1. People vs. Santiago, G.R. No.
L-17584, March 8,
1922
Santiago was driving an automobile at the rate of 30
miles/hour on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the
fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon
standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the
other side where there were 2 young boys. Santiago did not
take the precaution required by the circumstances by
slowing his machine, and did not proceed with vigilant care
that under the circumstances, an ordinary prudent man
would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might
occur. Unfortunately, as his automobile ran over the boy
Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of
the accident. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of
homicide by reckless negligence. (Sentenced to 1 year and 1
day imprisonment)
Santiago questioned the decision alleging that he was
prosecuted in conformity with Act no. 2886 of the
Philippine Legislature which is unconstitutional for
amending G.O.58 which it is not authorized to amend for
having a constitutional character.
o G.O. No. 58, Sec. 2 - All prosecutions for public
offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the
persons charged with the offenses.
o Act No. 2886, Sec. 2 - All prosecutions for public
offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands against the persons charged with the offense
Whether Act No. 2886 which amended General Order
no. 58 is valid?
Yes. The Government has the right to use police power,
creating and defining criminal offenses. It is urged that the
right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of
sovereignty, but by reason of principle of territoriality.
The Philippine Legislature by the virtue of Jones Law has
the power to define and punish crimes. Philippines is
autonomous created by the US congress. Power of
legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as
long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be
informed the nature of the accusation is not violated.
2. US vs. Andres Pablo, G.R. No. 11676, October 17,
1916
Pablo made a false testimony in order to protect some
gambling lords. He was convicted of perjury under Act.
1697 which was repealed by the Administrative Code,
which in turn does not provide for any penalty. The Court
resolved the matter by ruling that Act No. 1697 did not
expressly repeal the articles of the Penal Code relating to
false testimony. Since the Administrative Code, in totally
repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the
provisions of the Penal Code are also repealed, the Penal
Code provisions are deemed to be in force.
Given that the Administrative Code does not provide for
any penalty against the crime of perjury, should it go
unpunished?
No. Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal the
articles of the penal code relating to false testimony. Since
the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697,
does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the
Penal Code are also repealed, the Penal Code provisions are
deemed to be in force.
This manner of understanding and construing the
statutes applicable to the crime of false testimony or perjury
is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3,
of the Novisima Recopilacion which says: ―All the laws of
the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent
laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are
not in use cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their
successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I
ordered on different occasions, and even though they were
repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree
which I issued in conformity with them although they were
not expressly designated. The council will be informed
thereof and will take account of the importance of the
matter.‖
3. Pasingan vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 64279, April 30,
1984
 Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao
dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26
carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas.
Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and
certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary
command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating
the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
confiscated by private respondents, Police Station
Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr.
Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order
626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one
province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda
distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners
filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against
private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in
Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed
the case for lack of cause of action.
Whether EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in
the Official Gazette
No. Said executive order should not be enforced
against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two
months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It
became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil
Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe
penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.
4. Tañada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,
1985
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to
publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable
Yes. Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of this provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads:
there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
―shall‖ therein impose upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.
2. Basic Principles
a. U.S. v Sweet, GR No 448, September 20, 1901
FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military
who committed an offense against a prisoner of War. His
case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6
months is imposed. He is now contending that, first, an
assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a
prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code; and
second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless
the military character sustained by the person charged with
the offense at the time of its commission exempts him from
the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI has jurisdiction
RULING: YES. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil
Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases in which a penalty more than 6 months
imprisonment or a fine greater than $100 may be imposed.
Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders
charged with violation of the Penal Code within their
territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the
accused. The defendant and his acts are within the
jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he
was indeed acting in the line of duty. Though assault by
military officer against a prisoner of war is not in the RPC,
physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC. The
application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of
the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other
special character brought before them for trial (R.A. No.
7055). Appellant claims that the act was service connected.
If this were true, it may be used as a defense but this cannot
affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the
case.
b. Liang v People, GR No 125865, March 6, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker
Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
MeTC. After fixing petitioner‘s bail, the MeTC released him
to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day,
the MeTC judge received an ―office of protocol‖ from the
DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said
protocol communication that petitioner is immune from
suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the criminal cases.
ISSUE: Whether Liang is immune from suit
RULING: NO. The slander of a person, by any stretch,
cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the
immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. The
immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be
done in ―official capacity‖. Hence, slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such,
enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of
a crime is not part of official duty.
c. U.S. v Ah Sing, GR No 13005, October 10, 1917
FACTS: Defendant Ah Sing is a Chinese who works as a
fireman on the steamship named Shun Chang. The
defendant bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon and brought
them on board the steamship Shun Chang going to Cebu.
The steamer anchored on the port of Cebu. When the
authorities made a search on the steamship, the 8 cans of
opium above mentioned was found in the ashes below the
boiler of the steamer‘s engine. The defendant confessed that
he was the owner of the said opium and that he purchased it
in Saigon. However, he did not reveal the purpose in buying
the opium.
ISSUE: Whether Ahsing is guilty of the crime of illegal
importation of opium in the Philippines
RULING: YES. Act No. 2381 section 4 states that ―Any
person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands‖. The mere act of going into
a port, without breaking bulk is a
prima facie evidence of importation. In such case, a person is
guilty of illegal importation of opium unless it does not exist
or proven otherwise.
Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to
think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and
forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so
doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the
accused needed so large an amount of opium for his
personal use. No better explanation being possible, the
logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium
to be brought into the Philippine Islands. Therefore, there
was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into
the Philippine Islands.
d. Miquiabas v Commanding General, GR No L-1988,
February 24, 1948
FACTS: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and a civilian
employee of the US army in the Philippines who had been
charged of disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things
belonging to the US army in violation of the 94th article of
War of the US. He was arrested and a General Court-
Martial was appointed by respondent. He was found guilty
and sentenced to 15 year imprisonment. However, it is not
yet final for it is still subject to review. Thus, a petition for
writ of habeas corpus was filed against the Commanding
General PH-Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who
appointed a General-Court Martial to try petitioner with an
offense which the said court has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the General Court-Martial appointed by
respondent has jurisdiction to try petitioner
RULING: NO. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign
nation has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its
territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that
the US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed within said portions of territory.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial
would have jurisdiction over the criminal case against
petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base.
Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed
outside a base, still the General Court-Martial would have
jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member
of the armed forces of the United States" there being no
question that the offended party in this case is the United
States. It is not necessary therefore, to consider whether the
offense is against "the security of the United States" under
paragraph 1 (c), or whether petitioner committed it in "the
actual performance of a specific military duty" or in time of
a declared "national emergency" under paragraph 4, or
whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for
in all these instances the military jurisdiction depends also
upon whether the offender is a member of the armed forces
of the United States.
The Port of Manila Area where the offense was
committed is not within a US base for it is not names in
Annex A or B of Article XXVI of the Military Base
Agreement (MBA) and is merely part of the temporary
quarters located within presented limits of the city of
Manila. Moreover, extended installations and temporary
quarters are not considered to have the same jurisdictional
capacity as permanent bases and are governed by Article
XIII paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in
the beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.
2.E GUMABON VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37
SCRA 420 (1971)
FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on
May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The
decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March
8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner
Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan.
12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for
more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v.
Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling
which was not handed down until after their convictions
have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled
that the information against the accused for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not
warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such
complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until
after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez
served more than the maximum penalty that could have
been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus,
his continued detention is illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a
penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case
(WON judicial decisions favourable to the
accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied
retroactively)
RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused
must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22
of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is
not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their
constitutional right to equal protection, given that
Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as
they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas
corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the
retroactive character of a favorable decision.
2.F BERNARDO VS. PEOPLE, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)
FACTS: Bemardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa‘s
Riceland in Bulacan from Oct. ‘72 to Aug. ‗74. His son
stayed with him in the house built on that land. The tenancy
rights of the house were left with the son when the father
transferred but without Sta. Rosa knowing. Eventually, Sta.
Rosa took possession of the whole rice field and filed a case
of forcible entry against the Bernardos. The Bernardos lost
in their cases before the Municipal Court Sta. Rosa sent a
letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate their
house and land but since they refused, a criminal complaint
was charged against them for violation of PD 772 on
squatting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain
criminal case for alleged violation of presidential decree no
772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an
offence or violation of said law
RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person
should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is
not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. Based
on its preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in urban
areas and not to agricultural lands.
2.G PEOPLE V. PIMENTEL
FACTS: As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with
Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-Subversion Law) as
amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest
was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not
be found. Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis
of warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested,
an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition
was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was
charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under PD No.
1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to quash the
information invoking protection versus double jeopardy
since he claims that alleged possession of firearms was
absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA
1700) should be applied retroactively to Tujan.
