CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS
& FAMILY RELATIONS
(Under Dean Genevieve B. Paulino)
Prepared by:
Autida, Alpanta, Bongcayao, Calvo,
Dalugdog, Daquiado, Escabarte, Ganados,
Gordon, Intal, Lalaquil, Miral, Nadela, Pacia,
Parantar, Penales, Sa-ao, Sioson, Tizon,
Tubiano
RAYRAY v. CHAE KYUNG LEE
G.R. No. 18176, October 26, 1966
Case Digest by: Lalaquil, Norai
FACTS:
● Rayray (Plaintiff) seeks for annulment of
his marriage to Chae Kyung Lee
(Defendant)
● Defendant is a former resident of
Pusan, Korea, but her whereabouts are
unknown
● As to the Rules of Court, summons were
sent to the respondent, but she filed no
answer
● Plaintiff motioned for the default of the
defendant, and that he be given the
date for the reception of his evidence
● Lower court referred the case to the
City Fiscal of Manila, pursuant to Art. 88
and 101 of the New Civil Code
● The findings of the City Fiscal of Manila
stated that there was no collusion
between the parties of the plaintiff and
respondent, the case was heard on the
merits
● Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by
the lower court on the following
grounds:
1. The court could not
nullify a marriage
contracted abroad
2. Facts proven do not
warrant the relief
prayed for
● Plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, then the case was certified to
the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds to which the
lower court based their decision to dismiss the
plaintiff’s petition were substantial?
HELD: Yes.
● Although the first reason of the lower
court to dismiss the petition is an
erroneous conclusion
● The res is the relation between said
parties or marriage tie
● Jurisdiction depends upon the
nationality of the parties, not the place
of celebration of marriage
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● Plaintiff is a Filipino, residing in the
Philippines, and the complaint was filed
within the country
● Lower Court has jurisdiction over the
case despite the defendant being a non-
resident alien
● As for the second reason for the
dismissal, the Plaintiff presented the
following evidence:
1. He met defendant sometime in
1952
2. They lived together from
November 1952 to April 1955
3. They were married in Pusan,
Korea on March 15, 1953 as
attested on their marriage
certificate
4. Defendant secured a “Police
Clearance” (written in Korean)
in Pusan, Korea on February 16,
1953, which is necessary for her
to contract marriage with the
Plaintiff
5. He left the defendant in Korea
on June 30, 1953, and went to
India. Defendant later joined
him in India on October 1953
6. Afterwards, on February 16,
1958 the plaintiff noticed on
the translated (English) “Police
Clearance” of the defendant
that she was married to
someone else prior to March
15, 1953
7. The defendant confided to him
that she was with three other
men before they met, but she
was never married to any of
them
8. Later on , they separated ways
and he doesn’t know the
defendant’s whereabouts
● The lower court dismissed the evidence
of the “Police Clearance” as insufficient.
The document was not signd, bearing
only the seal of the Chief of Pusan
National Police; there is lack of
knowledge as to who prepared it, nor
did the Plaintiff have personal
knowledge on the truth of the entry
concerning the status of the defendant
on Febuary 15, 1953.
● The presumption is that the foreign law
is identical to the lex fori, or, in the case
at bar, the Philippine Law. Korea does
not permit polygamy or bigamy. If the
defendant was married already, why
was her marriage to the plaintiff
granted?
● Their marriage certificate does not
indicate that any of the parties have
marriages prior to the one they have,
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
whether the prior marriage had been
dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if
there had been such decree, the date
thereof
● Plaintiff also lied regarding his status
prior to his marriage to respondent. He
was married to one Adelaida Melancio,
some time in 1940
ATCI OVERSEAS CORP. vs. ECHIN
G.R.No.178551, Oct.11,2010
Case Digest by: Alpanta, Annie
FACT: Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by
petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf
of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of
Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the
position of medical technologist under a two-
year contract, denominated as a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00. Under the MOA, all newly-hired
employees undergo a probationary period of
one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil
Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000
but was terminated from employment on
February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly
passed the probationary period. As the Ministry
denied respondent’s request for
reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines
on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner
ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal),
and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. By
Decision of November 29, 2002, the Labor
Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed
that there was just cause to warrant
respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to
qualify as a regular employee, held that
respondent was illegally dismissed and
accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the
three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by
Resolution of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration having been denied
by Resolution of April 22, 2004, they appealed to
the Court of Appeals, contending that their
principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure
to meet the performance rating within the one-
year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil
Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that
Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of
petitioner ATCI.
