Verification of Onshore LNG & Gas Facilities PDF

SERVICE SPECIFICATION
DNV-DSS-315
VERIFICATION OF ONSHORE LNG

AND GAS FACILITIES
OCTOBER 2010
DET NORSKE VERITAS

FOREWORD
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) is an autonomous and independent foundation with the objectives of safeguarding life,
property and the environment, at sea and onshore. DNV undertakes classification, certification, and other verification and
consultancy services relating to quality of ships, offshore units and installations, and onshore industries worldwide, and
carries out research in relation to these functions.
DNV service documents consist of amongst other the following types of documents:
— Service Specifications. Procedual requirements.
— Standards. Technical requirements.
— Recommended Practices. Guidance.
The Standards and Recommended Practices are offered within the following areas:
A) Qualification, Quality and Safety Methodology
B) Materials Technology
C) Structures
D) Systems
E) Special Facilities
F) Pipelines and Risers
G) Asset Operation
H) Marine Operations
J) Cleaner Energy
O) Subsea Systems
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Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010
Changes – Page 3
Background
The experience gained from past projects specific to onshore LNG and Gas installations is incorporated in this
Service Specification.
Introduction
The suit of inter-related DNV-OSS documents consist of a general description of the verification systematics
(DNV-OSS-300) and object specific documents. This DNV-OSS-315 offers the reader the application of the
common framework and overview of processes in risk verification, to process facilities.
This Service Specification:
— Introduces a levelled description of verification involvement during all phases of an asset's life.
— Facilitates a categorisation into risk levels High, Medium and Low, assisting in an evaluation of the risk
level.
— Assists in planning the verification through the making of a Verification Plan, and describes the DNV
documentation of the process throughout.
— Provides an international standard allowing transparent and predictable verification scope, as well as
defining terminology for verification involvement.
Changes
Two new DNV service document types have been introduced as from October 2010 to be used for services that
are not limited to offshore and/or not to be considered as DNV Rules for classification of Ships or HSLC/NSC.
The documents have been named; DNV Service Specifications (DSS) and DNV Standards (DS).
This service specification; DSS-315: “Verification of Onshore LNG and Gas Facilities” replaces the previous
version of the document with short name; DNV-OSS-315. There are no changes in content, only how the
document is referred to, as OSS now will be used for Service Specifications intended for Offshore use.
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Page 4 – Contents
CONTENTS
Sec. 1 General ............................................................................................................................................... 6

A. General ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
A 100 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 6
A 200 Objectives ............................................................................................................................................................. 6
A 300 Scope of application for verification..................................................................................................................... 6
A 400 Structure of this document ................................................................................................................................... 7
B. Risk Based Verification .................................................................................................................................................. 7
B 100 General.................................................................................................................................................................. 7
B 200 Verification’s Role in Hazard Management ......................................................................................................... 7
B 300 Risk-based Verification Planning ......................................................................................................................... 7
B 400 Certificate of Conformity...................................................................................................................................... 8
C. Definitions and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 9
C 100 General.................................................................................................................................................................. 9
C 200 Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................................ 9
C 300 Verbal forms ......................................................................................................................................................... 9
C 400 Definitions ............................................................................................................................................................ 9
D. References ..................................................................................................................................................................... 11
D 100 List of Internal References.................................................................................................................................. 11
D 200 List of External References................................................................................................................................. 11
D 300 List of Technical Specifications.......................................................................................................................... 11
Sec. 2 Principles of Risk Based Verification ............................................................................................. 12
A. Purpose of Section ........................................................................................................................................................ 12
A 100 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................... 12
B. Verification Principles .................................................................................................................................................. 12
B 100 Purpose of Verification ....................................................................................................................................... 12
B 200 Verification as a Complementary Activity ......................................................................................................... 12
B 300 Risk-based Levels of Verification ...................................................................................................................... 12
C. Selection of Level of Verification................................................................................................................................. 13
C 100 Selection Factors................................................................................................................................................. 13
C 200 Overall Verification Objective............................................................................................................................ 15
C 300 Assessment of Risk ............................................................................................................................................. 15
C 400 Technical Innovation and Contractor Experience............................................................................................... 15
C 500 Quality Management Systems ............................................................................................................................ 15
D. Communications ........................................................................................................................................................... 15
D 100 Notification of Verification Level ...................................................................................................................... 15
D 200 Obligations.......................................................................................................................................................... 16
Sec. 3 Service Overview .............................................................................................................................. 17
A. General .......................................................................................................................................................................... 17
A 100 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................... 17
B. Service Process ............................................................................................................................................................. 17
B 100 General Principles............................................................................................................................................... 17
B 200 Simplified verification planning ......................................................................................................................... 17
B 300 Selection of level of verification......................................................................................................................... 18
B 400 Codes, standards and reference documents ........................................................................................................ 18
C. Project Initiation............................................................................................................................................................ 18
C 100 Verification during conceptual design ................................................................................................................ 18
D. Project Execution .......................................................................................................................................................... 18
D 100 General................................................................................................................................................................ 18
D 200 Verification of overall project management ....................................................................................................... 19
D 300 Verification during design .................................................................................................................................. 19
D 400 Verification during construction ......................................................................................................................... 20
E. Verification Documents ................................................................................................................................................ 23
E 100 General................................................................................................................................................................ 23
App. A Selection of Verification Level ........................................................................................................ 24
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Contents – Page 5
A. General .......................................................................................................................................................................... 24
A 100 General principles ............................................................................................................................................... 24
B. Trigger Questions.......................................................................................................................................................... 24
B 100 Overall project objective and goals..................................................................................................................... 24
B 200 Assessment of risk .............................................................................................................................................. 24
B 300 Technical innovation........................................................................................................................................... 25
B 400 Contractors’ experience ...................................................................................................................................... 25
B 500 Quality management systems ............................................................................................................................. 25
App. B Generic Detailed Verification Scopes of Work Tables ................................................................. 26
A. Purpose.......................................................................................................................................................................... 26
A 100 Introduction......................................................................................................................................................... 26
B. Critical Elements........................................................................................................................................................... 26
B 100 Critical Elements and Components..................................................................................................................... 26
App. C Examples of Verification Documents ............................................................................................. 69
A. Verification Documents ................................................................................................................................................ 69
A 100 Validity of verification documents ..................................................................................................................... 69
A 200 Statement of Compliance ................................................................................................................................... 69
A 300 Verification Reports............................................................................................................................................ 69
A 400 Verification Comments ...................................................................................................................................... 69
A 500 Audit report......................................................................................................................................................... 69
A 600 Survey Reports.................................................................................................................................................... 70
B. Use of quality management systems ............................................................................................................................. 70
B 100 General................................................................................................................................................................ 70
B 200 Quality plans ....................................................................................................................................................... 70
B 300 Inspection and test plans ..................................................................................................................................... 71
B 400 Review of quality management programme ....................................................................................................... 71
C. Document forms............................................................................................................................................................ 71
C 100 Introduction......................................................................................................................................................... 71
C 200 Statement of Compliance.................................................................................................................................... 73
C 300 Verification comments sheet............................................................................................................................... 74
C 400 Survey report....................................................................................................................................................... 75
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SECTION 1
GENERAL
A. General
A 100 Introduction
101 This Service Specification (DNV-DSS-315) gives the criteria for and guidance on verification of the
integrity (safety, environmental and reliability) of parts of onshore LNG (both import and export) and gas
receiving facilities during various phases of new developments and modifications.
102 This document is an object-specific Service Specification conforming to the philosophy defined in the
top level document DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based Verification.
A 200 Objectives
201 The objectives of this specification are to:
— describe DNV’s verification services for onshore LNG and gas receiving facilities during design,
construction, and commissioning,
— provide guidance for the Client and other parties for the selection of the level of involvement of those
carrying out verification activities, whether quantitatively as a result of a quantitative risk assessment or
qualitatively by simple trigger questions.
— provide a common platform for defining and manage the scope and extent of verification activities.
A 300 Scope of application for verification
301 This specification may be adopted for the verification of parts of onshore liquefied natural gas and gas
receiving facilities during the project development phase starting from detailed design up to and including
commissioning and start-up.
302 The LNG and gas facilities covered in this specification comprise the following critical systems:
— support structures and foundations
— non-cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment
— cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment (including transfer piping)
— LNG storage tanks
— open hazardous drains
— pressure relief systems
— ignition prevention and control systems
— emergency shutdown system
— blowdown system
— fire and gas detection system
— fire and blast protection
— emergency power supply
— escape and evacuation means
— emergency communication systems
— environmental control.
which are applied in various configurations and tailored to each particular project’s specific requirements.
The specification does not cover the following:
— Jetty, Mooring and Marine related facilities (with the exception of the shore based transfer systems and
associated safety equipment. Jetty structures are covered by DNV-OSS-304).
— the import and export pipelines within plant battery limits (this is covered under DNV-OSS-301)
303 Compliance to CE Marking Directives such as Pressure Equipment Directive (PED/97/23/EC),
Machinery Equipment Directive 98/37/EC and Explosion Proof Devices ATEX 94/9/EC which are applicable
in the European Community are not covered in this specification.
304 This DSS describes the principle of a levelled verification involvement, where the extent of verification
involvement is linked to the risks associated with part or all of the facility.
305 The primary scope of DNV’s verification work is the verification of the integrity of gas facilities and the
safety of its personnel and those in close proximity to it. Other aspects, such as the verification of the
environmental safety of the facility, or its ability to meet the Client’s business objectives, may be included in
DNV’s scope of work if desired by the Client.
306 Statutory verification (or certification) of onshore gas facilities to the requirements of National
Authorities is not included specifically in the scope of application of this DSS. Such verification (or
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Sec.1 – Page 7
certification) shall be governed by the regulations of the relevant Authority. However, if detailed procedures
are not given by these Authorities, this DSS shall be used by DNV as a guideline for its work.
A 400 Structure of this document
This document consists of three sections and 3 appendices:
— Section 1 explains the relationship between this document and DNV’s overall risk-based verification
process.
— Section 2 explains the principles of DNV’s verification process with its risk-based levels of involvement,
and how the level of involvement for a particular project is defined.
— Section 3 describes the verification process and the activities for each of the project phases.
— Appendix A gives guidance on the selection of verification level, preferably as the result from a quantitative
risk assessment or alternatively, qualitatively as a result of the posing of trigger questions.
— Appendix B gives a generic detailed scope of work tables for all phases and all levels of involvement. These
tables are the basis for the development of project-specific scopes of work tables.
— Appendix C gives example verification documents and describes the documents issued during and as a
result of the verification process. The use of quality management systems is addressed here also.
B. Risk Based Verification

B 100 General
101 This DSS describes the principles of verification of the safety and integrity of natural gas facilities for
all phases.
The risk based verification concept is described in DNV-OSS-300 and visualized in Figure 1 overleaf.
102 The Verification Plan is the pivot element, with the Asset Specification, Risk Assessment and Definition
of Involvement Level as input and the Verification Execution being the implementation.
B 200 Verification’s Role in Hazard Management
201 Major Accident Hazards are identified in a safety assessment by an analysis of the risks to the facility’s
personnel using suitable definitions of such accidents.
202 Critical Elements are those parts of the facilities and such parts of the facilities (both hardware and
software), or any part thereof:
— the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or
— a purpose of which is to prevent; or limit
— the effect of a major accident and/or impact on project specific objectives.
203 Performance requirements are statements which can be expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of
the performance required of a system, item of equipment, person or procedure, and which is used as the basis
for managing the risk– e.g. planning, measuring, control or audit – through the lifecycle of the facilities. It can
be:
— a criterion or a standard of performance with which assessed performance may be compared
— an availability/reliability standard; a probability that an HSE or Business Critical system will be available
for its required function under a defined load
— an endurance period: a period of time over which an HSE or Business Critical function is stated to remain
functional under a defined load
— an impairment criterion/threshold: a specified condition, which defines impairment of an HSE or Business
Critical function.
204 Verification Plan is a document describing the process and activities required for verifying that all
Critical Elements meet project objectives. This will form the scope of work for the Verifier.
205 Verification is the process whereby DNV as an independent and competent party assesses that a Critical
Element will be, has been, and will continue to be suitable to meet project performance requirements.
A graphical representation of this process is shown in Figure 1.
B 300 Risk-based Verification Planning
301 The selection of the level of verification shall depend on the level of risk a particular item adds to the
overall risk to the facility. The planning can be simplified or detailed. This is further described in DNV-OSS-
300.
302 This Service Specification addresses both approaches as input into the preparation of a verification plan.
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Page 8 – Sec.1
Guidance note:
Risk can be evaluated based on safety, environmental impact, business, schedule, public relations, reputation or other
criteria set by the Client.
The generic scopes of work tables are generated based on safety and integrity risks. Where other risks, such as
environment or business, are required by the Client to be considered during the verification process, the principles set
out in this document may be used to modify the generic scopes of work tables given in Appendix C.
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303 In view of the complexity of many gas facilities, DNV recommends strongly that the verification level
be derived from the results of risk assessments of the facility.
Guidance note:
Only for simple natural gas facilities, with consequently lower levels of risk would DNV consider that simplified
verification planning using the trigger questions and generic Verification scope set out in Appendices A and B to be
justifiable.
For novel technology for which there are no applicable standards to verify against, Technology Qualification
according to procedures as defined in "DNV-RP-A203 Qualification Procedures for new Technology" can be used as
input for Verification.
As s e t Pla n n e d
As s e t S p ec ific a tio n
in clu d ing o ve ra ll co m p a n y ac c ep ta n c e c rite ria ,
p e rfo rm an ce re qu ire m e nts a n d
ve rific a tio n o b je cti ve s
R is k As s e s sm e n t
in c lu din g id e ntific a tio n o f h a za rd s an d
ra n king o f h a z ard s b a se d o n risk e valu a tio n
D e finitio n o f V e rifica tio n In v o lve m e n t

in c lud in g de ta ilin g o f a c ce p ta n c e crite ria , an d
p e rfo rm a n ce re q u ire m e n ts
V erific a tio n P lan

inclu d in g list o f ve rifica tio n a c tiv itie s
Ve rific a tio n Ex e c u tio n

in c lu din g rep o rtin g o f co m plia n c e or
n o n-c o mp lia n ce
A s s e t C o m ple te d
Figure 1
DNV risk based verification Flow-Chart
B 400 Certificate of Conformity