RULING: Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively.
The repeal by said law of RA 1700, as amended was
absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and
absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law
ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous
offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this
jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of
subversion against the accused-private respondent has no
more legal basis and should be dismissed.
2.H RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 171396,
171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 MAY
3, 2006
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country. The Office of the President
announced the cancellation of all programs and activities
related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier
by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006,
operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of
ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3,
2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the
state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners
filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three
(3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency
powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
ISSUES: ( 1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
( 2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S.
David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
( 3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
( 4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in
questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?
( 5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is
necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial
Law are used?
RULING:
( 1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President
for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence
whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were
extraneous provisions giving the President express or
implied power:
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives."); (B) To direct
the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President [The absence of a law defining "acts of
terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of
the police or military]; and (C) To impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in
the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only
partly unconstitutional.
( 2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal,
in the absence of proof that these petitioners were
committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards
on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well
as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and
whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was
no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent.
( 3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued
in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law.
( 4.) This Court adopted the ―direct injury‖ test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have ―a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result.‖ Therefore, the court
ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered
―direct injury‖ resulting from ―illegal arrest‖ and ―unlawful
search‖ committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017.
( 5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the President may temporarily
take over a privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest only if there is congressional
authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate
legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which
the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the
best assurance that due process of law would be observed.
4.A PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO.
25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for
prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was
alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him
to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was
guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for
failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts
stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and
interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being
available only when a question calling for an incriminating
answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the
right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that
he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by
respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first
witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative
hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent. The Court found for the
petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
"the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to
answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the
witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify
against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property
but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and
his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It
is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to
the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of
the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens.
4.B People vs. Temblor G.R. No. L-66884/ May 28, 1988
SYNOPSIS: While Cagampang and wife Victoria were
manning a store adjacent to their house, Temblor came and
asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, Temblor shot
Cagampang. Temblor and another man demanded from
Victoria to bring out Cagampang‘s firearm which she did.
Temblor took Cagampang‘s .38 caliber revolver and fled.
Temblor was charged with murder. CFI and SC found him
guilty. One of Temblor‘s contentions was that he lacked
motive for killing Cagampang. But the court held that he
had enough motive (he was NPA and NPA had an agaw-
armas campaign) and that, moreover, proof of motive is not
essential in this case because Victoria positively identified
Temblor as the person who shot her husband.
FACTS: At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30,
1980, Julius Cagampang (Cagampang), his wife Victoria
and their two children were in the store adjacent to their
house in Brgy. Talo-ao, Agusan del Norte. Accused Vicente
Temblor alias Ronald arrived and asked to buy a half-pack
of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack
of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and
Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and
bleeding on the head. Victorina, upon seeing that her
husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul"!
Two persons barged into the interior of the store
through the main door and demanded that Victoria brings
out her husband‘s firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!"
("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired
two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina
hurried to get the maleta where her husband's firearm was
hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after
inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber
revolver, and fled.
Some months after the incident, Victorina was
summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station
Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the
accused as the man who killed her husband. Temblor and
his companions, admitted members of the NPA (New
People‘s Army) were not apprehended earlier because they
hid in the mountains of Malapong. Temblor surrendered to
Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender
of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the
Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on
November 26, 1981. Temblor was later on charged with the
crime of murder.
CFI: found him guilty of Murder, reclusion perpetua with
accessory penalties under Article 41 and 42 RPC and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim. He appealed.
ISSUE: W/N TEMBLOR IS GUILTY OF MURDER –
YES
RULING: Judgment appealed affirmed in all respects,
Temblor guilty.
Lack of motive
Temblor: he contended that he did not have a motive for
killing Cagampang.
Court: untenable. Temblor‘s knowledge that Cagampang
possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as
killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army
for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and
ammunition for their group are prevalent. It is known as the
NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive
is not essential when the culprit has been positively
identified.
4.C PEOPLE VS. HASSA, G.R. NO. L-68969, JAN. 22,
1988
Facts: Usman Hassan, 15 yrs. Old of Samal Tribe in Zambo
City was convicted of murder of Pichel. Pichel was stabbed
to death at fruit paradise while sitting at his red Honda
motorcycle, waiting for friend Jose Samson who was buying
fruits.
Issue: W/N conviction is valid
Held: No. Conviction reversed. Acquitted. The Medico
Legal found two stab wounds from front but the Samson
claimed that Pichel was stabbed once from behind.
Procedure followed was also improper. The accused was
presented to the witness alone and in confrontation, not
police line-up. He was also denied right to counsel,
particularly when identification took place—this qualifies
for uncounselled confession. The witness was also
questioned 2 days after incident and sworn 4 days after. The
fruit vendor as well as the companion of the accused was
not investigated. In fact, they did not pursue other suspect.
Also, the knife was not tested. Further notable are the facts
that the age of the accused was observed without medical
basis, that the accused did not run away and that he had no
motive, which, in People vs. Verzo was considered
important when there is doubt in the identity of culprit and
reiterated in People vs. Pervelo which stated that
identification is tenuous.
The accused-appellant was presented alone- not in a police
lineup- and unaccompanied by counsel to the eyewitness, in
the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving
relatives of the victim. Such procedure is as tainted as an
uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same
ambit of the constitutionality entrenched protection.
4.D PEOPLE VS. DELOS SANTOS GR NO.
135919,MAY 9, 2003
Facts: While Rod Flores was drinking gin with Narciso
Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainer at Rainer‘s
house, Marcelino de Leon approached them to borrow
Flores‘ cart. While Flores was talking to his drinking
buddies, Danny delos Santos suddenly emerged from
Flores‘ back and stabbed him with a knife. Flores ran after
he was stabbed twice, but he was pursued by delos Santos
and was stabbed until Flores‘ intestines bulged out from his
stomach. Delos Santos then turned his ire towards Rainer
and chased him. During Flores‘ autopsy, it was found that
he had suffered 21 stab wounds in the frontal, posterior and
lateral side of his body, 11 of which were fatal.
For his defense, delos Santos denied the accusations
against him and interposed an alibi. He stated that during
the incident, he was in his Auntie‘s house which was 40
meters away from the scene of the crime.
The lower court convinced delos Santos for murder
with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
aggravated by cruelty, taking into account the brutality of
the manner by which Flores‘ life was taken. He was
sentenced to death by lethal injection.
Issue: Whether or not proof of motive to kill was
indispensable in this case.
Ruling: No. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a
conviction, particularly where the accused is positively
identified by an eyewitness and his participation is
adequately established. In this case, two witnesses positively
identified delos Santos.
Felonies; How committed
d. US vs. Ah Chong, GR No. 5272, March 19, 1910
Facts: Defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in
one of the Officers‘ quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was
the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a
houseboy. There had been several robberies in Fort
McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the
defendant and his roommate to reinforce the flimsy hook
used to lock the door of their room by placing a chair
against it. The defendant and the deceased had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should
knock on the door and say his name.
On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alone
in his room, was awakened by someone trying to force open
the door of the room. The defendant called out twice,
asking the identity of the person but heard no answer.
Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, the
defendant called out that he would kill the intruder if he
tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open
and the defendant was struck first above the knee by the
edge of the chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the
defendant thought he was being hit by the intruder and tried
to defend himself by striking wildly at the intruder using a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow. It
turned out that the said intruder was actually the
defendant‘s roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The roommate
was brought to the military hospital where he died from the
effects of the wound the following day.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant was criminally liable
for committing a felony
Ruling: No.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that—
"The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt
from criminal liability:
* * * * * * *
"4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
there are the following attendant circumstances:
"(1) Illegal .aggression.
"(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it.
"(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself."
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt
that defendant would be entitled to complete exemption
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal
blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to
resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice
repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small
room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing
upon him despite his warnings, defendant would have been
wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly,
without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a
thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in
real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a
thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for. the use
of the knife to defend his person or his property or the
property under his charge.
Hence, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or
mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent
which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged (e. g., in larceny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes and misdemeanors generally some degree
of criminal intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and
works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases
where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit.
That, under such circumstances, there is no criminal
liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such
ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption
of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where
the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions governing negligence, and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, a person
voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even
though the act be different from that which he intended to
commit.
e. People vs. Oanis, GR No. 47722, July 27, 1943
Facts: Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal of
Philippine Constabulary Alberto Galanta were instructed to
arrest Anselmo Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped
convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They
were informed that Balagtas is with Irene Requinea at that
time.
When they arrived at Requinea‘s house, Oanis approached
and asked Brigida Mallare where Irene‘s room was. Mallare
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that
Requinea was sleeping with her paramour. Defendants then
went to the said room, and on seeing a man sleeping with
his back towards the door, simultaneously or successively
fired at him with their revolvers.
