LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES UNIVERSITY - CAVITE

COLLEGE OF LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE

TO: ATTY. MARLA A .BARCENILLA

FROM: DENMARK G. BOCALAN

SUBJECT: COMMENT ON THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V SERENO

DATE: JUNE 5, 2019

Background

The case of Republic v Sereno is an unprecented case and a historic one.

It is a controversial case wherein an impeachable officer was ousted via a
petition for quo warranto. On August 30, 2017, 25 congressmen filed a petition
to impeach Chief Justice Sereno for failure to declare all her assets during her
tenure as a law professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law.
However, during the pendency of the preliminary stages of her impeachment,
a petition for Quo Warranto was filed by Solicitor General Jose Calida against
the then Chief Justice for lack of integrity. The Quo Warranto proceeding was
ultimately successful wherein the Supreme Court justices voted to oust
Sereno as Chief Justice on May 11, 2018, voting 8-6, which made Sereno the
first officer in Philippine jurisprudence unlawfully holding office to be removed
through the special civil action of Quo Warranto and not through
impeachment.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the Petition for Quo Warranto

It is the opinion of the commentator that the Petition for Quo Warranto
violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

“SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.”

While Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Court provide that:

“SECTION 7. Venue — An action under the preceding six sections can be

brought only in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where
the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor
 General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial
Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme
Court.”

While it is true that the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over the
petition, the action may be premature for violating the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. As stated in the case of Ernesto Dy v Hon. Bibat-Palamos:

“Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is

improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must
remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its
docket.”1

According to then Justice Regalado,citing Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Co.

and Veraguth v. Isabela Sugar Co.:

“In the absence of special reasons, the SC will decline to exercise original
jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus since it is not a trier of
facts and, that is a function which can be better done by the trial courts.
The same rule applies for quo warranto wherein the SC has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC.”

Recourse may however be made directly to the SC. The exceptions to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts are the following as stated in the case of
Republic v. Caguioa:

1.) Where there are special and important reasons clearly stated in the
petition;
2.) When dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
3.) When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
4.) When the challenged orders are patent nullities;
5.) When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances call for
and justify the immediate and direct handling by the Court 2

Not squarely fitting any of the exceptions above, the Ponente invoked that
the case against Sereno was one of transcendental importance to justify the
Court’s instant jurisdiction. However, such doctrine applies to the legal
standing or locus standi of a petitioner or plaintiff. The Court invoked the
doctrine of transcendal importance in the manner of a magic wand to fit the
petition for quo warranto to the exceptions of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.

The commentator finds such application questionable.

1
Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013
2
Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013
Propriety of a Quo Warranto proceeding against an impeachable officer

It is the opinion of the commentator that a Quo Warranto proceeding is

not the appropriate action to remove an impeachable officer from office.

The majority in the case hinged the propriety of a Quo Warranto

proceeding against Sereno on the Constitution’s use of the auxiliary verb
“may”. The dictionary meaning of the word “may” is to express possibility.

Section 2 Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

“The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,

the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment.”

The use of the word “may” does make it seem that the Constitution itself
does not prohibit a petition for quo warranto to oust the enumerated officers
therein.

However, the construction of the Constitution must be viewed in this wise:

“A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the

framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components
through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is called
into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The
Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular,
whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be
understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution
contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.” 3

Thus it cannot be simply gainsaid that since the word “may” is used then
the possible mode of ouster can be a petition for quo warranto.

The alleged language of the Constitution on which the ponente in the

Sereno case based his decision from did not even take the whole of Section 2
into consideration. The wording of Section 2 gives primacy to the
impeachment process. If “all other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment” then such
language must mean that impeachment is an exclusive proceeding only
applicable against the enumerated officers. If such proceeding is exclusive
then it must mean that a petition for quo warranto which is less exclusive does
not hold ground against these officers.

3
David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
 The power of impeachment is lodged in the Congress. It is the power of
Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution.4 It is a safeguard to the separation of powers of
the state and acts as a check and balance. Such great power cannot simply
be diminished by the use of the permissive word “may” which makes it
possible for a special civil action of quo warranto to step into its shoes.

It is said that the impeachment is a political proceeding while a quo

warranto is a judicial proceeding. If a quo warranto is a judicial proceeding
then such would erode the Separation of Powers of the State as the Judiciary
itself opens its doors to future petitions against its members which can be
initiated by the:

1.) The President, directing the OSG;

2.) The OSG, in the name of the government when he has good reason;
3.) The OSG, upon the relation and request of another person;
4.) An individual only when he claims to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped by another.

