactive construction

The verbs and verb phrases in the examples provided above refer to processes as understood by
Langacker (1987, 1999), which are to significant extent rather imperfective than perfective.
When a verb is perfective it means that it is related to the basic cognitive capacity of perceiving
change. When a verb is imperfective, it is related to the lack of the basic cognitive capacity of
perceiving change. The imperfective verbs and verb phrases involved in the provided examples
are the following want, forfeit, have to give some thought to somebody, think about somebody,
pretend, forsake, eschew, take advice on something, accept, live, forgo, spend time / live. That
is why most subject referents should be conceived of as experiencers rather than agents, which
is corroborated by the above considerations concerning semantic roles in the provided
examples. The only verbs which clearly refer to physical actions, i.e., perfective processes, are
in the considered sample lead and move. Nevertheless, actions as well as states profiled in the
provided examples constitute events positively affecting the referents of subject nouns at whom
they are directed, which encompasses also the self-beneficial aspect. Generally, the axiological
charge of verbs whose subjects represent human beings is determined by their complementing
objects. When it comes to axiological assessment of the verbs which precede the for the sake
73
of phrases in the analysed sentences, four of them are charged negatively, i.e., eschew, forfeit,
forgo and forsake. Four verbs are axiologically neutral, i.e., spend, move, lead and choose. One
of them, which appears twice, is charged positively, i.e., want to. The already mentioned choose
may appear to bear a positive rather than neutral axiological load as the act of choosing is mainly
associated with choosing options beneficial for agentive performers of an action.

3.6.5. The role of modality in the self-sake benefactive construction

In the analysed sample of linguistic data, the occurrence of verbs expressing modality, i.e., can,
should, must and be unable to is significantly common. The verb phrase have to tends to express
necessity imposed on the agent from outside, as in example [4], which differentiates it from
must, typically used to express the feelings and wishes of the speaker him / herself (Swan 1995:
345). As indicated by Radden and Dirven (2007: 243), the group of modal verbs that only occur
in the finite form comprises may, might, can, could, must, shall, should, ought, will, would,
need. It should be noted, though, that need is special among them since it can also occur as a
regular verb, e.g., I need to talk to you, or She needed to leave. As the authors claim, the
enumerated modals “perform the function of grounding a situation in potential reality with the
speaker being the fixed reference point”. However, it should be noted that in contrast to lexical
verbs, modals do not possess most of their morphological and syntactic properties, which is
why they are sometimes referred to as “defective”. Their structural “defects” consist in their
grounding function and their maximal subjectivity (2007: 242). A similar role is performed by
verbs marked for tense, person and number. The level of subjectivity is higher in the case of
lexical verbs than modal verbs, which are specially designed to express the speaker’s attitude,
with the exclusion of such verbs reflecting a speaker’s mood or attitude, as want or desire.

Radden and Dirven also address the issues of force dynamics of modality:

Common characteristic of epistemic and deontic modality is their ‘force-

dynamic’ basis. They identify ‘force’ as one of the image schemas. The notion
of force dynamics pertains to the opposition of forces and counterforces. The
phenomenon of force is ubiquitous in the physical world. For example, we
feel the force of gravity when doing push-ups or the force of the head wind
when riding a bicycle. We also experience force dynamics in the social world
when a person in authority tells a weaker person what to do. For example, a
teacher may call upon a lazy student by saying, ‘You must start working for a

74
 change now’. The force-dynamic basis of modals is more perspicuous with
deontic modals than with epistemic modals (2007: 243).

They, subsequently, consider force-dynamics of obligation and deontic necessity. An obligation

is a force to be abided by a person who feels compelled to carry out a particular action. R&D
consider the obligation expressed by You must go home, where the abiding force is present in
the social authority of the speaker, who imposes his will on the hearer. It is apparent that the
addressee is willing to stay. The authors explain this situation claiming that the hearer’s
“counterforce is opposed to that of the speaker but is weaker” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 243).

The role of modal verbs in their deontic senses in the self-sake benefactive constructions
is significant as regards their influence on the role of the subject and the for the sake of phrase.
The modal verb that expresses strong obligation, i.e., have to concerns a necessity imposed on
the speaker from outside, similarly as must, as in the example provided in the previous section.
It introduces the aspect of obligation to an utterance, as in example [4]. When it comes to should
and need, the role of the subject referent seems to be not so powerful as in the case of have to
or must, yet still more prominent than in the case of non-modal verbs. What should be pointed
out is the fact that the degree of benefactivity decreases in the examples in which the positive
effect of the event is ambiguous as a result of the use of a modal verb expressing compulsion,
such as have to indicating not the intention, but the necessity for the referent of the subject to
perform a given action. This situation is illustrated by the following sentence from the BNC,
We have to give some thought to them for the sake of our ambition and our dependants and our
own physical well-being. In the analysed examples, the compulsion imposed on the subject
referents can be read as both being beneficial for them (acting career, ambition, physical well-
being) as likely as having detrimental effects on them (the necessity to leave the city and to give
some thought to someone).

3.6.6. The self-sake benefactive construction in Smith’s classification

Considering the examples enumerated above, it can be concluded that in the case of the self-
sake benefactive construction, the benefactive sense is conveyed via both the meaning of the
lexemes involved and the syntax, while the latter is one of the criteria recognised to determine
the benefactive sense of an utterance in the account proposed by Smith (2010: 73). The author
claims that ‘benefactive constructions are often syntactically reflexive when the agent and the
beneficiary are identical’ (2010: 77). This is the case of the self-sake benefactive construction
in its first variant, which is exemplified by two sentences with reflexive pronouns as object
75
phrases, e.g., All MPs must take advice on personal security very seriously for the sake of
themselves, where the direct object is a reflexive pronoun, and TR=LM. The second variant is
the self-sake benefactive construction, which involves co-referential possessive pronouns,
where a LM is a part of a TR and the direct object refers to an aspect of TR (partly reflexive),
as in That we forsake prudence, right conduct and dignity for the sake of our stomachs?. The
subtype within this variant is the self-sake benefactive construction with the emphatic own, as
in example [16]. All the variants of the self-sake benefactive constructions describe the TR’s
own benefit due to the use of the for the sake phrase preceding the NP which refers to a LM.

3.6.6.1.An analysis of object phrases involved in benefactive construction

Taking into account all the object phrases in the analysed examples, only one of them is a
concrete noun i.e. stomachs in example [11], metonymically referring to the need to satisfy
hunger. The conception represented by the noun stomachs stands for the need to eat, which in
this particular sentence is opposed to such spiritual values as prudence, right conduct and
dignity. Two object phrases in the sentences analysed in section 3.6.3. of the present chapter
are constituted by reflexive pronouns, i.e. himself in [6] and themselves in [14]. Therefore, the
object phrases in all the examples, excluding [6], [11] and [14], are ‘nonobservable and
nonmeasureable’, as Q&G (1985: 247) characterise the referents of abstract nouns, and they
can be divided into several groups regarding the abstract notions they stand for and the degree
of externality of the states symbolised by the object phrases, e.g., the state of physical and/or
mental well-being, personal qualities or aspirations, which are inherent aspects of human
condition. As already indicated, the referents of the agent nouns are all beneficiaries of the
processes in which they consciously engage, e.g., moving to the seaside and separating from
someone, as in [1] or [2]. All of these examples illustrate the phenomenon of the indefiniteness
(fuzziness) of semantic roles, as discussed before. Generally, all the object nouns participating
in the samples of language analysed above are axiologically charged and in the case of all of
them the charge is positive, e.g., spiritual growth, physical well-being, or sanity.

When it comes to the types of notions that the abstract nouns whose referents constitute
LMs performing the role of direct objects refer to, three groups can be distinguished. The first
group encompasses concepts connected with physical health and well-being. These are:
physical well-being, hygiene, health and sport. The second one includes the states / conditions
of human psyche: solitude, privacy and sanity. The third one comprises nouns whose meaning
revolve around the concepts of human motivation / desire / drive to act and achieve goals that

76
were previously set: ambition, spiritual growth, self-interest, pride, career. As regards the
degree of externality of the human states and/or conditions which the object noun phrases refer
to, two of them refer to public esteem or regard, i.e. reputation and name. Other object phrases
refer to internal states, qualities, aspirations of the agent or the private or professional sphere of
life: sanity, physical well-being, hygiene, health, solitude, privacy, ambition, self-interest,
pride, spiritual growth and career.

To sum up, the self-sake benefactive construction is a kind of reflexive construction

involving a subtype of for expressing the Self-Sake Benefactive Sense, already discussed in
detail in Section 3.5.7. of the present chapter. The presence or absence of modality marked on
in the sentences illustrating the construction in question influence the overall meaning of a given
sentence exemplifying the construction since the level of subjectivity is higher in the case if
lexical verbs than modal verb. The forthcoming section constitutes a recapitulation of the
examined characteristics of for in the present chapter.

3.6.7. The preposition for – recapitulation

To recapitulate, it should be stated that the category of prepositions is an astoundingly broad

one and a typical characteristic of its members is polysemy, as is the case with other parts of
speech in English as well as in other natural languages. The multiplicity of meanings of English
prepositions is, indeed, astounding, as illustrated by the example of over, so thoroughly
examined by Brugman, Lakoff or Tyler and Evans.

When it comes to the preposition in focus of the present study, it seems to be polysemous
to a considerable degree, as well, even though it never assumed the role of a postmodifying
adverbial particle. There are numerous meanings of for listed in reputable dictionaries, as was
proved in the previous sections of the present chapter. Most commonly for appears to be used
in modern English to express the senses of purposiveness, benefactivity and causativeness. The
Sense of Purpose presumably is the sanctioning sense, from which other senses arise.
Particularly interesting and productive, however, seems to be the benefactive sense, which is
supposedly the most prototypically associated sense with the preposition for by a casual
language user. It is also the basis for some grammatical constructions, especially the self-sake
benefactive one, whose foundation is constituted by the conception of reflexivity.

As mentioned polysemy is characteristic of lexemes functioning in natural languages.

Therefore the forthcoming section will revolve around the issues concerning the polysemy of

77
the Polish counterpart of the preposition for. The aim of this comparison of the network of for
to the network of the Polish dla is to recognise the possible similarities and difference between
the extensions of the basic senses of the corresponding words built by two different languages.

3.7. The most significant accounts of the polysemous dla

It should be pointed out that dla is in Polish just one of many possible equivalents of the English
for. While in English a single form, i.e., for functions as two parts of speech, i.e. a prefix and a
preposition, in Polish there are more counterparts of the English for, yet the one which
encompasses the purposiveness, benefactivity and causativeness, the main three senses of the
preposition in question in both languages, is dla. It should be mentioned, though, that other
counterparts of the English for in Polish are, e.g., do, as in an ear for music (‘ucho do muzyki’)
to refer to some standard or to express measurement of someone’s talent. Za, in turn,
participates in the expression of the concept of responsibility, as in responsible for
(‘odpowiedzialny za’). Za is also the Polish counterpart of the English for of exchange, e.g.,
Bill obtained some food for his dog (‘Bill dostał trochę jedzenia / jakieś jedzenie za swojego
psa’). Another Polish counterpart of for, namely for of contingency is the Polish na, as in What
do you do for a stiff neck? (‘Co robisz na sztywność szyi?’).

The present section constitutes a brief outline of the uses of dla, which is the Polish
equivalent of the English preposition for in its basic, purposive sense. This analysis is proposed
with a view to comparing the uses of for with the uses of its Polish equivalent dla and detecting
the semantic overlap of both prepositions. This comparison aims at demonstrating the semantic
incompatibility of entire networks of senses represented by apparently equivalent lexemes in
two different languages, as presupposed by Lakoff.

In the dictionary by Boryś (2005: 113) the author indicates that the preposition is used to
indicate:
• somebody’s benefit/ in somebody’s interest, e.g., dla nas (‘for us’),
• cause of something which has already happened, e.g., dlaczego? dlatego, że… (‘why?’
‘because of…’)
• purpose, e.g., dla elegancji (‘for elegance’ / ‘in order to look elegant’).
As can be observed, Boryś points to two main uses of dla, namely those expressing benefit and
cause/purpose, which are also the most prevailing senses as regards the uses of for in English.

78
However, it must be indicated that all the specified senses in a way pertain to a single one; that
of purpose.
In Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN17 (‘The PWN Dictionary of the Polish Language’) the
preposition dla is described as primarily a lexeme informing about the purpose or function of
the object referent, e.g., film dla młodzieży (‘a film for the youth’). As an illustration, the
sentence tupali nogami dla rozgrzewki (‘they were stamping their feet for warming up/ (in
order) to warm up’) can also be considered. Dla is a preposition indicating an object of
judgement too, presenting it as assessed from a certain perspective, e.g., in Był to dla mnie rok
pełen sukcesów (‘It was a very successful year for me’). What is more, the preposition can
point to the cause of some actions, e.g., Na dziki polowano dla mięsa (‘Wild boars were hunted
for their meat’).

Another study that appears to be a reliable source of information as regards the Polish
preposition in question is one accomplished by Topolińska (2010). The author describes the
evolution of dla, as it has historically developed, drawing upon several dictionaries of the Polish
language and considering the characteristic uses of dla on the basis of contemporary online
corpora. Topolińska notes that dla is a semantically untypical preposition because of its
primarily causal, rather than spatial semantics, a characteristic that is also recognisable of its
English counterpart for. She acknowledges the fact that prototypical prepositions are
predications expressing spatial relations, while their possible causal meanings are the effect of
secondary semantic derivation, e.g. in expressions such as the Polish zrobiłem to z sympatii dla
niego (‘I did this because / for I like him’), where the preposition z signals reason, source of an
action (2010: 153).

As indicated by Topolińska, dla can also express cause, but the type of construction which
is most productive in Polish is the one where dla signals purpose or benefactivity, e.g. Najwięcej
dla popularyzacji burleski zrobiła jednak Dita von Tesse (literally: ‘The one who did the most
for popularisation of burlesque after all was Dita von Tesse’). As regards the reason / purpose
indeterminacy, Topolińska provides ambiguous examples, as to which there are doubts whether
to interpret dla as the expression of cause or purpose, which is also the case with some uses of
the English for. They constitute a testimony for the existence of a semantic continuum
extending between ‘cause’ and ‘purpose’ which seems to be of existential nature and language-
independent. One of the sentences illustrating this phenomenon is the following: Ubieram się

17
https://sjp.pwn.pl/

79
tak dla przyjemności bycia elegancką ‘I dress like this for the pleasure of being elegant’ (2010:
159), where dla (‘for’) may mean żeby (‘so as to’), precisely ‘to be elegant’ but also z powodu
/ ponieważ (‘because of) ponieważ bycie elegancką jest dla mnie przyjemnością. Nevertheless,
similarly as in the case of the English for, dla is mainly used to express ‘purpose’, rather than
‘cause’.

In Topolińska’s study dla is also claimed to have once been used in expressions which at
present would include the Polish spatial preposition do (‘to’), which seems to involve
directionality, e.g., miłość dla pani Reszko ‘love for Mrs. Reszko’ (in contemporary Polish
miłość do pani Reszko) (‘love to Mrs. Reszko’) or Matylda pała nienawiścią dla Ireny (in
contemporary Polish Matylda pała nienawiścią do Ireny) (‘Matylda is burning with hatred to
Irena’) (Topolińska 2010: 158).

Moreover, dla participates in adjectival predications, e.g., (nie)właściwy dla (‘/un/suitable

for’), (nie)dobry dla (‘/not/ good for’), (nie)uchwytny dla (‘/un/attainable for’) (2010: 160).
Other uses can be exemplified by such expressions as problem / okazja / szansa / przeszkoda
dla kogoś (‘a problem / an opportunity / a chance / a hindrance for / to somebody’) and dla
mnie, dla nas, dla Anny (‘for me’, ‘for us’, ‘for Anna’), which illustrate the senses of relatedness
or norm (2010: 160-161). What is more, there are numerous constructions where dla is directly
followed by an object referring to an addressee, beneficiary, or recipient of a given action, e.g.,
dla chorych, dla gości (‘for the infirm’, ‘for guests’) (2010: 160).

As was indicated in the beginning of the present section, three basic senses of dla pertain
to purposiveness, benefactivity and causativeness, which has already been corroborated by The
PWN Dictionary of the Polish Language, the specification of the senses of dla made by Boryś
and the study carried out by Topolińska.

3.7.1. The network of the senses of dla

On the basis of the admittedly modest data gathered above, the network of the senses of dla has
been created, as presented on the next page in Fig. 16.