It turned out later that the person shot and killed was a
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson.
Accordingly, the Lower Court (LC) charged and found the
accused guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and
were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from
one year and six months to two years and two months of
prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. However,
defendants appealed separately from this judgment claiming
different versions of the tragedy ― each one blaming the
other.
Issue:
1. Whether or not defendants incur no criminal liability
due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties.
2. Whether or not the acts committed by the defendants
be considered as criminal negligence and, being an
act in the fulfillment of a duty, is a justifying
circumstance to exempt the defendants from criminal
liability.
Ruling:
1. No, the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest
mistake of fact is not a valid defense for the Oanis and
Galanta.
As per the case U.S. v. Ah Chong, the maxim ignorantia facti
excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or carelessness. There is an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness if the accused,
having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry,
and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had
no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to
him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In addition,
Section 2 (2), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court reads, ―No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making
an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.‖
Here, Oanis and Galanta found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action.
Given Tecson being then asleep, appellants had ample time
and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made. Thus, the
defendants have no justification for killing, be it Balagtas or
Tecson, when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance
or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep.
2. No, the crime committed by defendants is not merely
criminal negligence.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime
committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosía. There is, how-ever, a mitigating circumstance of
weight consisting in the incomplete justifying cir-cumstance
defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the ful-filment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense com-mitted be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such dutv or the lawful exercise
of such right or office.
In the instant case, onlv the first requisite is present—
appellants have acted in the per-formance of a dutv. The
second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed be the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest.
Balagtas, or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered
by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience
or over-anxiety or in their desire to take chances, they have
exceeded in the fulfilment of such dutv by killing the person
whom they believed to be Balagtas without anv resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. Accord-ing to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty lower bv one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
f. People vs. Buan, GR No. L-25366, March 29, 1968
Facts: The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La
Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the MacArthur
Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Allegedly because of his negligence — and recklessness, the
vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger
jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it
to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter
suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance
for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with serious
bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45
days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent of
P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was
tried and acquitted on December 16,1963. Prior to this
acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in
the Court of First Instance the information in the case now
before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both
charges referred to the same highway collision. When the
accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his
counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground that he
had already been acquitted of the same offense by the
Justice of the Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the
motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to
secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court
Issue: Whether the second case placed the appellant twice
in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the
previous acquittal
Ruling: Yes. Reason and precedent both coincide in that
once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as
the result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two
persons were seriously injured while another three suffered
only slight physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide
through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518,
March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the
Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a
second information of damage to property through reckless
imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused.
In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information
for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result
of a collision between two automobiles was declared, to
block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence and another for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same
doctrine was reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April
30, 1959.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could
not be joined with the accusation for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of
grave or less grave felonies.
This same argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra
―This may be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence.‖
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the
exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of
the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the CFI of
the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense
g. People vs. Pugay, GR No. 74324, Nov. 17, 1988
Facts: May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public
plaza ofRosario, Cavite. Sometime after midnight, Eduardo
Gabionwas sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic
book. Later, Pugay and Samson with several companions
arrived atthe scene seemingly drunk. The group saw Bayani
Miranda and started making fun ofhim by tickling him with
a piece of wood.Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and
poured its contents on Miranda. Gabion asked Pugay to
stop during the process of pouring the gasoline. Then
Samson set Miranda on fire.
Issue: Whether or not Pugay and Samson are guilty of the
crime murder.
Ruling: No. There was no evidence found that Pugay and
Samson planned to kill Miranda. Their meeting was
accidental and the accused were merely making fun of the
deceased-victim. The criminal responsibility of Pugay and
Samson are counted as individual acts and they are held
liable only for the acts they committed individually. Pugay
should have known that what he was pouring on Miranda
was gasoline because of its smell. He failed to exercise
diligence necessary to avoid the consequences of his actions
and exposed Miranda to danger and injury.
Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
The fact that Samson just wanted to set Miranda‘s clothes
on fire but this doesn‘t relieve him of criminal liability (Art.
4). Samson is guilty of homicide credited with ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave
a wrong. Gabion testified that accused were stunned when
they noticed Miranda burning.
Felonies; Crimes defined and Penalized by Special Law
a. Padilla vs. Dion, AC No. 3086, Feb. 23, 1988
Facts: A tourist, Lo Chi Fai, was caught by Customs guard
at the Manila International Airport while attempting to
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments
out of the country, at time of apprehension, he was found
carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments (360) amounting to US$355,349.57 where he
failed to declare in the form prescribed by Central bank
upon his arrival in the Philippines. Information was filed
against the accused Lo Chi Fai with the RTC of Pasay city
for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular no. 960 where
Respondent judge presided.
―No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out
or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the
Philippines directly....... tourist and non-resident temporary
visitors bringing with them more than US$ 3,000.00 shall
declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entriesupon arrival in the
Philippines‖ (CB Circular no. 960 sec. 6)
Alexander Padilla, Commissioner of Customs, filed an
Administrative complaint dated August 6, 1987 against
Respondent Judge Baltazar R. Dizon for rendering a
manifestly erroneous decision due at the very least, to gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal
case entitled ―People vs. Lo Chi Fai‖ (no. 86-10126-P).
Acquitting said accused for violation of Central Bank
circular no. 960 sec6. The acquittal according to him is
based on:(1) No deliberate intent, there must be a clear
intention to violate the law in order for the accused to be
prosecuted, (2) Money brought by the accused is for the
purpose of investing in some undefined business ventures
and that the reason why the accused ought to export the
money is because of the fear that the ―Attempted
Revolution‖ might spread. Furthermore, respondent Judge
Alleged that he rendered his decision in ―good faith‖.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law rendering the
decision in question
Ruling: Yes, the proof of malice or deliberate intent is not
essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are
―Mala Prohibita‖. Thus, in requiring proof of malice, the
respondent judge has by his gross ignorance allowed the
accused to go scot free. A judge cannot be held to account
or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. But these
circumstances which make the story invented by the
accused as palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of
the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the
acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim
that he rendered the decision ―in good faith.‖ The court
finds the Respondent Judge Baltazar Dizon guilty of gross
incompetence, ignorance of the law. The court thereby
ordered that the Respondent Judge be Dismissed from the
Service
Felonies; Crimes defined and penalized by Special Law
b. PADILLA v CA, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997
FACTS: Robin Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in
Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help of
a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered
firearms were found in his possession:
1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for
hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal
Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994,
Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms
under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from
17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum.
The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled
bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order
of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of
Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a
sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround
and filed ―Manifestation in Lieu of Comment‖ praying for
acquittal. Padilla‘s main defense was that his arrest was
illegal and that he is a confidential agent authorized, under
a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms
ISSUES: 1. Whether the arrest was illegal
2. Whether Padilla is authorized to carry the
firearms
3. Whether the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
RULING: 1. NO. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not
make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a)
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo,
petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he was
actually committing another offence in the presence of all
those officers. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the
actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces
of evidence are admissible.
2. NO. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two
requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized
from petitioner‘s possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the
second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our
meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On
this score, we lift from respondent court‘s incisive
observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also
unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5,
1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner
is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of
Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would
justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866).
Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38
caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3. NO. Petitioner faults respondent court ―in applying P.D.
1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive
context‖ and adds that respondent court should have
applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of
firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under
P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17
years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession
of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The
trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of
the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers
to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its
repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying
P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to
by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant‘s allegation that the
penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The
penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be
stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to
reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant‘s erroneous
averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto
make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this
Court. Just recently, the Court declared that ―the pertinent
laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to
any provision of the Constitution…‖ Appellant‘s grievances
on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be
addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively
within the province of Congress which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only
function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply
the laws
c. PEOPLE v SALEY, G.R. No. 121179, July 2, 1998
FACTS: Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B.
Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of 11 counts of estafa punishable
under the RPC and six counts of illegal recruitment, one
committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
Saley defrauded 11 people by representing herself as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment,
when in truth and in fact she was not and inducing said
victims to give and deliver to her sums of money for
placement abroad. The defense posited the theory that Saley
merely assisted the complainants in applying for overseas
employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and
from which she derived a commission.
According to the appellant, she used to be the liaison officer
of the Friendship Recruitment Agency. In that capacity, she
would submit to the POEA "contracts for processing job
orders for applicants" and assist applicants prior to their
departure at the airport.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the crimes charged.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
asserting that the trial court had erred in giving credence to
the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding
her guilty of the crimes charged despite the "failure" of the
prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the accused committed illegal recruitment
RULING: YES. The prosecution was able to prove by
overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent herself
as being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas
contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was
thus able to demand and receive various amounts from the
applicants. The latter would then be briefed by appellant on
the requirements for employment overseas.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent
herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she merely helped the
complainants secure "tourist visas," could not make her less
guilty of illegal recruitment, it being enough that he or she
gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit
workers for deployment abroad.
