A.C. No.
6281 September 26, 2011 phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda. 1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square
meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the
proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case
when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay respondent
Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as
appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed
by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further
strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject
property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover,
complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount
being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of
complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their relationship
became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for
registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On March
24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and
owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been claimed by and
released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the
complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the
PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which,
respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand,
for not having been agreed upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's duplicate
of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent over the telephone.
Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened to
have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on
the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services was 20% of
the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent, complainant
invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon demand. x x x
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No.
0-94 because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete payment of his
agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the property covered by the title, i.e., 378
square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per
square meter, thus, yielding a sum of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that he
was ready and willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him
completely the aforesaid professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the amount
earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot. He alleged that the
agreement was not reduced into writing, because the parties believed each other based on their mutual
trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum,
since he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount being
demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in
the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-173,5 dated December 17, 2005,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration,
respondent filed a petition for review6 with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006,
directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution
in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification that respondent is
ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of
notice. Hence, the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with modification the
findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that
would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly due
him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his
client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering
such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to
his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-
client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied
claim for attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the
account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which
may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment. 10
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of professional
fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that their agreement was only
for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the complainant and the
respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area
covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the parties only shows that respondent will be paid the
acceptance fee and the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is
no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence,
respondent could not validly withhold the title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing complainant
to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the exercise of an
attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in
the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the title
of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to additional
professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." It
is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never
mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent
should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling
the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to
determine if he has the financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the
basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he
deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but
recoverable by him from his client."12The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed
without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits
for his services, as much as he has earned. 13 In the present case, the parties had already entered into an
agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not
fully find application because the respondent is already compensated by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure the owner's
duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that the title was already in
his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas City to get the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed by, and
released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with
his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. 14 By keeping secret with the client his
acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client. Respondent could have easily
informed the complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29,
2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing unwarranted
fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction. Hence, the
ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and approving with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from notice given to respondent within which to return
the title should be modified and, instead, respondent should return the same immediately upon receipt of
the Court's decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal
record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the Records Department of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty.
Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C,
Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon.
She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal
separation case, which she filed against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her
share in their property settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus,
as she was respondent's trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was
always there whenever she visited respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply
for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her
property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the speedy
processing and release of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the
GSIS, respondent lent her the sum of ₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title
was released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation of
documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant gave respondent the authority for this
purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the application for the loan, but respondent always
assured her that she was still preparing the documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances,
complainant did not bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle
speedily the preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment was
already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property, which she
later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D.
Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent about what she discovered, but respondent just
brushed her aside and ignored her. After verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on
November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before
whom the sale was acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner,
Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989. 4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to acknowledge
the sale. She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and that her signature
was forged, as she did not sign any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office,
and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent denied that
she suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses. She said
that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who
could help her raise the money she needed to complete the amortization of her property, which was
mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who
introduced complainant to the Spouses Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their
conversation, complainant offered the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The
Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant. Thereafter, complainant
told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of the
Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that they
had reached an agreement with complainant, and they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale
in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus
went to respondent's office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven
Thousand Pesos (₱67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of
the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime, work for the
release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title, together with the Deed of
Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance of the agreed price. Complainant
allegedly told respondent that she would inform respondent when the transaction was completed so that
the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no
knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she
was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244).
Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to verify what happened to
her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her story when she
saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming the
veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be scheduled by the
Commission on Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial hearing, and hearings
were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the reception
of respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant. The
Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint, and
directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001. 9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of complainant
and the issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of Deeds failed to
appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a
certification10 from Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which
certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C. Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the
registry and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005,
respondent was directed by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit
her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on the
ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, which estafa
case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed in a
Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case for estafa
could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of
evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence of the Deed of Sale
and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Peña's signature therein was forged and the
transfer of the land was made through fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and
preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by (a)
deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to
enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified
contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his
Report and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by complainant
by executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's certificate of title, and that
respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no
evidence showing that respondent actively conspired with any party or actively participated in the forgery
of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence
supports the conclusion that her signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in the
National Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner
Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness, Maura Orosco, proved
that the original copy of the owner's duplicate certificate of title was delivered to
respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to respondent's denial that complainant handed
to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco,
respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at the GSIS, testified that she saw
complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent her
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in
constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven
years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it. 14 Yet, respondent
assured complainant that she was still the owner.15Later, complainant discovered that a new building was
erected on her property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent
argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years, complainant never took any step to verify the status
of her loan application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant
explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order
to process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect
to the sale of the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for
₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her
office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the
instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-examination, she stated that she was not denying that
she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale.21 Estrella Kraus' affidavit22supported respondent's
defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by
complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed.
However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his participation
in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he saw the parties sign
the Deed of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony that
she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's deception. Respondent's
notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party.
Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her
office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in
truth and in fact the said person did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should
be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial
register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for violation
of her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and Canon 125and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name
stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of
respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment
as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section
20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if still existing is Revoked with
Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the
facts and the law applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules
of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a
separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to
establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently,
even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial
court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove
the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. 32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the
court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that she gave
respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply for a bank
loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in complainant's
office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw complainant give her title to
respondent.35Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the Deed of Sale per the request of
the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No.
15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence,
through no fault of the complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to
prove her allegation that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by
facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval.
However, complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila,
National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was
executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a notarial
register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as
part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof. 39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of the
entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next
following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of
court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February 22, 1994,
stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and
that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the month of
November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial
Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could not also be found in the National Archives per the
certification42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of
respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of November
1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for
revocation of her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries
public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for any
deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually
constitutes malpractice. REVOKED.

Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the certificate Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, the important evidence of the alleged in the country for their information and guidance.
forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale
itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll of
City, as it could not be located in the general files of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that Attorneys.
the Deed of Sale may be considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, 46 including the said Deed of Sale, SO ORDERED.
which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it
appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
from getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting verification from an expert to prove that Chief Justice
her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper
RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed
of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave
consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed
the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her testimony, it was
observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of records that respondent
would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said Deed of Sale.

For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a member
of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of Professional
A.C. No. 10451 February 4, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence, and
gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election
protest case involving the candidacy of Mariecris Umaguing (Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and
Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year
2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged an
election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were
asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of ₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and
miscellaneous expenses in the amount of ₱30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had
more than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took
action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of
the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the
Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was
personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by
Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly
instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or
relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and
Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De
Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat (Atty. Manguiat). 8 Later,
however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the
affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on
his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo
Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo
pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim
with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was
observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the
affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that
the affidavits at hand were falsified.11
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear
before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer
any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.12
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give him
₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing. 13
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera,
as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel
and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only
appeared twice for the case.14
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment. 15
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against him by
complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on
the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit
was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted
and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his
mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw
the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants
with his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew
from the case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel,
complainants executed a document entitled "Release Waiver & Discharge,"19 which, to him, discharges
him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the
falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respectto the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that
Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty.
De Vera was present during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not
Almera – was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore. 22 It was also observed
that the backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on
November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed that Atty.
De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of advising his client’s
campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in
his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election protest.23 To this, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics of the profession.24
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the
findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2)
month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated February 11,
2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension
from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to
be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are
the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide
member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the
laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe
and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De
Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his desire
to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is
wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as
a witness given that nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the
fact that the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during
disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts– are given the opportunity to first-hand observe
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of Almera’s
affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in
his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no
specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the
one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public, who he does not even know or has
seen in his entire life,31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents,
much less of the participation in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the
same to be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that
he indeed participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of
the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is that
Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court,
merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the
discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the
dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty
requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law. 33 Likewise, he is prohibited
from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the procedure in
handling the case.35
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release Waiver &
Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes
of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court its
power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.1âwphi1 What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the country for their information and guidance.
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for SO ORDERED.
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to Associate Justice
the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 37

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer
therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view of the
antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
₱60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to
his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer before the
IBP.42

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions. 43

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
stem warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the
amount of ₱60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with
the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their clients.
Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without need for reminders. The
privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage the
case as if it were their own. The relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot
be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked
by an acquaintance. The professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the
acceptance by counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.
Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the
case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was
dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge
her duties of candor to her client.
This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated capacity to conduct
fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 4 Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.5
In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallo’s
services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses Roque v. Ramirez."7 The
case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68. 8
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a friend
of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she
be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees. 10 It was also agreed upon
that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo ₱1,000.00 per court appearance. 11
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12 Atty.
Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of
Appeals.13
The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008. 14 On
December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified
Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.15
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo
informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief. 16
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no
word from the Court of Appeals.17
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. 18 She told him that
the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father,
which was the basis of his claim.19 She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court
since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an
Appeal had already lapsed.20
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13,
2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period.21
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Codeof Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to
take on the case for free, save for travel expense of ₱1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had
candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case. 23 She
denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the
land subject of the controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez
had begged her to do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing
on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he
had been busy.25 Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of
Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and
accidentally erased all her contacts.26
Mandatory conference and findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty.
Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties
then appeared and were directed to submit their position papers.29 Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva
recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern warning that her
next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.30 This was based on his two key
findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by
assuming that Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to
protect the interest of her client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel,
resulting in the loss of Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals. 32
In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors
resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34 In the Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors
granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration and increased the recommended penalty to suspension
from practice of law for two (2) years.35
On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court.36She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe considering that she had
been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first
time a Complaint was filed against her.37 Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion
for Reconsideration previously filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty.
Margallo’s Petition for Review.38 In the Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez’s
Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This court’s ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence." 41 Lawyers are
expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They
commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their
ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high
degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying
client or an indigent litigant.42
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule
18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there
with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his absence
in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for resolution. This was
aggravated by the lawyer’s failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals,
thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions
amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
....
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing
the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was
palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire
case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not because a court of law
ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her
duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to
pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her
client. This is an admission that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption.
Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest,
which is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she
clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or
power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry
between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must
attend to that may not be known by the principal.
This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney client relationship. Lawyers are for its members' conduct is laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of
expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in candor is reprehensible.
relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the
client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board of
jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND
receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client. AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true
that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and Associate Justice
accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery
comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs
of indifference or negligence. Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too
severe considering that it is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we
observed:

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross
negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months.
In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which
resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence,
suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a
pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In
Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons
17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly
suspends him for a period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other hand,
respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his
legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her
alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers must
actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. 46 Under the
current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional
powers of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the
precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is
worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of
professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need in
the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015 In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. CARINGAL
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
....
x-----------------------x
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was
A.C. No. 10584 about four years old.
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]
A : Yes, sir.
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs. Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t it?
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her cousins.
RESOLUTION
....
LEONEN, J.:
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon 10,
Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. THE WITNESS

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 against Atty. : Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].
Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be
investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.5 THE COURT

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. : What’s the name of the mother?
Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. 6
ATTY. CARINGAL
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by
Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. : Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Santos states:
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said
deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the THE WITNESS
original underscoring supplied)
: Yes, sir.
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a
Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?
against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12
A : Of course.
13
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.15
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you requested to : Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn the
be marked as Exhibit B. legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife
Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject of
THE COURT my continuing objection from the very beginning.

: Exhibit? THE COURT

ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you as you just
testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the
floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your
Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents, your Honor.