401 A Certificate of Conformity may be issued by DNV to confirm compliance according to the scope of
work. An example is given in Appendix C.
402 The DNV Certificate of Conformity confirms that, after performing verification according to a DNV
defined scope of work, DNV has found the natural gas facility to conform to a given DNV Standard or
acceptable international standards.
403 Usually DNV performs the complete scope of work for all phases. However, in some circumstances,
DNV may accept external Independent Review Certificates, for example for pressure vessels. This shall be
reflected in the text of the Certificate.
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Sec.1 – Page 9
404 A Statement of Compliance is issued in all other instances where Certificate of Conformity is not
applicable. See Appendix C for further details.
C. Definitions and Abbreviations

C 100 General
101 Relevant definitions in EN 1473:2007 also apply to this DSS.
C 200 Abbreviations
ALARP = As Low as Reasonably Practicable
C&E = Cause and Effect
CFD = Computational Fluid Dynamics
D&ID = Ducting and Instrumentation Diagram
EC = European Community
ESD = Emergency Shutdown System
ESDV = Emergency Shutdown Valve
ESSA = Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis
FERA = Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis
FGS = Fire and Gas System
HAZID = Hazard Identification (Assessment)
HAZOP = Hazard Operability (Study)
HVAC = Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
HIPPS = High Integrity Pressure Protection System
ICS = Integrated Control System
LNG = Liquefied Natural Gas
MPQT = Manufacturing Procedure Qualification Testing
MPS = Manufacturing Procedure Specification
NDT = Non-Destructive Testing
OSS = (Offshore) Service Specification
PCS = Process Control System
PFD = Process Flow Diagram
PFP = Passive Fire Protection
PSD = Process Shutdown System
QRA = Quantitative Risk Analysis
RAM = Reliability Availability Maintainability
SIL = Safety Integrity Level
UPS = Uninterruptible Power Supply
VAR = Verification Activity Report
WPS = Welding Procedure Specification
WPQR = Welding Procedure Qualification Record
C 300 Verbal forms
301 “Shall”: Indicates requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to this DSS and from which
no deviation is permitted.
302 “Should”: Indicates that among several possibilities, one is recommended as particularly suitable,
without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily
required. Other possibilities may be applied subject to agreement.
303 "May": Verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the DSS.
C 400 Definitions
401 Client: DNV’s contractual partner. It may be the purchaser, the owner or the contractor.
402 Construction phase: All phases during construction, including fabrication, installation, testing and pre-
commissioning, up until the installation or system is mechanically complete and safe to receive and/or export
gas or LNG. In relation to onshore facilities, this include both onsite and offsite fabrication, site assembly and
integration, tie-in, pressure testing, pre-commissioning and repair.
403 Commissioning phase: Activities after pre-commissioning when gas or LNG are introduced into the
installation up until the complete installation is rendered safe and operable for intended operations.
404 Critical Element: Parts of an installation which prevent, control or mitigate identified major hazards and
the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives.
Safety Critical Elements represent the barriers which prevent, control or mitigate the major accident scenarios.
405 Critical Equipment: Item of equipment or component or assembly the failure of which could cause or
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 10 – Sec.1
contribute substantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives.

406 Design: All related engineering to design of the onshore facilities, including structural supports, pressure
containment, safety systems, as well as material and corrosion aspects.
407 Design phase: An initial phase that takes a systematic approach to the production of specifications,
drawings and other documents to ensure that the onshore installation meets specified requirements (including
design reviews to ensure that design output is verified against design input requirements).
408 Fabrication: Activities related to the assembly of objects with a defined purpose. In relation to the
onshore facilities, fabrication typically refers to the process of assembly or transformation of e.g. plates,
profiles and pipes etc into production equipment and facilities. These may be built fully on-site or built offsite
in parts and transferred to site for assembly or integration.
409 Hazard: A deviation (departure from the design and operating intention) which could cause damage, injury
or other form of loss (Chemical Industries Association HAZOP Guide).
410 HAZID (HAZard Identification): A technique for the identification of all significant hazards associated
with the particular activity under consideration. (ISO-31010 Risk Management - Risk Assessment
Techniques).
411 HAZOP (HAZard OPerability study): The application of a formal systematic critical examination to the
process and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the hazard potential of mal-operation or
mal-function of individual items of equipment and their consequential effects on the facility as a whole (Chemical
Industries Association HAZOP Guide).
412 Manufacture: Making of articles or materials, often in bulk. In relation to onshore facilities, this typically
refers to activities for the production of various components under contracts from one or more contractor or
supplier.
413 Major Hazard: A deviation (departure from the design and operating intention) which could cause
unacceptable damage, injury or other form of loss.
414 Onshore Gas facilities: Onshore process plants for regasification of LNG or receiving, treatment and/or
liquefaction of natural gas
415 Operations (phase): The phase when the gas facilities are being used for the purpose for which it was
designed.
416 Performance Requirement: A description (qualitative or quantitative statement) of the essential
requirements to be met, maintained or provide on demand by a system or item of equipment in order for it to
satisfactorily fulfil its purpose.
417 Risk: The qualitative or quantitative likelihood of an accident or unplanned event occurring, considered
in conjunction with the potential consequences of such a failure. In quantitative terms, risk is the quantified
probability of a defined failure mode times its quantified consequence.
Guidance note:
Risk is not only related to physical failure modes, but also to operational errors, human errors and so on. For some
risks the functional failures or physical failure modes contributes less than 20% while more than 80% of the risk
relates to other devices.
418 Risk Reduction Measures: Those measures taken to reduce the risks to the operation of onshore facilities
and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity by:
— reduction in the probability of failure
— mitigation of the consequences of failure.
Guidance note:
The usual order of preference of risk reduction measures is:
— inherent safety
— prevention
— detection
— control
— mitigation
— emergency response.
419 Project Objectives: The safety, integrity and business goals for the design, construction, operation and
decommissioning of the gas facilities including acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client.
420 Safety Objectives: The safety goals in terms of functionality, reliability/availability and survivability for
the design, construction and operation of the natural gas facility including acceptance criteria for the level of
risk acceptable to the Client.
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Sec.1 – Page 11
421 Statement of Compliance: A statement or report signed by a qualified party affirming that, at the time of
assessment, the defined onshore installation phase, or collection of activities, met the requirements stated by
the Client.
422 Verification: An examination to confirm that an activity, a product or a service is in accordance with
specified requirements.
Guidance note:
The examination shall be based on information, which can be proved true, based on facts obtained through
observation, measurement, test or other means.
It should be noted that there is a distinct difference between verification and certification.
The scope of work for verification is ultimately decided by the customer, while the scope of work for certification is
ultimately decided by DNV (or the national authorities when DNV issues certificates on their behalf).
ISO 8402: 1994 definition: Verification: Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that
specified requirements have been fulfilled.
423 Verification Plan: A plan which defines the scope of the work (sow) for verification. It includes;
verification objectives, elements to be verified, performance requirements, level of involvement by party and
type of verification activity. (ref. DNV-OSS-300 Sec.2 C)
D. References
D 100 List of Internal References
— DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based Verification, 2004, Det Norske Veritas
— DNV-OSS-301 Certification and Verification of Pipelines, 2000, Det Norske Veritas
— DNV-OSS-304 Risk Based Verification of Offshore Structures, 2006, Det Norske Veritas
— DNV-OSS-307 Verification of Process Facilities, 2004, Det Norske Veritas
— DNV-OSS-309 Verification, Certification and Classification of gas export and receiving terminals, 2009,
Det Norske Veritas
— DNV-RP-A203 Qualification Procedures for New Technology
D 200 List of External References
— A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies, 1979, Chemical Industries Association Limited, London
— ISO 8402 Quality – Vocabulary, 1994, International Organization for Standardization, Geneva
— BS 4778 Quality Vocabulary, Part 2 Quality Concepts and Related Definitions, 1991, British Standards
Institute, London
— EN 45011 General Criteria for Certification Bodies Operating Product Certification, 1998, European
Committee for Standardization, Brussels
D 300 List of Technical Specifications
Relevant technical specifications which can be used as references are given in Appendix B.
The main standards for LNG facilities addressed in this document are:
— EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore Installations
— NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas.
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SECTION 2
PRINCIPLES OF RISK BASED VERIFICATION
A. Purpose of Section
A 100 Objectives
101 The objectives of this section are to provide:
— an introduction to the principles of verification the safety and integrity of onshore LNG and gas receiving
facilities
— an introduction to the principles of risk-based levels of verification activity and
— guidance on the selection of levels of verification.
B. Verification Principles
B 100 Purpose of Verification
101 Verification constitutes a systematic and independent examination of the various phases in the life of a
natural gas facility to determine whether it has sufficient integrity to meet its safety objectives.
102 Verification activities are expected to identify errors or failures or non-compliance to agreed
performance requirements in the safety and integrity-related work associated with the natural gas facility and
to contribute to reducing the risks to its operation and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it
or in its vicinity.
103 Verification is primarily focused on integrity and human safety, but business risk (cost and schedule)
may be addressed also if required by the Client.
B 200 Verification as a Complementary Activity
201 Verification shall be complementary to routine design, construction and operations activities and not a
substitute for them. Therefore, although verification will take into account the work, and the assurance of that
work, carried out by the Client and its contractors, it is possible that verification will duplicate some work that
has been carried out previously by other parties involved in the natural gas facility.
202 The verification plan shall be developed and implemented in such a way as to minimise additional work,
and cost, to maximise its effectiveness. The development of the verification plan shall depend on the findings
from the examination of quality management systems, the examination of documents and the examination of
project activities.
B 300 Risk-based Levels of Verification
301 To achieve a DNV Certificate of Conformity for a natural gas facility a verification of the activities
described by the scope of work defined within this DSS first shall take place.
302 The level of verification activity is differentiated according to the overall risk to the facility and to
individual parts of it. If the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is higher, the level of verification
involvement is higher. Conversely, if the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is lower, the level of
verification activities can be reduced, without any reduction in their effectiveness.
303 The extent of verification of gas facilities is categorised into Low, Medium and High. A summary of the
levels of involvement is given in Table 2-1.
304 It is the prerogative of the Client of the natural gas facility to decide the level of verification. The
selection should consider the factors given in Sec.2 C. The selection of the most suitable verification level may
be guided by using the information gained from a Quantitative Risk Assessment, or alternatively qualitatively
by trigger questions, as described in Appendix A. Further guidance is provided in DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based
Verification.
305 Where DNV is issuing the Certificate of Conformity for the facility, DNV will decide on the appropriate
scope and use the same type of questions to evaluate the suitability of the selected level.
306 Different levels of verification can be chosen for different phases of the natural gas facility’s design,
construction or commissioning, or even within the same phase if necessary. For example, the design of a
particular component or unit may be innovative and considered high risk whereas the construction and
installation methods are well-known and considered low risk. The converse might be true also.
307 The level of verification can be reduced or increased during a phase if the originally chosen level is
considered too rigorous or too lenient, as new information on the risks to the natural gas facility becomes
available.
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Sec.2 – Page 13
308 Verification should be planned in close co-operation with the Client and each of its contractors, to
provide a scope of work that is tailor-made to the schedule of each production process or activity, i.e. to make
the verification activities, surveillance and hold points, an integrated activity and not a delaying activity.
Guidance note:
Many contractors have adequate quality control systems and quality control departments, with competent personnel
to perform, for example, inspection at pressure vessel manufacturers.
In that case, not all verification work need be done by DNV personnel. Where applicable, the various inspections may
be carried out by competent persons other than DNV personnel.
In that situation DNV’s verification activities may comprise:
— reviewing the competence of the contractor’s personnel
— auditing their working methods and their performance of that work
— reviewing the documents produced by them.
309 Verification will direct greatest effort at those elements of the natural gas facility whose failure or
reduced performance will have the most significant impact on safety and integrity.
310 The degree of confidence placed in a certificate by its users depends on their degree of confidence in the
verification carried out. Therefore, the level of verification will be stated on the Certificate of Conformity for
the facility.
311 If more than one verification level has been used for a phase, then the lowest level will be reported on
the facility’s certificate, and the additional verification activities will be identified and described in the
verification report.
C. Selection of Level of Verification

