ELECTION LAW

21. DELA CRUZ VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 192221 NOVEMBER 13, 2012 J. VILLARAMA, JR
FACTS: Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong,
Province of Antique under the ticket of the National People’s Coalition (NPC). Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also
filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the vice mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion among
voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner’s surname.
COMELEC First Division declared Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for
the vice mayoralty position.
Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified
List of Candidates and Official Sample Ballot issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-
Mayor, including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official Sample Ballot.
COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution listing the names of disqualified candidates, including Aurelio which votes
are to be considered stray if voted upon.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), petitioner insisted that the
votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844.
Hence the result, to wit:
Aurelio – 532 votes
Petitioner – 6389 votes
Pacete – 6428 votes
Petitioner filed with the RTC an election protest praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for
Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent Pacete’s proclamation as Vice-Mayor; and (3) her proclamation as
winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor.
COMELEC’s Argument:
While the votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of the bona fide
candidate, this is no longer the rule for automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors which changed
the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in automated elections now contain the full names of the official
candidates so that when a voter shaded an oval, it was presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it
and voted for that candidate, regardless of whether said candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance;
(2) since the names of the candidates are clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when these
were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot secrecy folder, the voter’s intention is clearly
to vote for the candidate corresponding to the shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of ballots under Section
211, Article XVIII of the OEC apply only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots;
and (4) with the use of the automated election system where the counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation controversies, including complaints regarding the
appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the names of the candidates written, were flaws which the
automation rectified.
Pacete’s Argument:
Petitioner cannot validly claim the votes cast for Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of BP
881, which cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also cites an annotation on election law, invoking
this Court’s ruling in Kare v. COMELEC that the aforesaid provision when read together with Section 72, are
understood to mean that “any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared
final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray.” And that COMELEC caused the publication of
Resolution No. 8844 in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest effort
on the part of COMELEC to disseminate the information, especially to the voters in Bugasong, Antique, that the
name of Aurelio was printed on the official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were
amply forewarned about the status of Aurelio’s candidacy and the consequences that will obtain should he still
be voted for.
ISSUE: If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official ballots on Election Day, should the votes cast
for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
HELD: Yes. Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and jurisprudence on the
legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate, especially in the case of nuisance candidates
who have the same surnames as those of bona fide candidates.
Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to
a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to
be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed “to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates, or other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate” are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving
money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions,
election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or
Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in
the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule
provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered
candidates whose CoC’s had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the
candidate whose CoC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special action cases
stated: xxx (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five
(5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate. Xxx
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. HRET, this Court likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No.
4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide
candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of
petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of
significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same
position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting
system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However,
as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time
to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the
Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted
from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a
petition to cancel or deny a CoC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify
under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a CoC of a nuisance candidate cannot be
equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of CoC of Aurelio
because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista case, the voters’
constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical
to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner.
The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots
on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially
considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of
the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the
same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the
delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible
the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
22. GOH VS. BAYRON G.R. No. 212584 NOVEMBER 25, 2014 J. CARPIO
FACTS: Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence
brought about by “gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross
violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence,
and other related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional
immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City.”
In Resolution No. 9864, COMELEC found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but suspended the
funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue.
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882 stating that “The conduct of recall is one of several constitutional
mandates of the Commission. Unfortunately, it cannot now proceed with the conduct of recall elections as it
does not have an appropriation or legal authority to commit public funds for the purpose.”
Commissioner Tagle stated that “in order for the Commission to effectively undertake actions relative to recall
petitions, first, the budget proposal to Congress for the FY 2015 should contain a specific line item appropriated
for the funding of the conduct of recall elections; or second, if feasible, we can request a supplemental budget
from Congress for the FY 2014 to specifically answer for the funding of recall proceedings.”
Commissioner Padaca called for a holistic look of the GAA. She submitted that “the allocation for the Commission
in the GAA is primarily geared toward our Constitutional mandate, that is, the enforcement and administration
of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall x x
x.” Therefore, the interpretation of the provisions of the GAA should be read with the intent to pursue
COMELEC’s mandate.
Commissioner Guia proposes a liberal approach: that the 2014 GAA should be construed as merely failing to
provide sufficient funds for the actual conduct of recall elections, and not as preventing COMELEC from
exercising its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
ISSUE: WoN the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882.
(WoN lack of sufficient funds is a ground of not to conduct of a recall election which is a right of the electorate.)
HELD: Yes. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014
GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct
recall elections for 2014.
