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Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: a Proposal for Grouping Philosophical

Exercises in Classroom Teaching
Article in Metaphilosophy · April 2014

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METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2014
0026-1068
The Philosopher as Teacher
THREE APPROACHES TO DOING PHILOSOPHY:

A PROPOSAL FOR GROUPING PHILOSOPHICAL EXERCISES
IN CLASSROOM TEACHING
NATASCHA KIENSTRA, MACHIEL KARSKENS, AND

JEROEN IMANTS
Abstract: Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great
philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty
exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches.
The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communica-
tive action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated
by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test-based truth finding,
is related to such philosophers as Popper, and is illustrated by Community of
Philosophical Inquiry. The third, doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging
truth-value and making judgment, is related to such philosophers as Foucault, and
is illustrated by philosophical debate. The analysis shows that although the clas-
sical methods applied by the great philosophers appear to be missing from class-
room exercises, they do, in fact, remain at the heart of the matter.
Keywords: debate, doing philosophy, philosophical exercise, philosophical

inquiry, producing criticism, reflecting, Socratic method, truth finding.
1. Introduction
Great philosophers such as Plato, Descartes, Kant, and Wittgenstein
have indicated that teaching philosophy can focus both on learning phi-
losophy and on actively philosophizing. The latter activity can be called
doing philosophy to contrast it with learning philosophy. Dutch philo-
sophical education has the goal of teaching students to do philosophy for
themselves (Karskens et al. 2008). In this article we examine questions
like: What is doing philosophy? Is there a standard for doing good phi-
losophy? What kind of exercises are there that teach students to do phi-
losophy? What are the possibilities and limitations of these exercises?
In our fifteen years of experience as teachers and educational research-
ers, philosophical exercises sometimes proved to be difficult to incorporate
into educational approaches, as they have no clear connection to the
methods of the great philosophers. A solution to this problem lies in the
proposing of three approaches to truth finding that link philosophical

THREE APPROACHES TO DOING PHILOSOPHY 289
exercises to philosophy and philosophical methods in general. The three

approaches are compared with earlier suggested groupings and paradigms.
In brief, the first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding
or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and
Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing
philosophy as test-based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as
Popper, and is illustrated by Community of Philosophical Inquiry. The
third, doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value and making
judgment, is related to such philosophers as Foucault, and is illustrated by
philosophical debate.
We present in this article an overview of the philosophical exercises that
we have identified from a survey of the literature. While this overview is
not comprehensive, we come to a total of thirty exercises. The exercises are
grouped into three approaches. The added value of these three approaches
is that they make it possible to relate the philosophical exercises to the
larger philosophical tradition, classical philosophical methods, and the
complete body of philosophical knowledge. We note that the approaches
are not simply a redefinition of the classical philosophical methods,
because the relation between the classical methods and the philosophical
exercises cannot be elaborated in this manner. The use of the three
approaches will show that although the classical methods applied by the
great philosophers appear to be missing from classroom exercises,
the classical methods in fact remain at the heart of the matter.
In section 2 we describe the theoretical framework within which the
proposal of the three approaches is located. Section 3 introduces the
three approaches against the background of the philosophical tradition.
In section 4 we describe how we came to an inventory of philosophical
classroom exercises. In section 5 we use the three approaches to group the
exercises, and in section 6 we suggest a few conclusions and points for
further discussion.
2. The Theoretical Framework: Doing Philosophy, Philosophical

Exercises, and Philosophical Methods
In this section we describe the theoretical framework within which the
proposal of the three approaches lies. Further, we examine the theory
behind learning to do philosophy and what a philosophical exercise is.
And we also provide a rough sketch of what makes a philosophical exer-
cise philosophical.
One of the goals of philosophical education is to teach students to do
philosophy. Rondhuis (2005) distinguishes three characteristics of doing
philosophy: (1) quality in reasoning and analysis; (2) a sense for ambigu-
ity, vagueness, insecurity, and feeling out boundaries; and (3) the ability to
jump from theory to practice and vice versa in a flexible manner, within an
internal framework of knowledge and experience. Karskens et al. (2008)

290 NATASCHA KIENSTRA, MACHIEL KARSKENS, AND JEROEN IMANTS
describe the following skills that should be taught in philosophical edu-

cation: selecting, structuralizing and interpreting, analyzing, evaluating,
forming an argument and defending it, transmitting thoughts to others,
researching hypotheses, and the ability to take up different positions.
Henceforth we will employ a definition of doing philosophy that is
largely the same as learning to think scientifically. For this, we will use
elements of both Rondhuis (2005) and Karskens et al. (2008), which we
will supplement. Doing philosophy is about (1) selecting, transforming,
structuralizing, and interpreting material; (2) analyzing; (3) testing; (4)
producing criticism; and (5) reflecting. The so-called typically philosophi-
cal part is reflecting on the terms and (logical) argumentation used and the
problematizing or questioning of hypotheses and/or preconceptions.
A philosophical exercise can be described as a standardized way of
doing philosophy that allows participants to exchange thoughts on a
philosophical problem. With our definition we would also like to seek
a connection with the work of Imants and Oolbekkink (2009, 49),
who indicate that in learning to think within the school subject students
combine knowledge and skills. This process serves to stimulate certain
learning activities, which happens, among other ways, by explicitly paying
attention to philosophical core concepts or metaconcepts.1 This allows for
an improved definition of a philosophical exercise: (1) a standardized way
of doing philosophy that combines philosophical knowledge and skills to
(2) exchange ideas, opinions, and arguments by (3) paying explicit atten-
tion to philosophical (meta)concepts and forms of reasoning.
Furthermore, we want to include the active components in active didac-
tic arrangements: namely, structuring assignments, the quality of coopera-
tion and interaction, subsequent discussion of assignments, recording of
teaching experiences in writing, and making the thought process within
the subject more explicit (Imants and Oolbekkink 2009, 116). Referring
back to the definition of a philosophical exercise that was just given, we
suggest the following: (1) the standardized manner of doing philosophy
can be accomplished by structuring the assignment, the subsequent dis-
cussion of assignments, and the recording of the outcomes in writing; (2)
the exchange of ideas, opinions, and reasoning can be accomplished
through a high quality of cooperation and interaction; and (3) paying
explicit attention to philosophical (meta)concepts and forms of reasoning
can be accomplished by making opinions, terms used, and reasoning
explicit in the subject.
Subsequently we aim to make use of the work of Westhoff, Wijnen, and
Zuylen (2009, 21), who stipulate “complexity” and “lifelike context” as
characteristics of effective learning activities. This makes a philosophical
1
For classroom teaching of history, a large number of this type of metaconcept have
been specified: for example, cause, significance, change, evidence, historical context (see
Havekes et al. 2012). For classroom teaching of doing philosophy, we did not find any
literature with such a large number of metaconcepts.