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee
in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant an
acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible testimonial evidence that the
accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment,
a conviction for the offense can very well be justified.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, whenever the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall impose
on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same." Accordingly, in imposing the
penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for
each of the five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court
has acted correctly.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa.
Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction
while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
warrant conviction.
d. PEOPLE v SIMON, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994
FACTS: Accused Martin Simon was charged with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of
marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-
buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8
grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were
found positive for marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on
the day of question, he was picked up by the police at their
house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher
so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was
handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he
was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he
was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro.
He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried
marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came
from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he
vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the
hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana
Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant
for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination
revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant‘s
peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious
external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and
to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
ISSUE: Whether the conviction is correct
RULING: Qualified yes, modification as to penalty.
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale
must be clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means
to give, whether for money or any other material
consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea
bags of marijuana that was sold and there were 2 other tea
bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be
charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on
the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual
imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where
the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the
minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is
750 grams or more. The same error has been committed
with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs
provided in said Section 20.
To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give
effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs
involved is less than the quantities stated in the first
paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that
all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the
accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of
said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the
amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for
in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the
Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid
Section 1 which directs that ―in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.‖
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the
benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which
is the maximum range have fixed through the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with
fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at
6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional.
e. LADONGA v PEOPLE, G.R. No. 141066, February
17, 2005
FACTS: Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse,
conspiring and knowing fully well that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743
postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable
to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the
latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with
the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse,
give and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of
rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that
the account of the accused had already been closed, to the
damage and prejudice of Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga
spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted.
On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the
principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which
is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.
ISSUES: a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in
toto the conviction of petitioner as conspirator applying the
suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is
applicable?
RULING: A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in
Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits
that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding
the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses
not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws
are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides
that offenses which in the future are made punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC,
while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such
laws
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
suppletory application of the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P.
Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the
Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy
in this case is analogous to the application of the
provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs.
Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals. But, in the present case,
the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed
any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Thus,
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the
charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
f. PEOPLE v BUSTINERA, G.R. No. 148233, June 8,
2004
FACTS: ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi
driver. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi
from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he would return it
to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in the
amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996,
appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi,
but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed
to because he fell short of meeting his boundary. The owner
of ESC reported the taxi as stolen. Appellant claims that he
did not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January
5, 1997 and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount
of ₱2,000.00 to his wife whom he instructed to remit the
same to ESC as payment of the boundary fee and to tell the
latter that he could not return the taxi as he still had a
balance thereof. Appellant, however, admits that his wife
informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the
boundary fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996),
ESC was already demanding the return of the taxi. The trial
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
theft.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction for qualified theft under the
RPC was proper
RULING: NO. Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However,
Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain
vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND
PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
"When statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to the
same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or
things, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates
that they should be construed together.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking
of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. Theft is qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a
domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave
abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation;
(5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fish pond or
fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as
amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor
vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without
the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and
(3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is
essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping
being the same.
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of
the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car
napping law and not the provisions of qualified theft
which would apply
5. FELONIES; PUNISHABLE CONDUCT
5a. People vs. Sabalones
GR. 123485, August 31, 1998
On June 1, 1985 at 11:45 PM, respondents including
Rolusape Sabalones, armed with firearms, attacked and
ambushed individuals riding in two vehicles resulting to the
death of two persons and injury to three others.
According to a witness presented, Sabalones was
implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez because of the
slapping incident involving her father-in-law, Federico
Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez which took place prior to
the death of Junior Sabalones (whose wake was during time
of the commission of the crime).
The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was
based on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga
and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of
evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they
were suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing
Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against
them
The Trial Court observed that ―they went to their
grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves
in defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful
gang of supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez.‖
W/N the case is one of aberratio ictus.
NO. The case is not one of aberration ictus but one
of error in personae or mistake in identity, as observed by
the OSG. Transferred intent is used when a defendant
intends to harm one victim, but then unintentionally harms
a second victim instead. In this case, the defendant's intent
transfers from the intended victim to the actual victim and
can be used to satisfy the mens rea element of the crime that
the defendant is being charged with. The transferred intent
doctrine is only used for completed crimes, and is not used
for attempted crimes. Aberratio ictus means mistake in the
blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other
due to imprecision of the blow. In the case at bar, the
appellants opened fire because they mistook the vehicles to
be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez. The fact that
they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The
Court has held that ―mistake in identity of the victim carries
the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his
intended victim.‖
5b. US vs. Bautista
GR 2189, November 3, 1906
In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy
entered into by a number of Filipinos in Hongkong, for the
purpose of overthrowing the government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and
establishing a new government.
Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the chief of
military forces (of the conspirators) took part of several
meetings. Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences
whereat plans are made for the coming insurrection; he was
appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal Corps of the
revolutionary forces. Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some
bonds from one of the conspirators.
The lower court convicted the three men of
conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment
and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years
imprisonment and P1,000.
Whether or not the accused are guilty of conspiracy?
YES. Judgment for Bautista and Puzon
CONFIRMED. Judgment for de Guzman REVERSED.
Yes, Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy. Bautista
was fully aware of the purposes of the meetings he
participated in, and even gave an assurance to the chief of
military forces that he is making the necessary preparations.
Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment and in doing so
assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance.
This may be considered as an evidence of the criminal
connection of the accused with the conspiracy.
However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might
have been helping the conspirators by accepting bonds in
the bundles, but he has not been aware of the contents nor
does he was, in any occasion, assumed any obligation with
respect to those bonds.
5c. People vs. Fabro
GR 114261, February 10, 2000
Appellant Fabro together with her common-law
husband Donald Pilay and Irene Martin, was charged with
the crime of "violation of Section 21 (b) Art. IV, in relation
to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425. They
conspired and sold/delivered to PO2 APDUHAN, acting as
poseur-buyer, 1 kilo of dried marijuana leaves. Gloria and
Emma Borce, reported to Chief Inspector Evasco about the
sale of marijuana. Acting on that report, Chief Inspector
Evasco organized two teams to conduct a buy-bust
operation. Senior Inspector Mabanag was to be the overall
team leader with Batag as his assistant. SPO2 Ellonito
Apduhan was designated poseur-buyer in the operation.
After briefing the group, Chief Inspector Evasco gave
P600.00 as purchase money to Apduhan. The amount
consisted of six P100-bills with their serial numbers duly
listed down.
As Apduhan, Gloria and Emma drew near Pilay‘s
residence, appellant met them. Donald Pilay who appeared
drunk was inside the house by the main door. Gloria and
Emma introduced Apduhan to appellant as a stranger in the
place who wanted to buy marijuana. Appellant told them
that a kilo would cost them P700.00 but she agreed to
Apduhan‘s price of P600.00. After Apduhan had ordered a
kilo of the contraband, appellant told them to wait a while.
Appellant then went to a house just behind her own. After a
few minutes, she returned in the company of another
woman who was later identified as Irene Martin. Appellant
handed the stuff to Apduhan. Her companion, Irene
Martin, demanded payment therefor. Apduhan gave her the
P600.00. After ascertaining that it was a brick of marijuana,
he made the pre-arranged signal of lighting his cigarette.
Immediately, the back-up team rushed towards their
direction. However, before the team could reach them,
Irene Martin ran away. Apduhan held appellant so that she
could not escape. Donald Pilay was also arrested.
Whether there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime
Appellant‘s contention that Irene Martin was the real
culprit being the source of the contraband does not in any
way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana. While it
is true that it was Irene Martin who took the money,
appellant was the one who negotiated with the poseur-
buyers; fetched her co-accused; carried and handed over the
marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin and appellant
clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the
sale of marijuana. In other words, between Martin and
appellant, conspiracy in the commission of the crime was
indubitably proven by the prosecution.
Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere
conspiracy to commit the offense of selling, delivering,
distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs.
Conspiracy herein refers to the mere agreement to commit
the said acts and not the actual execution thereof. While the
rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without
doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception is when
such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of
Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime
should be distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of
incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the
case at bar.
5d. People vs. Bello (passion and obfuscation)
GR 124871, May 13, 2004
To support his family, ROLANDO ANDASAN left
Cabanatuan City and landed a job as messenger/collector at
the Sunshine Moneychanger in Pasay City. In the course of
his employment, he was mercilessly stabbed 28 times and
died. Only accused Marife and Eladio, Jr. were arrested.
Accused Danny and Cayo remain at large.