80
 SELF-SAKE BENEFACTIVE

BENEFACTIVE

INTENDED FUNCTION
INTENDED RECIPIENT

PURPOSE

CAUSE

Fig. 16. The graph representing the network of the senses of dla

The constructed network of the considered preposition allows for drawing certain conclusions.
Thus, in Polish, similarly to English, the prototypical sense of dla (the most obvious equivalent
of for) is the Purpose Sense, which can be exemplified by the expression zrobić coś dla żartu
(‘to do something for fun’) or the phrase zrobić coś dla swiętego spokoju (‘do sth for sake of
peace and quiet’). The sentence Ubieram się tak dla przyjemności ‘I dress like this for pleasure’,
where dla (‘for’) may be paraphrased as żeby (‘in order to’), is also an expression of purpose.
The sense specifying the Intended Recipient can be exemplified by the expression film dla
młodzieży (‘film for the youth’) or list dla Ciebie (‘a letter for you’), which extends from the
Purpose Sense. A good example of the Intended Function Sense, also arising from the Purpose
Sense, can be the phrase witaminy dla wzmocnienia organizmu (‘vitamins for strengthening the
body’), where vitamins are clearly indicated to serve a specific function. The Benefactive Sense,
arising from the Intended Recipient Sense, is instantiated by the sentence Kupuję bluzkę dla
Basi (‘I’m buying a blouse for Basia’) or Najwięcej dla popularyzacji burleski zrobiła Dita von
Tesse (‘The one who did the most for the popularisation of burlesque was Dita von Tesse’). The
afore-mentioned sentence serves also as an illustrative example of the Purpose Sense. The Self-
Sake Benefactive Sense can be exemplified by the sentence Pan Karlik był górnikiem i od lat

81
przyjeżdżał tu dla zdrowia (‘Mr. Karlik was a miner and he came here for years for the sake of
his health’ (lit. ‘for health’). The Cause Sense can be exemplified by the sentence Na dziki
polowano dla mięsa (‘Wild boars were hunted for their meat’) or Zrobiłem to dla siebie (‘I’ve
done this for myself’). In the last example the cause is again conflated with the Purpose Sense
(as indicated in the case of use of for in the sentence: He bought a suit for his brother’s
wedding).

3.8. A recapitulation of shared and disparate meanings of dla and for

As a result of the study of the senses of the two prepositions presented above, the following
conclusion is reached: English and Polish expose a good degree of similarity as regards the use
of the prepositions for and dla, respectively. Generally, in English there is a larger number of
senses of the preposition for than the senses represented by dla in Polish. What can be observed
is that in both languages the corresponding prepositions are mainly used to express
purposiveness, and, finally, both constitute markers of the Benefactive semantic role (in Polish
additionally signaled by the case form). The English for the sake of phrase has a Polish
equivalent and can be translated as ze względu na / przez wzgląd na. Generally, for seems to
cover more meanings than dla, which does not encompass the senses of ‘duration’ or
‘destination’ as it is in the case of the preposition for, for which Polish uses prepositions other
than dla, such as przez (‘through’) or do (‘to’). What is more, there is no sense of reciprocal
purpose in Polish. Distinctly from for, dla does not imply spatial movement and its meaning
does not seem to subsume the aspect of dynamism, i.e., actual movement as is the case with
for. It should also be indicated that the particular meanings, of respectively for and dla are not
discernibly separable. What can be observed in the networks of both for and dla is the fact that
the scopes of the senses represented by particular nodes overlap and the boundaries between
them are fuzzy. The English for in its post-verbal position functions only as a preposition and
modifies the following object noun, unlike other forms from this category, e.g., in, about, etc.
which assume the adverbial function with regard to the preceding verb. The adverbial functions
of for- are only observable when it appears in the pre-verbal position prefixed to particular
verbs, such as give, get, go and a few more, which is an issue elaborated upon in the next
chapter.

82
 Chapter 4: The semantic evolution of for-prefixed verbs

The previous chapter has been an attempt to present the nature of the morpheme for in its
function as a preposition. Thus, Chapter 3 of the present work has addressed the issues of the
preposition for and, to some extent, its Polish equivalent dla. The senses of for and dla have
been compared, and the main conclusion that has been drawn, is that it is purposiveness that
constitutes the prototypical sense of both prepositions. As regards the present chapter, it is
devoted to the second nature of the morpheme for which can in English function also as a prefix.
It is hypothesised that the notion of spatiality (and movement in space) recognised in the
etymological forerunner of the morpheme in question but faded in the case of its prepositional
function, is subsumed in the prefix when it is attached to some verbs. This is crucial for shaping
the entire meanings of the resulting lexemes (for-prefixed verbs). This account of the meaning
of the morpheme exposes its contrast to the meaning of the already analysed preposition, in the
case of which the spatial dimension is, as indicated, of secondary importance.
The overriding goal of the current part of the thesis is to accomplish a semantic analysis
of lexemes constituting in English a small class of for-prefixed verbs, i.e., forgo, forgive, forget,
forbid, forswear, forfeit, forbear, forsake, forfend, and argue for their recognition as linguistic
evidence of conceptual blending, a process described in the theory worked out by Turner and
Fauconnier (1998, 2002). It is essential that the for-prefixed verbs be recognised as a vital
example of the phenomenon of lexicalisation (as described by Brinton and Traugott 2005: 96-
97 and Trousdale 2012a: 541-543), morphologically being the outcome of the combination of
the prefix for- with the chosen root verbs, namely go, give, get, bid, fend, swear, feit and bear.
Lexicalisation, according to Brinton and Traugott, is a historical change that produces
new lexical forms primarily out of syntactic constructions (e.g., run-of-the-mill ‘ordinary’, out-
of-work ‘unemployed, dyed-in-the-wool ‘inveterate’) and word formations (e.g., woman from
the Old English compound wifmann ‘wife.man’, lord from the Old English word loaf combined
with weard – ‘guardian’, garlic from the Old English gar ‘spear’ and leac ‘leek’). Trousdale,
on his part, indicates that a new item, being an outcome of the process of lexicalisation,
performs a referential / conceptual (lexical) function. The function of a new item, which is an
outcome of the process of grammaticalisation, in turn, as Trousdale claims, is procedural or
indexical (i.e., grammatical). This means that it becomes part and parcel of a fixed pattern
codifying a specific construal in a given language.

83
 The specificity of the two-morpheme for-prefixed verbs consists also in the fact that the
initial element, i.e. the particle for- should be classified as an adprep with a modifying function,
whose meaning is ‘away’ (cf. An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language by Walter
W. Skeat). Due to this characteristic, the conceptualisations which for-prefixed verbs represent
involve in some cases a re-orientation of the direction of motion ‘inherited’ from a stem verb,
while in some other cases the idea of motion is altogether imported into a specific
conceptualisation. What should be pointed out is the fact that the motion involved in the
conceptions represented by such verbs due to their prefixed morphemes is subjectified,
conceptual in nature. This change of conceptualised directionality can be observed, for
example, in the relational scenes described by the verbs give and forgive. Thus, the sentence I
gave him that book describes a scene in which the actual (objectified) movement of the
landmark represented by noun book (the direct object) is directed from the trajector I to the
other landmark him (the indirect object), whereas in the scene represented by the sentence I
forgave him that mistake, the movement of the abstract landmark mistake (the direct object) is
subjectified and is oriented not towards the landmark him (the indirect object), but away from
it. Therefore, the scene involves a metaphorical construal of a mistake (LM1) in terms of a
physical object, which the TR causes to move away from LM2.

What seems to be the most important in regard to the issue of for-prefixed verbs is the
clarification of the phenomenon of attenuation of the agentive role of subject referents in scenes
described by sentences in which such verbs participate. This phenomenon could be
characterised, after Langacker (2010), as follows: the more subjectified, i.e., highly
conceptualised movement of a trajector is, the less evident (objective) its role becomes due to
the process of cognitive attenuation. Moreover, when the concept represented by the prefix for-
is combined with the concept represented by one of the verbs already mentioned in the present
section, functioning as a root of a given for-prefixed verb, the result may be understood in terms
of conceptual blending. In such blends, the conception that constitutes the meaning of a for-
prefixed verb involves a TR whose agentive role is decreased (or attenuated) significantly. For
instance, the agentive role of the TR in a conceptualised scene described by a sentence with the
prototypically spatial verb go is far more evident, i.e., objectified than in a scene described by
a sentence with the verb forgo, which is the result of the combination of the concept represented
by the prefix for- with the concept represented by the verb go. This means that the role of the
agent is highly attenuated in the latter case. The conception represented by the verb forgo does
involve movement, albeit this movement is not conceptualised as occurring physically, but only

84
subjectively in the mind of a language user (conceptualiser), i.e., its construal is subjectified.
The process of the aforesaid attenuation is determined by metaphorisation, which will be
discussed in more detail in the forthcoming parts of the present chapter.

The theoretical foundations on which the analysis herein conducted is based, are:

• The Theory of Conceptual Blending (Blends) (Turner and Fauconnier 1998, 2002),
• the idea of phrasal verbs and for-prefixed verbs as metaphorical extensions representing
conceptual blends (Hampe 2002, Panther and Thornburg 2009),
• the cognitive approach to morphology and prefixation (Hamawand 2011, 2013),
• an account of English prefixes of spatiality as conceived of by Hamawand (2011, 2013),
• Bolinger’s account of particles (1971),
• the idea of the polysemy of the prefix for-,
• Langacker’s notions of:
o subjectification (explained in 1990, 2000), which is adopted in the present thesis
to explain the conceptualised motion of landmarks in the relational scenes
described by the for-prefixed verbs,
o the idea of attenuation of the agentive role of the subject,
o the process of lexicalisation observable in the for-prefixed verbs as a result of
attaching for- to the analysed root verbs (go, get, give, bid, feit, fend, swear,
bear).
The dictionaries referred to in the present chapter are the following:
• An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language,
• A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (2013),
• An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language by Walter W. Skeat (2005),
• Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English (1989),
• The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
• The Concise Dictionary of English Etymology,
• Oxford Dictionaries (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com).

85
4.1. The cognitive approach to morphology and prefixation

In the present chapter, it will hopefully be demonstrated that in the case of for-prefixed verbs it
is the prefix that imposes its semantic profile on the entire structure of a given for-prefixed verb.
It is intended to prove that the analysed polymorphemic for-prefixed verbs, commonly
considered to be monomorphemic, are in fact complex units, in which the composite structure
of form reflects the composite nature of the represented conception. Those complex units are
originally composite (complex / polymorphemic) lexemes composed of two or more
substructures which are morphologically divisible (as defined by Hamawand 2011: 3).
Morphology, as Hamawand holds, is:

a branch of linguistics which studies the form-meaning relationships between

the subparts of composite words in the lexicon. It aims to show how the
subparts are integrated and how the resulting formations are interpreted. A
composite word consists of two or more subparts, one of which imposes its
profile (Langacker’s terminology) on the entire structure (2011: 15).

In an attempt to conduct a scrupulous analysis of for-prefixed verbs in English, the present

author strongly relies on Hamawand’s innovative work addressing the issue of the cognitive
approach to morphology. His intention is, as he puts it, “to throw a new light on the structures
of words, developing an approach based on Cognitive Linguistics in general and Cognitive
Grammar in particular” (2011: 15). Below are listed cognitive assumptions put forward by
Hamawand on which the morphological analysis of the English for-prefixed verbs is based:
(1) Morphological expressions result from cognitive operations, processes
which describe capabilities of the mind or functions of the brain in
producing and interpreting morphological expressions. Mental abilities
include general operations like derivation and compounding.
(2) Morphological expressions occur in contexts perceived as the
environment in which an utterance is used. The meaning of an expression
is not fixed. It changes depending on the demands of discourse (office
cleaner, floor cleaner).
(3) In morphological expressions, bound morphemes may attach to the same
root but profile distinct aspects of its meaning (e.g. childish, childlike)
(Hamawand 2011: 17).

86
When it comes to item (2) above, it appears that the meanings of the analysed for-prefixed verbs
are not fully context-dependent, i.e., they do constitute constant items in the lexicon of English
and represent certain specific, albeit very general concepts. Considering claim (3), in the case
of the for-prefixed verbs, as it seems, for- attached to various verbs, i.e., free morphemes,
profiles different aspects of their meanings. In accordance with the following definition of a
root, i.e., a morpheme, which is ‘a word substructure that cannot be decomposed into further
elements’ (Hamawand 2011: 3), the roots under examination in the present thesis are verbs to
the front of which for- is affixed. Thus, it can be proposed that each for-prefixed verb constitutes
an integrated whole, which is morphologically decomposable and which consists of a root and
a bound morpheme to which a further bound morpheme can be added, as can be illustrated by
such words as unforgettable or unbearable, where get and bear are roots, to which, apart from
for-, two other bound morphemes are added, namely the prefix un- and the suffix -able. For-
also serves an adverbial role similar to the one performer by adverbial particles in phrasal verbs,
which like for-prefixed verbs constitute integral wholes. This fact has already been referred to
earlier in this chapter, when the prefix was classified as an adprep, the concept of which is
thoroughly discussed in the forthcoming section 4.3. of the present chapter).

4.1.1. A complex word

As has already been claimed in the previous section, for-prefixed verbs constitute
polymorphemic, complex units. A complex word may consist of a root and one or more
suffixes, which differentiates it from a compound. In the case of compounds, it is roots rather
than roots and suffixes that are combined into a self-dependent whole. A root is generally
identified as a free morpheme of any word class which can stand by itself and which is
considered phonologically autonomous, phonologically and semantically contentful, also
semantically independent, and in a way “promiscuous”, i.e., it may admit a number of different
suffixes. A prefix, in turn, is a bound morpheme that is attached to the beginning of a free
morpheme to form a new word. Such a morpheme is generally considered phonologically
dependent, phonologically schematic, semantically dependent and “choosy” with respect to the
root it attaches to.
When it comes to the meaning of a complex word, it may be either compositional or
non-compositional in character. Compositionality is at issue in the cases where the meaning of
a complex expression is the sum of the meanings of its parts, i.e., it is fully predictable from
those meanings, as in the expression subfreezing (temperature), where subfreezing means
‘lower than the freezing point’, as can be inferred considering the senses of the stem participle

87
and the prefix. Non-compositionality occurs in the cases where the meaning of a complex
expression is the function of both the meanings of its parts and the contextual knowledge
surrounding its use, e.g., subnormal child refers to an individual who represents the level of
intelligence that is considered lower than some established standard. The non-compositionality
of meaning is a matter of degree, it may be only partly predictable on the basis of the meaning
of the parts, as in, e.g., ‘fisherman’ / ‘blackberry’ or entirely unpredictable, e.g., ‘catwalk’. It
should be borne in mind, however, that according to Turner and Fauconnier (2002), the role of
mental context in the process of word formation is always traceable. Thus, compositionality
seems to be but a myth.
According to Hammawand, a prefix, such as ante-, fore-, intra-, mid-, or post-, discussed
further in the present section, is a word-initial element that is added to a free morpheme to form
a new lexeme whose meaning is typically non-compositional. It is a bound morpheme because
it never occurs by itself, but is always integrated with a free root, and only then can it represent
a certain meaning.
In line with the traditional approach is the claim that it is the meaning of the root that
determines the sense of the entire unit in which it participates. According to Hamawand,
however, whose approach contrasts with the traditional one, the integration of the participating
subunits in a composite item along the formal and semantic dimension is affected by the
following four determinates:
• Firstly, the two morphemes are integrated because they have certain
elements in common at both semantic and phonological poles.
• Secondly, of the two morphemes, the free one qualifies as an autonomous
element while the bound morpheme qualifies as a dependent one.
• Thirdly, the bound morpheme is primarily responsible for the character of
the composite structure. It acts as a profile determinant and has a crucial
function in the derivation process. It causes a shift in the semantic
structure of the root, thereby creating a movement of a root to the derived
formation, e.g. inter in intertribal is the key subpart in that it lends its
profile to the entire composite structure, which means ‘existing or
occurring between different tribes’.
• Fourthly, the two morphemes form a head-complement structure, with the
bound morpheme being the head and the free morpheme being the
complement. In the formation, the complement adds intrinsic conceptual
substance to the head (2013: 736-747).

88
It should be observed, then, that there is a disparity between the notions of a morphological /
grammatical head and a semantic head. The first two criteria specified by Hamawand do not
seem to be disputable as they concern the former type of head. When it comes to the third
criterion, which contrasts with traditional account of complex language structures, it should be
pointed out that there are phrases composed of a modifier and a noun, in which it is the modifier
that supplies the more relevant information into the semantic representation, e.g., when the
lexeme raincoat is considered, it turns out that the concept of raincoat has more in common
with that of rain rather than with that of a coat (Ungerer and Schmid 2006: 98). As regards the
lexeme raincoat, describing the results of an attribute-listing experiment, which reveals that
many compounds attract attributes which cannot be traced back to their source categories,
Ungerer and Schmid claim that in the attribute listing experiment they conducted:
[…] the overlap of attributes between raincoat and the ‘modifier’ category
rain was far greater than between raincoat and the ‘head’ category coat. (…)
Yet if we accept the cognitive view that category descriptions include
associative and experimental attributes, the idea that for the ordinary language
user raincoat is part of a comprehensive cognitive model rain rather than a
type of coat (besides other types of coats) cannot be dismissed (2006: 95).

When it comes to the aforementioned four determinates in the process of integration of the
participating subunits (morphemes in a polymorphemic word), all the criteria are met in the
case of the for-prefixed verbs. The third and the fourth criteria are fulfilled in the sense that the
analysed prefix can be claimed to semantically dominate in the conception represented by a
complex lexeme of this type. The fourth criterion, nevertheless, might appear to be
controversial, yet it can be demonstrated as valid taking into account any for-prefixed verb
analysed in the present thesis, e.g., in the case of the verb forgive, it is the prefix for-, which,
despite its status of a mere morphological complement, on closer look appears to add a
morphological complement in this structure, that seems to supply ‘intrinsic conceptual
substance to the head’, which is constituted by the verb give.