The COMELEC’s Fiscal Autonomy
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.” The 1987
Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC’s fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by
law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.28 The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the
COMELEC Chairman.
Despite Resolution No. 9882’s statement about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide for a line item
appropriation for the conduct of recall elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a
line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. This is found in the Programs category
of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a “line item for the ‘Conduct and
one of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall elections. When the COMELEC
receives a budgetary appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation includes
expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates
v. COMELEC, recall elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the
2002 GAA.
Under these factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELEC’s reasons why it is unable to conduct
recall elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was able to conduct recall elections in 2002 despite lack of the
specific words “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x” in the 2002 GAA. In the 2002 GAA, the phrase
“Conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises” was sufficient to fund the conduct of recall
elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item appropriation for the “Conduct and supervision of x x x
recall votes x x x.”
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has “a line item for the
‘Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.’” This admission of the COMELEC is
a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation. To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a
specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into
different related sub-categories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be to “conduct elections,”
which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of the
appropriation is still specific — to fund elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated,
not only regular but also special or recall elections.
The COMELEC’s Savings
Nowhere in the COMELEC’s comment, however, does it dispute the existence of savings. In the transcript of the
hearing for the COMELEC’s 2014 budget, the COMELEC estimated to have Php10.7 billion savings around the
end of 2013. However, since the DBM did not include a line budget for certain items, Chairman Brillantes
estimated that the Php10.7 billion savings will be reduced to about Php2 billion after the COMELEC augments
expenses for the purchase of its land, warehouse, building, and the overseas absentee voting. Chairman
Brillantes also underscored the need for a line item budget for certain items that the COMELEC can subsequently
augment based on its savings. Chairman Brillantes was aware that an item without a line budget cannot be
funded by savings.
Despite the Php2 billion to Php10.7 billion savings existing in the COMELEC’s coffers, the COMELEC asserts
that it cannot legally fund the exercise of recall elections. The power to augment from savings lies dormant until
authorized by law. Flexibility in the use of public funds operates only upon legislative fiat. And that a provision
in the GAA limiting the items that can be funded from realignment of savings creates a limitation effectively
establishes a clash between the COMELEC’s constitutional mandate as an independent constitutional body to
administer recall elections and the power of Congress to appropriate public funds.
There is no clash between the COMELEC and Congress. We reiterate that the 2014 GAA provides a line item
appropriation for the COMELEC’s conduct of recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not
have sufficient funds from its current line item appropriation for the “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes
x x x” to conduct an actual recall election, then there is therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for
the current year. This is a situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC Chairman’s power to augment
actual deficiencies in the item for the “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x” in its budget
appropriation.
23. BANAT PARTYLST VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 177508 August 7, 2009 J. CARPIO
FACTS: BANAT assails the constitutionality of RA 9369, an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending Republic
Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System
in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes.
Banat argues the following:
- RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution – the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it
speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns.
- Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution – it
impairs the powers of PET and SET. Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress
and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and
the SET.
- Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution – because it gives the other prosecuting arms of
the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.
ISSUE:
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
2. Whether Secs.37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI5 and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII6 of the
Constitution.
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice
if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title
which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the
amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act as mentioned above. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, BP 881, RA 7166, and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner
deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38
amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of
BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA
7166 and BP 881, among others.
2. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no
conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and
the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC
en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice
presidential, and senatorial candidates.
3. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to “investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.”
The phrase “where appropriate” leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses
that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.
The history of election laws shows that prior to BP 881, no such “exclusive power” was ever bestowed on the
COMELEC.
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of
the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is clear that the grant of the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC
was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the
Constitution were to give the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election offenses,
the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.
The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of
the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Thus, given the plenary power of the
legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does
not violate the Constitution.
24.1 ARROYO VS. DOJ G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012 J. PERALTA
FACTS: 3 consolidated petitions and supplemental petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court filed by Mike Arroyo, Abalos and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) assailing the constitutionality of
the following:
(1) COMELEC Resolution No. 9266 “In the Matter of the Commission on Elections and Department of Justice
Joint Investigation on the Alleged Election Offenses Committed during the 2004 and 2007 Elections Pursuant to
Law”;
(2) Joint Order No. 0012011 (Joint Order) “Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee [Joint Committee] and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
Electoral Fraud and Manipulation Cases”;
(3) Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004
and 2007 National Elections (Joint Committee Rules of Procedure);
(4) Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team.
The COMELEC, acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating
the occurrence of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections, issued the abovementioned Resolutions and Orders.
- the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in
the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that petitioner Abalos and ten (10) others be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato.
