THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS

Fernando Alcoforado *

Paul Keynnedy's book Ascensão e queda das grandes potências: Transformação

econômica e conflito militar de 1500 a 2000 (The rise and fall of the great powers:
Economic transformation and military conflict from 1500 to 2000) (Rio de Janeiro:
Campus Publishing House, 1989, 675 pages), has become a classic of geopolitics since
its publication two decades ago. In the late 1980s, after the stock market crash in 1987,
when there was continued concern about fiscal deficits and the current account balance
of the United States before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Keynnedy shocked the
world with his claim that "the only answer to the increasingly contentious question of
the ability of the United States to preserve its present position is "no".

According to Kennedy, the United States had become an international debtor for the
first time and was increasingly dependent on European and Japanese capital inflows.
Japan was on the rise. The sense of decadence came close to hysteria in the United
States when Japanese companies bought symbolic assets from the former boom of
American capitalism. Today, in addition to being dependent on European and Japanese
capital inflows, the United States is heavily dependent on capital from China. The thesis
of the English professor of Yale University is being confirmed even in the
contemporary era.

Paul Kennedy's thesis briefly stated that the relative strength of the major nations on the
world never remains constant, primarily because of the uneven growth rate between
different societies and, secondly, of the technological and organizational innovations
that provide the society has greater advantage than the other. When their productive
capacity increased, countries usually had a greater ability to shoulder the burdens of
large-scale armaments in peacetime and to maintain and supply large armies and naval
forces during the war. Wealth is usually necessary for military power. This, in turn, is
generally necessary for the acquisition and protection of wealth. If, however, too large a
proportion of the country's resources are diverted from wealth creation and assigned to
military purposes, then it is likely that this will lead to the weakening of national power
in the long run.

Paul Kennedy further argues that if the country exceeds strategically, for example, by
conquering vast territories or in onerous wars, it risks seeing the potential advantages of
external expansion outweighed by the large expenditures required. This dilemma
becomes acute if the country in question has entered a period of relative economic
decline. The history of the rise and fall of the system of the leading countries of the
great powers, from the advance of Western Europe in the sixteenth century, that is, of
nations such as Spain, Holland, France, British Empire and now the United States,
shows very significant correlation, in the longer term, between their ability to produce
and generate revenue, on the one hand, and military force, on the other.

Holland, for example, the hegemonic power of the planet in the seventeenth century,
abandoned its exploration of sugar cane in Brazil in 1654 because this activity came to
represent a burden to maintain it. Examining the historical records of the rise and fall of
the great powers over the last 500 years, Kennedy has come to some conclusions of
general validity, although obviously recognizing the possibility of some exceptions.

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There is, for example, a concrete causal relation between the variations that have
occurred over time in the general economic and productive equilibria and the position
occupied by the individual powers in the international system. The pronounced
economic changes heralded the rise of new great powers that would someday have some
decisive impact on the military or territorial order.

For Kennedy, history suggests the existence of a very clear long-term link between the
rise and fall of great military power or World Empire. This results from two related
facts. The first is that economic resources are needed to support the military structure on
a large scale. The second is that, as far as the international system is concerned, both
wealth and power are always relative and as such must be seen. If any nation is now
powerful and rich, it does not depend absolutely on the abundance or security of its
power and wealth, but mainly on having its rivals less of that power and wealth. This
situation occurred during the rule of the British Empire and also with the United States
after 1990 when it became hegemonic power in the world. This does not mean,
however, that the relative economic and military power of any nation will grow or
decline in parallel with that of another, according to Kennedy.

Kennedy makes it clear that there is a time lag between the trajectory of the relative
economic strength of a particular state and its trajectory of its military or territorial
influence. Economic booming power may well prefer to be richer than investing heavily
in weapons. Half a century later, priorities may have changed. Economic expansion
brought with it other obligations, that is, dealing with dependence on foreign markets
and raw materials, military alliances, and perhaps bases and colonies. Other rival
powers that are expanding at a faster pace then want to extend their influence to the
outside world. The world becomes more contested space with the great powers
competing hard with each other for market slices. In these circumstances, the greater
power between the others disturbed can be seen spending more with the defense than
before. The world has become more hostile simply because other powers have grown
faster and are becoming stronger. The great relative declining power reacts,
instinctively, by spending even more on "security" and thereby fails to use potential
resources in "productive investment". It further aggravates their long-term dilemma.
This is the situation of the United States which, at the present time, is no longer able to
assume its military expenditures as before. This explains the Donald Trump
government's stance to demand that its NATO allies increase their spending.

Kennedy makes such generalizations, however, without falling into the trap of
economic determinism. He is not arguing that the economy determines all the facts, or
is the sole reason for the success or failure of nations. There is simply too much
evidence, indicating other elements: geography, military organization, national morality,
alliance system, and many other factors that may affect the relative power of members
of state systems. What seems incontrovertible, however, is that in a long war of great
powers, usually in a coalition, victory has happened repeatedly for those who have a
more flourishing productive base. The position of power of important nations closely
followed their relative economic position over the past five centuries. This is not to
deny that "men make their own history", but they do so within historical circumstances
that may limit, as well as enlarge, the possibilities.