C 100 Selection Factors
101 The selection of the level of verification shall depend on the criticality of each of the elements that have
an impact on the management of hazards and associated risk levels of the facility. This is illustrated by Figure
1 below.
102 The contribution of each element shall be judged qualitatively and/or quantitatively and shall use, where
possible, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made.
103 Selection factors are the:
— overall safety objectives for the facility
— assessment of the risks associated with the facility and the measures taken to reduce these risks
— degree of technical innovation in the facility
— experience of the contractors in carrying out similar work
— quality management systems of the Client and its contractors.
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Table 2-1 Levels of Verification - Summary of Involvement

Level Description of involvement Guidance for application on the level of involvement
Low — Review of general principles and production — Proven facility designs with relatively harmless
systems during design, construction and contents and/or installed in benign environmental
commissioning conditions
— Review of principal design documents, — Established design; manufacturing and
construction and commissioning procedures and installation by experienced contractors
qualification reports — Low consequences of failure from a safety point
— Site attendance only during system testing of view (or environmental or commercial, if
— Less comprehensive involvement than level required)
Medium — Relaxed to normal completion schedule
Mediu — Review of general principles and production — Facilities in moderate or well-controlled
m systems during design, construction and environmental conditions
commissioning — Facilities with a moderate degree of novelty
— Detailed review of principal and other selected — Medium consequences of failure from a safety
design documents with support of simplified point of view, (or environmental or commercial,
independent analyses if required
— Detailed review of construction and — Ordinary completion schedule
commissioning procedures
— Full time attendance during (procedure)
qualification and review of the resulting reports
— Audit-based or intermittent presence at site
High — Review of general principles and production — Facilities with a high degree of novelty or large
systems during design, construction and leaps in technology
commissioning — Extreme environmental conditions
— Detailed review of most design documents with — Inexperienced contractors or exceptionally tight
support of simplified and advanced independent completion schedule
analyses — Very high consequences of failure from a safety
— Detailed review of construction and point of view (or environmental or commercial, if
commissioning procedures required
— Full-time attendance during (procedure)
qualification and review of the resulting reports
— Full time presence at site for most activities
— More comprehensive involvement than level
Medium
Note:
High, Medium Low Verification Involvement refers to the degree or intensity of verification involvement.
Completion schedules affect verification involvement in an indirect but important way. The effect of a tight completion
schedule is pressure on the project team to take less time to carry out the various tasks. Tight completion schedules are
more prone to run late, thus adding more pressure on the project team. Problems which have been encountered in this
situation in the past have included:
— design reviews not carried out
— incomplete welding
— non-destructive testing incomplete
— missing structural members
— commissioning incomplete.
Inc re as ing
High R isk
HIGH
Probability M EDIUM
of Failure
L OW
Low
Consequence of Failure High
Figure 1
Selection of the Required Level of Verification
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Sec.2 – Page 15
C 200 Overall Verification Objective

201 An overall verification objective covering all phases of the natural gas facility from design to operation
shall be defined by the Client. The objective should address the main integrity goals as well as establishing
acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client. Depending on the facility and its location, the
risk could be measured in terms of human injuries as well as environmental, political and economic
consequences.
C 300 Assessment of Risk
301 A systematic review should be carried out to identify and evaluate the probabilities and consequences of
failures in the natural gas facility. The extent of the review shall reflect the criticality of the facility, the planned
operation and previous experience with similar facilities. This review shall identify the risk to the operation of
the facility and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity.
Once the risks have been identified, their extent can be reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable by
means of one or both of:
— reduction in the probability of failure,
— mitigation of the consequences of failure.
302 The result of the systematic review of these risks is measured against the safety objectives and used in
the selection of the appropriate verification activity level.
The result of the systematic review of these risks is measured against the safety objectives and used in the
selection of the appropriate verification activity level.
C 400 Technical Innovation and Contractor Experience
401 The degree of technical innovation in the natural gas facility system shall be considered. Risks to the
facility are likely to be greater for a facility with a high degree of technical innovation than with a facility
designed, manufactured and installed to well-known criteria in well-known locations.
Similarly, the degree of risk to the facility should be considered where contractors are inexperienced or the
work schedule is tight.
402 Factors to be considered in the selection of the appropriate verification level include:
— degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements
— knowledge of similar facilities
— knowledge of contractors’ general experience
— knowledge of contractors’ experience in similar work.
C 500 Quality Management Systems
501 Adequate quality management systems shall be implemented to ensure that gross errors in the work for
facility design, construction and operations are limited.
502 Factors to be considered when evaluating the adequacy of the quality management system include:
— whether or not an ISO 9001 or equivalent certified system is in place
— results from external audits
— results from internal audits
— experience with contractors’ previous work
— project work-force familiarity with the quality management system, e.g. has there been a rapid expansion
of the work force or are all parties of a joint venture familiar with the same system.
D. Communications
D 100 Notification of Verification Level
101 An assessment of the required level of verification for a project should be made by the Client before
preparing tender documents for design and construction activities. The Client can then specify this level in
Invitations to Tender. This will give contractors clear guidance and reference when estimating the extent and
cost of efforts associated with verification activities.
102 The required level of verification can be assessed by the Client using this DSS. However, if the Client
requires the Contractor to carry out this assessment as part of his response to an Invitation to Tender the Client
should provide the necessary information to enable the Contractor to carry out this work. This information
should include overall safety objectives for the natural gas facility as well as particulars, such as temperatures,
pressures, contents and environmental criteria, commonly contained in a design brief.
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D 200 Obligations
201 To achieve the purpose and benefits of verification the involved parties shall be mutually obliged to share
and act upon all relevant information pertaining to the verification scope.
202 The Client shall be obliged to:
— Inform DNV about the basis for selecting the level of verification and the investigations and assumptions
made in this context.
— Give DNV full access to all information concerning the verification scope for the natural gas facility and
ensure that clauses to this effect are included in contracts for parties acting on behalf of the Client and
parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification scope. If information is
proprietary and not available, exclusion from verification shall be mutually agreed with DNV.
— Ensure that DNV is involved in the handling of deviations from specified requirements within the
verification scope.
— Act upon information provided by DNV with respect to events or circumstances that may jeopardise the
safety or integrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.
— Ensure that the Safety Objective established for the facility is known and pursued by parties acting on
behalf of the Client and parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification
scope.
203 Second parties shall be obliged to:
— Perform their assigned tasks in accordance with the safety objectives established for the project.
— Provide the Client and DNV with all relevant information pertaining to the verification scope.
204 DNV will be obliged to:
— Inform the Client if, in the opinion of DNV, the basis for selecting the level of verification or the
assumptions made in this respect are found to be in error or assessed incorrectly.
— Inform the Client of events or circumstances that, in the opinion of DNV, may jeopardise the safety or
integrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.
— Effectively perform all verification work and adjust the level of involvement according to the actual
performance of parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification scope.
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Sec.3 – Page 17
SECTION 3
SERVICE OVERVIEW
A. General
A 100 Objectives
101 The objectives of this section are to provide:
— an overview of the verification activities
— details of DNV’s verification services for onshore LNG and Gas facilities during design, construction and
commissioning phases.
B. Service Process
B 100 General Principles
101 The description of the process of DNV’s verification of LNG and gas receiving onshore facilities is based
on distinct project phases and the recognition of key milestones.
102 Verification performed by DNV normally progresses through one or more of these project phases and
may include all or selected aspects of the project. Prior to commencement of work, the scope shall be defined
in terms of the facilities to be verified (battery limits to be specified), applicable codes and standards and
performance requirements, the agreed verification levels and phases to be covered in the Verification Plan.
103 Credit may be given in the Verification Plan, in terms of reduction in the Verification scope, for
compliance to National regulations for example EC Pressure Equipment, Machinery Directive and ATEX
Directives certified by a Notified Body. This is relevant for projects in the European Union in which the EC
Directives are applicable.
104 The risk based verification process is described in relation to the normal project phases:
Project initiation:
— conceptual design.
Project Execution:
— project Management
— detail design
— construction
— manufacturing of process facilities
— manufacturing and fabrication of process facilities components and assemblies
— site assembly and integration
— project completion (pre-commissioning)
— commissioning
— issue of as-built and as-installed documentation,
— issue of operation manuals.
B 200 Simplified verification planning
201 The steps in the simplified verification planning are as follows:
— Use trigger questions to assess the overall risk level of the project (or manageable elements thereof).
— Evaluate the risk against the relevant project acceptance criteria (often this can be directly tied to the
Client’s core values, objectives or a sub-set of these) and decide whether the general verification
involvement shall be Low, Medium or High.
— Use the example detailed scope of work tables in Appendix B to make a first draft of a Verification Plan.
— Generate the project specific Verification Plan by including a project specific engineering judgment or risk
analysis to adjust the table to suit the project.
— Perform the verification execution according to the Verification Plan, making revision to the plan if and
when necessary.
— Report the verification.
202 The trigger questions are included in Appendix A.
203 Generic scopes of work for verification are suggested at the three levels of verification:
— low (L)
— medium (M)
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— high (H).
These are given in the tables in this section.
204 Project specific detailed scope of work descriptions should be made identifying all relevant activities to
be verified. Examples of the level of detail are given in Appendix B.
205 It is the tables in this Sec.3 that give the principle difference between the levels of verification
involvement. The detailed example tables in Appendix B are to be treated as examples only. They shall not be
used without a project specific confirmation of their completeness based on an assessment of the prioritised
risks.
206 The project specific scope of work definition, derived from the tables in Appendix B (or similar), shall
be part of the final DNV verification report.
B 300 Selection of level of verification
301 The selection of the level of verification for the simplified verification planning is facilitated by the
trigger questions included in Appendix A.
B 400 Codes, standards and reference documents
401 The verification process described in this DNV-DSS is not tailored to a specific technical standard, code
or reference document.
402 It is recommended to use internationally recognised codes or standards. Where combinations of
standards and external criteria are used the exact terms of reference and documents to be issued shall be agreed
at the beginning of the project and formally defined in the contract.
403 It is strongly recommended not to mix standards due to the possible differences in safety philosophies.
The use of European standards (EN) is required for compliance to EC directives.
Guidance note:
Most standards are a coherent collection of requirements for all the relevant aspects of a process system. These
aspects, e.g. load and resistance, are normally among themselves adjusted to give an overall acceptable safety level.
To pick requirements from different standards can then easily result in unpredictable (low) levels of safety and non-
uniform level of safety.
C. Project Initiation
C 100 Verification during conceptual design
101 Verification during the conceptual and or feasibility studies of a project and in the early stages of a
project can reduce the need for verification during the design and construction phases, and can reduce costs
during the long term operation, inspection and maintenance phases.
Table 3-1 Scope of work for initial verification plan

Verification activity Level
L M H
Review of the project conceptual design
Review of initial design x x x
Review of environmental aspects x x
Review of project schedule risks x x
Review of business risk x x
D. Project Execution
D 100 General
101 All design, construction and commissioning aspects, relevant to an onshore LNG and Gas Facility, shall
be covered by a verification process.
102 In this specification the split in the scope of work between design and construction is made between sets
of performance requirements developed during design and a description of the steps necessary to satisfy the
specification (procedures) showing how construction verification activities will be implemented.
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Sec.3 – Page 19
Guidance note:
The split between design and construction phases may vary, but it is useful to spend some time on the definition to
reduce interface problems later.
D 200 Verification of overall project management