: Yes, sir. THE COURT

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial. : So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?

A : Yes, sir. ATTY. REY SANTOS

Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication. : No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.

ATTY. REY SANTOS ATTY. CARINGAL

: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because it is not : What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
the issue in this case.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
....
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and impertinency and
ATTY. CARINGAL relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.

.... THE COURT

Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly notarized on : So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with the ruling
or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?

number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the THE WITNESS
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read
into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and : No, that is not true.
inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other heir
entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have drafted into this document . . ATTY. CARINGAL
. true or false?
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted a
ATTY. REY SANTOS document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five
years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a
share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for
himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This
was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla,
Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his
deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his
professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged
communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate. 26 In other
words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that
Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos’ wife,
Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other
heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he is fully
aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was then
employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the
neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife who is a
BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of
Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any
other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina
Turla had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be
distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income. 34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged
that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments. 35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that the death
certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not
aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate. 38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. 39 Further, "he [was] representing
Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole heir
of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum shopping
because the various cases filed had different issues. 42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as
the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s
fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses of administration." 44 Also, payment of Atty.
Santos’ legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the
Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered. 46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos
be suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was
falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal
failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the
evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law." 50 Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and prayed for
different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission on
Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes
members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained that "the
proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may
be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition
inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The respondent
has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand admitted that he drafted
Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To
substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on the
birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano
Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is
Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance
and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,]
stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a position
where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir of Rufina
Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission on
Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors
in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15,
2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is
proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution. However, this
court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months to
one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers
must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients
to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case. 59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained
what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will
be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute
Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse,
he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar
Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case
for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed
as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr.
Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . .
told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the
Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission
proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s
estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that
there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009.65 It is
understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not
present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano Turla
and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest
against respondent was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon 10,
Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite .
. . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the
respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and
protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only
was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected
to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With full
knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and
March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to
impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys"70 and
discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members
of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal profession,
has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of
justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive
power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court
and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society.71 (Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose disciplinary MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
action on those admitted to the practice of law. Associate Justice

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.73 Under the
current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional
powers of this court.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. 74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the
verified complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation
of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on
the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State—the administration of
justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." 76 (Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is granted
by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be equated
with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey
Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is imposed upon
Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY
UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T.
PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009 filed by
complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty.
Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-
Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr.
(Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa;
collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule
against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon
Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon,
Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated
labor cases2 where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement
of both parties.3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by
FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael Villacorta
(Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled
complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents,
alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR, 5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon Dabao
Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their association is not a formal
partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes
a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as
transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing
each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss
their clientele with the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled
collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They
averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the
entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was
handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant’s labor cases, as he
started working for the firm after the termination thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he
indeed handled complainant’s labor cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008, 9 and that
complainant did not have any monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not see the
need to discuss complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very
simple,11 and that the latter did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that
would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other lawyers were
not aware of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they know that he was the handling counsel
for complainant even after the said cases were closed and terminated. 12 The IBP’s Report and
Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found respondents
to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be reprimandedtherefor, with
the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.14 The IBP found that complainant was
indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by
Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty.
Peñalosa, having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the
qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. 15
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the
IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors granted in its
Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b)
adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, with modification, (1)
reprimanding the respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against
Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year,
being the handling counsel of complainant’s labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 20
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The
prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 21 In this case, the Court concurs
with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held
liable. As the records bear out, respondents’ law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in
the labor cases instituted against him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to
represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant,
its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal
case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep
track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an organization of individual
lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it
behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of
coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets
vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s
primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its
members, Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling
the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents,
as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court finds
no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court
sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same
penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the
labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client
relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment.22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De
La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa
are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents'
personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994
SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,
ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief from
judgment, as well as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order
the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further proceeding with
Civil Case No. 107203-CV.
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private
respondent Vicente Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants, with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered
judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons claiming
right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment and surrender possession of
the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month from January 1987 as the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the land is actually vacated,
and the costs of suit. 1
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August 1985,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking
the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an order of its execution.
The petition was in due time dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.
On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed by
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the
judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. This time,
petitioners appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by
the MTC for the enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners
deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid
every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of
dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court was to be of no avail. The petition was
denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to remove
their house on the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of demolition was
issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining
order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari, with
preliminary injunction and restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court
dismissed the petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC
decision in a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil
Case No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which, again, issued a
restraining order. 2
Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion of
petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch
XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against
petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its
decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was proclaimed an
area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of
Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446,
entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately
related, where we ruled:
. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court is the implication of
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law," and its amendments or
ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential
Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are being implemented by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On May 20, 1992, this
Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a Comment on the status of the program of
acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the disputed property, as part of the Areas
for Priority Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and proclamations.
In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro Manila Project discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this
Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the following report on the status of Lot 6-A, obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the Carlos Estate, an APD
site. Pertinent portions of the report read: SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which is We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the
the subject matter of the case and located within the Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is
Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, is not for acquisition by NHA. contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt
power. 7
The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP) and
Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site, however, is under the administration of the Presidential WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED
Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.) and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely.
Double costs against petitioners.
The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged negotiation for the
acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring the This resolution is immediately executory.
said lot for its program.
SO ORDERED.
It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in order to avoid eviction from the disputed
premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly under the Community Mortgage Program of the
National Housing Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same. Consequently, the
petition is DISMISSED. 5