Appellant Marife avers that her alleged conspiracy
with the other accused was not sufficiently established by
circumstantial evidence as there was no showing that she
had the same purpose and united with the other accused in
the execution of the crime. She alleges that her mere
presence in the crime scene is not per se a sufficient
indicium of conspiracy. She insists that she acted against her
will due to the irresistible force employed by her co-accused.
Whether there was conspiracy in the commission of a
crime.
Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it.
Conspiracy is predominantly a state of mind as it involves
the meeting of the minds and intent of the malefactors.
Consequently, direct proof is not essential to establish it.
The existence of the assent of minds of the co-conspirators
may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of the
complete plan to commit the crime.
On the whole, the incriminating circumstantial
evidence against the appellants sufficiently proves their
complicity. Circumstantial evidence is that which proves a
fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Resort to circumstantial evidence
is, in the nature of things, a necessity as crimes are usually
committed clandestinely and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. To require direct testimony
would, in many cases, result in freeing criminals and deny
proper protection to society.26 Thus, the guilt of an accused
may be established through circumstantial evidence
provided that the requisites are present, viz: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences must be
based on proven facts; (3) the combination of all the
circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.
In the case at bar, while no witness testified to the
actual stabbing and robbing of the victim, the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution supports a judgment of
conviction. Appellants asked roomboy Jonathan for a room;
Jonathan escorted them to room no. 2, prepared the room
for them by turning on the lights, television and
airconditioning unit before ushering them in. The telephone
operator received a request for an outside line from the lady
occupant of room no. 2 thrice that day. Eduardo, the
manager of the moneychanger, got phone calls from the
lady occupant of room no. 2 who identified herself as Joann
Redillo; the caller pretended that she just arrived from Japan
and asked her yen be converted to pesos. Eduardo gave his
messenger, the victim Rolando Andasan, the amount of
P114,000.00 to be delivered to the lady occupant of room
no. 2. Rolando arrived at the lodge and explained his
purpose to the employees therein. Rolando was a familiar
face in the lodge which had an internal arrangement with
the moneychanger to extend currency conversion services
upon the request of their guests. Appellant Eladio, Jr. used
to be employed as a messenger of the moneychanger and
knew about the office‘s internal arrangement with the lodge.
Roomboy Mayonito escorted Rolando to room no. 2 for the
currency transaction; when appellant Eladio, Jr. opened the
door to Mayonito, the latter informed him about the
presence of Rolando in the garage; appellant Eladio, Jr.
gave the go signal for Rolando to come up to the room;
Mayonito returned to the garage, fetched Rolando and
escorted him to room no. 2; again, it was appellant Eladio,
Jr. who opened the door and let Rolando in. That was the
last time Rolando was seen alive and the money was no
longer to be found.
After accomplishing their criminal design, appellants
emerged from the room, hurriedly paid their bill and left.
The roomboys discovered the cadaver of Rolando in the
room which sustained several stab wounds. Appellants fled
and scaled the wall of the subdivision. The police authorities
recovered a knife under the bed of room no. 2 which fitted
the scabbard left by appellant Marife in the cab, together
with a bloodied face towel. The width of this knife is
compatible with the width of the stab wounds sustained by
the victim.
Thus, while no person actually witnessed the
appellants rob and kill the victim, the confluence of the
incriminating circumstances enumerated above clearly
shows that the appellants had motive and opportunity to kill
the victim when he resisted the robbery. As the victim was
last seen alive with them, coupled with their conduct that
fateful day and their possession of the deadly weapon, there
can be no other reasonable conclusion than that the
appellants authored the crime. To be sure, their conviction
is essentially based on this unbroken chain of events as
testified to by the prosecution witnesses and not on the
uncounselled interrogation of appellant Marife by the police
authorities.
Appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with
modification. Appellants MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO and
ELADIO M. CONSUELO, JR. are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery with
homicide and, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.. No costs.
5e. Li Nunez vs. People
GR 127962, April 14, 2004
A petty argument evolved into a street brawl. After the dust
had settled, Christopher Arugay lay dying from multiple
stab wounds, while his neighbor, Kingstone1 Li ("Li"),
staggered injured, with hack wounds on his head. Shortly
before his death, Arugay was watching television at home
with his sisters. Peering through the window, they saw Li
and Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked.
The two were facing the house of the Arugays. An incensed
Arugay went out the house where he was met by Li, now
wearing briefs and carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay
on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back
to his house. Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then
stabbed Arugay once. Arugay hit Li with the bolo. Li passed
out.Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to
his house but Ronald Tan hit him at the back of his left ear
with a baseball bat. At this point in time, Eduardo
Sangalang, who was then also present stabbed the deceased
several times at least six times.
Whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the
crime.
A conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy
must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and
presumption. It is worth noting that while conspiracy was
alleged in the Information against Li, the prosecution
devoted its efforts to prove that Li had actually inflicted the
stab wounds on Sangalang, tagging him as a direct
participant in the crime. Thus, there seems to be no
evidence that would directly establish the fact that Li and
Sangalang had come into an agreement to commit a
common felony. Any conclusion that there was a
conspiracy will have to be drawn inferentially, as the RTC
did.
It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to
commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have
acted in concert and in pursuance of the common
objectives. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy
since it is by its nature often planned in utmost secrecy and
it can seldom be proved by direct evidence.52 Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such point to a joint purpose and design. Complicity
may be determined by concert of action at the moment of
consummating the crime and the form and manner in which
assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal
wound.Moreover, it appears that the fight involved two
distinct phases. The first phase commenced when Li,
without sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the
baseball bat. Li‘s participation in this phase, albeit as a
solitary actor, was indubitably established. Sangalang‘s
participation, much less his physical presence during this
phase, was not established at all. In the second phase,
Sangalang was the main actor. Li was incapacitated by
then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be ruled
out.
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on
the victim‘s right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay
with a baseball bat. When there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required
medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the
criminal culpability of Kingstone Li in the death of
Christopher Arugay was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the
death apparently remains at large. Yet absent any clear
showing of conspiracy, as in this case, Kingstone Li cannot
answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of
the charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.
F. PEOPLE vs. BAGANO GR 139531, January 31, 2002,
375 SCRA 470
Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision of the RTC of
Cebu City, finding Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot and
Pablito Cañete guilty of murder. Bagano and Cañete were
charged with murder qualified by conspiracy and
aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation in an
Information dated 3 July 1995. On 1997 the trial court
convicted both accused of murder for the killing of Jeremias
Montecino and sentenced Bagano, a recidivist, to reclusion
perpetua, and Cañete to seventeen reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua.
The court a quo rejected the defense of alibi and
denial raised by accused Bagano and Cañete on the basis of
the following findings: About 3am, Jeremias Montecino and
his wife Merlinda were sleeping in their home, when they
were awakened by someone repeatedly calling Jeremias'
name. The call came from outside. Jeremias went to the
window to see who it was and thereafter left their room to
go outside. Merlinda remained in their room, but peering
through the window she saw Canete suddenly embrace
Jeremias as the latter was opening the gate. Thereupon,
Bagano with ice pick in hand stabbed Jeremias on the chest.
Jeremias struggled to free himself from Cañete's clasp and
ran, but Reynaldo Bagano gave chase. Upon hearing
Merlinda's screams for help Bagano withdrew and fled with
Canete following him. Merlinda rushed Jeremias to the
Cebu City Medical Center but he succumbed to severe
hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the left side of
his chest. He died upon arrival at the hospital.
ISSUE: Whether there conspiracy in the commission of the
crime
RULING: Conspiracy is attendant in the commission of the
crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is sufficient that at the time
of the commission of the offense the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution. Proof of an actual
planning of the perpetuation of the crime is not a condition
precedent. From the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, and as can be inferred from their acts, it is
evident that Bagano and Cañete were one in their intention
to kill Jeremias Montecino. Hence, in accordance with the
principle that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all,
the fact that it was Bagano who delivered the fatal blow on
Montecino and Cañete's participation was limited to a mere
embrace is immaterial. Conspiracy bestows upon them
equal liability; hence, they shall suffer the same fate for their
acts.
Decision of the court a quo of 15 October 1997 in Crim.
Case No. CBU-39045, finding accused-appellants Reynaldo
Bagano alias Pugot a.k.a. Reynaldo Friolo and Pablito
Cañete guilty of murder is AFFIRMED with the
MODICATION that both accused-appellants shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
G. PEOPLE vs. BANGCADO, GR 132330, Nov. 28,
2000, 346 SCRA 189
FACTS: At around 8:30 in the evening, Cogasi, Clemente,
Adawan and Lino were at the Skyview Restaurant,
Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, drinking and listening to
folksongs. Moments later, a group of five (5) arrived and sat
one table away from Cogasi and his friends. Among the
newcomers was SPO1 Bangcado, and $PO3 Banisa. The
rest of their group were not identified.
