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NDC POLICY BRIEF
No. 12 – May 2019

What NATO’s prosperity”2 – no longer a purely operational-tac-

tical threat, but a strategic challenge. This also im-
counter-terrorism plied designing a vision on
how to wage the fight against One key
strategy? terrorism. It resulted in the
Policy Guidelines on Count- challenge of
er-Terrorism in 2012, marking NATO’s
Kris Quanten *
an important step forward.3
For the first time, the Alliance
Counter-
had a commonly agreed poli- Terrorism
Until 2001, NATO considered the terrorist threat
cy, clearly defining its role and
mandate for the fight against
Strategy comes
as a secondary phenomenon with a limited impact terrorism. The focus was on from the political
on the Alliance. The 9/11 attacks marked a radical
turnaround: suddenly terrorism became a top secu-
three key areas: awareness, ca-
pabilities and engagement.4
support – or
rity priority. This was also the first and only time in The fact that NATO had the lack thereof
NATO’s history that Article 5 was invoked, further- taken so long to develop a – of its own
more for a terrorist attack.
Initially, the reaction to 9/11 was purely military.
strategic vision had a lot to do
with member states’ divergent member states
However, it soon became clear that there was lit- political and ideological views.
tle strategic vision underlying the initiatives to fight A compromise was ultimately reached by explicitly
terrorism at the operational level. Hence, the hasty putting three general principles at the forefront of
approval, at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, of the fight against terrorism: compliance with inter-
a Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.1 national law; support to Allies; non-duplication and
This Concept foresaw a number of new initiatives, complementarity.
such as intelligence sharing, CBRN measures, the
establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence
Unit, and Civil Emergency planning, as a priority. An evolving counter-terrorism frame-
Yet all these separate initiatives lacked coordination work
and an overarching vision. The 2012 Policy Guidelines provided the strategic
The new Strategic Concept of 2010 provided framework for NATO’s Counter-Terrorism ap-
this vision. For the first time terrorism was explic- proach. The next step was to transform this poli-
itly mentioned as “a direct threat to the citizens of cy into the operational level. In May 2014, NATO
NATO countries and to international stability and published an Action Plan (classified), which identi-

2  “Active engagement, modern defence: strategic concept for the

*
Lt.Col. Quanten, PhD, is Military Professor at the Royal Military
Academy in Belgium. He was a Course Member in the NDC’s 133th
Senior Course, from August 2018 to February 2019. This Policy Brief is a
shortened version of his end-of-course Individual Paper.
1  “Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism (MC-472)”,
NATO, 2012.
defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization”, NATO, 2010.
3  S. Stefano, “The new NATO policy guidelines on counterterrorism:
analysis, assessments and actions”, Strategic Perspectives, No.13, US Institute
for National Strategic Studies, 2013.
4  “NATO’s policy guidelines on counter-terrorism”, NATO, 2012.
 NDC Policy Brief – No. 12 – May 2019
fied specific tasks within the three pillars. For aware-
ness, the emphasis was put on the exchange of in-
formation and intelligence between member states,
as well as with other international organizations
like the European Union (EU), the United Nations
(UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). However, the most
concrete initiatives were in the capabilities domain.
The aim was to use innovative technology to pro-
tect vital assets, mainly deployed troops and exist-
ing infrastructure. To this end, the Defence against
Terrorism Programme was launched. This consist-
ed in research programmes for a better protection
against MANPADs and CBRN attacks, the devel-
opment of biometric identifi-
An effective cation systems, the detection
and destruction of improvised
response to explosive devices (IEDs), the
terrorism clearance of explosive devices,
and the promotion of cultural
requires a awareness in deployed troops.
holistic, multi- An important role therein was
reserved for NATO’s Centre
pronged approach of Excellence for the Defence
involving a wide against Terrorism, in Ankara.5
range of actors In the third domain – en-
gagement – the Partnership
Action Plan on Terrorism
played a central role, with the aim of contributing
to regional stability through capacity-building in
partner countries.
With these measures, NATO’s Counter-Terror-
ism Strategy took concrete form. However, the Pol-
icy Guidelines and the Action Plan were not an end
in themselves. As the terrorism environment was
quickly evolving, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy
also had to adapt to changing circumstances. For
this reason, numerous new initiatives were taken in
the following years.
In particular, the exchange of information proved
tricky and was difficult to get off the ground. In
2016 a separate Joint Intelligence and Security Di-
vision was set up within the International Staff,
focusing not only on centralizing terrorism-related
intelligence, but also on all possible threats facing
the Alliance.
At the same time, awareness grew that terror-
ism had to be tackled preventively in the countries
of origin. To this end, the concept of “projecting
stability” was introduced in 2016. The aim was to
stabilize the Alliance’s external borders by strength-
ening neighbouring countries militarily, and pre-
venting entire areas from slipping out of any form
5  J. Page, “The home game. Countering violent extremism within
NATO”, Research Paper No. 104, NDC, Rome, September 2014, p.11.