What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through
different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The
utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to
prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before
different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be
countenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the
pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and
keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and
defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man's
cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
A.C. No. 5118 September 9, 1999
(A.C. CBD No. 97-485)
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent
Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), 1 in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the
respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainant's trip to the USA
for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a
receipt was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent
regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an
additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign
from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters
Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in
favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the
complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of
questions which would be asked during interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming
the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing,
Inc. The complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed identity.1âwphi1.nêt
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her
money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been
engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something
goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by
complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to
her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given
her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo
and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel
were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant
contacted the respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From
September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her
from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
Respondent took complainant's passport with a promise that he will secure new travel documents for
complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her
money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00;
and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the
refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was
ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that
the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent
had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications
for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of
fees paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent. 2
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there
was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No
appearance whatsoever was made by the respondent. 3 As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not
obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against
him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:
It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A.
travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad, hence it is not
correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an assumed
name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted
likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However, the
transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a
member of the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of
the Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6, of the Rules of Court. 4
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP
Board of Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution 5 dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt
and approve with amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis be
DISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution
dated December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the Resolution passed by
the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of
illegal recruitment was not established because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the
matter. In fact she did not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent.
The only service of the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the
United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of
gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon I,
Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring
her that he could give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward
would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and
expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws
in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized
by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The
lawyer's oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable. 6 The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. 7 This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 8 We have sternly warned that
any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character
in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 9
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he
made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal
recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents?
Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false
assurances. Not only are respondent's acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view.
His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. 10 We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be
heard. 11
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his
total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional
conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for
his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is
in order. 12 Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainant's money upon demand, but
he stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the
complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be
spread on the personal records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant
immediately the amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the
amount he collected from her.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 632 June 27, 1940
In re Attorney MELCHOR E. RUSTE, respondent,
The respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
LAUREL, J.:
By virtue of an administrative complaint filed by Mateo San Juan against Melchor E. Ruste on February 27,
1934, to which the respondent made answer on March 15, 1934, this Court, by resolution of December 1,
1934, referred the case to the Solicitor-General for report. The reference brought forth the following formal
complaint filed by the Solicitor-General against the respondent on March 26, 1935:
Comes now the undersigned Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands in the above entitled administrative
case, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5 of the rules concerning disbarment or suspension of
attorneys-at-law, to this Honorable Supreme Court, respectively alleges:
1. That in cadastral case No. 6, G. L. R. O. Record No. 483 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
the respondent, Melchor E. Ruste, appeared for and represented, as counsel, Severa Ventura and her
husband, Mateo San Juan, the herein complainant, who claimed lot No. 3765; and as a result of said
cadastral proceedings, an undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share of said lot was adjudicated by said
court to said claimants;
2. That there was no agreement the respondent and his said clients as to the amount of his fees; but that
they paid to him upon demand on different occasions the sums of (30 and P25 as attorney's fees;
3. That after said payments, the respondent again demanded of the complainant and his wife as additional
fees the sum of P25, but they had no money to pay, him, and so he asked them to execute in his favor a
contract of lease, and a contract of sale, of their share in said lot No. 3764 in order that he may be able to
borrow or raise said sum of P25;
4. That in accordance with said respondent's request, the complainant and his wife executed on
September 22, 1930, a contract of lease, whereby in consideration of P100, they leased to him their
coconut and banana plantation in said lot No. 3764 for a term of five years, and also a deed of sale,
whereby in consideration of P1,000, they sold and transferred to him their undivided eleven-twentieth
(11/20) share in said lot No . 3764, although, ,in fact and in truth, neither of the consideration mentioned in
said contracts of lease and sale were ever receive by them;
5. That on March 21, 1931, the respondent executed a deed of sale, whereby in consideration of P370 he
sold and transferred to Ong Chua said undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in lot No. 3764 excluding
the house and its lot, occupied by the complainant and his wife; and on March 28, 1931, the respondent
executed another deed of sale, whereby in consideration of the same amount of P370 paid to him by the
same Ong Chua, he sold and transferred to the latter the same undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20") share
in lot No. 3764, but already including said houses and its lot;
6. That by virtue of the sale to him, Ong Chua has taken possession of said eleven-twentieth share in lot
No. 3764;
7. That notwithstanding said second deed of sale, the respondent obtained from Ong Chua to allow the
complaint and his wife to continue living house for a period of two years without paying any rent;
8. That on October 10, 1933, however, the respondent notified the complainant and his wife in writing that
the said house still belonged to the respondent, and requires said spouses to pay, the sum of P40.50,
representing ten months' rental in arrears, and thereafter a monthly rental of P1.50; and
9. That the respondent did not turn over to the complainant and his wife the amount of P370 paid by Ong
Chua nor any part thereof.
Wherefore, the undersigned prays that disciplinary action be taken against the respondent.
To the foregoing complaint, the respondent, on April 23, 1935, interposed the following answer:
Comprarece el infrascrito, en su propiarepresentacion y a la Honorable Corte Suprema, alega:
Niega, general y especificamente sus alegaciones en dicha demanda, sobretodo en cuanto al pago de
cantidades monetarias alli especificadas, y como defensa especial, alega:
Que el denunciante Mateo San Juan, y sus testigos Esperato Bucoy y Severa Ventura han infringido la
Ley del Perjurio; ademasd el Fiscal Provincial Jose Evangelista es una parte interesada en el resultado de
este asunto;
Por todo lo expuesto, al Honorable Tribunal pide:
(a) Que para la substanciacion de esta causa que actue de Fiscal, el Honorable Enrique Braganza, Fiscal
de Jolo, Sulu;
(b) Que dicho Honorable Fiscal Enrique Braganza, sea requerido a investigar a los testigos, Esperato
Bucoy y Severa, Ventura, y la Ley del Perjirio tal como esta enmendada.
Sometido respetuosamente.
By resolution of this court of April 24, 1935, the said formal complaint and answer were referred to the
judge of First Instance of Zamboanga for investigation, report, and recommendation. After various and
postponements, transpiring between August 3, 1935 and October 18, 1939, the Honorable Catalino
Buenaventura, then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, elevated the record of the
case of this court. On October 31, 1939, the case was included in the January, 1940 calendar, and at the
hearing thereof on February 1, 1940, the respondent submitted the case without oral argument, and the
memorandum presented by the Solicitor-General, recommending the dismissal of the complaint filed For having improperly acquired the property referred to in Exhibits A and B, under the above
against respondent, was ordered attached to the record. circumstances, which property was then subject matter of a judicial proceedings, in which he was counsel,
the respondent is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended for a period of one year, reserving
From a perusal of the entire record, particularly of the formal complaint filed by the Solicitor-General to the complainant and his spouse such action as may by proper for the recovery of such amount or
against the respondent attorney, we gather the following material charges formulated against the latter, to amounts as may be due from the respondent. So ordered.
wit, (1) that he engineered the execution in his favor, by the spouses Mateo San Juan and Severa
Ventura, of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, and of the deed of sale, Exhibit B, covering the property in
question; (2) that he did turn over the considerations therefor to the said spouses; (3) that he likewise
deeded the same property to one Ong Chua, for P370, without paying the spouses the said purchase
price, and (4) that he required the spouses to pay (40.50 for ten months' rental in arrears, and thereafter a
monthly rental of P1.50 for the house occupied by the said spouses.