exercise a complex standardized manner of doing philosophy in which

philosophical knowledge and skills are combined to exchange thoughts by
paying explicit attention to philosophical (meta)concepts in a lifelike
context.
Finally, we would like to examine and record that which is thought of
as being typically philosophical. Tradition sees philosophy as the subject
that concerns itself with truth.2 To assess this claim we turn to the discus-
sion by Kessels (1997, 58) of elenchus (refutation) and maieustics (forma-
tion). These core processes can be further elaborated as falling into two
categories. The first is the destructive category that aims at undermining a
wrong opinion or thought. The second is the constructive category that
aims at forming a correct opinion.
This leads us to the following working definition:
A philosophical exercise is a complex standardized manner of doing philoso-

phy, in which philosophical knowledge and skills are combined to exchange
thoughts by paying explicit attention to philosophical (meta)concepts in a
lifelike context in such a manner that a person or several persons first realize
that they are actually ignorant and subsequently continue to inquire on a
metalevel with the aim of constructing a true belief.
We note here that the concepts “philosophical exercise” and “philo-

sophical method” have both dissimilarities and commonalities. For us,
methods of doing philosophy are, for example, the hermeneutic, dialectic,
analytical, and postmodern approaches. The different classical methods of
doing philosophy have different thinking styles and philosophical exer-
cises. The hermeneutic thinker will mostly read texts, while the analytic
philosopher will mostly choose the debate. Section 3.2 further discusses
the differences and commonalities.
3. The Three Approaches

Section 3.1 suggests three approaches to truth finding with the aim of
grouping philosophical classroom exercises accordingly. We do not antici-
pate, it should be noted, that each of the defined exercises will fit into just
one of the approaches. Section 3.2 deals with the comparison of the three
suggested approaches to other attempts at grouping that have been devel-
oped with other goals in mind.
2
Truth is problematic in the contrast between appearance and being, between opinion
and truth, and between the philosophies of the One and General Truth. It does not disappear
from the philosophical agenda as a problem when we assume that there are many truths and
many ways to speak the truth. Indeed, those philosophers who address the multitude and
variety of truths continue to believe that “we cannot but live in truth” (Karskens 2006, 9
and 13).

3.1. Proposal and Elaboration of the Three Approaches

We saw in section 2 that for philosophers the question “What is truth?” is
one of the primary philosophical questions (Karskens 2006). Thus, the
philosophy course in the popular book Sophie’s World starts with “the
philosopher’s hunt for the truth” (Gaarder 1996, 21; our translation).
Besides the question “What is truth?” a method of truth finding is also
required, “a link of meaning between ‘being concerned for truth’ and
‘being clear about what’s meant’” (Wilson 1982, 201).
In the context of doing philosophy in the classroom we believe that
there are three forms of truth finding. The first form is to search for the
truth together through narratives and conversations. The second form is
to search for scientific truth as it is practiced by scientists. And the third
form is the juridical way of finding the truth and truth-value of the
competing/different or opposite claims through analysis by a competent
judge and reaching a “verdict” (Oakeshott 1975, pt. 1). This, as Schuyt
writes in relation to criminal proceedings, is rooted in ancient Greek
culture where “two parties . . . (are and stay) bound together, without
having to deny or ignore the conflict and the contrasts. The conflict is
presented to a neutral, independent third party. . . . At first this happened
rather primitively, . . . but the criminal proceedings subsequently devel-
oped into a refined and well-considered system of rules for accusations,
defense, and furnishing of evidence” (Schuyt 2006, 117; our translation).
We propose the following nomenclature for the three forms of truth
finding:
1. doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative

action;
2. doing philosophy as test-based truth finding; and
3. doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value and
making judgment (truth-value analysis).
We employ these forms as ideal types, which are heuristic instruments that
show how our observations exemplify a certain fixed pattern of thinking,
understanding, and action (see Weber 1972, 14). We will refer to these
forms of truth finding as “approaches.”
We will now analyze the three approaches. In testing them, our analysis
supposes equality of the three approaches. Table 1 compares the
approaches with regard to a number of characteristics. First, there are a
number of theoretical characteristics: namely, concepts, method, struc-
ture, thought, philosophy, and epistemology (panel 1 of table 1).
Second, there are practical characteristics: focus, surroundings, teacher,
and practice (panel 2 of table 1). As a third set of characteristics we add
didactic aspects of our definition of doing philosophy from section 2
(analyzing, testing, producing criticism, and reflecting, panel 3) because

TABLE 1. Commonalities and contrasts of the three philosophical approaches
Panel 1. Theoretical characteristics
Doing philosophy defined as Doing philosophy as Doing philosophy as

connective truth test-based truth juridical debate, judging
finding finding truth-value
Concepts Own thoughts as a result of Every thought as a result of Transcendental / logical
narrative texts, images, music, etc. assessment framework;
no fixed reference point
of experience: Kant
(Critique of Pure Reason)
Method Spinning or weaving a tale Selecting and testing of Reflection on data; external
relevant data; internal criticism: explicitly
criticism examining the saying no
consistency of
reasoning/theory
Structure We-narratives about origin Logical structure Argumentative structure
(historical narratives)
Thoughts At metalevel: keeping sight Continuous metacognitive Plan of realistic contrasts
of the involvement of the thinking as an integral (repugnance) at
participants and on the part of the process metalevel of criticism
forming subgroups and (see Van der Kuijlen
their (social-narrative) 2009, 196–98)
connections amongst
themselves
Philosophy Dewey’s pragmatic Plato, neo-Kantian Scholastic sic et non; Kant:
philosophy (1998, 16); philosophy, Popper the court of Reason
speech in Hannah (Critique of Pure
Arendt (1958); Reason); Foucault:
communicative action in Parrèsia
Habermas and Rorty
Epistemology Truth is a continuous, Truth is in all humans The burden of proof of a
successful, active (rational); obtaining party is not sufficient to
manipulation of the knowledge from the fulfill the claim (see Van
world made by humans outside world der Kuijlen 2009, 197)
(constructivism)
Panel 2. Practical characteristics

Focus on Construction of narrative Inquiry and experiment Debate
by students
Surroundings Politics in social interaction Science Administer justice
Teacher Explains philosophy and Academic and trained Academic and trained
logic in narratives; philosopher presiding philosopher separating
teacher’s manual with over the level of arguing the rhetorical and quality
assignments and games and testing levels of the arguments
guarantee the and helping to achieve a
philosophical level final judgment
Practice Democratic surrounding: Striving for confirmation Appeal to third body that
each student is (consensus) and negative passes the final judgment
encouraged to talk and judgments (see Van der (with Kant, reason can
has an equal opportunity Kuijlen 2009, 198) pass judgment)
to contribute to the
discussion (see McCall
2009, 105)

TABLE 1, continued
Panel 3. Didactic characteristics

Analyzing Questioning; wondering Continuous questioning; Problematizing; considering
interrogation
Testing Evaluation Making definitions and Making judgments
distinctions
Producing Reasoning; being led by Argumentation (pro and Debating
Criticism explanation/ con); constructing and
reason/connection maintaining a logical
argument
Reflecting Making metaremarks; Making creative leaps; Reflecting (1) on the pro
mirroring thinking about the and con arguments, (2)
thought process itself on the assessment
framework, and (3) on
its own application
the approaches have been shown to adhere to these aspects in their own
way. We built on a review of theoretical and practical characteristics
similar to that of McCall (2009, 93–112), who compares dialogues. With
the third set of characteristics, the didactic characteristics, we introduce a
new element.3 We have chosen to present the three approaches in a table
because it helps to highlight the differences between them in a concise
manner.
As an explanatory example of a characteristic in panel 1, let us consider
the theoretical characteristic “method.” In the approach “doing philoso-
phy as connective truth finding,” doing philosophy takes place in a way
that one can also encounter in spinning and weaving: the one who is
talking responds to his or her interlocutor, and together they come to
greater understanding (see Arendt 1958).4 In the second approach, “doing
philosophy as test-based truth finding,” doing philosophy takes place in a
way that one can also see in science: reasoning is examined for its consis-
tency by giving internal criticism and can “be treated as a living set of
truths that might be validated as one does in the laboratory” (Silvermintz
2009, 694). With the third approach, “doing philosophy as juridical
debate, judging truth-value and making judgment (truth-value analysis),”
3
We use the tables in an analytic way and have adjusted them to suit our purposes. The
adjustments are (i) we have changed the order of the theoretical and the practical charac-
teristics, (ii) we have grouped the characteristics such that two separate panels for theoretical
and practical characteristics could be built, (iii) we have added a third panel for didactic
characteristics, and (iv) we have added a third approach because McCall distinguishes only
the first two approaches.
4
Interestingly, Wikipedia indicates that the English word “text” is derived from the Latin
word for “weaving,” “texare,” explaining that as the source of terms like “weaving a tale.”