- 26 persons, including petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for preliminary investigation
for electoral sabotage for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao. Several persons were also
recommended to be charged administratively, while others, including petitioner Mike Arroyo.
- Senator Aquilino Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against
petitioners and twelve others and several John Does and Jane Does.
ISSUE: I. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 “Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral
Fraud and Manipulation Cases” is constitutional in light of the following:
A. The due process clause of the 1987 Constitution
B. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
C. The principle of separation of powers
D. The independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body
II. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with
the DOJ.
A. Whether or not due process was observed by the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Fact-Finding Team and Preliminary
Investigation Committee, and the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and approval of the
Joint Panel’s Resolution.
HELD:
A. The due process clause of the 1987 Constitution
The due process clause is not infringed upon by the alleged prejudgment of the case as petitioners failed to
prove that the Joint Panel itself showed such bias and partiality against them. Neither was it shown that the
Justice Secretary herself actually intervened in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. More importantly,
considering that the Comelec is a collegial body, the perceived prejudgment of Chairman Brillantes as head of
the Comelec cannot be considered an act of the body itself.
B. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents
therein were linked to GMA; thus, Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
C. The principle of separation of powers
The assailed Joint Order did not create new offices because the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team perform
functions that they already perform by virtue of the Constitution, the statutes, and the Rules of Court.
D. The independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body
In acting jointly with the DOJ, the COMELEC cannot be considered to have abdicated its independence in favor
of the executive branch of government. Resolution No. 9266 was validly issued by the COMELEC as a means to
fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its
mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The role of the DOJ in the conduct
of preliminary investigation of election offenses has long been recognized by the COMELEC because of its lack
of funds and legal officers to conduct investigations and to prosecute such cases on its own. This is especially
true after R.A. No. 9369 vested in the COMELEC and the DOJ the concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses. While we uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9266 and Joint
Order No. 001-2011, we declare the Joint Committee’s Rules of Procedure infirm for failure to comply with the
publication requirement. Consequently, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure govern.
II. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with
the DOJ.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG, the Court decided the issues therein notwithstanding the fact that Informations had
already been filed with the trial court.
In Allado v. Diokno, a petition for Certiorari, the Court took time to determine whether or not there was, indeed,
probable cause to warrant the filing of information. This, notwithstanding the fact that information had been
filed before the Prosecutor’s office and a warrant of arrest had been issued. Petitioners therein came directly to
this Court and sought relief to rectify the injustice that they suffered.
* - Concurrent Jurisdiction applies here.
II. A. Whether or not due process was observed by the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Fact-Finding Team and Preliminary
Investigation Committee, and the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and approval of the
Joint Panel’s Resolution.
Petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They were furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits,
and other supporting documents submitted to the Joint Committee and they were required to submit their
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. As to petitioners Mike Arroyo and Abalos, the pendency of the
cases before the Court does not automatically suspend the proceedings before the Joint Committee nor excuse
them from their failure to file the required counter-affidavits. With the foregoing disquisitions, we find no reason
to nullify the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee and the COMELEC in the electoral sabotage cases
against petitioners.

24.2 ARROYO VS. DOJ

FACTS: MR not granted. Reiteration of important points.
Mike & Gloria Arroyo’s Argument:
Independence of independence of the COMELEC as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-COMELEC
resolutions.
 He insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the COMELEC.
 The DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the COMELEC but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction.
 The subject COMELEC Resolution creating the Joint Panel is different from the previous COMELEC resolutions
requesting the DOJ Secretary to assign prosecutors to assist the COMELEC, as the latter emphasize the role of
the DOJ as deputized agency in the conduct of preliminary investigation.
 It is the COMELEC and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of election cases.
DOJ-COMELEC’s Argument:
 It does not undermine the independence of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still the Comelec
that ultimately determines probable cause.
HELD: Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No. 3467 dated
January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases.
However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the COMELEC. It is
noteworthy that COMELEC Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265, OEC was still effective, while
Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 8733 and 9057 mentioned in the assailed
decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving
the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy.
In COMELEC Resolution No. 3467, the COMELEC maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the
COMELEC Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force
pursuant to the mandate of the OEC. However, with the amendment, the COMELEC likewise changed the tenor
of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the
government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department and the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of
the COMELEC -DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including Joint Order No. 001-
2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared
“constitutional” in BANAT Case, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain the previous role of
other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the amendment would mean challenging
Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been settled in Banat.
Further, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction” authorized
by the amendatory law. And Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the COMELEC and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee
finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint
Committee as an abdication of the COMELEC’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.