Sometime in July, 1930, the respondent acted as counsel for the complainant and his wife when the latter
laid claim of ownership upon lot No. 3764 in case No. 6, G. L. R. O., Cadastral Record 483 of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga, eleven-twentieth of said lot having been eventually adjudicated to the wife,
Severa Ventura, on December 20, 1933. On September 22, 1930, that is, during pendency of said
cadastral case, the spouses purportedly leased a part of said lot to the respondent for P100, which lease
was cancelled and superseded by a deed of sale executed on the same date, whereby the said spouses,
in consideration of P1,000, conveyed eleven-twentieth of the same land in favor of the respondent. This is
also the finding of the Solicitor-General in his report submitted in this case:

. . . convinieron cancelar el arrendamiento y otorgar en sustitucion un contrato de compraventa absoluta a

favor del recurrido, como en efecto se hizo y es el Exhibito B (pp. 37-38, Rollo 1), por cuyo documento
Severa Ventura con el consentimiento marital correspondiente vendio definitivamente al recurrido su
participacion pro indivisa da 11/20 partes en el rferido lote, y estando aun el mismo pendiente de vista u
decision el Expediente Catastral No. 6, Record No. 483, del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Zamboanga.
(Pp. 19-20.)

The property being thus in suit, which the respondent was waging on behalf of his clients, his acquisition
thereof by the deed of sale, Exhibit B, constitutes malpractice. (Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil., 775; In
re Calderon, 7 Phil. 427.) Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the
spouses driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as
contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case as attorney occupies a vantage position to
press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective of the
confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both."
(Hernandez vs. Villanueva, supra.)

There is evidence to show that the respondent has failed to account to the aggrieved spouses for the
various amounts received by him on account of the transactions effected by him pertaining to the portion of
lot No. 3764. However, as the evidence is conflicting and the statements of the parties are contradictory on
this point, it is believed that the determination of the exact amount due them by the respondent should
better elucidated and determined in an appropriate action which the complaint and his spouse may
institute against the respondent for this purpose.
G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973
VICENTE MUÑOZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member of the Philippine Bar,
connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates, must be held accountable
for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel, more specifically with reference to a
duty owing this Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a
petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of
facts in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When
given an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her
memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable.
Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her relative
inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure. So we rule.
The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12, 1971. It reads as
follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G.R. No. L-33672, Vicente Muñoz v. People of the
Philippines and the Court of Appeals, and considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner
Muñoz is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the information; that - in the
language of the decision of the Court of Appeals - "the prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting
versions of the incident that gave rise to the case"; that, upon examination of the evidence, the Court of
Appeals found, as did the trial court, that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the
defense is unbelievable; that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence,
whereas the version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts, for: (a) petitioner's theory,
to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant, is refuted by the fact that after
hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's boat, the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit
also the left front portion of complainant's boat - where the complainant was seated, thereby hitting him on
the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death - so that, immediately after the collision - part of
petitioner's boat was on top of that of the complainant; (b) these circumstances, likewise, indicate the
considerable speed at which petitioner's motorboat was cruising, (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered
very little damage, which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended party's boat,
the latter being bigger than, as well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as, that of the petitioner;
and (d) although appellant's boat carried several passengers, including children, and was, in fact,
overloaded, appellant acted as pilot and, at the same time, as its machinist, thereby rendering it difficult for
him to manuever it properly; the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly
factual and for lack of merit. Considering further, that the petition quotes, on page 5 thereof a portion of the
decision appealed from, summing up evidence for the defense, and makes reference thereto "findings" of
the Court of Appeals, which is not true; that, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a
portion of the same quotation, that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized by the
Court of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue; that, on page 8 of the petition, it is averred - "It being
conceded that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible, although they are conflicting
the same cannot be binding on, and is therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court.
(Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April 30, 1957)" although, in fact, no conflicting findings of fact are made
in the decision appealed from; and that, on page 9 of the petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals
had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court," although,
in fact, minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor"; the Court
resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why they
should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making
aforementioned misrepresentations." " 1chanrobles virtual law library
A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August 14, 1971.
There was no attempt at justification, because in law there is none, but it did offer what was hoped to be a
satisfactory explanation. If so, such optimism was misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of
lack of candor, of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals
certain alleged facts not so considered as such. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous
appraisal of the matter in issue. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true.
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year, requiring all
lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. At such a hearing, respondent Delia T. Sutton appeared. While
her demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from contrite. On the contrary, the
impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach.
Even when subjected to intensive questioning by several members of the Court, she was not to be budged
from such an untenable position. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable
reaction to, which her evasive answers gave rise. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious
character of her misdeed. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to
understand. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo,
Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what appeared in its petition
for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the
Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible, and did make with the proper spirit of
humility the necessary expression of regret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on December
1, 1971, signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Delia Sutton, did seek to make amends thus: "1. That
undersigned attorney, Delia T. Sutton, together with Messrs. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Pedro L. Yap and
Custodio O. Parlade, partners in the firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade & Associates, appeared
before this Honorable Court on November 22, 1971, pursuant to an order dated October 18, 1971; 2. That
with all the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned attorney, the circumstances surrounding
her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be
punished for contempt of court were explained by her, with the assistance of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez; 3.
That the undersigned Delia T. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this
Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit, and that it was her lack of adequate extensive
experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the
said petition which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court; 4. That undersigned Delia T. WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the said petition her record.
for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on
candor and fairness in the Canons of Professional Ethics, which reads: "22. [Candor and Fairness]. - The
conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper, the testimony
of a witness, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a
textbook or; with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled, or a
statute that has been repealed; or in argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved, or in
those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by
concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. ..." 5.
That undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez joins Atty. Delia T. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to
the Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Delia T. Sutton of a type
of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar." 2chanrobles virtual law library