At that time, members of the police force of Baguio
City were conducting Operation Kapkap at the Skyview
Restaurant. They however exempted the table of PO3 Cesar
Banisa as they knew him to be a fellow policeman.
At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Cogasi and his
friends left the restaurant to go home. They were residents
of La Trinidad, Benguet. As they went behind the restaurant
where their Ford Fierra was parked, they noticed SPO1
Bangcado and PO3 Banisa following them. Banisa asked
Richard Lino for a light. Then Bangcado and Banisa asked
the group if they were willing to be frisked. Since the two (2)
police officers were armed with handguns and smelled of
liquor, the group agreed to be frisked. Bangcado, with
Banisa standing guard behind him with a drawn gun,
ordered Adawan, Lino, Cogasi, and Clemente to form a line
against the Ford Fierra facing him in that order. Without
any warning, Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick
succession at the four (4) persons lined up against the Ford
Fierra. Cogasi saw Adawan and Lino fall down. Cogasi
then felt he was hit on the left side of his neck and he also
fell down. He managed however to crawl away and run. He
woke up to find himself confined in a hospital together with
Clemente. There Cogasi learned that Lino and Adawan
died from gunshot wounds in their heads. Cogasi himself
suffered a gunshot wound at the neck, at the junction of his
left jaw near the ear, while Clemente received two (2)
gunshot wounds on his right shoulder with one (1) of the
bullets being lodged just below his right eye.
ISSUE: Whether there conspiracy in the commission of the
crime
RULING: Thus, as to the identity of the gunman, it is
apparent that both witnesses were positive only as far as
Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems that they only
concluded that Banisa participated in the shooting because
he was also holding a gun. The failure of the surviving
victims to assert with confidence that Banisa also fired his
gun raises reasonable doubt as to whether he participated in
the shooting.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit
a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different
acts directed against one and the same person is individual
and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable
only for his own acts. Consequently, Banisa must be
absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on the
victims. It is clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could
have anticipated Bangcado‘s act of shooting the victims
since the attack was sudden and without any reason or
purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet
been revealed prior to the killings.
There being no finding of conspiracy with accused-
appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado, PO3 Cesar Banisa is
ACQUITTED of all the charges against him and,
consequently, is ordered released from custody in
connection with herein cases, unless he is held for other
lawful causes.
H. PEOPLE VS RAMOS GR 125898 APRIL 14, 2004
Facts: October 6, 1991, in MANILA ,accused, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one ERWIN
PUNZALAN Y MERCADO, by stabbing the latter with a
bladed weapon on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Appellant‘s conviction was principally based on the
testimony of a sole eyewitness, Rigor Almodovar.-
voluntarily disclosed his knowledge of a stabbing incident
he witnessed on the night of October 6, 1991 at around
11:00 p.m. of the same date, he was riding his bike on his
way home when he noticed a man being stabbed in front of
Alhambra Cigarette Factory. He witnessed the assailant stab
the victim three times with a bladed weapon. He was unable
to get a close look at the victim, but was able to describe the
assailant as 5‘5" to 5‘7" in height, with burly built, fair
complexion and wavy hair.
He narrated therein that the assailant kept stabbing the
victim even as the latter was running away. It was only
when the victim fell down to the ground that the assailant
fled Almodovar further stated that his sleepless nights spent
thinking that he could suffer the same fate had prompted
him to volunteer information on the incident
RTC Ruling: Finding appellant guilty of murder. It rejected
the defense of alibi in light of appellant‘s failure to present
other witnesses to substantiate it.
Appellant sought recourse to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the findings of the trial court.
Hence the instant appeal. Appellant questions his
conviction on the same grounds on which he anchored his
appeal to the Court of Appeals:
Issue: W/ TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION THAT
ACCUSED WAS THE ASSAILANT.
W/ TC GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED.
Ruling: This Court sees no indication of suggestive
identification from the foregoing testimony. The policemen
had asked Almodovar to identify the assailant from among
the detainees lined up, without suggesting to the witness
whom to point to. As correctly found by the CA, he had
already given a detailed description of the assailant before
he was brought near the detention cell to view the detainees
lined up.
Further, it bears stressing that appellant gave no proof of ill-
motive for Almodovar to testify falsely against him.
Appellant himself admitted in court that he met the witness
for the first time only during the investigation.2Absent any
ill-motive, this Court can only conclude that his act in
imputing the responsibility for the crime on appellant
stemmed from a legitimate desire to bring the perpetrator to
justice.
II. Alibi is the weakest of defenses, as it is easy to contrive
and difficult to disprove.24 To merit serious consideration,
this defense must be supported by credible corroboration,
preferably from disinterested witnesses.25 In the present
case, not one of appellant‘s four friends who were allegedly
with him on the night of the incident came forward to
corroborate his alibi.
Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to show that the accused was somewhere else when
the crime was committed. He must further demonstrate that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission
thereof.Appellant, who was allegedly in his residence within
the area, glaringly failed in this regard. His unsubstantiated
defense of alibi therefore fails to overturn the prosecution‘s
evidence proving his guilt.
I. PEOPLE VS GREGORIO GR 194235 JUNE 8, 2016
FACTS: Jay Gregorio, Rolando Estrella, and Ricardo
Salazar were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Art.
267 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659 and Danilo
Bergonia and Efren Gascon, as accomplices for the same
crime of kidnapping for ransom of one JIMMY TING,
depriving him of his liberty against his will for the purpose
of extorting money as in fact a demand for money in the
amount of Fifty Million Pesos for his release.
Accused-appellants were also charged with violation of PD
1866, for carrying outside their residences and having in
their possession, without lawful authority firearms with live
ammunition.All aforementioned criminal cases were tried
together.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found Jay, Rolando, and Ricardo guilty as
principals and accused-appellants Efren and Danilo guilty
as accomplices of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The
RTC though acquitted accused-appellants Jay, Rolando,
and Efren of the offense of illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed with modification the RTC judgment,
ruling that there was conspiracy among all five accused-
appellants, thus, they should all be equally liable as
principals for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
ISSUE: Whether accused appellants are guilty of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom.
RULING: The appeal has no merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines
and prescribes the penalty for the crime of kidnapping:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1 If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
three days.
2 If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3 If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats
to kill him shall have been made.
4 If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of
the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
In prosecuting a case involving the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, the following elements must be
established: (i) the accused was a private person; (ii) he
kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another
of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was
illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for
ransom.
Art. 267 of the RPC, as well as its amending R.A. No, 7659,
provides, that, ―The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person‖ x x
x.
It was clearly established that efforts have been made
to raise and deliver the ransom. The elements of
kidnapping, having been sufficiently proven, and the
appellants, being private individuals, having been clearly
identified by the kidnap victim, this Court affirms the
finding of appellants‘ guilt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom.
J. PEOPLE VS. OLAZO/lasconia/fernandez GR 220761
OCTOBER 3, 2016
FACTS: Accused Lasconia together with several others
hatched a plan to rob the spouses Erlinda and Nicanor
Vallecera inside their home. It was agreed that accused
Dionesia Lasconia, who was then employed as a stay-out
house help of the spouses
Vallecera would assist them by helping them get access
inside the house undetected. During the commission of the
planned robbery, Erlinda was killed. Subsequently, the
accused, together with Joseph Oronos (Joseph) and several
others were charged with Robbery with Homicide, however
only the accused were found guilty. During trial, Joseph
was discharged as state witness. On the other hand,
Dionesia Lasconia was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser
offense of Homicide on the condition that she would
corroborate the testimony of Joseph, the alleged driver of
the motorcycle used to transport the accused to and from
the scene of the crime. Joseph testified that on several
occasions that Charito hired him drive a
RTC Ruling: After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated
June 14, 2011,7 the RTC convicted Charito, together with
Rogelio Lasconia, Eddie Olazo, and Miguel Corbis, of the
cnme charged.
Aggrieved, Charito appealed before the CA, along with
Eddie Olazo and Miguel Corbis (Accused-appellants).
CA Ruling: the CA affirmed the RTC insofar as it convicted
Charito of the crime charged. Notably, however, the CA
acquitted Eddie Olazo and Miguel Corbis on the ground
that there was a lack of evidence in the records to sustain
their conviction.
Issue: Whether RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erred in
finding Charito guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide?
Ruling: We disagree. To begin with, this Court has
repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies given its unique position to observe the elusive
and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment
on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to
the appellate courts.