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ISSUE: Whether or not, the principal, Ministry of
Public Health-Kuwait being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to ATCI Overseas
Corporation and that respondent was validly
dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period
as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws?
HELD: NO. Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait is not
immune from suit and that Josefina Echin was
illegally terminated, such liability is extended to
ATCI Overseas Corporation.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency,
cannot evade responsibility for the money claims
of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it
deploys abroad by the mere expediency of
claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from
suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must
first be established before it, as agent, can be
held jointly and solidarily liable.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine
labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondent’s employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in
fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules,
customs and practices of the host country, the
same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is
considered the law between the parties who can
establish stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient,
including the laws which they wish to govern
their respective obligations, as long as they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
[T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the
local agent and its foreign principal are not
coterminous with the term of such agreement
so that if either or both of the parties decide to
end the agreement, the responsibilities of such
parties towards the contracted employees under
the agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees
recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will
render nugatory the very purpose for which the
law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
claims under this section shall be joint and
several. This provision shall be incorporated in
the contract for overseas employment and shall
be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by
law, shall be answerable for all money claims or
damages that may be awarded to the workers. If
the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
TUNA PROCESSING vs.PHIL. KINGFORD
G.R. No. 185582, February 29, 2012
Case Digest by: Bongcayao, Rizalien
FACTS: Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a
corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines, entered into a
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to established Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI),
a foreign corporation not licensed to do business
in the Philippines.
Due to a series of events not mentioned
in the petition, the licensees, including
respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner
TPI and correspondingly reneged on their
obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for
arbitration before the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution in the State of California,
United States and won the case against
respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner
TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati
City. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity
to sue in the Philippines.
ISSUE Whether or not a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines, but
which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral
award
HELD: Yes.
On the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign
arbitral award should be respected not because
it is favored over domestic laws and procedures,
but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly
erased any conflict of law question.
SEC. 44. Foreign Arbitral Award Not Foreign
Judgment. - A foreign arbitral award when
confirmed by a court of a foreign country, shall
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be recognized and enforced as a foreign arbitral
award and not a judgment of a foreign court.
The Court held that Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI),
although a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason
alone, precluded from filing the Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.
AMOS G. BELLIS v. EDWARD A. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
Case Digest by: Calvo, Almira
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a former US citizen born
in Texas, had five children with his divorced first
wife, three with his second wife (who survived
him); and finally, three illegitimate children.
Six years prior to Amos G. Bellis’ death on He
executed two wills- one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate. In
both wills, the recognized illegitimate children
were not given shares but were compensated
with an appropriated amount.
Two of his illegitimate children, filed oppositions
on the ground that they were deprived of their
‘legitimes’ as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
After the parties filed their pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling with Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which
in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.
With their pleadings denied, the oppositors-
appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court
to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
ISSUE: Can the Philippine law be applied in the
case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional right.
HELD: NO. Court ruled that provision in a
foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed.
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
The decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. Under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to
be determined under Texas law, and as per the
ruling of the court with Art 16- the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
[ So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system
(law of the domicile) should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
If Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of
law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours. Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned
it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.]
*The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept
whereby the ‘Conflict of Laws Rule’ in the place
of the forum refer a matter to the Conflict of
Laws Rule in another, and the latter refers the
matter back to the forum (remission) or to a third
state (transmission). Thus, owing to its French
translation: “to send back” or “to refer back
unopened”.
