Capek On Eternal Recurrence

Capek on Eternal Recurrence
Bas C. Van Fraassen
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 14. (Jul. 5, 1962), pp. 371-375.
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Tue Jun 19 06:30:11 2007
COMMENTS AND CRITICISM
COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

CAPEK ON ETERNAL RECURRENCE *
I n a recent paper Milic Capek has argued that the theory of

eternal recurrence, or the cyclical theory of time, is incompatible
with recent developments in physicst Capek points out that the
theory presupposes "that it is meaningful to speak about a definite
'state of the universe' a t each particular instant." He argues
that, in view of the theory of relativity and quantum physics, "the
concept of instantaneous states of the universe loses its physical
significance." Sections I and I1 of the present paper argue against
this contention. I n his opening sentence, Capek describes the
cylical theory of time as being "better known under the name of
the 'theory of eternal recurrence'." Section I11 attempts to show
that these are in fact two distinct theories. Section IV examines
Capek's discussion of logical difficulties involved in the concept
of cyclical time.
I
Since the theory of relativity rejects the concept of absolute
simultaneity, Capek feels, we cannot speak of the universe at a
given instant. Happily this does not follow, for we can define
simultaneity uniquely even in the theory of relativity. Reichen-
bach's "causal" theory of time defines a temporal order of events
through the following coordinative definitions : l
Event B is temporally between A and C if a causal connection between
A and B, and between B and C, is physically possible.
If no causal connection is physically possible between two events, they
are indeterminate as to time order, or simultaneous.
Hans Reichenbach has developed this theory in his book The Direc-
tiorz of Time.2
I n classical physics, the causal theory of time uniquely defined

simultaneity, since there were no restrictions on the speed of causal
* T h e author gratefully acknowledges the valuable help received from
Dr. Karel Lambert.
t Capek, M., "The Theory of Eternal Recurrence in Modern Philosophy
of Science, with Special Reference to C. S. Peirce," this JOURNAL,57, 9 (April
28, 1960): 289-296.
1 Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time (New Pork:
Dover Publications, 1958).
2Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956; reviewed by Hilary
Putnam in this JOURNAL, 49, 8 (April 12, 1962): 213 f. This work will be
referred to as D from here on.
372 T H E JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
processes. I n the theory of relativity the velocity of light c is the

limiting velocity. If points P and Q are a distance s apart, it takes
a light signal a time interval 2 ( s / c ) to travel from P to Q and
back. All events that happen at P during this interval are
"indeterminate as to time order" relative to the arrival of the
signal at Q. If we now designate the three instants involved by
t, t', and t", simultaneity is uniquely defined by
where k can be given any value between 0 and 1 (usually 1/2).

On this basis, we can make an instantaneous cross section of
the universe in the following manner: An instantaneous cross
section of the universe is a cross section at any time t, specified
with reference to, say, the earth, where k is given a fixed, specified
value. But then we can formulate a "minimum" theory of eternal
recurrence :
For any instant t, between t' and t", there are infinitely many instants
t"', not between t' and t", such that, for any cross section A of the uni-
verse at t, there is a cross section A' at t"' (where k is kept constant),
such that A=A1.
We shall say that two states A and B are identical if the most
accurate possible description of A is also the most accurate possible
description of B.
I1
We have now shown that on the basis of the theory of relativity
we can still speak of the world at a given instant, but we must
yet consider Capek's argument from quantum physics. Capek
points out that the theory of eternal recurrence has as a major
premise that the universe is made up of a finite number of distinct
atomic entities. The purpose of this premise is to establish that each
state of the universe can be thought of as a definite configuration
of physical quantities. Therefore, if the premise, admittedly taken
from classical physics, is outdated, the theory is not affected if we
can show that contemporary physics leads to the same view.
Quantum physics challenges the premise in two ways: (1) the
particles are not individually distinguishable, and (2) they lack
permanence through time. To deal with particles that behave as
though they were indistinguishable, the Bose-Einstein statistics
were de~eloped.~Where before we talked of the probability of a
certain particle being in state C, we now talk of the probability
of a certain state C being occupied by a certain number of particlek.
3 Eyring, H., Quantum Chemistry (New York, 1957), pp. 282-289; D,
QQ26 and 27.
COlVMENTS AND CRITICISM
Again, definite configurations are both possible and meaningful,