89
4.1.2. Prefixation in polymorphemic units

Since for- clearly functions as a prefix in a number of English polymorphemic verbs, it is

worthwhile to provide a brief characteristic of the process of prefixation in general. As claimed
by Sapir (1921), affixation is one of the six most common grammatical processes in English.
The other processes that he enumerates are word order, composition, internal modification,
reduplication and variations in accent. When it comes to the definition of a specific type of
affixation, i.e., prefixation, it is understood as the morphological process of forming a new word
by attaching a bound morpheme to the front of a free morpheme, or to put it briefly, the process
of deriving a new word by means of adding a prefix. In English, prefixes are generally attached
to adjectives to express contrast, e.g., the prefix dis-, when added to honest, results in the
formation of the adjective with the meaning opposite to honest, i.e. dishonest, similarly, the
prefix counter-, when added to balance, results in the formation of the noun counterbalance,
or the outcome of un- combined with faithful is the adjective unfaithful (The Oxford Handbook
of Cognitive Linguistics 2007: 658). This phenomenon can also be observed in the case of verbs,
e.g., misinterpret, undo, disappear, etc.
As regards the history of this method of word building in English, Baugh and Cable assert in
reference to the morpheme in question that

many of the Old English prefixes gradually lost their vitality, their ability to
enter into new combinations. The Old English prefix for- (corresponding to
German ver-) was often used to intensify the meaning of a verb or to add the
idea of something destructive or prejudicial. For a while during the Middle
English period it continued to be used occasionally in new formations […] At
about 1300 we find forhang (put to death by hanging), forcleave (cut to
pieces), and forshake (shake off). It was even combined with words borrowed
from French: forcover, forbar, forgab (deride), fortmvail (tire). But while
these occasional instances show that the prefix was not dead, it seems to have
had no real vitality. None of these new formations lived long, and the prefix
is now entirely obsolete. The only verbs in which it occurs in Modern English
are forbear, forbid, fordo, forget, forgive, forgo, forsake, forswear, and the
participle forlorn. All of them had their origin in Old English (2002: 168).

As already noted in the present thesis, for- attached to particular verbs, e.g. bid, resists
the general tendency observable in the effect that prefixes exert on the meaning of structures in
which they participate. It can be claimed that it introduces the idea of contrast in a more subtle

90
way – to modify the meaning of a verb rather than to create its antonym. The modification
applies to the relation represented by a stem verb and it consists in affecting the conceptualised
motion of a landmark represented by the direct object, for example in the case of the verb
forgive, the prefix for- imports the conception of ‘moving away’ (‘remittance’) into the
conceptual blend represented by forgive. It should be noted that the conceptualised motion of a
landmark in the scene represented by the root verb give alone is directed towards rather than
away from the LM, the direct object referent. This means a complete re-orientation of
directionality.

4.1.3. Prefixes of spatiality in English

In Cognitive Semantics, it is the very constructional patterns, i.e., symbolic units of an

extremely high level of schematicity that are claimed to represent conceptualisations, that is to
be meaningful. Such patterns are constituted by strings of symbols representing very general
linguistic categories, such as N, NP, Adj., etc. According to Langacker (1997), a semantic
structure includes both the conceptual content and a particular way of construing that content,
which is determined by the imagery conventionally associated with a given form. Hamawand,
in turn, claims that “prefixes have meanings of their own, give substance to the host roots, and
shape the final meanings of the derivates” and “the root has a multiple facet of content, whereas
the prefix has its own which adds to the root” (2013: 736-747). Such assumptions are in line
with what is proposed by the present author as regards the role of for- in the analysed for-
prefixed verbs.

Although direct references to for- classified as a spatial prefix are difficult to find in
professional literature, it can be proposed that in fact it is a spatial prefix or at least it adds its
own dimension of conceptualised spatiality to the meaning of complex lexemes in which it
participates, as has already been mentioned in the present work. This claim will be discussed in
the course of the present section. The list of English spatial prefixes presented by Hamawand
(2013) includes, ante-, fore-, inter-, intra-, mid-, post-, sub-, super- and under-. The purpose of
Hamawand’s paper (2013) is to investigate the role of prefixes of spatiality in the formation of
words, for the purpose of which he adopts the approach of Cognitive Semantics and argues that
prefixes marking spatiality represent a wide range of meanings that gather around the central
sense (736-747). As already indicated, the meaning of a derivative is characterised in terms of
two aspects, i.e. its conceptual content and the construal it represents.

91
4.2. The etymology and polysemy of the prefix for-

In the beginning of the present section it should be pointed out that both for as a preposition
and for- as a prefix originate from a lexeme whose semantic scope involved a spatial aspect.
Yet, in modern English the concept of directionality in the represented conceptualisations
functions differently in each of them. In the case of the preposition for, the concept of
directionality has evolved into the concept of purposiveness. When it comes to for- as a prefix,
the concept of directionality has remained within the represented conceptualisation, but it has
undergone the process of subjectification. The spatial directionality has changed into the
directionality conceptualised metaphorically. In the case of the preposition the aspect of
purposiveness is more prominent and dominant, whereas the prefix serves the function of
marking subjectified movement of, e.g., landmark1 away from landmark2, as happens in the
conceptualised scene represented by a predication with the verb forgive involved, e.g., I will
forgive him this mistake. Thus, the characteristic that for- shares with another prefix
etymologically related to it, i.e., fore- is the involvement of a spatial dimension in both of them.
The semantic network of the senses of fore- in Fig. 18 below is presented to explain
Hamawand’s methodology, which is used for the purpose of the present thesis.

As regards the etymology of for-, it is nowadays semantically quite distinct from fore-,
yet, as indicated, to some extent also related to it, as is confirmed by CEDEL (2013: 193). The
Middle English for- comes from Old English and has replaced earlier forms, such as fer-, faer-
(akin to the German ver-, related to the Proto-Indo-European base *per-) and the Old French
for- (as in forfeit - ‘crime’ and forfaire - ‘commit crime’) with the origins in Latin, as in foris,
meaning ‘beyond’, ‘from within’. As regards the Old English and Middle English meaning of
the prefix, it can be specified as ‘away’, ‘apart’, ‘off’, as in forbid, forget, forgo, where,
nevertheless, the original senses are now largely obscured. For- ‘follows its Old French
forerunner in the sense of from, out, or away. Thus, the prefix for- as a modifier of the following
verbs as in forbid, forswear, forgive, etc., imports the meaning of away into the conceptions
represented by them (The Philomatic Journal and Literary Review 1826: 80). Similarly, in
WNWDAE (1989: 526), for- as a prefix is also characterised as akin to the German ver-, which
is used to indicate that the action (referred to by the stem verb) exerts a negative effect (on the
referent of the noun functioning as the direct object of the complex verb) and it denotes the state
of movement or change.

92
 Dwelling on Hamawand’s (2013: 739) graphic representation of the multiple senses of
the prefix fore- (Fig. 17), which is offered below, a network of the senses of for- has been
drawn, as presented in Fig. 18. The solid arrows extending from particular boxes represent
basic, prototypical senses, whereas the dashed arrows point to their semantic extensions.

the prefix
fore-

prototype periphery
time space

preceding occuring in front of important

position

Fig. 17. The semantic network of the prefix fore-

The prototypical sense of fore-, as indicated by Hamawand, refers to time and is equivalent to
the meaning of the participle ‘preceding’, as in the nouns forefather, forerunner or the verbs
foreshadow, foresee. The second most significant sense is related to the spatial dimension. It
conveys one physical sense, that is ‘in front of’, as in foreshore, which can be metaphorically
extended to mean ‘important position’, as in forefront, foreman.
As regards the senses of the prefix for-, an account accomplished in a similar mode can
be presented. According to EDEL, for-, as a prefix attached to a verb preserves something of
the sense of from, to which it is related. As hypothesised therein, its original sense was related
to that represented by away or forth. Consequently, the sense of away seems to be most clearly
preserved in such for-prefixed verbs, as e.g., forbid, forgo, forgive, forswear (2005: 221). For-
as a prefix representing the senses corresponding to ‘completely’ or ‘excessively’ is also
mentioned in AHDEL. As claimed in EDEL18, for- attached to verbs as a prefix usually has an

18
https://archive.org/stream/etymologicaldict00skeauoft/etymologicaldict00skeauoft_djvu.tx

93
intensifying effect, or preserves the sense of from, to which it is, as already pointed out, related.
The intensifying sense of for- is also pointed out by Baugh and Cable, who claim that:

a part of the flexibility of the Old English vocabulary comes from the generous
use made of prefixes and suffixes to form new words from old words or to
modify or extend the root idea. In this respect it also resembles modern
German. In like manner the use of prefixes was a fertile resource in word
building. It is particularly a feature in the formation of verbs. There are about
a dozen prefixes that occur with great frequency, such as ā-, be-, for-, fore-,
ge-, mis-, of-, ofer-, on-, tō-, un-, under-, and wiþ- (2002: 60).

What is more, as indicated by OD, for- is a prefix designating prohibition as in forbid, or

abstention / neglect / renunciation as in forgive, forget and forgo19, in which it can be also
interpreted as representing the sense ‘away’, ‘keeping away’.

The evolution of senses is demonstrative of two semantic aspects of for-, namely the one
referring to outwardly directed movement and the one which pertains to a negative or
detrimental effect (for the referent of the noun functioning as the direct object of the complex
verb). Both aspects can be observed to participate in the conceptions represented by for-prefixed
verbs. Fig. 18 on the next page summarises the senses of the prefix in question. The sense of
detriment may be motivated by the spatial sense, which is based on experience. Objects moving
away from observers are out of their reach, therefore, they become unattainable, which is likely
to exert a negative effect on human psyche. In other words, such a situation is typically
experienced as a negative event.

19
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/for-

94
 the prefix for-

prototype spatial periphery

sense destructive effect

from away completely excessively

Fig. 18. The semantic network of the prefix for-

As has already been indicated and as is illustrated by Fig 18. above, the prefix for- in the present
section, prototypical sense of the prefix for- is a spatial one, bearing the meaning of ‘away’ and
‘from’, as in the verbs forbid, forgo, forget. The peripheral sense refers to the destructive effect
and corresponds to the meaning of ‘completely’ or ‘excessively’.

4.3. The prefix for- as an adprep in the for-prefixed verbs

The importance of particles in relation to the meaning of verbs with which they form complex
lexemes has been discussed by many linguists, such as, among others, Bolinger (1971) or
Kovács (2007). According to the latter author,

[…] that particles contribute special meanings to the verb is shown by the fact
that new combinations are rarely made on a random basis, but they form
patterns which can, to some extent, be anticipated. Particles often have
particular meanings which they contribute to a variety of combinations. These
fixed meanings are used in order to create new combinations. For example,
the particle up has the meaning of completing and finishing in drink up, eat
up, heal up or break up, off has the meaning of obstructing and separating in
block off, brick off, cut off or wall off or down has the meaning of completing

95
 or failing in break down, close down, hunt down or turn down, etc. (2007:
157).

All of the combinations of verbs and particles listed by Kovács in the quote above, instantiate
the verb-particle patterns and are phrasal verbs.

For the purpose of conducting a research on complex lexemes composed of particle and
verb morphemes, Bolinger’s notion of adprep, which has already been mentioned in Section
4.1., can be adopted. His approach is very much in line with the assumptions of the present
study. As he states (1971: 28) an adprep “is a prepositional adverb which is an adverb and a
preposition at one and the same time”. According to O’Dowd (1998), in turn, the term adprep
represents a gradational category where an independent linguistic item, a preposition, forms a
constituency with the preceding verb as well as with the following noun phrase it governs.
However, in the examples involving for- prefixed verbs selected in the present study the adprep
for- forms a constituency with the following, rather than preceding verb, as, for example, with
give in forgive, where for is morphologically a prefix, grammatically a preposition and
semantically an adverbial. Thus, the lexemes analysed in the present chapter have been
categorised as complex verbs, where for functions as an adprep, i.e., it modifies the meaning of
the words (verbs) to which it is adjoined. It seems that the prefix for- in the for-prefixed verbs
serves the function of a preposition as regards grammar, but semantically it performs the
function of an adverb. Thus, for- appears to be a transitional form between a preposition (a
noun-related word) and an adverb (a verb-related word).

4.4. The semantic importance of the particle for- contributing to the overall meaning of
for-prefixed verbs

The meanings of for-prefixed verbs result from conceptual blending of two input concepts
which participate in the projection into a blended space in the procedure of composition, which
is completed with relevant background knowledge (related to the meanings of the prefix for-
and of the root verb) in the language user’s mind. Finally, the for-prefixed verbs develop their
actual semantic impact via elaboration – a dynamic process based on activating a speaker’s
general knowledge as well as the knowledge of current situation, this allowing to obtain a
particular usage adjusted to the requirements of the specific context. Furthermore, it is
significant to point out that formal unification results from conceptual unification. The unity of
two concepts is reflected in the formal combination of two parts of speech (as pointed out by
Turner and Fauconnier 1996), for example, when the concept behind the prefix for- blends with
96
the concept represented by the verb give, the outcome is a new lexeme representing a new self-
dependent conception symbolised by of the verb forgive.

In the present work, the conceptual blending theory, as proposed by Turner and
Fauconnier (1996), is extended onto complex units constituted by combinations of a prefix and
a verb. As already indicated, a few English verbs, which incorporate the old, historically related
to the German ver-, prefix for-, constitute a small class including, e.g., forget, forbid, forgo,
forsake (Dewell 2015: 182). In Old English all morphemes indicating directionality were
prefixed to verbs, e.g., utgan – which at present has assumed the form of the phrasal verb go
out, ongan representing the sense equivalent to that of approach, ingan, whose meaning is now
rendered by go in (Crystal 1995: 22). Generally, it seems that the meanings of the analysed for-
prefixed verbs should be viewed as a result of conceptual blending, which involves the
integration of two disparate concepts: those represented by the prefix for- and those represented
by the respective verbs, which are under examination in the present thesis.

4.4.1. The for-prefixed verbs as relics of the archaic method of referring to directionality

In this section the questions of the reason for which the for-prefixed verbs should be considered
as relics of the archaic method of referring to directionality found in Old English is addressed.
As has already been mentioned, the prefix for-, as part of a complex lexical structure, i.e., a for-
prefixed verb, imposes the reorientation of movement within the conceptualized scene
contributed to a blend by a root verb. This effect is due to its basic meaning, i.e., ‘away’. As
regards the interpretation of the meanings of complex for-prefixed verbs in terms of conceptual
blending, it is assumed that the concept represented by the prefix for- (input 1) blends with the
conception represented by a verb (input 2), as a result giving rise to a unified mental construct
(blended space), where the conception of motion occupies an important position. Specifically,
the conception represented by the prefix for-, which adds the conception of motion directed
away from some entity constituting a point of reference, as already indicated, blends with the
conception represented by a particular verb. For example, give is a ditransitive verb with slots
for two nouns in the direct and indirect object roles, whose prototypical sense is ‘turn over the
possession or control of (something) to someone without cost; make a gift’. Prototypically it
denotes physical objective movement of a direct object referent towards the referent of an
indirect object. However, in the sentence I will forgive them this one mistake, the verb seems to
involve the conception of moving a metaphorically construed entity away from a certain
reference point, with the referent of the subject noun performing the semantic role of both

97
Experiencer and (metaphoric) Agent. The conception of motion introduced into the blends
referred to by for-prefixed verbs becomes dominant. It re-orientates the physical movement
‘towards a recipient’ into the mental movement ‘away from a recipient’.

4.5. The Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT)

The observation which is of vital importance for the purposes of the present study is that “some
of the apparently simplest forms in the language consist of two words put together: noun-noun
compounds like boat-house, adjective-noun combinations like angry man, noun-adjective
combinations like child-safe or sugar-free” (Turner & Fauconnier, Conceptual Blending, Form
and Meaning 20
). It means that seemingly simple forms frequently represent complex
conceptual structures, i.e., conceptual amalgams.

4.5.1. Ungerer and Schmid’s account of conceptual integration

Ungerer and Schmid describe conceptual blending as “a process of conceptual projection and
composition of material from input spaces into a blended space”. They indicate that the most
prototypical pattern as regards conceptual blending are reflected in morphological blends,
which is exemplified by such words as smog, brunch, motel, etc. They also differentiate
between two types of morphological blends: “those that fail to survive and to be
conventionalized and those that are intentionally conceived as temporary and open-ended
phenomena” (2006: 268). Conceptual blending, as the authors state, is an important process
inspiring the creation of new grammatical and lexical structures in language. Thus, the
construction NP V NP PP, found in a large number of languages to express caused motion, is a
conceptual blend of two different conceived actions. An illustration of this situation can be the
one described by the utterance Jack threw the ball into the basket, which includes three
participants. It instantiates the following schema: The agent (Jack) acts on the patient (ball),
which finally reaches its goal (basket).