The exclusivity of impeachment found within the power of Congress is

meant to keep the independence of the Judiciary. Members of the Supreme
Court should not be open for attacks in the guise of quo warranto petitions but
rather through impeachment only. Also, one can question how could the
Supreme Court Justices judge one of their own, no less the Chief Justice. It’s
not difficult to fathom that personal issues can have an effect on the supposed
cold and neutral impartiality of the judges. Such is also a reason why
impeachment is a check and balance to the branches of the government for
internal squabbles among and between the Supreme Court magistrates could,
in one way or another, affect the outcome of the quo warranto proceeding
unlike in impeachment where it is lodged in a separate body, the Congress.

A dangerous precedent is now nonetheless part of the law of the land for
Article 8 of the Civil Code provides: “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”

Prescription of the Petition for Quo Warranto

The commentator opines that the action of a petition for quo warranto has
prescribed.

Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Court provide:

SECTION 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be

construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for
his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year
after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in
4
Corona v. Senate, G.R. No 200242, July 17,2012
 accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner’s right to the office in question. (16a)

The language of the law is thus clear that the action should have been
commenced one (1) year after the alleged cause for Sereno’s ouster. In a nifty
and convenient move, the majority decision in the case heavily relied that
“prescription does not run against the State” based on the Civil Code
provision:

Article 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:

(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions

However, a closer inspection of the provision would provide that the

subject of the provision is the acquisitive and extinctive prescription of
acquisition of ownership of real right. A public office is not a property right.
A construction of the Civil Code provision that would defeat the very language
of the time period to file an action of quo warranto is against the rules of
statutory construction for the rule clearly provided the period of one (1) year
after the cause of action against the officer arises.

If the legislative intent is to provide that the action does not prescribe
against the State then such should have been written unto the Rules of Court.
Usually, it is the Solicitor General who initiates the action for quo warranto,
therefore the State is always involved. Should the idea of “prescription does
not run against the State” is to be recognized under Section 11 of Rule 66 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, it should have been inculcated in the language for
the State, again because the State is involved in actions for quo warranto
because a quo warranto is as provided:

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An action for

the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced
by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a

public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of
law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office.

From the definition provided, a quo warranto is an action by the

government. The State is therefore involved, the makers of the law should
have expressly included that prescription does not run against the State
should such be the intent of the law.

As succinctly stated in the case of Unabia v The Honorable City Mayor5:

5
Unabia v City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956
 “However, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an
office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has
been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally
fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find
this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and
that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.”

Integrity of Sereno and non-filing of SALNs

It is the opinion of the commentator that Sereno lacks integrity because

of her non-filing of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth (SALNs).

The Constitution requires integrity, among others as a qualification to be a

member of the Supreme Court.

Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Section 7. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven

competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Sereno’s consistent failure to file her SALNs during her tenure as a law
professor in the University of the Philippines and failure to submit the required
SALNs upon the request of the Judicial and Bar Council for her nomination for
Chief Justice is proof that Sereno lacks integrity.

Failure to submit SALNs is not to be taken lightly for the Constitution, no

less, mandates that:

Article 11. Accountability of Public Officers:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office

and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress,
the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law.

The Code of Judicial Conduct also provides that:

RULE 5.08 A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.

Thus, her failure to submit her SALNs is indeed a culpable violation of

the Constitution. Despite the lack of demand from the University of the
Philippines to file her SALNs, such does not in any way absolve Sereno of
the duty to make a disclosure of her assets.

While integrity may be a relative and abstract word best left to be

determined by the JBC in the process of nominating candidates to be
members of the Judiciary, the omissions done by Sereno can never equate to
her having integrity as regards holding the position of Chief Justice.

Conclusion

With the foregoing, the commentator opines that the case of Republic v
Sereno is one that diminishes the independence of the Judiciary and impairs
the impeachment power of Congress. The application of the rules on Statutory
Construction is somehow stretched to accommodate the decision of the
majority. A dangerous precedent is created that would one day haunt the
Judiciary itself. It could be said that the floodgates have been opened and the
Court may be flooded with similar actions.

It is however the commentator’s opinion that then Chief Justice Sereno

does lack the integrity required of her position. Her failure to submit her
SALNs can never be excused. Her omission is a culpable violation of the
Constitution itself and is a ground for her removal from office.

The commentator also believes that matters regarding a public officer’s

SALN is the ultimate trump card to find holes and question a public officer’s
integrity. The case of Republic v Sereno shows that if the State does so wish,
any public officer, even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court herself, is not
immune to the overwhelming power of checking the truthfulness and faithful
compliance to the SALN.

It could be said that the case was politically motivated by the current
administration but such inference is already moot and academic. What now
lies ahead is the future application of the jurisprudence created by this
unprecedented and historic case.