2
of control. The concept also aimed at strengthen-
ing local security forces, and enabling partner coun-
tries to tackle terrorism by themselves. As NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg put it: “In the long
run, it is much better to fight terrorism and project
stability by training local forces and building local
security institutions, instead of NATO deploying
large numbers of our own combat troops in com-
bat operations”.6 From 2017 on, mobile training
teams were sent to Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Mauritania,
Morocco and Tunisia.
These measures, however, did not go far enough.
The US Administration stated that it expected more
from the Alliance in the fight against terrorism.7
This led to a series of additional initiatives in 2017.
The most remarkable was that NATO as an organi-
zation joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.8
This was a sensitive issue for a number of Euro-
pean countries – particularly France and Germany,
which had always opposed collective participation
in the Coalition. In practice, this meant that NATO
would deploy AWACS planes over Syria and Iraq,
while providing logistical support for the opera-
tions.9 However, there was no question of sending
combat missions.10 The decision was therefore seen
as a political concession to President Trump, with
no major military consequences on the ground.
Despite the progress already made, the exchange
of intelligence remained difficult. In 2017, it was
clear that a new initiative was needed in this area.11
To this end, a separate Terrorism Intelligence Cell
was set up within the newly-established Joint Intel-
ligence and Security Division at NATO HQ. This
cell was to ensure a better flow and coordination of
intelligence on terrorist threats and foreign fighters,
enabling a quicker and better response to new ter-
rorist threats.
Finally, a Strategic Direction-South Hub was es-
tablished within Joint Forces Command Naples to
acquire better knowledge of the specific challenges
originating from the MENA region, including ter-
rorism.
All these initiatives led to a significant expansion
6  “Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten-
berg ahead of the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers”, NATO, 31
March 2017.
7  “Sommet de l’OTAN: une nouvelle étape dans la lutte contre le
terrorisme”, Comprendre l’Europe, 29 May 2017.
8  J. Stoltenberg, “At the same time, we agreed that NATO will be-
come a full member of the Global Coalition, in which all 28 Allies
already take part”, NATO, Press conference, 25 May 2017.
9  “NATO to join Anti-ISIS Coalition”, Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Scholar Center, 25 May 2017.
10  J. Stoltenberg, “Being in the coalition does not mean that NATO
will engage in combat”, NATO, Press Conference, 25 May 2017.
11  “Adapting NATO intelligence in support of one NATO”,
NATO Review, 8 September 2017.
NDC Policy Brief – No. 12 – May 2019
and intensification of the Counter-Terrorism Strat-
egy. The Alliance had succeeded in presenting itself
as a global security actor in the fight against terror-
ism, within limits.
Constraints and shortfalls of NATO’s
counter-terrorism strategy
Political divergences
One key challenge in NATO’s Counter-Terrorism
Strategy comes from the political support – or lack
thereof – of its own member states. The prob-
lem is that the terrorist threat, as well as the pol-
icy response, is not perceived in the same way by
all member states. Three fault lines can be distin-
guished. First, there is tension between those that
support an increased role for NATO in the fight
against terrorism (e.g., the USA, the UK, Turkey
and Denmark) and those that see this as mainly a
responsibility of the individual member states (like
France or Germany). The latter group believes that
NATO does not have the adequate instruments to
tackle terrorism in its totality, and that nations must
therefore take the initiative.
Second, there is the transatlantic divide, by which
the United States adopts a “war on terror” ap-
proach, in contrast to the “soft” European method
which prioritizes diplomatic, legal, judicial, social,
economic and cultural means. Whereas the Ameri-
cans focus mainly on the military approach, Euro-
peans concentrate on the underlying root causes.
Third, views on how to proceed differ also among
Europeans. For example, some member states – es-
pecially the Baltic and northern countries – see the
Russian threat on the Eastern flank as the most im-
portant, while others – mainly the southern mem-
ber states – are more preoccupied by the Southern
flank and instability in the MENA region, and the
associated migration issue. The crisis in Ukraine in
2014 further exacerbated this split. These differenc-
es in perception impact priority-setting and in the
end hinder consensus on policy options.
Better cooperation with other organizations
An effective response to terrorism requires a holis-
tic, multi-pronged approach involving a wide range
of actors. This necessarily involves political and dip-
lomatic instruments, law enforcement, judicial au-
thorities, intelligence organizations, military means,
immigration control, development aid, as well as
economic and financial instruments. Consequently,
the military contribution is only a limited part of
the global effort. This entails far-reaching coordi-
nation between the actors involved, which in prac-
tice has proved difficult. NATO and the EU, for
3
example, have long been announcing their shared
intention of closer coordination in counter-terror-
ism. In practice, however, little has been achieved,
often due to the persistent mutual distrust between
the two institutions.
What role for NATO?
This brings us to the question of the role that
NATO should play in this multilateral approach. As
a defence organization, NATO should focus on the
military aspects of combating terrorism, where it
can arguably make a difference.
The non-military aspects, on the other hand,
should be left to the member states or other spe-
cialized organizations. This implies that the Alliance
has no leading role to play in the fight against ter-
rorism. Former US Secretary of State Tillerson hit
the nail on the head when he stated: “We do not
believe that NATO has to lead in the fight against
terrorism. Others will often have that role (…). But
NATO must add value where it can and provide
greater support”.12
The role of the Alliance in counter-terrorism is
therefore one of complementarity and support.