every statement or position is confronted with a counterstatement or

counterposition, and a third party passes judgment (thus the Kantian
approach is seen as a juridical approach; see Van der Kuijlen 2009); this
judgment does not need to be the truth but is instead the verdict of truth.
To similarly elaborate on a practical characteristic in panel 2, let us take
“teacher.” The approach “doing philosophy as connective truth finding”
holds that philosophy and logic are hidden in narratives. Accordingly,
there is a teaching manual that states how the teacher must instruct and
guide the students to let them do philosophy. For the approach “doing
philosophy as test-based truth finding” an academic and trained philoso-
pher needs to be present to watch over the level of arguing and testing. In
the approach “doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value
and making judgment (truth-value analysis)” an academic and trained
philosopher needs to separate the rhetorical and qualitative levels of the
arguments and helps to achieve a final judgment.
Finally, let us take “testing” as an example of how our definition of
doing philosophy plays out in panel 3. In the approach “doing philosophy
as connective truth finding” the skill of testing takes the form of evalu-
ation (see the category “evaluation skills” found in Baumfield 2002). With
“doing philosophy as test-based truth finding” students participate in
defining or making distinctions and in the skill of critically testing. In
“doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value and making
judgment (truth-value analysis)” the skill of testing is used to judge
what has been said by the teacher or fellow students (see Karskens et al.
2008).
The motivation for our proposing the third approach is that (i) many
exercises make use of a debate, (ii) it focuses on the classical scholastic sic
et non method, and (iii) we give credit to Kant’s idea of the court of reason.
3.2. Comparison with Other Groupings and Paradigms

Section 3.1 introduced the three approaches to truth finding. We chose the
word “approach” because this best fits our goal: to form a grouping of
exercises based on certain characteristics. We found other groupings in the
literature, but these have been suggested for other purposes. If we take our
goal as a base, we believe that the term “approach” is the most appropri-
ate. When philosophy itself is at the base (that is, when the grouping
occurs in reference to philosophical characteristics) then “paradigm”
might be more appropriate because, seen from philosophy’s point of view,
the approaches to truth finding are inclined to exclude each other as
opposite theories of truth. In this section we compare the three approaches
with a set of educational paradigms that were suggested by Tozzi (Unesco
2007). This set shows similarities with the philosophical opinions of Van
der Leeuw and Mostert (1991) and philosophical methods as they are
explained by Martens (1999) and Münnix (2009).

Tozzi (Unesco 2007, 83) has identified a system of five main coexisting
educational paradigms “to move from a view of philosophy as a body of
texts to an understanding of how philosophy, as a historically and
university-based field of knowledge, can be taught in the context of
secondary education.” These paradigms are only partially comparable to
the approaches suggested by us. The difference between our approaches
and Tozzi’s paradigms can be described as follows: our approaches are
chiefly concerned with students doing philosophy in class and deal with
the demands of didactics, while Tozzi’s paradigms are about what the
teacher is teaching and start with the great philosophers. The emphasis we
want to make here, however, is on the similarities between our approaches
and Tozzi’s paradigms.
• Tozzi’s first paradigm is dogma and ideology: Hegel’s philoso-

phy raised to the level of official state philosophy—perfected
philosophy as absolute knowledge in the perfected state. We see
examples of this in the Middle Ages, Franco’s Spain, the Vatican,
Fundamentalist Muslim states, and the Eastern bloc (see Unesco
2007, 84). Tozzi’s paradigm is a scientistic corollary of our
approach “doing philosophy as test-based truth finding” because of
the substance of dialectical materialism. This paradigm sometimes
resembles our third approach, “doing philosophy as juridical
debate, judging truth-value and making judgment (truth-value
analysis),” not because the method is the same but because the
form in which it is presented is polemic: to discredit and defeat an
opponent.
• The second paradigm is history of philosophy: the teaching of a
history of ideas with its powerful and essential high points marking
this intellectual epic; for example, the Platonic idea, Aristote-
lian rhetoric, the Kantian imperative, Freudian unconscious,
Heidegger’s Dasein, and so forth (see the concept “historically aimed
philosophy” in Van der Leeuw and Mostert 1991). This paradigm of
Tozzi’s does not concern us because the emphasis is on the great
philosophers and not on doing philosophy, which is the focus of our
approaches.
• The third paradigm is the problem-solving paradigm (see Van der
Leeuw and Mostert 1991 on doing philosophy as personal philoso-
phy). The goal here is the students” own personal evolution. This
paradigm is represented in two of our approaches, “doing philoso-
phy as connective truth finding or communicative action” and
“doing philosophy as test-based truth finding,” but it is not an end
in itself.
• The fourth paradigm is the democratic and discussionary para-
digm (see Van der Leeuw and Mostert 1991, where this could
be accommodated within doing philosophy as problem-focused

philosophy).5 In this paradigm the aim is problem solving, and the

teaching of philosophy is included in the prospects of education in
the name of citizenship or democracy. This paradigm is represented
in two of our approaches: “doing philosophy as connective truth
finding or communicative action” and “doing philosophy as test-
based truth finding.”
• The fifth paradigm is the decision-making (praxeological) and
ethical paradigm (see Tozzi’s section “Moral Philosophy in Belgium
and Germany”), which aims not only “to interpret the world” but
also “to transform it,” and with these aims this paradigm is repre-
sented in all three of our approaches.
We therefore argue that our approaches “doing philosophy as con-

nective truth finding or communicative action” and “doing philosophy
as test-based truth finding” can be found embedded within Tozzi’s para-
digms (Unesco 2007). This is not the case for our approach “doing phi-
losophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value and making judgment
(truth-value analysis).” A possible reason for this is that the form of the
pro and contra in the juridical debate is almost completely integrated in
“doing philosophy as test-based truth finding” and is also often used
in “doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative
action.” The final judgment made by a third person (with the experience
of truth), however, is, in “doing philosophy as test-based truth finding,”
left to common sense or the reason of the participants or the scientific
community.
Aside from Tozzi’s educational paradigms, Martens (1999) has sug-
gested a system of four philosophical didactic methods in which he incor-
porates ten philosophical exercises.6 These four philosophical didactic
methods are the classical philosophical methods: the phenomenological
method, the analytical method, the hermeneutic method, and the dialec-
tic method. Münnix (2009) names another, fifth philosophical didactic
method: namely, speculative thinking. We do not make use of these para-
digms because, as stated in section 2, we focus on philosophical classroom
exercises themselves and not on broader philosophical methods.
5
Aside from solving problems, Van der Leeuw and Mostert (1988, 58–61) state that in
philosophical education the “problem transformation” must also be considered in order to
make the solution of the problem comprehensible and thus make it easier. This is what
philosophical classroom exercises strive for.
6
The ten exercises are the philosophical conversation, the philosophical handling of
texts, writing texts, dilemmas, simulation and role-play, Konfliktschlichtung, kreatives Gestal-
ten, handling of audiovisual media, project learning, and Realbegegnungen. These exercises
show similarities with our set of thirty philosophical exercises. According to Martens only
philosophical conversation and the philosophical handling of texts are typically philosophi-
cal exercises.