4.5.2. Fauconnier and Turner’s definition of conceptual blending

According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002), concepts are created when humans exploit
different sources of knowledge and experience, and then integrate these domains with one
another. A minimal conceptual integration network consists of four spaces: two input spaces, a
generic space, which links the input spaces and provides a general organisation for the blend,

20
http://tecfa.unige.ch/tecfa/maltt/cofor-1/textes/Fauconnier-Turner03.pdf accessed: 27.05.2017

98
and the blend itself. Meaning is constructed by creating mental spaces (cf. Fauconnier and
Turner 2002: 40, 102). A blend arises from the fusion of material from both input spaces. It
contains what the elements in the input spaces share, but it may also contain additional
structures projected from neither of the inputs (after Evans and Green 2006: 403).
Fauconnier and Turner (2003) explain the idea of conceptual blending as follows:

Conceptual blending is a basic mental operation that leads to new meaning,

global insight, and conceptual compressions useful for memory and
manipulation of otherwise diffuse ranges of meaning […] The essence of the
operation is to construct a partial match between two input mental spaces, to
project selectively from those inputs into a novel blended mental space, which
then dynamically develops an emergent structure. Mental spaces are small
conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local
understanding and action – they are very partial assemblies containing
elements, structured by frames and cognitive models (2003: 57-58).

Fauconnier and Turner’s enunciations can be completed with Busse’s claims that:
[a blend is] creative because it contains more than the sum of the parts of the
input spaces. The result is a new blended space which has its own conceptual
structure, and it is not uni-directional or one-dimensional. It is in the entire
blend that meaning is generated (Busse 2011: 179).

Thus, one of the most important aspects of human efficiency, insight, and creativity is the
compression achieved through blending (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 2003: 63). Fauconnier and
Turner also state that “blending can perform massive compressions and express them in simple
forms” (2003: 63). The capacity of being compressed and decompressed makes a simple form
capable of representing forms which are semantically extremely extensive and complicated.

Fauconnier and Turner provide examples of different complex networks obtained through
decompression. One of them is captured in the succinct phrase dolphin-safe (2003: 63). As
they claim, “the mental space for the situation involving dolphin is blended with an abstract
frame of danger. This yields a specific counterfactual mental space in which a dolphin is
assigned to a role in the danger frame. This mental space of specific harm is disanalogous with
the mental space for the current situation. These two disanalogous spaces are inputs to a new
blend, in which the disanalogy is compressed into the property safe” (F&T 2003: 64). The
conception represented by the phrase in question is that some fish offered for sale are dolphin-

99
safe, which means they are caught in a way that does not harm or kill dolphins. Defining the
CBT, Turner and Fauconnier elaborate upon the elements and mechanisms of conceptual
blending, which are elucidated in the next section.

4.5.2.1. The elements of conceptual blending

Three operations which are involved in constructing a blend are: composition, completion and
elaboration. The first stage consists in composing the blend from the elements of input spaces.
After that, the blend is completed with complex background conceptual structure. In the final
stage it is developed ‘through imaginative mental simulation according to principles and logic
in the blend’ (F&T 1998: 144). As already indicated, the model is comprised of at least four
mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic space encompassing what the two inputs have in
common, and a blended space which contains some elements from each input space but also
ones of its own. It should be, thus, noted that “the blended space may also contain emergent
structure, retrieved from long-term memory or resulting from comparison of elements drawn
from the separate inputs, or from elaboration on the elements in the blended space (“running
the blend”)” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 40). In the Clinton as French president example, the
value “Bill Clinton” and the role “French president” are brought together via the process of
composition in the blend and the result of this blend is the phrase Clinton as French president.
In the second stage, i.e., completion, background frames are activated and finally, in the Clinton
as French president example, the process of elaboration facilitates the frames for “French
politics” and “French moral attitudes” (Evans and Green 2006: 409). The phrase Clinton as
French president refers to the love affair between Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, and
Clinton is described as French president because “it is an accepted part of French public life
that the President sometimes has a mistress”, as Evans and Green explain (2006: 407).

4.5.3. The criticism of the Conceptual Blending Theory and its application to the study
of for-prefixed verbs

As some linguists advocate, The Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT), also known as the
Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; 2002), as effective as it may seem,
does not constitute a flawless model in terms of which to process language, and it has been
criticised because “it seems to introduce needless complexity into relatively simple linguistic
processes”, as Harder (2003) puts it. It is also argued that the assumption of four independent
cognitive spaces enters the model primarily as an entailment of the SPACE, BLENDING, and

100
CONSTRUCTION metaphors, which leads to unnecessary ambiguity, and works against the
statement of the theory in a form that supports derivation of testable hypotheses. Ritchie, for
example, wonders whether “the full conceptual apparatus, including at least four distinct spaces
for each instance of conceptual integration, and many more for complex operations that require
long sequences of integrations, is necessary for conceptual integration” (2004: 31-50). He
suggests that many of these elements derive not from the requirements of neurologically
embodied cognitive processes, but from the entailments of the focal metaphors, i.e., those of
‘spaces’ and ‘blending’ (2004: 31-50). Moreover, Brandt & Brandt (2005) criticise Fauconnier
and Turner’s model of conceptual blending because of its lack of attention to context. However,
the theory does mention the activation of context, which is indeed important, in the phase of
completion. Therefore, despite the afore-mentioned criticism, the CBT seems to be a relevant
paradigm on which to base the current study and, consequently, it is relied upon in the
forthcoming discussion concerning the conceptualisations recognized to be represented by the
English for-prefixed verbs. As indicated before, the for-prefixed verbs are claimed to constitute
examples of conceptual blends, which can be recognised to be reflected in the morphological
composition of such verbs.

It appears that the application of the CBT to the study of (complex) verbs is not a very
popular topic in linguistic literature. That is why for the purposes of the present thesis, a new
model of a conceptual blend should be established. An important example of specialised
literature where the concept of blends is mentioned in relation to verbs is Hampe’s work of
2002. The author states that:

complex conceptual blends are behind all phrasal verbs including the literal
ones. With idiomatic examples, this is only more noticeable since syntactic
behaviour is strongly influenced by a range of cognitive processes, such as
metaphor, metonymy, and stereotypical associations of conceptual blends with
specialised contexts, all of which may cause restrictions. Therefore, the
semantic make-up of constructions must be said to motivate, but cannot
strictly predict syntactic deficiencies (2002: 178).

What should also be clarified is the fact that the representations of the type of conceptual blends
assumed to be represented by for-prefixed verbs are still in common use, e.g., forgive or forget,
with the prefix for- no longer being productive, whereas some other ones have become rather
obsolete, less frequently used, for instance, forbear, forfend. What is more, for-prefixed verbs

101
can be classified as a type of phrasal verbs, where the prefix for- has not become independent in
the form of a distinct adverbial particle, but it functions as an adprep.

4.6. Metaphorical extensions in the scenes described by phrasal verbs and for-prefixed
verbs representing conceptual blends

In regard to phrasal verbs and conceptual blends which they represent, it is important to mention
that the actual meaning of a linguistic item can only be a meaning-in-context and, moreover, a
meaning-within-a-construction: linguistic items tap the relevant conceptual frames, which must
also contain information about typical uses, including typical linguistic environments, as
indicated by Fillmore 1988 and Goldberg 1995. As was mentioned in the Introduction,
constructions are defined by Goldberg as “stored pairings of form and function, including
morphemes, words, idioms, partially lexically filled and fully general linguistic patterns” (2003:
219). Constructions can also be understood, after Panther and Thornburg (2009), as ‘meaning-
bearing units’ within the ‘lexicogrammatical system’. For-prefixed or phrasal verbs, like other
parts of speech, such as nouns, verbs, etc., belong to the ‘lexicogrammatical system’, in which,
as elucidated by Panther and Thornburg, there are no clear-cut boundaries between ‘lexical’
items and more ‘functional’ or ‘grammatical’ elements, such as determiners or verbs (2009: 14).
According to Linder, who was the first linguist to apply the cognitive approach to the phrasal
verb, the term verb-particle construction highlights the structural properties of phrasal verbs:
“each construction, as a bipolar symbolic unit, […] codes a whole, integrated scene, each
component foregrounding certain facets of it. As such, it is a combination of two meaningful
predicates which overlap to a greater or lesser degree, and whose meanings are salient to greater
or lesser degrees in the meaning of the whole” (1983: 251). Similarly, for-prefixed verbs appear
to constitute constructions comprised of two meaningful components and it is crucial to relate
one meaningful component, i.e., for- in a for-prefixed verb to the overall meaning of the whole
construct. The semantic import of the prefix in the for-prefixed verbs has been discussed in
Section 4.4. of the present chapter.

As asserted by Panther and Thornburg, all the ‘meaning-bearing units’ are ‘potentially
subject to metonymic and metaphoric operations’ (2009: 14). For example, the meaning of the
phrasal prepositional verb representing the verb-particle-preposition pattern to face up to
subsumes the conception of motion, indicating the movement of the trajector referred to by the
grammatical subject toward the landmark referred to by an object, which may be part of the
conceptual base of the verb to face, but which is not an especially salient or ‘profiled’ dimension

102
of its meaning. However, since to face up to is only used non-literally, no literal ‘movement’
can be involved in a situation described by the expression face up to a problem. Thus,
considering the overall concept of KNOWING IS SEEING / PERCEIVING (cf. Sweetser 1991)
and ACTION IS MOTION. The latter is part of the EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphor complex,
so ‘actively dealing with a problem’, which is the idiomatic sense pf the phrase, can be
conceptualized as fearless moving towards an obstacle which obstructs further progress along
a path.

It is essential to note that in metaphorical extensions the inference patterns inherited from
source domains are retained (cf. Lakoff 1990/1993): approaching an object entails seeing it
clearly, and in the same way approaching a problem entails realising its nature and getting to
know it in more detail. As Hampe claims, up adds a sense of completion, which also implies
activity, movement since only dynamic processes can be completed. According to her:

the complex conceptual blend ‘behind’ the phrasal verb is not ‘contained’ by
its components or by the way they are put together and […] all elements
contribute to this target interpretation: the verb by supplying the source
domain for the activity, the particle by ‘profiling’ and image-schematic
dimension of the verbal base which is left unspecified when the simple verb
alone is used (Hampe 2002: 91).

The final interpretation of the overall meaning of the construction cannot be predicted basing
only on the literal meanings of its components (Hampe 2002: 91). In the prototypical sentence
involving ‘verb-particle construction’, the grammatical subject represents the trajector of the
relation described by the verb, and hence the whole sentence. In the case of transitive phrasal
verbs, the direct object representing a subtrajector (the term used for the direct object referent)
of the relation represented by the verb is simultaneously the trajector of the spatial relation
referred to by the particle. The construction as a whole is either conventionally associated with
particular conceptual blends as default values for particular contexts, or it triggers novel
conceptual blending if it occurs in a totally new context (c.f. Hampe 2002: 174). The example
Hampe provides is the word formation child-safe. As Hampe claims:

The word formation child-safe, for example, is usually applied to containers

the content of which is potentially harmful for children and which cannot
easily be opened, or to rooms from which potentially dangerous objects have
been removed. But one can easily imagine the complex adjective referring to

103
 a sanatorium whose elderly inhabitants need to be protected from the noise
and disturbance caused by children – a radically different, but equally possible
conceptualization (2002: 176).

Panther and Thornburg claim that “in the case of grammatical metaphor the relevant
factor shaping lexicogrammatical structure is typically the source meaning of the
metaphor”, whereas “in the case of grammatical metonymy the relevant factor shaping
lexicogrammatical structure is typically the target meaning of the metonymy” (2009: 14). As
an example illustrating the latter case they consider the line from a song, Can you please be my
man. The issue of grammatical metaphor is illustrated with the example of the so-called
Historical or Narrative Present, in the case of which the metaphor PAST IS PRESENT
determines the use of the Simple Present verb forms to refer to past events.

As it seems, in the case of for-prefixed verbs, the meaning of their stem elements, which
refer to physical relations, should be understood metaphorically. Apparently, in the case of all
the for-prefixed verbs the conceptions of scenes with clear and objective trajectors and
landmarks represented by the stems conceptually intertwine with the dominant conception
imported into a blend by the prefix for-, namely the conception of motion directed ‘away from’,
which contributes to the specific metaphorical meanings of particular for-prefixed verbs. In
fact, those meanings function in specific collocations determined by the meaning of the source
domains, which corroborates the afore-quoted assumption of Panther and Thornburg as regards
‘grammatical metaphor’, and it certainly does apply to the conceptualisations represented by
for-prefixed verbs. In view of this, in the next section (4.7) those complex verbs in question are
presented as the outcome of lexicogrammatical processes motivated by metaphorical thinking.
Interestingly, the process of attenuation of the agentive or the recipient (as in the case of the
verb get) role of the trajector, is triggered off in the aforementioned lexicogrammatical process
due to metaphorisation.

4.7. Attenuation of the role of the Agent through metaphorisation in the semantic
evolution of for-prefixed verbs understood as conceptual blends

The current part of the present work offers an analysis of for-prefixed verbs which aims at the
explanation of the process of attenuation of the Agent role in the conceptualisations represented
by such verbs as forgive, forget, forgo, forfend, forsake, forbid, forswear, forbear and forfeit.
As indicated, most of the root verbs among those nine listed above represent conceptualisations
with high levels of objectification involved in their typical uses, since these verbs stand for

104
schematic, physical processes, and most of them involve the notion of spatial, physical
movement of a trajector or, more often, a landmark within the described scene. Those that do
not display this characteristic are forswear and forbid, whose root verbs are performative, i.e.,
they are names of illocutionary (speech) acts.

Thus, the stem verbs, constituting the morphological foundation of for-prefixed verbs,
i.e., go, get, give, bear, fend, bid, swear and feit, can be divided into two categories, which
seems to be crucial for analysing the phenomenon of subjectification of conceptualised
movement involved in the relational scenes described by the examined verbs, and attenuation
of the agentive or another prominent role of trajectors in those scenes. The first group includes
verbs pertaining to physical actions, and comprises the lexemes go, give, get, bear, as well as
the archaic feit, fend and sake. In Modern English, the last-mentioned lexeme, i.e., sake exists
only as a part of the verb forsake or as a constituent nominal element in the expression for the
sake of, which has been discussed in Chapter 3 of the present thesis. Swear and bid also in a
way refer to instances of doing something; they are verbs pertaining to illocutionary acts, which,
as indicated by Austin (1962), are actions all the same. Nevertheless, they may be assigned to
a distinct group since they do not imply any physical movement. Moreover, some of the for-
prefixed verbs, i.e., forsake, forbid, forswear and forbear involve stem verbs which either are
obsolete or their meanings have undergone significant modification or extension, as in the case
of bid or bear. The former is at present used mostly in the sense ‘to offer (a certain amount) as
the price or fee that one is ready to pay’, the meaning of the latter is at present on most occasions
metaphorical and expressible in terms of such expressions as endure, persist.

The semantic evolution of the examined for-prefixed verbs, i.e., forgo, forget, forgive,
forbid, forbear, forfeit, forswear, forsake, forfend as representations of specific conceptual
blends, seems to be the result of the mental process of metaphorisation, which results in the
attenuation of the role of the TR (subject referent) involved in prototypical situations denoted
by verbal stems, which objectively describe physical scenes, i.e., go, give, bid, sake, swear,
bear, feit, fend, with the trajector performing a prominent semantic role, such as that of an Agent
or Recipient. Subjectification resulting in the process of attenuation “is a shift from a relatively
objective construal of some entity to a more subjective one” (Langacker 2000: 297). The
following root verbs, namely, give, go as well as the obsolete feit, fend and sake prototypically
refer to physical situations, where the agentive role is strong and evident. The exception is get,
in whose case the Recipient role performed by the trajector is also objectively conspicuous.
When those root verbs are prefixed with for-, the prominent physical role of a subject referent
105
undergoes attenuation leading to subjectification, i.e., it becomes internalised in the mind of a
conceptualiser - speaker. It is important to note, after Langacker (1990) that:

subjectification is a recurrent and highly important type of semantic extension

and is often a central factor in the evolution leading from “lexical” to
“grammatical” elements. Subjectification pertains to the distinction
recognised in cognitive grammar between the subjective versus the objective
construal of an entity. This distinction pertains to whether an entity functions
primarily as the “subject” or the “object” of conception (Langacker 1990).

However, in the case of for-prefixed verbs, it is not new grammatical constructions, but new
lexical units that emerge.

Langacker explicates the process of subjectification with the utterances Vanessa jumped
across the table and Vanessa is sitting across the table from Veronica, and comments that “the
foregoing instance of subjectification represents a general type characterized by the following
central property: objectified motion on the part of an objectively-construed participant is
replaced by subjectified motion (mental scanning) on the part of the conceptualiser” (2000: 17-
19). The objectified motion on the part of an objectively-construed participant can be observed
to be referred to in the utterance Vanessa jumped across the table, and the subjective motion on
the part of the conceptualiser is represented by the utterance Vanessa is sitting across the table
from Veronica.

a) b)

Vanessa jumped across the table Vanessa is sitting across the table from Veronica

Fig. 19. The illustration of Langacker’s idea of subjectification (2000: 17-19)

In Fig. 19a above, depicting the situation where the subject referent, i.e. (Vanessa), performed
the physical action of jumping across the prepositional object referent, i.e. table, “the trajector
occupies a continuous series of positions with respect to the stationary landmark, thus defining
a path from one side of the landmark to the other” (Langacker 2000: 17). As Langacker
furthermore claims, “the second sense of across represents a subjectification in relation to the

106
first”, and “the only ‘movement’ over this path is subjective, residing in the conceptualizer
tracing along it mentally in order to locate the trajectory vis-à-vis the reference point” (2000:
18). This sense is illustrated by Fig. 19b, where the broken arrow represents subjectified, i.e.,
conceptualised movement.

