b.

Allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such violation

IX. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS OR RELATED TO or offense (Sec 3 (a), RA 3019).
PUBLIC OFFICE:
2. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official
1. ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. 3019, AS AMENDED) capacity has to intervene under the law (Sec. 3 (b), RA 3019). (BAR 2010)

PURPOSE OF LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY & POLICE POWER:
MORFE V. MUTUC
Doctrine: Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in
public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public
office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Moreover, What is under
consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in
public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a public official claiming to be
adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof?
The answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the
protection of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such
requirement is observed.
Elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. He requested and/or received, directly or indirectly, a gift, present or
consideration;
c. The gift, present or consideration was for the benefit of the said public officer
or for any other person;
d. It was requested and/or received in connection with a contract or transaction
with the Government; and
e. The public officer has the right to intervene in such contract or transaction in his
official capacity
3. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or
material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer,
in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given (Sec. 3
(c), RA 3019).

a) Coverage NOTE: This is a special form of bribery.

All public officers which include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or 4. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service, receiving compensation, which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one
even nominal from the government (Sec. 2, RA 3019). year after its termination.

Government includes: Elements:

a. The public officer accepted, or having any of his family member accept any
1. National government employment in a private enterprise;
2. Local government b. Such private enterprise has a pending official business with the public officer;
3. GOCCs and
4. Other instrumentalities or agencies c. It was accepted during:
5. Their branches i. The pendency thereof; or
ii. Within 1 year after its termination.
b) Punishable acts
5. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
1. A public officer:
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
a. Persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to:
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
i. Perform an act constituting a violation of the Rules and Regulations
inexcusable negligence (Sec. 3 (e), RA 3019). (BAR 1990, 1991, 1997, 2005, 2009)
duly promulgated by competent authority, or
ii. An offense in connection with the official duties of the latter.
Elements:
Example: The act of Former Comelec Chaiman Benjamin Abalos in bribing a. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
Romulo Neri with the amount of 200 Million Pesos in exchange for the official functions;
approval of the NBN Project (Neri v. Senate Committee on b. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
Accountablility of Public Officers and Investigation, G.R. No. 180643, negligence; and
March 25, 2008). c. That his action caused:
i. Any undue injury to any party, including the government; or
 ii. Giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
Note: Since bad faith is an element, good faith and lack of malice is a
valid defense.
6. Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to
act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him (Sec. 3 (f), RA 3019).
Elements:
a. Offender is a public officer;
b. Public officer neglected or refused to act without sufficient justification after
due demand or request has been made on him;
c. Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public
officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and
d. Such failure to act is for the purpose of:
i. Obtaining (directly or indirectly) from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage;
ii. Favoring his own interest; or
iii. Giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other
interested party.
Note: The neglect or delay of public function must be accompanied by an
express or implied demand of any benefit or consideration for himself or
another. Absent such demand, the officer shall be merely
administratively liable.
7. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby (Sec. 3 (g), RA 3019).
Elements:
a. Accused is a public officer;
b. The public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
c. Such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government (the threshold of the crime).
8. Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in which he:
a. Intervenes or takes part in his official capacity; (Intervention must be actual and
in the official capacity of the public officer), or
b. Is prohibited by the constitution or by law from having any interest (Sec. 3 (h),
RA 3019).
9. Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gains, or having a material interest
in any transaction or act which:
a. Requires the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member and
which exercises discretion in such approval; or
b. Even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the
board, committee, panel or group (Sec. 3 (i), RA 3019).
Note: Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officials
responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular
transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
10. Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of:
a. Any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or benefit; or
b. A mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled (Sec.
3 (j), RA 3019).
11.
a. Divulging valuable information of a:
i. Confidential character
ii. Acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized person
b. Releasing such information in advance of its authorized released date (Sec. 3 (k),
RA 3019).
c. The following persons shall also be punished with the public officer and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified, in the discretion of the Court, from
transacting business in any form with the Government:
1. Person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit in par. 2
and 3.
2. Person offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in par. 4.
3. Person urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential
information in par. 11.
Q: May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 [“directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage or benefit, for
himself of for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law”] also be simultaneously or successively charged with direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. (BAR 2010)
A: YES, a public officer charged under Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. 3019 may also be charged
simultaneously or successively for the crime of direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised
Penal Code because two crimes are essentially different and are penalized under distinct legal
philosophies. Violation of Sec. (b) of R.A. 3019 is a malum prohibitum, the crime under Art. 210
of the Code is a malum in se.
Q: Mayor Adalim was charged with murder. He was transferred from the provincial jail and
detained him at the residence of Ambil, Jr. Considering that Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does
the fact that a Mayor was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners’ case beyond the
ambit of said law?
A: NO. In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use “private party” rather than
“private person” to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
for a reason. A private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer while a private
party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting
in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. When Mayor Adalim was transferred from
the provincial jail and was detained at Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to
Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus,
for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019, Adalim was a private party
(Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011).
NOTE: The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3 of RA
3019 is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer
be charged in court, as in thepresent case where the public officer has already died, the private
person may be indicted alone (People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014).
Gross inexcusable negligence
Gross inexcusable negligence means that the public officer did not take any more into
consideration all other circumstances.
Evident bad faith
Evident bad faith is something that is tantamount to fraud or having ill-motive or with furtive
design. It connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage.
“Undue injury”
The term “undue injury” in the context of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
punishing the act of “causing undue injury to any party,” has a meaning akin to that civil law
concept of actual damage (Guadines v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 164891, June 6,
2011).
Q: In violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019, “causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government”; and “giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, must both
circumstance be present to convict the accused of the said crime?
A: NO. The Supreme Court has clarified that the use of the disjunctive word “or” connotes that
either act of (a) “causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government” and (b)
“giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference,” qualifies as a
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended. The use of the disjunctive “or” connotes that
the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would
suffice for conviction (Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011).
Q: Is proof of the extent of damage necessary to prove the crime?
A: NO. The Supreme Court held in Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, that proof of the extent or
quantum of damage is not essential. It is sufficient that the injury suffered or benefits received
can be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. Under the second mode
of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 therefore, damage is not required. In order
to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified
favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions
(Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011).
Prohibited acts for private individuals under Sec. 4 of RA 3019
It shall be unlawful:
1. For any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize
or exploit or take advantage of such family or personal relation, by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government,
in which such public officer has to intervene (Sec. 4, RA 3019); and Family relations include
the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within 3 rd civil degree. Close Personal
relations include:
a. Close personal friendship
b. Social and fraternal relations
c. Personal employment
2. For any person to knowingly induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Sec. 3.
Other prohibited acts for the relatives
GR: It shall be unlawful for the spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree of the President, Vice President, Senate President, or Speaker of the House to
intervene directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
government.
XPN: This will not apply to:
1. Any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom
he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of
business;
2. Any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of
such assumption of public office;
3. Any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of
the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law; or
4. Any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession
(Sec. 5, RA 3019).
SEC. 3 (B), POWER TO INTERVENE INTO CONTRACT OR TRANSACTION:
JARAVATA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Doctrine: Sec. 3(b) refers to a public officer whose intervention in contract or transaction is
required by law. Hence, Jaravata’s official capacity as assistant principal does not require him
to intervene in the payment of salary differentials of teachers.
FACTS.
 Petitioner Hilario Jaravata was the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao,La Union
Barangay HS. On 5 Jan 1979, he informed six classroom teachers of the approval of the
release of their salary differentials for 1978. To facilitate its payment, petitioner and the
teachers agreed to reimburse the petitioner of his expenses, which totalled P220. The sum
was divided among the six, at the rate of P36 each.
 The teachers actually received their salary differentials. Pursuant to their agreement,
they, with the exception of two teachers, gave the petitioner varying amounts of money
exceeding the P36. But as the school’s administrator did not approve it, the petitioner was
ordered to return the money. Petitioner complied.
 The petitioner was charged with violating Sec 3(b) of RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the same.
ISSUE: WON petitioner violated Sec 3(b) of RA No. 3019 - NO
RULING: ISSUES & RATIO.

 Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public WON Mejorada is liable under RA 3019, Sec 3(e) – YES.
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
Elements of Section 3(e) Elements of 3(e) according What the Supreme Court
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with any
to Petitioner said
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the
The accused must be a The accused must be public Its [sec. 3(e)] reference to
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. Xxx
public officer. officer charged with the “any public officer” is
 Petitioner was, at the time material to the case, a “public officer” as defined by Sec. 2 duty of granting licenses or without distinction or
of RA No 3019, i.e. “elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or permits or other qualification and it specifies
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving concessions. the acts declared unlawful.
compensation, even normal from the government”, and it may be said that any amount That such public officer [Same element] However, The government suffered
he received in excess of P36 from each of the complainants was in the nature of a gift caused undue injury to any he denies that there was undue injury as a result of
or benefit  But in the opinion of the Court, Sec 3(b) refers to a public officer whose party, including the injury or damage caused to the petitioner’s having
official intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction. Government, or gave any the Government because inflated the true claims of
 -No law invested petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary private party unwarranted the payments were complainants which became
differentials  far from exercising in any power, he sought to expedite the payment of benefits, advantage or allegedly made on the basis the basis of the report and
the same preference in the discharge of a document solely made which eventually became
of his official administrative by the Highway District the basis of payment. His
 -His official capacity as assistant principal does not require him to intervene in the
or judicial functions. Engineer to which petitioner contention that he had no
payment of salary differentials had no hand in preparing. participation is belied by
the fact that as a right-of-
SC= WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED and conviction of petitioner Jaravata is set aside.
way agent, his duty was
precisely to negotiate with
SEC. 3 (E), ELEMENTS; CAUSING UNDUE INJURY: property owners affected
MEJORADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN for the purpose of
Doctrine: Section 3 which enumerates the crime punishable under RA 3019 applies to all compensation.
public officers without distinction or qualification. Last sentence in 3(e) intended to make The injury to any party, or He argues that for the 3rd There was evident bad faith
clear the inclusions of officers and employees of officers or gov’t corporation which ordinarily giving any private party any element to be present, the on the part of the petitioner
may not come within the term. unwarranted benefits, alleged injury or damage to when he inflated the values
advantage or preference the complainants and the of the true claims and when
FACTS. was done through manifest, government must have been he divested the claimants of
partiality, evident bad faith caused by the public officer a large share of the amounts
1. Arturo Mejorada was employed as a Right of Way Agent in the Office of the Highway District or gross inexcusable in the discharge of his due them.
Engineer in Pasig whose main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by negligence. official, administrative or
highway constructions/improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the judicial functions.
damages incurred by said owners.
2. Binangonan, Rizal residents were some of those affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta
Cruz-Calamba Road. Mejorada contacted them and informed them that he could facilitate SC= DENIED. Mejorada sentenced to 56 years, 8 days of imprisonment.
their claims regarding the payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements
affected by the road widening. He required the claimants to sign blank copies of the “Sworn MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH, GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE:
Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties” and “Agreement to FONACIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Demolish, Remove, and Reconstruct Improvements” then inflated the amounts. Likewise, Doctrine: The elements of the offense defined in Sec 3 of the Anti-graft law are that: (1) The
the said “Agreements to Demolish” reflected the value of the improvements “as per accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must
assessor” which on the average was only P2,000 lower than the value declared by the have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his
owners.
action has caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any
3. A few months after, he accompanied the claimants to collect from the Office of the
party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Highway District Engineer, to receive payments and personally assisted them in signing the
vouchers and enchasing the checks by certifying as to their identities and guaranteeing
payment. FACTS
4. Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied  This case is about a "ghost project" in 1978 by the Benguet Highway Engineering District
them to his car where they were divested of the amounts paid to them, explaining that under the then Ministry of Public Highways. Petitioners were charged violation of Section
there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless and 3, paragraph (e), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
unable to complain because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion. and Corrupt Practices Act, and for estafa thru falsification of public documents
5. The claimants filed 8 Informations against the petitioner.  President Ferdinand Marcos was informed by Ben Palispis, Governor of Benguet, of the
deteriorated condition of the Halsema (Baguio-Bondoc) Highway.
 Acting on this report, the President, through then Minister of Public Highways Baltazar
Aquino, directed Santiago Paragas, district engineer of the Benguet Highway Engineering
District ("BHED"), in the presence of Eugenio Manalo, Public Highways Director for Region
I, to immediately undertake repairs on said highway.
 In March 1978, Eusebio Fonacier, supervising civil engineer of the BHED, instructed Ruben
Buccat, a district civil engineer, to prepare a program of work ("PW") for the Halsema
Highway under cover of a P10 million development fund.
 Fonacier and Buccat visited the highway in April 1978. During the same month, Buccat went
to Km. 271 to 276 of the highway and placed stakes or markers for the installation of
culverts. He noticed that the road continued to deteriorate and mounds of gravel were at
the roadside.
 Following Fonacier's instruction, Buccat prepared the PW. The PW was forwarded by the
BHED to the regional office in Bauang, La Union.
 The PW was later revised upon the representation of Governor Palispis who wanted the
road to be concreted, not merely asphalted. The PW for the concreting of Km. 271 to 276
was submitted in July 1978 to, and approved only in January 1979 by, Public Highways
Minister Aquino.
 Pending the Minister's approval, the processing of other documents required to implement
the Halsema Highway project continued. On 20 April 1978, Remedios Gacad, an accountant
at the BHED, signed a requisition for supplies and equipment ("RSE"), bearing the signature
of Fonacier, with an allotment of P270,500.00.
 Gacad entered the RSE in her Journal Analysis of Obligation which she thereafter brought
to the administrative office of the BHED.
 In May 1978, Fonacier designated Buccat to be the resident engineer for the Halsema
project. Buccat was asked to prepare the statement of work accomplished ("SWA") which
would indicate the delivery of the road materials for Phase II of the project (the asphalting
of Km. 271 to 276).
 It was the first time that Buccat learned of such assignment. Since he had not seen as yet
the deliveries covered by the SWA, Buccat told Fonacier that he would first check them
out.
 Fonacier replied that there was no need for that because he (Fonacier) himself had
personally seen the deliveries. Fonacier also assured Buccat that he (Fonacier) would
continue to supervise the deliveries. Since Buccat was busy with Phase I of the Halsema
project which entailed the asphalting of the overlay of the road shoulders, Buccat agreed
to sign the two sheets of SWA.
 Later that day, Fonacier asked Buccat to prepare the tally sheets ("TSs") and the delivery
receipts ("DRs").
 Fonacier gave to Buccat a list of dump trucks, with their corresponding plate numbers,
volume and dimension, which, according to Fonacier, were used in delivering Item 108, an
aggregate subbase construction material with mixed gravel, stones and sand.
 The DRs were in blank mimeographed forms while the TSs bore the signature in red ink of
Arnulfo Sarmiento, an audit clerk of the COA assigned at the BHED. Buccat left all these
papers in his locker and proceeded to the site of the asphalt overlay project.
 The next day, Buccat went to the BHED office to get the blank mimeographed forms and,
following the instructions of Fonacier, he cut each of them in triplicates, stapled them and
filled in the blanks using for reference the list of dump trucks furnished by Fonacier.
 Buccat was finally able to prepare and sign close to 10% of the DRs in four or five days.
Buccat would report to Fonacier every morning before going to his assigned project site,
and each time the latter would find occasion to inquire about the DRs. Buccat would answer
that he had yet to complete them.
 On 25 May 1978, Francisco del Moral, a private contractor, brought to accountant Gacad
two general vouchers ("GV"), numbered 8410 and 8412, already signed by Fonacier and
Francisco Villanueva (the acting property custodian).
 Attached to the GVs were the RSE, canvass paper, approved purchase order ("PO"), abstract
of bids, report of inspection and materials test signed by Ramos.
 While Gacad was processing the first GV, she inquired from Del Moral about the DRs which
were required to be part of the documents. Del Moral took out from a brown envelope a
bundle of documents, 1/8 of a coupon bond in size, 5 to 6 inches thick and bound by a
rubber band, stating that they were the delivery receipts.
 Seeing that on top of the bundle was an already filled up DR, and having been told by Del
Moral that Paragas was waiting for the documents, Gacad affixed her initials on the portion
corresponding to "indexed by" of the GV.
 Gacad had no reason to doubt that the supporting papers were complete since the GVs
already appeared to have been signed by Fonacier and Villanueva. While she was processing
the second GV, Gacad once again asked Del Moral about the DRs. Del Moral again brought
out from an envelope a bundle of documents. Believing that these were the same DRs
earlier shown to her by Del Moral, Gacad merely glanced at the receipts and affixed her
signature on the GV.
 The GVs soon reached the desk of Josephine Carantes, acting chief of the Internal Control
Unit ("ICU"), for pre-audit.
 Using a blue ink pen, Carantes checked the stamped list of submitted documents against
those shown by Del Moral consisting of the approved RSE, approved PO, original invoice,
report of inspection, latest tax clearance, taxpayer's certificate, canvass and abstract of
bids. She noticed certain crossed marks in red ink on the list but she could not tell who
placed them there.
 Carantes asked to Del Moral for the DRs. Del Moral retorted, "Why do you still have to check
(them) when those papers have already been checked by three different people in your
office?" He told her that he was in a hurry because Paragas was waiting for the papers.
 He then brought out from an envelope two bundles of papers on top of which was what
appeared to be an already filled up DR. When she asked him, "Supposed they are not really
delivery receipts?" Del Moral replied, "They are really the ones because they have been
scrutinized already by these people. Otherwise, these people would not have affixed their
signatures had they not been shown to them." In finally initialing the GVs, Carantes affixed
the abbreviated word "Del" on the stamped list to indicate that the DRs were the supporting
documents in place of the original invoices.
 Meanwhile, Buccat stopped preparing the DRs when, in the BHED office, Fonacier
"whispered" to him that he should rush the preparation of the DRs because "they" had
already "collected." Suspecting possible irregularities, Buccat tore into pieces the DRs
which he had prepared and signed, and he thereafter ceased to further attend to the still
unsigned DRs and the preparation of the TSs.
 When Fonacier saw Buccat the following day at the office, the former, once more,
reminded the latter to rush the preparation of the DRs. Fearing the pressure, Buccat lamely
answered that he was still in the process of preparing the DRs.
 Some time during the last week of May 1978, Buccat asked Fonacier and Del Moral how
they were able to collect payment despite the absence of the DRs; one of them answered,
"Utak lang."
 Informed that the PW was already being implemented by the BHED and that the subbase
materials had been laid out, Director Manalo signed the RSE on 22 May 1978. He had the
RSE stamped for public bidding. On 06 June 1978, he received a telegram from Minister
Aquino suspending the work at the Halsema Highway.
 In his report, dated 19 July 1978, to Director Manalo, Matias Ateo-an, a civil engineer in
the Maintenance Division, MPH, Region I, recommended that the surface of Km. 271 to 276
be repaired immediately. He also recommended that Item 200 should be used since the
road thereat was stable enough. Ateo-an had frequently gone home to Bontoc but he did
not once see any pile of Item 108 along the stretch of Km. 271 to 276 between the months
of April and July 1978. He did see piles of Item 300 which he thought were part of the road
rehabilitation program of the IBRD
 A month earlier, or on 17 June 1978, Jose Dominguez, Vice Chairman of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Mountain Province, informed the Provincial Fiscal, through a letter, of
alleged irregularities and anomalies concerning BHED projects along the Halsema Highway.
Governor Palispis requested for a meeting with Dominguez at his residence. Coincidentally,
Buccat also heard from an engineer of the regional office that an investigation was being
conducted in connection with the delivery of road materials at Km. 271 to 276.
 During the first week of August 1978, Dominguez went to the residence of Governor
Palispis. Dominguez brought with him documents consisting of a report on the Halsema
Highway project and sworn affidavits of witnesses.
 He briefed the governor on the anomalies attending the project. Governor Palispis
requested Dominguez to make representations with the Provincial Fiscal's Office to hold in
abeyance any investigation pending further verification of the matter. The governor was
said to have been apprehensive that making public the incident would alienate him from
the people of Benguet.
 A special panel was created to investigate the 17th June 1978 complaint of Dominguez.
The panel conducted an investigation from 03 to 23 October, 1978. On 24 October 1978,
the GVs were brought to Cabading's office by Resident Auditor Apolinario Padilla. When
Cabading noticed that the DRs and TSs were not among the papers shown, he inquired from
Padilla whether there were other documents aside from those already attached to the GVs.
Padilla answered that all have been submitted. Cabading did not mention specifically the
DRs and TSs because, wanting to find out the extent of the anomalies committed, he
thought it to be prudent at the time that the concerned officials were not unduly forwarned
about the missing documents. Following the panels' investigation, a formal charge was filed
on 08 November 1978 against the accused.