Of course, in examining the "perspectives" of each of the great powers, there is today
the temptation to move away of the office of historian who seeks to explain the facts of

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the past to approach the uncertain world of speculation about the future. But many
analysts do not stop doing futurology. Many analysts say that, with China, India and
other emerging countries reaching the same level as developed countries, the United
States is expected to suffer relative economic decline by producing a smaller share of
world GDP even as the country grows more than most major developed economies and
still the world's largest economy in absolute terms. Several emerging countries are
gaining increasing share of world GDP. By the forecast of Goldman Sachs, China will,
in 2050, surpass the United States, with GDP of US$ 45 trillion, against the US$ 35
trillion from United States.

In a study of the world's largest economies, Angus Maddison of the University of

Groningen states in Chinese Economic Performance In The Long Run that China's
participation in world GDP in 1820, before expanding the Industrial Revolution in
Europe, was of more than 30%, which is much higher than the current participation of
the United States. Thus, according to this long-standing historical vision, China is
simply returning to the position already achieved in the past. China, although seen by
many as the main beneficiary of the potential exhaustion of the United States, has
already experienced its own decline. By the middle of the previous millennium, it was
technologically more advanced than Europe, with more efficient agriculture, and the
mandarin class had no rivals in its professionalism. Even after the West overcame it,
economically and technologically, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries,
China's economy was still the largest in the world when the English industrial
revolution began.

However, between 1820 and 1952, when Europe experienced unprecedented economic
growth rates in history, China's per capita productivity fell, while its share of world
GDP plummeted from one-third to one-twentieth. Per capita income fell to a quarter of
the world average in the period, according to Angus Maddison. This declining
performance has been attributed to a number of causes, including foreign colonial
intervention, domestic disturbances, and the inflexibility of the Chinese bureaucracy in
the face of the challenges posed by the rebirth of the West. When Kennedy's book was
published, his thesis about the decline of the United States seemed to be wrong for
many analysts of global geopolitics, suggesting that the United States might have
expanded its empire to such an extent that it could no longer manage it, as it happened
to Spain in the seventeenth century and the United Kingdom in the twentieth century. In
fact, it was in the 1980s that the Soviet Union collapsed, while the United States
succeeded in restoring its budget equilibrium during the Clinton administration without
substantial retreat in their international commitments. Since 2001, the George W. Bush
administration has put everything to lose in the fiscal area, with increasing military
expenditures. In parallel, the Japanese economic challenge lost pace with the bursting of
real estate and stock bubbles, and the country was threatened by deflation. The panic of
the American media with the Japanese invasion was empty.

The question at issue now is whether Paul Kennedy's thesis of the inability of the
administration of the Empire was wrong or was simply premature. Predicting the
periods of rise and fall of nations and economies is notoriously difficult futurology. Paul
Kennedy's book filled a critical gap in the history of the rise and fall of the great powers
with rare erudition and depth. The predictions about the future of the United States
unmistakably demonstrate the decline of the United States. Paul Keynnedy shocked the
world with his assertion that "the only answer to the increasingly contested question of

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the ability of the United States to preserve its present position is" no. " Kennedy asserts
that wealth is usually necessary for military power. This, in turn, is generally necessary
for the acquisition and protection of wealth. If, however, too large a proportion of the
country's resources are diverted from wealth creation and used for military purposes as
is the case with the United States, then it is likely that this will lead to weakening
national power in the long run.

The world has become more hostile to the United States simply because other powers
have grown faster and are becoming stronger, as is the case in China. The great relative
declining power reacts, instinctively, by spending even more on "security" and thereby
driving potential resources away from "productive investment". It further aggravates
their long-term dilemma. By the forecast of Goldman Sachs, China will, in 2050,
surpassed economically the United States. One fact is clear: the United States has
broadened its empire to such an extent that it can no longer manage it, as it did in Spain
in the seventeenth century and the United Kingdom in the twentieth century. Another
empire, the Soviet, was the one who first demonstrated the inability of administration in
the 1980s because war expenditures surpassed all the limits that led the Soviet Union to
collapse. Increasing US military expenditures could lead to the same outcome.

One of the comments made by Donald Trump after his meeting with Kim Jon Un when
he said that there would be a substantial reduction of military spending by the
suspension of the military exercises with South Korea, this accentuates Trump's concern
to reduce spending which are affecting the United States economy. The peace
agreement on the Korean peninsula could undoubtedly mean that the United States
generally would have the lowest military expenditures. It is quite evident that the United
States will not be able to maintain its hegemony in the world supported by the military
power whose expenses are increasing. Kennedy asserts that wealth is usually necessary
for military power. This, in turn, is generally necessary for the acquisition and
protection of wealth. The world has become more hostile to the United States simply
because other powers have grown faster and are becoming stronger, as is the case of
China and Russia that has become a major player in world geopolitics. The response of
the great relative declining power, such as the United States, would be to react,
instinctively, by spending even more on "security" and thereby moving away of
"productive investment" potential resources. It would, therefore, further aggravate its
long-term dilemma.

* Fernando Alcoforado, 78, member of the Bahia Academy of Education, engineer and doctor in
Territorial Planning and Regional Development by the University of Barcelona, university professor and
consultant in the areas of strategic planning, business planning, regional planning and planning of energy
systems, is the author of 13 books addressing issues such as Globalization and Development, Brazilian
Economy, Global Warming and Climate Change, The Factors that Condition Economic and Social
Development, Energy in the world and The Great Scientific, Economic, and Social Revolutions that
Changed the World.