and, since quantum processes are not irreversible, the same con-
figuration may recur. This statistical treatment also disposes of
the objection that the particles lack permanence through time.
For an arrangement is the same if the numbers of (indistinguish-
able) particles occupying the states C, C', . . . , respectively, are
the same.
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy states, in effect, that
for every physical quantity p, there are many such quantities q,
which cannot be measured simultaneously with p. Capek argues
that from this it follows that we cannot speak of nature, at the
subatomic level, a t a given i n ~ t a n t . ~He further states that "if
there is no definite state of the universe at anp moment, it is
certainly meaningless to speak of the possibility that such a state
will occur again. "
There is no reason why Capek's arguments from quantum
mechanics, if valid, should apply to the universe only. It followg
then that it is meaningless to say of any system that it does or
does not pass through the same state twice. I n other words, it is
meaningless to speak of processes being either reversible or irre-
versible ! This conclusion would have far-reaching effects indeed.
I t seems to me, rather, that Capek is mistaken in his understanding
of contemporary physics. The fundamental device of quantum
theory, the psi-function, supplies a description of the physical
state of a system, which is as complete as p ~ s s i b l e . ~We can thus
say that the state of a system S is the same a t times t and t', if the
psi-function of S has the same value at t and t'.
Unless the theory of eternal recurrence is incompatible with
physics for some reason other than those stated by Capek, the
field where it is to meet its Marathon or Thermopylae is cosmology.
Unfortunately data are scarce here, and cosmologists are at present
unable to decide between several rival t h e o r i e ~ . ~
When a generally
accepted cosmological theory has been produced, the question
whether eternal recurrence is consistent with our scientific knowl-
edge will again be relevant.
Capek then argues that, because of logical difficulties, the theory

lands in a dilemma of which both horns are fatal. The cyclical
theory of time is based on the "relational" or "causal" theory
4 Capek, op. cit., p. 294.
5 Capek, lac. cit.
6 Eyring, op. cit., p. 28.
7 Reiehenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1951), pp. 210-212.
3 74 T H E JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of time; yet it needs an absolute concept of time to formulate its

conclusions. Before we examine his arguments, we must ask
whether Capek is correct in identifying the theory of eternal recur-
rence with the cyclical theory of time.
The simple nineteenth-century argument for eternal recurrence
can be restated as follows:
1. The universe is a closed system containing a finite number n of ele-
mentary particles; its total energy E is fixed and finite.
2. Time has no beginning or end (is unbounded).
Poinear6 proved in 1890 that any system satisfying premise 1
will in time pass again through every configuration through which
it has already passed.* Since time is unbounded (premise 2),
this process will have no end where the universe is concerned. But
this argument does not lead to cyclical time. The theory of eternal
recurrence maintains that if A, B, C, . . . , N represent all pos-
sible states of the universe, each of A, . . . , N will recur again
and again; it does not specify any definite order of recurrence.
The cyclical theory of time, however, asserts that the sequence
A, . . . , N will recur i n d e f i n i t e l ~ . ~Therefore, to arrive a t the
cyclical theory of time we need the further premise that identical
states are followed by identical states. More formally,
3. I f state A is followed by state B and i f there is a state A' identical
with A , then A' is followed by a state B', identical with B.
The ordering principle postulated in 3 may be made to depend
on an interpretation of causality. The principle of causality can
be partially formulated as follows: Given a finite volume V , we
can predict the state of affairs in V a t time t' if we are given a
cross section of V a t a preceding time t and also the state a t the
surface of V from t to t'.1° When V is the universe, we do not
need to know the boundary conditions, since effects from outside
are by definition excluded. The principle can thus be stated for
the universe :
4. I f D is the most accurate possible description of the state of the
universe a t time t', and D' is such a description of the universe a t time t',
then D implies D'.
A deterministic interpretation of 4 asserts:
5. The probability value of the implication " D implies D' " in 4 equals 1
(certainty).
Capek, op. cit., p. 291; D, pp. 78-79.
8
As Capek remarks, the cyclical theory of time postulates a cosmological
9
closed causal chain. This situation is allomed f o r in the theory of relativity;
see D, pp. 38-39.
10 Schlick, M., Nature, 8 (1920) : 461 f.; Reichenbach, Modern Philosophy
of Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1959)) p. 112; D, $11.
COMIMENTS A N D CRITICISM 375
As in See. I, we specify that two cross sections A and B are identical