Practically though, since several actors are involved
– military and civilian, state and non-state – the ap-
proach in the field must be coordinated, and the
question arises of who should take on this task.
Experience shows that NATO is reluctant to place
itself under the lead of a (civilian) umbrella orga-
nization, yet such resistance is no long-term policy.
Towards deeper partnership
Terrorism is not limited to the Euro-Atlantic zone
alone, it is global. Instability in the MENA region,
in particular, is a breeding
ground for terrorist organi-
zations, with all the related The role of
spillover effects in Europe. If
NATO wants to tackle ter-
the Alliance
rorism at its roots, or at least in counter-
contribute to the tackling of
terrorism, it must step up its
terrorism is
cooperation with the countries therefore one of
in that region: strengthening
local regimes militarily can em-
complementarity
power them to tackle terrorism and support
by themselves. Local forces are
best placed to do that. They know the terrain, speak
the language and are familiar with the society and
the culture. This theoretically enables them to gain
the trust of the population, which is crucial in the
fight against terrorism.
12  V. Hajnalka, “NATO: assessing the Alliance’s counter-terrorism
efforts”, Terrorism Monitor, Vol.15, Iss.8, 21 April 2017, p.3.
NDC Policy Brief – No. 12 – May 2019
NATO has already gained some experience in the
context of Projecting Stability. Yet, results remain
limited. This has to do with available resources.
Only 1 percent of the Alliance’s total budget cur-
rently goes to partnership programmes. There is
also a shortage of specialized personnel to carry out
partner activities. NATO must therefore free up fi-
nancial resources and make personnel available to
meet the growing demands from partner countries.
If not, the Alliance runs the risk of over-promis-
ing and under-delivering, which would undermine
its credibility. If partnerships are a key tool in the
fight against terrorism, then NATO should invest
more in its partnership programmes and do it more
effectively.
Intelligence sharing
Intelligence sharing is a major enabler of the inter-
national response to terrorism. The importance of
intelligence is acknowledged by the Policy Guide-
lines and subsequent initiatives in the field of intel-
ligence sharing.13 At the same time, the Alliance and
its member states are aware of the limitations in-
herent to the intelligence domain. NATO as an or-
ganization does not generate any intelligence itself
and depends on its member states, which are overall
reluctant to share sensitive information collective-
ly. NATO might facilitate the flow of intelligence
through the creation of permanent consultative
bodies, by standardizing security clearance proce-
dures and by assuring overall coordination.14 This is
obviously a long-term process. Sharing intelligence
has a lot to do with building confidence, which can
only be achieved in long-term efforts.
Matching capacity with needs
Finally, the way NATO operates at the policy-mak-
ing level seems to remain stove-piped, and inade-
quate to the diffuse nature of the threat. Extensive
discussions with various leading authorities have
revealed structural (and budgetary) inefficiencies
in this respect. Overall, counter-terrorism might
not be given the visibility that it deserves within
13 NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism”, NATO, 2012.
14 C. Bernasconi, “NATO’s Fight against Terrorism. Where do we
stand?”, Research Paper No. 66, NDC, Rome, April 2011, p.5.
The views expressed in
this NDC Policy Brief are
the responsibility of the
author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the
opinions of the NATO
Defense College, NATO,
or any government or
institution represented by
the contributors.
4
the institution, in contrast to the official narrative.
Streamlining both structure and budgets would
be an important step forward in a more effective
counter-terrorism approach.
NATO’s comparative advantage
Counter-terrorism has gained tremendous impor-
tance since 2001 and is today high on NATO’s stra-
tegic agenda. While NATO wants to position itself
as an essential actor in this fight, it has difficulty in
finding the right approach. These difficulties have
a lot to do with the divergent political visions of
member states. The strategy followed is therefore
reactive, mainly driven by events and developments
on the ground. No long-term vision has been de-
signed.
This notwithstanding, NATO can play an im-
portant role in the international fight against ter-
rorism. The Alliance benefits from key assets for
this: a framework for cooperation among member
states and with partners; a degree of international
legitimacy; specialized military means; experienced
planning structures; and experience.
Yet beyond what NATO can offer is the issue of
the multidimensional aspect of the fight against ter-
rorism, i.e. the fact that NATO can only contribute
to the response, in close coordination with a broad
range of other actors. This implies that the Alliance
must step out of its cocoon and cooperate more ac-
tively with the other actors involved. It also means
that it is not up to NATO to play a leading role in
the fight against terrorism. Rather, that task should
go to the member states or to other specialized or-
ganizations. The Alliance must concentrate on what
it does best: leveraging the military aspects in the
fight against terrorism. At the same time, NATO
must commit to prevention. In practice, this means
making more effort in the area of partnership, es-
pecially with the countries of the MENA region.
Without the support and active involvement of re-
gional partners, any effort to tackle terrorism seems
doomed to fail. Although the emerging counter-ter-
rorism challenges facing the Alliance remain daunt-
ing, putting them into an informed perspective
makes it possible to address them purposefully and
constructively.
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