G.R. No.

113107 July 20, 1994

WILMAR P. LUCERO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 113509 July 20, 1994

JOSE L. ONG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and WILMAR P. LUCERO, respondents.
Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Wilmar Lucero.
Napolean G. Rama and Remollo Melocoton & Associates for Jose L. Ong, Jr.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

After the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petitions therein and to decide the cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the
parties to delay these cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified
uncomplicated issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second Legislative District
of Northern Samar of representation in the House of Representatives for more than two years
now.

These cases are sequels to G. R. No. 105717, entitled "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections and Wilmar P. Lucero," which we finally resolved on 22 April 1993. 1 The petitioners
were two of the five candidates 2 for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the
synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L.
Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204
votes. However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of
Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they
were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and
no election was held; and of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the
election returns were missing.

On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282,
to:

1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to

suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.;

2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to correct the
Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and, accordingly, to correct the total votes so
far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to 24,088, thus reducing the margin it found in favor
of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr. from 204 to 184 votes only;

3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos, pursuant to
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;

4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District of Northern
Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay Camayaan, both of Silvino
Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code;

5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts herein above
enumerated in order to correct "manifest errors" pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act 7166
and for this purpose order the impounding and safekeeping of the ballot boxes of all said
precincts in order to preserve the integrity of the ballots and other election paraphernalia
contained therein. 3

On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC to
desist from reconvening until further orders.

On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero
opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the
PBC were to reconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran)
of Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay
Camayaan) and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.

On 13 June 1993, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial Election Supervisor of Northern
Samar to bring to the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes
from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner
and the respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect, and to notify said
parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town is directed to turn over custody of said
ballot boxes to the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned
over by the appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn give one key
for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of the petitioner and the respondent.

The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, and
the Chairman and members of the Boards of Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said
municipality to appear before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof.

Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners, however, Chairman
Christian S. Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B. Yorac, Dario C. Rama and Regalado E.
Maambong directed as follows:

We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the correction of the
Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is
in order in view of the testimony of the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar
Lucero garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction was duly filed
by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total
number of votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial Certificate of
Canvass. 4

On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election
Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos.5

On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court and
subsequently docketed as G. R. No. 105717, questioned the order for the recount of ballots in
Precincts No. 7 and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the
recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2
votes for Ong. 6

On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G. R. No. 105717 a temporary restraining order against
the implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June
1992.

On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G. R. No. 105717, 7 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and a writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order
of June 2, 1992, and its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby declared
NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on the recounted ballots from Precinct
16 are hereby DISCARDED and in lieu thereof, authentic returns from said precinct should
instead be made a basis for the canvassing. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern
Samar is hereby directed to PROCEED WITH DISPATCH in the canvassing of ballots until
completed and to PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the congressional seat for the Second
District of Northern Samar.

This decision is immediately executory. 8

Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by the COMELEC
and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993, modified 9 its aforesaid disposition in G. R. No. 105717
as follows;
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the December 23, 1992 Decision
is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows;

"WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992 ORDER OF

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO. 92-282 IS HEREBY ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992 RESOLUTION THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE INSOFAR AS IT AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE
RECOUNT OF VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE CORRECTION OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS, BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH RESPECT TO THE
ISSUE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF
THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCT
NO. 16.

THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ASSIGN

SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS PURSUANT TO ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF
CASES FOR IT TO RESOLVE THE PRE-PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN
SECTION 15 OF R. A. NO. 7166.

WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL

A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR,
AND (B) RECONVENE THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS AND THE
SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD EARLIER CONSTITUTED OR
CREATE NEW ONES.

ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL DISPATCH TO THE END
THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE." 10

As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this Court explicitly stated;

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a
pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Section
15 of R. A. No. 7166. 11

Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G. R. No. 105717, SPA No. 92-282 was
raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which conducted hearings thereon and received
the arguments and evidence of both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda
on 25 June 1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of the First
Division, the concurrence of at least two of them could not be obtained; accordingly, pursuant
to the COMELEC Rules, the case was elevated for proper disposition to the COMELEC en
banc to which the parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993. 12

On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution 13 whose dispositive

portion reads as follows:

1. To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to include
in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the forty-three (43) votes of petitioner
Lucero and the two (2) votes of private respondent Ong as reflected in the election returns of
Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared by the special Board of Election Inspectors
constituted by the Commission to recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by
the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal
certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and
29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC Copy submitted
as "Comelec Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special
Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the total number of votes of
petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the provincial certificate of
canvass the correct total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected
in the Statement of Votes (C. E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of
the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals)
and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos and the total votes of
petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as corrected. However, under no
circumstances should the Board proclaim any winning candidate until instructed to do so by the
Commission;

2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13
(Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the
schedule of election activities for that precinct; and

3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13,
to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos,
pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to resolve the discrepancy of the votes
of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidates concerned
would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending
parties shall have been determined.

Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions for
certiorari to challenge the Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of
Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2)
his chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the
returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to order the correction
of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the
absence of any appeal; and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are:

(1) Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos
before determining the necessity of holding a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino
Lobos:

(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the correction
of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas; and

(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special
election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1) year and
ten (10) months, following the day of the synchronized elections.

We shall take up these issues seriatim.

I.

The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative.

We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be unclear. In the first
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board
of Canvassers "to include in the municipal certificate of canvas of Silvino Lobos the sixty-one
(61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected
in the election returns (MBC copy submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay
Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos,"
and "to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including
therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in
Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. . . ." On the other hand, in the fourth paragraph of the
said dispositive portion, it orders the Provincial Board of Canvassers, after "including in the
tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the
recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the
same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all
results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been
determined."
Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7, the
COMELEC would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election returns thereof, which
it describes as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal
certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero
— 29, 30, or 31. The recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13
shall have been held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.

We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the COMELEC, which has
in its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the questioned election returns of Precinct
No. 7 and heard the witnesses who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called
"Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7; 14 hence, it authorizes the PBC to
decide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code." Since it
doubts such authenticity, it could not, without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the
inclusion of the "votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the election
returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an uncontroverted fact that an
election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties
fully knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special
election may be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect
the result of the election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the
rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over
that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct
where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the
election"; hence, a special election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election
in Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been
included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No.
7 can by no means be validly included in the municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence
in the "preparation" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution
and in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and
Claravall, leaves no room for doubt that there was actually no counting of the votes in Precinct
No. 7. Quoted in the challenged Resolution is a portion of the testimony of Sabina T. Jarito,
Precinct Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on questions by COMELEC
Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly
admitted that the election returns were prepared at the "munisipyo" or municipal building and
not at the polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay Camaya-an. 15 This "munisipyo" is located
at the poblacion of Silvino Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare
the election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place. 16 There is
no evidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for valid reasons, authorized the transfer of
venue of the counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-
an to the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the latter. Although
in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a
reference to Exhibit "E," the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they
declare that after the voting the Board of Election Inspectors unanimously approved to transfer
the counting of votes to the Municipal Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was
allegedly concurred in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates present, the
alleged "counting" at the municipal building was denied by no less than the Municipal Election
Officer of Silvino Lobos, Antonio Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel
Basarte, in their affidavits marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G,"
respectively. 17

Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns could be
made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication. A recount
thereof, which presupposes a prior count, would obviously be unwarranted.

Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order. Sections 234,
235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still inapplicable. And, in the light of what
we stated before in relation to the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of
Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13.

II.

Ong's first grievance in G. R. No. 113509 is without merit.

The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in the municipal certificate
of canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to the declaration made by this Court in G. R. No.
105717 (Ong vs. COMELEC) 18 that:

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a
pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Sec.
15 of R. A. No. 7166.

Since no motion for reconsideration was filed in that case, the decision therein became final
and entry of judgment was made on 4 August 1993. Consequently, Ong cannot now re-litigate
the issue of the correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas.

III

On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call
for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement,

declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5,
6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by
a majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may
occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would
affect the results of the election. The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No.
13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the
necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the result
of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns.
The COMELEC held:

Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality
of Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos),
and the votes reflected in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino
Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene
to sum up the votes of the contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of
two hundred four (204) votes against petitioner Lucero — 24,272 as against 24,068 — will be
reduced to either 175 or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high
of 31 votes as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 7.

Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of Canvassers
can correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be held
in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos.

...

Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the
affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13
is two hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of
registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result because of the
possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority
might be more than the present lead of Ong. 19

On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, 20 the following computation
is in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of
24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from
Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is
admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13. 21

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
have indeed been met.

In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of
the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions
of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In
the instant case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the
rest of the electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as
stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or
maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that G. R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court. 22 Considering
then that the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account
the fact that since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding
of a special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered
"reasonably close to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should then be
rejected.

In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible application,
by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special election
in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if
the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election,"
and of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least
one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after
the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the underlying
philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy occurred within a certain
period before the next presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is
obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when
a regular election is, after all, less than a year away. The Court ultimately resolved that the
aforesaid constitutional and statutory proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which
may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special election in the
former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and Members
of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or
by reason of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail
minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by
the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of election.
On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and
Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide. Third, Section 6,
when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had been
proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would
be unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately
determine the winning candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation
until the end of the term. under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected
officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office.
Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding
of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R. A. No.
7166.
Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's disposition
of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and proclaimed the
duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the
fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the
results of the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election
in Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an incomplete
canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of Precinct
No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the
Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very
least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G. R. No. 113509; and

II. In G. R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on Elections to:

(1) Reconvene, in its main office of Manila, within five (5) days from notice hereof, the
Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, which shall
then, as a special Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 7 of said municipality, within
forty-eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the ballots of said Precinct No. 7, and deliver
to the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of the said Province a copy of the election returns;

(2) Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as aforestated, the
special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar which shall then, within seventy-two
(72) hours from its reconvening:

(a) Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos (1) the total number
of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in
Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the
aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2) the forty-three (43) votes for
petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and the two (2) votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in
the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared, after a recount of the
ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers; and after such inclusions to enter the new totals
of the votes for the petitioners in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(b) Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for the Municipality of Las
Navas, Northern Samar, which shall be two thousand and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as
reflected in the Statement of Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the same in the Certificate of Provincial
Canvass;

(c) After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew in the Certificate of
Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal certificates of canvass of all the municipalities of
the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar and if the same would establish that the
difference in votes between petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. is less
than two hundred and thirteen (213), hence the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 would
unavoidably and inevitably affect then the result of the election, to report to the Commission on
Elections such fact and to furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate of
Provincial Canvass;

(3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the special Provincial
Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, which
shall be held not later than thirty (30) days from such call; a copy of the election returns of said
special election shall forthwith be transmitted to the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Northern Samar, which shall then enter the results thereof in its canvass and make a final
summation of the results in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to
the Omnibus Election Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the
Commission, proclaim the winning candidate for Representative of the Second Legislative
District of Northern Samar.
If for any reason whatsoever it would not be possible to immediately reconvene the Special
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Silvino Lobos and the Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Northern Samar, the COMELEC may create new ones.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,

petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

NOTE: nay separate opinion (wa nako giapil diri)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the
people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987
Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent1 and
the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution
were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2)
by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we
resolved to give due course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein
Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist

Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people
power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal
election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before
the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and
dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed,
be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision
of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and
7 of Article VI,7 Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached
to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the
proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after
it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it
will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to
cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature
form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own
expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December
1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and
Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other
lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by
People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending
before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former
Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered
before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have
been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because
the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC
has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend
the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the
power of the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the
purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege
that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded
by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters
amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses
which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental
importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for
prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and
calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the
petition. They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF
THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991

PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT
SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A

PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH
RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE

OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND.
ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which
starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6
December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary
to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather
signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the
petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such
initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative
to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more
specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the
entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of
P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there
will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the
exercise of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the
Office of the Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and
its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the
Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the
Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735
does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement
the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order;
(b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order
filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating
that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the
Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6
January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later
than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced
by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change
from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such
as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the
political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership,
to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to
promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the
1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-
of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the
people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a
premium for good performance. 20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the
proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is
to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and
means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f)
the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of
the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the
appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a
people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the
Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's
right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law
to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent
Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for
initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the
proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the
initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
on the initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required
number of signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only
by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention
filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed
by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file
within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid
Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a
nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within
a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal
issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the
pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in
the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an
amendment to, the Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned
proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit
copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations
and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the
Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the
Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505,
as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter
filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE
DELFIN PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer.
Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding
any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the
proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In
this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of
legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the
arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them
to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or
specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering
Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative,
the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the
petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number
of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number
of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil
action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of
its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS

TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment
or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30
That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section
___of the Constitution. 31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a
new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted
this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee
report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no
details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does
not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite
could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is
right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called
until after five years from the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first
amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after
five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can
come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to be
carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is
the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that
possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as
a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the
three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal
to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment
thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent
power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values,
the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a
separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again
concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of
amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative,
which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. 34

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative
as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process
of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by
the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner

Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with
the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into
account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners
Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. —
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of
the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the
proposed amendment. 36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature
to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from
asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this
particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for
submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words,
none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on

line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through
initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by
the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would
require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the process
of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary
legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a
referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by
way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on
the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as
follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on
9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was
allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view
thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law"
in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text
of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer
the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point
to us R.A. No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last
minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of
Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:

The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
carried out." 46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of
the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill
No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt
with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under
Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning
ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives.
51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does
not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to
amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from
Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative
and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject"
and "in whole or in part." 52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of
the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems
of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought
to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as
follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and
for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735
to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local
Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the
scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what
is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into
national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and
clearer understanding:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms —

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1)
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments; thus:

Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may
file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions
for both national and local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative
and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local
initiative and referendum. It reads:

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts
from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details
in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby
giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides
for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of
the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes
for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for
the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation
of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local
government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the
registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all
of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b)
defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems
of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system
of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured
by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of
the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to

promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND

REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.
IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of
Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition
for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin
himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is
primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures,
the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting
en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such
petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records
and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;
65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election. 66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions
or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the
term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide
for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution;
and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition

(UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against
the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS,
respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one thing, it institutionalized people power
in law-making. Learning from the bitter lesson of completely surrending to Congress the sole
authority to make, amend or repeal laws, the present Constitution concurrently vested such
prerogatives in the electorate by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to
ordain legislation directly through the concepts and processes of initiative and of referendum.

In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and discusses the practical
and legal implications of such differences. It also sets down some guidelines in the conduct and
implementation of these two novel and vital features of popular democracy, as well as settles
some relevant questions on jurisdiction — all with the purpose of nurturing, protecting and
promoting the people's exercise of direct democracy.

In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent Commission
on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June 27,
19961 denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the
proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong, Bataan.