Tayag v. Benguet
G.R. No. L-23145, November 29, 1968
Case Digest by: Dalugdog, Carla
FACTS: In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in
New York. She left behind properties here and
abroad. One property she left behind were two
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stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of
stocks of the Benguet Consolidated, lnc (BCI).
The said stock certificates were in the possession
of the Country Trust Company of New York (CTC-
NY). CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of
the estate of Perkins (in the USA). Meanwhile, in
1963, Renato Tayag was appointed as the
ancillary administrator (of the properties of
Perkins she left behind in the Philippines).
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to
who between them is entitled to possess the
stock certificates. A case ensued and eventually,
the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the
stock certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused.
Tayag then filed with the court a petition to have
said stock certificates be declared lost and to
compel BCI to issue new stock certificates in
replacement thereof.
The trial court granted Tayag’s petition. BCl
assailed said order as it averred that it cannot
possibly issue new stock certificates because the
two stock certificates declared lost are not
actually lost: that the trial court as well Tayag
acknowledged that the stock certificates exists
and that they are with CTC-NY: that according to
BCI's by laws, it can only issue new stock
certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed
certificates of stocks, only after court of law has
issued a final and executory order as to who
really owns a certificate of stock.
On January 27, 1964, CFI (Court of First Instance)
of Manila ordered domiciliary administrator
County Trust Company to New York to surrender
to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines
33,002 shares of stock certificates owned by her
in a Philippine Corporation, Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.
When County Trust Company of New York
refused the court ordered Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. to declare the stocks lost and
required it to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof, an appeal was taken by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. alleging the failure to comply
with its by-laws setting forth the procedure to be
followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed so
it cannot issue new stock certs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. are correct.
HELD: No.
Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes
its existence to Philippine laws. It has been given
rights and privileges under the law. Corollary, it
also has obligations under the law and one of
those is to follow valid legal court orders. It is not
immune from judicial control because it is
domiciled here in the Philippines. BCI is a
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and
subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local
courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be
considered in any wise as immune from lawful
court orders. Further, to allow BCI's opposition is
to render the court order against CTC-NY a mere
scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag without any
remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity
refuses to comply with a valid court order. The
final recourse then is for our local courts to
create a legal fiction such that the stock
certificates in issue be declared lost even though
in reality they exist in the hands of CTC-NY. This
is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the
law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate
ends have played an important part in its
development.
Further, the argument invoked by BCI that it can
only issue new stock certificates in accordance
with its bylaws is misplaced. It is worth noting
that CTC-NY did not appeal the order of the court
- it simply refused to turn over the stock
certificates hence ownership can be said to have
been settled in favor of estate of Perkins here.
Also, assuming that there really is a conflict
between BCI’s bylaws and the court order, what
should prevail is the lawful court order. It would
be highly irregular if court orders would yield to
the bylaws of a corporation. Again, a corporation
is not immune from judicial orders.
HASEGAWA vs. KITAMURA
G.R No. 149177, November 23, 2007
Case Digest by: Daquiado, Erwin
FACTS: Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm
providing infrastructure support to foreign
governments, entered into an Independent
Contractor’s Contract (ICA) with Kitamura
on April 1, 1999 with a period of oneyear.
Kitamura is a Japanese national permanently
residing in the Philippines. He was hired to work
onthe Southern Tagalog Access Road project of
the DPWH. Kitamura was named as the project
managerfor the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement project of the DPWH but was later
informed that Nippon willnot automatically
renew his contract and will only be engaging his
services until the substantialcompletion of the
Southern Tagalog project, which is until the
expiration of his contract.Kitamura sued Nippon
and Hasegawa for specific performance and
damages with RTC Lipa City.Respondents moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
claiming that the claim for impropertermination
could only be heard in the courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus. RTC denied Nippon’s motion.
The RTC’s decision was upheld by the CA.
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ISSUES:
1.W/N the finality of the CA’s decision
barred the filing of the second petition.
2.W/N Hasegawa was authorized to act
on behalf of Nippon only on the certiorari
petition filedwith the CA.
3.W/N the verification and certification
was defective.