Because we have focused on the philosophical exercises and not on

philosophical methods and paradigms, we have succeeded in highlighting
the so-called typically philosophic, that is, reflection (see section 2). In our
third approach, “doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value
and making judgment (truth-value analysis),” every statement or position
is confronted with a counterstatement or counterposition, with a third
party passing judgment; this judgment does not need to be the truth, it is
more an experience of the truth (section 3.1). Thus defined, our third
approach differs from the dialectic method. The practice of debating
involves two parties, whereas the dialectic method is seen more as a
process. Popper, for example, never speaks about a definitive judgment,
always of a state of affairs. No conclusion is drawn, and reason never
appears as a third party. Hegel similarly believes that the dialectic method
is more of a development of reason.
4. Dataset of Philosophical Exercises

Using the definition of a philosophical classroom exercise as determined in
section 2 we collected philosophical exercises, asking ourselves the follow-
ing questions:
(a) Based on experience, what are the characteristics of a philosophical

exercise?
(b) What literature on philosophical exercises can we connect with?
(c) Can we find a philosophical exercise that does not conform to these
characteristics (that is, a negative case analysis)?
(d) Can we find general exercises that also share these characteristics?
The practice of Dutch philosophical education has shown that there

are a number of philosophical exercises currently in use, such as class-
room talk, philosophical debate, Socratic method, and philosophical
thinking out loud (Oosthoek 2007). Our (international) survey has
yielded a greater number of philosophical exercises—thirty in fact,
some with further subdivisions. We list these exercises in section 5 (and
discuss them in Appendix A). We do not suppose we have found all
existing philosophical exercises in the thirty included here, but we do
believe that we have reached a point where the addition of new exercises
is unlikely to provide new perspectives. Appendix B contains an over-
view of some of the general findings and criteria for selection we
employed.
5. Grouping Exercises into Approaches

This section covers the grouping of philosophical exercises into the three
approaches previously discussed. We operate as follows. First, we aim to

place each of the thirty philosophical exercises in one of our three

approaches. This process is discussed in section 5.1. Section 5.2 explores
whether the approaches are strong enough to describe the relationship
between approaches and exercises, and it includes a written exercise for
each approach.
5.1. Philosophical Classroom Exercises Grouped According to

Philosophical Approaches
While our three approaches have proved to be strong enough to allow for
the grouping of exercises, there are some that could be assigned to more
than one approach. The results are presented in table 2.
An exercise is assigned to a particular approach if it has the character-
istics of the approach as listed in table 1 and covered in section 3.1. Since
explaining the reasons for assigning the approaches would be little more
than a repetition of the contents of table 1, an explanation will not be
included here.
We would like to offer some observations on our groupings. First,
consider the exercise “writing a philosophical essay.” This is the only
exercise to occur twice in our list, once as writing an explicatory philo-
sophical essay and once as writing an argumentative philosophical essay.
This task is a classical philosophical exercise. High schools in France,
Germany, and the United States include writing a philosophical essay as
an important part of the curriculum (Britain does not include philosophy
as a course in high school). In France, writing a philosophical essay is even
included in final examinations. The Netherlands is an exception here;
writing an essay is part of the regular curriculum but not of the final
examinations.
Finally we would like to mention that, although the Platonic-style
symposium allows for an open ending, we have nevertheless placed this
kind of exercise under “doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging
truth-value and making judgment (truth-value analysis),” as we believe
that Plato’s literary intentions differ from the intentions of the classroom
exercise.7 In fact, we could also have placed this exercise within the
approach of “doing philosophy as connective truth finding,” given all the
symposia in a variety of fields that do not require application but are
simply paid occasions to enjoy lectures, snacks, and the company of
others.
7
The poet Agathon hosts a symposium to celebrate victory. Most of those attending are,
however, hung over from a party the previous night. Therefore, the guests agree to deviate
from the usual rules of the symposium (see Rademaker 2014). Essentially, the symposium is
intended as a form of debate, but in this case it comes down to investigating together and
making love with one another.

TABLE 2. Philosophical exercises organized according to the three approaches

Connective truth finding
Classroom talk (Oosthoek 2007)
Guided Socratic Discussion (GSD) (McCall 2009)
Night of philosophy (Unesco 2007)
Philosophical café (Tozzi 2014a; Unesco 2007; Verbij 2000)
Philosophy for children (P4C) (Tozzi 2014b; Vansieleghem and Kennedy 2011; Murris
and Haynes 2000; Van der Leeuw 2000; Rijssenbeek and Kienstra 1999; Splitter and
Sharp 1995; Lipman 1985; Matthews 1984)
Role-playing (Bellon 2001)
SAPERE (McCall 2009)
Tetralogue (Rondhuis 2005)
Thinking Skills (e.g., Images to Remember, Mystery, Missing Word, Contest of Values,
Semantic differential, Scenario thinking, Forbidden Word/Taboo, Odd One Out)
(Higgins et al. 2005; Baumfield 2002; Schwab 1996c; Schwab 1996b)
Written dialogue (Altorf 2010; Altorf 2004)
Test-based truth finding
Brainstorming (Valcke 2005)
Case Method, Paradox, Dilemmas, and Counterexample (Sanderse 2010; Van de Laar, De
Leeuw, and Rijksen 1999; Davis 1997; Kessels 1997)
Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI) (McCall 2009)
Conceptual analysis (Brüning 2003)
Didactic puzzle (e.g., Deduction, Induction, Scrabble as propositional logic,
Koningsveld’s game) (Damen 1991; Mostert 1983; Evans 1980; Koningsveld 1976;
Schein 1975; Causey 1972)
Philosophical thinking out loud (Oosthoek 2007; Schwab 2003)
Connective truth finding coupled with test-based truth finding
Imagining thoughts (Kessels 2014; Kessels 1995; Gaarder 1996)
Language games (Wittgenstein 1984)
Metaphors
(Philosophical) reading of primary texts (Immerwahr 2014; Skipper 2005)
Socratic method (Poppelmonde et al. 2001; Kessels 1997; Nelson 1975)
Writing an explicatory philosophical essay (Schwab 1996a)
Juridical debate and truth-value judgment
Dialogues of Oscar Brenifier (Brenifier 2014)
Philosophical debate and Sic et non (Nederlands Debat Instituut 2014; Oosthoek 2007;
Van der Geer 2005)
Speech (Willemsen 2010; Quintilian 2002)
Symposium (Slagter, Slagter, and Pieterse 2008)
Thought experiment (Boekstal 2010; Münnix 2009; Münnix 2001; Le Coultre, Jongenelen,
and Dooremalen 2007; Tittle 2005)
Test-based truth finding coupled with juridical debate and truth-value judgment
Critical Thinking (Fisher 2001)
Writing an argumentative philosophical essay (International Philosophy Olympiad [IPO]
2014; Onfray 2003)
Connective truth finding coupled with test-based truth finding and with juridical debate and
truth-value judgment
Studium Generale (Pozzo 2009; Kooistra 2007)