201 Verification of the overall project management is the examination of the means of controlling the entire
onshore LNG and Gas Facilities development project, or the phase for which verification is undertaken.
202 This verification should confirm that the necessary controls are in place to ensure adequate information
flow across the various interfaces. It is especially important where separate contractors have been employed
for different phases of the project such as design and installation.
203 Typically, the documentation produced is expected to be in line with ISO 9000 requirements.
Table 3-2 Scope of work for verification of overall project management

L M H
Review of the project management process by:
Review of project quality management
x x x
documentation.
Audit of project quality management system x x
Review of sub-contractor control x x
Review of interface controls x x
Review of methods of information flow including document control x x
204 The verification of the overall project management quality system and documentation is optional. The
reviews and audits should typically be performed if an extensive verification of a project is performed, while
may be omitted for smaller sub-phase verifications.
D 300 Verification during design
301 Design verification is the examination of the assumptions, methods and results of the design process and
is performed at the specified level of verification to ensure that the specified requirements of the onshore
facilities will be achieved.
302 Design verification should consist of one, or more, of the following:
— review of specifications for design (asset specifications)
— review of design reports and drawings
— review of technology qualification program and associated results (for new technology)
— performing independent calculations
— audit of project quality management system
— review of specifications for construction, installation and operations, resulting from design.
303 The documents that shall be produced in the project should as a minimum satisfy the requirements of the
selected code applicable for the project.
304 Definition of scope of work for verification of design should follow Table 3-3.
Table 3-3 Scope of work for verification of design

L M H
Review of specifications for design by:
— Review of the design basis with emphasis on the design criteria x x x
Review of design reports and drawings by:
Review of the main documentation to ensure that the main load conditions have been
accounted for in design, that the governing conditions are identified, and that the x x x
chosen design philosophies are in accordance with specified codes and standards
Evaluation of the main methods used and spot checks of the input data and the
calculation results x x
Detailed review of main design reports x
Performing independent calculations by:
Check of pressure containment or overall integrity x x x
Simplified independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks x x
Advanced independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks x
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Review of specifications for construction and operation by:

Spot check of critical aspects x x x
Review of main specifications x x
Thorough review of main specifications x
Review of specific operational challenges (e.g. flow assurance etc.)
general principles x x x
Review of main documents supported by simplified analyses x x
Guidance note:
Design verification activities may be split up between Basic Design and Detailed Design, or other sub-phases,
depending on type of contract.
D 400 Verification during construction

401 The construction phase comprises procurement, fabrication, manufacturing, sub-unit and unit integration
testing, assembly, erection and commissioning. An important element is to ensure that the contractual design
requirements are incorporated in the purchase documentation, and that correct materials, joining and corrosion
control, have been applied, and that pressure rating, capacity and function are meeting the requirements as per
approved specifications and procedures. It is imperative that relevant preparations for this is started as early as
possible, e.g. by the appointment of a vendor supply verification co-ordinator.
402 Verification during construction is carried out by means of full time attendance, audits, inspection or spot
checks of the work, as appropriate, in sufficient detail to ensure that the specified requirements of the facility
will be achieved.
403 Verification of these activities relates not only to the contractor’s work but also to the monitoring of this
work carried out by others.
404 Construction verification should consist of one, or some, of the following:
— reviewing the construction process
— reviewing construction procedures
— reviewing qualification process
— surveillance during construction activities
— reviewing final documentation.
405 The documents that should be produced in the project and submitted for review prior to start up are
typically:
— Manufacturing Procedure Specification (MPS)
— manufacturing procedures and method statements, including test requirements, test procedures and
acceptance criteria, repairs, personnel qualification records etc.
— material specifications and data sheets
— quality plans including Inspection and Test Plans (ITP)
— Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) and Welding Procedure Qualification Record (WPQR)
— NDT procedures
— Manufacturing Procedure Qualification Test (MPQT) results.
— manufacturer’s and fabricator’s quality system manual.
406 The “as-built” documentation to be submitted after manufacturing should include but not be limited to:
— manufacturing procedures including test requirements and acceptance criteria, repairs, personnel
qualification records etc.
— Material certificates
— production test records (visual, NDT, test samples, dimensional, heat treatment etc.)
— hydrostatic test report
— FAT (Final Acceptance Test) report
— commissioning report.
— as-built drawings
— relevant statistics of chemical composition, mechanical properties and dimensions for the deliveries.
— relevant logs.
407 Definition of scope of work for verification of construction should follow Table 3-4 for manufacturing
and fabrication of critical (high-risk) components, Table 3-5 for manufacturing and fabrication of components
not considered critical, Table 3-6 for verification of site construction and Tables 3-7 and 3-8 for final testing,
pre-commissioning and completion.
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Guidance note:
Materials may be ordered with certificates of varying degrees of independent 3rd party verification (e.g. 3.2 according
to EN 10204). This can this be integrated in the overall verification activities, so as not to duplicate work.
Table 3-4 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of critical equipment

L M H
Review of the manufacturing and fabrication process
Review of manufacturing and fabrication management systems x x x
Audit of the quality management system x x
Review of manufacturing and fabrication procedures
Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection procedures for confirmation of compliance with
x x x
the manufacturing specification
Review method statements x x
Review of qualification process
Review the Manufacturing Procedure Specification, (MPS), Manufacturing Procedure
x x x
Qualification Test (MPQT), as applicable
Full time attendance during MPQT, as applicable, or first day production x x
Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities
Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered products
x x x
have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification
Visit-based or full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot
checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing x x
specification
Full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks, that the
delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification x
Review of final documentation x x x
Table 3-5 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of non-critical components
L M H
Review of the manufacturing & fabrication process
— Review of manufacturing and fabrication management systems x x
Review of manufacturing & fabrication procedures
— Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection procedures for confirmation of compliance
x x
with the manufacturing specification
— Review the Manufacturing Procedure Specification, (MPS), Manufacturing Procedure
Qualification Test (MPQT), if applicable x x x
— Full time attendance during MPQT, if applicable, or first day production x
Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities
— Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered
x x
products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification
— Visit-based attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks,
that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing x
specification
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Table 3-6 Scope of work for verification of site construction

L M H
Review of the construction process
Review of construction management systems x x x
Review of construction procedures
Spot check of construction procedures, including erection procedures x x x
For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review the method
x x
statements
For critical operations, review the qualification process, e.g.
- welding
x x x
- non-destructive testing
- site heat treatment
Full time attendance during qualification tests x x
Surveillance during construction activities
Visit-based attendance during start of each critical operation x x x
Full time attendance during each critical operation x x
Full time attendance for all construction operations x
Table 3-7 Scope of work for verification of site commissioning and start-up
L M H
Review of the commissioning process
Review of commissioning management systems x x x
Review of commissioning procedures
Spot check of commissioning procedures x x x
For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review the method
x x
statements
Surveillance during commissioning activities
Visit-based attendance during start of each critical operation x x x
Full time attendance during each critical operation x x
Full time attendance for all commissioning operations x
Table 3-8 Scope of work for verification of final testing for operation, including as-built survey and
project completion
L M H
Review of procedures
Review of the procedures for commissioning tests to ensure that the procedure adequately covers the
system in accordance with the design requirements x x x
Surveillance during testing and completion activities

Full time attendance during commissioning x x
Full time attendance during specific tests testing and audit based attendance during ongoing testing
x
Review of test results x x x

Review of final documentation
Spot check of as-built documentation x x x
Review of as-built documentation x
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Sec.3 – Page 23
E. Verification Documents
E 100 General
The hierarchy of verification document is given in DNV-OSS-300 Appendix C. The descriptions of the content
of these documents as well as examples of Reporting templates are given in Appendix C to this specification.
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APPENDIX A
SELECTION OF VERIFICATION LEVEL
A. General
A 100 General principles
101 The selection of the level of verification depends on the risk level of each of the elements that have an
impact on the management of risks to the asset.
102 Verification shall direct greatest effort at those elements of the asset where the risk is highest and whose
failure or reduced performance will have the most significant impact on the project objective and goals, e.g.:
— safety risks
— environmental risks
— business risks.
103 Suitable selection factors include, but are not limited to, the:
— overall safety and other objectives for the asset
— risks associated with the asset and the measures taken to reduce these risks
— degree of technical innovation in the asset
— experience of the contractors
— quality management systems for the Project and its contractors.
104 Due to the diversity of various installation facilities, their contents, their degree of innovation, the
geographic location, etc, it is not possible to give precise guidelines on how to decide what level of verification
is appropriate for each particular LNG and gas receiving onshore facility.
105 Therefore, guidance is given as a series of questions that should be answered when deciding the
appropriate level of verification for an onshore gas facility. This list is not exhaustive and other questions
should be added to the list if appropriate for a particular onshore gas facility.
106 It must be emphasised that the contribution of each element should be judged qualitatively and/or
quantitatively. Wherever possible quantified risk assessment data should be used to provide a justifiable basis
for any decisions made.
107 Depending of the stage of the project, the activities may not have taken place yet in which case the
questions can also be posed in another form, i.e. “Is …. planned to be?”
B. Trigger Questions
B 100 Overall project objective and goals
a) Does the overall verification objective address the main project objectives?
b) Does the verification objective establish acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client?
c) Is this risk (depending on the onshore LNG and gas facility and its location) measured in terms of safety,
as well as environmental, economic and reputation consequences?
B 200 Assessment of risk
a) Has a systematic review been carried out to identify and evaluate the probabilities and consequences of
failures in the onshore gas facilities?
b) Has this review judged the contribution of each element qualitatively and or quantitatively and used, where
possible, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made?
c) Does the extent of the review reflect the risk level of the (onsite and offsite) onshore gas installation, the
planned operation and previous experience with similar facilities?
d) Does this review identify the risk to the operation of the onshore gas facilities and to the health and safety
of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity?
e) Has the extent of the identified risks been reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable by means of
one or both of:
— reduction in the probability of failure?
— mitigation of the consequences of failure?
f) Has the result of the systematic review of the risks been measured against the Client’s safety (or other)
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App.A – Page 25
objective?
g) Has the result of this review been used in the selection of the appropriate verification activity level?
B 300 Technical innovation
a) Has the degree of technical innovation in the onshore gas facilities been considered?
b) Has it been considered that risks to the onshore gas facilities are likely to be greater with a high degree of
technical innovation than with an onshore gas facility designed, manufactured and installed to well-known
criteria in well-known locations?
c) Have factors been considered in the selection of the appropriate verification level such as:
— Degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements.
— Knowledge of similar onshore LNG and gas facilities
— Effect of the new onshore LNG and gas facility on the surrounding area.
B 400 Contractors’ experience
a) Has the degree of risk to the onshore LNG and gas facilities been considered where design, construction or
installation contractors are inexperienced?
b) Has the degree of risk been considered where the contractors are experienced but not in similar work?
c) Has the degree of risk been considered where the work schedule is tight?
B 500 Quality management systems
a) Have all parties involved in the onshore LNG and gas facilities implemented an adequate quality
management system to ensure that gross errors in the work are limited?
b) Do these parties include the:
— client?
— design contractor?
— construction contractors?
— installation contractor?
— operator?
c) Do the factors being considered when evaluating the adequacy of the quality management system include:
— Whether or not an ISO 9000 or equivalent certified system is in place?
— Results from external audits?
— Results from internal audits?
— Experience with contractors’ previous work?
— Project work force familiarity with the quality management system?
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APPENDIX B
GENERIC DETAILED VERIFICATION SCOPES OF WORK TABLES
A. Purpose
A 100 Introduction
101 This appendix gives the format of the generic detailed scope of work tables for onshore LNG and Gas
facilities.
102 The Verification Plan shall be developed based on the tables provided in this Appendix. The Tables shall
be supplemented and updated by input from Project Risk Assessments when developing the Plan.
103 The appropriate level of verification involvement based on the principles outlined in Sec.3, is further
defined in the Verification Plan.
104 For gas facilities with aspects or components not covered in this Appendix, similar tables, with the same
degree of detail, shall be developed.
B. Critical Elements
B 100 Critical Elements and Components
101 Based on the results of the HAZID, HAZOP or other risk assessments, gas facilities are likely to have
many or most of the critical elements listed in 104 below.
102 Verification of design is broken down into consideration of these critical elements and components in
isolation but the many interactions between them must not be forgotten.
103 Typical Critical Elements for an onshore LNG and gas facilities are shown in Table B-1. These Critical
Elements shall be modified to suit a specific facility and the Project Objectives.
Table B-1 Onshore LNG and Gas facilities - Typical Critical Elements and associated components
Function Critical Elements Component
Layout Area classification
Inherent Safety
Measures Hydrocarbon Inventory/
All
Leak Source Minimisation
Ship-Shore Interface
Offloading and Loading Loading Arms and Transfer Facilities
Facilities Integrity LNG Transfer Pipelines
Jetty and Moorings
Support Structures and Foundations
Hazard
Prevention Relief Valves and Relief System
Measures Process Systems
Process Facilities Integrity
Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment
Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment
LNG Storage Tanks
Dropped Object and Impact
Critical components
Protection
Bunding and Drains
Fired Heaters, Hot Surfaces and Exhaust
Control of Ignition Electrical items (explosion proof rating, electromagnetic
compatibility,
ingress protection)
Hazard
Detection and Lightning Protection, Static and Earthing
Control Smoke and Gas Detection for Site Buildings
Measures Fire and Gas Detection - External Areas
Fire and Gas Detection
Fire and Gas Detection - Machinery Enclosures
Fire and Gas Control System
Control Room Control Systems
HVAC Ventilation System, Fire Dampers pressurised enclosures
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App.B – Page 27
Table B-1 Onshore LNG and Gas facilities - Typical Critical Elements and associated components
Function Critical Elements Component
Fire Water Storage
Firewater Pumps
Firewater Distribution Ring main
Active Fire Fighting Systems
Firewater and Foam Supply
Hazard Gaseous Fire Fighting Systems
Mitigation Fire-fighting Vehicles
Measures Blast and Passive Fire Protection Critical components
Bunding and Drainage Closed drains, open drains, tank bunds
Blowdown & Flare System Flare, Blowdown valves, knock-out drum, relief valves
Emergency Shutdown System ESD Control System
(ESD) Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
Personnel Protection, Breathing Apparatus
Egress and Evacuation System
Escape Routes
Emergency Muster Area
Response
Measures Emergency Lighting
Emergency Services
Emergency Power, uninterruptible power supply
Emergency Communications and Alarms
Emission and Waste Control Emission and Discharge Controls
Environmental Systems
Protection
Waste Heat Recovery Waste Heat Recovery Units
104 The following Tables P1 to P7, C1 to C4, M1, E1 to E3 and N1 provide a template of verification
activities which can be used for Verification activity planning. These give generic performance requirements
and verification activities for typical Critical Elements:
— P1 Support Structures and Foundations
— P2 Installation Layout
— P2 Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment
— P4 Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment
— P5 LNG Tanks
— P6 Open Hazardous Drains
— P7 Pressure Relief Systems
— C1 Ignition Prevention and Control System
— C2 Emergency Shutdown System
— C3 Blowdown System
— C4 Fire and Gas System
— M1 Fire and Blast Protection Systems
— E1 Emergency Power System Supply
— E2 Emergency Escape and Evacuation
— E3 Emergency Communications
— N1 Environmental Protection
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Table P1 – Support Structures