4.W/N Rule 65 was the proper to
question the RTC’s motion to dismiss.
5.W/N the RTC had jurisdiction despite
the fact that the ICA was entered into by and
between twoJapanese nationals, written in
Japanes and executed in Tokyo, Japan.
HELD:
1.No. The CA’s dismissal of the case due to a
defective certificate of non
-forum shopping and non-statement of material
dates was a dismissal without prejudice. Nippon
can re-file the petitionwith the appropriate
attachments and material dates stated therein,
within the prescribedperiod.
2.Yes. Nippon already submitted an updated
Authorization for Hasegawa to act on behalf of
thecompany in the instant petition. The court
found the same as sufficient and in compliance
withthe Rules.
3.Yes. Hasegawa only signed the petition on his
behalf and not on behalf of Nippon. This is
because the Authorization issued him was only
issued by Nippon’s President and CEO
and not
the company’s Board of Directors. While
technical rules of procedure are designed not to
frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they
are intended to effect the proper and
orderlydisposition of cases.
4.No. It is a well-settled rule that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and
cannotbe the subject of the extraordinary
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or
mandamus. Theappropriate course is to file an
answer, interpose as defenses the objections
raised in themotion, and to proceed to trial.
In case of an adverse decision, to elevate the
entire case by
appeal in due course. Petitioners’ case does
not fall among the recognized exceptions to this
rule.
5.Yes. Jurisdiction over subject matter in
a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereignauthority which establishes and
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in
the mannerprescribed by law. To succeed in its
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject.
RAYTHEON INT’L, INC v. ROUZIE, JR
G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008
Case Digest by: Escabarte, Harris
FACTS: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a
corporation duly organized & existing under the
laws of Connecticut and Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract.
BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to
negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts.
Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of
Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption &
mudflows.
Rouzie filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust
International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination, & breach of
employment contract.
The Labor Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay
Rouzie’s money claims.
Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed
Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Rouzie filed an action for damages before the
RTC of La Union (where he was a resident)
against Raytheon International. He reiterated
that he was not paid the commissions due him
from the Pinatubo dredging project which he
secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also
averred that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon had
combined & functioned as 1 company.
RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON
CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY
OF COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC
DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA
AFFIRMED.
Raytheon’s contention: The written contract
between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice
of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.
It also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute, namely that the parties
& witnesses involved are American corporations
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& citizens & the evidence to be presented is
located outside the Philippines, which renders
our local courts inconvenient forums. The
foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens
RULING:
(a) YES
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-
laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties
and the rest, it may or can proceed to try the
case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and
the law & by the material allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or
reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action
for damages arising from an alleged breach of
contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action
and the amount of damages prayed are within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards to the jurisdiction over the parties,
the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was
acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A
STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE
GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE
PHILIPPINE COURTS, OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN
TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED
FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTION.
JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2
DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel
to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits
of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of
law stipulation will become relevant only when
the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.
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(b) NO
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-
LAWS CASES, MAY REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS
JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST
“CONVENIENT” OR AVAILABLE FORUM AND
THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM
SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE. Raytheon’s
averments of the foreign elements are not
sufficient to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over
the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on the principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination; hence, it is
more properly considered as a matter of
defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts
are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance.
TAMANO v. ORTIZ
G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998
Case Digest by: Ganados, Paul
FACTS: Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano
(Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their
marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior
to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del
Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent
Zorayda joined by her son filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and
Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves
as divorced and single, respectively, thus making
the entries in the marriage contract false and
fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never
divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was
not single when she married Tamano as the
decision annulling her previous marriage with
Romeo C. Llave never became final and
executory for non-compliance with publication
requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the RTC of Quezon was without jurisdiction over
the subject and nature of the action. She alleged
that "only a party to the marriage" could file an
action for annulment of marriage against the
other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who
could file an action for annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that
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since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims
and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to
hear and try the instant case was vested in
the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
and ruled that the instant case was properly
cognizable by the RTC of Quezon since Estrellita
and Tamano were married in accordance with
the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance
with PD No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal
laws. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the
instant petition with this Court.
We referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled that the instant case would fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts
only when filed in places where there
are shari'a court. But in places where there are
no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant
case could properly be filed before the Regional
Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has the
jurisdiction against the instant case.
HELD: Yes. Under The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract
of marriage and marital relations.
In the complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by private respondents herein, it
was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that
Estrellita and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly,
Estrellita never stated in her Motion to
Dismiss that she and Tamano were married
under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married
to Tamano under Muslim laws was first
mentioned only in her Motion for
Reconsideration.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and
Tamano were married in accordance with the
Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of
petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the
instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner
and Tamano were likewise married under
Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the
general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently,
the shari'a courts are not vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to
marriages celebrated under both civil and
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial
Courts are not divested of their general original
jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129
which provides —
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. —
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In
all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions . . .
ZAMORANOS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011
Case Digest by: Gordon, Rizza
FACTS: Marietta Zamoranos married Jesus de
Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who
had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two
got married again, this time, in civil rites before
Judge Perfecto Laguio of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman
obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of
their marriage was confirmed by the Shari'a
Circuit District Court, which issued a Decree of
Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos got married
once again. As she had previously done in her
first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos married
Samson Pacasum, Sr., her subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs where she worked, under
Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte.
Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of
their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony
before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan
City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her
and Pacasum was blessed with three (3) children,
namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three (3) children, the relationship
between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and the two were in fact separated. The volatile
relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum
escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their
minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and
Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement
which vested primary custody of the children by
Zamoranos, with Pacasum retaining visitorial
rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement caused
resentments on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of
cases against Zamoranos including a petition for
annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and
dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.
8|P age
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the
Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding
prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable
for bigamy. Consequently, an information for
bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the
RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the
Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC,
rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found
that Zamoranos and De Guzman were Muslims,
and were such at the time of their marriage,
whose marital relationship was governed by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines.
ISSUE: Was the marriage of Zamoranos to
Pacasum bigamous?
HELD: No. First, we dispose of the peripheral
issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness
of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, which heard the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the
ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of
which was already final and executory, the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the
regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court
which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
which heard the case for bigamy, should had
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration
of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos
was a Muslim, whose first marriage to another
Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized
under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further
declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De
Guzman validly ended their marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three
persons in authority, two of whom were officers
of the court, it was evident that Zamoranos was
a Muslim who married another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the
nature, consequences, and incidents of such
marriage were governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in
criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
offense. In this case, the charge of bigamy hinged
on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos was not a
Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
governed by civil law. This was obviously far from
the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower
courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of bigamy
dwelled on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still remained in
force and had yet to be dissolved. At the very
least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have
suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had
litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit
Court, and had successfully shown that it had not
been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq
entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in
the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote
the advancement and effective participation of
the National Cultural Communities, and the
State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for bigamy simply because the
regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense, defeats the purpose for the enactment
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the
equal recognition bestowed by the State on
Muslim Filipinos.
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as
other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
Therefore, Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman,
as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of
the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by
Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her
to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, was without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of
bigamy.
WASSMER V. VELEZ
G.R. NO. L-20089
Case Digest by: Intal, Mi Amor
FACTS: The plaintiff Beatriz P. Wassmer and
defendant Francisco Velez decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. However, two (2)
days before the big day the defendant left a note
to for his bride-to-be saying,
“Dear Bet –
Will have to postpone wedding- My
mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people
about the reason why- That would only
create a scandal.
9|P age
Paquing
And on the next day, the respondent sent
another telegram saying :
“Nothing changed rest assured returning
very soon apologize mama papa love
paking”
Thereafter defendant did not appear nor was he
heard from again.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages
and the judgment was rendered on April 29,
1955 for the defendant to pay the plaintiff for
damages.