5.2. Three Exercises in Writing

To show that the described relationship between approaches and exercises
is correct, we will argue in favor of the classification of a key philosophical
exercise for each approach. We have chosen three typical philosophical
exercises for this demonstration. We propose the following key exercises
for the respective approaches:
(1) “Socratic method” both in “doing philosophy as connective truth

finding” and in “doing philosophy as test-based truth finding”;
(2) “Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI)” in “doing philoso-
phy as test-based truth finding”; and
(3) “philosophical debate” in “doing philosophy as juridical debate
and truth-value judgment.”
We will now compare characteristics of the philosophical exercises to

characteristics of the three approaches presented in table 1.
Socratic Method
Method. The Socratic method must start with a question. Then, examples
from personal experience will be extensively examined. A panel chair-
person (an academic and trained philosopher) will lead a group of people
with a continuous search for consensus. The panel chairperson makes
comments during this process, in which he or she clarifies connections.
The possibility to request a metaconversation also exists. Explicit atten-
tion is given to philosophical core concepts or metaconcepts (for example,
freedom, friendship, critical thinking).
Objectives
• joint analysis of a fundamental question;

• to make explicit and concrete one’s own beliefs;
• testing these against those of others;
• examining their validity; and
• researching to what extent these beliefs are shared among the group.
Discussion. We now proceed to elaborate on how “Socratic method”

relates to a number of the characteristics and skills discussed above. From
panel 1 of table 1, we take the theoretical characteristic “method,” and
from panel 2 the practical characteristic “teacher”; in relation to the
definition of doing philosophy and from the list of philosophical skills

(panel 3), we focus here on the aspect of “testing,” “producing criticism,”

and “reflecting.”
Theoretical characteristic “method.” In the approach “doing philoso-

phy as connective truth finding,” doing philosophy occurs in a
manner that is also found in spinning and weaving a tale: proceeding
from personal experience, a search for consensus is conducted
through joint analysis.
Practical characteristic “teacher.” In the approach “doing philosophy
as connective truth finding,” philosophy and logic are hidden in
narratives: examples from personal experience are examined exten-
sively, and “the facilitator is a coach and a catalyst for the inherent
autopoeisis of group dialogue” (Kennedy 2004, 753).
“Testing” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical skill. In
the approach “doing philosophy as connective truth finding,” the
skill of testing appears as evaluation: students search for relevant
arguments. We seek a connection through Kessels (1997, 58) with
elenchus (refutation), aimed at exposing an incorrect opinion or
thought.
“Producing criticism” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical
skill. The students seek a founded answer to the initial question.
Maieustics (formation), in contrast to elenchus, is aimed at forming
sound opinions (Kessels 1997, 58). Forming sound opinions is more
accurately described as “reasoning; being led by explanation/reason/
connection” than “argumentation (pro and con); constructing and
maintaining a logical argument.”
“Reflecting” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical skill.
This does not lead to a final judgment in any explicit sense. This is
connected to the ideas of no confrontation and no conflict (Kessels
1997, 179).
By continually discussing the same characteristics of the philosophical

exercise and the characteristics of the three approaches from table 1, we
have seen these exercises shift toward different approaches. Thus, while we
initially assigned “Socratic method” to “doing philosophy as test-based
truth finding,” from the increasing number of learning activities we found
in more recent literature that we examined (e.g., Poppelmonde et al. 2001)
we became increasingly convinced that the Socratic method might also,
and perhaps more properly, be considered an example of “doing philoso-
phy as connective truth finding.”
Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI)
Method. The search for difference is crucial (both in terms of opinions

and hypotheses and in terms of fictional and abstract examples) because,

even if everyone agrees with everyone else, there may still be errors in their
thought process. Participants may engage in thought experiments to test
theoretical conceptions (Popper). The conversation is modeled on a
spider’s web: CoPI dialogues become increasingly complex as time passes.
A petition for metadiscussion is disallowed because the structure of the
conversation is not argumentative. The panel chairperson (an academic
and trained philosopher) is primarily responsible for the dialogue rather
than the participants, who often feel uncomfortable.
Objectives. The CoPI method assumes a Realist philosophical position,

which separates epistemology and metaphysics. Knowledge is gained from
the outside world.
Discussion. To discuss this, we follow the same process as for “Socratic

method.” From table 1, we take again the theoretical and practical char-
acteristics “method” (panel 1) and “teacher” (panel 2), respectively; in
relation to the definition of doing philosophy and as an example of philo-
sophical skills, we focus here on the aspects of “producing criticism” and
“reflecting” (panel 3).

phy as test-based truth finding,” doing philosophy occurs in a
manner that is also found in science: CoPI examines reasoning for
consistency through internal criticism.
Practical characteristic “teacher.” The approach “doing philosophy
as test-based truth finding” requires an academic and trained
philosopher who monitors the doing of philosophy performed by
the participants through research and testing. McCall has copy-
rights on CoPI and demands that the philosopher be trained by
herself.
“Producing criticism” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical
skill. In the approach “doing philosophy as test-based truth
finding,” students are engaged in arguing, constructing, and main-
taining a logical argument. This links up with McCall (2009, 89–94)
and her concepts of “philosophical inquiry,” “stimulation of differ-
ent views,” “contribution of ideas and arguments that are not the
students’ own opinion,” and “structuring the dialogue in a dialecti-
cal manner.” We also argued above, in section 3.2, that the dialec-
tical method is a scientific process.
“Reflecting” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical skill.
CoPI does not stop at the end of a session but goes on forever; there
are no conclusions (McCall 2009).
In Nelson’s neo-Kantian Socratic method, groups seldom come to the

end of a truth-finding process, and the method employed often provides

more insight into the questions underlying the discussion than real
answers (McCall 2009, 99). In philosophy for children on the topic of
Dewey’s philosophy the construction of a democratic society is more
prominent than the act of doing philosophy (McCall 2009, 103). In terms
of methods where philosophy and logic “are located in the mind of the
discussion director” (McCall 2009, 112) as opposed to “located in
materials (usually books),” McCall suggests the following hierarchy of
philosophical exercises:
CoPI;
Nelson’s Socratic method;
Lipman’s P4C; and
Guided Socratic Discussion.
This is consistent with our views on which approaches best describe par-
ticular forms of dialogue.
Philosophical Debate
Method. The debate is centered on formulated problems that can be

linked to differing points of view, while the argumentation is continually
focused. The debaters are given the task of incorporating the views of the
philosophers into their own argument, engaging in debate and contrasting
thoughts.
Objectives. Providing a crucial contribution to a sound process of forming

opinions and decisions, or: to obtain truth from differences in opinion by
concise exchange, the defense of one’s own position, and the assault on
those of others.
Discussion. As with the two exercises above, we will examine “philoso-

phical debate” in relation to several examples of the themes discussed
above. Here, the theoretical and practical characteristics “method”
and “teacher,” respectively, will again be discussed; “analyzing” will here
be taken in relation to the definition of doing philosophy and exam-
ples of philosophical skills, with “testing,” “producing criticism,” and
“reflecting.”