One of other examples of the process of grammaticisation, as described by Langacker,

pertains to the verb get. Langacker considers the grammaticisation of get in combinations with
a passive participial complement. In each of the following examples: Sue got (herself)
appointed to the governing board, Ralph got fired again, All my books got stolen, Another bank
got robbed last night, get occurs in a finite form, hence it profiles a process viewed sequentially,
whereas the passive participial complement is non-finite and represents a holistic, summary
construal of a respective process. The evolution of get involves progressive attenuation in both
the nature of the profiled relationship and the degree of control exercised by its trajector
(represented by the subject). The attenuation is also observable in such expressions, as She got
cheated, She got married. Langacker explains this process in the following way:

The result is that get comes close to being just a passive auxiliary, like be,
serving only to provide the sequential viewing required for the head of a finite
clause. It has not gone quite that far, however. In all the examples, the main
clause subject – the trajector of the finite verb get – is also the trajector of the
complement. And since the complement is based on a passive participle, its
trajector is the same element which functions as landmark (or patient) of the
verb stem from which the participle derives. In Sue got (herself) appointed to
the governing board, the trajector and the subject Sue is construed as a
volitional agent who manages to bring about the participial event, and who
also, secondarily, is an Experiencer who enjoys the benefits of its occurrence.
This volitional construal is almost necessary with the reflexive herself, but it
is at least possible in the simpler construction without the reflexive. In Ralph
got fired again the subject is not a volitional agent with respect to the
participial complement. In All my books got stolen the subject is inanimate and
the experiencer is not identified with the trajector, nor is it put in focus as a
specified, profiled participant. Another bank got robbed last night does not
imply any particular experiencer, which may be construed as the owners or
employees of the bank, or perhaps just awful members of society who feel
menaced by the rising level of crime (2002: 312).

107
 The uses of the verb go can also exemplify the process of grammaticisation, or the
projection of certain basic concepts into the grammar of a language. It is the primary verb
representing the conception of motion and, subsequently, it has evolved into the marker of the
future time. This occurs because the original meaning of ‘movement away from the current
location of the speaker’, a spatial concept, is transferred to the temporal domain. On the one
hand, this verb prototypically represents the concept of spatial movement, on the other hand, it
may also signal more abstract motion through time, i.e., an activity that will be carried out in
the future. In this sense, English combines physical spatial and conceptual temporal movement
into the meaning represented by a single verb (Langacker 2002: 149-163). Evidently, in the
latter case the agentive role of the TR (subject) is attenuated, and, as already indicated,
attenuation consists in the decrease of the degree of control exerted over a given process by an
agentive subject (TR) in a conceptualised scene. When carried to extremes (as happens in the
case of highly grammaticised forms), attenuation results in achieving the property of
transparency, which means that in the case of, e.g., the expression to be going to, the verb in
question is used to refer to the future, and “anything eligible to be the subject of the infinitival
complement is also eligible to be the subject of the entire expression”, as in the sentence There
is going to be another storm tonight (Langacker 1999: 160).
The issue of attenuation and transparency is frequently observable in relation verbs
equivalent to go in other languages, which have also become, like the English be going to
construction. For example, in French the verb aller (‘go’) is used to mark a future tense, i.e.,
future proche (a future tense used to talk about near future), e.g. Je vais prendre le douche (‘I’m
going to take a shower’). In English, the sentence Sam is going to mail the letter is ambiguous,
since, as Langacker holds, “it may indicate actual movement through space by the subject, in
order to initiate an action at the endpoint of the spatial path”, and “it can also indicate the futurity
of the infinitival event, with no implication of spatial motion”. In the latter case, Langacker
posits the idea of subjective movement of the TR through time. In the future sense of be going
to, the conceptualiser follows a mental path along the temporal axis and situates the infinitival
event downstream in the flow of time relative to some reference point. As Langacker claims,
“the trajector has a diminished role in the profiled relationship since it no longer moves through
space, its activity is confined to whatever it does in the landmark event” (2002: 302). A
landmark event is understood as a situation in which the landmark plays the crucial role, a
situation, in which something has happened to landmark, as, e.g., in the scene described by the
sentence Herman had his nose broken, where the landmark event is referred to by [Herman’s]
nose [getting] broken (an example provided by Dąbrowska 1997: 152).

108
 The attenuation of an Agent can also be observed in the conceptions of processes
represented by for-prefixed verbs. Developing the conception of subjectified motion is the
consequence of prefixing for-, whose semantic import is the idea of outwardly directed (“away
from”) movement, to the analysed root verbs, most of which prototypically stand for
conceptions of physical processes. The most significant role of the Agent is noticeable in the
uses of the aforementioned verbs referring to situations with actual movement involved. It
becomes less significant, i.e., attenuated when these verbs function as part of larger,
polymorphemic lexical units, where they are preceded by the prefix for- and have their
meanings modified by the conception that it supplies into the blend. The for-prefixed verbs,
which constitute complex units comprising a root verb and the prefix for- relate to different
conceptions. When combined with the idea imported by that prefix, the meanings of the root
verbs are seriously affected, as can be observed in the case of, e.g., forgo, forget, forgive and
forbid. In situations described by utterances with these derivative verbs, the attenuation of the
Agent role is recognisable in comparison to the scenes depicted by the root verbs alone. This is
due to the metaphorical conceptualisation of direct object referents. The movement of an entity
involved (landmark) becomes highly subjectified and it takes place only in the mental space
established in the mind of a language user. The directionality inherent in the conceptions
represented by for-prefixed verbs and imported into the entire conceptualised scenes by the
particle in question can only be understood in terms of subjective motion construed by the
conceptualiser, who traces a mental path by scanning in a particular direction along the subject’s
expanse (based on Langacker’s examples 2002: 318-320). Consequently, Langacker’s central
claim, derived from his above-specified observations, is that:

[…] subjectification represents a common type of semantic change, and […]

it often figures in the process of grammaticization, whereby “grammatical”
elements evolve from “lexical” sources. It is of course a fundamental tenet of
cognitive grammar that all grammatical units have some kind of conceptual
import, so that lexicon and grammar form a continuum divisible only
arbitrarily into separate “components”. As an element becomes
grammaticised, it therefore moves along this continuum rather than jumping
from one discrete component to another, and it undergoes a change of meaning
rather than becoming meaningless. Still, this change generally does involve
some kind of semantic attenuation (or “bleaching”, to use Givon’s original
term), which tends to be accompanied, iconically, by a reduction in
phonological status (for example from an independent form to a clitic, affix,

109
 or inflection). These semantic and phonological developments are
concomitant with the expression’s conventionalization as one member of a
relatively small set of contrasting elements systematically used for a particular
structural purpose (2000: 16).

However, as regards the for-prefixed verbs, the result of subjectification is lexicalisation,

rather than grammaticisation, since, as a result of the combination of for- with the analysed
verbs, new lexical items, which constitute dictionary items, are formed. Also some reduction in
the phonological status resultant from the process of attenuation of the agentive role of subject
can be observed, as the prefix for- is not stressed in the polysyllabic words in which it
participates. Its semantic contribution, however, to conceptions represented by for-prefixed
verbs is still morphologically marked and it is explainable in terms of Langacker’s ideas, which
can be related to the concept of lexicalisation, understood as:

the change whereby in certain linguistic contexts speakers use a syntactic

construction or word formation as a new contentful form with formal and
semantic properties that are not completely derivable or predictable from the
constituents of the construction or the word formation pattern” (Brinton and
Traugott 2005: 96).

What is more, “over time there may be further loss of internal constituency and the item
may become more lexical” (Brinton and Traugott 2005: 96). It seems that in the case of for-
prefixed verbs there has indeed occurred considerable loss of internal constituency. Although
two componential parts in each for-prefixed verb can be distinguished, the verbs themselves are
generally considered to be non-divisible units.

In the subsequent sections, the for-prefixed verbs are presented as resultant from the
process of lexicalisation. The verbs are analysed as conceptual blends, in which the concept of
the prefix for- contributes significantly to the overall contents of the concepts represented by
the whole complex lexemes by either adding the sense of directed movement or re-orienting
that already brought into respective conceptual blends by a stem verb. Consequently, the
importing or re-orienting the notion of directed movement, which is subjective rather than
objective, is accompanied by the attenuation of the role of a TR in the conceptualised scenes
represented by respective for-prefixed verbs. The attenuation results also from the metaphorical
construal of LM’s involved therein. It should be noted that the referents of direct objects
completing the discussed verbs are typically non-material phenomena such as, e.g., sins,

110
mistakes (forgive), violence, chances (forfeit), political views (forswear), actions (forget, forbid,
forbear, forsake, forgo). Only the archaic forsake typically involves a human LM, but it is used
almost exclusively in religious contexts (e.g., God has forsaken us), so the whole situation is
conceptualised metaphorically. All in all, the role of subject referent (TR) in the relations
depicted by for-prefixed verbs, which are all transitive, becomes subdued and changes from
that of Agent or Goal/Recipient to that of Experiencer. In the forthcoming sections the for-
prefixed verbs will be analysed as regards the meanings represented by their roots and the
function of for-.

4.7.1. Forgive, forget and forgo

In the first group of the analysed for-prefixed verbs such lexemes as forgive, forget and forgo
are included. All of them are the verbs of action which can take on objects representing tangible,
material phenomena. They are also lexemes of common use in Modern English.

Newman (1996) provides an in-depth study of the lexeme participating as root in the first-
mentioned item. He notes that give is immensely productive as regards its involvement in word
building, metaphorical extensions and grammaticisation in English and other languages’, e.g.,
it appears in idioms, such as give someone a kiss or metonymical expression give someone the
boot, which means ‘to dismiss someone from job’ (1996: 16). Newman also presents an
overview of possible figurative extensions of give within the framework of Cognitive Grammar.
All of them represent actions directed at a recipient and are marked by a rather positive load
ascribed to the entity given. The main categories of the semantic extensions of the verb in
question in English and their motivations are the following:

• “Emergence/manifestation extensions are relatable to the movement of a

THING out of the sphere of control of the GIVER […] The
emergence/manifestation extensions may likewise be relatively concrete
(as in land “giving” good crops) or abstract (e.g. an event manifests itself
by ‘giving itself’)”
• “The recipient/benefactive group of extensions includes GIVE
morphemes used to mark both RECIPIENTs with verbs of transfer,
exchange, etc. and benefactives.”
• “Completedness extensions refer to GIVE morphemes used to impart or
reinforce a sense of completion or perfectivity or abruptness within a
clause” (1996: 233, 249).

111
An example of emergence/manifestation can be the expression describing a relatively concrete
relation, such as give good crops, or a more abstract one when an event manifests itself by
giving itself, whereas give the car a wash is an instance of schematic interaction. A
completedness extension is instantiated by the sentence At least he gave me the money. As
regards the recipient/benefactive group of extensions, the sentence I gave the book to the man
constitutes an appropriate example.

Langacker describes the process of giving as an activity involving energy flow, initiated by the
benevolent giver (the ‘energy source’) and ending up with the recipient (the ‘energy sink’), who
normally accepts the thing (1991: 22). It depicts relations involving the movement from the
giver to the recipient. According to Newman’s Agent-Patient model applied to give, the giver is
Agent, the recipient is Goal, and the entity given is Patient. Thus, in the prototypical scene of
giving, there are three participants, i.e. the giver, the given and the recipient; the giver hands
the given over to the recipient. In more detail, the transfer typically involves physical contact
with the given (thing), first in the hands of the giver, then in the hands of the recipient.
Accordingly, as Fagerli claims, the change of control or possession is often associated with the
act of transfer (2001: 204-205). The conceptual scene of the main sense of give, as described
above, is portrayed in Fig. 20 below. TR represents the giver, LM1 represents the given and LM2
represents the recipient.

TR LM2

LM1

the path of LM1

TIME

Fig. 20. The representation of prototypical spatial scene represented by the verb give.

Phenomena referred to by objects of give are prototypically concrete entities, e.g., an

apple, a present. As has already been mentioned, the sense of give can be extended

112
metaphorically, as in, e.g., give somebody a kiss or a blow or a piece of advice. There seems to
be a continuum of concreteness involved: a present is concrete, a kiss or a blow are less concrete
but still involve tangibility, a piece of advice and regards are abstract and metaphorically
objectified, i.e., conceptualised in terms of a material object. In any case the given thing
(concrete or abstract) is transferred from the giver to the recipient. Its spatial movement in time
is indicated by the horizontal arrow (Newman 1996: 37).

When it comes to the complex verb in which give participates as root, i.e., forgive, its
etymology dates back the Middle English forgeven and the Old English forgiefan, which carried
the meaning similar to that represented by the modern version. Its sense can be paraphrased as:

• ‘to give up resentment against or the desire to punish’, ‘to stop being angry with’, ‘to
pardon’;
• ‘to give up all claim to punish or exact penalty for (an offense)’, ‘to overlook’;
• ‘to cancel or remit (a debt)’ (WNWDAE 1989), what is depicted in the Figure 21 below.
Similarly, in EDEL, the meaning of forgive is specified as ‘pardon’ and ‘remit’ (‘absolve
somebody from something’). According to CEDEL (2013: 194), the morphological components
of forgive are the prefix for- and the verb give, as in the German vergeben, where ver- denotes
‘the opposite, deterioration, change’ (EDGL, 1891: 375). Phenomena referred to by object
nouns complementing this verb are typically represented by abstract nouns, such as e.g., sin,
mistake, failure, wayward humour, disrespectful behaviour, which have a negative axiological
load. It can also be added that the verb forgive is typical in the Biblical context, for example, in
Jesus’s statement directed at a harlot who was about to be lapidated, Your sins are forgiven (…)
go in peace (Luke 7:48-50, New International Version).

Fig. 21 on the next page illustrates the process of conceptual blending of the notions
provided by both elements of the considered lexeme. Input 1 is constituted (as in the case of
other verbs of this type) by the concept of movement “away from” provided by the prefix. Input
2 supplies the conception of giving, i.e., of a transfer of an entity to a goal. Thus, the conception
of movement along the horizontal axis, subsumed in the generic space is shared by both inputs.
In the blended space the direction of movement supplied by Input 2 is re-oriented under the
influence of Input 1, i.e., an entity metaphorically construed as a material object is conceived
to move AWAY from the goal (the indirect object referent).

113
 Generic space

Input 1 ‘for- space’ Input 2 ‘give space’

• involves movement
• horizontal trajectory

FOR- GIVE

• away, apart, off • to give, to grant (from

• subjectified outwardly PIE *ghabh),
directed movement • movement towards
[conceptual integration] recipient

[conceptual blend]

FORGIVE

• to move away guilt

• to give up resentment
against or the desire
to punish

Fig. 21. The conceptual blend behind the verb forgive

An act of forgiveness, i.e., a metaphorical subjectified shifting away of the direct object
referent, is accomplished in the mental sphere of a conceptualiser; thus, the role of Agent is
attenuated. The attenuation of the agentive role of the TR takes place through the metaphor
GUILT IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT and GIVING UP RESENTMENT IS MOVING AWAY.
The referent of the subject (TR) metaphorically moves the entity metaphorically construed as a
material thing, e.g., this one mistake away from the recipient. The role of the prefix for- as an
element determining the semantic profile of the verb forgive seems to be decisive and the overall
meaning of the afore-mentioned verb is owed predominantly to its influence. The act of moving
an entity away is only conceptualised, i.e., the motion is subjectified. For- modifies the semantic
role played by the original Agent (trajector) in the spatial scene represented by of give, by

114
importing the subjectively construed, metaphorical movement “away from” into the blend.
Instead of a giver, there emerges a forgiver, i.e., Experiencer who is conceptualised as a factor
removing the guilt from the referent of the object direct, i.e. the beneficiary. The mental activity
of giving up resentment is conceptualised as a physical activity.

A typical act of exculpation is comprised within the semantic frame evoked by the verb
forgive in its basic sense. The recipient is the entity, prototypically a person, who receives
forgiveness. To quote again Newman’s statement, “persons function in many related routines
and typically act for certain reason with certain goals in mind” (1996: 37). Acts of forgiving
may be part of established rituals, e.g., during a confession in the Roman Catholic Church,
when a confessor utters the words “Your sins are forgiven (…) go in peace” (Luke 7:48-50,
New International Version) directed to a penitent. When it comes to the semantic roles
represented by clause elements in I will forgive them this one mistake!21, the role of the subject
(trajector) is that of Experiencer, precisely a forgiver is the one who has the intention to engage
in a relation with another entity referred to by the plural pronoun them. The subject referent
performs the function of benefactor and the indirect object referent performs the function of an
undergoer (beneficiary) affected by the benefactum accomplished for his/her benefit. This
situation is illustrated by Fig. 22 on the next page. The broken line represents conceptualised
motion involved in the scene. The lines of the circles representing LM1 (direct object referent)
are broken to emphasise the fact that it is an abstract entity perceived metaphorically as an
object being moved away from the wrongdoer.