The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. Some
members of the Court feel, however, that it does not go far enough. While expressing regret and offering
apology, there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely
as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there were a greater sincerity on her part,
the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. There ought
to be, for the apology to gain significance, no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It
is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. The mood, even at this
stage, seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered.
This Court does not view matters thus. To purge herself of the contempt, she ought to have displayed the
proper spirit of contrition and humility. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not
take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel
is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of
deviation from the truth. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more
certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession
of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties
than does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it
is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." 3 What is
more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence. It is
by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to
respondent Delia T. Sutton.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, both
in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted, must be commended. He has made
manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel, especially in his relationship to this
Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated, however, that in the future he, as well as the other senior
partners, should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm,
perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., respondents.
IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA,
MANUEL G. MONTECILLO, ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONGSIAKO, and JOSE S. ARMONIO,
members of the Philippine Bar.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioners.
Jose T. Valmonte for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider the decision herein, filed by counsel
for petitioners —
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether or
not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of
this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which
delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this
Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional
authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing
earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Court's
decision in the instant case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction
of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .
It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court when it applied the so-called "rule against splitting of jurisdiction" in its Decision in the present
case. As applied by this Honorable Court, the rule means that when an employee files with the Court of
Industrial Relations numerous claims relative to his employment but only one [of] which is cognizable by
said court under the law, while the others pertain to other tribunals, that court has authority to entertain all
the claims to avoid multiplicity, of suits. . . . .
drew from the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court.
In respondent attorneys' verified return, they offered "their most sincere apologies for the language used"
and stated that "[i]t was not and it has never been their intention to be disrespectful." They manifested that
the language "was the result of overenthusiasm on the part of Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought best to
focus the attention of this Honorable Court to the issue in the case, as not in any way meant to slight or
offend this Honorable Court. They also said that the unfortunate Motion for Reconsideration was prepared
and filed by Atty. Armonio who had been personally handling the case since its inception at the Court of
Industrial Relations, and who had, perhaps, become too emotionally involved in the case."
Respondent members of the law firm, namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna,
Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full responsibility" for what
appears in the motion for reconsideration. They submitted, not as an excuse, but as fact, that not one of
the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an
associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion "without clearing it with any of the partners of the firm."
The return winds up with an expression of deep regret about the incident, coupled with an earnest pledge
that it "shall never happen again."
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and Armonio were
orally heard.1äwphï1.ñët
1. As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question.
That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making "any reference to and analysis of" the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that
error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the
law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court
on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from
the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and —
some former members — of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm when counsel labelled as "so-called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."1
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid
excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical
terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to
the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." 2
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he
may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility. and Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequete supervision and control of the
pleadings and other documents submitted by their law firm to the courts of justice of this country.
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and
punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious So ordered.
or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney — in a motion for reconsideration
— to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the
least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion"
are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." 4 It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty.
Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him in
bridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief." 5 Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.

The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an
old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is
no less a virtue, if channelled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of
propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government. 6

We are not unmindful of counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant to slight or
offend" this Court. Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the language employed.
For, counsel cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must
have understood them as meaning." 7 At best, it extenuates liability.

3. We now turn to the partners of the law firm. They explained that not one of them cleared the motion in
which the questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the office at the time said
motion was filed — which was the last day. They added that "it is the policy of the firm known to all its
members and associates that only the partners can sign court pleadings except in rare cases where, for
want of time or due to unexpected circumstances, an associate has to sign the same." We understood
Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in his long years of practice, he knows that it
serves no useful purpose to downgrade the dignity of the Court. We may overlook the shortcomings of the
members of the law firm; except that, as we see it, partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious
control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of their law firm.
Seemingly, such control was absent here.