The Facts

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic
Economic Zone, thus:

Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. — Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlugnsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipalities of Subic. Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and
Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of
Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as
embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic
Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be
issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act,
each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall
issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein." (Emphasis
supplied)
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the
Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.2 Petitioner was organized with an
authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the
Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and
defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper
inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency".3

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations
left by the American navy.

In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec.
12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to
the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The
petition prayed for the following:

I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa and Pambayang Kapasyahang Blg. 10, Serye

1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na walang kundisyon.

II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEFZ
kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa
kapakanan at interest ng Morong at Bataan:

(A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" — isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at punong-
puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman.

(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.

(K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng

salaping ipinagkaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) sa
Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.

(D) Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" and bawat bayan ng
Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.

(E) Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.

(G) Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.

(H) Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito
sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng
pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.

(I) Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-

Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng
mga kabundukan.

(J) Magkakaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong,

Hermosa at Bataan.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas,
et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of
the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227, particularly those concerning the
matters cited in items (A), (B), (K), (E), and (G) of private respondent's petition. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already
been referred to and favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the
Bases Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the President.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted
to their power initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991,4 Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of
which provides as follows:

Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents,
through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the sangguniang concerned.

xxx xxx xxx

On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied
the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13,
1993, public respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-1676) further
directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures
being solicited by private respondents.

On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus5
before this Court against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a
local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec
Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan
from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support of the
initiative and the gathering of signatures.

On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation included
in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base, including Grande Island and that
portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled
Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the
assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".

On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is
intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law. . . .

The Issues

The petition6 presents the following "argument":

Respondent Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

of jurisdiction in scheduling a local initiative which seeks the amendment of a national law.

In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1) petitioner has failed to show the
existence of an actual case of controversy: (2) . . . petitioner seeks to overturn a
decision/judgment which has long become final and executory; (3) . . . public respondent has
not abused its discretion and has in fact acted within its jurisdiction; (and) (4) . . . the
concurrence of local government units is required for the establishment of the Subic Special
Economic Zone."

Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of Morong, in his Reply (should be
Comment) joined petitioner's cause because "(a)fter several meetings with petitioner's
Chairman and staff and after consultation with legal counsel, respondent Calimbas discovered
that the demands in the petition for a local initiative/referendum were not legally feasible." 7
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent, identified two issues, as follows:

1. Whether or not the Comelec can be enjoined from scheduling/conducting the local
initiative proposing to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

2. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
request of petitioner SBMA to stop the local initiative.

On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the parties, after which, it issued the
following Resolution:

The Court Resolved to: (1) GRANT the Motion to Admit the Attachment Comment filed by
counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (2) NOTE the: (a)
Reply (should be comment) to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, filed by counsel for respondent Catalino
Calimbas, date July 22, 1996; (b) Separate Comments on the petition, filed by: (b-1) the Solicitor
General for respondent Commission on Elections dated July 19, 1996 and (b-2) counsel for
private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996, all filed in compliance with the
resolution of July 16, 1996 and (c) Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, dated July 22,
1996.

At the hearing of this case this morning, Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and argued for
petitioner Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) while Atty. Sixto Brillantes for private
respondent Enrique T. Garcia, and Atty. Oscar L. Karaan for respondent Catalino Calimbas.
Solicitor General Raul Goco, Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor
Zenaida Hernandez-Perez appeared for respondent Commission on Elections with Solicitor
General Goco arguing.

Before the Court adjourned, the Court directed the counsel for both parties to INFORM this
Court by Friday, July 26, 1996, whether or not Commission on Elections would push through
with the initiative/referendum this Saturday, July 27, 1996.

Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.

At 2:50 p.m., July 23, 1996, the Court received by facsimile transmission an Order dated also
on July 23, 1996 from the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc inter alia "to hold in
abeyance the scheduled referendum (initiative) on July 27, 1996 pending resolution of G.R. No.
125416." In view of this Order, the petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic and will thus not be passed
upon by this Court at this time. Puno, J., no part due to relationship. Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the submissions and arguments of the
parties, the Court believes that the issues may be restated as follows:

(1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become
final and executory"; namely, G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.;

(2) Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of the
referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and

(3) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people
of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment

Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T. Garcia,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.8 on "the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or
not there can be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the subject proposition — the
very same proposition, it bears emphasizing, the submission of which to the people of Morong,
Bataan is now sought to be enjoined by petitioner . . .".

We disagree. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal
resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative
and/or referendum. We quote from our said Decision:9

In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is
the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that
under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative.
They rely on Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991
which provides: "Local Initiative
Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government until may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with
the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the
Local Government of 1991 on initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of
a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall,
as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . .". An act includes
a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote
something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts,
laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . .". It is basic that a law should be
construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with this postulate, we
held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative,
if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality,
even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent
import of the language used."

Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230 and we found that the sole issue
presented by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution can be the subject of a valid initiative or referendum".10

In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of a municipal resolution as the
form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly exercised.
What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is
sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether
the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No.
2848.

Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848

The main issue in this case may be re-stated thus: Did respondent Comelec commit grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848?

We answer the question in the affirmative.

To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution
11 as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times,
but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum";
the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative"
used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In
enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act,12 Congress differentiated one term from the other,
thus:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through
an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law,
or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution
or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz13 defines initiative as the "power of
the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to
the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body
and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law." The
foregoing definitions, which are based on Black's14 and other leading American authorities, are
echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160) substantially as follows:

Sec. 120. Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.

Sec. 126. Local Referendum Defined. — Local referendum is the legal process
whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.

The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty
(60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty
(30) days in case of baranggays.

The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the
people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance,
resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing.
Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the
proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their
power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the
proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period granted by
said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not
referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned . . .".
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters
of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly
enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also
under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections.15

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and
consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people
themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives,
while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn
up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are
understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply
write either "Yes" of "No" in the ballot.

[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as "powers" or
"legal processes", these can be also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or
"the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.]

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an
initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing
of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper
form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is
especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be
broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care
must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted
to the electorate,"16 although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative".17

It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or
his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition."

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should
have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise
of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and

Imposition of Conditionalities — Ultra Vires?

Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite, namely,
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the
Sangguniang Bayan to enact,18 stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as are within the
legal powers of the sangguniang to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only
such ordinances or resolutions as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact. 19
After the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong and the other municipalities concerned (Olongapo,
Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ
had been created, whose metes and bounds had already been delineated by Proclamation No.
532 issued on February 1, 1995 in accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to
withdraw such concurrence and/or to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer
within the authority and competence of the Municipal Council of Morong to legislate.
Furthermore, petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal
resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose. Hence, such withdrawal can no
longer be enacted or conditionalities imposed by initiative. In other words, petitioner insists, the
creation of SSEZ is now a faith accompli for the benefit of the entire nation. Thus, Morong
cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as
this would effectively render nugatory the creation by (national) law of the SSEZ and would
deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be derived therefrom. Once created. SSEZ has
ceased to be a local concern. It has become a national project.

On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument is premature and
conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it
during the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal.
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the
municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal
and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.20

We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides21 that "(n)othing in this Act
shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition
approved pursuant to this Act . . . ."

So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court.22 It passes upon errors of law (and
sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as
well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present
case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same
authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission
on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court
which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its
review powers.

Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Commelec itself has no power to pass
upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters
are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission — to which then the herein basic
questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in
the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved
propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form
and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content,
where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local
legislative body to enact."23 Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is
within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the
Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.

While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be fruitful for the parties
and the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the question of whether Grande Island
and the "virgin forest" mentioned in the proposed initiative belong to the national government
and thus cannot be segregated from the Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient
of passing a municipal resolution. We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of the full
subscription and payment of the P20 billion authorized capital stock of the Subic Authority by
the Republic, with, aside from cash and other assets, the ". . . lands embraced, covered and
defined in Section 12 hereof, . . ." which includes said island and forests. The ownership of said
lands is question of fact that may be taken up in the proper forum — the Commission on
Elections.

Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon remand of the
initiative is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal Council to
enact, may be divided into several parts for purposes of voting. Item "I" is a proposal to recall,
nullify and render without effect (bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No.
10, Series of 1993. On the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said
resolution with another municipal resolution of concurrence provided certain conditions
enumerated thereunder would be granted, obeyed and implemented (ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad
at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong and Bataan. A voter may favor Item I —
i.e., he may want a total dismemberment of Morong from the Authority — but may not agree
with any of the conditions set forth in Item II. Should the proposal then be divided and be voted
upon separately and independently?

All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity.
Epilogue

In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present
controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions involved
here; (iii) the respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review and correct its
errors in promulgating its Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing — if necessary — for the
plebiscite; and (iii) that the said Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial
jurisdiction to pass upon the question of whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language
and whether such proposal or part or parts thereof are clearly and patently outside the powers
of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore violative of law.

In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as concepts and
processes, are new in our country. We are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that proper
corrective measures, as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our
people's aspirations for the actualization of effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize
that "(p)rovisions for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate their
purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted
thereby."24 In his authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S. J.
treasures these "instruments which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to
the needs of the people."25 Impelled by a sense or urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 6735 to give life and form to the constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased initiative
and referendum into the workings of local governments by including a chapter on this subject
in the Local Government Code of 1991.26 And the Commission on Elections can do no less by
seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for both national and local use,
in implementation of these laws. For its part, this Court early on expressly recognized the
revolutionary import of reserving people power in the process of law-making.27

Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing
popular sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to
nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound public policy to enable
the electorate to express their free and untrammeled will, not only in the election of their
anointed lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the very rules and laws by
which our society shall be governed and managed.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the
Commission on Elections for further proceeding consistent with the foregoing discussion. No
costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Romero and Mendoza, JJ., are on leave.

LAMBINO VS COMELEC

NOTE: nay separate opinion

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution.

Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-
7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the
COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since
Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago
binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of
the "will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent
COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition
despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as
an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor
General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary
devises to implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the
Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file
the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an
initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After
receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution
for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the
present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in
Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an

amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be
shown to the people when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before
they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they
are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only
if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given
the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the
United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all
States15 which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first
see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that
the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various
courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not
first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation
of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to
describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer
having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting,
downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the
signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it
gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are
described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient
information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative
petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it
is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or
subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect
of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set
forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure
the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the
people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed
their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral
arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to
the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in
full:

Province:

City/Municipality:

No. of

Verified

Signatures:

Legislative District:

Barangay:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein
which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support
for the filing thereof.

Precinct Number

Name

Last Name, First Name, M.I.

Address
Birthdate

MM/DD/YY

Signature

Verification

4
5

9
10

_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)

_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

__________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February
to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed
copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on
30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both.
However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August
2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started
gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25
August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as
a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as
shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present
petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22
has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE

COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt
a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative
Commission on Charter Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration
for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her

Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report
sometime in December 2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which
militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to
amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue
the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice
to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-

LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at
the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25
August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission
on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987
Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 are vastly different from the
proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006
amended petition filed with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions
have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The
Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing
Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before
the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the
Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets,
six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the
draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino
Group declared:

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments
alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section
5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended
petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-
gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present
petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft
petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group
first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:

[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who
did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on
the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v.
Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature
sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are
presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out
that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated
Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to
mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did
not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an
authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to
the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the
petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be

incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present
initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug
from under their feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to
August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition
they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in
their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the
amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000
copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition
but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed.
Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself
caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty
one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty.
Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space
for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with
the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed
the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a
great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the
signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the
6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million
signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed
changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the
signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere
reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with
the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the
initiative clause of the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not
see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature
and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament
can be re-elected indefinitely;26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost
all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the
members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's
signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The
people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the
people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be
held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended
petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying
the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could
have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials."
This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the
word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of
office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond
their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of
regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty.
Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino
and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present
initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino
and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe
that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature
sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides:

Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
(Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the
Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as
logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the
entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one
of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not
only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed
amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The
ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x
The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal
makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that
proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the
Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-
subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or
the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and
there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative
process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised
process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent
on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x
Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to
potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the
several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative
from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or
revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim
Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the
proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section
4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising
again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific
amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and
why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the
dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is
not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and
effect of the proposed changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30
August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than
that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister
exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present
members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be
used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister
only to members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden
from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do
not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people
before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to
comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must
be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution
and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third
mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as
shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No.
7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered
by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead
of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by
the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

xxxx

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1

refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in
McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only
to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and
does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of
the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised
constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove.
Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure')
now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ
sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended
or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only
through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the
measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and
as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the
revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized
by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It
failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs
is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to

the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII,
Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments.
There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner
other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional
and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and
that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in
doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law.
And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the
people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-
imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk
from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution
― that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition
should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental
difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment"
implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering
the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers
to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only
the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan
also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision
and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting
a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On
the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the
changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of
the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be
because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)

In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State
constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether
the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x
affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking
down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:

The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides
for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence
in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest
days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and
a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

xxxx

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the
people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit
further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which
would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to
adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would
obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These
examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many
sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-
to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The
Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it
also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not
even touch the executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution
that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino
Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected
based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the
Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only
one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body
drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same
substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because
the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for
both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates,
while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the
people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the
people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on
the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are
expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to
the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably
be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing
supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted
the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes
would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals
drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution
are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45
Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential
mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the
Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions
have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution
proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by
which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject
matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of
the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside
the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights
and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens.
Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic
principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII,
section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision
of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article
XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the
court said:

"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as
a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as
a means of revising the constitution." x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of
the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea
that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x
xx

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent
of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments
and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and
difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative
is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present
initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles
of the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47
is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also,
a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency
is an amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect
the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three
branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the
far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A

change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or
"theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure
of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-
and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,

a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
states:

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article
VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall
be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a
prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However,
the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule
of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision
"shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect
is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.

Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily
conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a
"surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that
the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is
not as simple as that.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory

Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in
the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be
resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are
among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not
possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government ― the
British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which
have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that
they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form
of government?

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of
the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross
absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution."

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system
of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on
initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying
with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the
"petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%)
of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that
the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition
of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato,
and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming
to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the
petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC
did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as
valid.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No
petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The
proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more
than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino
Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed
this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it
appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and
obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly
amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and
revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered
waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows
today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in
the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.

An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53
− approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is
the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino
Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the
Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of
the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot
override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political
groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation's stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino
Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition
with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group
thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The
Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court
exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative,
propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to
allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993

ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LUCILA PAYUMO, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmeña, Crisostomo Banzon and Horacio Apostol for private respondents.