21
The example comes from the British National Corpus.

115
 TR LM2

forgiver beneficiary
LM1

the path of the first LM

TIME

Fig. 22. The representation of the spatial scene represented by the verb forgive.

The stem verb of forget, i.e., get, involves the conception of actual motion and is one very
commonly used, especially in informal language. It has many different senses and is involved
in numerous idioms. The phenomena referred to by direct objects of get are prototypically
concrete ones, represented, e.g., by such nouns as, money, a present, but they can also be
abstract entities, conceptualised metaphorically as material things, such as, for instance, a
shock, an impression. Generally, the direct objects taken by get tend to be charged positively
or neutrally as regards their axiological load. An exception among the object nouns taken by
the verb listed above can be, e.g., the lexeme shock, whose axiological load is neither neutral
nor positive, but rather negative. Thus, the sentence I got a graduate job in engineering depicts
a conceptualisation in which an abstract entity is obtained by the trajector (represented by the
grammatical subject) from the landmark, which is unprofiled, but is presumably some kind of
engineering company. The frame evoked by get in its basic sense is the act of obtaining, in
which a LM entity (concrete or abstract) follows a path (actual or conceptualised) towards a TR
who assumes control over it.

The meaning of the next for-prefixed verb discussed in this section, in which the lexeme
for participates, i.e., forget is defined as ‘lose from the mind, be unable to remember, overlook,
omit, neglect unintentionally’. In EDEL by Walter W. Skeat, the meaning of forget is explained
as ‘lose remembrance of’ and ‘neglect’. Moreover, according to Krzeszowski (1990: 151), the
verb forget reflects the axiological principle and is one of those with a high ‘bad’ charge, and

116
can only co-occur with subject nouns representing human agents, and is situated near the ‘bad’
pole.

Generic space

Input 1 ‘for- space’ • involves movement Input 2 ‘get space’

• horizontal trajectory

GET
FOR-

• obtain, to reach, from

• away, apart, off
PIE root *ghend-, also
• subjectified outwardly
*ghed- to seize, to take
directed movement
• movement towards
trajector (grammatical
[composition] subject)

[conceptual blend]

FORGET

• lose from the mind

• be unable to remember
• overlook, to omit, to
neglect unintentionally

Fig. 23. The conceptual blend of the verb forget

Due to the semantic import of for- affixed to get, the orientation of conceptual movement in
the relation represented by the stem verb is changed, as is indicated in Fig. 23 above, in the
circle representing the semantic contents of the blend. The role of the TR from Goal / Recipient

117
in the conceptual scene depicted by get is changed and attenuated to a more subjectified one,
namely the role of Experiencer. Thus, the conception represented by the verb forget is an
illustration of the process of attenuation of the Goal / Recipient role of TR. For example, the
sentences I got a present or I got a graduate job in engineering, where the stem verb is
employed, refer to situations in which a concrete entity or an abstract entity conceptualised in
terms of a material object is obtained by the trajector (represented by the grammatical subject)
from a landmark, which is unprofiled, but implicated in both instances. The movement of the
landmark in the former scene is physical, objective, in the latter scene it is more subjectified. A
similar change of the degree of subjectification can be observed in, e.g., He forgot to mail the
letter and He forgot her name, where the semantic role of the TR is that of Experiencer. The
metaphor, which operates in the case of the verb forget can be formulated as AN IDEA /
ACTION IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT. This kind of attenuation of the Goal / Recipient role of
the TR to the role of Experiencer results in lexicalisation, with the new lexeme representing a
specific conceptualisation. This differs from the phenomenon of subjectification of the scenes
described by the verb get as presented by Langacker, where subjectification leads to
grammaticisation since the prefixation of get with for results in lexicalization and the new
lexeme represents a scene in which the original direction of movement is re-oriented.

The illustration of the afore-mentioned process taking place in the semantic conceptual
scene is also relevant in the analysis of the conceptualisation represented by the verb forgo,
whose root verb, i.e., go inherently and prototypically indicates spatial directional movement.
The subject in a typical sentence with the verb go represents the agentive role and the
prototypical semantic scene depicted with the use of this verb is highly objectified, i.e.,
independent of a conceptualiser’s construal. A sentence with go as a central verb indicates
actual movement through space by the trajector (the subject referent), e.g. John went to the post
office.
However, when the prefix for- is attached to go, the complex verb represents a scene in
which the movement becomes subjectified and it is transferred from the TR (subject referent)
to a LM (direct object referent, typically constituted by an action, i.e., a relational entity). The
trajector has a diminished role in the profiled relationship, since it no longer is conceived of as
an entity physically moving through space, its activity is confined to whatever it does in the
landmark event. There is also no implication of physical spatial motion in the semantic scene
represented by an expression with forgo (based on Langacker 2002: 352), as can be observed
in the sketch of the resulting blend in Fig. 24 on the next page. The landmark event is construed

118
metaphorically as an object, which is shifted away by TR. Thus, taking into consideration
Panther and Thornburg’s theory, the following metaphor can be formulated GIVING
SOMETHING UP is MOVING IT AWAY.

Generic space

Input 1 ‘for space’ Input 2 ‘go space’

• involves movement
• horizontal trajectory

FOR- GO

• away, apart, off • advance, walk, depart,

• subjectified from PIE *ghe -
outwardly directed release, let go
movement [composition] • outwardly directed
movement of TR

[conceptual blend]

FORGO

• do without, abstain from,

give up
• an entity avoided

Fig. 24. The conceptual blend of the verb forgo

As illustrated by Fig. 24 above, go represents a very schematic concept, that of outwardly

directed (away from the conceptualiser) movement of an object along a path. There is a path
between a trajector (grammatical subject referent) and a landmark, a trajector’s destination,
which is profiled by an object of a preposition (most commonly ‘to’) participating in the phrase

119
complementing the verb22. When the concept represented by the prefix for-, in Input 1 (‘for-
space’) is combined with that represented by the verb (Input 2), the direction of the trajector’s
movement, or in other words, the movement in the scene depicted by the complex verb is
changed with regard to the scene represented by the verb go without the prefix. It is no longer
the movement of TR, but the movement of LM. Although outwardly directed movement is
involved in both conceptualisations, represented by for- and go alike, forgo, differently than
go, is a transitive verb, what appears to reflect the fact that the movement is transferred from
the TR to the LM (direct object referent). This change can be observed when Input 2 (‘go
space’) is compared to the conceptual contents of the space of the blend. The movement is
transferred onto LM but the directionality “away from” is retained. The frame evoked by forgo
can be examined in its prototypical sense, which is involved in the sentence She had to forgo
her early ambition to be a writer. In the construal, the landmark (early ambition) is
metaphorically (i.e., subjectively) taken away from the trajector (represented by the
grammatical subject she). The metaphors involved in the construction with the verb forgo are
DOING SOMETHING IS MOVING ALONG A PATH (MOVING AWAY FROM AN
OBJECT), which is a structuring metaphor and IRRELEVANT IS AWAY, which is an
orientational metaphor. It is through the metaphors that the attenuation of the agentive role of
subject referent takes place.
The role of Agent as the “mover” is thus attenuated and even entirely reduced, and the
trajector assumes the Experiencer role. As explicated in WNWDAE (1989), the verb forgo,
comprised of the prefix for- and the verb go, is transitive. It comes from the Middle English
forgon and the Old English forgan. Its senses can be explained as follows:
• ‘to do without’, ‘abstain from’, ‘give up’;
• ‘to go past’, ‘to overlook’, ‘to neglect’ (archaic).
Therefore the grammatical properties of the verb in question, i.e., its transitivity reflects the
construal in which the outwardly directed path is metaphorically followed by LM rather than
TR.

22
A sentence such as, e.g., *I went, without a complementing prepositional phrase or adverbial particle, is
unacceptable in English.

120
4.7.2. Forbear and forfeit

The primary sense of the root verb of forbear, i.e., bear, is related to a physical activity,
namely, carrying or supporting a weight with physical effort. The secondary, metaphorical
meaning is ‘to tolerate something’, usually something that one dislikes or disapproves of. Thus,
in its basic sense it refers to a physical process which is, however, less dynamic than that
represented by the verbs give or go. It also seems that the metaphorical sense of bear, which is
“to tolerate something disliked”, has become conventionalised to such an extent that this
meaning is often mentioned in the first place in dictionaries. Most commonly it is used in the
expression can’t bear.

The Agentive role of the subject referent is more prominent with bear, particularly as
regards its physical sense, i.e., ‘carry’, as illustrated on the next page by Fig. 25 representing
the conceptual blend of the verb forbear, where less control on the part of the TR is involved
and the attenuation of its agentive role is recognised due to the metaphor involved in the
conceptualisation represented by the verb forbear, which can be formalised as AN ACTION IS
A PHYSICAL OBJECT. Generally, the verb is used to describe situations where certain actions
are thwarted due to the TR’s conscious effort.

121
 Generic space

Input 1 ‘for- space’ • involves removal, Input 2 ‘bear space’

• involves action

FOR- BEAR

• away, apart, off • carry

• spatial dimension, • endure
outwardly directed
movement [composition]

[conceptual blend]

FORBEAR

• refrain from
• avoid or cease

Fig. 25. The conceptual blend of the verb forbear

What is more, the verb forbear seems to have undergone a semantic shift over the past
years. As claimed by Iyeiri (2010: 179-180), “this is most likely related to the fact that the
meanings of ‘avoiding’, ‘shunning’, and ‘refraining’ have increasingly been prominent with
forbear rather than the meanings of the opposite direction, i.e. ‘bearing’, ‘enduring’, and
‘submitting’ in recent years”. In fact, the OED states that the latter meanings are obsolete in
contemporary English. The verb forbear is of limited use in current English.

Other lexemes to be examined in this section are forfeit and feit, the obsolete root verb of
the former. As regards the etymology of feit, the root verb of forfeit, it comes from the Latin
facere, which means ‘to do, act’. That is why it can be classified as a verb of action, similarly
as the previously discussed forgo and forgive. The prefix for- in this for-prefixed verb is claimed
122
to have the meaning of the Latin foris,‘beyond, from without’, which, nevertheless, also
involves the notion of outwardly directed movement. Thus, according to CDEE, the verb forfeit,
which means ‘to lose, give up, be deprived of’, descends from the Latin word comprised of
foris (‘out of doors) and facere (‘to do’), as illustrated in Fig. 26. In the sketched representation
below for- in Input 1 has the meaning of beyond, which confirms its etymology mentioned
previously and the conception of the lexeme beyond, like away in other for-prefixed verbs
represents the conception of potential, subjectified motion. This sense is exemplified by the
sentence If you cancel now, you forfeit your deposit. Thus, the prefix for- introduces the concept
of subjectified motion, which leads to the attenuation of the role of the trajector from Agent to
Experiencer due to the metaphor involved in the conceptualisation represented by the verb
forbear, which can be formalised as LIFE / FREEDOM / RESPECT, etc. IS A PHYSICAL
OBJECT.

123
 Generic space

Input 1 ‘for- space’ Input 2 ‘feit space’

• involves movement
beyond

FEIT
FOR-

• from Latin facere - do,

• beyond, from, without
act
• subjectified outwardly
• movement towards
directed movement
trajector (grammatical
subject)
[composition]

[conceptual blend]

FORFEIT

• lose
• give up
• be deprived of’

Fig. 26. The conceptual blend of the verb forfeit

However, as indicated, the stem verb of forfeit derives from the Latin ‘facere’, which means ‘to
do’, ‘to act’ (c.f. the French faire), in which no conception of directed motion is involved. This
conception is imported into the blend by the prefix. At the same time the metaphorical construal
of the object referent, which is typically an abstract entity results in the attenuation of the Agent
role of the TR. The metaphor involved in the scene represented by forfeit can be described as
LIFE / FREEDOM / RESPECT, etc. IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT.

124
4.7.3. Forsake and forfend

Two other for-prefixed verbs to be considered in this part of the thesis are different from the
other ones because their roots are constituted by relics of Old English which survived to the
present day only in the combination with for-. In modern English, thus, the stem morpheme of
forsake, i.e., sake does not function as a verb but has been preserved as an element of the for
the sake of construction used in, e.g., for the sake of principle, for the sake of safety or for God’s
sake. It can also appear in the self-sake benefactive construction, which has been discussed in
Chapter 3. For example, in the sentence He moved to the seaside for the sake of his health the
concept of sake participates in the conceptual scene of bringing a benefit to one’s life.

According to The Century Dictionary23, the verb forsake is “chiefly applied to leaving
[…]: to forsake one’s home, friends, country, or cause; a bird forsakes its nest”. It derives from
the Old English verb sacan, whose meaning was ‘to contend’, ‘to struggle’, so it was a verb of
action with the subject performing the role of Agent. For- imports into the blend represented
by this complex verb the conception of outwardly directed movement (away), as in the previous
cases. As regards forsake, it is used in expressions instantiating the metaphor AN ACTIVITY
/ STATE (e.g., of living in one’s home) IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT. Also in this case the
original objectively construed Agent of an activity described by the simple verb undergoes the
process of attenuation to the role of Experiencer which is involved in the scene depicted by the
complex one.

In the forthcoming part of the thesis, another Langackerian concept will be introduced
to accomplish a study of the meaning of the remaining for-prefixed verbs. Thus, when it comes to
the verb forfend, in about 1300 AD it meant ‘to protect’, ‘to defend’, ‘to forbid’. The lexeme
was also used as a clipped form of defend24. The verb fend is no longer used in Modern English,
which is evidence of the fact that language does not retain absolute synonyms and excludes one
of them, especially that the remaining member of the pair is not commonly used and does not
seem to be a basic term in English. Fend appears only in the fixed expression fend for oneself,
which means ‘to look after and provide for oneself, without any help from others’, as in the
sentence she left her 14-year-old daughter to fend for herself or The corporation must fend for
itself financially. The meaning of forfend, likewise, is ‘to protect’, ‘to prohibit’, ‘to avert’, ‘to
fend off’, ‘to prevent’, as in the sentences Taking aspirin may help to forfend a heart attack,

23
https://archive.org/details/centurydictiona02whitgoog
24
https://www.etymonline.com/word/fend

125
Vaccination forfends disease. In modern English, forfend, meaning ‘to forbid’ is used mainly
in such phrases as heaven forfend or God forfend. As can be observed, therefore, the conception
represented by forfend does not in principle differ from that represented by (de)fend, the
conception of movement “away from” is involved in both, as is the agentive role of the trajector.
Nevertheless, it is forfend, rather than defend that is more likely to take object nouns referring
to abstract phenomena (disease, racial discrimination), which indicated that the metaphor AN
ABSTRACT ENTITY IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT IS AT ISSUE in its case.

The following section constitutes an introduction to an action chain and the metaphor
of a river/ a snake, which operates in the conceptualisations of the reaming for-prefixed verbs
to be examined, namely forswear and forbid.

4.8. An action chain and the metaphor of a river / a snake

As regards the role of the prefix for- in shaping the meaning of the for-prefixed verbs, also such
a notion as the action chain metaphor, as discussed by Langacker (1990), can be considered.
Thus, according to Langacker, in a conceptualisation organized in terms of that metaphor an
action chain is initiated by an energetic head, which is an object or organism functioning as the
source of the energy transmitted from the head to the element called the tail of the action chain.
As can be observed, to better characterise the concept of energy flow, Langacker invokes the
metaphor of a river, consequently using the terms upstream (for the head) and downstream (for
the other elements of the action chain). Actually, using the terms “upstream” and “downstream”
alongside the terms “head” and “tail” to describe an action sequence (the word “chain” also
points to a metaphorical mapping) indicates that it is understood in terms of both a river and a
snake. In the case of each of these source domains the flow of energy is one-directional, which
is an arrangement reflected by the sense and structure of a complex sentence. The sentence
Susan is peeling a banana describes an action chain where there are three elements involved in
the scene of energy transmission. The first element (head) is the TR, i.e., Susan, the second one
is banana and the third default element, as Langacker claims, is Susan’s hand, which actually
perform the action.

The river metaphor is a counterpart of the more tangible BILLIARD BALL metaphor
(Langacker 1990), which is interpreted by Ungerer and Schmid as follows:

After being activated by the touch of the cue, the white ball is pushed against
another ball, and if this physical contact has necessary force, part of the

126
 original energy is transmitted the second ball, which ideally hits a third ball
and transmits energy to it and so on. The remaining energy is absorbed by the
cushioned edges or, if the balls reach their goals, by the pockets of the billiard
table (2013: 179-180).

Fig. 27 below illustrates how the BILLIARD BALL metaphor works with three participants in
the scene depicted by the sentence Floyd broke the glass with the hammer, namely Floyd, the
glass, and the hammer. Thus, the TR (Floyd) is an Agent, who broke the glass (LM1 - patient)
with the use of hammer (LM2 - instrument).