phy as juridical debate, judging truth-value,” any claim or position
is confronted with a counterclaim or counterposition and judged by

an external third party; this judgment need not be the truth, it is

more properly considered a truth-value judgment. These character-
istics are found in continually focusing argumentation, debating,
confronting thoughts, and contributing to a sound process of
forming opinions and decisions.
Practical characteristic “teacher.” The approach “doing philosophy as
juridical debate, judging truth-value” requires an academic and
trained philosopher to separate the rhetorical and quality levels of
the arguments to help to achieve a final judgment.
“Analyzing” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical skill. The
philosophical skill of analyzing requires that students prepare for-
mulations of a problem with respect to its content.
“Testing” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical skill. Stu-
dents engage in concise exchange, defend their own position, and
assault the position of another. This can be seen in the activities of
the Dutch Debating Institute.
“Producing criticism” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philoso-
phical skill. The students link differing points of view, continually
focus their arguments, incorporate the views of the philosophers
into their own arguments, engage in debate, and compare thoughts
(see Oosthoek 2007, 802, on guiding debate and processing
arguments).
“Reflecting” as an aspect of doing philosophy and philosophical skill. At
the end the person serving as a jury reflects on the arguments pro and
con given the assessment framework and motivates his or her
judgment. Second, topics like the eloquence, humor, and nonverbal
presentation are judged.
6. Conclusions and Discussion

In our introductory section above we asked what the relationship is
between philosophical exercises and the methods of the great philoso-
phers? We have suggested three approaches to facilitate this compari-
son. Table 1 highlights a relation between the three approaches and
the field of philosophy. The approach “doing philosophy as connective
truth finding or communicative action” shows connections to the work
of Dewey, Arendt, Habermas, and Rorty. The approach “doing philoso-
phy as test-based truth finding” relates to Plato, neo-Kantian philoso-
phy, and Popper. And the approach “doing philosophy as juridical
debate, judging truth-value” links up with the Kantian approach as a
juridical approach. Section 3.2 explored the relation between these
approaches and philosophical methods. Table 2 displayed the rela-
tionship between the three approaches and the philosophical exercises.
We would now like to offer a number of preliminary or tentative
conclusions.

In the practice of philosophical education our experience is that for

some student-related philosophical domains doing philosophy is more
successful than for other, more abstract domains.8 We have the impression
that there is a wider range of exercises offered in the student-related
domains. We found the largest number of exercises for “doing philosophy
as connective truth finding” or a combination in which it was included.
This dimension is qualified as accessible doing philosophy. Accessibly
doing philosophy will easily connect with subjects in student-related
domains.
Our research has yielded a number of clear findings, but also a number
of questions. One of the questions is to what extent the learning activities
carried out in the exercises discussed by us are actual learning activities
from the perspective of the student; or should they be considered primarily
as instructions for the teacher?
A related problem is the discrepancy between descriptive and prescrip-
tive. The unit of analysis is the educational situation that utilizes a
particular philosophical exercise. Subject-didactical research has used
descriptive language to describe the matter. The schoolbooks themselves
sometimes apply prescriptive language, as in Schwab: “There is always
one person speaking, each waits, you must participate, assume” (1996b,
83; our translation). However, instructions on how the teacher may actu-
ally achieve this in his or her students in the educational situation are
missing.
A third question is to what extent do the learning activities described by
authors relate to the exercise in its proper form (approach)? In this respect
we first designated the exercise of “role playing” (role taking, Münnix
2001) as “doing philosophy as juridical debate and truth-value judgment.”
However, we found learning activities in the literature that belong to
“doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action”:
for example, “to extend and exercise political and moral imagination”
(Bellon 2001, 320–21). In the exercise of CoPI we also found learning
activities that would be expected in “doing philosophy as juridical
debate and truth-value judgment”: “create most conceptual conflict/
philosophical tension” (McCall 2009, 91).
8
A conventionally held belief is that doing philosophy for oneself does not suppose the
accumulation of knowledge. However, a conversation about friendship shows a form of
knowledge that can be deemed common sense. Therefore, doing philosophy requires a
particular form of knowledge. In scientific philosophy, for example, commonsense knowl-
edge appears to be insufficient, because it also seems to require understanding. Support for
this notion is found in Kessels 1997, 235n. Compare also Goering 2008, 45: “The greatest
philosophical questions have no clearly right answers, and so adolescents are free to articu-
late their own perspectives on how a life identity is made, and to defend them to the best of
their abilities . . . when they discovered that all these other students were also eager to talk
about, for example, identity and free will and determinism.”

A further question is to what extent the exercises are unequivocal. The

exercise “Thinking Skills” as a mystery is really different from an Odd One
Out exercise. Also, exercises need not exclude one another. And they can
be a continuation of one another: for example, a session of British Par-
liament method can form the starting point for one or several Socratic
methods (Kessels 1997, 184).
A fifth question is to what extent philosophical exercises fall exclusively
within one approach. We can conclude that the exercises of role-playing,
(philosophical) reading of primary texts, and writing a philosophical essay
are centered in one or two approaches but have strong characteristics of
all three approaches. We can also conclude that the exercises “CoPI” and
“Socratic method” are centered in one approach and explicitly exclude
one or two of the other approaches.
A final question is to what extent we can suppose from the perspective
of philosophical methods that an exercise is a typically philosophical
exercise, because that exercise is exclusive to one philosophical approach.
As we saw in table 2, however, philosophical exercises are frequently not
exclusive. In section 5.2 we explored this with respect to the philosophical
exercise “Socratic method.”
Natascha Kienstra
Graduate School of Education
Radboud University
Postbus 9103
6500 HD Nijmegen
The Netherlands
n.kienstra@docentenacademie.ru.nl.
Machiel Karskens
Department of Philosophy
Radboud University
Postbus 9103
6500 HD Nijmegen
The Netherlands
m.karskens@phil.ru.nl
Jeroen Imants
Graduate School of Education
Radboud University
Postbus 9103
6500 HD Nijmegen
The Netherlands
j.imants@docentenacademie.ru.nl

Appendix A
In this appendix we present some general characteristics of each of the
thirty exercises discussed in our article. Four rudimentary characteristics
of each exercise are provided: reference, origin of the exercise, objectives
of the exercise, and other relevant characteristics (examples of use, pos-
sibilities, and limitations).
Brainstorming (Valcke 2005). A problem-solving exercise with the