NOTE: Naay sperate opinion

PUNO, J.:

The EDSA revolution of 1986 restored the reality that the people's might is not a myth. The
1987 Constitution then included people power as an article of faith and Congress was mandated
to p ass laws for its effective exercise. The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted
providing for two (2) modes of initiating the recall from office of local elective officials who
appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate. One of these modes is recall through the
initiative of a preparatory recall assembly. In the case at bench, petitioners assail this mode of
initiatory recall as unconstitutional. The challenge cannot succeed.

We shall first unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11,
1992 elections. In the early evening of July 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National
Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30 A.M of the following day, July
2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of
Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila
Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively.
Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he
moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of
confidence."1 The motion was "unanimously seconded."2 The resolution states:

RESOLUTION NO. 1

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in the Province
of Bataan have voluntarily constituted themselves for the purpose of the recall of the incumbent
provincial governor of the province of Bataan, Honorable Enrique T. Garcia pursuant to the
provisions of Section 70, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991;

Whereas, the total number of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in the
province of Bataan is One Hundred and Forty- Six (146) composed of all mayors, vice-mayors
and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of all the 12 towns of the province of Bataan;

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, after a serious
and careful deliberation have decided to adopt this resolution for the recall of the incumbent
provincial governor Garcia for loss of confidence;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved that having lost confidence on the
incumbent governor of Bataan, Enrique T. Garcia, recall proceedings be immediately initiated
against him;

Resolved further, that copy of this resolution be furnished the Honorable Commission on
Elections, Manila and the Provincial Election Supervisor, Balanga, Bataan.

One hundred forty-six (146) names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but only eighty (80) carried
the signatures of the members of the PRA. Of the eighty (80) signatures, only seventy-four (74)
were found genuine.3 The PRAC of the province had a membership of one hundred forty-four
(144)4 and its majority was seventy-three (73).

On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course
to said Resolution No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the
"substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In a per curiam Resolution promulgated August
31, 1993, the respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections
for the position of Governor of Bataan on October 11 , 1993. Petitioners then filed with Us a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said
Resolution of the respondent COMELEC on various grounds. They urged that section 70 of
R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and
(2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal
protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing
Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate
failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. On September
7, 1993, We required the respondents to file their Comments within a non-extendible period of
ten (10) days.5 On September 16, 1993, We set petition for hearing on September 21, 1993 at
11 A.M. After the hearing, We granted the petition on ground that the sending of selective
notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of the Constitution and
fatally flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1. We ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

After deliberation, the Court opts not to resolve the alleged constitutional infirmity of sec. 70 of
R.A. No. 7160 for its resolution is not unavoidable to decide the merits of the petition. The
petition can be decided on the equally fundamental issues of: (1) whether or not all the members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of its meeting; and (2) assuming lack of notice,
whether or not it would vitiate the proceedings of the assembly including its Resolution No. 1.

The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the members known to
be political allies of petitioner Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the respondents. They
did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a
matter of political strategy and security. They justified these selective notices on the ground
that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of notice.

We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the Constitution
requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part
and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice to all the members of the
assembly is also imperative for these members represent the different sectors of the electorate
of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent
is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall should
articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely
determined only after all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to
express the will of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is
indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall petitioner Garcia
as Governor of the province of Bataan.

The petition raises other issues that are not only prima impressionis but also of transcendental
importance to the rightful exercise of the sovereign right of the people to recall their elected
officials. The Court shall discuss these issues in a more extended decision.

In accord with this Resolution, it appears that on September 22, 1993, the Honorable Mayor of
Dinalupihan, Oscar de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the members of the PRAC to
"convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the town plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30
o'clock in the morning."6 From news reports, the PRAC convened in session and eighty-seven
(87) of its members once more passed a resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia.7
On September 27, 1993, petitioners filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of
Extremely Urgent Motion for a resolution of their contention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is
unconstitutional.

We find the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of
section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly initiate the recall of
local elective officials as bereft of merit.

Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect due to the
wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief
Executive, by whom the law is
approved,8 For upholding the Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also
the duty of the legislative and executive.9 To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must
be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
permits.10 The annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful, and arguable implication. The
universal rule of legal hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
the constitutionality of a law. 11

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and
in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations.
Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs.
12 Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a
representative democracy. 13

Recall is a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in our 1973
Constitution.14 It was mandated in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:

Sec. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive
and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing
for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local Government Code of 1983."
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local
elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned, viz:

Sec. 54. By Whom Exercised; Requisites. — (1) The power of recall shall be exercised by the
registered voters of the unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(2) Recall shall be validly initiated only upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%)
of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned based on the
election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.

Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337
was exercised by our people.

In February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted
to revolution and they booted of office the highest elective officials of the land.

The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of
the electorate led to its firm institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations, viz:

Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the
people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to
promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.

Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation
at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State
shall, by laws, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government
code which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum. . .," viz :

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsible and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units.

In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. In this Code, Congress
provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall
assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian
members of the municipalities and component cities. We quote the pertinent provisions of R.A.
7160, viz:

CHAPTER 5 — RECALL

Sec. 69. By Whom Exercised. — The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised
by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to
such recall belongs.

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall
assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
municipality which shall be composed of the following:

(1) Provincial Level. — all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

(3) Legislative District level. — In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are
elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; in cases where sangguniang
panglungsod members are elected by district , all elective barangay officials in the district; and

(4) Municipal level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the
municipality.

(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in
a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local
government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly
initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall
assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may be validly
initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five (25) percent of the total number of registered voters
in the local government unit concerned during the election which in the local official sought to
be recalled was elected.

Sec. 71. Election Recall — Upon the filing of a valid resolution petition for with the appropriate
local office of the Comelec, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the
date of the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the
resolution or petition recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials, forty-five (45)
days in the case of provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent
positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.

Sec. 72. Effectivity of Recall. — The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be
recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he
shall continue in office.

Sec. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. — The elective local official sought to be recalled shall
not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding regular election.

A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of
empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective
officials originated from the House of Representatives A reading of the legislative history of
these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the recall from office of local elective officials, originated from the House of
Representatives and not the Senate. 15 The legislative records reveal there were two (2)
principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people;
and (b) to cut down on its expenses. 16 Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that
the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the
City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former
Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the
people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. 17
Consequently, our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials
thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode
may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease.

We have belabored the genesis of our recall law for it can light up many of the unillumined
interstices of the law. In resolving constitutional disputes, We should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs. Prescinding from this proposition, We shall now resolve the
contention of petitioners that the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional.

It is first postulated by the petitioners that "the right to recall does not extend merely to the
prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to
be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive
right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not." 18

We do not agree. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution that will
sustain this submission. To be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a
recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of
initiating recall elections. 19 Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating
recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress
to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given
the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power
given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are
effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one
particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is that
the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective.
Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative
mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of
the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the
prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even
then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By
the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 20

Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall
Assembly did not only initiate the process of recall but had de facto recalled petitioner Garcia
from office, a power reserved to the people alone. To quote the exact language of the
petitioners: "The initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of
the incumbent local officials. Precisely, in the case of Gov. Garcia, an election was scheduled
by the COMELEC on 11 October 1993 to determine who has the right to assume the unexpired
portion of his term of office which should have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to
the status of a mere candidate for the same position of governor (by operation of law) he has,
therefore, been effectively recalled." 21 In their Extremely Urgent Clarificatory Manifestation,
22 petitioners put the proposition more bluntly stating that a "PRA resolution of recall is the re
call itself."

Again, the contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have misconstrued the
nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that
initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the
PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is
not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives.
Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to
their representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional
constituent assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or
reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of the people.
More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself. It cannot be
seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the
process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall
that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise,
a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose
bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official
concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official
concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question. This is clear
in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local
official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person
of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."

We shall next settle the contention of petitioners that the disputed law infracts the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioners asseverate:

5.01.2. It denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws for the local officials constituting
the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the recall of a duly elected
provincial official belonging to the minority party thus rendering ineffectual his election by
popular mandate. Relevantly, the assembly could, to the prejudice of the minority (or even
partyless) incumbent official, effectively declare a local elective position vacant (and demand
the holding of a special election) for purely partisan political ends regardless of the mandate of
the electorate. In the case at bar, 64 of the 74 signatories to the recall resolution have been
political opponents of petitioner Garcia, not only did they not vote for him but they even
campaigned against him in the 1992 elections.

Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of
the PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More specifically, the fear is
expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they may
initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those belonging to
the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give
an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to
be considered is the politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Sec. 70
(b) of the Code provides:

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall
assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
municipality which shall be composed of the following:

(1) Provincial level. — All mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

(3) Legislative District Level. — In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are
elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang
panglungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the
municipality.

Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level.
Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political
affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the
greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the
Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence
of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political
parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence
cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution
encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the
growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for
discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.

The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it
may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions, especially
those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. To
be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no escape from the reality that
all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per
se the grant of power to an individual or entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused
by the grantee is to render government powerless and no people need an impotent government.
There is no democratic government that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its
officials, especially those elected by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws
assume that officials, whether appointed or elected, will act in good faith and will perform the
duties of their office. Such presumption follows the solemn oath that they took after assumption
of office, to faithfully execute all our laws.

Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a
preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. As explained
above, the diverse and distinct composition of the membership of a preparatory recall assembly
guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. It is for this reason that
in Our Resolution of September 21, 1993, We held that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in
a public place. It also requires that the recall resolution by the said majority must be adopted
during its session called for the purpose. The underscored words carry distinct legal meanings
and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the members of a preparatory recall
assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements
is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course
by the COMELEC.

Furthermore, it cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan preparatory
recall assembly voted strictly along narrow political lines. Neither the respondent COMELEC
nor this Court made a judicial inquiry as to the reasons that led the members of the said recall
assembly to cast a vote of lack of confidence against petitioner Garcia. That inquiry was not
undertaken for to do so would require crossing the forbidden borders of the political thicket.
Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a major author of the subject law in his book The Local
Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development, stressed the same reason why
the substantive content of a vote of lack of confidence is beyond any inquiry, thus:

There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of confidence. This
means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve to recall
any local elective officials without specifying any particular ground except loss of confidence.
There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption against the local
elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.

In the case of Evardone vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 204 SCRA 464, 472 (1991), the
Court ruled that "loss of confidence" as a ground for recall is a political question. In the words
of the Court, "whether or not the electorate of the municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in
the incumbent mayor is a political question.
Any assertion therefore that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted due
to their political aversion to petitioner Garcia is at best a surmise.

Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall assembly
subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who elected petitioner Garcia with
a majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceeds from the erroneous premise that the
resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that the resolution of
recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith.
The proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this judgment
has yet to be expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of
Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia
in an appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the proposal to recall
him made by the preparatory recall assembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate
does not re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once
enjoyed. The judgment will write finis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of
courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for "sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."

In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people, particularly
their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. If the petition
would succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall elections which
Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru
a preparatory recall assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to remove
impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the
performance of their elected officials. The power to determine this mode was specifically given
to Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the
constitutionality of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the recall process are dismissed for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

NOTE: Naay separate opinion

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall,
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November
13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this
time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action
No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required
the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition.
In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to
that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment.
Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place
within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK
election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.4 The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term
of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular
local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local
election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute.5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in

harmony with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government
Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional
mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill
its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the
letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this
case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall
election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to
the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned.
The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore,
be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought
to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May
1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall
election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126576 March 5, 1997

MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, and ATTY. AURORA S. DE ALBAN,
respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-29511
dated October 15, 1996 issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
which (1) approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one registered voter — herein
private respondent Ma. Aurora Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner — incumbent Mayor
Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters
of Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996; and (3) in case the said petition is signed by at
least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauini, Isabela, scheduled the recall
election on December 2, 1996.

On October 25, 1996, this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order2 enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from implementing and enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.

The facts of this case are not disputed.

Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local
elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private respondent de Alban was also
a candidate in said elections.

Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar
of Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall3 against petitioner. On September 12, 1996,
petitioner received a copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was forwarded to the
Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila,
for approval.

Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to
the COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum4 dated October 8, 1996 recommending approval of
the petition for recall filed by private respondent and its signing by other qualified voters in order
to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991.

In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the
COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.

Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore
invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same
was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the
number of signatures supporting any petition for recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled
the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.

In at least three (3) urgent motions, private respondent has sought the lifting of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued last October 25, 1996 on the twin grounds (1) that the issue of the
one-year bar on recall elections has been resolved in the case of Paras v. COMELEC5,
promulgated on November 4, 1996; and (2) that the procedure prescribed by Resolution No.
96-2951 involving petition signing upon initiation of even just one person, is no different from
that provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 which was upheld as constitutional in the
1991 cases of Sanchez, et al. v. COMELEC6 and Evardone v. COMELEC7.

Private respondent is correct in saying that in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v.
COMELEC8, the recall election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be
said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. In construing the meaning of the
term, "regular local election" in Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year . . . immediately preceding a regular
local election," we ruled that for the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election
must be one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and
filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time bar is being invoked by
petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no
application of the one year bar, hence no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951
on this ground.

We, however, find petitioner's second ground to be impressed with merit.

Before the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, the recall of public officials voted
for in popular elections, was governed by Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983. Pursuant to Section 59 thereof, which
states that "the Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of and
election on recall . . . and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations," the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2272 Sections 4 and 5 of which
provide as follows:

Sec. 4. How instituted. — The recall of an elective provincial, city or municipal official shall be
commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice of recall containing the address and precinct
number of the voter filing the notice, and the name of the official sought to be recalled, his
position, and the ground(s) for the recall. Each notice shall refer to only one official.

The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the local Election Registrar if the recall involves a city
or municipal official, or with the Provincial Election Supervisor if it involves a provincial official,
one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the city/municipal
hall.

If the recall involves a provincial official, two additional copies of the notice shall also be
furnished by the voter filing the notice to the Election Registrar of each city and municipality in
the province, one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in
the city/municipal hall.

In every case, the voter filing the notice of recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the official sought
to be recalled, the Commission on Elections in Manila and the Election Records and Statistics
Department of the Commission.

Sec. 5. Schedule and place of signing of the petition. — The Election Registrar shall submit
to the Commission on Elections, not later than ten days from filing of the notice of recall, the
schedule of the signing of the petition to recall for approval and funding . . .9
In the case of Sanchez v. COMELEC 10, petitioners therein contended that the aforegoing
"Resolution No. 2272 is unconstitutional there being no legislative enactment yet on [the]
mechanism of recall as mandated under Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution". 11 It is true, as
private respondent asseverates, that we upheld the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272,
but not because we found nothing constitutionally infirm about the procedure of allowing the
initiatory recall petition to be filed by only one person. The issue in Sanchez was not this
questioned procedure but the legal basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making
power in the alleged absence of a grant of such power by an enabling statute on recall. Thus
we ruled:

While it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution mandates the Congress to enact a local
government code providing among others for an effective mechanism of recall, nothing in said
provision could be inferred the repeal of BP 337, the local government code existing prior to
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution merely provides that the
local government code to be enacted by Congress shall be "more responsive" than the one
existing at present. Until such time that a more responsive and effective local government code
is enacted, the present code shall remain in full force and effect. Thus, under Sec. 3, Art. XVIII,
(a)ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.