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: STRUCTURAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT
INTEGRITY Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
Support Structures

OBJECTIVES: The objectives of the Structural Integrity performance requirement are:
1) To ensure that foundations will adequate support of surface structures and equipment
2) To ensure that surface structures are able to support the weight of the installation facilities and equipment and transfer
all operating and environmental loads to the foundations;
- support escape routes to allow personnel to escape from the process Installation to the muster areas and then evacuate
to a place of safety;
- prevent escalation following a major accident by maintaining the integrity of equipment supports;
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Foundations of support structures include the following major items of equipment:
a) Slug catcher b) Storage tanks (Condensate, LPG, LNG) c) Major Rotating Equipment d) Buildings (local and central
control room),
e) Critical Utility Systems (electricity, heating and cooling, fuel gas) f) Flare Stack g) Pipe rack in process area
h) Firewater retention pond bund i) Scrubbers j) Columns (distillation, contactors, wash) k) Vaporizers
l) Major Heat Exchangers (cold box) m) Condensors n) Stair towers and escape routes
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore Installations
EN1992 Design of Concrete Structures
EN1993 Design of Steel Structures
EN1994 Design of Composite Steel and Concrete Structures
NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas
EN14620-1, Design and Manufacture of Site Built Vertical Cylindrical Flat bottomed Steel Tanks for the Storage of
Refrigerated Liquefied Gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Part 1 General
Performance Requirement Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

Specification
Foundations
Confirm by review of civil foundation design that the
foundation will adequately support the structure
under all realistic loading conditions. Including the
Foundations to be designed following as relevant to the specific foundation
such that they adequately - Basis of Design
- Detail design design:
support the structures under all Review foundation piling design for a given soil
realistic loading conditions as calculations
(including condition for the maximum and minimum governing
per code requirements for: loading cases. Check:
computer input/
— slug catcher output if — Resistance to differential settlement
— storage tanks (condensate, applicable) Design — Sliding resistance if relevant
LPG, LNG) - Soil or — Frost heave of tank foundations to be avoided if
— major rotating equipment Geotechnical relevant
— buildings reports — Seismic/earthquake
— critical utility systems - AFC — Review design of concrete foundation base,
— flare stack foundation reinforcement requirements and check that the
— pipe-racks/supports drawings material specified is suitable
— firewater retention pond — Review foundation construction drawings for
bund compliance with the design
— scrubbers — Design of tank connections to foundation base.
— columns
— vaporizers Review construction procedures for piling, pile caps
— re-condensors and rafts to confirm compatibility with industry
— major heat exchangers practice
(cold box) Method Confirm by audit that the properties and origin of
— stair towers and escape Statements materials for piles, pile caps and rafts (steel,
routes ITP reinforcement, aggregates, concrete mixes) are
Material according to specifications and/or as specified on
Guidance: Heat tracing Construction
Certificates drawings.
system to prevent frost heave of Concrete
LNG Tank foundations is a Review records and monitor construction to:
Strength Test Confirm that pile layout, position, dimensions and
critical system which requires Records
sufficient reliability. depths are in accordance with design;
Confirm by sampling review of test results that
strength of concrete piles, pile-caps, rafts meet
minimum requirements.
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App.B – Page 29

Specification
Support Structures
Confirm by review of design basis that all relevant
design conditions are being considered, the correct
loads have been combined for each load case, and the
load combinations and allowable limits conform to
Design the requirements of an applicable and recognised
code.
Review Mooring Analysis to ensure that the loads for
the range of vessels anticipated to berth at the Jetty are
considered for design.
Basis of Design Confirm by review of the structural analyses, weight
Load analysis reports and environmental data or by independent
Detail design analysis that:
calculations
(including — the loads and load cases identified in the design
computer input basis for all the design conditions have been
& output if correctly incorporated
applicable) — the thermal loads induced by the flare radiation
Support against all loading Drawings have been correctly assessed and included in the
anticipated through the design Design load combinations
life of the installation:
— in conjunction with the structural drawings that
flare structure the structural and material properties have been
process equipment correctly assessed and incorporated
pipe-work supports
— the response to the applied loads has been
firewater retention pond bund correctly assessed and stresses do not exceed the
Guidance: Loads include values specified in the code specified in the
environmental, dead loads, live design basis
loads, accidental loads as — suitable materials have been specified.
specified in the risk Review fabrication specification for the support
assessment, seismic and Construction structures to confirm that it is compatible with the
operational loads relevant industry practice
Confirm by surveillance that the properties and origin
Construction of all materials within this CE are assured and that
material properties are at least equivalent to those
Method specified in the fabrication drawings.
Statements Review records and monitor fabrication to:
ITP
WPQR and NDT — Confirm compliance with the design and
Records fabrication specification with any deviation
Fabrication documented & justified and that dimensions are
Dossiers within tolerances defined in the specification.
Construction — Confirm that welding procedures are in
accordance with the fabrication specification.
— Confirm by document review that NDT and
inspections are being carried out in accordance
with the requirements of the fabrication
specification and design requirements.
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Specification
Review the FERA (or other appropriate study) to
confirm that fire and blast scenarios and fire and blast
Design loads are appropriate. Confirm that these scenarios
have been incorporated into the design basis.
Support structures for Confirm by review of safety studies that the time
enclosures with critical required for essential safety equipment to complete
functions or containing critical Design safety critical actions has
equipment or normally a) been identified; and
occupied by people shall b) been considered in the design
maintain integrity for the time QRA
required to complete their FERA Confirm by review of the fire and blast structural
safety critical actions under: Fire and Blast analyses that the structure is adequate or has adequate
Structural Design PFP to withstand the scenarios identified in the
FERA, for the required period, and conforms to the
(a) fire loading and following analyses requirements of a recognised code.
a design explosion [as PFP
defined in the FERA]. Specifications Confirm by review of PFP specification and reports
Plastic deformation is Design (type approval certificates, test reports etc) that PFP
acceptable providing specified is adequate and sufficient.
integrity is maintained Confirm that support structures and escape ways that
(b) other accidental events as maybe exposed to accidental spillage of LNG (if
specified in the design considered a credible event) are protected against
basis or as required in Design brittle failure if failure of such structures can result in
code requirements. escalation. e.g.
(c) accidental spillage of water curtain, drip trays, thermal protection of steel
LNG and cryogenic structures.
liquids causing brittle Method Confirm by monitoring and review of records that
fracture Statements measures to provide protection from blast
ITP
Construction overpressure, fire (PFP) and LNG spillage have been
Specifications implemented and conform to the structural drawings.
Product
Certificates
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App.B – Page 31
Table P2 - Installation Layout

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS HAZARD MANAGEMENT
CONTAINMENT Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
Installation Layout
  
OBJECTIVES: The layout of facilities in the Installation shall:
— Ensure safe working conditions and access for personnel and equipment for operation and maintenance.
— Prevent ignition by separation of ignition sources from fuel sources and non hazardous area from hazardous area
(Note: Hazardous area classification is addressed in HSE Critical Element P7 Ignition Prevention and Control).
— Minimise the consequence of fire and explosion, in particular with respect to escalation and ease of access for fire
fighting personnel and equipment.
All equipment and unit layouts within installation battery limits.
NFPA 59A
EN1473
IP part 15

Specification
HAZID Study Confirm by review of the scenario’s taken in the
Fire Zone limits shall be Safety Concept HAZID Study that all worst case and fire zone limit
selected such that the Impacted, Restricted Design defining cases have been correctly selected and
consequences of a fire, a Area and Fire Zone modelled as required.
flammable gas leak or an Layout
explosion corresponding to the Confirm by review of the HAZID Study results
credible event likely to occur HAZID Study against the fire zone layout plots and fire zone
in the concerned fire zone shall Safety Concept safety distance layouts that all appropriate fire zone
not impact other fire zones to Impacted, Restricted Design safety distances have been complied with, unless
an extent where their integrity Area and Fire Zone deviations are noted and approved. Compliance
could be put at risk. Layout shall be confirmed with respect to the above
relevant Project Specifications.
Areas affected permanently by HAZID/HAZOP Confirm by review of the scenarios considered in
normal operation of the Study the HAZID Study that all worst case and restricted
facility or exceptionally by the Safety Concept area defining cases have been correctly selected
consequences of an Impacted, Restricted and modelled as required.
emergency situation caused by Area and Fire Zone Design Confirm by review that simultaneous operations
a major failure shall be Layout (e.g. maintenance activities, truck loading) cannot
designated as “Restricted Installation and cause additional unacceptable situations.
Areas” which shall be Equipment Plot
confined to within the Plans
boundaries and control of the Confirm by review that all buildings and
Installation. HAZID Study equipment located within the Restricted Areas are
Safety Concept correctly identified as being suitable for the
Guidance: Areas affected Impacted, Restricted applicable Restricted Area requirements.
permanently implies areas Area and Fire Zone Design Restricted areas extending beyond the Installation
defined by flare and vent Layout boundary shall be adequately addressed through
dispersion and radiation by Installation and Risk Assessment.
Hazardous Area Equipment Plot The criteria for equipment and buildings design
Classification or by Plans when located inside the restricted areas are
legislation. provided in the relevant project specifications.
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Specification
Safety Concept Confirm by review of Installation equipment
Installation and layouts that minimum spacing requirement with
Facility, equipment and equipment Plot Design respect to the project requirements are complied
building layout shall meet the Plans with.
general requirements of the
Client. Safety Concept Confirm by review of building area layouts that
Building Layouts Design general spacing and equipment locations comply
Plot Plans with the minimum project requirements.
Safety Concept Confirm by review of Installation equipment and
Working building area layouts that minimum fixed means of
environment access requirement with respect to the project and
Installation and Design regulatory requirements are complied with.
equipment
Building Layouts
Working platforms, Plot Plans
walkways, stairs, step-ladders, Review Specification for Fabrication and
guard-rails and fixed ladders Construction of the Installation and building area
shall meet the safety and confirm that it is in compliance with
requirements of the Client and specifications or compatible with industry practice.
local regulations. satisfactory level of inspection and possible
Construction
Construction measurement will be performed by all parties;
drawings fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance
with Specification for Fabrication and Installation
Confirm by review of Installation equipment and
buildings that Hazardous layout on site complies
with all project requirements.
Table P3 – Non-cryogenic pressure vessels, piping & equipment

Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective pressure containment systems and process equipment that shall
eliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.
Pressure vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of hydrocarbon are present or could
be present during normal operations. ‘Significant’ is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active
mitigation in the event of loss of containment.
The process installation equipment including pressure vessels heat exchangers and process equipment are those
associated with the following systems: Slug-catcher, Pig Launcher / Receivers, Inlet Separator, Gas Conditioning, Gas
Compression, Condensate Stabilisation and Storage, LPG Storage, Chemical Storage, Fuel Gas, Produced Water, Closed
Drains and Hot Oil System
- Safety Critical Rotating Equipment are as follows: Condensate Pumps, Gas Compressors, Flare Liquid Pumps, Diesel
/ Hydraulic / Lube Oil Pumps, Methanol Pumps, Produced Water and Closed Drains Pumps.
- The Safety Critical Pressure Vessels are those associated with the following systems: Scrubbers, Gas Coolers, Gas
Conditioning (Amine unit, Molecular Sieve unit, Sulphur recovery unit)
- The Safety Critical Tanks are those associated with the following systems: Condensate Storage Tanks, Closed Drains
Collection Tank, Methanol Storage & Diesel (large volumes).
- Piping systems refers to all pipe-work, fittings, flanges, manual valves, tubing, flexible hoses, etc. downstream of the
inlet isolation valve associated with the following systems:
- Process Gas, Fuel Gas, Relief, Vent and Flare, Diesel, Hydraulic and Lube Oil, Chemicals, Hot-oil Systems, Cooling
Medium System, Produced Water and Closed Drains.
Notes: Piping Systems in high-pressure utility systems (e.g. Utility Air) are considered Safety Critical if their failure is
likely to damage the hydrocarbon envelope in the immediate vicinity.
For the ESD Valves the process containment is covered in C1 Emergency Shutdown Systems
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App.B – Page 33
- project specific documents
- Regulatory requirements
- International standards
Pressure Vessels:
— ASME VIII
— PD5500
Heat Exchangers:
— API 660 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service
— API 661 Air Cooled Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service
— API 662 Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service
— ASME VIII
— TEMA
Rotating Equipment:
— API 610 Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries
— API 611 General Purpose Steam Turbines for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services
— API 616 Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries
— API 617 Centrifugal Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries
— API 618 Reciprocating Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries
— API 672 Packaged Integrally Geared Centrifugal Air Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service
Industries
Tanks:
— API 620 Design and Construction of Large, welded, Low pressure storage tanks
— API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage
API RP 686 Recommended Practices for Machinery Installation and Installation Design
API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations
Piping Systems: ASME B31.3
Relief Systems: API 14C
ASME B31 Standards of Pressure Piping
EN13480 Metallic Industrial Piping
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Performance Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

Requirement
Specification
The process facilities Confirm by review of process basis of design, PFDs, line
shall safely contain all Design Basis
lists and P&IDs that specified design conditions are
hydrocarbons at the correct for all lines and equipment.
PFDs
maximum and minimum P&IDS
Design
foreseeable pressures, Line List
design temperatures and
operating forces.
P&IDs Review material selection and corrosion control
Piping Class philosophies and coating specifications to confirm that
Specification piping class is suitable for the worst case conditions, that
- Materials Material Design suitable allowance for internal corrosion is specified and
Selection Report that significant external corrosion is prevented by
Material suitable protective coatings.
Specifications
Review piping design to confirm that:
— the correct design conditions are considered
Stress Analysis — suitable criteria are set for identifying which
- Piping Reports Design systems/lines require calculations of stresses
ISOs — the criteria has been correctly applied in accordance
Critical Line List with the appropriate design codes
— there is sufficient piping flexibility inherent in the
design.
Review of recognised Independent Third Party
Supplier Data
Certification and design data to confirm that all procured
- Critical Equipment FAT Reports Procurement safety critical equipment have been designed,
Packages Manufacturer
constructed and tested in accordance with a recognised
Dossiers
international code or standard.
Review manufacturing records and quality certification
to confirm all bulk items (fittings, flanges etc) have been
- Bulk Items Supplier Data Procurement
designed and fabricated to a recognised international
code or standard.
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App.B – Page 35

Requirement
Specification
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and
Testing of the Installation and confirm that it is in
compliance with specifications or compatible with
Method industry practice.
Statements
Construction satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all
Procedures
parties;
ITPs fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with
Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of
Piping
Survey to confirm that:
— the equipment nozzles are installed in
accordance with design, and any deviations
Method documented and justified
Statements — the piping system is installed in accordance with the
ITPs design and any deviations have been documented
WPQR and justified including stress analysis where
- Storage Tanks Material Construction necessary
(Non-Cryogenic) Certificates — all piping systems are fabricated and pressure tested
Test Packs in accordance with the design, and any deviations
Commissioning documented and justified
reports — piping spools are installed and that field welds are
completed and tested in accordance with the design,
and any deviations documented and justified
— hydrocarbon containment systems installed are leak
tested and proof tested satisfactorily.
Design Basis Confirm by review of design documentation that any
Design Reports hydrocarbon containing storage tanks have been
Material Design designed in accordance with a recognised code or
Specifications standard.
P&IDs
Method Confirm by survey that any hydrocarbon containing
Statements storage tanks have been fabricated in accordance with the
ITPs Construction design documentation and fabrication is to the required
WPQR project specification.
Material
Certificates
Systems shall be HAZOP Confirm by review of P&IDs and HAZOP Study that
provided with adequate HAZID adequate and appropriate safety devices to prevent
and appropriate safety Thermal Relief overpressure resulting from process upsets (including
devices to prevent Study Design
blocked outlet, excessive temperature or fire exposure)
overpressure or other Surge Analysis which may result in unsafe operation are specified and
process deviations Report comply with specifications.
which may result in PSV Data Sheets
unsafe operation P&IDs
(including exposure to P&IDs Confirm by inspection that all piping components and
excessive temperatures ITPs Commissioning safety devices are correctly installed in accordance with
and fire). Test Procedures P&IDs, correctly calibrated and set points are correct.
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Page 36 – App.B

Requirement
Specification
Confirm by review of specifications that rotating
Rotating equipment to Design equipment has adequate seal systems provided and that
be provided with appropriate monitoring is provided with necessary
adequate seal system to Supplier Data executive actions specified.
prevent loss of Vendor P&IDs Confirm by review of commissioning records that
containment of rotating equipment have adequate seal systems provided
hydrocarbon. Commissioning
and appropriate monitoring is provided and executive
actions are undertaken as specified by design.
All hydrocarbon Design
Review the safety studies to confirm that the proposed
containment non- fire and explosion loadings are justified.
cryogenic equipment Confirm by design review of equipment details, layout
and piping with the drawings and details of passive fire protection that
potential to give rise to specified equipment will survive specified explosion
significant escalation Design overpressure and fire impingement with no loss of
hazards are to withstand containment in the period while the Installation
the effects of an inventory is being reduced to a safe level (blowdown is
explosion followed by complete) and personnel are escaping.
fire impingement with
no loss of containment Confirm by inspection and review of records that any
before the Installation required passive fire protection has been installed as per
inventory has been Safety Studies the design.
reduced to a safe level
(blowdown is complete)
and personnel have
escaped to a place of Testing &
safety. Commissioning
.
Guidance: plastic
deformation is
acceptable providing
there is no loss of
integrity and no low
cycle fatigue failure.
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App.B – Page 37
Table P4 – Cryogenic vessels, equipment and piping

Cryogenic Vessels, Equipment and Piping

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shall
(Cryogenic vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of LNG are present or could be
present during normal operations.)
Significant is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active mitigation in the event of loss of
containment.
LNG Loading Arms
Heat Exchangers (Vaporisers, Re-condensors, shell and tube- plate fin, spiral wound)
Process Vessels (Scrubbers, Separators, Columns)
Piping and valves
Cold Boxes
Rotating Equipment (Pumps, Turbo compressors and expanders)
Refrigerant and liquid Nitrogen Storage
Note: LNG Storage Tanks are covered by separate Table P5
EN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas – General characteristics of liquefied natural gas
EN1474-1 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design and testing of loading/unloading arms
EN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – ship to shore interface
EN1473
NFPA 59A
EN12567 Industrial Valves – Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test
(EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service, EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic
service, BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service)
EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves – Fire type-testing requirements
ASME VIII div 2
ASME B31.3
Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)
API520 and API521
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Performance Requirement Document Types Phase Verification Activity

Specification
LNG Loading Facilities
Confirm by review of design basis and hazard studies
that the design philosophy is in compliance with the
requirements prescribed in a recognized design
standard (EN 1474-1, SIGGTO or relevant code)
Design basis
Hazard studies Confirm by Technology qualification or for proven
design a review of design documentations (reports,
design basis, material specifications) that marine
Design code transfer arms are designed in accordance with a
Design reports recognized design standard (EN 1474-1 or relevant
(calculations code)
and analysis for The review should comprise:
all components Design — structural design
of marine — pressure containment, including thermal and
transfer system) hydraulic loads
Material
specification - swivel joints
Drawings - valves, connectors
Critical - materials, fittings, piping.
Equipment list — motion envelope
— ESD and Safety system, including the ship shore
interface
— hydraulic and electric control system
— electrical systems, cables
— accessories.
Review of purchase requisitions for compliance with
the design basis.
Marine transfer arms Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
Marine transfer arms shall Purchase and Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirm
load or unload the LNG and requisitions that it is in compliance with specifications or
the vapour return in a safe and compatible with industry practice.
controlled manner between Supplier Data Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
Procurement
LNG carrier and the onshore FAT Reports all involved parties; review of recognised
LNG Installation Manufacturer Independent Third Party Certification and design
Dossiers data to confirm that the Marine transfer arms have
ITPs been designed, constructed and tested in accordance
with a recognised international code or standard.
Monitoring, fabrication, assembly and testing of
loading arms for compliance with the design basis.
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
and Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirm
Method that it is in compliance with specifications or
Statements Construction
compatible with industry practice.
Procedures satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
ITPs all parties;
fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with
Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing
ITPs — the equipment is installed in accordance with
WPQR design, and any deviations documented and
Material justified.
Construction — all piping is fabricated and pressure tested in
Certificates
Commissioning accordance with the design, and any deviations
reports documented and justified.
— all safety systems are installed inspected and
tested.
Confirm by review of test protocols and acceptance
Test protocols
criteria that these are in accordance with the protocols
and acceptances
criteria Commissioning and acceptance criteria specified in a recognized
design standard (EN 1474 -1 or relevant code)
Commissioning
Witness SAT in accordance with the relevant design
reports
code.
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App.B – Page 39

Specification
Vaporisers
Confirm by review of design basis and specifications
Supplier data/
that the design philosophy is in compliance with the
Data Sheets Design
requirements prescribed in a recognized design
Design Code
standard (e.g. EN1473)
Confirm by review of specifications that the
vaporiser has appropriate monitoring and executive
actions are undertaken as specified
The review should comprise:
For all types of vaporizers P&IDs — Vaporiser gas outlet temperature and water flow
(water stream open rack/ Specifications rate (open rack type)
closed, intermediate fluid — Flow rate and temperature of the water (closed
atmospheric water bath/forced -Methods Design type, forced flow type)
flow condenser vaporizer, -HSE — Water bath temperature and heat supply
submerged combustion and -Operation (atmospheric water bath)
atmospheric vaporizer); Manuals — Intermediate flow rate and LNG temp at outlet
systems shall be provided to (condenser/vaporiser type)
control the vaporiser’s — Bath water temperature and level, gas outlet
operational process temperature, extinction of flame, gas detection in
parameters in a safe and incoming air, air fan tripping (submerged
controlled manner. combustion type vaporiser),
Confirm by review of commissioning records that the
specific vaporiser has appropriate monitoring and
executive actions are undertaken as specified by
- ITP design.
-
Commissioning For example with respect to Submerged combustion
Commissioning type vaporisers that the water pH is regularly
reports monitored, safety devices that initiate shutdown are
implemented and a program for testing of legionella
and a plan to avoid bacterial growth is in place.
Review of purchase requisitions for compliance with
the design basis.
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
and Testing of the Vaporiser and confirm that it is in
compliance with specifications or compatible with
-Supplier Data industry practice.
-Data Sheets Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
-Procurement Procurement all involved parties; Review of recognised
specifications Independent Third Party Certification and design
data to confirm that the Vaporiser will be designed,
constructed and tested in accordance with a
recognised international code or standard.
Monitoring fabrication, assembly and testing of
The vaporizer shall safely loading arms for compliance with the design basis.
contain all hydrocarbons at Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
the maximum and minimum -FAT and Testing of the Vaporiser and confirm that it is in
foreseeable pressures, design -ITP compliance with specifications or compatible with
temperatures and operating -Drawings industry practice.
forces. -Material Design Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
Certificates all parties;
-WPQR fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with
Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing
— the equipment is installed in accordance with
design, and any deviations documented and
-Fabrication justified.
Construction — all piping and components are fabricated and
Dossiers
pressure tested in accordance with the design,
and any deviations documented and justified.
— all safety systems are installed inspected and
tested.
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Page 40 – App.B