The defendant filed a “petition for relief from
orders, judgment and proceedings and motion
for new trial and reconsideration.” The
defendant in support to his motion for
reconsideration asserted that “there is no
provision in the Civil Code authorizing” an action
for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant can be
sued for damages due to breach of promise to
marry.
HELD: Yes. The defendant is liable to pay the
plaintiff for damages due to breach of promise to
marry.
Article 21 for the New Civil Code provides that
“any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.”
The case at bar, is not a mere breach of promise
to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
The Court ruled that, per express provision of
Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same
could not be adjudged against him because
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton, reckless [and] oppressive
manner."
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
Therefore the Court ordered the defendant to
pay P15,000.00 for moral and exemplary
damages.
TANJANCO vs. CA,
G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966
Case Digest by: Lalaquil, Norai
FACTS: The petitioner and the defendant are
both of legal age, and single. They became
acquainted with each other sometime in
December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the
petitioner started visiting and courting the
defendant. In July 1958, they both engaged in
sexual intercourse, due to the petitioner ́s
incessant profession of his undying love and
promise of marriage to the defendant. This
continued on until about July 1959, at the same
time the defendant started conceiving which
was confirmed by a doctor. Afterwards, the
defendant confronted the petitioner about her
pregnancy and asked for the petitioner ́s
promise of marriage. Which then resulted to the
petitioner refraining from seeing the defendant
ever since, and to all intents and purposes has
broken their engagement and his promises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed an error when it dismissed the
petitioner ś appeal with regards to Article 21 of
the Civil Code
RULING: Yes. In its decision, the Court of Appeals
relied upon the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the
example set forth by the memorandum, Court of
Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort
upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction
connotes the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded. That definition of seduction is not
consistent with the position of Santos, who was
of legal age, and granted carnal access to
Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for
one whole year. Rather than being deceived,
Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco
which is incompatible with the premise behind
the idea of seduction.
Case Digest by: Miral, Dianne
Case Digest by: Nadela, June Dianne
10 | P a g e
Case Digest by: Pacia, Kath
Constantino v. Mendez
209 SCRA 18
Case Digest by: Parantar, Janilyn
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals which dismissed petitioner’s complaint
and set aside the resolution of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, ordering private respondent
Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor
Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2)
to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the
minor child; (3) to pay complaint Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and
moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s fees in
the sum of P5,000.00 plus costs.
One June 5, 1975, petitioner filed an
action for acknowledgment, support, and
damages against private respondent Ivan
Mendez. Petitioner alleges that she met the
respondent in the month of August 1974 at
Tony’s Restaurant at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where
she worked as waitress. On the following day,
respondent invited petitioner to dine with him at
Hotel Enrico where he was billeted. The
respondent brought the petitioner inside his
hotel room and through a promise of marriage
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the
latter and repeated whenever the respondent is
in Manila even after the respondent confessed
that he is a married man.
In respondent’s answer on August 5,
1975, he admitted that he met petitioner at the
Tony’s Restaurant but denied having sexual
knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
cause of action.
The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioner, Amelita Constantino.
Respondent is to pay for the actual and moral
damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs of this
suit.
Both parties filed their separate motion
for reconsideration. Respondent anchored his
motion on the ground that the award of
damages was not supported by evidence.
Petitioner on the other hand, sought the
recognition and support of her son Michael
Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan
Mendez (respondent).
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
The trial court granted the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
claim for damages based on article 19 and 21
HELD: No, the petitioner is not entitled to
claim for damages based on article 19 and 21.
According to Article 19, every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty in good
faith. Petitioner’s attraction to respondent is the
reason why she surrendered her womanhood.
Had the petitioner been induced because of a
promise of marriage, she could have
immediately ended her relation with respondent
when she knew that the respondent was
married. Since they repeated their sexual
intercourse, it was not the promise of marriage
that made her submit herself to the respondent.
The Supreme Court said “Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a
product of voluntariness and mutual desire”.
Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to claim
damages.