Considering that the present local government code (BP 337) is still in effect, respondent
COMELEC's promulgation of Resolution No. 2272 is therefore valid and constitutional, the
same having been issued pursuant to Sec. 59 of BP 337. It reads:

Sec. 59. Supervision by the Commission on Elections. — The Commission on Elections shall
conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall . . . and, in pursuance thereof,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations. 12

We reiterated the foregoing ruling in the case of Evardone v.

COMELEC 13 in this wise:

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or
revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved
by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec.
534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1
January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law
applicable to the present case.

xxx xxx xxx

Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local
elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and
supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations. . . . Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in
respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.

We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve the
petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition. 14

In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC-prescribed procedure of (1) allowing the recall
petition to be filed by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total number of registered
voters and then (2) inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for that purpose, was never
put to issue. As this is the crux of the present constitutional challenge, the proper time has come
for this court to issue a definitive ruling on the matter.

Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of the evolution of the mechanism of recall as a
mode of removing a public officer by direct action of the people, essayed in the case of Garcia
v. COMELEC 15:
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and
in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations.
Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs.
Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a
representative democracy.

Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in section
2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz.:

Sec. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive
and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall . . .

The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled, "The Local Government Code of 1983.
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local
election officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned . . . .

Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337
was exercised by our people.

In February, 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they
resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of the land. The
successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the
electorate led to its firm institutionalization of the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations . . . .

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government
code which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum . . . . In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992." 16

Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any
elective . . . municipal . . . official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-
five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected". The
law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take
careful note of the phrase, "petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%)" and point out that the
law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters;
rather, the petition must be "of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition
must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters. This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required to be
undertaken "before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a
representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the . . . municipality
. . . " 17. Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the
petition in the meantime.

We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less
than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person,
as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of
subsisting law.

Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They
knew that this is the requirement under a majority of the constitutions and recall statutes in
various American states to the same extent that they were aware of the rationale therefor. While
recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving
satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the
best of his ability and as his conscience dictates 18 it is a power granted to the people who, in
concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other
words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections
or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of
the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to
recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government.

A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum
voter requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the vigilance of lawmakers
against the abuse of the power of recall. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the
case of In Re Bower 19 that:

[t]he only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before
petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove
a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his
political policies and decisions. We view the statutory provision requiring the number of petition
signers to equal at least 45% of the total votes case in the last general election for mayor as a
further attempt to insure that an official will not have to defend his policies against frivolous
attacks launched by a small percentage of disenchanted electors. 20

Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen, v. City of
Boulder 21 that:

[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least 25% of all votes
cast in the last election for all candidates for the position which the person sought to be recalled
occupies, assured that a recall election will not be held in response to the wishes of a small and
unrepresentative minority. However, once at least 25% of the electorate have expressed their
dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the recall power to the will of the electorate. 22

And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp 23, the Supreme Court of Michigan echoed the foregoing
posturings in this wise:

Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or contemplated
by the Constitution has revealed fears about an irresponsible electorate . . . . A much cited
Nebraska case pertaining to a Nebraska recall statute provides some answers which are
equally applicable to the Michigan constitutional right of recall:

. . . Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of the electors to sign the petition before the
council [is] compelled to act was designed to avoid such a contingency. The Legislature
apparently assumed that nearly one-third of the electorate would not entail upon the taxpayers
the cost of an election unless the charges made approved themselves to their understanding
and they were seriously dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent of the office. 24

In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to
the applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is
a lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall
is validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding
such awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as
the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in
Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear
the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to
oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly earnest
in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims
responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioner's continuance in office. But the same cannot
be said of all the other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to
hers. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power
is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the
exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be
recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate
end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then
setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public
which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of
the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an
attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all circumstances,
countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of
the recall process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is hereby GRANTED.
COMELEC Resolution No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID and accordingly
SET ASIDE.

The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127066 March 11, 1997

REYNALDO O. MALONZO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY
(Caloocan Chapter) and ALEX L. DAVID, CONRADO G. CRUZ, TRINIDAD REPUNO,
GLORIA M. CRUZ, MIRALI M. DURR, FERMIN JIMENEZ, AURELIO BILUAN, ROGELIO
SARAZA, HELENE VALBUENA, and HIGINO RULLEPA, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-026,1 dated November 18, 1996, of the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) calling for an Election for the Recall of the
Petitioner Reynaldo O. Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City.

Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995, winning over former
Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term, petitioner's office as Mayor was put to
serious question when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay
members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election,
voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss
of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.

Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for
appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with the respondent
Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was deficient in form and substance,
and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and declared
the recall proceedings to be in order. The COMELEC's Resolution on the petition states
pertinently:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc hereby RESOLVES to

DISMISS the Petition. We approve and give DUE COURSE to PRA Resolution No. 01-96
entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE RECALL OF REYNALDO O. MALONZO AS MAYOR OF
KALOOCAN CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. Accordingly and conformably with Section
71 R.A. 7160, the Commission SETS the date of the Election on Recall on December 14, 1996.
We shall, by separate resolution, issue a calendar of activities involved in said exercise.

SO ORDERED.2

On November 28, 1996, Mayor Malonzo came to us on a "Petition for Certiorari With Prayer
For Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction", assailing
the COMELEC's resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Petition,
in the main, raises the issue of the validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall, putting
to fore the propriety of the service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly,
and the proceedings held, resulting in the issuance of the questioned Resolution.
Due to the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall Election date
declared by the COMELEC, the Court, on November 29, 1996, issued a Resolution 3 ordering
the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from proceeding with the recall election
projected on December 14, 1996, and directing the respondents to file their respective
Comments.

Private respondents Liga ng mga Barangay (Caloocan Chapter), Alex L. David, Conrado G.
Cruz, Trinidad Repuno, Gloria M. Cruz, Mirali M. Durr, Fermin Jimenez, Aurelio Biluan, Rogelio
Saraza, Helene Valbuena and Higino Rullepa, filed their Comment 4 on December 6, 1996,
alleging that all the requirements for the holding of a recall election were duly complied with
and that the petition is therefore without basis. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment 5 on February 7, 1997, with the surprising
submission that the COMELEC was amiss in its duties as enforcer of election laws.

According to the Solicitor General, the veracity of notices sent to 42 members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly were not directly passed upon by the COMELEC before it issued the
questioned Resolution. It thus submits that the propriety of notices sent to said PRA members
must first be determined by the COMELEC, after giving private respondents the chance to prove
the same, otherwise, a discussion of the other issues in the present petition would be premature.

At this juncture, the Court finds that there is no need to refer the matter of the veracity of the
questioned notices sent to certain members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly back to the
COMELEC, for the reason that the COMELEC has already conducted an investigation into the
same, and has found the proceedings instituting the recall to be in accord with law.

The Solicitor General's observation that the issue of veracity of the notices was not directly
passed upon by the COMELEC is incorrect. On the contrary, the matter of validity of notices to
the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was sufficiently considered by the respondent
Commission, as in response to petitioner's request for a technical examination of the recall
documents, the COMELEC directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to
resolve the matter of notices sent to the Preparatory Recall Assembly members. The ERSD in
turn performed its task and reported its findings to the COMELEC. The following excerpts from
Resolution UND 96-026 of the COMELEC reflect the results of the ERSD's investigation, and
the resulting action of the COMELEC:

The ERSD Report gave the following information:

Three (3) lists of elected Barangay officials were used as reference, namely: COMELEC list;
DILG list and Caloocan City list.

According to the COMELEC listing, of the 188 barangays in Kalookan City, there should have
been 1,692 members of the PRA. However, one barangay, Barangay 94, did not elect an SK
Chairman, thus, there are of record, 1,691 elected barangay officials of Kalookan City, broken
down as follows:

Punong Barangay — 188

Barangay Kagawads — 1,316
SK Chairmen — 187
(One Barangay, Barangay
94 did not elect its
SK Chairman).

The DILG registry is incomplete, showing only a listing of 1,390 barangay officials. The
Kalookan City Talaan ng mga Barangay tallies with the COMELEC List. From the records, the
following data is found: Of the 1,691 barangay officials, forty (40) had resigned. In the stead of
twenty-eight (28) resignees, replacements were appointed. Twelve (12) positions however,
remained vacant, there being no successors named therein. Twenty-two (22) barangay officials
are deceased. Twelve (12) vacancies caused by such death were filled up by appointing
replacements. Ten (10) vacant positions were however not filled up. There being twenty-two
(22) unfilled posts, the total number of Barangay officials of Kalookan City at the time of the
constitution of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was initiated is 1,669.
ERSD reported that there were a total of 1,927 notices sent, some members being served two
or three notices. The Notices were sent in three modes; Personal, registered mail and by courier
and they were in the name of the PRA member, and addressed at his residence or office of
record.

In its initial report, the Department stated that six persons listed in the COMELEC record as
barangay officials were not duly notified. These were: Jose de Chavez, listed as Barangay
kagawad of Barangay; 6; Enrico Marasigan, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 65; Pablo
Musngi, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119; Rolando Ang, listed as Barangay
kagawad of Barangay 109; and Pilar Pilares, Barangay Kagawad of Barangay 162 and Teresita
Calayo, listed as kagawad of Barangay 182. Respondents explained the absence of notice to
these persons thus:

1. Jose de Chavez has been removed from office as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 6 by
virtue of Resolution No. 95-011 passed on July 16, 1995, and has been replaced by Corazon
Obusan by virtue of Resolution No. 95-016 passed on August 1995, both promulgated by the
Barangay Council of said barangay. In view of the fact that it is Corazon Obusan who is the
recognized Barangay kagawad of the aforementioned barangay, as it appears in the official
roster of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) the notice of the July 7, 1996
PRA session was duly served on her and not on Mr. de Chavez.

2. Enrico Marasigan has resigned as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 65 as evidenced by his

resignation letter dated March 24, 1995. He was replaced by Ronio de la Cruz, by virtue of a
Resolution passed by the Barangay Council of Barangay 65 dated August 10, 1995.
Accordingly, the notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly served on Mr. de la Cruz and
not on Mr. Marasigan.

3. Pablo Musngi ceased to be a Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119 by reason of his death on
April 12, 1996. He has been replaced by Sylvia Saberola on whom notice of the July 7, 1996
PRA session has been duly served.

4. Notices, both by personal delivery and by registered mail, were served on Mr. Rolando Ang
at his official address at Barangay 109 Zone 10 East Grace Park, Caloocan City. The returns
of the said service of notice, however, disclosed that he can no longer be located in the said
address. He has, however, not informed the DILG of any change in his official address.

5. Pilar Pilares had been served notice by personal delivery but refused to sign
acknowledgment receipt. She has likewise been served notice by registered mail as evidenced
by the receipt in her behalf by a certain Ricardo Pilares III. (Respondents' Comment, dated
October 14, 1996.

As to Teresita Calayo, respondent defends lack of notice to her, thus:

Teresita Calayo is not a duly elected kagawad of Barangay 182, Zone 16.

Per certification issued by the Board of Election Tellers, Ms. Calayo did not win in the May 1994
Barangay Election. Records would show that it should be Kagawad Fermin Quintos who should
be recognized as legitimate barangay kagawad of the said barangay having placed no. 7 in the
election and not Ms. Calayo who appears to be a loser/9th place. There appears to be an
apparent oversight in placing the name of Calayo in the subject PRA Resolution for signature,
wherein it shows that both the names of Fermin Quintos and Teresita Calayo are included.
(Respondents' Compliance dated November 13, 1996, p. 6).

In the ERSD's final and complete report, two (2) additional names were reflected as not having
been served notices and these were Line Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja, listed as kagawads of
Barangay 174.

Commenting on this report, respondents stated:

1. As regards Tomas Daep and Teodulfo Abenoja (not Agenoja);.

Notice by registered mail was served on, and acknowledged by Tomas Daep, who personally
signed the return card.

There was actually an error committed by the ERSD when it concluded that Tomas Daep has
already resigned and was replaced by Ernesto Taupa. Official records would show that Tomas
Daep and Ernesto Taupa are still both presently holding the position of Kagawad of Barangay
174 Zone 15.

Ernesto Taupa was officially appointed to the position vacated by Teodulfo Abenoja by virtue
of the latter's resignation on 15 March 1996. Teodulfo Abenoja, on the other hand, was
appointed to the position vacated by a Line Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja — they, having
resigned and, the latter, having been already replaced by Ernesto Taupa.

Ernesto Taupa on the other, as correctly determined by the ERSD, was validly served with the
notice of the PRA session two (2) days before the scheduled PRA meeting.

Respondents' submission, being substantiated by documents. and uncontroverted by Petitioner

are hereby accepted as meritorious.

In addition to the aforenamed, three persons, Pablo de Castro, Ruben Ballega, and Jesus Tan
claiming to be the Barangay captains of Barangay 116, Barangay 148 and Barangay 156,
respectively, and therefore members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, came before the
Commission and manifested that they were not duly notified about the PRA session.

The records in custody of the Commission, however, revealed that there was no truth to their
allegations.

Pablo de Castro was served notice by registered mail on July 1, 1996, and this he received on
July 3, 1996, as shown in the return card duly signed in acknowledgment. The same notice was
served on him by courier (LBC) on July 5, 1996.

Ruben Ballega was notified by personal service on July 1, 1996, the receipt of which was duly
acknowledged and by registered mail on July 2, 1996.

Jesus Tan Sr. was served notice personally and by registered mail. The personal service was
completed on July 1, 1996, as shown by the receipt signed by his daughter, one Analiza T.
Asque. The same notice was sent him by registered mail, received by the same daughter on
July 2, 1996.

The Commission however regards the sending of notice one thing, and the completion of
service thereof another, for indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied, if there
was not only service, but also completion of service thereof. Thus, we were obliged to inquire
more closely into the records and we found:

Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the addressee himself, then,
as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a person of sufficient discretion
in the member 's residence or office. Service by registered mail was evinced by the return card
duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There were instances when notices
were served but were refused, this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and
his witnesses. The circumstances being thus, we hold that there was complete service of the
notices as contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides;

Sec. 8 Completeness of Service — Personal service is complete upon delivery. Service by

ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court
otherwise provides; Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee;
but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice
of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.

That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who sent the notices is of no
moment. We had earlier determined that as member of the PRA, he can legally exercise the
prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices
to the other members of its scheduled convening.

It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the requirements
of notice had been fully complied with.6

Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in
nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the
absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb
the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

Moreover, to order the COMELEC to repeat the process of determining the notices' propriety
would be sanctioning a recycling of administrative functions, entailing added cost and waste of
effort.