In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Antonio, with the warning that repetition of this incident will be dealt
with accordingly. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his record.
A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer
and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit1 with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition
to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of
public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February
23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The
latter was not even a signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of
hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang
abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy
with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he
faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines
Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily
time record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of
Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges
of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer’s clients filed a
case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the
waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet
was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty.
Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on
December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations that
speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending.
Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he
filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on
December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a
collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer
nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing
the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness
from reporting the accident to the authorities.4
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the
citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,5 the IBP-Camarines Norte
Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground
that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge" and
that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee
of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040,
the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that
Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court
personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225,6 adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution7 of October 19, 2002
on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003,
however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
reconsideration.8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
reconsideration.10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008.11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment as a petition for
review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment, 12 reiterating his
arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines
Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding
respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court’s Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty.
Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this
imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using
offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with
motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of
documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of
counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly
"FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the
Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including
the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the
same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for
"DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions."15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers
to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before
the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this
particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not
report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a
subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na
palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy,
humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and
litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal
profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum.17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever
moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation.1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one’s defense.18 So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side,
the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the
allegations of Atty. Barandon.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the
dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.20 Atty. Ferrer’s
display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both
as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very
ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD
Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one
year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an attorney with the Office of the
Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with
the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges
that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated
May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for
June 11, 2004.4After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of
the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he
did on July 27, 2004.6Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation,
which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84
dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, 7 which involved
moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the
car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but
a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop
the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused
who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but
the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the
accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter
pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to
the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,9 complainant
would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the
attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed
an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included
satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano." 10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred
from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter
also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had
overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got
a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.13 In the instant
case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated
homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only
issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves
moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee who was
dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the
IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that,
having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral
turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back
turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face
into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately
swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times.
These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were
not inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit
once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed
his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic
incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In
the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact
revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We
remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound
himself to "obey the laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation.
And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date,
respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and
intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly
amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers,
but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings
is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon
them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that
office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is
an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty.24
and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior
disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case,
however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly
disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty
would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining
exemplar of truth and justice.

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the
trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with
complainant’s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it
appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having
been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does
not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and
boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,]
that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the
contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly when he said that he
boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns
duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In
all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the mere
fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of
the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to
practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP
proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1698 March 3, 2008
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1523-MTJ)
JAIME RACINES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. MORALLOS and SHERIFF III BENJAMIN CABUSAO, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Complainant Jaime Racines (Racines) was required by the Court in its Resolution dated November 22,
2007 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing a baseless and unfounded
administrative case.
Racines filed on December 17, 2003, a Complaint against Judge Jose P. Morallos (Judge Morallos) and
Sheriff Benjamin Cabusao, Jr. (Sheriff Cabusao) of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 68 of Pasig
City, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,1 other deceits,2 violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,3violation of Article 32 of the New Civil Code, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.4 The Court, finding the evaluation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to be in accord with law and the facts on record, affirmed its recommendation and
dismissed Racines’s complaint in the Resolution dated November 22, 2004. The Court held that there was
nothing in the records to show that Judge Morallos was moved by improper motive when he rendered the
decision in Civil Case No. 9681;5 neither was there anything to show that Sheriff Cabusao used his
position to influence the outcome of the decision; and in any event, the proper recourse was to elevate the
case to a higher court for review, and not through an administrative case. The Court, in the said resolution
also directed Racines to show cause within 10 days from receipt thereof, why he should not be held in
contempt of court for filing an utterly baseless and unfounded administrative case. 6
Racines through counsel, Atty. Onofre D. Manalad, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 which the Court
denied with finality in the Resolution dated March 2, 2005 for lack of substantial argument. The Resolution
likewise admonished Racines and his counsel to desist from initiating baseless complaints. 8
On March 29, 2005, the OCA received an Earnest Motion for Clarification9 filed by Racines through Atty.
Manalad which the Court treated as a second motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated May 25,
2005. The Court denied the motion for being a prohibited pleading and directed that no further pleadings or
motions shall be entertained in the case.10
On June 19, 2007, Racines by himself, filed a Pagpapaliwanag claiming: He received the Court’s
Resolution dated November 22, 2004 only on March 30, 2007 and he was able to file his explanation only
at this time since he had to look for a lawyer who would explain it to him. The complaint and the other
documents which Atty. Manalad prepared were all written in English and because he fully trusted Atty.
Manalad, he immediately signed the same even though Atty. Manalad did not explain it to him. Had Atty.
Manalad fully explained the documents to him, he would not have signed the same, as he had no intention
of filing a baseless administrative case against respondents. If there was anyone who should be punished,
it was Atty. Manalad because he deceived him into filing a baseless administrative case. 11
The Court required Atty. Manalad to comment on Racines’s Pagpapaliwanag.12
In his Comment, Atty. Manalad avers that Racines is being used by Gerry Chua, lessor of the Viajeros
Market and Chua’s lawyer Atty. Edgardo Galvez against him (Atty. Manalad), since he is assisting the
officers of the Pasig Fruits & Vegetables Vendors Association (PFVVA) in their cases against Chua.
Racines, who was for several years a sergeant-at-arms of the PFVVA, was pirated by Chua to lead a
group of goons to harass his co-vendors into giving up their stalls. Atty. Manalad claims that he would not
have initiated an action against an incumbent trial court judge had no grievous correctible error been
committed in bad faith at the expense of truth and justice. He also asserts that the allegations in the
complaint against Judge Morallos are substantiated by the admission of the parties in their pleadings, and
that he filed the charges against respondents at the instance of Racines who was even crying when he
was pleading before Atty. Manalad for legal assistance.13
The Court finds both Racines and Atty. Manalad guilty of indirect contempt.
Persons guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.14 The Court, in the exercise of its inherent
power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons in
any manner connected with a case before it, may motu proprio initiate proceedings therefor.15
The Court has held that unsubstantiated charges serve no purpose other than to harass judges and cast
doubt on the integrity of the entire judiciary.16 The filing of clearly unfounded or malicious complaints
seriously affects the efficiency of the members of the judiciary in administering fair, speedy and impartial
justice.17 The Court, mindful of the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases
filed by losing litigants and disgruntled lawyers against members of the judiciary, therefore issued A.M. No.
03-10-01-SC18 which took effect on November 4, 2003 with the aim of preventing or at least discouraging
the filing of such cases to protect the orderly administration of justice. 19 It provides in paragraph 1 thereof
that if upon informal preliminary inquiry it is found that the complaint is unfounded, baseless and merely
intended to harass respondent, complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. And if the complainant is a lawyer, he may be further required to show cause why he or
she should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the
court.1avvphi1
In the present case, Racines, through his lawyer Atty. Manalad filed a case against Judge Morallos and
Sheriff Cabusao, imputing to them corrupt and criminal acts on the mere basis of Judge Morallos’s
decision. The complaint stated that Judge Morallos "distorted the facts" in his "anomalous decision" and
committed the crimes of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, causing undue injury to Racines,
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and estafa by means of other deceits. 20 The complaint
also questioned Judge Morallos’s integrity, impartiality and professional competence, all on the basis of his
decision on the ejectment favoring the plaintiff therein, Jellicom Manpower and Transport Services owned
by Sheriff Cabusao, with Racines as defendant. The complaint also claims that Sheriff Cabusao, Judge
Morallos and Gerry Chua, lessor of the property, conspired with one another in commiting the wrongful
acts for which they are liable to pay damages.21