CCI vs. QUIÑONES
G.R. No. 175822, October 23, 2013
Case Digest by: Penales, Jomar
FACTS: Respondent, a ticketing agent of Cebu
Pacific Air, bought a pair of jeans worth P2,098
from Guess USA Boutique. While she was on her
way to Mercury Drugstore, a Guess employee
approached her and said that she failed to pay
for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she presented
an official receipt and suggested that they should
talk about the matter in the Cebu Pacific Office
located within the mall.
While they were in the office, the Guess
employees allegedly humiliated her in front of
the clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded
payment and even searched the respondent’s
wallet to check how much money she had.
Another argument ensued and after that,
respondent went home.
The Guess employees submitted two letters to
the Director of Cebu Pacific narrating the
incident but the said letters were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioners, California Clothing, Inc.,
Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and
Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due to the
incident, she suffered physical anxiety, sleepless
nights, mental anguish, fright, serious
apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral
shock and humiliation. She demanded payment
11 | P a g e
for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Petitioners stated that they
approached the respondent to clarify whether or
not payment was made and that they
approached and talked to the respondent in a
gentle and polite manner. They sought payment
for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses as counterclaim. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed both the
complaint and counterclaim stating that the
petitioners acted in good faith and the
respondent was the one who put herself in that
situation by inviting the Guess employees to the
Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the issue of
payment. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court
decision stating that there was preponderance
of evidence showing the petitioners acted in bad
faith but, Hawayon and Villagonzalo were
absolved from liability due to good faith. Since
petitioners acted in bad faith, respondent was
entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted in bad
faith which resulted to the Court of Appeals
awarding moral damages and attorney’s fees to
respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones.
RULING: Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and
the award for moral damages and
attorney’s fees to respondent was proper. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’
decision.
The principle of abuse of rights under Article 19
of the Civil Code is present in the case.
Respondent complained when petitioners
embarrassed her and insisted that she did not
pay for the black jeans despite the issuance of an
official receipt in her favor. The court cited the
case of Carpio vs. Valmonte in which the
elements of abuse of rights were enumerated.
“The elements of abuse of rights are as follows:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) Which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.”
The elements stated are complete in the present
case. First, petitioners continued to insist that
there was no payment made when respondent
already presented the black jeans with the
original receipt. Second, they accused the
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for
the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and
quickly left the shop. Third, the letters sent to the
respondent’s employer was not only intended to
ask for assistance in collection of the payment
but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation. The
exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus,
it must be in accordance with the purpose of its
establishment and not abused. Respondent was
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees
BDO v. GOMEZ
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015
Case Digest by: Sa-ao, Kam
FACTS: Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a
teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB
when a certain Colin R. Harrington opened
Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said
branch in January 1985.
The following day, Harrington presented two (2)
genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985,
issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first
draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to
"C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in
the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants
C/C.R. Harrington."
Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked
her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R.
Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the
savings account of Harrington. When Flores
answered in the affirmative, and after receiving
from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a
Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts
reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the
deposit slip.
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual
representing himself as Harrington withdrew the
sums of P45, 000.00 and P5, 600.00.
Subsequently, the bank discovered that the
person who made the withdrawals was an
impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington
P50, 600.00 representing the amounts of the
bank drafts in his name.
The PCIB issued a memorandum asking
Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for having accepted
the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned
that being a new teller she was not yet fully
oriented with the various aspects of the job. She
further alleged that she had asked the approval
of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving
the deposits.
On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the
amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the
deduction was made.
After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB
issued another memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and liable for performing acts
in violation of established operating procedures.
The memorandum required Josephine to pay the
amount of P-50,600.00 through deductions in
12 | P a g e
her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit
sharing until the amount is fully paid.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of
its findings that she was grossly negligent and
liable to pay the amount of P50, 600.00. During
trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even
respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged
that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and
explained that she was afforded due process and
the deductions made prior to January 15, 1986,
were merely a withholding pending the
investigation.
On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a
complaint for damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati
City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its
right by gradually deducting from her salary the
amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the
PCIB to pay her actual damages.
The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of
deducting from the salary and allowance of
Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith
and contrary to morals, good custom, and public
policy.