if 'the same optimum description applies to both. I t follows then
from 5 that identical states are followed by identical states. That
is, premises 1, 2, and 5 are necessary and sufficient to arrive at the
conclusion that time is cyclical.
Hans Reichenbach has argued that determinism is not justified
by classical physics and is incompatible with quantum theory.ll
On this view the probability value of "D implies D' " is less than
1, and premise 5 is rejected. We may conclude that, although
eternal recurrence is consistent with contemporary physics, the
cyclical theory of time is not, if 3 is to be justified by a determi-
nistic interpretation of causality.
Even granting the above, there remains Capek's claim that the
cyclical theory of time suffers from logical inconsistency. Capek
argues that the concept of successive, completely identical cycles
is meaningless. If there is nothing to differentiate one cycle from
another, then, by the principle of the identity of indiscernibles,
they are one and the same cycle.12 That is true; but this does
not do away with the theory. Let us imagine the history of the
universe pictorially represented by a curve. Then, if any part
of the curve is circular, we may not say that the universe has
traveled this circle 2, 3, 4, . . . or n times. We may postulate
only as many cycles as the minimum required by the curve. This
will be a number equal to or larger than 1, but smaller than 2,
the exact value depending on where the curve enters and leaves
the circle.
If the cyclical theory of time is true, then the curve as a
whole is circular, and we may only assume the universe to have
traveled this circle exactly once. That is, Capek has shown not
that the theory is self-contradictory, but that it leads to the view
that time is h i t e , though unbounded. This conclusion does not
contradict premise 2, See. 111, which states only that time is un-
bounded. Capek is right when he states that we can only speak
of successive, identical cycles if we assume absolute time; he is
wrong when he believes that the theory that time is cyclical cannot
be formulated within a relational theory of time.
11 D, $$I1 and 25; Modern Philosophy o f Science, chs. 3 and 5.

12 Capek, op. cit., pp. 294-295.
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Capek on Eternal Recurrence
Bas C. Van Fraassen
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 14. (Jul. 5, 1962), pp. 371-375.
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[Footnotes]
†
The Theory of Eternal Recurrence in Modern Philosophy of Science, with Special Reference
to C. S. Peirce
Milic Capek
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 9. (Apr. 28, 1960), pp. 289-296.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819600428%2957%3A9%3C289%3ATTOERI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
2
Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
The Direction of Time by Hans Reichenbach; Maria Reichenbach
Hilary Putnam
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3
Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
Hilary Putnam
Stable URL:
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
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to C. S. Peirce
Milic Capek
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5
to C. S. Peirce
Milic Capek
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8
to C. S. Peirce
Milic Capek
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8
Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
Hilary Putnam
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9
Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
Hilary Putnam
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Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
Hilary Putnam
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Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
Hilary Putnam
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12
to C. S. Peirce
Milic Capek
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Capek on Eternal Recurrence

Bas C. Van Fraassen

The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

I n a recent paper Milic Capek has argued that the theory of

I n classical physics, the causal theory of time uniquely defined

processes. I n the theory of relativity the velocity of light c is the

where k can be given any value between 0 and 1 (usually 1/2).

Again, definite configurations are both possible and meaningful,

Capek then argues that, because of logical difficulties, the theory

of time; yet it needs an absolute concept of time to formulate its

As in See. I, we specify that two cross sections A and B are identical

11 D, $$I1 and 25; Modern Philosophy o f Science, chs. 3 and 5.

You have printed the following article:

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