Specification
To avoid over-pressure, any See verification activity P7 – Pressure Relief Systems
vaporiser that could be
isolated shall be served with
sufficient, adequately sized,
relief devices such that the
system may not be over-
pressured.
Cold Boxes
-Drawings Review specifications and drawings from supplier
-Insulation Design covering insulation material and insulation
specifications containment
Review Cold Box fabrication to confirm:
Cold Box are to be designed -Material
and fabricated to contain the Certificates — Verify the identity of the components being
equipment and provide -Drawings installed within the Cold box
containment of insulation -ITP Construction — Suitable materials have been used
-FAT — Compliance with the design and fabrication
-Fabrication specification with any deviation documented and
dossier justified and that dimensions are within
tolerances defined in the specification
Cold box to be provided with Review Cold Box design to ensure:
adequate and appropriate -Drawings Design That appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc or vent
safety devises to prevent panels) is installed
overpressure within Cold Box Verify that appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc or
enclosure -Drawings Construction vent panels) is installed
Rotating equipment (Pumps and Turbo compressors/expanders)
Review purchase requisitions for Rotating equipment
Review mechanical interface with connected
-Design code equipment and support
-Drawings
Review control and safety system
-Data sheets Design Confirm by review of specifications that rotating
-Critical equipment has adequate seal systems provided and
Equipment List
that appropriate monitoring is provided with
necessary executive actions specified
Review Rotating equipment manufacturing dossiers
to confirm:
Rotating equipment are to be — Specified materials have been used
according to manufacturers — Compliance with the design and fabrication
code and requirements and -Material specification with any deviation documented and
provided with adequate seal Certificates justified and that dimensions are within
system (where relevant) to -Drawings tolerances defined in the specification
Construction
prevent loss of containment of -FAT — FAT are performed and fulfil project
hydrocarbon. -Fabrication specifications
dossier — Where relevant, CE mark certificates are
available
Guidance: DNV CMC procedures to be followed

where relevant.
Confirm by review of commissioning records that
rotating equipment have adequate seal systems
Supplier Data
Commissioning provided and appropriate monitoring is provided and
Vendor P&IDs
executive actions are undertaken as specified by
design.
Valves
Review manufacturing records and quality
The cryogenic valves shall Design code certification to confirm that the valves have been
Procurement
safely contain all Supplier Data designed and fabricated to a recognised international
hydrocarbons at the maximum code or standard.
and minimum foreseeable Review valve design to confirm that:
pressures, design Method
temperatures and operating Statements Design — the correct design conditions are considered
forces. Procedures — the criteria has been correctly applied in
ITPs accordance with the appropriate design codes.
Relief valves
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 41

Specification
Thermal relief valves for the Ensure material compatibility for low temperature
protection of equipment, application.
piping and hoses from over- In addition, see verification activity P7 –Pressure
pressure resulting from Material Relief Systems
ambient heat input to blocked Specifications
in LNG or other light
hydrocarbon liquids shall be
installed.
Re-condensors
Review of recognised Independent Third Party
Certification and design data to confirm that the Re-
Design code
Supplier Data Procurement condensors have been designed, constructed and
tested in accordance with a recognised international
code or standard.
The Re-condensors shall Review re-condenser design to confirm that:
safely contain all
hydrocarbons at the maximum Drawings Design — the correct design conditions are considered
and minimum foreseeable — the criteria has been correctly applied in
pressures, design accordance with the appropriate design codes.
temperatures and operating Review Re-condensors fabrication to confirm:
forces. -Material
Certificates — Suitable materials have been used
-Drawings — Compliance with the design and fabrication
Construction
-FAT specification with any deviation documented and
-Fabrication justified and that dimensions are within
dossier(s) tolerances defined in the specification.
Heat Exchangers
For Shell and Tube heat exchangers - See verification
activity P3 – Non Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and
Equipment
For other Heat exchangers that are not regulated by
codes and standards, a process to be developed to
ensure the equipment is delivered according to
Design project specifications. Review design basis that the
Specifications Design following is considered:
Drawings
— Suitable materials are specified including
cryogenic temperatures
— Design calculations including thermal stresses
— Review mechanical interface with connected
equipment and support
— Review pressure relief system.
Review Heat Exchanger manufacturing dossiers to
confirm:
Material — Specified materials have been used
certificates — That compliance with design and fabrication
Drawings specification with any deviation documented and
Construction justified and that dimensions are within
FAT
Fabrication tolerances defined in the specification
Dossier — FAT are performed and fulfil project
specifications
— Where relevant, CE mark certificates are
available.
Pressure Vessels (for refrigerants)
See verification activity P3 – Non Cryogenic
Pressure Vessels and Equipment
Design Confirm by review of design basis that all relevant
Design design conditions are being considered:
Specifications
— Thermal stresses
— Mechanical properties at low temperatures.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 42 – App.B

Specification
Piping
Check that materials for piping, flanges, fittings and
bolting etc are suitable for low temperature
Material applications.
specifications Piping flexibility analysis shall take into account
Design large temperature variations and mechanical
Design
specifications properties at low temperatures.
Isometric Check water-hammer effects arising from emergency
drawings shutdown of LNG transfer pipeline.
The cryogenic process piping Note: See verification activity P3 – Non Cryogenic
facilities shall safely contain Pressure Vessels and Equipment
all hydrocarbons at the Check that required expansion joints are installed
maximum and minimum
according to project specifications.
foreseeable pressures, design Survey to confirm cryogenic containing piping
temperatures and operating Isometric installed are leak tested and proof tested as
forces.
drawings Construction satisfactory.
ITP
Guidance:
Preference is for pneumatic test if approved by local
Authorities
Confirm by inspection and review of records that
ITP Commissioning required insulation has been installed as per the
design
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 43
Table P5 – LNG storage tanks

LNG Storage Tanks

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shall
LNG Storage Tanks (does not include tanks covered by the Pressure Equipment Directive – EU)
EN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas – General characteristics of liquefied natural gas
EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas – Design of onshore installations
EN 14620-1 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – General
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Metallic components
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Concrete components
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Insulation components
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Testing, drying, purging, and cool-
down
API Standard 620 Design and construction of Large, Welded, Low-pressure Storage Tanks
NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
EN12567 Industrial Valves – Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test
EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service
EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic service
BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service
EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves – Fire type-testing requirements
ASME Section VIII-DIV 2 Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)
API 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure - Relieving Devices in Refineries
API 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and De-pressuring Systems
ASME B31.3 Standards of pressure piping – Process piping
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Requirement
Specification
Site characterization Hazard assessment shall be carried out during the design of the facility and it is also recommended if a major
documentation modification takes place. Methodologies (deterministic and/or probabilistic), hazard identification (external
(weather conditions, and internal origin), estimation of probabilities, and estimation of consequences shall be done in accordance
topography of the to the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project.
ground, site soil
conditions and geology,
natural (lightning, Hazard
flooding, earthquakes, Assessment
tsunamis, etc) and man-
made (projectile
impact, collisions, etc)
hazard potential, etc.
Preliminary design
documents
Confirm by review of design basis, reports, and drawings that all relevant design conditions and phases are
being considered and the load combinations and allowable limits conform to the requirements of the applicable
DET NORSKE VERITAS
The LNG storage tanks and recognised code or standard for the project.
shall safely contain all Adequacy of following items shall be checked:
hydrocarbons at the
maximum and minimum — Materials:
foreseeable pressures (as General for all materials: Strength, fire resistance, behaviour at cryogenic temperature if relevant,
defined for this type of durability
tanks), design
temperatures, normal and Design basis/ — Loads and load combinations for normal and abnormal loading condition: It shall be checked that

abnormal loading specifications following loads are considered:
conditions Material specifications
Design reports — Dead and Live Loads
(including computer — Fire loads
input & output if Design — Other hazards
applicable)
Test reports — Structural analysis: Containment structure shall be analysed as an integrated structure (foundation, wall,
Drawings roof, contained liquid, liner (if acting as structural element) with due consideration of different
Construction construction stages and corresponding loading and discontinuities. Following aspects shall be checked:
procedures
— Material models and parameters shall reflect behaviour at cryogenic and ambient temperatures. Most
critical parameter shall be used in design.
— Boundary conditions shall reflect the different stages of the structure, friction coefficients for sliding
connections shall be at cryogenic temperatures if this is more critical
App.B – Page 44
— Loads, to be combined in accordance with applicable standards
— Reliability of analysis tools shall be documented
— Analysis simplifications shall be conservative related to actual behaviour
— Seismic analysis: Methodology, effects of soil-structure interaction (if relevant), damping, response
spectra reflecting site conditions, load combination. Check of sloshing and adequacy of freeboard.
Page 45 – App.B
Requirement
Specification
— Design:
— Foundation: Covered in a separate checklist.
— Wall: Access openings, closure pours between precast elements (if relevant), connection to
foundation, pre-stressing (losses, anchorages, etc), liquid/vapour tightness, embedment loads, design
for heat flux loadings due to fires, construction joints, and wall penetrations shall be checked. Walls
shall be designed for missile impact. Requirements for liquid/vapour tightness are different for
primary and secondary containments, if applicable. Buckling resistance considering pressure from the
insulation when tank is emptied/heated shall be checked.
— Roof: Composite members, liner, sufficient thickness to provide adequate buckling resistance, design
for missile impact, and thermal resistance to heat flux due to fire
— Floor: Heating system shall be designed to avoid permafrost.
— Insulation: Shall be designed to avoid permafrost and to meet boil-off requirements
— Special considerations for earthquake design: Secondary containment structure shall be designed for
1) SSE 2) SSE aft and spill, and 3) OBE
— Special considerations for steel design: The “elephant’s foot” should be checked for earthquake
loadings. When non-linear analyses methods are used to determine the ultimate strength of a structure
DET NORSKE VERITAS
the following shall be considered:

— The software used shall be documented and tested for the purpose;
— The finite elements and the modelling techniques (element type, mesh, material
parameters, imperfections etc.) should be calibrated against a known case (e.g. from the
design code) in order to show that the failure mechanisms are adequately represented.
The calibration should be documented. All factors that influence the resistance shall be
addressed. Such factors are material non-linearity, imperfections, residual stresses,
external pressure etc.;
— The loading sequence in the analyses should be selected such that the result represents
the conditions to be analysed in a safe way;
— Detailing:
— Metal components
— Liners and coatings
— Anchorage details to concrete base, if required
— Instrumentation: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: liquid level
indicators and/or switches, pressure indicators and/or switches, temperature indicators and/or switches,
density indicator.
— Pressure and vacuum protection: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards:
pressure relief valves, rupture disc, gas injection system, vacuum relief valves, etc.
— Safety equipment: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: anti-roll-over
devices, protection against lightning, sensors to monitor temperature, heating system control, foundation
settlement, leaks.
— Piping: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: Cool down piping, filling piping.
Requirement
Specification
Confirm by review of relevant documentation that constructions procedures are in compliance with the
requirements of the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project. LNG storage tanks shall be
Construction installed in accordance with design and any deviations shall be duly documented and approved.
procedures Confirm that a satisfactory level of inspection for all systems is performed by relevant/competent parties.
Specification for Confirm that fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with the specification for fabrication,
fabrication installation and testing.
Inspection and testing Adequacy of following items shall be checked:
plans and reports — dimensions and tolerances (should be within design assumptions)
Design basis/ Construction — material specification compliance
specifications — pre-stressing and post-tensioning systems (anchorages, forces, sequence of stressing), if relevant
Material specifications — forming and forming removal, if relevant
Design reports — construction joints, if relevant
Drawings — embedment’s, if relevant
Qualification of — coatings (liquid/vapour barrier for concrete)
welding procedures — corrosion protection (steel outer tank and roof)
— welding qualification
DET NORSKE VERITAS
— non-destructive testing (NDT) of welds.

Confirm that following operations are performed according to the requirements of the applicable and
Design basis/
specifications recognised code or standard for the project and the design basis:
Testing including: hydrostatic testing, liquid tightness testing, pneumatic testing, pressure and vacuum testing.
Drawings Commissioning
Testing, commissioning Purging into service, cool-down operation, and LNG tank filling.
Purging out of service and warm up.
records
Records of all the previously mentioned operations shall be kept.