In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the
May 25, 1999 RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in
ruling that its actions were in total and wanton
disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
because the courts a quo summarily imputed
bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.
HELD: No.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. The principle embodied in this
provision is more commonly known as the
"abuse of right principle." The legal sanctions for
violations of this fundamental principle are
found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice;
to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS
by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government
of human' relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the
PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the
Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages.
While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees
for acts of negligence, the right must not be
exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant
case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's
salary even if the investigation was still pending.
Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum
finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring
her to pay the amount which the bank
erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor.
When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis
for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to
give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make
deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances,
and bonuses.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED.
Spouses Hing v. Choachuy
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Case Digest by: Sioson, Jinkee
FACTS: On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses
Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint for
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to
Branch 28, against respondents Alexander
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered
owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817
situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu and that respondents are the owners of
Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo)
located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the
property of petitioners. Respondents
constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo
Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C. On April 2005,
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
13 | P a g e
Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
5125 that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and that the said construction would
destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent
to petitioners’ property. The court denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure
to substantiate its allegations and in order to get
evidence to support the said case, respondents
on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on
the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners’
property. Respondents, through their employees
and without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures of petitioners’ on-going
construction and that the acts of respondents
violate petitioners’ right to privacy. Petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove
the video surveillance cameras and enjoined
from conducting illegal surveillance.
Respondents claimed that they did not install the
video surveillance cameras nor did they order
their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
construction. They also clarified that they are
not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.On October 18, 2005, the RTC
issued an Order granting the application for a
TRO. Respondents moved for a
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in
its Order dated February 6, 2006. Respondents
filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for
a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On
July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision granting
the Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the
Petitioners right to privacy
HELD: The Petition is meritorious. The right to
privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to
a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right
of an individual “to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the
public is not necessarily concerned.” The right to
privacy is “the right to be let alone.”The Bill of
Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy
and protects them against the State’s abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the
right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except “in
case of overriding social need and then only
under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can
disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
protects an individual’s right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS by LOST STUDENTS

be committed against him by other made to extend the view to [petitioners’] lot. To
individuals. It states: Art. 26. Every person shall allow the [respondents] to do that over the
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and objection of the [petitioners] would violate the
peace of mind of his neighbors and other right of [petitioners] as property owners. “The
persons. owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such
a manner as to injure the rights of a third
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is person.”
his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have
“any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their
inquisitively into the residence of another property, whether they use it as a business office
without the consent of the latter.” The phrase or as a residence and that the installation of
“prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” video surveillance cameras directly facing
however, does not mean that only the residence petitioners’ property or covering a significant
is entitled to privacy. An individual’s right to portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear
privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code violation of their right to privacy.
should not be confined to his house or residence
as it may extend to places where he has the right Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical
to exclude the public or deny them access. The personality separate and distinct from its
phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s stockholders, records show that it is a family-
residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, owned corporation managed by the Choachuy
or even situations which an individual considers family. All these taken together lead us to the
as private. And as long as his right is recognized inevitable conclusion that respondents are
by society, other individuals may not infringe on merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a
his right to privacy. In ascertaining whether there shield to protect themselves from this suit. In
is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use view of the foregoing, we find that respondents
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” are the proper parties to this suit.
test. This test determines whether a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
the expectation has been violated. In this day
and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and Case Digest by: Tizon, Alan
safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places
where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was
obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to Case Digest by: Tubiano, Aira
pry into the privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There
is basis to grant the application for a temporary
restraining order. The operation by
[respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it
were mounted on their building, violated the
right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the
owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not
only focus on [respondents’] property or the roof
of the factory at the back (Aldo Development
and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through
a good portion of [the] land of [petitioners].
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court
understands why [petitioner] Hing was so
unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera
was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor
showed only a portion of the roof of the factory
of [Aldo]. If the purpose of [respondents] in
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the
building and factory premises, then the camera
should revolve only towards their properties at
the back. [Respondents’] camera cannot be

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