Here, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act had, indeed, been violated by nine (9) of the accused who acted in conspiracy
to defraud the Government "in the amount of P96,903.00, which excludes . . . the 3% BIR
contractor's tax on the amount of P99,999,00, through the utilization of fictitious and/or
fraudulent public documents which certified to the alleged requisition of supplies or
materials intended for a non-existing project, resulting in the payment of public funds for
non-existent deliveries." The Sandiganbayan acquitted accused Nabus since his
participation was in merely issuing the checks in payment of the GVs, and that it was not
shown that he had the "legal duty to process the said GVs and supporting papers or to verify
the correctness of each and every document prior to his causing the preparation and
issuance of said checks."
Issue: WON Petitioners are liable for violating Sec 3 of the Anti-graft law
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it finds
petitioners Santiago G. Paragas, Eusebio V. Fonacier, Francisco Villanueva, Jr., Apolinario T.
Padilla and Rogelio Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and in imposing on them the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from four (4) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to seven (7) years and one
(1) day, as maximum as well as a perpetual disqualification from public office, and in ordering
them to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
the amount of P96,903.00, and, proportionately, to pay the costs.
Petitioners Remedios T. Almoite, Joseph Gonzales and Arnulfo Sarmiento are hereby
ACQUITTED of the offense charged without prejudice to the filing of proper administrative
charges against Almoite and Sarmiento such as may be warranted.
Held: YES.
The particular provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) with
which violation petitioners have been charged states:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The elements of the offense defined in this provision are that: (1) The accused is a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action has caused any undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
In this, it is undisputed that herein remaining petitioners are public officers with whom private
contractor Del Moral, now deceased, has been charged also as a co-principal. The first element
required for the commission of the offense charged is thus clearly extant.
The second element enumerates the different modes by which means the offense penalized in
Section 3(e) may be committed. "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a
disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."
These definitions prove all too well that the three modes are distinct and different from each
other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under
Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant conviction.
The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable
negligence" in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct
offenses 71 but only implies that the offense charged may have been committed through any of
the modes provided by the law. In Criminal Case No. 010, all three modes of committing the
offense under Section 3(e) are alleged in the information.
The third element of the offense is satisfied when the questioned conduct causes undue injury
to any party, including the government, or gives any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not thus essential; it should be
sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived to be substantial enough
and not merely negligible.
We have examined the voluminous records of the cases at bench, and we cannot decry the
findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan to Be bereft of factual bases. Petitioners, except
for Del Moral who was charged a co-principal, were all public officials and alleged to have acted
as such in the commission of the offense.
From the testimony of Director Eugenio Manalo of Region I of the then Ministry of Public
Highways, projects undertaken by the BHED would undergo the following procedures, briefly
narrated by the Sandiganbayan thusly:
. . . . Projects within the region were prosecuted after the Ministry issued
sub-advices of allotments (SAA) to the region which in turn releases letters
of advice of allotments (LAA) to the districts based on allocations and
programs of work for specific projects prepared by the district engineers. If
below P100,000.00, said programs of work can be signed by the district
 engineer, and above that amount, they are referred to the regional director
who can approve them up to the amount of P300,000.00. Beyond the latter
amount, the approval of the Minister of Public Highways must be secured.
After the preparation of the program of work and its approval by the
regional office, it is returned to the district office for execution. A
Requisition for Supplies or Equipment (or RSE) is prepared by the project
engineer and approved by the regional director regardless of the amount,
after which it is returned to the district engineer for implementation. The
procurement of materials is then made by advertisement or canvass. If the
amount to be requisitioned is more than P5,000.00, there must be an
advertisement for public bidding, but if the requisition is P5,000.00 and
below, canvass may be made for bidders' proposals. In case of newspaper
advertisement or publication, the same must be made three times in
newspapers of general circulation in the province or city and posted on
bulletin boards in three public places. When the bids are submitted on the
day of the bidding, the Committee on Bids and Award in each district makes
the award to the supplier on the basis of the lowest bid. A Purchase Order
(or PO) is prepared stating the period to deliver and other conditions and is
signed by the winning bidder or supplier. The supplier then starts delivering
the requisitioned materials and notifies the district engineer or project
engineer, as well as the auditor, of the start of deliveries so that the same
may be checked. Delivery receipts (DRs) in four or five copies are usually
signed by the resident engineer together with the tally sheets (TSs) which
contain a summary of the deliveries. Upon the completion of the deliveries,
the supplier demands payment. The DRs, TSs, the Certificate of Testing,
RSE, SWA, abstract and program of work are then attached to the general
vouchers (GVs) which are prepared for the collection of payments due to
the supplier. The GVs and supporting papers are processed as to funding and
deliveries and pre-audited by the auditor's office, after which the
corresponding checks are prepared by the cashier, signed by the district
engineer, and countersigned by the auditor.
The Halsema Highway project was initiated upon the verbal directive of then President Marcos
to the then Minister of Public Highways Baltazar Aquino in the presence of Regional Director
Eugenio Manalo. Minister Aquino, in turn, directed petitioner Paragas, then Highway District
Engineer of the locality, to prepare a program of work. The one prepared by the BHED for
asphalting the Halsema Highway, however, was disapproved due to the request of Governor Ben
Palispis that "concrete" should instead be used for the project. Hence, the Regional Office itself,
through engineers Purugganan and Collado, prepared the PW. Project engineer Fonacier brought
the PW to the Regional Office for approval. Considering that the total allocation of
P10,000,000.00 for the whole project, exceeded the jurisdictional limit set for approval merely
by the Regional Director, the PW was transmitted to Minister Aquino. It was finally approved by
Minister Aquino only in January 1979 or eight months after contractor Del Moral had supposedly
delivered Item 108 at the jobsite.
According to Paragas, they proceeded with the "public bidding" for the materials required for
the project because the copy of the PW, still unsigned by the Regional Director but which
Fonacier retained, "was the basis of the preparation of the RIV or RSE." Paragas claimed that
they relied upon the verbal instruction of Minister Aquino to proceed with the implementation
of the project because it was an "emergency" case. Although he knew that the PW was yet to
be approved. Paragas scheduled, nevertheless, the holding of a public bidding upon learning
that the funds for the project were already made available. He directed Assistant District
Engineer Felimon Garcia to cause the publication of a notice of a general bidding for the supply
of materials which did not indicate any quantity or volume thereof considering that the PW was
yet pending approval by the Regional Director. The items were also not detailed on the excuse
that the itemization of the materials needed would "involve great space for publication."
7
Instead of the required three publications, the notice for public bidding scheduled for 28 to 31
March was published only twice in the Midland Courier, a newspaper in Baguio City, on 19 March
and 26 March of 1978.
According to the BHED administrative officer, Cipriano G. Ismael, he gave invitations to bid to
interested bidders. Del Moral was first informed of the reset bidding because he was the first to
come to the office to get a copy of the invitation to bid. Del Moral talked to Ismael and Fonacier
to know what materials would still be bidded but he did not bother to ask Fonacier on the
quantity of materials needed because he was "sure of winning the bidding." Ordinarily, bidders
were required to post bonds but Garcia could not remember if Del Moral submitted a bidder's
bond.
At the reset bidding on 28 April 1979, Del Moral emerged the winning bidder for Item 108 having
placed a bid of P18.00 per cu. m. In the abstract of bids, Garcia annotated "Recommended as
to Item 108 only" because "all the other items were priced too high." Once he knew that he had
won the bid for Item 108, Del Moral supposedly instructed his drivers to make the deliveries of
Item 108 at the jobsite. Deliveries were said to have started in the afternoon of April 28 even
though no purchase order had yet been issued. The purchase order for 5,550 cu. m. of Item 108
at P18 per cu. m. for the total amount of P99,900.00 bore the date 02 May 1979. Property
custodian Francisco M. Villanueva, Jr., admitted having signed the purchase order only on 25
May 1976 although on the face of the original copy of the purchase order his signature clearly
appeared..
The deliveries were reportedly checked by Arnulfo Sarmiento, the auditing office
representative. Ruben Buccat, the resident engineer designated by Paragas for the project,
upon the other hand, denied that there were such deliveries although he admitted having
prepared some DRs and TSs only upon the persistent prodding of project engineer Fonacier. He
swore that he had prepared not more than 10% of the DRs which he also tore up to pieces upon
learning that the materials said to have been delivered had already been paid for. Del Moral
presented to the processors of the vouchers what appeared to be bundles of delivery receipts
but later admitted that there were blank forms in the DRs he submitted for examination, lamely
explaining that whoever prepared them did not press hard enough the ballpen used in filling
them up or that no carbon paper was placed between the copies.
No report was prepared on whether the materials met the standards set therefor and no
certificate of test was accomplished until after the absence of that vital document was
discovered by auditing examiner Remedios Almoite. That a certificate of test was eventually
submitted did not diminish the negligence of Ramos; on the contrary, its belated submission
compounded his complicity. For his part, Fonacier also proved to have been recalcitrant to his
duty by failing to verify that the materials delivered were not only quantitatively but also
qualitatively in accordance with the specifications set for the project.
Del Moral himself admitted that he requested for "partial" payment from Fonacier "in the middle
of May." The property custodian, Villanueva, prepared and signed the voucher without having
seen the actual deliveries but merely relied on the signature of Fonacier thereon and the dubious
DRs and TSs presented by Del Moral.
Auditor Padilla can hardly profess ignorance of Commission on Audit Circular No. 76-41, dated
30 July 1976, prohibiting the splitting of requisitions, purchase orders, vouchers and the like.
Auditor Padilla asseverated that when the vouchers reached him after it had been pre-audited
by Remedios Almoite, he only "took a cursory examination" of the signatures thereon, "verified
the supporting documents attached" and saw the list of documents attached, as well as the
computation made by the auditing examiner. If indeed, however, he verified the documents
attached to the vouchers, he could not have escaped noticing that the quantity of Item 108
indicated in the attached purchase order, Exh. D-4, was for 5,550 cu. m. Ordinary diligence and
a working knowledge of the pertinent COA circulars, specifically Circular No. 76-41, expected
of someone in his position, would have sounded a warning bell upon Padilla before affixing his
signature. Another circular which Padilla had grossly overlooked was COA Circular No. 76-16A,
dated 23 March 1976, "clarifying COA Circular No. 76-16, dated 10 February 1976, on the
limitation for the countersignature by different officials of the Commission on Audit."
The checks issued in favor of Del Moral, i.e., PNB Checks No. SN 4-6394572 and No. SN 4-
6394573, each for P48,451.50 bearing the signatures of both Paragas and Padilla bore the date
26 May 1979. Granting that Padilla failed to notice that the quantity of the materials delivered
indicated on the PO was clearly halved by Villanueva and that he also missed seeing the two
vouchers to be supported by the same set of documents, the issuance of two checks indicating
amounts close to P50,000.00 each on the same day to the same person should have easily put
him on guard.
From all that appear on record, we cannot disregard the Sandiganbayan in finding guilt on —
Paragas, in knowingly ordering the implementation of an unapproved program of work,
instructing the holding of the starkly irregular bidding, and in signing the pertinent documents
leading to the issuance of checks in favor of Del Moral; Fonacier, in knowingly going along with
the irregular directives of Paragas in so misperceived a role as the "trusted" project engineer of
Paragas; Villanueva, for preparing the documents or ordering their preparation notwithstanding
the non-observance of the applicable procedures therefor; Padilla, for negligently agreeing to
the splitting of payments in gross violation of COA circulars and closing his eyes to irregularities
glaringly indicated on the documents supporting the two vouchers; and Ramos for the grossly
lackadaisical performance of his duty to see to it that the materials allegedly delivered were in
accordance with government standards.
MENDOZA-ARCE V. OMBUDSMAN
Doctrine: The elements of the offense under Sec. 3(e) are: 1) That the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2) That said public officers
committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to
their public positions; 3) That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government
or a private party; 4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and 5) That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
FACTS.
 There was a Special Proceeding to for the will of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz and Santiago
Villaruz was one of the oppositors. The said case was assigned to the sala of Judge Patricio
 Santiao was initially the administrator of the estate of Remedios but he was removed for
patent neglect. His eldest brother Nicolas Villaruz, Jr. replaced him and he filed a motion for
the approval of his bond as administrator.
 The motion was opposed by Jose Maria, another brother, and attached to their opposition
was a certification executed by Remedios, which authorized Santiago to take possession of
her nipa, lands and gave Santiago the option for leasing such lands.
 Judge Patricio issued an order recognizing the validity of the certification and the
administration of the new administration was subject to them but this was not reflected in
the dispostive portion of the order.
 The case was, in the meantime, reassigned to Judge Pestaño who approved Nicolas’ bond.
After this receiving Judge Pestaño’s order, Susan Mendoza-Arce, prepared a Letter of
Administration (LOA) in favor of Nicolas and this was based on the form prescribed in the
Manual for Clerk of Courts. Acting on the LOA, Nicolas took possession of the entire estate of
Remedios including the nipa lands, which were leased to Santiago.
 Santiago filed a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman claiming that Mendoza violated Article
171 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 for showing manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexclusable negligence.
 The Ombudsman found sufficient basis for the filing of the informations against Mendoza.
 Mendoza claims she was not guilty of the crimes and she merely issued the LOA based on the
Manual.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Mendoza violated Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. – NO.
There is no probable cause for the filing of information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
The elements of the offense under Sec. 3(e) are: 1) That the accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2) That said public officers committed the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public
positions; 3) That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private
party; 4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to such parties; and 5) That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
All of elements must proven, however, in this case the issuance of the LOA there is no basis
for finding of Mendoza to have acted with “partiality” or bias or “bad faith”, nor with “gross
negligence”. The work of a Clerk of Court, although an officer of the Court, a public officer,
and an officer of the law, is not that of a judicial officer but essentially a ministerial one.
The LOA issued by Mendoza was performed as a ministerial duty. She merely copied
substantially the form for letters of administration prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of
Courts. The LOA is not accurate for lack of reference to the lease agreement in favor of
Santiago but this does not equate to gross negligence or from some corrupt motive. She used
the phrases in the Manual prescribed by the Court, instead of employing her own words.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution dated April 20, 2001, of the
Graft Investigation Officer, as approved by the Office of the Ombudsman, and his order, dated
June 29, 2001, are hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz
against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce for violation of R.A. No.
NOTES.
“Partiality” or bias, which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are.
“Bad faith” which connotes not only bad judgment or negligence but also a dishonest purpose
or conscious wrongdoing, a breach of duty amounting to fraud
“Gross negligence” which is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are
concerned
SEC. 3 (H), ELEMENTS; FINANCIAL INTEREST & INTERVENES IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY:
TRIESTE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Doctrine: Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows: SEC.
3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest. The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: a) The public
officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction; b) In connection
with which he intervenes in his official capacity. Concurrence of both elements is necessary as
the absence of one will not warrant conviction.
FACTS:
 Generso Trieste was the Municipal Mayor and a member of the Committee on Award of the
Municipality of Numancia, Aklan, who had administrative control of the funds of the
municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds.
 He purchased the construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, of which he is the president, incorporator, director, and major stockholder.
 He then awarded the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation and approved payment thereof to said corporation.
 He was then charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly for
willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or
transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official
capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest.
 SANDIGANBAYAN: convicted petitioner
 Petitioner:
o The prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the
offense, and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or
indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or
transactions.
o He did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the
purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had
already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer
o There was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations
filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency
direct purchases by personal canvass.
ISSUE: W/N accused Trieste violated Sec. 3 (h), RA 3019. NO.
RATIO: see Doctrine.
 Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were
delivered, petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind
of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
 What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the
transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may
attach
 The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything
for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use
of influence, authority and power
 There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his
influence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask
anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the
construction materials from Trigen.
 Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction.
 Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by
the way, has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship.
Further, personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most
reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty
of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set
aside and reversing the appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING
Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged against him with costs de oficio.
TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Doctrine the essential elements of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows: 1. The
accused is a public officer; 2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract, or transaction; 3. He either a. intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with such interest; or b. is prohibited from having such interest by
the Constitution or by any law. There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer
who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in connection
with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction, the public officer
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.
FACTS.
 Former Valencia, Negros Oriental Mayor Edgar Y. Teves and his wife Teresita Z. Teves were
convicted of violating Sec. 3h [Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part
in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.] of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center.
 Petitioners pleases not guilty. Sandiganbayan convicted them of violating Sec. 3h of the Anti-
Graft Law; imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and
twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum; and ordering the confiscation of
all their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government, as well as perpetual
disqualification from public office.
 It was found that Mayor Teves did not divest himself of pecuniary interest in the said cockpit;
that Teresita Teves was the owner/licensee of the cockpit; and that they were marries and
their property relations were that of a conjugal partnership of gains, thus the said pecuniary
interest.
 Pecuniary interest is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) [Hold such interests in any cockpit or other
games licensed by a local government unit;]of the Local Gov’t Code.
 The Sandiganbayan absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of the
business permit to operate the cockpit for not being well-founded.
 The Petitioners filed the present case P/Review on Certiorari, which the SC initially denied
for failure to show that Sandiganbayan committed error. However, upon M/R, the petition is
reinstated.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Pets. Teves are guilty of violating Sec. 3 of the Anti Graft Law - YES
 The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly
evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
 A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted last part thereof is
merely an allegation of the second element of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or
indirect “financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction.” Not by
any stretch of imagination can it be discerned or construed that the afore-quoted last part
of the information charges the petitioners with the second mode by which Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree with the petitioners that the charge
was for unlawful intervention in the issuance of the license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit. There was no charge for possession of pecuniary interest prohibited by law.
 However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves,
then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn
application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6
January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof
is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual
with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective
January 1990 he “turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for
the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due
to other work pressure” is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership
over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves
effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
 Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his
wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent
Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such
their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code
declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by
the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is,
therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
 The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be
convicted thereof, considering that it was not charged in the information?
 The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure
 It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of
those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of
the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence,
the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to
this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense
proved.
2. Under which law should Pets. be punished, Sec 3h of the Anti Graft Law or Sec 89(2)
LGC – LOCAL GOV’T CODE
 It must be observed that Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is a general provision, it being
applicable to all prohibited interests; while Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 is a special
provision, as it specifically treats of interest in a cockpit. Notably, the two statutes provide
for different penalties. The Anti-Graft Law, particularly Section 9, provides as follows:
 SEC. 9. Penalties for violations.—(a) Any public official or private person committing any
of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen
years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor
of the Government of any prohibited interest . . .
 On the other hand, Section 514 of the LGC of 1991 prescribes a lighter penalty; thus:
 SECTION 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions or Possessing Illegal Pecuniary
Interest.—Any local official and any person or persons dealing with him who violate the
prohibitions provided in Section 89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with imprisonment
for six months and one day to six years, or a fine of not less than Three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or both such imprisonment
and fine at the discretion of the court.
 Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials
from possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and
which, in itself, prescribes the punishment for violation thereof, is paramount to the Anti-
Graft Law, which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a general manner.
Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August 1960, while the former became effective on
1 January 1991. Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law has to yield to the LGC of
1991, which is the later expression of legislative will.
 Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. The charge against her is
conspiracy in causing “the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center.” For this charge, she was acquitted. But as
discussed earlier, that charge also includes conspiracy in the possession of prohibited
interest.
SC DECISION.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 16 July 2002 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal Case No. 2337 is hereby MODIFIED in that (1)
EDGAR Y. TEVES is convicted of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
and is sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000; and (2) TERESITA Z. TEVES is hereby ACQUITTED
of such offense. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