following characteristics: learning as a continuous process, inter-
activity, group thinking, mutual testing.
Case method, paradox, dilemmas, and counterexample (Sanderse 2010;
Van de Laar, De Leeuw, and Rijksen 1999; Davis 1997; Kessels
1997). Cases from philosophy and from everyday life, with a step-
by-step plan for ethical analysis and judgment. The steps involve
determination of facts, tracing of values, naming problems, and
finding interested parties.
Classroom talk (Oosthoek 2007; Ebbens, Ettekoven, and Van Rooijen
1996). Structured conversation between teacher and class. A good
teacher of philosophy stimulates his or her students to arrive at
meaningful questions themselves, which he or she can use in the
initiated thought process. The teacher involves students in the
advancement of the process.
Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI) (McCall 2009). Seeks dif-
ferences in thought, concepts, and so on, as people may all commit
errors in thinking. It makes use of thought experiments, a conver-
sation modeled on a spider’s web, and a dialogue that is centralized
rather than participatory.
Conceptual analysis (Brüning 2003). In the classroom students con-
struct an answer, a shared concept, to a philosophical question.
Choose a concept from a philosophical domain and follow a number
of steps to reach a conceptual analysis such as: deductive ladder
(going from abstract to concrete), building sentences (thinking out
loud about how the concept can be used), defining, searching for
counterexamples, and exploring boundaries.
Critical Thinking (Fisher 2001). “Critical thinking is skilled and active
interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications,
information and argumentation” (Fisher 2001, 10; see also Fisher
and Scriven 1997, 21). The goal is to develop skills by explicitly and
directly learning them, so that they may be transferred to other
studies and everyday life. It is possible to take Cambridge examina-
tions in critical thinking.
Dialogues of Oscar Brenifier (Brenifier 2014). Like Plato, Brenifier
defines thinking as a debate within one’s soul. To reason is also
about eliminating the alternative. In his questioning Brenifier forces
the subject to answer yes or no, or to make a choice between two
alternatives, thus eliminating the option that is not chosen. Doing

philosophy is to cease living and stop the narration. Thus we realize

that all options are not really open to us, as we tend to imagine in
daily life (see Brenifier’s Web site).
Didactic puzzle (e.g., Deduction, Induction, Scrabble as propositional
logic, Koningsveld’s game) (Damen 1991; Mostert 1983; Evans
1980; Koningsveld 1976; Schein 1975; Causey 1972). Didactic aid to
help get a sense of something and thus understand it through: (i)
having an idea-trial, theory-inspired observation, finding/imposing
order; (ii) asking questions; (iii) determining right and wrong,
refutation (creating an error or falsifying), confirming; (iv) forming
concepts and hypotheses; (v) reasoning; and (vi) attempting to
understand, acknowledging the reasoning behind something,
attempting to grasp the unknown by placing it within what is
known.
Guided Socratic Discussion (GSD) (McCall 2009). Designed to put
students and teachers to work using textbooks that contain
everyday stories with step-by-step instructions to philoso-
phical concepts, ideas, puzzles, and discussion questions. A
“talking stick” is used to ensure everyone gets a turn in the
conversation.
Imagining thoughts (Kessels 2014; Kessels 1995; Gaarder 1996). Here,
the teacher still has to decide which way the exercise will go. It could
become one of the philosophical exercises above. The intentions of
the teacher may not match the intentions of the inventor. As teacher
you may have your own preference (e.g., to engage in Socratic
method more frequently). According to Baumfield (personal com-
munication in 2009) this may either lead to collision or to great
heights.
Language games (Wittgenstein 1984). In the Philosophische Unter-
suchungen, Wittgenstein attempts to create an image of language by
referring to a number of different language games, without giving an
unequivocal definition. The metaphor he employs is that of walking
through a city. If you traverse a city in several directions you slowly
but surely get a pretty good sense of the city without ever having seen
a map. A map is only a two-dimensional representation that does
not tell the whole story.
Metaphors. Plato’s allegory of the cave.
Night of Philosophy (Unesco 2007). Every year, both famous and lesser-
known (inter)national philosophers take the stage during the Night
of Philosophy. Visitors can engage in debates and attend lectures
and interviews that are tailored to the theme of the Month of
Philosophy, which changes annually.
Philosophical café (Tozzi 2014a; Unesco 2007; Verbij 2000). A
volunteer group wants people to start engaging each other in con-
versation through organizing theme nights, reading groups, and
Socratic and general discussion groups in order to do philosophy
together.

Philosophical debate and sic et non (Nederlands Debat Instituut

2014; Oosthoek 2007; Van der Geer 2005). Providing a crucial
contribution to a sound process of forming opinions and decisions;
or: to obtain truth from differences in opinion by concise exchange
of information (e.g., arguments), the defense of one’s own position,
and the assault on that of others.
(Philosophical) reading of primary texts (Immerwahr 2014; Skipper
2005). Skipper distinguishes between: (i) the appreciation approach,
which delves into details of a serious answer, studying the historical
and contemporary challenges and responses to that answer, actually
critiquing and defending the answer in class, assessing the results of
the whole dialectic; and (ii) the performance approach, which builds,
critiques, and refines arguments, assessing evidence, entering into a
dialectical process and stepping back frequently to evaluate and
reflect on where the whole process has led.
Philosophical thinking out loud (Oosthoek 2007; Schwab 2003).
Requires (i) a lot of time, energy, and persuasiveness. Crucial is (ii)
the attitude of the teacher: required to conscientiously start from
(iii) development of ideas in class, no hidden agenda, genuine
interest in what is proposed by the students; able to (iv) maintain
the procedure of class discussion. There is progress in collective
thinking.
Philosophy for children (P4C) (Tozzi 2014b; Vansieleghem and
Kennedy 2011; Murris and Haynes 2000; Van der Leeuw 2000;
Rijssenbeek and Kienstra 1999; Splitter and Sharp 1995; Lipman
1985; Matthews 1984). Truth is a continuous, successful, active
manipulation of the world conducted by people. We interact with
the environment. Short stories followed by an attempt to give
meaning to the link between ideas and personal experiences in
conversation.
Role-playing (Bellon 2001). Students act out a situation. Each student
has a particular role and tries to empathize with the character he
or she is playing. There is (complex) interaction. The objectives
according to Bellon (2001, 320–32) are: “(i) to extend and exercise
the student’s political and moral imagination (motivation); (ii) to
deepen and personalize their understanding of political theory;
(iii) to evaluate political theories in terms of their adequacy and
relevance to our thinking about political organization and its
justification.”
SAPERE (McCall 2009). Ten steps (inspired by Lipman’s P4C
program) that are followed according to the conventional rules for
discussion. The occasion may be a narrative, an image, a piece of
music, or a music video. Each child tells the group his or her
thoughts. Questions may then be asked, and the children vote on
what will be discussed by the group. The teacher asks for a reaction
from the group. At the end, each child’s final thoughts about the
question are collected.

Socratic method (Poppelmonde et al. 2001; Kessels 1997; Nelson 1975).

Nelson and Heckmann use regressive abstraction to reach the truth
present in all people (neo-Kantian). We only need a systematic
method to reach the truth from our own experiences in our own
thinking. Refutation and deep research.
Speech (Willemsen 2010; Quintilian 2002). There are three types of
speeches: legal, political, and occasional speeches. According to
classical philosophers every speech has three goals: to inform,
to please, and to move us. There are three means by which
an orator can convince the audience: by reasoning, by character,
and by emotions (Aristotle: logos, ethos, and pathos). Every good
speech has a clear structure: a catchy beginning in which one must
learn to trust the speaker, a middle part containing the arguments,
and an ending in which the facts are listed and emotions are
evoked.
Studium Generale (Pozzo 2009; Kooistra 2007). In the 1930s American
universities were in a deplorable state (described as “Neohumanism
Lost”). They recovered from this based on the generalist idea of
Studium Generale: reading a text and only then pursuing speciali-
zation of discussion. Pozzo aims to repeat this project between 2010
and 2020, whereby an “open access hypertext will be constituted
along with a critical edition and translations in the main European
languages” (Pozzo 2009). He refers here to Leibniz’s dream of a
universal library. The university course of scientific philosophy
(Kooistra 2007), to which we adapted the form of our own educa-
tional practice, is taught in the form of a Studium Generale and
contains a range of philosophical exercises.
Symposium (Slagter, Slagter, and Pieterse 2008). A meeting in which
a particular subject is investigated from several perspectives in
order to systematically and entertainingly inform and examine the
quality and relevance of the research, as well as the validity of
conclusions, according to a critical investigation through public
discussion.
Tetralogue (Rondhuis 2005). A tetralogue is a standardized philosophi-
cal conversation in which four adolescents (participants) exchange
thoughts with one another in response to a philosophical problem
that is determined beforehand by the participants themselves.
Tetralogues are guided by a philosophically or psychologically
trained individual who may only interrupt the conversation on
grounds that are determined beforehand.
Thinking Skills (e.g., Images to Remember, Mystery, Missing Word,
Contest of Values, Semantic differential, Scenario thinking, Forbid-
den Word/Taboo, Odd One Out) (Higgins et al. 2005; Baumfield
2002; Schwab 1996c; Schwab 1996b). “Thinking skills interven-
tions are approaches or programmes which identify for learners
translatable, mental processes and/or which require learners to
plan, describe and evaluate their thinking and learning. These

can therefore be characterized as approaches or programmes

which require learners to articulate and evaluate specific learning
approaches; and/or identify specific cognitive and related affective or
cognitive processes that are amenable to instruction” (Higgins et al.
2005, 1).
Thought experiment (Boekstal 2010; Münnix 2009; Münnix 2001;
Le Coultre, Jongenelen, and Dooremalen 2007; Tittle 2005).
Münnix distinguishes between four levels of perspectival change:
(i) changing perspectives to that of “the other on ourselves”; (ii)
fables in which “we can enlighten” blind spots which lie outside
our focus of interest; (iii) “Two sides of the truth where we rise
to increasingly overarching perspectives and can look over a lot
of individual and cultural perspectives”; and (iv) what if? (imagin-
ing of virtual cases and the consequences of thinking) (Münnix
2009).
Writing an argumentative philosophical essay (International Philo-
sophy Olympiad [IPO] 2014; Onfray 2003). The essay (Montaigne)
is a literary text that serves to provide a convincing argument. The
value of the text is in the reflective (philosophical) nature it dis-
plays. An essay involves making things concrete, making defini-
tions, reacting, repeating, removing the superfluous, explaining
properly, having the reader understand what you mean, and alter-
nating between the abstract and the concrete. The conclusion is a
summary.
Writing an explicatory philosophical essay (Schwab 1996a). A ques-
tion involves several basic elements of philosophy: questions, pre-
suppositions, values, analyses, and the formation of images,
concepts, and concept relations. Using these “philosophical building
blocks” students learn to formulate an answer to a philosophical
question.
Written dialogue (Altorf 2010; Altorf 2004). Referring to Gadamer and
Alcoff, Altorf introduces a “dialogical model of truth. . . . If truth is
understood as the product of an argument (involving two or more
participants), then all the contributing elements of that argument
must be analysed within an epistemological characterisation of its
results” (Altorf 2004, 34). The imagery, metaphors, and myths of a
philosophical text are part of this conversation.
Appendix B
Some general findings and selection criteria used by us in this research are
discussed in this appendix and displayed in the table below (see also
Baarda 2009; Rondhuis 2005). We had initially selected thirty-three philo-
sophical exercises from five countries: France, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.

TABLE. Diagram of several philosophical exercises found, rejected, and to be analyzed

Philosophical
exercise Number Number
Found 33 Through (Subject-didactic) literature 19

Member checking 7 (brainstorming,
(checking with the classroom talk, debate,
participants) Socratic method,
thinking out loud,
writing an explicatory
philosophical essay,
speech)
Collegial consultation 3 (Altorf, Brenifier,
Kooistra)
Own collection 4 (Dries van Os game,
crossword puzzles, ICT
game Sofie’s World,
didactic puzzles)
Rejected (negative 3 Reason for Too lean 2 (crossword puzzles, ICT
analysis) rejection game Sofie’s World)
Ethical reason 1 (Dries van Os game)
To be analyzed 30
The three exercises that did not make the final set of thirty philosophi-
cal exercises have been rejected either because they are too lean or on the
basis of ethical reasons:
• Too lean: Jackson (1983, 1985) has created several crossword

puzzles for a variety of fields (ethics, metaphysics, and cognition
theory, religious philosophy, social and political philosophy and
logic) and has described how to create a puzzle: place a list of key
concepts into a grid and black out the remaining squares or fill them
with filler words. The primary goal of these puzzles is to introduce
the terms and descriptions used in the field (Damen 1991). The
assignments or “clues” are trivial and therefore have no bearing on
the act of doing philosophy.
• Too lean: the ICT game Sofie’s World (Spectrum Software 2007) is
not philosophy and does not provide cause to engage in philosophy.
• Ethical reason: the Dries van Os game has never left the design
phase, although it does look promising. In the game the student gets
lost in the exercise, because it never ends.
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Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: a Proposal for Grouping Philosophical

Article in Metaphilosophy · April 2014

Natascha Kienstra Machiel Karskens

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© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The Philosopher as Teacher

THREE APPROACHES TO DOING PHILOSOPHY:

NATASCHA KIENSTRA, MACHIEL KARSKENS, AND

Keywords: debate, doing philosophy, philosophical exercise, philosophical

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

exercises to philosophy and philosophical methods in general. The three

2. The Theoretical Framework: Doing Philosophy, Philosophical

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

describe the following skills that should be taught in philosophical edu-

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

exercise a complex standardized manner of doing philosophy in which

A philosophical exercise is a complex standardized manner of doing philoso-

We note here that the concepts “philosophical exercise” and “philo-

3. The Three Approaches

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

3.1. Proposal and Elaboration of the Three Approaches

1. doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

TABLE 1. Commonalities and contrasts of the three philosophical approaches

Panel 1. Theoretical characteristics

Doing philosophy defined as Doing philosophy as Doing philosophy as

Panel 2. Practical characteristics

Doing philosophy defined as Doing philosophy as Doing philosophy as

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Doing philosophy defined as Doing philosophy as Doing philosophy as

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

every statement or position is confronted with a counterstatement or

3.2. Comparison with Other Groupings and Paradigms

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

• Tozzi’s first paradigm is dogma and ideology: Hegel’s philoso-

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

philosophy).5 In this paradigm the aim is problem solving, and the

We therefore argue that our approaches “doing philosophy as con-

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Because we have focused on the philosophical exercises and not on

4. Dataset of Philosophical Exercises

(a) Based on experience, what are the characteristics of a philosophical

The practice of Dutch philosophical education has shown that there

5. Grouping Exercises into Approaches

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

place each of the thirty philosophical exercises in one of our three

5.1. Philosophical Classroom Exercises Grouped According to

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

TABLE 2. Philosophical exercises organized according to the three approaches

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

5.2. Three Exercises in Writing

(1) “Socratic method” both in “doing philosophy as connective truth

We will now compare characteristics of the philosophical exercises to

• joint analysis of a fundamental question;

Discussion. We now proceed to elaborate on how “Socratic method”

© 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

(panel 3), we focus here on the aspect of “testing,” “producing criticism,”

Theoretical characteristic “method.” In the approach “doing philoso-

By continually discussing the same characteristics of the philosophical

Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI)

Method. The search for difference is crucial (both in terms of opinions