We see no reason to doubt the positive testimony of Joseph,
especially when weighed against the bare allegations of
Charito, i.e., that he was elsewhere having a drinking spree
during the time of the commission of the
crime.18chanrobleslaw
In proving conspiracy, direct evidence is not indispensable
as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime.21chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, the candid testimony of state witness
Joseph unmistakably produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. That Charito was present before, during,
and after the commission of the crime and that there was
conspiracy between the malefactors are findings fully
supported by the evidence on record:
Without doubt, Joseph positively identified Charito and
declared that he saw him during the initial planning of the
commission of the crime and noted Charito's express
agreement thereto.23 Joseph also testified that he saw
Charito in the evening of August 8, 2004, when he brought
the accused near the house of the spouses Vallecera and
again upon their return to the drop-off area almost an hour
later.24 It was also established that Charito paid Joseph for
the use of his motorcycle two (2) days after the commission
of the crime and that he was threatened by Charito should
the former "squeal" on them.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
These facts clearly evince unity of purpose and criminal
design between Charito and his cohorts.
Finally, we take note of the fact that the RTC and the CA
had concurring factual and legal findings insofar as they
found Charito guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Thus, in the absence of any showing that
material facts or circumstances were overlooked by the
inferior courts, this Court affirms the questioned Decision.
K. PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530 August 03, 1935
FACTS: Lamahang was caught by a policeman the
act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store of cheap goods. The accused had only succeeded in
breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly
arrested him and placed him under custody. The lower
court found him guilty of attempted robbery.
Issue: Is he guilty of attempted robbery?
RULING: NO. He is guilty of attempted trespass to
dwelling - The attempt to commit an offense which the
Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator,
leading directly to its realization and consummation.
The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch
as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a
juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. - There
is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence,
passing through the opening which he had started to make
on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the
timely arrival of the police, did not develop beyond the first
steps of its execution. - But it is not sufficient, for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively
performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is
necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the
logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with
the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into
one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of
entering by means of force or violence another person's
dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this
offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended
to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is
nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred. - in offenses not
consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the
nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature
of the acts executed (accion medio). Acts susceptible of
double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the
culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable
act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for
attempted nor frustrated crimes
L. PEOPLE VS. DIO,
GR NO. L-36461, JUNE 29, 1984
FACTS:
 At about noontime Crispulo Alega fetch his
girlfriend, Remedios Maniti. They proceeded
to the Pasay City Public Market.
 As they were going up the stairs leading to
the Teresa and Sons Restaurant, Remedios,
who was about an arms-length ahead of
Crispulo suddenly heard the dropping of her
folders and other things, being carried by
Crispulo.
 When she looked back, she saw a man —
later Identified as Danilo Tobias but still at
large — twisting the neck of Crispulo, while
the appellant was holding his (Crispulo's) two
hands.
 The appellant and his companion tried to
divest Crispulo of his "Seiko" wrist watch,
but Crispulo resisted their attempt and fought
the robbers. At this juncture, the man who
was twisting the neck of Crispulo stabbed the
latter on the left side of his chest.
 Crispulo ran down the stairs followed by
Remedies who shouted for help. When he
reached the front of the Pasay Commercial
Bank he fell down and expired. At the time of
his death, the "Seiko" watch was strapped to
his wrist. The trial court convicted defendant-
 appellant of the special complex crime of thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and fortunately a
robbery with homicide as defined and Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and
penalized under art. 294, par. 1, of the helped him board a bus for Butuan. Trinidad was charged
revised penal code which is now being with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the shooting of
contested since the watch was never taken Tan.
from the deceased.
Issues: W/N Trinidad is correct in contending that
ISSUE: whether the crime of robbery was
he can only be convicted of attempted murder? YES
consummated
RULING: NO. The evidence adduced show that the
Ruling: Trinidad should only be held criminally
appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their
liable for attempted murder.
criminal venture of divesting the victim of his wristwatch so
as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery. Indeed,
Ratio: Trinidad had commenced the commission of
as adverted to earlier, when the victim expired, the 'Seiko'
the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform
watch was still securely strapped to his wrist. The killing of
all the acts of execution which would have produced it by
Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to
reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such
and an offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which
as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion,
however was not consummated because of the resistance
and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of
offered by the deceased.
his body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal
The crime committed by the appellant is attempted
and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on
robbery with homicide and the penalty prescribed by law is
the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
only ATTEMPTED murder, the accused not having
perpetua. Since there was no attendant mitigating nor
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be applied in
about the death (citing, People v. Pilones)
its medium period, i.e. 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20
years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law has also to be
N. PEOPLE V. CAMPUHAN
applied.
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
FACTS:
M. PEOPLE v. TRINIDAD
 April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P.
GR No. 79123-25 9 January 1989
Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their
Facts: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers
house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for
were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa. While the three were
her 2 children. There she met Primo
driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused
Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,
Emeliano Trinidad asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte.
brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling
Tan, the driver at that time, suddenly heard two gunshots --
small plastic bags with water to be frozen into
Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the
ice in the freezer located at the second floor.
head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the two
victims.  Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko,
Tan was able to get off the car and hail a jeepney ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo
passing by. However, he noticed that Trinidad was also Campuhan inside her children's room
seated at the back of the said jeepney. Tan immediately got kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or
off the jeepney, followed by Trinidad. When the jeepney "jogging pants" and panty were already
started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but removed, while his short pants were down to
Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right his knees and his hands holding his penis with
his right hand
  Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak
ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He
pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block
his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted
for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother,
a cousin and an uncle who were living within
their compound, to chase the Campuhan who
was apprehended. They called the barangay
officials who detained.
 Physical examination yielded negative results
as Crysthel ‗s hymen was intact
 Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood
and wanted to ride on his back when she
suddenly pulled him down causing both of
them to fall down on the floor.
 RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him
to the extreme penalty of death. Thus, subject
to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
RULING: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum. Costs de oficio.
o People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be
entered for rape to be consummated
o Primo's kneeling position rendered an
unbridled observation impossible
o Crysthel made a categorical statement
denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet
as underdeveloped
o Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his
penis with his right hand, thus showing that
he had yet to attain an erection to be able to
penetrate his victim
o the possibility of Primo's penis having
breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's
advances by putting her legs close together
and that she did not feel any intense pain but
just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to
her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
not "Aray ko, aray ko!
o No medical basis to hold that there was
sexual contact between the accused and the
victim
O. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO and
SAMSON DELA TORRE y ESQUELA, accused. G.R.
No. 122099 July 5, 2000
Facts: Culled from the eyewitness account of Marlon
Araque, he discloses that around 5:00 p.m. of August 14,
1991, he and his brother Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang,
Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money from a certain Tino.
Having failed to collect anything from Tino, they then
turned back. On their way back while they were passing
Tramo near Tino‘s place, a group composed of Agapito
Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon
dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and
attacked them with lead pipes and bladed weapons. His
brother, Jeonito, was stabbed from behind and sustained
three stab wounds causing him to fall down. Marlon was hit
on the head with lead pipes and momentarily lost
consciousness. When he regained his sense, he saw that his
bro Jeonito was already dead. Their assailants then fled
after the incident. Marlon, who sustained injuries in the arm
and back, was thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment.
Accused‘s version: he was in the store of Nimfa Agustin
having a little fun with Edgar Demolador and Andres
Gininao drinking beer. At around 2:00 o‘clock he went to
his house and slept. He was awaken by the two and told
him there was a quarrel near the railroad track. He was
invited by the two policemen for questioning with his co-
accused Samson dela Torre, and was implicated in the
sinumpaang salaysay of Marlon for the death of Jeonito
Araque and the frustrated murder of Marlon Araque. He
professed his innocence and insisted that Marlon‘s
testimony is insufficient to convict him of the crimes
charged.
Trial Court rendered judgment only against accused
Agapito Listerio because his co-accused Samson dela Torre
escaped during the presentation of the prosecution‘s
evidence and he was not tried in absentia. Their other co-
accuseds have remained at large. The trial court convicted
the accused for the crime of Murder and Attempted
Homicide only on the basis of Dr. Manimtim‘s testimony
that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon Araque were
fatal.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the accused should be charged with
Attempted Murder for the reason that none of the
wounds sustained by Marlon were fatal.
(2) WON there is conspiracy.
RULING:
(1) The reasoning of the lower court is flawed because it
is not the gravity of the wounds inflicted which
determines whether a felony is attempted or
frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in
the commission of an offense has been passed. By
subjective phase is meant ―that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the
last act performed by the offender which, with the
prior acts, should result in the consummated
crime. From that time forward, the phase is
objective. It may also be said to be that period
occupied by the acts of the offender over which he
has control – that period between the point where he
begins and the point where he voluntarily
desists. If between these two points the offender is
stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not
been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so
stopped but continues until he performs the last act,
it is frustrated.‖
It must be remembered that a felony is frustrated
when: 1.] the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony; 2.] the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of
the perpetrator‘s will. On the other hand, in an
attempted felony: 1.] the offender commits overt acts
to commence the perpetration of the crime; 2.] he is
not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony; and 3.] his failure to
perform all the acts of execution was due to some
cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.