NOTES.
Rule 120
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. —When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
BAD FAITH UNNECESSARY; COMMITTED BY NEGLIGENCE:
ALVAREZ V. PEOPLE
Doctrine: It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may
be committed even if bad faith is not attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not
act in bad faith, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable.
FACTS.
 1. This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the decision which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. (no facts)
2. Petitioner stresses there was no bad faith. He stresses that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of RA 7718 and while it is true that petitioner may
have deviated from some of the procedure outline in the law, the essential purpose
of the law – that a project proposal be properly evaluated and that parties other than
the opponent be given opportunity to present their proposal – was accomplished.
3. SOLGEN – the findings of the SB and the SC of the Built-operate-transfer (BOT) law
and its rules have not been followed in the bidding and award of the contract to
Australian professional were based on the documents of the project which have not
been questioned by petitioner. Despite the claim of substantial compliance, it is
undisputed that it did not include the required company profile of the contractor and
that the publication of the invidiation for comparative proposals were defective.
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON the prosecution was able to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, (were they able
to establish the alleged gross inexcusable negligence, evident bad faith or manifest partiality
of the petitioner – YES.
 Notably, petitioner’s invocation of good faith deserves scant consideration in the light of
established facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan and upheld by this Court, clearly showing
that he acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the
BOT project to an unlicensed and financially unqualified contractor.
 It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be
committed even if bad faith is not attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not
act in bad faith, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross but also
inexcusable. Submission of documents such as contractor’s license and company profile
are minimum legal requirements to enable the government to properly evaluate the
qualifications of a BOT proponent. It was unthinkable for a local government official,
especially one with several citations and awards as outstanding local executive, to have
allowed API to submit a BOT proposal and later award it the contract despite lack of a
contractor’s license and proof of its financial and technical capabilities, relying merely on
a piece of information from a news item about said contractor’s ongoing mall construction
project in another municipality and verbal representations of its president.
 In his testimony at the trial, petitioner admitted that after the awarding of the contract
to API, the latter did not comply with the posting of notices and submission of
requirements. He simply cited the reason given by API for such non-compliance, i.e., that
the BOT law does not provide for such requirements. This clearly shows petitioner’s
indifference and utter disregard of the strict requirements of the BOT law and
implementing rules, which as local chief executive, he is mandated to follow and uphold.
Petitioner’s reliance on the representations and statements of the contractor on the
compliance with legal requirements is an unacceptable excuse for his gross negligence in
the performance of his official duties. He must now face the consequences of his decisions
and acts relative to the failed project in violation of the law.
 The substantial compliance rule is defined as "compliance with the essential requirements,
whether of a contract or of a statute." Contrary to petitioner’s submission, his gross
negligence in approving API’s proposal notwithstanding its failure to comply with the
minimum legal requirements prevented the Sangguniang Bayan from properly evaluating
said proponent’s financial and technical capabilities to undertake the BOT project. Such
gross negligence was evident from the taking of shortcuts in the bidding process by
shortening the period for submission of comparative proposals, non-observance of
Investment Coordinating Committee of the National Economic Development Authority
approval for the Wag-wag Shopping Mall Project, publication in a newspaper which is not
of general circulation, and accepting an incomplete proposal from API. These forestalled
a fair opportunity for other interested parties to submit comparative proposals.
Petitioner’s argument that there was substantial compliance with the law thus fails. The
essential requirements of the BOT law were not at all satisfied as in fact they were
sidestepped to favor the lone bidder, API.
 Petitioner was grossly negligent when it glossed over API’s failure to submit specified
documents showing that it was duly licensed or accredited Filipino contractor, and has the
requisite financial capacity and technical expertise or experience, in addition to the
complete proposal which includes a feasibility study and company profile. These
requirements imposed by the BOT law and implementing rules were intended to serve as
competent proof of legal qualifications and therefore constitute the "substantial basis" for
evaluating a project proposal. Petitioner’s theory would allow substitution of less reliable
information as basis for the local government unit’s determination of a contractor’s
financial capability and legal qualifications in utter disregard of what the law says and
consequences prejudicial to the government, which is precisely what the law seeks to
prevent.
 We have held that the Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC
should apply to determine the financial capability of a bidder for pre-qualification
purposes: (i) proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide
a minimum amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable
banks attesting that the project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking
with them, that they are in good financial standing, and that they have adequate resources.
The evident intent of these standards is to protect the integrity and insure the viability of
the project by seeing to it that the proponent has the financial capability to carry it out.
Unfortunately, none of these requirements was submitted by API during the pre-
qualification stage
SC DECISION. WHEREFORE, the present motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with
FINALITY.
NOTES.
RA 7718 - AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6957, ENTITLED “AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE FINANCING, CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
C) Exceptions
1. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere
ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs and usage; and
2. Practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private persons or by any
public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or
occupation during his incumbency except where the practice of such profession, trade or
occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any
violations of said Act (Sec. 14, RA 3019)
 SEC. 3 (G):
GO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Doctrine: Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and,
if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
Facts:
 Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and President
of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement
and the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the
government with Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
 Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he
was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He
further assert that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only
with the offense under Sec3(e).
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA
3019.
Ruling:
 The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private persons.
 Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may
lead thereto.
 Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. In the former, Dans, the public
officer and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section 3(g) of
RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as
a private person, of the said offense.
 The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a
function duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such function cannot be meddled
with by the courts by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference except for compelling
reasons.
2. CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES (R.A. 6713)
DUTY OF PROFESSIONALISM:
SAMSON V. RESTRIVERA
Doctrine: Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is
not a ground for disciplinary action.
ACT PROMPTLY ON LETTERS AND REQUESTS (SEC. 5 (A)):
OMBUDSMAN V. MADRIAGA
Doctrine: Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory within the bounds of law.
FACTS:
1. San Juan School Club through it’s president (Teresa nuque) charged respondents with
violation of sec 1 of Rule 4 and sec 1 of Rule 6 of the IRR of RA 6713 (code of conduct and
ethical standards for public officials and employees
2. After the respndents replied, the the Graft investigation officers (GIO) found them guilty
of sec 5a of RA6713 ((a) Act promptly on letters and requests. – All public officials and
employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to
letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must
contain the action taken on the request (Emphasis supplied).
3. GIO penalized them with 6 months suspension
4. Respondents filed an MR but it was denied. Certiorari to CA questioning the authority of
Ombudsman to impose administrative sanctions over public officials and the nature of the
function of the Ombudsman
5. CA: penalty was merely “RECOMMENDATORY” it having only the power to investigate
possible misconduct of a government official or employee in the performance of his
functions and thereafter recommend to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty
to be meted out and it is the disciplining authority that has the power or prerogative to
Impose the penalty.
ISSUES & RATIO. WON Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over
public officials. YES
 Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides for the power of the petitioner, to
wit; “Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.”
 Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner of the power
to "recommend" the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and
ensure compliance therewith. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge
a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, that the refusal by an officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
said officer;
 In the case of Ledesma v CA: resolving in the negative the issue of whether the
recommendation of the Ombudsman for the suspension of the therein petitioner, who was
found administratively liable in connection with the extension of Temporary Resident Visas
of two foreign nationals, was merely advisory on the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
where petitioner was the Chairman of the First Division of its Board of Special Inquiry, held:
o Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning, that
is, that the Ombudsman's action is only advisory in nature rather than one having
any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman
o For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that
the word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and ensure
compliance therewith." The proper interpretation of the Court's statement
in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine
the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct
and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the
penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of
the Ombudsman's functions and not its jurisdiction.
 o We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate
against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a
cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the
failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the
charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is
unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations,
as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
o The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents' theory. Section 15 is
substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides
for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We draw attention to
subparagraph 3, to wit:
 SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
 (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 of this Act: Provided, that the refusal by an officer without just cause to comply with
an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;(Emphasis
supplied)
o We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee – akin to the
questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause,
of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an
erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong
indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in
nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be
interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of
office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the
Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that
the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which
in this case would be the head of the BID.
o The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the
phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
 In fine, petitioner's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law.
The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through
the proper officer.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, the challenged Court of Appeals Decision of May 28, 2004
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
SWORN STATEMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S ASSETS, LIABILITIES, NET WORTH AND
FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS INTEREST (SALN):
RABE V. FLORES
Doctrine: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply
in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him.
FACTS.
 Rabe charged Flores for conduct unbecoming a government employee, acts prejudicial
to the interest of the service and abuse of authority.
o She alleged that Mrs. Flores took advantage of her position as a court
employee by claiming a stall at the extension of the Public Market when she
is not a member of the association and with full knowledge that the said
area had already been awarded to others.
 The Court issued a resolution and required respondent to explain why she should not
be administratively dealt with for the following:
o She obtained a certificate that she started performing her duties as an
interpreter when she was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor
as Assessment Clerk I
o Not reporting said business interest in her SALN and identification of
relatives in the government service
o Not divesting herself of her interest in said business within 60 days from her
assumption into office
o She indicated in her DTRs that she worked on the days where her Contract
of Lease states that she has to personally conduct her business and be
present at the stall otherwise the contract would be cancelled.
 Flores states that she assumed her job in the RTC in compliance with the directive
from the SC to start working on the said date. She also states that she reported in
advance so she could familiarize herself with the scope of her duties. She also admits
that she had received from the municipality a salary notwithstanding the fact that she
had already transferred to the judiciary.
o She stated that she did not divulge any business interest in her SALN because
she was never engaged in business during said period although she had a
stall in the market.
ISSUES & RATIO. WON Flores is guilty of misconduct by a government employee – YES.
 Respondent’s overriding need for money does not justify receipt of a salary not due her.
Her defense of poverty is not an acceptable excuse for her misconduct. If Respondent was
just driven by dire pecuniary need, she should have returned the salary she had obtained
from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary from the
court. She only returned the money after receiving the Court’s Resolution.
 The Constitution states that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Alhtough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the
judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their
everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times
and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage the public decency.
 Respondent is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business
interests. She admitted it herself that she a stall in the market. She had also been receiving
rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market stall.
 Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee to
submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Section 11 of the same law
 prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof.
Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper
administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public
official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him."
SC DECISION. WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of the Office of the
Court Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa M. Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service with
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with PREJUDICE to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
3. PUNISHING PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE AND FOR
PRIVATE PERSONS TO GIVE GIFTS ON ANY OCCASION INCLUDING
CHRISTMAS (P.D. 46)
MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE, AND FOR
PRIVATE PERSONS TO GIVE, GIFTS ON ANY OCCASION, INCLUDING CHRISTMAS
 WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service rules, it is prohibited to receive, directly
or indirectly, any gift, present or any other form of benefit in the course of official duties;
 WHEREAS, it is believed necessary to put more teeth to existing laws and regulations to
wipe out all conceivable forms of graft and corruption in the public service, the members
of which should not only be honest but above suspicion and reproach; and
 WHEREAS, the stoppage of the practice of gift-giving to government men is a concrete step
in the administration's program of reforms for the development of new moral values in the
social structure of the country, one of the main objectives of the New Society;
 NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and
General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable:
1. for any public official or employee, whether of the national or local
governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons
a. to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other valuable thing to
any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other
valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of
whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or
b. the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in
the future from the public official or employee concerned in the
discharge of his official functions.
c. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainments in honor of the official or employees or his immediate
relatives.
 For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor
more than five (5) years and perpetual disqualification from public office shall be imposed.
The official or employee concerned shall likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary
action and, if found guilty, shall be meted out the penalty of suspension or removal,
depending on the seriousness of the offense.
4. ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. 7080, AS AMENDED)
ESTRADA V. SANIGANBAYAN
Doctrine: It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention
of the lawmakers—who are ordinarily untrained philologists and lexicographers—to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
FACTS.
 On April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
information against Estrada: (Violations of RA 7080, RA 3019, RA 6713 and CA no. 142)
 Petitioner Estrada was the highest ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (Anti-
Plunder Act). He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law
to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because of the ff. grounds:
(a) It suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) It dispenses with the reasonable standard in criminal prosecutions; and
(c) It abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the RPC.
 All of which, according to petitioner, are clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder law is vague? NO.
Argument: Petitioners bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms “combination” and “series in key phrase “a combination or series of overt
criminal acts” found in Sec. 1 par(d) and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overboard and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
Held:
 It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
The intention of the lawmakers—who are ordinarily untrained philologists and
lexicographers—to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Webster’s Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
“combination” and “series”:
 Combination – the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining; to
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
 Series – a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and tempral succession.
 According to the deliberations of RA 7080: When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,”
it is referring to at least 2 acts falling under different categories of enumeration in Sec. 1
par. (d). On the other hand, to constitute “series,” there must be 2 or more overt criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1 par. (d).
 As for pattern, Sandiganbayan correctly interpreted that this term is sufficiently defined
in Sec. 4 of RA 7080 whereby “pattern” consists of at least a combination or series of overt
 or criminal acts enrumerated in subsections 1-6 of Sec. 1(d). The pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public
officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. There must either be an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to achieve said common goal.
 It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder law is more imagined than real.
Ambuguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics.
2. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder law dispenses with the reasonable standard in criminal
prosecutions and hence violates the rights of the accused?
Argument: Petitioner claims that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts
constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal
acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Held:
 According to the deliberations of the statute, the legislature did not in any manner
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still
remains with the prosection to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
 The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a numver of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50M. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme to acquire ill-gotten wealth.
3. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder law is malum prohibitum therefore mens rea is not
required? NO.
Held:
 The court adopted the concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. The rationale behind this is precisely because
the constitutive crimes are mala in se the elements of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime was commited “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” which thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of the petitioner.
SC= DECISION. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
a) Definition of terms
Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term -
a. Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or
contract.
b. Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
c. Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates
otherwise.
d. Ill-gotten wealth.
b) Ill-gotten wealth
Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned
or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
c) Plunder
Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.
Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
1. amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series
of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
2. shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death.
Note: Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense.
Note: In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court.
Note: The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes b) Nature of proceedings
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
CABAL V. KAPUNAN
d) Series/Combination
Doctrine: As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal,
e) Pattern and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.
Combination Series Pattern
Combination refers to at Series refers to at Pattern refers to every overt or
least two different acts in least 3 overt acts criminal acts indicative of the overall PLUNDER DOES NOT SUBSUME FORFEITURE:
the above enumeration. covered by the unlawful scheme or conspiracy for
enumeration. purposes of establishing the crime of GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
plunder.
Note: It is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused to commit Doctrine: A forfeiture case under Republic ActNo. 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate
the crime of plunder. It is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder absorbs
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (Sec. 4, RA 7080). the forfeiture case.
Note: The said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the
FACTS.
allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as allegations charging
separate criminal offenses punished under the RPC, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
 This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife of retired Major Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, with
and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It bears
application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan
stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes
denying the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193
separate and independent of the crime of plunder (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148468, January 28, 2003).  To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that retired Major General Garcia and
his family had amassed, the Ombusdman pursuant to RA 1379 fled with the Sandiganbayan a
petition for forfeiture of properties- civil case 0193 (forfeiture case 1)
 The ombudsman charged Garcia with violation of RRA 7080 (plunder) criminal case 28107.
f) Evidence necessary
Information was filed with the SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same
properties as in forfeiture case 1 and 2
Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
 forfeiture case 2 was later filed to recover funds and properties with the Sandinganbayan
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the (civil case 0196)
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to  Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall the plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated pursuant to RA 8249.
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.  On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture
case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
5. FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE criminal case of plunder.
BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE  Petitioner argues that the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4thDivision of jurisdiction
over the forfeiture case and that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible
(R.A. 1379) double jeopardy entanglement - denied
 Petitioner, the wife of maj gen Garcia, now then filed these two petitions for certiorari
a) Property subject to forfeiture claiming that.
1. the [SB] has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture 1 upon the
filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture
"Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities of the subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any
which the respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by conviction for plunder.
gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income 2. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by
thereof) already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or the the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include: 3. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal
conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.
4. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being
matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible
recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants,
double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions
relatives, or any other person.
of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person
or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.
3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the ISSUES & RATIO. WON plunder case absorbed the forfeiture cases- NO.
satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.

 Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against
the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case
(Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction,
ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases.
The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner
claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions.
Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the
SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions
and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
 Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the
assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are
the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. The civil liability for
forfeiture cases does not arise from the comision of a criminal offense as such liability is
based on a statute that safeguards the right of the tsate to recover unlawfully acquired
peoperties.
 Secondly, a forefeiture ase under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and
different from a plunder case. Thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charges
in case 28107 absorbs the forefeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to
be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of
ill gotten wealth. On the other hand, all the court needs to determine, by preponderance
of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate
income, it being unecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly
formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the
provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D.
Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are
VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
NOTES.
Ruled in favor of Garcia because court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
Ruling on Jurisdiction:
However on the matter on Jurisdiction over the person of Clarita Garcia and his sons the court
said that the 4th division of SB did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no valid
substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of
petitioner and her children for the reason that there was also no voluntary appearance since
they questioned the jurisdiction of the 4th division of SB through their motion to dismiss and
quashal for lack of jurisdiction into their person . And perforce, the proceedings in the subject
forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided
insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed
against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the
petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
c) Procedure for forfeiture
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal
who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and
shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has
been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file,
in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of
the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for
a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any
part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall
be filed within one year before any general election or within three months before any special
election.
The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or
employment in the Government or in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not
be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however, That the right to file such petition
shall prescribe after four years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or
expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except as to those who have ceased
to hold office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings
shall prescribe after four years from the approval hereof.
Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following information:
(a) The name and address of the respondent.
(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or
employment which he has previously held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his
past and present offices and employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor
General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes
from legitimately acquired property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the
respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.
Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within
which to present his answer.
Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public,
and during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction
of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.
Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that
he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property,
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall
become property of the State: Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months
before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may,
in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or
criminal action, or both.
Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance as
provided in the Rules of Court for appeals in civil cases.
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND ASISTIO
Doctrine: In cases of unlawfully acquired wealth amassed before February 25, 1986, as is the
situation obtaining in the case at bar, it is the Solicitor General who should file the petition for
forfeiture. The reason is manifestly supplied by an analysis of the interplay of antecedent
legislation.
Facts:
 Messrs. Arnel Blancaflor and Rodolfo Santos charged Macario Asistio, incumebt Mayor of
Kalookan, with having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act RA 3019 Section 8
 Asistio acquired wealth of amounts of a combined P17,264,722.90 and deposited in his
personal bank account.
 In Asistio’s sworn statement of assests and liabilities for December 1982 to December 1984
he had a total income of P234,128.68 and P 255.324.02
 The Preliminary Investigation was conducted by Special Prosecution Officer finding that
the total combined family income of respondent Asistio for the years 1981, 1982, 1983 and
1984, amounting only to P489,452.70, is manifestly out of proportion to the totality of his
bank deposits in the total amount of P14,184,337.16
 Ombudsman, therefore, finds that a violation of Republic Act 1379 and/or Section 8 of
Republic Act 3019 has been committed and that Asistio is 'probably guilty’
 SOLGEN filed a Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan
 Petition dismissed based on:
 The Office of the Tanodbayan (Now Ombudsman) have the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file information
therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of the said cases. (Sec. .77, PD 1630.)
 The provisions of the Decree notwithstanding, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue
to have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file the necessary
information, and direct and control the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 1606, whether such cases be within the exclusive
original/appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630. (Sec. 3, PD 1861, attending
PD 1606.)
 Petition is hereby DISMISSED but without prejudice to the refiling of another petition by
the Ombudsman.
Issue: WON the SOLGEN has authority to file a Petition for forfeiture?
Held: Yes.
 In the case at bar, the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent was supposed to have
been acquired from 1981 to 1983. Verily, the Ombudsman, like the Special Prosecutor, is
without authority to initiate and file the petition for forfeiture against respondent Asistio.
 In cases of unlawfully acquired wealth amassed before February 25, 1986, as is the situation
obtaining in the case at bar, it is the Solicitor General who should file the petition for
forfeiture. The reason is manifestly supplied by an analysis of the interplay of antecedent
legislation.
 Before the creation of the Sandiganbayan, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized
to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then court of first instance of the city or
province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Section
2 of Republic Act No. 13798 which reads:
o See. 2. Filing of petition.—Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion to s salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall
be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor
General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall
conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases
and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to
believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where
said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ
commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid,
or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: ... .
 It will be recalled that when Presidential Decree No. 1486 was issued on June 11, 1981
it vested in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings provided for
under Republic Act No. 1379, Section 12 of the same decree gave the Chief Special
Prosecutor the authority to prosecute forfeiture cases. This should be taken as merely
an implied repeal by Presidential Decree No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former
courts of first instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for
forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction
and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.
 Presidential Decree No. 1486 was promulgated on June 11, 1978 providing for the
creation of the Sandiganbayan and vesting it, under Section 4 thereof, with
original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide, among others:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations in relation to their office;
Provided, that in case private individuals are accused as principals, accomplices or
accessories in the commission of the crimes hereinabove mentioned, they shall be
tried jointly with the public officers or employees concerned.
(d) Civil suits brought in connection with the aforementioned crimes for restitution or
reparation of damages, recovery of the instruments and effects of the crimes, or
forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379; (PETITION FOR
FORFEUTIRE IS CIVIL IN NATURE)
(e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code.
 The repeal of Presidential Decree No. 1486 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor
General to file a petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379
 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 13798 which reads:
o See. 2. Filing of petition.—Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion to s salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall
be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor
General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall
conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases
and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to
 believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where
said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ
commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid,
or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: ... .
DUE PROCESS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS:
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND MARCOS
Doctrine: Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would
have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for
forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the
witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised
in the Marcoses' answer were false.
“GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS LAWFUL INCOME”:
BUGARIN V. REPUBLIC
Doctrine: When the government, through the PCGG, filed forfeiture proceedings against
Bugarin, it took on the burden of proving the following: 1. The public official or employee
acquired personal or real properties during his/her incumbency; 2. This acquisition is manifestly
disproportionate to his/her salary or other legitimate income; and 3. The existence of which
gives rise to a presumption that these same properties were acquired prima facie unlawfully.
After the government had established these, the burden to debunk the presumption was shifted
to Bugarin. He had to explain and adequately show that his acquisitions, even though they might
appear disproportionate, were nonetheless lawfully acquired.
FACTS.
 The late Bugarin was the Director of NBI when late Ferdinand Marcos was still the President
from 1965-1986.
 After the downfall of Marcos, the new administration through the PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture of properties under RA 1379 against Bugarin with the Sandiganbayan. The latter
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
 PCGG sought a review of the dismissal. The Court found Bugarin to have amassed wealth
totaling P2.1M from 1968 to 1980 against his total income for the period 1967 to 1980
totaling only P766,548.00. With this, the Court held that Bugarin’s properties, which
were visibly out of proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to 1980, should be forfeited
in favor of the government.
 The case was remanded to the Sndiganbayan for proper determination of properties to be
forfeited in favor of the Republic.
 Bugarin moved for reconsideration and while his motion was pending, he passed away so his
heirs moved to have the case dismissed. Likewise, the petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the order of the SC arguing that the Sandiganbayan could not determine
the properties to be forfeited on its own, and further prayed that the parties be allowed to
present evidence to determine what properties of Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.
 Finally, the Sandiganbayan issued its assailed Resolution ordering the forfeiture of certain
properties of Bugarin.
 Residential house and lot in Dasma Village, Makati
 Nine residential lots in Tagaytay City
 Residential lots in Greenhills, QC, Pasig City, Mindoro
 Condo unit in Baguio City
 Orchard and Cocoland in Mindoro
 Other investments in Makati Sports Club, Manila Polo Club, Phil. Columbian Club and
Baguio Country Club = TOTAL: PHP 1, 395,543.00
ISSUES & RATIO. Whether the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan was in accordance with
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Republic case. YES
 Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as well as in the body of the Republic decision,
that the properties listed by this Court were all candidates for forfeiture. At that point, no
additional proof or evidence was required. All that was needed was for the Sandiganbayan,
as the court of origin, to make sure that the aggregate sum of the acquisition costs of the
properties chosen remained within the amount which was disproportionate to the income
of Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director. To reiterate, the case was only remanded to
the Sandiganbayan to implement the Court’s ruling in the Republic case. To grant the
petition and order the Sandiganbayan to receive evidence once again would be tantamount
to resurrecting the long-settled disposition in the Republic case. This cannot be permitted.
 It is equally clear in the earlier fallo of the Republic that this Court had already made a
determination, nay, a declaration that the properties of the late Bugarin acquired from
1968 to 1980 which were disproportionate to his lawful income were ordered forfeited in
favor of the State. Following Section 6 of R.A. No. 1379, this means that the late Bugarin,
now being represented by the petitioners, failed to convince the Court that the delimited
list of properties were lawfully acquired. With this failure, the said properties have been
ordered forfeited to the extent or up to that which is disproportionate to his lawful or
disposable income which was likewise determined by the Court in that case.
 The properties, consisting of real and other investments, acquired within the subject
period were identified and listed down in the case of Republic. Both the acquisition dates
which were likewise indicated there were reckoned. Still in Republic, the lawful income of
Bugarin during the same period was also determined by the Court based on his very own
“Exhibit ‘38’ ” minus that tempered amount representing his as well as his family’s
personal expenses. Therefore, when the case was returned to the Sandiganbayan, it was
not, as petitioners ardently claim—to conduct another full blown trial or proceeding to
determine or establish the very same things that this Court had long decided in Republic.
Rather, it was to choose from among the Court’s identified and declared reduced list of
properties that would approximate the amount which was beyond or out of proportion to
Bugarin’s lawful income also identified and declared by the High Tribunal in the same case.
SC DECISION. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated
April 3, 2006 and August 30, 2006, implementing the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, are hereby AFFIRMED.
6. HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 (R.A. 9372)
a) Failure to deliver suspect to proper judicial authority
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within Three
Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested,
detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the
proper judicial authority within the period of three days.
b) Infidelity in the custody of detained persons
SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who has direct
custody of a detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act,
misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall
be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to
twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has already been convicted and
sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve
(12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a
final judgment of a competent court.
c) False prosecution
SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material Fact in
Joint Affidavits. - Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in
the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute
a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one
day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious Evidence. -
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious
evidence in any investigation or hearing under this Act.
SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted under a provision
of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense
or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act.
7. ANTI-RED TAPE ACT OF 2007 (R.A. 9485)
a) Prohibited acts
SEC. 11. Violations. - After compliance with the substantive and procedural due process, the
following shall constitute violations of this Act together with their corresponding penalties:
(a) Light Offense –
(1) Refusal to accept application and/or request within the prescribed period
or any document being submitted by a client;
(2) Failure to act on an application and/or request or failure to refer back to
the client a request which cannot be acted upon due to lack of
requirement/s within the prescribed period;
(3) Failure to attend to clients who are within the premises of the office or
agency concerned prior to the end of official working hours and during
lunch
(4) Failure to render frontline services within the prescribed period on any
application and/or request without due cause;
(5) Failure to give the client a written notice on the disapproval of an
application or request; and
(6) Imposition of additional irrelevant requirements other than those listed in
the first notice.
Penalties for light offense shall be as follows:
1. First Offense - Thirty (30) days suspension without pay and mandatory
attendance in Values Orientation Program;
2. Second Offense - Three (3) months suspension without pay; and
3. Third Offense - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public
service.
(b) Grave Offense - Fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of economic
and/or other gain or advantage.
Penalty - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to promote
integrity, accountability, proper management of public affairs and public property as well as to
establish effective practices aimed at the prevention of graft and corruption in government.
Towards this end, the State shall maintain honesty and responsibility among its public officials
and employees, and shall take appropriate measures to promote transparency in each agency
with regard to the manner of transacting with the public, which shall encompass a program for
the adoption of simplified procedures that will reduce red tape and expedite transactions in
government.
SEC. 3. Coverage. - This Act shall apply to all government offices and agencies including local
government units and government-owned or -controlled corporations that provide frontline
services as defined in this Act. Those performing judicial, quasi-judicial and legislative functions
are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
X. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS:
1. ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004
(R.A. 9262)
GARCIA V. DRILON
Doctrine: Republic Act No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children)
defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated
by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. The law provides
for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further
acts of VAWC.
Facts:
 Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her 3 minor children, a verified
petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to RA 9262.
 Rosalie alleged that during the marriage, her husband admitted to an ongoing affair with
a bank manager. The infidelity spawned a series of fights that left her physically and
emotionally wounded and the children traumatized.
 In one of their quarrels, Jesus grabbed Rosalie on both arms and shook her with such force
that caused bruises and hematoma. Jesus sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-
Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for
squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
 Rosalie is decided to leave Jesus but she is afraid that he would take her children from her
and deprive her of financial support. Jesus had previously warned her that if she goes on a
legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.
 The RTC initially issued a Temporary Protection Order effective for 30 days which was
repeatedly renewed. Notwithstanding the TPO, the husband allegedly failed to give them
financial support and continued to commit new acts of harassment. The TPO was extended
for another ten days, and gave Jesus a period of five days within which to show cause why
the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified.
 Upon appeal to the CA, Jesus assailed the constitutionality R.A. 9262 of as being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power
to barangay officials.
Issue 1 & Held: Whether or not the family courts have jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute – YES
 Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts (RTC). The
Supreme Court designate the Family Courts from among the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts. The designated Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children.
 In spite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether
civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization,
admiralty or insolvency
 RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute. The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in the Supreme Court, but in all RTCs.
Issue 2 & Held: Whether or not Jesus raised the issue of constitutionality at the earliest possible
time. – NO
 Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file
an Opposition to the petition and not an answer. The rule prescribes that the opposition
shall exclude any counterclaim, cross-claim and/or third-party complaint but these may
be raised in a separate action.
 Since the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject
of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complain, then it is not prohibited from
being raised in the Opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
 That the proceedings are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from
raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute
is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.
Issue 3 & Held: Whether or not a TRO may be issued against a TPO. – NO
 Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for
certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the Court of Appeal against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper.
 The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve
the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. However, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts
of violence. To issue an injunction against such protection orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against VAWC.
Issue 4 & Held: Whether or not RA 9262 violates the equal protection clause. - NO
 The deliberations of Congress reveals that the lawmakers intended to limit the protection
against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only, and to exclude
men from the protection under the said measure.
 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application
of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
 The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be (1) based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; (2) that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) that it must apply equally to each member of
the class.
 While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot render RA 9262 invalid. The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
 RA 9262 did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
(a) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions-- The “gender-based violence” or the
unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for real differencesjustifying the
classification under the law.
(b) Classification is germane to the purpose of the law – the distinction between men
and women is germane to the purpose of the law which is to address violence
committed against women and children
(c) RA 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but
to future conditions as well.
(d) The law applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse
Issue 5 & Held: Whether or not RA 9262 is void for vagueness. - NO
 The “void for vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as
 the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions.
 There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its
meaning nor differ in its application.
Issue 6 & Held: Whether or not RA 9262 single out male husbands – NO
 There is no merit to the contention that RA 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships.
 Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code, allowing liability
to extend even to parents-in-laws (see Go-Tan vs Spouses Tan).
Issue 7 & Held: Whether or not the grant of a TPO ex parte is violative of due process – NO
 Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when
the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
 There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte
order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to
attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
 The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Notably, when
the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service.
a) Punishable acts
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited
to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of
custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or
her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.
b) Remedies
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section
5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order
serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in
the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently
regain control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law
enforcement agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay
protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order
(PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless
of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the
residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household
member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school,
place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any
designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement
officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the
petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential
personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to
legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly
by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon
and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court,
including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess
a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender
to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the
offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited
to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide
for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided
petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree
of legal separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner
from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.
PAVLOW V. MENDENILLA
Doctrine: The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is
expressly given personality by Section 9(b) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (the Anti-VAWC Law), to file a civil
action petitioning for the issuance of a protection order for her child. In filing such a petition,
she avails of a remedy that is distinct from the criminal action under Section 5 of the same law.
Section 9. Who May File Petition for Protection Orders. - A petition for protection order may
be filed by any of the following: (a) the offended party; (b) parents or guardians of the
offended party; (c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity; (d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local
government units (LGUs); (e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's
desks; (f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad; (g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare
provider of the petitioner; (h) at least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or
municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred and who has
personal knowledge of the offense committed. (Emphasis supplied)
FACTS.
 Pavlow is an American citizen and President of Quality Long Term Care of Nevada, Inc.,
married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in civil rites in Quezon City and since then, they cohabited
as husband and wife.
 Barely 3 months into their marriage, Maria filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Pavlow for
slight physical injuries and late on filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include
maltreatment in relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground.
o She alleged that they had several fights over a certain Diane, an employee
of the Manila Peninsula Hotel and who was allegedly liked Pavlow and was
sending him text messages and e-mails.
o That, they quarrelled over their loss of privacy and the intrusion into their
affairs of the same employees.
o That, Pavlow hit her in the stomach and shouted at her when he knew that
she had been telling her mother, herein respondent Mendenilla, about her
marital experiences with Pavlow.
o That, Pavlow had been compelling her every night to take 2 small white
tablets, which made her feel dizzy and if she refuses to do sim she will be
maltreated.
 Makati Assistant City Prosecutor Romel S. Odronia (Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia)
issued a resolution dismissing Maria’s criminal complaint for failing to substantiate her
allegations.
RTC: At Mendenilla’s instance, Maria’s mother, she filed before the RTC of QC a petition for
the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) under
the Anti-VAWC Law.
o Mendenilla recalled the same ordeal Maria had told her and further alleged
that Maria was even confined to St. Agnes General Hospital for injuries
borne by Pavlow's alleged acts of violence.
o Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of Maria
with Summons addressed to Pavlow.
o According to the Sheriff, Pavlow was out of the country when summons was
served. Instead, he served it to his employee.
o Pavlow filed an Omnibus Motions praying for the dismissal of Mendenilla's
petition, the reconsideration of the issuance of the TPO, and the suspension
of the enforcement of the TPO. He raised as principal ground the RTC’s
supposed lack of jurisdiction over his person as summons was purportedly
not properly served on him.
o Judge Giron-Dizon denied Pavlow’s motion and held that substituted service
of summons sufficed since the case filed by Mendenilla was an action in
personam because Pavlow was out of the country during the service of
summons.
o Pavlow appealed via Petition for Certiorari and alleged:
o that Judge Giron-Dizon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to dismiss Mendenilla's Petition despite the alleged
improper service of summons on him;
o Mendenilla lacked personality to file her Petition and;
o Mendenilla’s filing of a petition only after Assistant City
Prosecutor Odronia dismissed Maria Sheila's criminal complaint
was considered forum shopping.
CA: Dismissed Pavlow’s petition.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. Whether Mendenilla had personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order
under Sec. 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter, Maria. (YES)
 RA No. 9262 specifies 3 distinct remedies available to victims of acts of "violence
against women and their children": 1. criminal complaint; 2. civil action for damages;
and civil action for the issuance of a protection order.
 A petition for the issuance of protection order is not limited to the alleged victim, Maria.
Mendenilla, the mother, is explicitly given the capacity to apply for a protection order for
the benefit of her child. By this clear statutory provision, Mendenilla had the requisite
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order in favor of Maria.
2. Whether Mendenilla engaged in forum shopping by filing a petition for the issuance of a
protection order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was dismissed by the
prosecutor. (NO)
 The word used by Section 8 is "suspend." To suspend is to momentarily, temporarily, or
provisionally hold in abeyance. It is not to perpetually negate, absolutely cancel, or
otherwise obliterate. The right of persons other than the victim to file a petition for the
issuance of a protection order therefore persists; albeit, they may not exercise such right
for as long as the petition filed by the victim subsists.
 Mendenilla's petition for the issuance of a protection order was filed with the RTC-QC after
the Ass. Prosecutor had already dismissed Maria’s complaint for slight physical injuries and
maltreatment under the Anti-VAWC Law. More so, there was not even a prior judicial
proceeding which could lead to the issuance of a protection order. The criminal action in
which Maria Sheila would have been deemed to have impliedly instituted her own petition
for the issuance of a protection order did not even commence.
3. Whether summons was properly served on Pavlow and jurisdiction over his person was validly
acquired. (YES)
 Pavlow, though an American citizen, was admittedly a resident of the Philippines as of the
date when Deputy Sheriff Velasco attempted to personally serve summons on him.Since he
was not in the Philippines, at the time summons was personally served to him, this impelled
the sheriff to make a substituted service of summons through his employee.
 Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to if, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be [personally] served within a reasonable time. The
exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how, by the convenience
of Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service was rendered impossible. This
case pertains to alleged acts of violence against a woman. Pavlow was alleged to have
physically and psychologically assaulted his wife, Maria, on multiple occasions. The totality
of these entails an urgency which, by statute, justifies the issuance of a temporary
protection order even as the respondent to Mendenilla's petition was yet to be heard.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 17, 2007 Decision and
January 25, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94540 are AFFIRMED.
2. ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009 (R.A. 9775)
a) Definition of terms
(a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully
take care of himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:
(1) a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as
defined herein; and
(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a
person who is represented or who is made to appear to be a child as defined
herein.
(b) "Child pornography" refers to any representation, whether visual, audio, or written
combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means, of child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.
(c) "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or simulated -
(1) As to form:
(i) sexual intercourse or lascivious act including, but not limited to, contact
involving genital to genital, oral to genital, anal to genital, or oral to anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(2) bestiality;
(3) masturbation;
(4) sadistic or masochistic abuse;
(5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus;
or
(6) use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts
(d) "Internet address" refers to a website, bulletin board service, internet chat room or news
group, or any other internet or shared network protocol address.
(e) "Internet cafe or kiosk" refers to an establishment that offers or proposes to offer
services to the public for the use of its computer/s or computer system for the purpose
of accessing the internet, computer games or related services.
(f) "Internet content host" refers to a person who hosts or who proposes to host internet
content in the Philippines.
(g) "Internet service provider (ISP)" refers to a person or entity that supplies or proposes to
supply, an internet carriage service to the public.
(h) "Grooming" refers to the act of preparing a child or someone who the offender believes to
be a child for sexual activity or sexual relationship by communicating any form of child
pornography. It includes online enticement or enticement through any other means.
(i) "Luring" refers to the act of communicating, by means of a computer system, with a child
or someone who the offender believes to be a child for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of sexual activity or production of any form of child pornography.(2)
Bestiality;
(j) "Pandering" refers to the act of offering, advertising, promoting, representing or
distributing through any means any material or purported material that is intended to
cause another to believe that the material or purported material contains any form of
child pornography, regardless of the actual content of the material or purported
material.
(k) "Person" refers to any natural or juridical entity.
b) Unlawful or punishable acts
Section 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person:
(a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in the creation or
production of any form of child pornography;
(b) To produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of child pornography;
(c) To publish offer, transmit, sell, distribute, broadcast, advertise, promote, export or
import any form of child pornography;
(d) To possess any form of child pornography with the intent to sell, distribute, publish, or
broadcast: Provided. That possession of three (3) or more articles of child pornography of
the same form shall be prima facie evidence of the intent to sell, distribute, publish or
broadcast;
(e) To knowingly, willfully and intentionally provide a venue for the commission of
prohibited acts as, but not limited to, dens, private rooms, cubicles, cinemas, houses or
in establishments purporting to be a legitimate business;
(f) For film distributors, theaters and telecommunication companies, by themselves or in
cooperation with other entities, to distribute any form of child pornography;
(g) For a parent, legal guardian or person having custody or control of a child to knowingly
permit the child to engage, participate or assist in any form of child pornography;
(h) To engage in the luring or grooming of a child;
(i) To engage in pandering of any form of child pornography;
(j) To willfully access any form of child pornography;
(k) To conspire to commit any of the prohibited acts stated in this section. Conspiracy to
commit any form of child pornography shall be committed when two (2) or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of any of the said prohibited acts and
decide to commit it; and
(l) To possess any form of child pornography.
3. Anti-Hazing Law (R.A. 8049)
VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE
Doctrine: Intent to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot and should not be inferred, unless there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have
been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the
act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
FACTS.
1. On Feb. 10, 1991, Leonardo “Lenny” Villa died due to hazing by the Aquila Legis
fraternity.
2. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide were filed against 35 Aquilans.
3. Trial Court rendered judgment holding 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Art. 249 of the RPC.
4. CA however set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation.
a. 19 of the accused-appellants (Victoriano, et al) – acquitted
b. 4 of the accused-appellants (Tecson, et al) – slight physical injuries
c. 2 of the accused-appellants (Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal) -
Homicide
5. Before the Court are the consolidated cases (1) Villareal v. People, (2) People v. CA,
(3) Dizon v. People, and (4) Villa v. Escalona.
Villareal v. People
6. Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under R45. It raises two reversible errors,
allegedly committed by the CA:
a. Denial of due process
b. Conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.
7. While this petition was pending, Villareal died, therefore Petition does not survive
death of the accused. Extinguished.
Dizon v. People
8. Petition for Certiorari under R45 questioning the CA decision:
a. He was denied due process when the CA sustained the TC’s forfeiture of his
right to present evidence;
i. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993
hearing should have been considered justified, since his original
pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8
September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He
posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates
assigned to him.
ii. He argues that his right should not have been considered waived
because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues
that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and
in fact insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the
original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing
date.
b. He was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same
“ratio decidendi” that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not
tainted by evil motives.
c. Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that “the
individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in
Lenny’s death.
People v. CA
9. Petition for Certiorari under R45. Seeks the reversal of the CA decision, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victoriano, et. al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson, et. al.) of the lesser
crime of slight physical injuries.
10. Petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch
as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are
criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. The said article provides: “Criminal liability shall be incurred...
[b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.”
11. Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to
the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the
trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the
accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the
crime.
Villa v. Escalona
12. Petition for Certiorari which involves the dismissal of criminal charge against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
13. Due to “several pending incidents,” the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and
Cabangon to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused shall have
terminated. TC found 26 accused guilty.
 14. For “various reasons,” the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March
2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
15. Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused
failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also
points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records
and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate
court.
ISSUES & RATIO.
Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process; - YES
1. Article III, Section 14(2) provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel.” This constitutional right includes the right
to present evidence in one’s defense.
2. In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, the S.C. held that “Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and
Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s nonappearance during the 22
June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only
and not for the succeeding trial dates.”
3. Therefore, the failure of petitioner (Dizon) to present evidence on August 25, 1993 was
merely a waiver of his right to present evidence on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates, since counsel for another accused – General – had made a last-
minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates and since
Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. Additionally, stripping all the pre-
assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the right to due process.
4. Nevertheless, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence does not vacate a finding
of guilt in the criminal case. So the guilty verdict may be upheld if the judgement is
supported beyond any reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial; - NO
1. The right of the accused to the speedy trial has been enshrined in Section 4(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial or when a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable
motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than
a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
of the case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also
to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of
the right and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
2. Based on the case of Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of
the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since arraignment o the accused amount to an
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused
to a speedy disposition of cases.
3. In this case, CA’s dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial does not amount to grave
abuse of discretion. An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that
for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the trial court
and the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time.
4. On 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On 29
November 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.
5. The unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since
the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated
the liability of each accused according to individual participation; - YES
1. According to Section 21, Article III of the Constitution, “No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”
2. The rule on double jeopardy dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and
the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an
identical offense. The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
3. However, the state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the
imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions:
a. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;
b. Where there is a finding of mistrial; or
c. Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. Such instance refers to Court’s
judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
4. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a
person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction
of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to
automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
5. The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries – punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies – is
therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and
legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework
governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. These two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for
physical injuries when actual death occurs.
6. Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings.
Considering that the CA found that the “physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was]
serious in nature,” it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony. The criminal responsibility should redound
to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical
injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac
 arrest. Accordingly, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for
slight physical injuries.
Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and – YES
1. The CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill is not sustainable. Animus
interficendi (intent to kill) cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the
product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence
– the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide. Thus, none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
Instead, there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
2. In this case, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were “baseless,”
since the statements of the accused were “just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes”; that “there is no element of truth
in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez”; and that the “harsh words uttered by Petitioner
and Villareal are part of ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members
during their initiation rites.”
3. As to the existence of animus interficendi (intent to kill) on the part of Dizon, the latter’s
way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at
the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could “justify” giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even
one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up. Thus,
without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be
taken within the context of the fraternity’s psychological initiation. It was not even
established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each
other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon’s threats.
4. Thus, Dizon is not guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the
basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Instead, the finding
of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the
specific intent to kill Lenny Villa should be adopted and reinstated.
5. The absence of the malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal
Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack
of foresight or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence consits of a voluntary act
done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the
person committing it.
6. Reckless imprudence or negligence can be attributed to a voluntary act done without
malice, from which an immediate injury results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person committing it.
7. Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that
8. organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.
Thus, the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI
medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
9. The finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. As to accused Villareal,
his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries. – YES
1. Certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that
the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.
2. Considering that the CA found that the physical punishment heaped on the victim were
serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability of
Tecson et al. to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony. Accordingly, the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
3. The CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug were liable merely for
slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of facts. According to the court,
the accused were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then adopted the NBI medico-legal
officer’s findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was the “multiple
traumatic injuries” he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA found that
the “physical punishment heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature”, it was patently
erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a
light felony.
4. According to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its results is different from intended.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in
G.R. No. 154954—finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries—is also MODIFIED and set aside in
part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to
pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate
of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal
case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
a) Hazing
(1) Definition
 b. The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or
Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or same from occurring (Sec. 4, RA 8049).
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or c) Punishable acts
psychological suffering or injury.
1. Hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or organization
(2) Allowed initiation rites without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization 7 days
before the conduct of such initiation; and
(1) Those conducted by “organizations” which shall include any club or the AFP, PNP, 2. Infliction of any physical violence during initiation rites.
PMA, or officer and cadet corp. of the Citizen's Military Training and CAT. The
Note: The maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in any of the following instances:
physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective (a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or
regular members of the AFP and the PNP as approved by the Secretary of National deceit on the person of the recruit who refuses to join;
Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, (b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning
AFP and the Director General of the PNP. that hazing will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from
(2) Those conducted by any fraternity, sorority or organization with prior written notice
reporting the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school
to the school authorities or head of organization 7 days before the conduct of such authorities, or to the police authorities, through force, violence, threat or
initiation (Sec. 1, RA 8049). intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or
PROCEDURES TO BE TAKEN FOR ALLOWED AN INITIATION
(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.
1. Written notice must be given to the school authorities or head of organization seven (7)
d) Exceptions
days prior to the conduct of initiation.
2. The written notice must indicate:
The fraternity, sorority or the organization should be one which is recognized by law, the school
(a) That the period of initiation activities will not exceed three (3) days,
or university for the Anti-Hazing Law to be applicable. If the organization is neither recognized
(b) The names of those to be subjected to such activities, and
by law nor formed for legal purposes, there is no hazing even if the applicant is tortured or
(c) An undertaking that no physical violence be employed
injured as requirement for admission. The formation of the organization or association for an
3. Two (2) representatives of the school or organization must be assigned to be present during
illegal purpose is a crime in itself.
the initiation; they shall ensure that no physical harm will be inflicted (Sec. 2, RA 8049).
e) Praeter intentionem inapplicable
b) Who are liable
Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
1. The following are liable as PRINCIPAL:
that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
a. The officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm;
b. The parents of the officer or member of the fraternity, sorority or organization,
when they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their home but
4. Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring; and
c. The officers, former officers or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or Discrimination Act (R.A. 7610, as amended)
sorority who actually planned the hazing although not present when the acts
constituting hazing were committed (Sec. 4, RA 8049).
a) Coverage - Sec. 3 (a)
Note: The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation therein as principal, UNLESS he prevented the commission of the acts
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
punishable therein.
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
2. The following are liable as ACCOMPLICE:
a. The owner of the place where the hazing is conducted, when he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to b) Child abuse - Sec. 3 (b)
prevent the same from occurring; and