Unfazed by the order of the Court directing Racines to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
for filing a baseless complaint, Racines, through Atty. Manalad even filed two motions for reconsideration,
reiterating their baseless claims.

Racines tries to escape liability by saying that Atty. Manald did not explain the contents of the pleadings to
him, because if Atty. Manalad did, he would not have signed the same.

The Court is not convinced. It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act22and unless the requirements for proper substitution were made, a lawyer enjoys the
presumption of authority given him by his client.23 Racines does not deny that the signatures in the
pleadings were his. He also does not claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from reading the
contents thereof. He only said that since he fully trusted Atty. Manalad he immediately signed the
documents. From the foregoing, it is clear that Racines acquiesced and gave his stamp of approval to the
pleadings filed in court. Considering however that he is not learned in the intricacies of law, the Court finds
the penalty of reprimand with warning to be sufficient in his case. 24

As to Atty. Manalad, the Court finds that a greater penalty is in order. As a member of the bar, he should
know better than to file an unfounded administrative complaint.25 He is bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Rule 11.04 thereof states that a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not
supported by the records. Canon 11 also enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. 26 His claim that he filed the
charges against respondent at the instance of Racines cannot free him from liability. As the Court has
pronounced, a client’s cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice.27 As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not
promote distrust in the administration of justice. For violating Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court finds that a fine of five thousand pesos is proper in his case. 28

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jaime Racines and Atty. Onofre D. Manalad guilty of Indirect Contempt
under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Atty. Onofre D. Manalad is ordered to pay
a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution, while Jaime
Racines is REPRIMANDED. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act may warrant a
more severe action by this Court.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner
Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant
petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good
standing of the Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive
portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves
to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos &
Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar
examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified
petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed
them to other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the
Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the
relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to become
one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to
pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering
service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he
initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually
pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the
Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various
activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar
examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel
in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of
Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal
Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal
services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices.
It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having
entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he was
stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar
Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable
consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by
the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the People’s
Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering
public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the
integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated
fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the
unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience
to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements of
various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his
Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member
of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of
Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay
Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-
susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated
1 June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas,
City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007
of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association,
Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng
Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to
Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8
June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of
Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest,
Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern University
Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008
of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G. De
Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication
and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De
Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian
College – Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman"
dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and
President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers
League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail
Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of
Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and
compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the
said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine
Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of
abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge
of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven
days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the
second division of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so
regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney
cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to
the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert
all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be
applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984),
the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years when
he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of
him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to
overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the community and
society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to
render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several social and civic
projects and activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some
as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in
whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination questions from Atty.
Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be
the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all
commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his
action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations
as well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner
had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of
said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be
GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as
served in view of the petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume
practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem
petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from
the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. 2 While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the
lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life
during his years outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge
himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and
capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar
and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to
the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice
law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and
members of the judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to
the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time
during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no
other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x x x
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his
transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public
service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in
the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata,
and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at
large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to
reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general
good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.
Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot
and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic." 8

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby
GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is
hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned
from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 7472 March 30, 2010
LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having been
suspended by the Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office
address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De
Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore,
prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No.
355-0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De
Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of
a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She,
however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman,
docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the
suspension immediately upon receipt of the Court’s Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001.
In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was
resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC,
Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from
practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the
directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to
the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account
of Judge Farrales’ letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which
"gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and that her
notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked." Acting on the said motion, the Court issued
a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) – Respondent’s Urgent Motion for
Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6) months
(sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have
SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001
as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she
allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The
complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to
file a supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De Dios and the
particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-
2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which reads:
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang]
mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang Certification mula sa
Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10, 2005,
nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc.
No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending
pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng Subic
Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled
Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo
Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw pa lamang mula
magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla
Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mula
magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong May 16,
2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c) isang Statement of non-
liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na
ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking personal
na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de Dios ang kanyang
suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may
petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong
May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new matters
raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B.
Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution dated April
23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According to her, the resolution should be the "final nail to the coffin of
this case."
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Court’s consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBC’s reply to an
inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios. 1 Therein, the
OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic, following the pronouncement
of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K.
Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo
C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his
compliance with the Court’s resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more than
six months. The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the
Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in
order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. 2
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he
has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after
evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of
suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that
this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of
law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to
avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a
uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of
law.1avvphi1
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.3Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it
should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to
exercise his profession unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in the
matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law
and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive
Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she
has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the
imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice