Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork
for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor
vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be
paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at
each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant
whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded
the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner
kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-
lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants
in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of
that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid
round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National
Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300,
respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed
can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes
in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as
consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for
the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of
the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to
be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying
or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme
depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any
money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or
 other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the
word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or
company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.—The Director
of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal
money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or
company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of
any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders
or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the
Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest
does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General
opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested
clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under
controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of
Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General
maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the
use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a
fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to
the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial
court rendered judgment as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest'
announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not
violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the
mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states
a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for
the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration
of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably
to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28,
1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al.,
G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing
crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant points
stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the
unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and
stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the
enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof —
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the
sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information
thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance
clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent
provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly
declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was
thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The
confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the
appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if
the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its
claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the
appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute
cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on
the other, concerning a real — not a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are as real as their
interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable
duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried
out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their
differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past
when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West
Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because the
said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the
contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds
from the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be
divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is
the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the
case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.
To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of
course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal
issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety —
nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion
and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p.
132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d.,
901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee
in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it
cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply
to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for
purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud
order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons
the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous
censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the
spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1,
Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can see in the present case any imposition upon our
jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he
believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve.
At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the
Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at
hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent.
In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional
advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of
a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17
App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82
A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections
1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster
General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any
information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44
Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned
provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that
of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling.
The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner
vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39
Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of
inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task
is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick
in the following terms —
 In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance,
but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the invitation
to participate therein is couched. Thus —

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything?
Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer
will dispense from — to —, and win valuable prizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go
to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same
for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which
the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the
scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to
win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this
would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to
participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give
anything of value.1awphîl.nèt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit
the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only
to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not
consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28
P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and
not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.
Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The
following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in
the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of
consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the
appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the
appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be
avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and
preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217,
Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of
consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of
whether or not the proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have found it to be — is a prohibited gift
enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears
to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting
artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a
chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck,
257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509,
5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted,
there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The
contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the broadest
sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no
added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving
an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited
(E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E.,
88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But
this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills
vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs.
Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S.,
1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words
and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific
statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms
"lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the
element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker
vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive
from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular
phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word "lottery".
With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a
sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is
concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves
a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination
thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to
prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are
declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the
recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com.
vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded
for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held —

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a
device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the
chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d.,
286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that,
under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs. (End)

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
Recaredo Ma. Calvo for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank, Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension
of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000. This special authorization was essential in
view of the memorandum order of President Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the discretional power of the local
manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be
increased to P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was granted the firm of "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C.," the only security required consisting of six demand notes. The notes, together with the interest, were
taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.

"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto Concepcion contributed P5,000;
Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion, P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin,
"casada con Gral. Venancio Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S. Concepcion was the administrator of the company.

On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank and as member of the board of
directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747.
He was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to imprisonment for
one year and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.

Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which reference must hereafter repeatedly be
made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board
of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall
violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment
not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the
alleged unlawful acts took place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.

Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court. These errors they have argued
adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in oral argument. Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally
accurate and comprehensive brief, answers the proposition of appellant one by one.

The question presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which follows:

I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion,
President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?

Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only show the
concession of a credit. In this statement of fact, counsel is correct, for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito" (credit)
and not of a " prestamo" (loan).

The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed by a lender that
he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones [1848], 13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan" means the
delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to
repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y., 146, 167.) The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit,"

II. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," by Venancio Concepcion,
President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a "discount"?
Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a "loan," it does not prohibit what is commonly
known as a "discount."

In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National Bank, inquired of the Insular Auditor
whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended to apply to discounts as well as to loans. The ruling of the Acting Insular
Auditor, dated August 11, 1916, was to the effect that said section referred to loans alone, and placed no restriction upon
discount transactions. It becomes material, therefore, to discover the distinction between a "loan" and a "discount," and to
ascertain if the instant transaction comes under the first or the latter denomination.

Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of an actual, live, transaction. But
in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount,
interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always on
double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.

Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers loans and not discounts, yet the conclusion
is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were
mere evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid when the
notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.

The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not essentially different from the facts in the
Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was declared that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so should
we here lay down the same ruling.

III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion,
President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?

Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an "indirect loan." In this connection, it
should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held one-half of the capital of this partnership.

In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director
of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters
— that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the
husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the
wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.

Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393,
1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a
bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the acknowledged fact that in
this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the
loan P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.

In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the Supreme Court of Maryland
said:

What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should borrow of the bank, and "if
any director," etc., "shall be convicted," etc., "of directly or indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by
fine and imprisonment?" We say to protect the stockholders, depositors and creditors of the bank, against the
temptation to which the directors and officers might be exposed, and the power which as such they must
necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank, and the legislature unwilling to rely upon the
implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the
most exact and faithful discharge of duty, declared in express terms that they should not borrow, etc., of the bank.

In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the Binalbagan Estate decision, it was said:

We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to himself directly. The loan was
made indirectly to him through his firm.
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of a violation of section 35 of Act
No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No. 2938,
prior to the finding of the information and the rendition of the judgment?

As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation to section 35 of the same Act,
provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the Act. It is contended, however, by the
appellant, that the repeal of these sections of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal
prosecution.

This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to such contention in the cases of
United Stated vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs. Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing and
Kwong Fok vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In other words, it has been the holding, and it must
again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense, such repeals a former Act which
penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict, and sentenced offenders charged with violations of the old law.

V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion,
President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this law?

Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the bank, and since section 49 of said
Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it violates any provisions of the law, but on a person violating any
provisions of the same, and imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition contained in said section 35 is
without penal sanction.lawph!l.net

The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors, and
to each director separately and individually. (People vs. Concepcion, supra.)

VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in extending the credit
of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a legal defense?

Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it was because he was misled by rulings
coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated that since the loans made to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion,
S. en C." have been paid, no loss has been suffered by the Philippine National Bank.

Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute which the defendant has violated, criminal
intent is not necessarily material. The doing of the inhibited act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest,
constitutes the crime. And, in this instance, as previously demonstrated, the acts of the President of the Philippine National
Bank do not fall within the purview of the rulings of the Insular Auditor, even conceding that such rulings have controlling
effect.

Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:

It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, and advantage not common to the other stockholders. The
law will not allow private profit from a trust, and will not listen to any proof of honest intent.

JUDGMENT

On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial court, and the errors assigned by the
appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this court on the same subject, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion
that no reversible error was committed in the trial of this case, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls within the limits of the
punitive provisions of the law.

Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for
allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:

Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6
years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.9 Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the
course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the
only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the
fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then
informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3)
different occasions.

The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old,
in the care of Luzviminda Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to
attend to her other son who was sick.13 During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept
together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second
occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to
their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these
instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her
siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy
watching, petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a
kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing
position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two
(2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by
his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw
petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left.
Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17

MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her
vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also
learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported
the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy
heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and
MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to
their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should
be brought to a doctor for examination.18

MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the locality who
examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested.20 Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went
to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report21
showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She
also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could
disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of
the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.

Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an organization that
helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.23 As
such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order
to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this
instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape.
However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.

Version of the Defense

Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega.24 He is the second child of three siblings ―
an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's
parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together
with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or showed his
private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely
accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have
accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house;25 they were dancing
and playing together with all the other children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act,
at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA
were having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA
what he was accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying;
AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left
AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were
summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to
BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28

Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the incident; CCC and BBB
were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are
half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her
youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and
conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could
clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or
noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon
hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything
unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the
parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and
they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a
belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not
to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no
indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted by
Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA.
Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who
recommended that they should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement
wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But
almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner
came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF
allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.29
 The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not
perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families.
Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six
(6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The
accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount
of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal.31

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over
the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any
showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element
of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great
weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its Resolution33 dated November 7,
2001.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF
CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN
FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM
REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34

Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from
overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the
result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved;
thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis
into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into
consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the
medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there
were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it
disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to
prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA,
petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and
contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age
of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to
extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions
that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days.
Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a
case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart
from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely
coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the
arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely
on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of
the lips of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and
December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have
any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other
people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it
had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not.
Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.36

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and
it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and
children at risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention,
diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its
implementation, the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it
with certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the
administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also

provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory
Provisions.43

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title VIII
Transitory Provisions

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of
children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the
child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment
of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention
programs, as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine
whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is
necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention
home.

SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. — The PNP, the BJMP and the
BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all
children in conflict with the law under their custody.

SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. — If a child
reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in
consultation with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services
and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In
case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has already
availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified
under the provisions of the Probation Law.

SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this
Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the
time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor
is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on
that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the
heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he
saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the
imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their
daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr.
Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most
cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is
improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the
hymen is not required.46 Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because
the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.47

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of
any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. 48 Therefore, while there is a crime
committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:

[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the
RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part
of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts
to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability."

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.

In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No.
9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344
was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by
R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if the child-
accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail
himself of the provisions of Section 3851 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly,
the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such
principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.

We are not persuaded.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected
to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
in accordance with existing laws.

Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of
the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the
time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No.
9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of
R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
 Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain instances involving special laws.54
R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.

In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as
follows:

Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions

Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we should insert,
after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:

ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE
OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD
SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15
YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.

The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?

Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the moment. It will take
time to develop the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children who do not have criminal liability
under this law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of
this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.

Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a diversion program, Mr.
President. That is my understanding.

Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that. That is why I was proposing
that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not
have the physical facilities.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to just craft it to ensure that the
input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals.
Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.

The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all those children in conflict with
the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration
under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.

The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for example, for conferencing
family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to
remain in detention.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower.
The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the
capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.
 The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago amendment is accepted.55

xxxx

PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS

xxxx

Senator Pimentel.

xxxx

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would like to suggest to the
Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make this law apply also to those who
might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact,
they are juveniles.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein we address
the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of
children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer." So that would be
giving retroactive effect.

Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders
erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment, subject to style.

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to address, otherwise injustice will
really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at the time of the
commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has
declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker.
The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from
the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the
spirit which gives life to

a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt
that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.57

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous
language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple
language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by
the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never
assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof
expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly
affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature
of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA
is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the
necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our children from the harshness of
life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by
Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in
the Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it
was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal
irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade
several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug
syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade.
They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are
proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or
distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. 60

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed
against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s
greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not
subject to review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.62

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are
hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No
costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.
Digested Case:

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.

Facts:

On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation regarding bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits and it was
found out that the petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources officer was
involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and illegally-cut logs in the area. So, a complaint was filed
against him which was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman to
furnished him a copy of the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the Office of the Ombudsman
since his messenger had to attend to some personal matters which the latter complied. Before proceeding to the
office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and the latter advised him that he could sign his name if
ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When he arrived at the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City, he was asked to sign his name on a log book and instead of writing his own name,
he wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative Division and hand in the letter to Loida
Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative Division in order to get a furnished copy of the complaint. Before
petitioner left, he was greeted by an acquaintance and from there Loida learned that the one who introduced his
name as Oscar Perez is actually the petitioner himself so the latter reported the matter immediately to the
Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of
the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name was fatal to its cause.
Petitioner contends that no document from the civil registry was presented to show the registered name of the
accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.The RTC
rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by
R.A. No.6085. On May 31,1993, The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the said petitioner. Petitioner
appealed to the C.A. contending that he has not violated C.A. No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he never
used any alias name, he only used such name on one occasion with an express consent of Oscar Perez himself.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or
otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner did not violateSec.1 of C.A No.142 as amended by R.A. 6085. The court ruled that there is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to used that name in addition to his real name. That name
was used in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. While the
act may be covered by other provisions of law, it does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A.
No.142

Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo.142 provides that except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of a pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one which he was registered at
birth in the office of the civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien,
with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court provided, that persons whose births have not been registered in any local
civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and
one or two surnames.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is
acquitted of the crime charged.