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
 (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
LUCIDO V. PEOPLE
Doctrine: Prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child
exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts. The element of resulting prejudice
to the child's development cannot be interpreted as a qualifying condition to the other acts of
child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation.
FACTS.
 Lucido was charged with child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
 Lucido, through counsel, offered to plead guilty to the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code or Violation of Article 59, paragraph 8
of Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. However, it was not
accepted by the complaining witnesses and the prosecution. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
 AAA was placed by her parents in the custody of their neighbor Lucido, alias Tonyay. The
arrangement was made upon the request of Lucido that AAA stay with her since she was
living alone. AAA was eight (8) years old at that time.
 During AAA's stay with Lucido, the child suffered repeated physical abuse in the latter's
hands, which included strangulation, beating, pinching, and touching of her sex organ by
Lucido. AAA was also threatened by Lucido that she would be stabbed if she tells anyone
about what was being done to her.
 One of Lucido's neighbors, Hinampas, noticed the abrasions on AAA's neck and observed
that she was limping as she walked. The child then related that she was choked and beaten
on her leg by Lucido. AAA's parents learned of her plight, prompting FFF to go to Lucido's
residence and take AAA back with the help of a barangay tanod.
 RTC convicted Lucido for child abuse. CA affirmed.”Tonyay" is hereby sentenced to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum
 Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to prove "that the physical injuries inflicted
on the child had prejudiced the child's development so as to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being." She cites the absence of an
expert opinion validating scientifically that the acts complained of proximately caused the
"prejudice inflicted upon the child's development."
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining her conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt- NO
The issues submitted by petitioner—the prosecution's failure to prove that the abuse suffered
by the victim had prejudiced her normal development and want of credibility of the prosecution
witnesses—are fundamentally factual. However, this Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, "only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Even if this Court disregards this infirmity, the petition still fails to impress. It is a fact that
when the incident happened, the victim was a child entitled to the protection extended by
Republic Act No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. Thus, petitioner was properly charged
and found guilty of violating Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, which reads:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article I, Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse as the maltreatment of a
child, whether habitual or not, including any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment; X X X X
As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is habitual or
not. Petitioner's acts fall squarely within this definition. AAA testified on the physical abuse she
suffered in the hands of petitioner. The Regional Trial Court described her narration of the facts
to be in "a straightforward, credible and spontaneous manner which could not be defeated by
the denial of the accused." From the appearance of the victim, the trial court likewise observed
physical evidence of the abuses and ill-treatment inflicted by the petitioner on AAA aside from
the victim's psychological displacement. A child witness like AAA, who spoke in a clear, positive,
and convincing manner and remained consistent on cross-examination, is a credible witness.
2. Whether the the prosecution failed to prove that the acts complained of were prejudicial
to the victim's development. - NO
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e.
(a) child abuse,
(b) child cruelty,
(c) child exploitation, and
(d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the element that the acts must be prejudicial to
the child's development pertains only to the fourth offense.
Instructive is Amanita vs. People:
The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child
abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another
and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, an
accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts
of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child
because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Contrary to the proposition of the appellant, the prosecution need not prove that the acts of
child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child
because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
The element of resulting prejudice to the child's development cannot be interpreted as a
qualifying condition to the other acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation.
Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year-old child to cause her to limp
are intrinsically cruel and excessive. These acts of abuse impair the child's dignity and worth as
a human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and harmonious
place. It is not difficult to perceive that this experience of repeated physical abuse from
petitioner would prejudice the child's social, moral, and emotional development.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the crime committed was only
slight physical injuries and not a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. - NO.
AAA was maltreated by petitioner through repeated acts of strangulation, pinching, and beating.
These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline of an
eight (8)-year-old child. Discipline is a loving response that seeks the positive welfare of a child.
Petitioner's actions are diametrically opposite. They are abusive, causing not only physical
injuries as evidenced by the physical marks on different parts of AAA's body and the weakness
of her left knee upon walking, but also emotional trauma on her.
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child abuse
and exploitation and to give a special protection to children from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It must be stressed
that the crime under Republic Act No. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment that debases,
degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 28, 2014 Decision and March 13,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01911 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SEE BONGOLAN, G.R. NO. 169533, MARCH 20, 2013
Doctrine: Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.―The crime
of slight physical injuries shall be punished: 1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or
shall require medical attendance during the same period.
FACTS:
Jayson dela Cruz and his older brother Roldan, both minors, joined the evening procession for
Santo Nino at Legazpi City  when procession passed in front of petitioner George Bongalon’s
house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called
him “sissy”
Bongalon confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like “strangers” and
“animals”, struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped him on the face, and went to
the brother’s house and challenged Jayson and Roldan’s father (Rolando) to a fight.
Rolando later brought Jayson to the Police Station to report the incident and thereafter
underwent medical treatment which stated that he suffered contusions.
Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson, explaining that he only
talked to the two minors after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn (his wife) had told him that
Jayson and Roldan were throwing stones at them and burning Cherrylyn’s hair  this was
corroborated by Mary Ann Rose’s testimony
RTC  found petitioner Bongalon guilty of child abuse under RA 7610 and sentenced him to a
penalty of imprisonment of 6yrs and 1 day to 8yrs of prison mayor in its minimum period
CA affirmed RTC’s conviction but modified the penalty to indeterminate sentence of 4yrs, 2
months, and 1 day of prision correctional as minimum to 6yrs, 8 months, and 1 day of prision
mayor as max
ISSUE 1 (relevant to topic): WON petitioner Bongalon’s acts should be considered as child
abuse within the purview of Sec 3(b) of RA 7610 and hence, should be held guilty- NO
RULING:
-Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period
-Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.
-CA disagrees with the RTC in holding that petitioner Bongalon’s acts constituted child abuse
within the purview of the provisions
-Records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being,
orthat he had intended to humiliate or embarrass Jason
-What records show that the laying of hands on Jayson have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being overwhelmed by his fatherly concerned for the
personal safety of his own minor daughter who just suffered harm from Jayson and Roldan
-With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime
of child abuse.
-Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required 5-7 days of medical attention, petitioner
was instead liable for slight physical injuries under Art. 266(1) of the RPC
ISSUE 2: WON petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC in
assailing CA’s affirmance of his conviction- NO
RULING:
-The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or GADALEJ  hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the
proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of ROC
-In the present case, the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
his petition and the reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he
imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction
-However, even if petition was treated as one brought under Rule 45, it would still be
defective due to its being filed beyond prescriptive period of 15 days from notice of judgment
to be appealed (received copy of decision 15 July 2005; petition filed 12 September 2005)
WHEREFORE, CA’s decision is SET ASIDE. Finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY and sentencing him to suffer penalty of 10 days
arrest menor1 and to pay Jasyon P5k as moral damages
c) Child prostitution & sexual abuse; attempt at - Sec. 5 & 6
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of
written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as
prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a
child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner
of the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco,
bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which
1
Penalty for slight physical injuries is arrest menor, ranging from 1 day to 30 days  but since there is a
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Art 13(6) of RPC, arresto menor is prescribed in its
minimum period (ie. 1 day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance
engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been
issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. – There is an attempt to commit child
prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of
a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel,
motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other
hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe
that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof
when any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic,
health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that
prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the
principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the
proper case, under the Revised Penal Code.
d) Child trafficking; attempt at - Sec. 7 & 8
Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children
including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other
consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. – There is an attempt to commit child
trafficking under Section 7 of this Act:1awphi1@alf
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and
without clearance issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal guardian;
(b) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women
or couples to bear children for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(c) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil
registrar or any other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking;
or
(d) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families,
hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during institutions
who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section
7 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under
this Act.
e) Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows - Sec. 9
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. – Any person who shall hire, employ,
use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows,
whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell
or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age,
the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall
cause and/or allow such child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act,
movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium period.
f) Other Acts of Abuse - Sec. 10
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –
a. Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
b. Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under
or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel,
beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach
and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000):
Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom
and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.
c. Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this
Act to keep or have in his company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less
than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator
be an ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision mayor in its maximum period, a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000), and the loss of parental authority over the minor.
d. Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or
private place of accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise,
including residential places, who allows any person to take along with him to such
place or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor
in its medium period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and
the loss of the license to operate such a place or establishment.
e. Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child
to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;
(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional
in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248,
249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical
injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts
of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave
trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is
under twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
MALTO V. PEOPLE
Doctrine: Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape
is a felony under the Revised Penal Code. They have different elements.The two are separate
and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
Rape of 12 yr. old, statutory rape or Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA
8353?:
PEOPLE V. MATIAS
DOCTRINE: Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse
but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused
of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot
be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
Sexual Assault, Acts of Lasciviousness & Rape:
FLORDELIZ V. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The insertion of petitioners fingers into the victims vagina constituted the crime of
Rape through sexual assault: By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. Aside from proving the fact that Rape was committed, the prosecution also
established that petitioner is the biological father of BBB and that the latter was less than
twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. Under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape by sexual assault, if attended by any of the aggravating
circumstances under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B, would carry the penalty of reclusion
temporal, ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
PEOPLE VS. CAOILI
Doctrine: We cannot accept the OSG’s argument that based on the variance doctrine, Caoili
can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in the
rape through sexual intercourse. The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an
accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime
charged. By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual
intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was
proven during trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of
rape.
FACTS.
 An information was filed against Caoili, charging him with the crime of rape through sexual
intercourse in violation of Art. 266-A, in relation to Art. 266-B, of the RPC as amended by RA
8353, and RA 7610 for allegedly raping his 15 year old daughter.
 AAA, testified that her father, Caoili, sexually molested her at her house. That he kissed her
lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the 4 th finger of his left hand in her vagina,
and made a push and pull movement. That against her father’s harsh warning not to go out
of the house, she still proceeded to the house of her uncle and that when he learned of this,
Caoili fetched AAA, dragged her home and beat and hit her with a piece of wood, and boxed
her on the stomach.
 AAA disclosed to Laoyon the sexual molestation and physical violence committed against her
by her own father. Laoyon accompanied AAA to the police station to report the sexual and
physical abuse.
 Caoili denied molesting AAA. He alleged that he saw her with her boyfriend, greeted them
“good evening” but they did not respond. He then went home. When AAA arrived, he
confronted her, got so angry so he struck AAA’s right thigh with a piece of wood and pushed
the same on her forehead. That he asked for forgiveness, but AAA kept mum. That AAA slept
in another room with her siblings.
 RTC convicted Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault. CA held that although Caoili is clearly
guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the trial court should have done was to direct the State
Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the proper offense, and after compliance
therewith, to dismiss the original information. Thereafter, ordered to remand the case for
further proceedings.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. W/N the prosecution has sufficiently established rape by sexual assault. – YES.
RA 8353 or the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997” amended Art. 335 of the RPC, reclassifying rape as a
crime against persons and introducing rape by “sexual assault,” as differentiated from rape
through “carnal knowledge” or rape through “sexual intercourse.” [check notes for the law]
Thus, rape under the RPC, as amended, can be committed in two ways:
1) Art 266-A par. 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse, also known as “organ
rape” or “penile rape.” The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is
carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2) Art 266-B par. 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called “instrument or object
rape,” or “gender-free rape.” It must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.
Through AAA’s testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that Caoili molested his own
daughter, clearly establishing rape by sexual assault under par. 2, Art. 266-A of the RPC. It is
likewise settled that in cases where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as a victim’s
father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of the mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence or intimidation.
2. W/N rape by sexual assault is subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse. – NO
We cannot accept the OSG’s argument that based on the variance doctrine, Caoili can be
convicted of rape by sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in the rape
through sexual intercourse.
The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is
different from but necessarily included in the crime charged. By jurisprudence, however, an
accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of
rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the
substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape.
In the 1st mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the offender is always a man; (2) the offended
party is always a woman; (3) rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina; and
(4) the penalty is reclusion perpetua.
In the 2nd mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) the offender may be a man or a woman; (2) the
offended party may be a man or woman; (3) rape is committed by inserting the penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person; and (4) the penalty is prision mayor.
3. W/N Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA
7610. – YES
RA 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children
or those “persons below 18 years of age or those over but unable to fully take care of themselves
or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was 14 years, 1
month and 10 days old. This calls for the application of Sec 5(b) of RA 7610. The elements of
sexual abuse under Sec 5(b) of RA 7610 are as follows:
1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2) The Said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3) The child, whether male or female is below 18 ears of age.
The prosecution’s evidence has sufficiently established the elements of lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Art 266-A of the
RPC and RA 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Sec. 4, in relation to Sec 5 of Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts
of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Sec 5(b) of RA 7610, which
was the offense proved, because it is included in rape, the offense charged.
Guidelines: Nomenclature of crime and penalties for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610
Based on the language of Sec 5(b) of RA 7610, the offense designated as Acts of Lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec 5 of RA 7510 should be used when the victim is
under 12 years of age at the time the offense was committed. This finds support in the first
provisio in Sec 5(b) of RA 7610 which requires that “when the victim is under 12 years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Art 335, par 3, for rape and Art 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the RPC, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be.” Thus, pursuant
to provisio, it has been held that before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through
lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness
under Art 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec5
of RA 7610.
Conversely, when the victim, at the time the offense was committed, is aged 12 years or over
but under 18, or is 18 or older but unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition, the nomenclature of the offense should be Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, since the law no longer refers to Art. 336 of the RPC
and the perpetrator is prosecuted solely under RA 7610.
Penalty and Damages
Considering that AAA was over 12 but under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of
the lascivious act, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
Since the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as acts of
lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating. With the presence of this aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum
period, i.e., reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole. This is in consonance with Sec
31(c) of RA 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period when the perpetrator is, inter alia, the parent of the victim.
DECISION. WHEREFORE, both petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeal’s Decision and
Resolution are SET ASIDE. Accused Noel Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog is guilty of Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
NOTES.
Incorporated into the RPC by RA 8353, Art 266-A reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; [and]
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
Section 5(b) of RA 7610:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. (Emphasis
ours.)
QUIMVEL VS. PEOPLE
Doctrine: 1. Under RA 7610, only minors can be considered victims of the enumerated forms of
abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VA WC law limits the victims of sexual abuses covered by
the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women with whom the offender has had a dating or sexual
relationship, or against her child. Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection against
sexual offenders who do not discriminate in selecting their victims. One does not have to be a
child before he or she can be victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a
woman with an existing or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can be a
victim of another's lewd design. 2. "Force and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion and
influence " 3. When the victim of the crime is a child under twelve (12) years old, mere moral
ascendancy will suffice
FACTS
1. AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the
children of XXX and YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas while YYY was a
Barangay Tanod who derived income from selling vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB
and CCC, were then staying with YYY in Palapas, Ligao City.
2. On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the ducks of AAA's
grandfather. He lived with AAA's grandparents whose house was just a few meters away
from YYY's house.
3. At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house to buy
kerosene since there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a
vegetable viand from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she
and her siblings were afraid. He agreed and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then
went to sleep. However, she was awakened when she felt Quimuel's right leg on top of
her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand inside her panty. In a
trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand.
4. Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in his
house. Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the children. After he left, YYY
and his children went back to sleep.
5. On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while XXX was lying
down with her children, she asked them what they were doing while she was away. BBB
told her that Quimvel touched her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her,
she recounted that Quimvel laid down beside her and touched her vagina.
6. RTC and CA found the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610
FIRST ISSUE: WON Art. 336 of the RPC has been rendered incomplete and ineffective by RA
8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape law. – NO
We respectfully disagree.
Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of
Congress, it would have expressly done so.1âwphi1 Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states:
"deemed amended, modified, or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]."
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions that are
inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere amendment or modification would suffice to
reconcile the inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case, Art. 335
of the RPC,62 which previously penalized rape through carnal knowledge, has been replaced
by Art. 266-A. 63 Thus, the reference by Art. 336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances
mentioned on the erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now
refer to the circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law.
We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor repeals by implication
for laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing
on the subject. The failure to particularly mention the law allegedly repealed indicates that
the , intent was not to repeal the said law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.64 Here, RA 8353 made no specific
mention of any RPC provision other than Art. 335 as having been amended, modified, or
repealed. And as demonstrated, the Anti Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art. 336 of the RPC,
on the other, are not irreconcilable. The only construction that can be given to the phrase
"preceding article" is that Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the
repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of Lasciviousness can no
longer be prosecuted under the RPC.
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by the Anti-Rape
Law and argue in the same breath the applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. The latter
provision reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - x x x
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
(emphasis added)
If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged incompleteness, then so
too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective since it defines and punishes the prohibited act
by way of reference to the RPC provision.
The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per Justice Leonen's theory,
would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA 7610 and RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Law (Anti-VAWC Law).
Under RA 7610, only minors can be considered victims of the enumerated forms of abuses
therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VA WC law limits the victims of sexual abuses covered by the RA
to a wife, former wife, or any women with whom the offender has had a dating or sexual
relationship, or against her child. 66 Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection
against sexual offenders who do not discriminate in selecting their victims. One does not have
to be a child before he or she can be victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have
to be a woman with an existing or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can
be a victim of another's lewd design. And if the Court will subscribe to Justice Leonen's
position, it will render a large portion of our demographics (i.e. adult females who had no
prior relationship to the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to sexual abuses.
SECOND ISSUE: WON Petitoiner, assuming without admitting that he is guilty, may be
convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. --NO
The Information charged the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610
Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness,
he should only be held liable for the crime as penalized under the RPC and not under RA 7610.
According to him, to be held liable under the latter law, it is necessary that the victim is
involved in or subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse, and that the failure to allege
such element constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of accusation against him. 12
His argument fails to persuade.
i. The acts constituting the offense must
be alleged in the Information
It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must
be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is
to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and parcel of
the rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution. 13 Sections 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, in turn, pertinently provides:
 Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.-A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the
statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. (emphasis added)
Jurisprudence has already set the standard on how the requirement is to be satisfied. Case
law dictates that the allegations in the Information must be in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and
enable the court to know ' the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged. The facts and circumstances necessary to be
included therein are determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crimes. 14
The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be set out in the Information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts
constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and the right of an accused to
question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived.
Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the
Information as constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the
caption.
ii. The elements of the offense penalized
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 were
sufficiently alleged in the Information
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the Information is deficient for failure to allege all
the elements necessary in committing Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 9160.
His theory is that the Information only charges him of the crime as punished under Art. 336 of
the RPC, which pertinently reads:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.-Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned on the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Conviction thereunder requires that the prosecution establish the following
elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances: 18
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconsc10us;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
On the other hand, the prosecution endeavored to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for child abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, which provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x
x (emphasis added)
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610, the requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC earlier
enumerated must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610, which are as follows: 19
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.
3. That child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 20 (emphasis
supplied)
Hypothetically admitting the elements of Art. 336 of the RPC, as well as the first and third
elements under RA 7610 -that a lascivious act was committed against AAA who at that time
was below twelve (12) years old - petitioner nevertheless contends that the second additional
element, requiring that the victim is a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, " is absent in this case.
The fault in petitioner's logic lies in his misapprehension of how the element that the victim is
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" should be alleged in the
Information.
Guilty of reiteration, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y
BRAGA also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and
unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA], 21 a minor of 7 years old and mash
her vagina, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the
phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. 23
torment only came to a halt when she managed to prevent his hand from further touching her
private parts.
As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed subjected to
other sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. 52 Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that
some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of
the offended party. 53 The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim;
moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient. 54

Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.24 Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms
of sexual abuse against children.
The petitioner's proposition-that there is not even an iota of proof of force or intimidation as
AAA was asleep when the offense was committed and, hence, he cannot be prosecuted under
RA 7610-is bereft of merit. When the victim of the crime is a child under twelve (12) years
old, mere moral ascendancy will suffice.
DISPOSITIV:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
iii. "Force and intimidation" is
CR No. 35509 finding petitioner Eduardo Quimvel y Braga also known as Eduardo/Edward
subsumed under "coercion and
Quimuel y Braga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness is hereby AFFIRMED
influence "
with MODIFICATION as follows:

The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial
''force and intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines
Region, Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-
"coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress " 26 while "[undue] influence" is defined as ''persuasion
appellant EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD QUIMUEL y BRAGA is
carried to the point of overpowering the will. " 27 On the other hand, ''force" refers
SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end " 28 while jurisprudence
reclusion temporal in its minimum period as minimum to fifteen (15) years. six (6) months. and
defines "intimidation" as "unlawfulcoercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. " 29 As can be
twenty-one(21) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. He is further
gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the
ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount
terminologies employed by RA 7 610 and by the Information are different.
of P15,000.00 each as well as P20,000.00 as civil indemnity. All damages shall earn interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
With the foregoing, the Court need not burden itself with nitpicking and splitting hairs by
making a distinction between these similar, if not identical, words employed, and make a
mountain out of a mole hill. “Laying hands”:

BONGALON V. PEOPLE
iv. There need not be a third person subjecting the exploited child to other abuse
DOCTRINE: Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child
The intervention by a third person is not necessary to convict an accused under Sec. 5 of RA abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown
7610. As regards paragraph (a), a child may engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
regardless of whether or not a "bugaw " is present. Although the presence of an offeror or a intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
pimp is the typical set up in prostitution rings, this does not foreclose the possibility of a child Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
voluntarily submitting himself or herself to another's lewd design for consideration, monetary
or otherwise, without third person intervention. Needless to say, the child, would still be
under the protection of the law, and the offender, in such a situation, could still be held
criminally liable for violation of Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610.
5. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A. 9344); ALSO
REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED)
THIRD ISSUE: WON PETITIONER IS INDEED GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE OFFENSE - YES
PUNISHABLE ACTS
Let us not forget the circumstances of this case, not only was the offense committed against a
child under twelve (12) years of age, it was committed when the victim was unconscious, fast Article 59. Crimes. - Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
asleep in the dead of the night. AAA, then a minor of seven (7) years, was awoken by the
weight of petitioner's leg on top of her and of his hand sliding inside her undergarment. His 1. Conceals or abandons the child with intent to make such child lose his civil status.
hand proceeded to caress her womanhood, which harrowing experience of a traumatic
 2. Abandons the child under such circumstances as to deprive him of the love, care and
protection he needs.
3. Sells or abandons the child to another person for valuable consideration.
4. Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in life
and financial conditions permit.
5. Fails or refuses, without justifiable grounds, to enroll the child as required by Article
72.
6. Causes, abates, or permits the truancy of the child from the school where he is
enrolled. "Truancy" as here used means absence without cause for more than twenty
schooldays, not necessarily consecutive.
7. It shall be the duty of the teacher in charge to report to the parents the absences of
the child the moment these exceed five schooldays.
8. Improperly exploits the child by using him, directly or indirectly, such as for purposes
of begging and other acts which are inimical to his interest and welfare.
9. Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or deliberately subjects him to
indignation and other excessive chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him.
10. Causes or encourages the child to lead an immoral or dissolute life.
11. Permits the child to possess, handle or carry a deadly weapon, regardless of its
ownership.
12. Allows or requires the child to drive without a license or with a license which the
parent knows to have been illegally procured. If the motor vehicle driven by the child
belongs to the parent, it shall be presumed that he permitted or ordered the child to
drive.

"Parents" as here used shall include the guardian and the head of the institution or foster
home which has custody of the child.

SEE LUCIDO, SUPRA

6. ANTI-ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE ACT OF 2012 (R.A.

10353)

“Enforced Disappearance”; “Order of Battle”

ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE ORDER OF BATTLE

Enforced or involuntary disappearance refers
to the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty
committed by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which places such
person outside the protection of the law.
Order of Battle refers to a document made
by the military, police or any law
enforcement agency of the government,
listing the names of persons and
organizations that it perceives to be enemies
of the State and which it considers as
legitimate targets as combatants that it
could deal with, through the use of means
allowed by domestic and international law.