It bears stressing that intent to kill determines
whether the infliction of injuries should be punished
as attempted or frustrated murder, homicide,
parricide or consummated physical injuries.
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts which at
the time of their execution are unmistakably
calculated to produce the death of the victim by
adequate means. Suffice it to state that the intent to
kill of the malefactors herein who were armed with
bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly be
doubted given the prevailing facts of the case. It also
cannot be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony
not an attempted offense considering that after being
stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of
which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlon‘s
attackers apparently thought he was already dead
and fled.
(2) Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime which indubitably point to and are
indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest. Indeed –
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. To establish the existence of a
conspiracy, direct proof is not essential since it may be
shown by facts and circumstances from which may be
logically inferred the existence of a common design
among the accused to commit the offense charged, or it
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated.
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of
acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances,
which vary according to the purpose
accomplished. Previous agreement to commit a crime is
not essential to establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient
that the condition attending to its commission and the
acts executed may be indicative of a common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there is
 a chain of circumstances to that effect, conspiracy can be
established.
Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist
by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and
convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of direct
proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should
have performed some overt acts as a direct or
indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his
con-conspirators by being present at the commission of
the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
other co-conspirators.
In this case, the presence of accused and his colleagues, all
of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus
criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the
victims.
As to the qualifying circumstances, the commission of the
crime was attended by treachery. The manner in which the
stab wounds were inflicted on the deceased were clearly
meant to kill without posing any danger to the malefactors
considering their locations and the fact that they were
caused by knife thrusts starting below going upward by
assailants who were standing behind the victim. Treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. That
circumstance qualifies the crime into murder. The crime
was also attended by abuse of superior strength on account
of the fact that accused and his companions were not only
numerically superior to the victims but also because all of
them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes,
purposely used force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the persons attacked. However, this
aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in treachery.
Furthermore, although alleged in the information, evident
premeditation was not proved by the prosecution. In the
light of the finding of conspiracy, evident premeditation
need not be further appreciated, absent concrete proof as to
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time
had elapsed before it was carried out.
With regard to the credibility of Marlon‘s testimony, it
cannot be doubted in this case because as a victim himself
and an eyewitness to the incident, it can be clearly gleaned
from the foregoing excerpts of his testimony that he
remembered with a high degree of reliability the identity of
the malefactors.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by
way of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 91-
5843 is DELETED;
2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 91-5843
of Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years
of Prision Correccional, as minimum to Ten (10)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as
maximum.
After finality of this Decision, the records shall be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
which is directed to render judgment based on the evidence
against Samson dela Torre y Esquela.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA, defendant-
appellant
Facts: The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11
months old and the evidence is conclusive that the
defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her,
but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded in
penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely
intervention of the mother and the sister of the child. The
physician who examined the genital organ of the child a few
hours after the commission of the crime found a slight
inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating
that an effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in
testifying before the court he expressed doubts as to whether
the entry had been effected. The mother of the child testified
that she found its genital organ covered with a sticky
substance, but that cannot be considered conclusive
evidence of penetration.
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age
that penetration was impossible; that the crime of rape
consequently was impossible of consummation; and that,
therefore, the offense committed should be treated only as
abusos deshonestos
Issue: Whether the defendant is guilty of the crime
consummated rape
Ruling: We do not think so. It is probably true that a
complete penetration was impossible, but such penetration
is not essential to the commission of the crime; it is
sufficient if there is a penetration of the labia. In the case of
Kenny vs. State ([Tex. Crim. App.], 79 S. W., 817; 65 L. R.
A., 316) where the offended party was a child of the age of 3
years and 8 months the testimony of several physicians was
to the effect that her labia of the privates of a child of that
age can be entered by a man's male organ to the hymen and
the defendant was found guilty of the consummated crime
rape.
There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the
genital organ of the offended party, the defendant is entitled
to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of
frustrated rape, but in view of the fact that he was living in
the house of the parents of the child as their guest, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence existed and
the penalty must therefore be imposed in its maximum
degree.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito,"
Facts: Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old
freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan,
Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary
(PC) soldier. Complainant arrived at her boarding house.
Her classmates had just brought her home from a party (p.
44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had left,
she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid).
All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her
neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent
visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid). She pleaded with
him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with
him.Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant
who hit her head on the wall. He ordered her to lie down
on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as
he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position,
however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a
portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p.
23, ibid). Appellant then lay down on his back and
commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a
small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of frustrated rape
Ruling: The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose
and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce
the crime.Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of
cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez,
49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April
29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-
32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the
uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559
People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v.
Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how
the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. Of
course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the
case of People v. Eriña 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found
the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray"
decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our
subsequent decisions
The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO,
MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., and ROBITO
CABALLERO, accused. ARMANDO CABALLERO,
RICARDO CABALLERO, and MARCIANO
CABALLERO, JR., appellants.
Facts: Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr.
(Jun), all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree
in the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon
Compound. As Eugene walked by the gate of the
Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed
Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted.
Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined
Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden
pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The
latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero brothers, to
no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the
commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify the
protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers: "Bay, what
is the trouble between you and Eugene?" However, Ricardo
accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of his
body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando
ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed Arnold on his
forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of
a neighbor.For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to
where the commotion was. He was, however, met by
Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo
retreated and pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help:
"Tio, help me because I am hit." The commotion stopped
only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able
to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to the
compound. In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of
Leonilo brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to
the Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and
Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they
sustained.
Issue:
 Whether the accused herein are guilty of the crime
murder for the death of Eugene? Yes
 Whether the accused herein are liable for the injuries
inflicted upon Arnold? Yes
Ruling: The appellants are guilty of murder, qualified by
treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to
prove that: .... (1) the employment of means of execution
that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the
victim is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim.25
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that
he would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his
girlfriend Susana‘s house. On the other hand, appellant
Armando was armed with a wooden pole while appellant
Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. The
attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced.
Undeniably, the appellants killed Eugene with treachery.
he appellants are guilty of frustrated murder under Article
248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised
Penal Code which reads:
With respect to the second issue, a felony is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
the offender performs all the acts of execution; All the acts
performed would produce the felony as a consequence; But
the felony is not produced; By reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,27 Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, distinguished an
attempted from frustrated felony. He said that to be an
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and
compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all the acts which should produce the crime as a
consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that
portion of the acts constituting the crime included between
the act which begins the commission of the crime and the
last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the
phase is objective.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. The
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the
acts of execution which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender
has performed all the acts of execution which should result
in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed
the subjective phase in the commission of the crime.
Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the
offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did
all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the
crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention of
causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.28
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter
survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the
victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated
murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill
the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a)
motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime
was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the
time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden
pole. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. It
cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill
Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts of execution
but the crime was not consummated because of the timely
medical intervention.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS ADIAO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a
leather belt, from the baggage of a Japanese and secreted the
belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by
other customs employees. He was charged in the Municipal
Court of the city of Manila with the crime of theft. He was
found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft.
Issue: Whether the court is correct in finding that the
defendant is guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft
Ruling: The Court is of the opinion that the crime cannot
properly be classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in
article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the offender
performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the
accomplishment crime of theft. The fact that the defendant
was under observation during the entire transaction and that
he was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom
House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed
crime of theft are present
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, defendant-appellant

Facts: The defendant is accused of the crime of rape. The

defendant is a man 70 years of age and the offended party is
a child of 9 years, the granddaughter of the defendant's wife.
There can be no question as to the defendant's guilt. The
evidence shows that he and the offended party were living
in the same house and that taking advantage of the absence
of the other inhabitants of the house, he had intercourse
with the child by force and violence. He admits that he did
so, but maintains that he was intoxicated at the time and did
not know what he was doing. The testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution is, however, to the effect that
he did not show any signs of intoxication at the time of the
commission of the crime or immediately afterwards.

The court below found the defendant guilty of frustrated

rape

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of frustrated rape

Ruling: In holding that the crime was frustrated, the court

seems to have been of the opinion that there can be no
consummated rape without a complete penetration of the
hymen. This view is not accordance with the weight of
authority; in fact, it is contrary to practically all modern
authorities. It has been held that entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, merely, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction
of the consummated crime of rape.

In the present case the physician who examined the

offended party immediately after the commission of the
crime found the labia and the opening of the vagina
inflamed together with an abundance of semen, though the
hymen was intact.

The judgment appealed from is therefore modified by

finding the defendant guilty of the consummated crime of
rape