TR LM2 LM1

Agent: Floyd instrument: the hammer patient: the glass

Fig. 27. The illustration of the BILLIARD BALL metaphor instantiated the sentence Floyd broke the glass
with the hammer

The three metaphors concerning the sense and structure of certain complex sentences relevant
in the study of semantic representations of the for-prefixed verbs are referred to in the
forthcoming sections. Contrary to the characteristics of the meaning of the previously analysed
for-prefixed verbs, in their case there is no attenuation of the role of TR. What happens instead
is the reversal of directionality in the stream of events, which will be illustrated with the use of
the BILLIARD BALL metaphor. The meanings of swear and bid under the influence of
affixation are changed to the effect that the for-prefixed verbs created from them assume
antonymous senses, which can be understood in terms of the change in the direction of the flow
of action in comparison to situations described by means of the stem verbs alone, as in, He
swore to keep his promise and He bid us farewell.

4.8.1. Forswear and forbid

As has already been mentioned, in the case of the lexemes forswear and forbid, attenuation of
the TR’s role does not occur because their stems do not refer to physical but are illocutionary
force specifying, performative verbs, which do not involve the semantic role of Agent. The
complex verbs in which they participate, i.e., forswear and forbid are also performative and,
likewise, do not collocate with agentive subjects. Nevertheless, the influence of the prefix for-
is clearly observable in the conceptual blends represented by those verbs. Under the influence

127
of the notion of outwardly directed movement, the resulting verbs come to represent senses in
a way antonymous with regard to the original. Contrary to get, give and go, bid and swear are
performative verbs, which, unlike action verbs (get, give), cannot take objects representing
material phenomena. In the case of forswear and forbid the river/snake/billiard balls metaphor
can be applied to explain the structure of sentences in which they participate. It means that one
action leads to another and the conception imported by for- causes the direction of the stream
of action to metaphorically avert.

As regards the verb swear, its two primary senses can be distinguished. One of them is
‘to use rude or offensive language’, and the second one is ‘to [solemnly] promise’. The sense
which is relevant to the present thesis is the latter one. In the case of the verb swear, taking into
account for example the sentence I swear I’ll never leave you, the trajector ‘I’ is the performer
of a speech act, and the landmark I’ll never leave you is relational, i.e., it constitutes a landmark
event illustrated in Fig. 28 below.

TR: I LM: will never leave you

Fig. 28. The illustration of the BILLIARD BALL metaphor in the sentence I swear I’ll never leave you

When for- is combined with the verb, as in the sentence We are formally forswearing the
use of chemical weapons for any reason, the meaning of swear functions differently in the
complex lexeme, whose meaning is antonymous with regard to the verb swear. The direction
of the downstream action is metaphorically averted. As is illustrated by the sentence We are
formally forswearing the use of chemical weapon and as can be observed in Fig. 28 below, the
TR, i.e., the referent of the pronoun we promises to stay away from the LM, i.e., the use of
chemical weapons. The conceptualisation represented by the prefix for- causes re-orientation
of the directionality of the landmark’s action, as illustrated by the sentence above and Fig. 29
below. The landmark, which is the secondary trajector in the downstream event described by
the subordinate clause is coreferential with the primary trajector in the relation represented by
the main verb. The negative sense of ‘moving away’ is due to the concept of subjectified
outwardly directed motion imported into the concept represented by forswear by for-. Just like
its stem, swear, it is a performative verb describing the illocutionary force of a commissive.
Both are susceptible to interpretation in terms of the metaphor SPEAKING IS ACTING
128
TR: we downstream LM event: forswearing (swearing away) the use of chemical weapon

Fig. 29. The illustration of the BILLIARD BALL metaphor in the sentence We are formally forswearing the
use of chemical weapon

The stem verb of forbid, i.e., bid historically descends from the OE biddan, which meant ‘to
urge, to compel’, but semantically its meaning has become completely conflated with the
meaning of an originally distinct verb, the OE bēodan, which meant ‘to offer, give’ or ‘to
proclaim, announce’. Therefore, both the stem in its obsolete sense25 and the derivative
compound verb (i.e. bid and forbid) are performative and express the directive illocutionary
force. The main sense in which the verb bid is still used by speakers of standard English today,
i.e., ‘make an offer to buy something (as at an auction)’, as in the sentence A foreign collector
has bid $500,000 for the portrait, comes from béodan rather than biddan (Fertig 2013: 62) and
does not seem to be involved in the conception represented by the for-prefixed verb in question.
However, bid in the meaning of ‘to issue an order to’, ‘to tell to’, ‘to request to come’ is rather
obsolete but forbid is the antonym of this meaning. Fig. 30 on the next page illustrates the scene
depicted by the sentence A foreign collector has bid $500,000 for the portrait, where ‘a foreign
collector’ is the TR, whose action is ‘bidding $500,000 for the portrait’ (the LM). The scene
can be conceptualized in terms of a flow of action (billiard balls), i.e., the collectors action of
bidding (offering) incurs his/her subsequent action of paying $500,000 for the portrait.

25
Bid, as used in modern English represents the meaning of bēodan rather than biddan.

129
TR: A foreign collector landmark: bidding $500,000 for the portrait

Fig. 30. The illustration of the BILLIARD BALL metaphor instantiated in the sentence A foreign collector
has bid $500,000 for the portrait

The conceptions represented by the verb of forbid are the following:

• ‘rule against, disallow, prohibit’;
• ‘command to stay away from, exclude or bar from’;
• ‘make impossible, prevent’.

As can be observed, each of the senses involves the conception of stoppage, blocking an
action, which is owed to the idea of outward movement imported into the verb by the prefix.
In the schema represented by the verb forbid, a landmark event (the clausal direct object
referent) is prevented, which can be metaphorically understood as re-directing the movement
of an object. In the blend with the conception represented by bid, and then with that depicted
by the subordinate clause, the directionality, i.e., the stream of actions is averted – the
proceeding is withheld, as in, e.g., I forbid you to marry him! illustrated in Fig. 31. below. The
directionality of the landmark action is conceptually turned away; it is different than in the case
of the conception represented by forbid Thus, the TR ‘I’ is bidding away, i.e., forbidding
someone to marry someone (the landmark event).

TR: I landmark event: forbidding someone to marry someone

Fig. 31. The illustration of the BILLIARD BALL metaphor in the sentence I forbid you to marry him!

As noted by Lehrer (1988), forbid is a verb of speaking, which permits only internal
datives. This phenomenon is discussed by Wierzbicka (1988). As she observes, in present-day
English, there are various types of constructions involving indirect objects, and they can be

130
divided into external and internal datives, the distinction pertaining to the syntactic function of
object nominals. The term internal dative refers to an indirect object if it takes the position
between a verb and a direct object, as in She gave her friend a book. The external dative, in
turn, refers to an indirect object in postposition to the direct object; i.e., when it participates in
a prepositional phrase, as in She gave a book to her friend. When it comes to the semantics of
both constructions, “the internal dative construction expresses that the speaker’s attention is
focused on the effect of the action produced on the target person, i.e., the person designated by
the internal dative. The external dative, on the other hand, does not place more importance on
the target person than on the patient” (Wierzbicka 1988: 359-387).

To conclude, the analysed for-prefixed verbs appear to constitute an immensely

interesting phenomenon when considered collectively. Their meanings are influenced to an
appreciable degree by the prefix for-, which imports the conception of subjectified motion into
the conceptualised scenes which they represent. This import, in turn, contributes to the
attenuation of the agentive, or otherwise conspicuous, objective role of a trajector represented
by a subject. Moreover, they constitute a good illustration of grammatical metaphor, as
described by Panther and Thornburg (2009) because they apply to relations in which abstract
landmark elements are conceptualized in terms of material objects that can be moved away. As
regards the counterparts of for-prefixed verbs in other languages, those that can be considered
as such can to some extent be found in Polish. They are briefly discussed in the next section.

4.9. The Polish equivalents of the for-prefixed verbs

As has been mentioned earlier (in Chapter 3) with regard to the preposition for and its Polish
counterparts, there does not seem to be a possibility to create one coherent network of senses
of the Polish equivalent of the prefix for- as there are clearly more than one equivalents.
Likewise, there are a number of different morphemes in Polish which can be considered the
counterparts of the prefix for. Similarly to the English preposition for and its Polish equivalents,
Lakoff’s (1982) claim that the networks of senses represented by corresponding lexemes in
different languages are hardly compatible can be confirmed. It has to be indicated, however,
that as regards comparing the senses of prefixes, it is far more challenging than comparing the
senses of equivalent prepositions from two languages.

What can be noted in the first attempt to pair the considered English for-prefixed verbs
with their Polish counterparts is the fact that the most common equivalents of the prefix for-

131
are wy-, as in wybaczyć (‘forgive’), wyrzec się, (‘forswear), za-, as in zapomnieć (‘forget’),
zabronić (‘forbid’) and od-, as in odżegnać się (‘forswear’), odmówić sobie (‘forgo’). Moreover,
it is noticeable that one English for-prefixed verb can have more than one Polish counterpart.
For example, forgive can be translated into Polish as wybaczyć or przebaczyć (prefixes wy- and
prze-). By the same token, forswear may correspond to zrzekać się (the prefix z-), wyrzekać się
(wy-), or odżegnać się (od-), while forgo - to zaniechać, poniechać (z- and po-), or odmawiać
sobie (od-)26 .

Nevertheless, in Polish, as in English, the meanings of most of the afore-mentioned

prefixes are related to outwardly directed movement, e.g., wy- in wyrzekać się (‘forswear’)
indicates movement from inside to outside27, whereas od (e.g., the afore-mentioned odżegnać
się) indicates movement away from the speaker. As asserted by Boryś (2005: 716), wy- can be
compared to the English out-; it comes from the PIE ύd, and it encompasses many more
meanings related to movement, e.g., vertical upward movement in such words as, wyrastać
(‘grow up’, ‘blossom’). As claimed by Bruckner (1985: 637), one of the meanings of wy- is
also connected with the feeling of fulfillment, satiation or even satiety, as in wycierpieć się
(‘suffer enough/too much’) or wybiegać się (‘run enough’). Wy- is also one of the Polish verbal
prefixes (alongside za-, prze-, od-, etc.) which expresses accomplishment of some activity , i.e.,
e.g. wybaczyć (‘forgive’), i.e., is a marker of the perfective aspect. Pianka (1985: 80) identifies
the general meaning of wy- as indicating directed motion/movement.

Another common Polish equivalent of the prefix for- is za-, in the counterparts of such
for-prefixed verbs, as forbid (‘zabronić’)28 forfend (‘zakazać’)29 forget (‘zapomnieć’), forfeit
(‘zaprzepaścić’ or ‘stracić’). It is interesting to point to the fact that when forfeit is translated as
zaprzepaścić, it means that subject of an action is Agent rather than Experiencer and when it is
translated as stracić, the subject is Experiencer rather than Agent. Even though the meaning of
za- does not seem to explicitly involve the conception of directed movement it does point to
outwardness and backwardness, the latter notion being part and parcel of the conception of a
path followed by an object in motion.

26
https://sjp.pwn.pl/doroszewski/odmawiac;5463923.html
27
https://sjp.pwn.pl/sjp/wy;2538494.html
28
https://sjp.pwn.pl/doroszewski/zabraniac;5523804.html
29
https://sjp.pwn.pl/doroszewski/zakazac;5525011.html

132
4.10. Conclusions

The provided linguistic examples have been analysed with a view to demonstrating the semantic
consequences of a certain morphological process, i.e. the capacity of the prefix for-, functioning
as an adprep, i.e. verb modifier, to dominate semantically and determine the meaning of a
derivative verb, in which it participates and to which it is prefixed. In the blended concepts the
directionality possibly supplied by the stem verb becomes re-oriented due to the subjectified
conception of movement imported by the prefix for-. Thus, it signals the import of the
conception of subjective, metaphorical movement or the redirection of this movement, as in the
case of forswear or forgive, respectively. The for-prefixed verbs have been analysed in terms of
the gradual process from an objectified construal of scenes represented by the roots to the
subjectification of those scenes owed to the semantic import of the considered prefix. In the
case of the for-prefixed verbs, the process of subjectification results in the effect of
lexicalisation (creation of new words) rather than grammaticisation. The attenuation of the
agentive role of a subject referent is also observable in the process of subjectification of
movement in the relational scenes described by particular for-prefixed verbs. The semantic roles
performed by trajectors are more prominent (Agent, Recipient) in the conceptions represented
by the roots of the analysed for-prefixed verbs but they become attenuated (typically to the role
of Experiencer) in the conceptions represented by complex lexemes in which they participate.
Moreover, the process of subjectification takes place due to the metaphorical construals of the
scenes represented the for-prefixed verbs.

When it comes to the verbs forswear and forbid the role of the subject in utterances with
those verbs or just their roots does not change. The aforesaid for-prefixed verbs have been
presented as examples of the reversal of a stream of actions as regards the landmark event in
the conceptual scenes which they represent. Their meaning is antonymous with respect to the
meaning of the simple lexemes upon which they are built, namely bid and swear.

As regards the counterparts of the prefix for- in Polish, it seems that it should take
another in-depth study to present all the equivalents and their forms and functions in a
systematic way. However, certain conclusions can be reached on the basis of the brief analysis
carried out in section 4.9. of the present chapter. Some of the Polish prefixes, are also in various
ways associated with movement, precisely the notions of outwardness, backwardness and
vertical upward movement, e.g., the prefix za-, as in zapomnieć (‘forget’) points to
backwardness, whereas wy- in wyrastać (‘grow up’ / ’blow’) refers to vertical upward

133
movement. What appears to be compelling is the fact that one English for-prefixed verb can
have more than one Polish counterpart. For example, forgive can be translated into Polish as
wybaczyć or przebaczyć (the prefixes wy- and prze- attached to the same stem). In Polish,
differently than in English, the role of subject, as Agent or Experiencer, may depend on a choice
of a word in translation, e.g. forfeit has a number of counterparts, zaprzepaścić, utracić,
pozbawić. The role of the trajector in actions represented by zaprzepaścić or pozbawić is Agent,
whereas the role of the trajector in an actions represented by stracić rather that of Experiencer.
However, it cannot be claimed that the English verb forfeit is of limited applicability; it
polysemous to the extent that can by all means represented the senses of its Polish counterparts
and involve similar semantic roles of the trajectors; it is simply the case that in Polish the
meaning is communicated more transparently. Nevertheless, the disparities between Polish and
English as regards word formation and the senses of corresponding lexemes do occur and are
worthy of a thorough study.

The last, forthcoming part of the dissertation is meant to present final conclusions of all
the investigations carried out in the research part of the study, i.e., in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

134
 FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The most important conclusion to draw at the end of the present dissertation seems to be the
confirmation of the hypothesis that all lexical and grammatical elements within what is called
by Panther and Thornburg the lexicogrammatical system of a language should be considered to
be meaning-bearing units with the emphasis put on the semantic contribution of the subparts
constituting a given lexicogrammatical construction. In the course of the present study it has
become evident that each morpheme represented by the phonological form for is a significant
contributory factor in the process of word formation, i.e., in for-prefixed verbs analysed in
Chapter 4 or a grammatical pattern formation, e.g. the self-sake benefactive construction
examined in Chapter 3.

What is more, in each function the morpheme is representative of different

conceptualisations which, nevertheless, can be claimed to be in a way related. As regards the
main sense of the prefix for-, it presumably involves the conception of outwardly directed
subjectified movement. The main sense of the preposition for, in turn, pertains to purposiveness,
but there is also an aspect of spatiality included in its meaning, specifically that of potential
movement since the concept of purposiveness can be understood as a lower-order domain in
the concept of spatial directionality. The present research demonstrates a cognitive approach to
the preposition for as a prototypical expression of purposiveness in English. As has been found
out, it retains to some extent the aspect of spatiality typical of prototypical English prepositions,
and illustrates the phenomenon of two directional spacialisation of two otherwise related senses
of the same morpheme resulting in near homonymy, as the morpheme is capable of functioning
alternately as two distinct parts of speech. Generally, in the scenes described by sentences with
the preposition for involving purpose, there is potential movement involved, commonly
directed from the trajector (the subject referent) to the landmark (the indirect object referent).
In the course of development of the English language, the notion of directionality involved in
the conception represented by the common ancestor has evolved into the notion of
purposiveness in the case of the preposition for, whereas the prefix for- has retained the original
content in the conception it represents.

What should also be highlighted is the role of metaphor in the conceptualisations

represented by the morpheme in question in the role of a preposition but especially in its role
of a prefix. For- introduces the concept of outwardly directed motion to all analysed for-
prefixed verbs. When it comes to forgive, forget, forgo, forfend and forfeit, metaphorisation

135
leads to the attenuation of the agentive role of the subject. In the case of forbear and forbid,
metaphorisation causes the subjectified reversal of the stream of a landmark action.