Petitioner likewise attacks the COMELEC's ruling on the validity of the proceedings held by the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, in that it allegedly ruled that the LIGA ng mga Barangay is
authorized to initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Petitioner
likewise averred that the session held, and the adoption of the recall resolution, by the recall
assembly were tainted with irregularities, violence, graft and corruption.

The pertinent provisions of law, as regards the initiation of the recall process, are Sections 69
and 70 of R.A. 7160:

Sec. 69. By whom Exercised. — The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised
by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to
such recall belongs.

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. —

(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the
local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality
which shall be composed of the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a
public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local government
unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through
a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly
concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly
initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled
was elected.

(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his representative,
and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a representative of the official
sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the province, city, municipality, or barangay, as
the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC through its office in the local government
unit concerned. The COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication
of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor
more than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of
the petition and the required percentage of voters.

(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative
shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of
candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled.

Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was
convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent
Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and
kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided
under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may
represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." 7 The Liga ng mga Barangay
is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that
the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of
the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record,
in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay
members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of
Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore,
cannot be denied merit on this ground.

Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings held during the recall assembly should be laid
to rest. As the respondent COMELEC pertinently observes:

The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session
held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we
shall later on establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated. Deliberations
were conducted on the main issue, which was that of petitioner's recall. The members were
given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their
sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarks
affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the
signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the resolution.
The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific
procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there should be a session
called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members
of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the resolution resulting from such
assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members. 8

The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and during the session
of the preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and cannot override the
substantiated findings of the respondent COMELEC.

In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.9

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 10 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis
from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. 11 To overturn the presumption of
validity of performance of official duty, more than a mere scintilla of proof is needed, otherwise,
one disgruntled fellow can destroy the foundations laid by the overwhelming majority, and this
is not the scenario envisioned by our democratic system of government.

In sum, we are persuaded strongly by the principle that the findings of fact of administrative
bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and
in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation
of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the
governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVED to DISMISS the present petition, for lack of
merit. The decision of the respondent Commission on Elections to GIVE DUE COURSE to PRA
Resolution No. 01-96 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Commission on Elections is hereby
ORDERED to set the date of the Election on Recall in the city of Caloocan, which date shall
not be later than thirty days after receipt of notice of this Resolution, which is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C,J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban.

Francisco, J., concurs in the results.

Footnotes

G.R. No. 140560 May 4, 2000

JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.

G.R. No. 140714 May 4, 2000

PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its

Chairman, RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly
of Pasay City (PRA) in the Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005 entitled IN THE
MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-1999
ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY
CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the
resolution, 1 dated October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the
recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor of Pasay City. On the other hand, G.R. No.
140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA, represented by its Chair, Richard
Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the holding of recall elections in Pasay
City pursuant to the aforecited resolution of the COMELEC.

The facts are as follows:

Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.

Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City
gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay
11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose
of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner
in G.R. No. 140714, was designated chair.

On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled
RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY
CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the
PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay
City to witness the formal submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the
petition for recall.

As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of
service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC,
copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin boards of the local COMELEC office, the City
Hall, the Police Department, the public market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the
entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos St., all in Pasay City. Subsequently, a
verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by Ligaya
Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC.

Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and
Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the
signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting;
(2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent
there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the
one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, 2 filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court,
seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should
first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall
resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were
actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40
sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
affidavits of retraction.

In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and
dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a
majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May
29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records
showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876.
In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had
been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the verification made by election
officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA
sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was
a prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the
COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case
to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on
recall within one year from the elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in
the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall.
Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's
assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.

Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April 4, 2000,
after which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members, 3 resolved to dismiss the petition in
G.R. No. 140560 for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, the Court unanimously dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the
ground that the issue raised therein had become moot and academic.

We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.

In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall
elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No.
140714 to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City is no longer
tenable. We are thus left with only petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition.

4
The bone of contention in this case is §74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) which
provides:

Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues are:

WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) . . . .

A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the election
period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.

(1)

On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local Government Code Includes
the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution.

Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in §74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term
"recall election" found in §74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that "when
several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to
initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose
of adopting a resolution "to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss
of confidence," the process of recall began" and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after
he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter,
including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and void.

The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of
the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition
for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's
assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in §74
refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-
year limitation in paragraph (b) of §74.

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall
assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the
COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall
election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. 5 However, as used in
paragraph (b) of §74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be
cited in support of this conclusion.

First, §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on
Recall." On the other hand, §69 provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since
the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings 6 but the power
to elect an official into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire
recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall
election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the
COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for
recall.

Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions
for recall filed with the COMELEC — there is no legal limit on the number of times such
processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating
a recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested
in the registered voters. It is this — and not merely the preliminary steps required to be taken
to initiate a recall — which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall
take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC 7 where two objections were
raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the
sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting
this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office
of incumbent elective local officials. Both objections were dismissed on the ground that the
holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held that it is
the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people.
With respect to the second objection, it was held that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage
for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official
concerned remains in office . . . ."

If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the
local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in
paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of
office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found
in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding
of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office
of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance
of an elective local official. In the Bower case 8 cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, 9
it was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait
one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in
voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the
soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing
of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that
"no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at
least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle
announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating
the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held
outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even
before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned
has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As
already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces
a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the
election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the official
concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his performance
prematurely.

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for
the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot
just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The
crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that
the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas
and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society.
Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election.
To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year
period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during
which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance
due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of
honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts
become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism
of his performance is politically motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the
baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the
people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan
politics may have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really
the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide
a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.

In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as
recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the
people of [Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey
Malonzo, they reelected him.

Two points may be made against this argument.

One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official whose
recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for
the holding of plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for
their approval are not always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not
a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan
City, had it been shown that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move to
oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a
petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a
gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.

Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit
cannot be more representative of the sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs
whose members represent the entire electorate in the local government unit. Voters who
directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as are
those composing PRAs.

The other point regarding Justice Puno's claim is that the question here is not whether recalls
initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation
in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will convening the
PRA outside this period make it any more representative of the people, as the petition filed by
25% of the registered voters is claimed to be?

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the
preliminary proceedings to initiate recall —

1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power which shall
be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not
exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not
prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient
basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the
election; and

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall
proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the
Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner
assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

(2)
On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local
Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of
Such Election.

Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within
the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local
elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for
the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45)
days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30,
2000, no recall election may be held.

This contention is untenable.

The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer
to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, 10 it could have
expressly said so.

Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall
election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the
assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election,
the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of
the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce
this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize
the right of recall which is designed to make local government units "more responsive and
accountable."

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus
Election Code, 11unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences
ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to
follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election
period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, §74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall
elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the
term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such
election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b)
prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, 12 "[p]aragraph (b) construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject
to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."

(3)

On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified.

Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC
ordering the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the
members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall
resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the
resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is
shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures
of the 74 begin.

This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case.
It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some
of the names in the petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their
support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a
prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be given
due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining
the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by petitioner.
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written
by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was
mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that
the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the
meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their
concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part.

The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly
verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for
Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before
the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.
140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.

Melo, J., is on leave.

Puno, J., see dissent.

Vitug, J., I also reiterate my separate opinion in the resolution of 5 Apr. 2000.

Kapunan, J., See attached separate and dissenting opinion.

Panganiban, J., I joined the dissents of JJ. Puno and Kapunan.

Pardo, J., I join J. Puno in dissent.

De Leon Jr., J., I join the dissenting opinion of Justice R.S. Puno.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;

The cases at bar are one of first impression. At issue is the meaning of Section 74 (b) of the
Local Government Code which provides: "No recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election." Our interpretation of this provision is significant for, to a large extent, it will
determine the use or misuse of the right of recall. The right of recall is part of the cutting edge
of the sword of the sovereignty of our people, and its exercise should be shielded from abuses.

I begin with the baseline proposition that the proper interpretation of Section 74 (b) of the Local
Government Code should depend on the edifying intent of our legislators. With due respect to
the majority, I wish to express my humble reading of the intent of our lawmakers, when they
engrafted the people's right of recall in the corpus of an laws. Our search should start with the
Constitution which provides the matrix of our rights. All our fundamental laws 1 set in stone the
principle that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." An important component of this
sovereign power is the right of the people to elect officials who will wield the powers of
government i.e., the power to make laws and the power to execute laws. These powers are
enormous and in the wrong hands can wreak havoc to the people. Our laws therefore regulate
their exercise. Among others, they set minimum qualifications for candidates to elective public
office. They safeguard the integrity of the procedure of electing these candidates. They also
established an independent COMELEC to enhance the laboratory conditions under which
elections must be conducted.
Over the years, however, the country experienced the defilement of these ideals. The wrong
officials were able to win the scepters of power, the sanctity of our election process has been
breached, and unscrupulous politicians perpetuated themselves in public office. The
authoritarian regime that prolonged its reign from 1972 to 1986 demonstrated the need to
address these problems with greater resolve. Various schemes were installed in the 1987
Constitution and our statutes. Among them are the provisions limiting terms of offices, banning
political dynasties, strengthening the power and independence of the COMELEC, sharpening
the accountability of public officials and institutionalizing the power or the people to recall their
elected officials.

In the ground breaking case of Garcia v. COMELEC 2 we traced the metamorphosis of the
people's right of recall from its diaper days. In Angobung v. COMELEC 3 we articulated the
rationale of the right of recall, viz.:

. . . While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who
is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full
duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates, it is a power granted to the people
who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify.
In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the
elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purpose as a direct
remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish
resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government.

A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum
voter requirement in America recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the vigilance of lawmakers
against the abuse of the power of recall. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the
case of In Re Bower that:

[t]he only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before
petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove
a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his
political policies and decisions. We view the statutory provision requiring the number of petition
signers to equal at least 45% of the total votes cast in the last general election for mayor as a
further attempt to insure that an official will not have to defend his policies against frivolous
attacks launched by a small percentage of disenchanted electors.

Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen v. City of
Boulderthat:

[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least 25% of all votes
cast in the last election for all candidates for the position which the person sought to be recalled
occupies, assured that a recall election will not be held in response to the wishes of a small and
unrepresentative minority. However, once at least 25% of the electorate have expressed their
dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the recall power to the will of the electorate.

And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp, the Supreme Court of Michigan echoed the foregoing
posturings in this wise:

Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or contemplated
by the Constitution has revealed fears about an irresponsible electorate . . . A much cited
Nebraska case pertaining to a Nebraska recall statute provides some answers which are
equally applicable to the Michigan constitutional right of recall:

. . . Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of the electors to sign the petition before the
council [is[ compelled to act was designed to avoid such a contingency. The Legislature
apparently assumed that nearly one-third of the electorate would not entail upon the taxpayers
the cost of an election unless the charges made approved themselves to their understanding
and they were seriously dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent of the office.

In fine, democratic experience, here and abroad, shows that the right of recall is a double-edged
sword. Rightly used, it can promote the greater good. Wrongly used, it can result in greater evil.
There are recalls as pointed out in Angobung that should be avoided: (1) recalls borne by the
ill motive of a few; (2) recalls that disrupt the smooth running of government; and (3) recalls that
destabilize the local government unit. The standard mechanisms in recall statutes to avoid
these evils are: (1) the setting of a waiting period before a petition for recall can be initiated,
and (2) the fixing of a minimum percentage of voters signatures to kickstart a petition for recall.
As clearly explained in Bowers, the reason for fixing a waiting period is "to prevent premature
action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time
to evaluate the soundness of his political policies and decisions." On the other hand, the reason
for requiring a minimum number of voters signatures is "to insure that an official will not have
to defend his policies against frivolous attacks launched by a small percentage of disenchanted
electors." It will further avoid expenditure of public funds for frivolous elections.

I like to focus on the one-year waiting period provided by Section 74 (b) which is the bedrock
issue in the cases at bar. Beyond debate, the ideal interpretation of the waiting period must
bring about this pristine purpose — — — to give the voters a sound basis for their decision to
recall or not to recall an official whom they have elected just a year ago. The sound basis cannot
exist in a vacuum. "Sound basis requires affording the official concerned a fair and reasonable
opportunity to accomplish his program for the people. By no means will there be a reasonable
opportunity if from Day One after assumption of office, the process of recall can already be
initiated against said official. For it cannot be gainsaid that the more disquieting and
destabilizing part of recall is its initiation more than the recall election itself. It is in the too early
initiatory process where the baseless criticisms and falsehoods of a few are foisted on the many.
Premature initiatives to recall an official are resisted with stronger vim and venom. The reasons
are obvious to those whose political innocence has long been slain. The incumbent would not
like to lose power just recently won. The challenger, often a loser in the previous election, would
not want to lose a second time. To allow early recall initiative is to encourage divisive, expensive;
wasteful politics. It will also put a premium on the politics of compromise — — — the politics
where public interest always comes out second best.

With due respect, the interpretation made by the majority of Section 74 (b) of the Local
Government Code, which will countenance recall initiatives right on Day One after an official
starts his term of office, will breed these political evils. To be sure, the interpretation is based
on a narrow rationale and cannot inspire assent. It starts from the premise that recall is a power
given to registered voters and "since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election,
it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period"
provided by law. The reasoning is based on the misleading perception that the only participation
of the people in recall is on election day when they cast their vote electing or rejecting an
incumbent. But the role of the people in recall is not limited to being the judge on election day.
In truth, the people participate in the initiation of the recall process. There are two (2) kinds of
recall — — — recall initiated directly by the people and recall initiated by the people thru the
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). In recall initiated by the people, it is self-evident that the
people are involved from beginning to the end of the process. But nothing less is true in recall
initiated by the PRA. In Garcia, 4 we scoured the history of recall and we held: "[p]etitioners
have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have
embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a
misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly
through their representatives." We further ruled that "the members of the PRAC are in the PRAC
not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people." 5

There is another reason why I do not share the majority ruling that the one-year waiting period
is a limitation on the right of the people to judge an incumbent on election day itself but not a
limitation on their right to initiate the recall process. I submit that the rationale for fixing the
election day one year after assumption of office is different from the rationale for prohibiting
premature recall initiative. The rationale of the first is for the benefit of the people, to give them
sufficient time to assess intelligently the performance of an incumbent. The rationale of the
second is for the benefit of the incumbent, to give him a fair chance to govern well, to serve the
people minus the unnecessary distractions from the itch of too much politics. The ruling of the
majority recognizes the rationale of the first but not the rationale of the second. Its ruling that
sanctions too early a recall initiative, and worse, that allows endless recall initiatives will deprive
an incumbent a fair opportunity to prove himself thru the politics of performance.

The majority also holds that "to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation
of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and assembly." Again, I beg to
disagree. A dredging even of the subterranean meanings of freedom of speech and assembly
will not yield this result. It is one thing to postulate that during the one-year waiting period the
people cannot legally start a recall process. It is entirely non sequitur to add that during the said
period, the people's freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are suspended. These rights
are in no way restricted for critical speeches during the one-year waiting period cam serve as
valuable inputs in deciding after the said period whether to initiate the recall process. They will
assume more importance in the recall election date itself. To stress again, what the law deems
impermissible is formally starting the recall process right after Day One of an incumbent's term
of office for the purpose of ending his incumbency, an act bereft of any utility.

In my Preliminary Dissenting Opinion, I purveyed the view that the one-year waiting period is a
period of repose, of respite from divisive politics in order to give whoever is the sovereign choice
of the people a fair chance to succeed in public service. Rejecting this view, the majority holds
that "unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in
politics." With due respect, the ruling betrays historical amnesia. By no means is the one-year
waiting period a new, startling legal mechanism. This legal mechanism has long been installed
to regulate our labor-management relations, a volatile relationship, then and now. One of the
areas of concern in labor-management relations relates to the choice of employee
representative who shall bargain with the employer on the terms and conditions of employment.
The choice of the representative is determined in a certification election, a democratic exercise
often forcefully contested by unions for at stake is enormous power, both political and economic.
In the infant years of our labor-management relations, these representatives were the objects
of frequent change thru repeated petitions for new certification elections. These repeated
petitions for certification elections weakened employee representatives and resulted in
instability in labor-management relations. The instability had a debilitating effect on the
economy. As a remedial measure, the Industrial Peace Act insulated the term of the employee
representative from change for one year. This is known as the certification year rule pursuant
to which no petition for certification election can be ordered in the same bargaining unit more
often than once in twelve months. 6Hence, for one year, the employee representative is
shielded from any initiative calling for a certification election to change representative. This
progressive mechanism is still contained in Article 231 of our Labor Code. To jog our memory,
this legal mechanism was taken from the Wagner Act 7 of the United States which had a
provision that no election can be directed in any bargaining unit or in any subdivision, where in
the preceding 12-months period, a valid election has been held. This 12-month ban on
certification election of the Wagner Act has never been challenged as violative of freedom of
speech and of assembly of members of minority unions who wish to be elected as employee
bargaining representative. Let us not miss the reason for the twelve-month ban. Authorities in
labor law like Professor Forkosch emphasize that the "concepts of political democracy were
assimilated in these representation elections in labor law." 8 Needless to state, our own laws
and derivative foreign law repudiate the majority ruling that ". . . the law cannot really provide
for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. . . The only safeguard against the
baneful . . . effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the
people. . . ."

I do not have any competing vision to offer against the majority on the need to hike the efficacy
of the power of our people to recall elected officials who have lost their confidence. After all,
our EDSA experience has taught us that it is the people and the people alone who can end
malgovernment when all else fail. Recall is a powerful weapon given to our people but, like any
power, it can be abused. For this reason, the legislature carefully defined its limitations for its
misuse can bring about the disuse of a valuable means to terminate the misrule of misfits in
government. Our lawmakers know that the paradox of power is that to be effective it must be
restrained from running riot. Section 74 of the Local Government Code spelled out these
restraints. Section 74 (a) limits the number of times an official can be subjected to recall during
his term of office to only one time. Section 74 (b) limits the periods when the power can be
exercised. It sets two periods: the first, sets the beginning, i.e., one year after an officials'
assumption of office; the second, sets the end, i.e., one year immediately preceding a regular
election. These limitations should be strictly followed considering the short 3-year term of office
of local officials.

It is in this light that the Court should interpret Section 74. Its interpretation should strengthen
the right of recall and the best way to do this is to interpret it to prevent its misuse. By way of
summation, I respectfully submit that by holding that recall initiatives can start right after Day
One of an official's assumption to office, the majority failed to recognize the need for stability of
a public office. By holding that these initiatives can be undertaken not once, not twice but
endlessly within one year after an official's assumption to office, the majority exposed our
people to an overdose of politics. By holding that recall initiatives can be done prematurely, the
majority forgot that such initiatives are meaningful only if they are used to adjudge an official's
performance in office. By holding that recall initiatives can be done even without giving an
official a fair chance to serve the people, the majority has induced incumbents to play the politics
of compromise instead of the politics of performance. By holding that recall initiatives can be
done at any one's caprice, the majority has cast a blind eye on the expenses that accompany
such exercise. These expenses have to be repaid later, an undeniable cause of cronyism and
corruption in government.

The bottomline is that our law intends recall as a mechanism of good government. It can never
fulfill that intent if we allow its use to foment too much politics. We need not be adepts in the
alleyways of politics to say that too much politics is the root of a lot of evils in our country. Our
1987 Constitution sought to check this bad political cholesterol plaguing our government. Any
attempt to restore this fat should draw more than a phlegmatic posture.

I vote to grant the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., separate and dissenting opinion;

With utmost due respect, I am constrained to disagree with the main opinion that the term
"recall" under Section 74(b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, refers to the recall election alone. Section 74 provides:

Sec. 74. Limitation on Recall. —

(a) Any elective official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence;

(b) No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official's assumption of office.

Mayor Claudio won the mayoralty race in Pasay City in the 11 May 1998 elections. He assumed
office on 1 July 1998. 1 Less than 10 months thereafter, or on 29 May 1999, the People's Recall
Assembly (PRA) of Pasay City convened and passed a resolution to initiate the recall of Mayor
Claudio. 2 On 2 July 1999, a petition for the recall of Mayor Claudio was filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). 3 In a Resolution, promulgated on 18 October 1999,
rendered in E.M. No. 99-005 (RCL), the COMELEC resolved to approve and give due course
to the petition for recall. The COMELEC, construing that the word "recall" only begins upon the
time of filing of the recall petition in the Office of the Election Officer of Pasay City up to the date
of recall election," 4 ruled that since the petition was filed on 2 July 1999, the same was already
outside the prohibited period of one (1) year after Mayor Claudio assumed his office on 1 July
1998. 5 Hence, the present case where the majority fund that the COMELEC did not abuse its
discretion in issuing the assailed resolution.

Contrary to the majority view, I humbly submit that "recall" under Section 74(b) is not limited to
the election itself, but, rather, it is a process which begins once the PRA makes its first
affirmative acts towards the recall of the elective local official concerned, i.e. the convening of
the PRA and the passing by the PRA of a recall resolution during a session called for the said
purpose, and culminates with the holding of the recall election.

The majority opinion concedes that it "can agree that a process which begins with the convening
of the preparatory recall assembly on the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit." Yet, it maintains that "recall" as used in paragraph
(b) of Section 74 "refers to the election itself by means of which the voters decide whether they
should retain their local official or elect his replacement."

The majority opines that the power of recall can be exercised solely by he electorate and not by
the PRA through "the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the
signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a petition for recall." This is so since the majority
equates the power of recall with the electorate's power to replace or retain the local official
concerned during the recall elections. In furtherance of this premise, the majority concludes
that since the "power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate the recall proceedings
but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to
the entire recall proceedings." I beg to disagree.

Since our form of government is a representative democracy, it cannot be claimed that the
initiation of the recall process by the PRA is not an initiation by the people. This was explained
by the Court in the case of Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 6 wherein it was said:

Again, the contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have misconstrued the
nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that
initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the
PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is
not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives.
Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to
their representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as congressional
constituent assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or
a reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of the
people. 7

It must be noted that in the above quotation, as well as in all the discussions in the Garcia case,
recall is always described and referred to as a process. The Garcia case does not, either directly
or impliedly; state that the term "recall" in Section 74(b) is confined solely to the recall election
alone. Garcia explains that recall as a process which begins with the convening of the PRA
coupled with the passing of a recall resolution and culminating with the recall election itself. 8 It
is the PRA resolution which paves the way for the official sought to be recalled to appear before
the electorate so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. 9 Thereafter, to
determine whether the elected official still retains the confidence of the people, a recall election
is held. Thus, the recall process may be considered as composed of two distinct but continuous
phases, namely: the initiatory phase and the election phase. As such, for purposes of
determining whether the recall was instituted within the allowable period under Section 74(b),
the reckoning point should be the initiatory phase which is the time of convening and passing
of the recall resolution. This should be so since it is from this moment that the process of recall
comes into being. It is at this precise moment when the PRA, as representatives of the
electorate, concretizes its stand and makes an affirmative act of its intent to recall the elected
local official. Nonetheless, it is still up to the people to affirm or reject the move to recall the
incumbent official during the election called for the purpose.

The underlying reason behind the time bar provisions, as pronounced by the Court in Angobung
vs. COMELEC 10 , is to guard against the abuse of the power of recall. In so holding, the Court
authoritatively cited the case of In Re Bower 11 , stating that "the only logical reason which we
can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall is to prevent
premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had
sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The phrase "premature
action" logically refers to any activity geared towards removing the incumbent official without
waiting for sufficient time to elapse to evaluate his performance in office. The convening of the
PRA and the passing of the questioned recall resolution in this case were actions or activities
proscribed by law, rendering the entire recall process invalid. The term "recall" under Section
74(b) being a process which begins with the convening of the PRA and the passing of the recall
resolution, such initiatory exercises within the prohibited period tend to disrupt the workings of
a local government unit and are deleterious to its development and growth.

In a political culture like ours where a losing candidate does not easily concede defeat as
demonstrated by numerous election protests pending before our courts and in the COMELEC,
all that a disgruntled candidate has to do to undermine the mandate of the victor is to court the
other local officials in order to set the stage for the convening of a PRA and the passage of a
recall resolution. After this, all that needs to be done is to wait for the lapse of the first time bar
and, thereafter, file the petition for recall. In the meantime, the incumbent official sought to be
removed and his political opponents engage in a full-scale election campaign which is divisive,
destabilizing and disruptive, with its pernicious effects taking their toll on good governance.
In this regard, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the main author of the Local Government Code of
1991, in his book entitled "The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National
Development," explained:

Recall resolutions or petitions may not be used whimsically. In fact, they can be resorted to only
once during the term of the elective official sought to be recalled. And since there is a prohibition
against recalls within the first year of an official's term of office, and within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election, the move to recall can only be done in the second year of
the three year term of local elective officials. 12

It can readily be observed that Senator Pimentel used the phrase "move to recall" in describing
the activity which can only he undertaken during the freedom period. This is significant because
the use of the phrase "move to recall" is instructive of the concept envisioned by the primary
author of the law in providing for the limitations on recall. It connotes a progressive course of
action or a step-by-step process. As such, the word "move," when used in conjunction with the
word "recall," can pertain to no other than the entire recall process which begins with the
convening of the PRA and the passing of the recall resolution and ending with the recall election.
It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as referring to the election alone.

I cannot subscribe to the observation of the majority that to construe the limitation in Section 74
(b) "as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and
of assembly guaranteed by the Constitution." The people can assemble and discuss their
opinions and grievances against the incumbent official, at any time during his term and as often
as they would like, because it is their right to do so. An exercise of their right to peaceably
assemble and exchange views about the governance of the local official would not be violative
of the limitations set forth in Section 74(b). However, once notice is sent, during the prohibited
period, stating that the purpose of the meeting is to convene the PRA and to pass a recall
resolution, and the same is actually approved, then Section 74(b) is transgressed. In this
instance, the limitation of the electorate's freedom of speech and assembly is not violated since
the time bar provision is imposed by the legislature in the exercise of its police power. The
limitation in Section 74(b) is analogous to the prohibition under Section 80 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits a person from
engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign
period. 1 The limitation on the freedom of speech and assembly imposed by Section 80 has
never been questioned as being unconstitutional.

Finally, I do not find any logical reason to support the view that the recall process should be
counted only from the time of the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC.
Although the filing of the petition for recall with the COMELEC is, admittedly, an important
component in the recall process, it, however, cannot be considered as the starting point of the
same. The filing of the petition, being merely a consequential mechanical act, is just a next step
in the process of recall after PRA's acts of convening the recall assembly and passing the recall
resolution. Once a petition for recall is filed, the only role of the COMELEC is the verification of
its authenticity and genuineness. After such verification the COMELEC is mandated by law to
set the date of the recall election. Clearly, the role of the COMELEC in the recall process under
Section 70 of R.A. 7160 is merely ministerial in nature. Such being the case, it cannot be
correctly argued that the crucial moment in the recall process is the actual filing of the petition
with the COMELEC.

I vote, therefore, to grant the petition.

Footnotes

G.R. No. 141787 September 18, 2000

MANUEL H. AFIADO, JASMINIO B. QUEMADO, JR. AND GLESIE L.

TANGONAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, praying
for the early resolution of the petition for the "recall" of former Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro
(currently the Mayor) of Santiago City, which was filed with respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

The facts are as follows:

During the May 11, 1998 elections in Santiago City, Joel Miranda became the substitute
candidate for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, for the position of Mayor. When the ballots
were counted, Joel emerged as the winner over his opponent Antonio Abaya and he was later
proclaimed. Amelita S. Navarro also won and was proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Santiago
City.

On May 13, 1998, the defeated candidate, Antonio Abaya, filed before the COMELEC against
Joel Miranda a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as SPA No. 98-288,
which was later amended. The amended petition sought the declaration of the certificate of
candidacy of Jose Miranda, the father of Joel, as null and void.

The petition, as amended, was granted by the COMELEC en banc, and consequently the
election and proclamation of Joel Miranda as Mayor of Santiago City was annulled. This ruling
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a Decision promulgated on July 28, 1999 in G.R. No.
136531, entitled "Joel Miranda vs. Antonio Abaya and COMELEC." In that decision, we ruled
that since the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda was not valid, he could not be validly
substituted by his son, Joel Miranda, as a mayoralty candidate in Santiago City. Hence, Joel
Miranda could not be validly proclaimed as the winner in the mayoralty elections. Vice-Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro thus became the new Mayor of Santiago City by virtue of the law on
succession.1 Joel Miranda filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied with finality by
the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated September 28, 1999.

Navarro took her oath of office and assumed her position as Mayor of Santiago City on October
11, 1999.

Meanwhile, on July 12, 1999, while the said G.R. No. 136531 was still pending in the Supreme
Court, petitioners Manuel H. Afiado, Jasminio B. Quemado and Glesie L. Tangonan convened
the barangay officials of Santiago City who compose the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA)
at the Santiago City People's Coliseum after giving them due notice. On the same date, July
12, 1999, the PRA passed and adopted Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 1 for the
recall of Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro. The pertinent portions of the said Resolution No. 1
read as follows:

ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 1

-oOo-

RESOLUTION OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF THE

BARANGAY OFFICIALS OF SANTIAGO CITY FOR THE RECALL OF THE
INCUMBENT VICE-MAYOR OF SANTIAGO CITY

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, during the Preparatory Recall Assembly the official acts of City
Vice Mayor Navarro that brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity
and fitness to discharge the duties and to perform the functions of her public
office were recounted for the contemplation and evaluation of the members
present, to wit:

1. Her lack of respect and due regard for superior authority…

 2. Her greed for political power which worked against public interest and the
general welfare…

3. Her lack of regard for public officials, subordinates and lowly employees,
which is conduct unbecoming of a public official and speaks of her
unprofessionalism…

4. Her constant insistence to usurp the powers or authority vested upon other
public officials…

5. Her application of delaying tactics in the SP actions on the City

Government's annual budget…

6. Her disregard of parliamentary rules by imposing her unsolicited and

unnecessary opinion unto the city councilors…

7. Because of her preoccupation towards matters other than those of public

concerns, substantial part of the legislative tasks of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod brought to it for action have remained unacted unfinished (sic);

8. Her alleged malfeasance of corruption while she was still the City Mayor
in acting capacity, specifically her direct hand in the anomalous acquisition
of six dump trucks, a request for investigation for (sic) which is pending at the
Office of the Ombudsman;

9. Her antagonistic attitude towards development concerns…

WHEREAS, on accounts of the documented facts and stated hereinabove

the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly present have lost, after due
thought their confidence upon the incumbent City Vice Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro.

NOW WHEREFORE, upon a motion duly seconded, be it -

RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED to INVOKE THE RESCISSION OF

THE ELECTORAL MANDATE OF THE INCUMBENT CITY VICE-MAYOR
AMELITA S. NAVARRO for LOSS OF CONFIDENCE through a recall
election to be set by the COMMISSION ON ELECTION as provided for under
Section 71 of the Local Government Code of 1991;

xxx xxx xxx

APPROVED by the majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall

Assembly held on July 12, 1999 at the People's Coliseum, Santiago City,
Isabela.2

According to the petitioners, PRA Resolution No. 1 together with all the reglementary
requirements, has been forwarded and submitted to the office of respondent COMELEC at
Santiago City and later to its Head Office in Manila through the Provincial Elections Office and
Regional Elections Office.

On September 9, 1999, while the subject Preparatory Recall Resolution No. 1 was under
evaluation in the COMELEC's Head Office, then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a petition,
docketed as EM No. 99-006, with the COMELEC which sought the nullification of the said PRA
Resolution No. 1. In Navarro's petition, the herein petitioners Afiado, Quemado and Tangonan
(as officers of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Santiago City) were impleaded as the
respondents therein.

Hearings in EM No. 99-006 were then conducted at the COMELEC's head office.1âwphi1 After
the deadline for the submission of memoranda on December 1, 1999, herein petitioners as the
respondents in that case, alleged that they were not informed nor were they aware of further
developments. This prompted them to file on December 27, 1999 an Urgent Motion for the Early
Resolution of the Petition (EM No. 99-006). According to the herein petitioners, the act of herein
respondent COMELEC in not deciding the said petition violates Rule 18, Section 7 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that:

Sec. 7. Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc. - Any case or matter submitted to or
heard by the Commission en banc shall be decided within thirty (30) days from the date it is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution, except a motion for reconsideration of a decision
or resolution of a Division in Special Actions and Special cases which shall be decided within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case or matter is deemed submitted for decision, unless
otherwise provided by law.

The herein petitioners allege that the act of respondent COMELEC in not resolving the petition,
EM No. 99-006, within the reglementary period constitutes neglect in the performance of its
duties and responsibilities; and that the alleged inaction of respondent COMELEC will render
the said case and/or PRA Resolution No. 1 moot and academic inasmuch as recall elections
cannot be undertaken anymore come June 30, 2000 pursuant to Section 74 of the 1991 Local
Government Code, which provides that:

Sec. 74. Limitation on Recall. -

(a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of
office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.3

Finally, on February 18, 2000, sensing the urgency of the situation since PRA Resolution No.
1 was not yet acted upon by the COMELEC, the herein petitioners filed the present petition
for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to resolve and deny immediately Navaro's
petition, docketed therein as EM No. 99-006, and in effect to give due course to and implement
the said PRA Resolution.

The corollary issue in the case at bench is whether or not an elective official who became City
Mayor by legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory
Recall Assembly Resolution which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was
still the Vice-Mayor.

We deny the petition.

On March 31, 2000 respondent COMELEC issued and promulgated in EM No. 99-006 a
Resolution4 which denied due course to the subject PRA Resolution No. 1. This development
therefore rendered the present petition for mandamus moot and academic. The record shows
that herein petitioners' counsel of record was furnished copies of the COMELEC's Resolution
dated March 31, 2000 by registered mail on April 1, 2000.

Anent the corollary issue as to whether or not Mayor Navarro can be the subject of recall
election by virtue of Resolution No. 1 of the Preparatory Recall Assembly which was passed
when she was still the elected City Vice-Mayor, the same has become moot and academic. We
quote below the pertinent portion of the COMELEC's Resolution dated March 31, 2000 in EM
No. 99-006 and to which we agree, to wit:

The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a
supervening event which rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. A
perusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall process is a specific
elective official in relation to her specific office. The said resolution is replete with statements,
which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor
for her official acts as Vice Mayor. The title itself suggests that the recall is intended for the
incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City. The third paragraph of the resolution recounted " the
official acts of City Vice Mayor Navarro that brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity
and fitness to discharge the duties and to perform the functions of her public office." And
because of such acts, the assembly "RESOLVED to invoke the rescission of the electoral
mandate of the incumbent City Vice Mayor." Clearly, the intent of the PRA as expressed in the
said Resolution is to remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence
in her by reason of her official acts as such. To recall, then, the petitioner when she is already
the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the PRA. Having, thus,
succeeded to the position of City Mayor, the petitioner was placed beyond the reach of the
effects of the PRA Resolution.5

The specific purpose of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was to remove Amelita S. Navarro as
the elected Vice-Mayor of Santiago City since PRA Resolution No. 1 dated July 12, 1999
expressly states that "…it is hereby resolved to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate
of the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro for loss of confidence through a recall
election to be set by the Commission on Election as provided for under Section 71 of the Local
Government Code of 1991."6 However, the said PRA Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable
to her inasmuch as she has already vacated the office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when
she assumed the position of City Mayor of Santiago City.

Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to adopt another resolution for the
recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not prosper
in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "No recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption of office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular election." There is no more allowable time in the light of
that law within which to hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro assumed office as Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her
assumption of office as Mayor will be October 11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year
prohibited period immediately preceding the next regular election in May 2001.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990

PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press.

On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act
originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990
by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.

The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be
a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite

campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution.

Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner
maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his
opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes
that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment
for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision, as follows:

Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities. — Except to the
extent that the same may not be applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and offenses
defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code ('Sections 261, 262, 263 and Article'
XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be aplicable to the
plebiscite governed by this Resolution.

Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and
opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and
desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

On November 28, 1989, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent

Commission on Elections from enforcing and implementing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167.
We also required the respondent to comment on the petition.

On January 9, 1990, respondent Commission on Elections, through the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Comment.

Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media
during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from
expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still
express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.
This is provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881:

Section 90. Comelec Space. — Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said
newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or
city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge equally and impartially within the area
in which the newspaper is circulated.

Section 92. Comelec Time. — The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide
radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11
of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167.

Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.

Similarly, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) likewise
provides:

Prohibited forms of election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda

prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: ...

(b) for any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90
and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or
personality who is a candidate for any elective office shall take a leave of absence from his
work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis ours)

However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits
or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision
is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why
a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective
office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par.
Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a
candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless
required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
basis.

In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the
prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and
prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil
sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a
plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in
an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.

Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or
against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he
may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement.
We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by
the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may
provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to
the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November
13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality
of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot,
and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.

WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a municipality
shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;

WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the
plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated

(sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:

1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected, namely
the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas
of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155,
July 11, 1986).

xxx xxx xxx

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890
votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of
Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks
to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo
and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of
petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid
and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should
have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising
the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses
that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4

In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987
Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied
upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive
Secretary 6 which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the
voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7

Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the
plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and
the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.

We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution
No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes
vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on
Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable
under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision
deleted the words "unit or."

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our
ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my
distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, to wit:

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform
the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words
used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of
these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the
Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the
part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in
the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a
barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.9 (Emphasis
supplied)

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently,
what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political
units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political
areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude
that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999

CITY OF PASIG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 128663 September 10, 1999

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves
the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its
jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays
encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated
from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and
separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of
Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan
in Pasig City. 1Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series
of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March
15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend
or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on
Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)3 and
March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta
called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. 4 According to the Municipality
of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of
said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and
ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after
the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities.5 Hence,
the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.

The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being
moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation
of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein.6 Hence,
the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.

The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary
dispute between the two local governments.

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation
of the proposed barangays may be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a
civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant
case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. 42,7 that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one
case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions
of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to
the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.8 Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of
such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,9 we held that —

The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the people's welfare.

Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent
to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the
entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Pasig.

Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the
proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered
moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the
COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still
pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

In Tan v. Commission on Elections,10 we struck down the moot and academic argument as
follows —

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should
not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the
respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the
instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents'
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those
who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident
that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to
bring about a fait accompli.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality
of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on
March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and
set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC
Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on
March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null
and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with
finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil
Case No. 94-3006.

No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 132603 September 18, 2000

ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA, REGION P. DE LEON,

MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA,
DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS
TOO NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A CLASS SUIT,petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan,
Batangas; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGLALA WIGAN OF BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY;
HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN, CALACA, BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

BUENA, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Order dated February 25, 1998,1 of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, 2
in Civil Case No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite
scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are undisputed.

On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca,
Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang
Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of
199S, with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order. Ordinance No. 05 3
declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the
required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 4 On the other hand, Resolution No. 345 5
affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto 6 exercised by the
governor of Batangas.7 Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for
being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under Section
9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the attestations or certifications
of the Department of Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), were
obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution, on February 10, 1998, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing
the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of
the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas.8Simultaneous with the filing of the action before the trial court, petitioners also filed
an ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from
enforcing Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.

In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According
to the trial court, the temporary restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed only
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court ruled that any petition or action questioning
an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.9

On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated
February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the conduct of the
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998.10

In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition. 11

On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment,
declaring that he concurs with petitioners' cause and recommending that the instant petition be
given due course.12 Consequently, the Court further resolved on September 29, 1998 to require
the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas to submit their own Comment
on the petition.

In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
require the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 13

In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the following issue for
the resolution of this Court:

"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN THE

COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998, WHICH
PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF
BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA,
BATANGAS, PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE
ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 2987."14

First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial
Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages multiplicity of suit[s] and splitting a single
cause of action," contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court. 15 Petitioners maintain that
since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was only issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, the propriety of the
issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent upon the validity of the Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.16 And considering that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear
and determine the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is not disputed, the
assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek the preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before this Court, advances multiplicity of suits and splitting
a single cause of action.

Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial functions under
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are subject to
the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial but,
such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court, 17citing Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:

"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial
in character."'18

Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that "[t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory [or quasi judicial] in nature but simply
ministerial or administrative in nature [and only] in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and
Resolution," citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:

". . . To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that
are best ventilated before the RTC [Regional Trial Court], a court which the law vests with the
power to exercise original jurisdiction over 'all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions'." 19

Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has already been
conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from being moot and academic,
claiming that the actual holding of the said plebiscite could not validate an otherwise invalid
ordinance and resolution;20 that there are still substantial matters to be resolved; 21
assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and academic, ". . . courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review"'; 22 and
finally, petitioners maintain that this Court has resolved to require the parties to maintain the
status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that is, a day before the plebiscite
was scheduled to be conducted.23

Concurring with petitioners' arguments, the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum filed on
September 7, 1999, asserts that ". . . [I]t is already settled in this jurisdiction that what is
contemplated by the terms 'any decision, order or ruling' of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari to this Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987]
Constitution, are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicialpowers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials." (Citations omitted.) 24
The Solicitor General further argues that the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions, hence, it is
submitted that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.

Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand, submits that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court, citing
the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo(23 SCRA 533, 540-541[1968]); Luison vs. Garcia (L-
10916, May 20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968]); and Aratuc vs.
COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272 [1979]);25 thus:

". . . For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this Court may review the
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand why no
interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on Elections of its functions
should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in point, indicates the proper approach.
Thus: 'It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and
every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any
order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to
impotence."26

The COMELEC further argues that ". . . if a Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction to
issue writs against statutory agencies of government like the ones cited above [referring to the
former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public Service Commission,
Social Security Commission, National Electrification Administration and Presidential
Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such jurisdiction over the
Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent body expressly clothed by the 1987
Constitution with, among others, quasi-judicial functions and tasked with one of the most
paramount aspects of a democratic government. . . ." 27 Finally, the COMELEC contends that
the temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot and academic
by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined.28

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:

"SECTION 7. . . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within this days from receipt of a copy thereof."

In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision
in this wise:

". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions
or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."29

In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that powers vested by the Constitution and the law on
the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial
in character.30

As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the COMELEC ascertained
the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it
issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the
affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. We
agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . . [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987
is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of
its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear
and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct
of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws." (Citation
omitted.)31Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC's
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution
may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention — that the power to
review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply not
in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo32 speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In the present case,
petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia33 refers to this Court's power to review
"administrative decisions," particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a certain
certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution.
In Macud vs. COMELEC,34 we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an election
return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the aggrieved party may
elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the
action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud,
the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of "final orders, rulings and decisions"
of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.

In view of the foregoing, public respondent's other contentions deserve scant consideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Order dated
February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered
to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the
plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the outcome of Civil Case
No. 3442.

SO ORDERED.

465 Phil. 800

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and
Antonio Bautista assailing the October 28, 2002 'en banc Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) which held that it has no jurisdiction over controversies involving the
conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its result.The facts show that in April, 1988, a
plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (Republic Act No.
8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city. Without completing
the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
declared that the "NO" votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a
city.

The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the COMELEC en banc to reconvene and
complete the canvass. The Board did and in due time issued an Order proclaiming that the
negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.

Forthwith, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul[1] the results of the plebiscite
with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast therein. They alleged that fraud and
irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes. The case was docketed as an election
protest and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.[2]

Private respondent Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an
election protest. He averred that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a
plebiscite is lodged with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).[3]

The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to the petition and ruled that it has
jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin to an election protest considering that
the same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots and
preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing the results of an election. It then
ordered the Taguig ballot boxes to be brought to its Manila office and created revision
committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.[4]

In an unverified motion, intervenor Cayetano moved for reconsideration of the COMELEC Order
insisting that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition contesting the results of a
plebiscite.

In a complete turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order on November 29, 2001
granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the petition to annul the results of the
Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves
an exercise of quasi-judicial powers not contemplated under Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the
1987 Constitution.[5]
On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd Division. It held that the
COMELEC cannot use its power to enforce and administer all laws relative to plebiscites as
this power is purely administrative or executive and not quasi-judicial in nature. It concluded
that the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the
RTC under Section 19 (6) of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 which provides that the RTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[6]

Hence this petition.

Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista reiterate their submission that jurisdiction
to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with the COMELEC. They likewise
claim that the impugned Order is discriminatory as during the pendency of the Taguig case, the
COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar case concerning the revision and recount of the
plebiscite ballots involving the conversion of Malolos into a city. The COMELEC resolved said
case and already declared Malolos a city.

Respondents contend that there is no such action as a plebiscite protest under the Constitution,
the laws and the COMELEC rules as they provided only for election protests; the quasi-judicial
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election contests extends only to cases enumerated in
Section 2(2), Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which does not include controversies over
plebiscite results; and, even if the petition to annul plebiscite results is akin to an election protest,
it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over election protests involving municipal officials, and the
COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction in said cases.

The petition is impressed with merit.

First. The key to the case at bar is its nature. The case at bar involves the determination of
whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality
of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose. Respondents
submit that the regular courts of justice, more specifically, the Regional Trial Court, has the
jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy concerning the conduct of said plebiscite. We hold
that the invocation of judicial power to settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is
misplaced. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as including "the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, "the first part of the
authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred by law."[7] The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct
of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power.
It does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement. There is
no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote
of the electorate of Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their
municipality to a highly urbanized city. There is no invocation of a private right conferred by law
that has been violated and which can be vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an
adversarial proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the determination of the sovereign
decision of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose of this determination is more to protect the
sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate the private interest of any individual. Such a
determination does not contemplate the clash of private rights of individuals and hence cannot
come under the traditional jurisdiction of courts.

Second. If the determination of the result of a plebiscite is not fit for the exercise ofjudicial power,
the invocation of Section 19 of B.P. Big. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, is ineluctably errant, viz:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

.
. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;

xxx xxx xxx

 1. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.

There cannot be any bout with doubt that the aforequoted provisions refer to civil cases or
actions. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.[8] As stressed above, a plebiscite involves the
expression of the public will on a public issue. The determination of the public will is a subject
that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts are established essentially to
resolve controversies between private persons.[9]

The case of Salva v. Macalintal [10] does not support the overarching thesis that "any question
on the validity of plebiscite, or any dispute on the result of the plebiscite falls within the general
jurisdiction of regular trial courts." Looking at it with clear eyes, Salva resolved the validity, not
of a plebiscite or its result, but of a provision in the rules and regulations issued by the
COMELEC governing the conduct of a plebiscite.

Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results can lead to jumbled
justice. Consider for instance where the plebiscite is national as it deals with the ratification of
a proposed amendment to our Constitution. Snap thinking will tell us that it should be the
COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over a petition to annul its results. If jurisdiction is given
to the regular courts, the result will not enhance the orderly administration of justice. Any
regional trial court from every nook and corner of the country will have jurisdiction over a petition
questioning the results of a nationwide plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these
courts is limited only within their respective judicial regions, the difficulties that will attend their
exercise of jurisdiction would be many if not unmanageable.

Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and related laws will reveal that only contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials are subject to the exercise
of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial power of our administrative agencies, thus: (a)
contests involving elective municipal officials are tried and decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, while those involving barangay officials are tried and decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction; in both cases, however, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b)
contests involving all elective regional, provincial and city officials fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests
involving members of the House of Representatives fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial power; (d)
contests involving members of the Senate fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial power; and, (e) contests involving the
President and the Vice President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power.

What grabs the eyeball is the intent of our Constitution and election laws to
subject only contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials from
the barangay to the President of the Philippines to the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers of courts or administrative tribunals. Contests which do not involve the election, returns
and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exerci of the judicial or quasi-
judicial powers of courts oradministra i agencies. Clearly, controversies concerning the conduct
plebiscite appertain to this category. In the case at bar. conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the
core of the controversy. This is a matter that involves the enforcement and administration of a
law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1),
Article IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the power "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x."

Fifth. The Court agrees with the following submissions of the Solicitor General, viz.

xxx xxx xxx

There can hardly be any doubt that the test and intent of the constitutional
grant of powers to the COMELEC is to give it all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest and peaceful and
credible elections [Maruhom v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 473 (2000)]. Hence,
the all encompassing power endowed the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election (or
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall) includes the power to cancel
proclamations [(Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997)]. The
 COMELEC also has the power to supervise and control the proceedings of
the board of canvassers, suspend and/or annul illegal and void proclamations,
declare a failure of elections and promulgate rules and regulations
concerning the conduct of elections.

While the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is most commonly invoked over

popular elections that which involves the choice or selection ' of candidates
to public office by popular vote, the same may likewise be invoked in
connection with the conduct of plebiscite.

In the present case, petitioners filed a petition for revision of ballots cast in a
plebiscite. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issue raised therein calls for
the exercise by the COMELEC of its judicial or quasi-judicial power.
According to the COMELEC, there is no law nor any constitutional provision
that confers it with jurisdiction to hear and decide a case contesting the
officially proclaimed results of a plebiscite based on frauds and irregularities.

The COMELEC's position is highly untenable. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is

very explicit that the COMELEC has the power to "enforce administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause
the performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or
operation, a plan or measure. When we say the COMELEC has the power to
enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it necessarily entails
all the necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of an
honest and credible plebiscite. Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not
limited to the mere administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. The
law is clear. It is also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct of
the plebiscite. Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct
or check what the Board of Canvassers erroneously or fraudulently did during
the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the true results of the plebiscite either
through a pre-proclamation case or through revision of ballots. To remove
from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite
through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated
power to "enforce" laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite. It is not correct
to argue that the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC is limited to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective Barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. If the COMELEC has quasi-judicial power to enforce laws
relating to elective officials then there is no reason why it cannot exercise the
same power to ascertain the true results of a plebiscite. All that the
Constitution provides is that the COMELEC shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to elective officials. The provision is not
a limiting provision in the sense that it only limits the quasi-judicial power of
the COMELEC to said cases. To repeat, the power of the COMELEC to
ascertain the true results of the plebiscite is implicit in its power to enforce all
laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.

COMELEC's claim that the petition for revision of ballots is cognizable by the
Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Section 19 (6) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 whieh provides that "Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court tribunal, person or body exercisingjudicial or quasi-
judicial functions lacks merit. To repeat, the power to ascertain the true
results of the plebiscite is necessarily included in the power to enforce all
laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.[11]
Sixth. From our earliest Constitution and election laws, the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular
courts. If the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this matter, our laws would have been
amended to that effect. There is another reason why the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve
disputes involving plebiscite results should be upheld. Such a case involves the appreciation of
ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has
the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws. Consequently, we should be
extra cautious in delimiting the parameters of the COMELEC's broad powers. We should give
the COMELEC enough latitude in the exercise of its expertise, for to straightjacket its discretion
in the enforcement and administration of laws relating to the conduct of election, plebiscite or
referendum may render it impotent. This is the first time that the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
a petition to annul the results of a plebiscite has been assailed and surprisingly, this is the first
time that the COMELEC has yielded its historic jurisdiction. More inexplicable is the inconsistent
stance of the COMELEC on the issue. As stressed by the petitioners, the COMELEC assumed
jurisdiction over the case assailing the result of the Malolos plebiscite. In the case at bar, it
refused to exercise jurisdiction.

Seventh. Finally, it appears that the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent
Congressman Cayetano was filed out of time. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that a motion for reconsideration should be filed within five (5) days from
receipt of the COMELEC Order or Resolution. Congressman Cayetano himself
admitted[12] that he received a copy of the October 3, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd
Division on October 9, 2001. The records show that it was only ten (10) days after said receipt,
or on October 19, 2001, that private respondent Cayetano filed his undated and unverified
Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC 2nd Division had no jurisdiction to entertain
his Motion. .

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC is directed to reinstate the
petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it without delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Sanliago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Austria-Martinez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.

Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., see dissenting opinions. Callejo, Sr., .J., concurs in the dissent
of Carpio Morales.

Tinga, J., took no part. One of the intervenors and former counsel for the intervenor.

G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio
Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing
Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 9371 2 - the law that Resolution No.
7837 implements - is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and
sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro."3This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9371.4 It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of
May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the
second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would
elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:

Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan,
Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi,
Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan
and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon,
Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40
shall comprise the second district.5

On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376 implementing
R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27,
2007.7 On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the following as
respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers. 8

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without
providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is
indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the
issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No.
9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No.
7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.

Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A.
No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.

The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General,
argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute;
2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of
Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371
did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v.
PAGCOR,9 the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2)
Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - the material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as
well as of the people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected
as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the
questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district
designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6)
government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of
Cagayan De Oro City.10

THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be limited to the
following contentious points:

1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be
dismissed on this ground?

2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro
City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

OUR RULING

Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without
merit.

The hierarchy of courts principle.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.11 It was pursuant to this original
jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.

While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals12 and the RTCs,13 a direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated
by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our
exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the "principle of
hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. 14

Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to the
rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our nation's
lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed. 15 The present petition is of this
nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised - among them, whether legislative
reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit - are
reasons enough for considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to
implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a
COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn
requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.16For these reasons, we do
not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the
present case.

The Plebiscite Requirement.

The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a
local government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment. This
argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of
apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government units.

Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the

number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body.17It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the
drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts.18 Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.19

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on
legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of,
are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal
corporations") that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays.20 In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body
politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the
purpose of local government thereof."21 The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are
covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political unit directly affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to
act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and
reapportionment of legislative districts,22 and likewise acts on local government units by setting
the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by
actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their
boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two
provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.

The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the
means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively
heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and
voting power among districts."23 Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented;
the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and
accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented, every city with
at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one
representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on
the other, relate and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required
standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as
the given standards are met.

In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10
expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and
the modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it
speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely,
the criteria established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified
as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services. 24 The division or merger of
existing units must comply with the same requirements (since a new local government unit will
come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area
of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code. 25

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require
a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a
local government unit.26 In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment
or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that arose from the division of the
congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we
confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for
Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held
for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary
for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the
creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San
Juan where only a reapportionment took place.

The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one under
Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots of these
two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their
areas of application.

A Bit of History.

In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of our

apportionment provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth Amendment 29 of the U.S.
Constitution and from the constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of
1902 created the Philippine Assembly,30 the body that acted as the lower house of the
bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper
house. While the members of the Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S. President
with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine Assembly were elected
by representative districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902
pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly among the provinces
as nearly as practicable according to population. Thus, legislative apportionment first started in
our country.

The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment provision,
dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts electing one delegate
each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine
Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine Islands.

Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was
"equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican institutions" as expressed
in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.31 The case ruled that inequality of representation
is a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated in Montejo v.
COMELEC.32Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite ever came up in these
cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.

Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation "in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" with each district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. This formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution,
distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of party-list representatives. In neither
Constitution was a plebiscite required.

The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government units
was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A.
No. 226433 required, in the creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the creation and
definition of boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected." In
1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that
the "Act shall take effect after a majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor
of the conversion of their municipality into a city in a plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972
by other legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a condition for the creation and
conversion of local government units as well as the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to
another.34 In 1973, the plebiscite requirement was accorded constitutional status.

Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was never
a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became constitutionally
entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition
and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of legislative
apportionment.

Nature and Areas of Application.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political
unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and
members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which
functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as
a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but
unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for
and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by
the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which
has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has
a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the
congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in
Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also
signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity
to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar
action on a legislative district.

The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state.35 They possess legal personality on the
authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as
entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be
altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.36 A
local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its
chief executive and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.37

As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying

out the functions of government."38 As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical
personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents.
It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs" 39 and the mediums
through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns.40 In light of these
roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units
through a plebiscite.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or

reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic
nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a
local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement
that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution. Its core provision - Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan,
Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi,
Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan
and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico,
Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to
Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity
takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and
intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into
two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly
apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837,
for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the
congressional apportionment made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is
not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law - R.A. No. 663641 - whose Section 3
provides:

SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have
eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified
voters therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and
other cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all
other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of
the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to
their charters be reduced.

However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two
political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a
corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter
more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one
congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately
500,000.42 By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de
Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city's
population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better access to their
congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000
he used to represent. The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks
increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation
terms, the fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city
resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and each councilor represents
both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are now concentrated in each
representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it
and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has
not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead
of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.

Equality of representation.

The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has
only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of
rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371
violates the principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be
the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein.
We settled this very same question in Herrera v. COMELEC44 when we interpreted a provision
in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras.
We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province
of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by
Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office.

The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of
Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the
National Statistics Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district
have a total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably,
these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. 45 The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative," while ensuring representation
for every province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents,
all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local
government units as they are found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to
satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some numerical
disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.

The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro
City into two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while
the second district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper
proof, we cannot question the division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of
development or developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards for
legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What the components of the two districts of
Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In
the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal parameters,
this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies. 47

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and

MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010.1

The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in
the Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda),
Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City’s population in 2010,
is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City’s
population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration
Report2) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July
2008,3 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008 4) which Congress
allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-
justiciability argument to these materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating
legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review
power,5 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their
constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are
entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must
inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to
comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected
claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation:

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing
conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the
question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of
authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which
the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political
power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the
question is properly brought before it.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation
does not render it political instead of judicial.

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse
for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the
means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of
representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial
legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution. 6 (Emphasis supplied; internal
citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this
Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we
subscribe to the COMELEC’s theory, this Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws
creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population
indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer way to render
meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 7

Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to
measure Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-
authoritative. On Miranda’s Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos
will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and
2000"), this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification
should be based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared official by the
National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population
estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or
estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further,
using Miranda’s own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City’s population as of 1 August
2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos
City’s population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification
"by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as it neither makes
Miranda the NSO Administrator’s designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its
fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the
NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report, the
Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as
authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 –
Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population census of
Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007
Census results (showing Malolos City’s population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos City’s claim that the 2007 census for
Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the population count for
Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement."8 This unbecoming attack by the
government’s chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the government’s census
authority has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing
proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of its functions.

The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its
ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its
business. To elevate the water district’s so-called population census to the level of credibility
NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population
data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into
legislative processes even though these private entities are not in the business of generating
statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to handle,
collate and process them.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the
Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population
census, much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to
conduct population census are local government units (that is, province, city, municipality or
barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and

under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing. 9

By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population
figures,10 the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized
certifications. EO 135’s stringent standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be
diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the
legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional districts in
cities with at least 250,000 constituents.

There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591.
The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness
of Miranda’s certificate.11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a
parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express prohibition. 12 Indeed, one is
hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO
certification of a city’s population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes
of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent component city. 13 Congress itself
confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135’s paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by
mandating that compliance with the population requirement in the creation and conversion of
local government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO certification. 14 Unquestionably,
representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local government units in
enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same
stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010
elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in
compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the
population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving
the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the
rest of the geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3),
Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was
impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory
because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out
of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section
5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its
purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to
include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s legislative district. Although unorthodox,
the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of
geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass
of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on

Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be
allowed.

SO ORDERED.