As regards the most obvious Polish equivalent of the preposition for, i.e., dla, its
dominant sense also pertains to purposiveness. The divergence between the meanings of for as
a preposition and for- as a prefix consists in the fact that, in the course of evolution from the
etymological source the prefix has preserved a reference to the notion of spatiality or detriment,
whereas for, albeit classified by Tyler and Evans (2003) as a spatial particle of orientation, came
to principally represent the senses of purposiveness, intentionality (as asserted by Tyler and
Evans 2003) and benefaction. Nevertheless, as has already been mentioned, the spatial aspect
is recognisable in the benefactive sense, which implies a potential transfer of a LM (direct object
referent) from the TR (subject referent) to another landmark (indirect object referent).

To sum up, the notion of spatiality, involved in the semantic scope of the prefix for-,
which is a symbolic unit, has preserved much of the semantic content of the etymological
source of the considered morpheme. The notion of spatiality has evolved into that of
purposiveness, which seems to have been motivated by physical experience. The present study
is a point of departure for the author to conduct a further research on the conceptions introduced
by other prefixes, e.g., with- to conceptions represented by verbs to which it is attached, e.g.,
hold, draw, stand, etc.

136
 References

Albertazzi, Liliana (Ed.). (2000). Meaning and Cognition - a Multidisciplinary Approach.

Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Allwood. J., Gärdenfors, P. (Eds.), (1999). Cognitive Semantics, Meaning and Cognition.
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Baugh C. A, Cable, T. (2002). A History of the English Language. London: Routledge

Bergen, B., N. C. Chang (2000). Spatial schematicity of prepositions in neural grammar. Paper
read at The Fifth International Conference on Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language,
May 11-14, at University of California at Santa Barbara, CA.

Bergs, A, Brinton, J. L. (Eds.), (2012). English Historical Linguistics. An International

Handbook. Volume 2. Berlin, Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.

Blank, A., Koch, P. (Eds.), (1999). Historical Semantics and Cognition. Berlin, New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.

Boers, F. (1996). Spatial Prepositions and Metaphor. A Cognitive Semantic Journey along the
UP-DOWN and the FRONT-BACK Dimensions. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.

Brenda, M. (2014). The Cognitive Perspective on the Polysemy of the English Spatial
Preposition Over. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Brinton, J. L., Traugott C. E. (2005). Lexicalization and Language Change. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Brugman, C. (1988). The Story of Over. Berkley: University of California.

Busse. B. (2011). “One should never underestimate the power of books. Writing and reading as
therapy in Paul Auster’s novels”. In M. Fludernik (Ed.), Beyond Cognitive Metaphor Theory.
Perspectives on Literary Metaphor (pp. 176-195). New York: Routledge.

Carnie, A., Sato Y., Siddiqi D. (Eds.). (2014). The Routledge Handbook of Syntax. New York:
Routledge.
Chomsky, N. (1995). The Minimalist Program. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

137
Cook, A. W. (1971). Case Grammar Theory. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Croft, W. (2012). Verbs: Aspect and Causal Structure. New York: Oxford University Press.

Crystal, D. (1995). The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language. Second Edition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cuyckens, H, De Smet, H. (2007). “For…to-infinitives from early to late modern English”. In

J. Pérez-Guerra, D. Gonzalez-Alvarez”, J.L. Bueno-Alonso, and E. Rama-Martinez (Eds.), Of
Varying Language and Opposing Creed: New Insights into Late Modern English (pp. 77-102).
Frankfurt: Lang.

Cuyckens, H., Radden, G. (2002). Perspectives on Prepositions. Tübingen: Gunter Narr

Verlag.

Dąbrowska, E. (1997). Cognitive Semantics and the Polish Dative. Berlin, New York: Mouton
de Gruyter.

Dennett, C. D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Dewell, B. R. (2015). The semantics of German Verb Prefixes. Amsterdam, Philadelphia:

Benjamins Publishing Company.

Dinneen, P. F. (1995). General Linguistics. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Dominiek, S, Rice. S. (1995). “Network analyses of prepositional meaning: mirroring whose

mind – the linguist’s or the language user’s?”. In Cognitive Linguistics 6-1 (pp. 89-130). Berlin:
Mouton de Gruyter.

Evans, V, Green, M. (2006). Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh

University Press.

Evans, Bergen, Zinken. (2007). The Cognitive Linguistics Reader. London, Oakville: Equinox
Publishing Limited.

Fagerli, Ole Torfinn. (2001). “Malefactive by means of give”. In H. G. Simonsen and R. T.

Endresen (Eds.), A Cognitive Approach to the Verb: Morphological and Constructional
Perspectives (pp. 203-22). Berlin. New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

138
Fauconnier, G, Turner, M. (1996). “Blending as a central process of grammar”. In A. Goldberg
(Ed.), Conceptual Structure, Discourse, and Language (pp. 113-130). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Fauconnier, G. (1997). Mapping in thought and language. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Fauconnier, G, Turner, M. (2002). The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s
Hidden Complexities. New York: Perseus Books Group.

Fertig, D. (2013). Analogy and Morphological Change. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University

Press.

Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic Structures. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Hamawand, Z. (2011). Morphology in English: Word Formation in Cognitive Grammar.

London, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Hamawand, Z. (2013). “Prefixes of spatiality in English: a study in cognitive linguistics” in

Theory and Practice in Language Studies, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 736-747.

Hampe, B. (2000). “Facing up to the meaning of face up to. A cognitive semantico-pragmatic

analysis of an English verb-particle construction”. In A. Foolen and F. van der Leek (Eds.),
Constructions in Cognitive Linguistics (pp. 81-101). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: Benjamins
Publishing Company.

Hampe, B. (2002). Superlative Verbs. A Corpus-Based Study of Semantic Redundancy in

English Verb-Particle Constructions. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.

Hawkins, W. B. (1993). “On universality and variability in the semantics of spatial adpositions”.
In C. Wibbelt-Zelinsky (Ed.), The semantics of prepositions (pp. 327-350). Berlin, New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.

Hopper, P. J. “On some principles of grammaticization”. In E. C. Traugott and B. Heine (Eds.),

Approaches to Grammaticalization, Vol. I. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1991.

Huddleston, R., Pullum, K. G. (2002). The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

139
Ibanez, F, Masegosa, G. A. (2014). Cognitive Modelling. A Linguistic Perspective. Amsterdam,
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing.

Kreitzer, A. (1997). “Multiple levels of schematization: a study in the conceptualization of

space”. In Cognitive Linguistics 8(4): 291-325

Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. London, Chicago: Chicago University
Press.

Lakoff, G. (1992). The contemporary Theory of Metaphor. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol, 1: Theoretical Prerequisites.

Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Langacker, R. W. (1991). Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. 2: Descriptive Application.

Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Langacker, R. W. (2000). Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin, New York: Mouton de

Gruyter.

Langacker, R. W. (2002). Concept, Image, and Symbol. The Cognitive Basis of Grammar. 2nd
edition with a new preface. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Langacker, R. W. (2011). “On the subject of impersonals in cognitive linguistics convergence

and expansion”. In Brdar, M., Gries, S., Fuchs, and Zic., M (Eds.), Cognitive Linguistics
Convergence and Expansion. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Lifschitz, A. (2012). Language and Enlightenment, Berlin Debates of the Eighteen Century.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miguel- García M. J. (2010). “Clause structure and transitivity”. In D. Geeraerts and H.

Cuyckens (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (pp.753–781). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Modrak, D. (2001). Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Mukherjee, J. (2005). English Ditransitive Verbs. Aspects of Theory, Description, and a Usage-

140
Based Model. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi.

Newman, J. (1996). Give. A Cognitive Linguistic Study. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

O’Dowd, M. E. (1998). Prepositions and Particles in English: A Discourse-Functional

Account. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Panther, K-U., Thornburg, L. L., Barcelona (Eds.), (2009). A. Metaphor and metonymy in
grammar. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S. (1973). A University Grammar of English. Langenscheidt ELT.

Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech. G., and Jan Svartvik. (1985). A Comprehensive Grammar of
the English Language. London, New York: Longman.

Radden, G, Dirven, R. (2007). Cognitive English Grammar. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John

Benjamins Publishing Company.

Radden, G, Panther, K. U. (2004). Studies in Linguistic Motivation. Berlin, NY: Mouton de

Gruyter.

Ritchie, D. (2004). “Lost in space: metaphors in conceptual integration theory”. Metaphor and
Symbol, 19, 31-50. Portland: Portland State University.

Robins, R. H. (1997). A Short History of Linguistics. New York: Routledge.

Rudanko, J. (1989). Complementation and Case Grammar, A Syntactic and Semantic Study of
Selected Patterns of Complementation in Present-Day English. State University of New York,
Albany.

Sapir, E. (1921). Language. An Introduction to the Study of Speech. New York: Harcout, Brace.

Schmid, H. J. (2000). English Abstract Nouns as Conceptual Shells: from Corpus to Cognition.
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Schmid, H. J. (Ed.) (2012). Cognitive Pragmatics. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Simonsen, G. H., Endressen, T. R. (Eds.), (2001). A Cognitive Approach to the Verb:

141
Morphological and Constructional Perspectives. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Smith, T. Y. (2010). “Cross-linguistic categorization of benefactives by event structure”. In

Benefactives and malefactives, typological perspectives and case studies Fernando Zúñiga,
Seppo Kittilä (eds.) s. 71-93. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Swan, M. (1995). Practical English Usage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thibault, P. (2004). Agency and Consciousness in Discourse: Self-Other Dynamics as a

Complex System. London : Continuum International Publishing Group.

Tomaszczyk, J, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk B. (Eds.), (1990). Meaning and Lexicography.

Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Tuggy, D. (2007). “Schematicity”. In D. Geeraerts, and H. Cuyckens (Eds.), The Oxford

Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (pp. 82-115). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tyler, A, Evans, V. (2003). The Semantics of English Prepositions: Spatial Scenes, Embodied
Meaning, and Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tyler, A., Ho, V., Mueller, C. (2011). “Applying cognitive linguistics to instructed L2
learning: the english modal verbs”. AILA Review, 23, 30-49.

Ungerer, F, Schimd, H.J. (2006). An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics. Edinburgh: Pearson

Education Limited.

Weissenborn J., Goodluck H. & Roeper T. (Eds.), (1992). Theoretical Issues in Language
Acquisition: Continuity and Change in Development. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Wierzbicka, A. (1988). The Semantics of Grammar. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins

Publishing Company.

142
 Internet sources

Fauconnier, G., Turner, M. Conceptual blending, form and meaning. Retrieved from
http://tecfa.unige.ch/tecfa/maltt/cofor-1/textes/Fauconnier-Turner03.pdf. Accessed on 4th
May, 2017

Jones, T. (2015). Theories of Language in the Eighteenth Century. DOI:

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935338.013.100. Accessed on 10th December, 2016

Kaszak, M. (2014). Self-sake benefactive constructions. International Journal of Arts &

Sciences, CD-ROM. ISSN: 1944-6934 :: 07(05):105–111. Retrieved from
http://www.universitypublications.net/ijas/0705/html/B4R428.xml. Accessed on 5th October,
2017

Kovács, Éva. The traditional vs. Cognitive approach to English phrasal verbs. 2007.
http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/~philos/2011_tom_XVI_1/141.pdf. Accessed on 2nd December,
2016

Langacker, R. W. (1986). An Introduction to Cognitive Grammar. Retrieved from

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1207/s15516709cog1001_1/abstract. Accessed on 10th
May, 2017

Langacker, R. W. Nouns and Verbs. In Language Vol. 63, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 53-94
Published by: Linguistic Society of America DOI: 10.2307/415384. Accessed on 23rd April,
2017

Langacker, R.W. Subjectification. Cognitive Linguistics (includes Cognitive Linguistic

Bibliography), Volume 1, Issue 1, Pages 5–38, ISSN (Online) 1613-3641, ISSN (Print) 0936-
5907, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cogl.1990.1.1.5. Accessed on 18th September, 2017

Lehrer, A. (1988). Checklist for verbs of speaking, Acta Linguistica Hungarica, Vol. 38 (1-4),
pp. 143-16. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/44362608?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Accessed on 10th
October, 2017

Miguel - García, M. J. (2007). Clause structure and transitivity. Retrieved from

http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.001.0001/oxfordh
b-9780199738632-e-29. Accessed on 9th October, 2017

143
Pianka, W. (1985). Modyfikacje semantyczne rodzajów akcji czasowników polskich z
prefiksem -wy. In Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch Vol. 31 (pp. 79-88). Harrassowitz Verlag;
Austrian Academy of Sciences Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24747063.
Accessed on 16th November, 2017

Pinborg, J., Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., Stump, E. (Eds.). Speculative Grammar. In The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the
Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600 (pp. 254-270) Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521226059.015. Accessed on 9th October, 2017

Topolińska, Z. (2010). DLA – semantyka i składnia. Linguistica Copernicana Nr 1 (3)/2010.

Retrieved from http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LinCop/article/viewFile/7422/6776.
Accessed on 28th December, 2016

Turewicz, K. (2004). UNDERSTANDING PREPOSITIONS THROUGH COGNITIVE

GRAMMAR. A CASE OF IN. Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/4384/. Accessed on 28th
February, 2018

Tyler, Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan. 2001. “Reconsidering prepositional polysemy networks: the case
of over”. Language 4: 724-765 (http://www.vyvevans.net/over.pdf). Accessed on 10th October,
2017

Tyler, A. (2011). Applying Cognitive Linguistics to Learning the Semantics of English to, for
and at: An Experimental Investigation. Retrieved from
http://vialjournal.webs.uvigo.es/pdf/Vial-2011-Article7.pdf. Accessed on 22nd December,
2017

White, S. A., Dudley, R., Hacquard, V, Lidz, J. Discovering classes of attitude verbs using
subcategorization frame distributions. University of Maryland, College Park. Retrieved from
http://ling.umd.edu/~hacquard/papers/nels_proceedings_white_etal.pdf. Accessed on 8th
June, 2017

Whitney, W.D. The Century Dictionary. New York: The Century Co. Retrieved from
(https://archive.org/details/centurydictiona02whitgoog). Accessed on 10th December, 2017
Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN (‘The PWN Dictionary of the Polish Language’)
https://sjp.pwn.pl/. Accessed on 22nd December, 2017.

144
The British National Corpus (http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/)

Dictionaries and Encyclopaedias

Boryś, W. (2005). Słownik Etymologiczny Języka Polskiego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo

Literackie.

Evans, V. (2007). A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Frawley, J. W. (Ed.), (2003). International Encyclopedia of Linguistics. Second Edition.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neufeldt, V., Guralnik B. D. (1989). Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English.
Third College Edition. Cleveland and New York.

Skeat, W. W. (2005). A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. London:

FB&cLtd.

Wielki Słownik PWN Oxford (‘The Great PWN Oxford Dictionary’) electronic version

145
 Streszczenie

Podstawowym celem niniejszej rozprawy była analiza semantyczna angielskiego morfemu for
reprezentującego dwie odrębne kategorie gramatyczne. Morfem o którym mowa, może pełnić
rolę przyimka lub przedrostka o funkcji partykuły przysłówkowej, w pierwszym przypadku
występując w roli morfemu wolnego, w drugim – morfemu słowotwórczego, związanego.
Pierwszy rozdział rozprawy dotyczy wyjaśnienia terminów i pojęć z dziedziny językoznawstwa
kognitywnego najistotniejszych dla rozważań przedstawionych w niniejszej pracy. Drugi
rozdział traktuje o kwestiach dotyczących kategorii przyimka w ujęciu semantyki kognitywnej.
W rozdziale trzecim zostały omówione poszczególne, powiązane ze sobą znaczenia przyimka
for, przedstawione następnie w postaci siatki znaczeń, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem
konstrukcji „autobenefaktywnej” – self-sake benefactive construction, w której podmiot
reprezentuje rolę semantyczną agensa wykonującego czynność dla swojej własnej korzyści. W
tym samym rozdziale uwypuklony został fakt, iż przyimek for nie jest przykładem typowego
angielskiego przyimka odnoszącego się w swoim znaczeniu głównie do aspektu
przestrzennego, ponieważ jego prototypowe znaczenie nie jest bezpośrednio związane z
ruchem w przestrzeni z ruchem w przestrzeni ani samą przestrzenią fizyczną, ale wskazuje na
celowość wykonywanej przez agensa czynności. Czwarty rozdział poświęcony został analizie
przedrostka for- i koncepcji jaką wprowadza do tak zwanych for-prefixed verbs (czasowników
poprzedzonych przedrostkiem for-), których przykładem jest czasownik forgive. Pojęcia
reprezentowane przez czasowniki tego typu ostały przedstawione w formie amalgamatów
konceptualnych. Rozprawę poświęciłam powyższym zagadnieniom, ponieważ jak dotąd nie
spotkałam się z analizą dwoistości znaczeniowej i gramatycznej morfemu for w publikacjach
językoznawczych. Praca ta może okazać się bodźcem do dalszych badań zmierzających do
gruntownej analizy koncepcji wprowadzanych przez przedrostki występujące w innych
czasownikach angielskich, np. with-, do koncepcji reprezentowanych przez leksemy, do których
są one przyłączone, np. withhold, withdraw, withstand, etc.

146
Pracę przyjmuję i akceptuję Potwierdzam złożenie pracy dyplomowej

…………………………… …………………………………………..

data i podpis opiekuna pracy data i podpis pracownika dziekanatu

147