Note:
If needed during the course of the project and evaluation, DNV has an extensive database containing data, formulae, etc pertaining to the risk and evaluation of different types of LNG
tanks and configurations.
App.B – Page 46
App.B – Page 47
Table P6 – Open hazardous drains

HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROCESS HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Open Hazardous Drains

OBJECTIVES: To remove hydrocarbon and hazardous spillage from process and utility areas and to prevent the spread
of hydrocarbon spilled inventory to adjacent areas.
Open Hazardous Drains System.
NFPA 59
EN1473
Drainage Systems
Performance Requirement Document Phase Verification Activity

Specification Types:
Confirm by review of the project studies that the
Design hazardous drains system is consistent with the project
Hazardous requirements and fire zone layout philosophy
Drains Design Review utility P&IDs to confirm that open drains are
Open drainage system to Specifications specified for all open areas where hydrocarbons may be
remove deluge, rainwater and Hazardous Design present, and that the drains terminate either at an open
spills from all open areas Drains Dwgs. drains tank or the contaminated fire water pond.
where hydrocarbons may be P&IDs
present, terminating either at Plot Plans Review open drain system design to confirm that it is
an open drains tank or the sized to remove spills, deluge water and rainwater from
Design
contaminated fire water pond. all open areas and drain lines are sloping as specified
with no pockets.
Confirm by survey that the bunds are installed where
P&IDs Construction required and have connections to the open drainage
system in accordance with the P&IDs.
Confirm by survey that impoundment basin(s) are
Impounding basins shall consistent with project requirements. Areas of concern
prevent cryogenic liquid from are:
damaging important
equipment, structures or — process areas
flammable fluids entering the Plot Plans Design — vaporization areas
surface water drainage GA Drawings — transfer areas for LNG, flammable refrigerants and
system. Hazardous flammable liquids
An LNG spill within the Drains Dwgs. — areas immediately surrounding flammable
process and transfer areas refrigerant and flammable liquid storage tanks.
shall be confined in the Review project documentation that the spill collection
vicinity of or remote from the Design area and the impounding basin is connected by open
spill collection area. The spill channel(s)
collection area and the
impounding basin shall be Confirm by survey that the impoundment basins are
P&IDs
connected by open channel(s) Plot Plans Construction installed where required and have connections to
channels in accordance with the P&IDs/Plot Plans.
Segregate hazardous and non Confirm by review of P&IDs that the design of
hazardous open and closed hazardous and non hazardous open and closed drains
drains to prevent migration of P&IDs
Design
prevents the migration of vapour between systems.
vapour between systems.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 48 – App.B
Table P7 – Pressure relief systems

Pressure Relief Systems

OBJECTIVES: The role of relief systems is to protect process systems from over-pressurisation.
To reduce to ALARP the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressure owing
to pressure control device failure, isolated and “locked in” equipment, overheating or fire impingement. To safely dispose
of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves, lifting of relief
valves, draining and maintenance depressurisation.
Relief/ safety valves
Relief system network (included in relief system activities)
Flare header and flare system are not part of this HSE Critical System
API RP 520 Sizing, selection and installation of pressure-relieving devices in refineries
API 521 Pressuring relieving and de-pressuring systems (equivalent to ISO 23251 Petroleum and natural gas industry –
Pressure-relieving and de-pressuring systems
Guidance note: The following specifications can be useful:
ISO10418 Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Offshore production installations -- Analysis, design, installation and
testing of basic surface process safety systems
API 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for
Offshore Production Platforms

The maximum allowable back P&IDs Confirm by review of the relief study and process
pressure and minimum design Relief System simulations that the maximum allowable back
temperature of the relief Design Basis Design pressure and minimum design temperature of the
system shall be suitable for the Relief Sizing relief system shall be suitable for the highest
highest identified flow rate. Calcs. identified flow rate.
Confirm by review of P&IDs that sufficient relief
P&IDs Design devices have been provided such that the system may
not be over-pressurised.
Relief Valve Confirm by review of process calculations and data
Sizing Calcs. sheets that PSVs capacity sizing basis and inlet
Relief Valve Design pressure drops are such that they will relieve
pressures in excess of system design pressure, with
Data Sheets
reference to applicable specifications.
The hydrocarbon containing Confirm by review of manufacturer’s data sheet and
system shall be served with calculations that PSVs have adequate capacity for the
sufficient, adequately sized, required flow rate to ensure that they will relieve
relief devices such that the Vendor Data Design pressures in excess of system design pressure and that
system may not be over- selection of device is appropriate for the specified
pressured. conditions (suitable for flow, fluid phase, back
pressure, etc.)
Confirm by inspection and review of mechanical
ITPs Construction completion records that the PSVs are of the correct
type and sizing as per the P&IDs/data sheets.
Confirm by inspection that inlet pipe-work to
relieving devices is located satisfactorily in relation
ITPs Construction
to potential restrictions (e.g. above liquid levels,
vessel internals, etc.).
It shall not be possible to Confirm by review of P&IDs that isolation valves for
simultaneously obstruct all relieving devices are specified as per the project
P&IDs Design specifications and that no protected equipment may
relief routes from any
protected equipment to the be isolated from the disposal system.
disposal system (e.g. by Confirm by sample inspection that all isolation valves
locking off both isolation ITPs Commissioning for relieving devices are installed as verified in the
valves at once) above activity.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 49
P&IDs Confirm by review of all vent locations (atmospheric

Equipment vent from drums or equipment seals) that they vent to
Plant Layouts Design safe location and in the event of liquid carry over will
Piping not discharge to areas that may cause a hazard to
Hydrocarbon liquids shall not Isometrics personnel.
be discharged from relieving Relief Sizing Relief drum sizing shall be sufficient to ensure no
devices or vents such that they Calculations liquid carry over to the flare system under highest
Design
are a hazard to personnel. Data Sheets identified flow rate conditions
P&IDs
P&IDs Confirm by visual inspection that vent locations are
Equipment in safe locations.
Plant Layouts Construction
Piping
Isometrics
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 50 – App.B
Table C1 - Ignition prevention and control system

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: IGNITION CONTROL HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Ignition Prevention and Control Systems Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To reduce to ALARP, the probability that a release of flammable gas will encounter a source of ignition
by:
— applying hazardous area classification and specifying the degree of protection required for electrical apparatus to be
used in hazardous areas.
— providing adequate ventilation
— isolating electric power supplies to apparatus which might provide a source of ignition.
— preventing hot surfaces causing ignition.
— providing earthing continuity.
All electrical equipment and instrumentation which must function within a potentially flammable atmosphere;
All exposed surfaces;
Earthing continuity for all equipment, structures and piping;
Fire dampers in all “rated” fire divisions and boundaries.
RELEVANT CODES AND SPECIFICATIONS
IP Code Part 15 (Area Classification of Petroleum Installations)
IEC 60079 -10-1, Classification of Areas – Explosive Gas Atmospheres
IEC 60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code)
API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities
ISO13732-1 Ergonomics of the thermal environment – Methods for the assessment of human responses to contact with
surfaces Part 1:Hot surfaces
Building Safety Regulations
Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation
Certified Electrical Equipment
Cargo Tank Inert Gas System
Earthing and Bonding Systems
Ignition Control Components
ATEX 99/92 (for EU projects only)
ATEX 94/9 (for EU projects only)
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 51

Review the area classification layouts and associated
studies to confirm that:
all possible Hazards have been appropriately
Table of considered, (including possible migration)
Hazardous the hazardous area drawings correctly account for
Sources the actual location of the sources of release
Hazardous the hazardous areas have been appropriately defined
Area and all areas have sufficient ACPH in accordance
Classification Design with the chosen design code.
Areas where potentially Layouts
hazardous concentrations of Vent inlets and outlets are correctly located in
Hazardous accordance with code requirements.
flammable gas may occur shall Area
be an electrically classified Classification Guidance:
Hazardous area, in accordance Criteria Design documentation relevant to the review will
with specifications. include but not limited to: Gas release and
dispersion study; Schedule of hazardous releases;
FERA study; and CFD study as applicable
Hazardous Confirm by Survey:
Area the hazardous area drawings correctly account for
Classification Construction the actual location of the sources of release
Layouts vent inlets and outlets are correctly located in
Equipment accordance with design documents
Layouts
Hazardous area
equipment
register Confirm by review of appropriate data that electrical
Mechanical & Electrical Hazardous area and mechanical equipment is correctly certified for
equipment installed in areas layout the hazardous area in which it is to be located and
where an accumulation of that a complete Hazardous Area Equipment Register
drawings
accidentally released Equipment Design has been developed.
hazardous flammable gas or Hazardous
vapours can occur shall be Guidance: Appropriate documentation will include
Area independent third party Hazardous Area
appropriate for the area Certification
classification. Certification, compliance review reports
Schedule of Engineering & Procurement Contractors.
hazardous
releases
Guidance: For compliance to Confirm by review of independent third party ATEX
IP Code Part 15 (Area or equivalent compliance review reports
Classification of Petroleum Hazardous area (Construction Contractors) that instrument &
Installations), all fire and gas equipment electrical equipment is correctly certified for the
detection equipment, ESD register hazardous area in which it is installed and it has been
Process Field Devices and Hazardous area Construction installed in accordance with any special conditions
ESD Driven actuating devices layout of use. Confirm that a complete and accurate as built
shall be certified for use in a drawings ATEX Register has been developed (for EU
Zone 1, Gas Group IIA ITPs projects).
temperature class T3
Hazardous Area
Confirm by review of independent third party
All externally located
Ingress protection compliance review reports
Instrument and Electrical
equipment is compliant with Vendor Data Design (Engineering & Procurement Contractors) that
the project requirements in instrument & electrical equipment is correctly
certified for the minimum project requirement e.g.
meeting specifications.
IP Rating 56. or NEMA 4/4X.
Hazardous area Confirm by review of the philosophy that all
All equipment shall be isolated equipment external electrical equipment that is to remain live
on confirmed gas detection. register Design following a confirmed gas release is suitable for
All external electrical Shutdown Zone 1 hazardous area use and that all other
equipment that is to remain Philosophy equipment is isolated on confirmed gas detection
live shall be suitable for Zone
1 hazardous area use. Confirm by survey and function test that the
ITPs Commissioning installed equipment is either appropriate for zone 1
use or isolated on confirmed gas detection.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 52 – App.B

Earthing Confirm by sample design review that equipment
philosophy for and structures are suitably earthed and comply with
All structures, equipment and all production requirements of specifications. Review to include
piping shall be suitably equipment but not be limited to:
earthed to prevent a potential including Design
ignition source, by build up of piping. — electrical earthing specification
a differential potential Frame/ — electrical earthing drawings
between adjacent equipment structure — electrical earthing typical detail drawings.
and/or structures drawings
Confirm by sample survey that the installed
ITPs Construction equipment and structures are correctly earthed
Surface temperatures of Confirm by design review of the equipment data
exposed equipment and pipe- sheets, piping schedule / list; piping lagging
work where flammable P&IDs schedule and P&IDs that equipment and pipe-work
vapours or gas may Piping Design located where flammable vapours or gas may
accumulate shall be less than Isometrics accumulate shall have exposed surface temperatures
the minimum temperature as lower than the hazardous area temperature
defined by the hazardous area classification.
temperature classification in Insulation Confirm by review of the insulation specification
accordance with Specification Design and P&IDs that appropriate equipment and piping
specifications. P&IDs protection is specified and meets specifications.
Guidance: All exposed parts Confirm by survey that all equipment or pipe-work
of equipment or surfaces which is expected to have a high surface temperature
having surface temperatures is correctly lagged such that the exposed surface
of more than 70°C or less than ITPs Construction temperature meets design and specifications.
-10°C shall be protected to
avoid direct contact with
personnel.
Confirm by review of D&IDs that HVAC is
D&IDs Design provided to enclosed areas and that it is specified to
provide positive air pressure.
HVAC systems shall provide Review Cause and Effects to confirm that there is an
positive air pressure within F&G Cause alarm in a normally manned area on reduction of the
each enclosed area to inhibit and Effects Design differential pressure below the threshold pressure.
gas ingress; a reduction in D&IDs
Guidance: threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.
differential pressure below 50
Pa shall alarm in a normally Confirm by survey and witness Function tests, that
manned area or agreed for the the HVAC systems provides positive air pressure
project. within each enclosed area and that a reduction in
ITPs Commissioning differential pressure below the threshold pressure,
alarms in a normally manned area.
Guidance: threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.
Confirm by review of safety studies and detector
Safety Concept specifications that temperature set point specified
Vendor Data for each damper is appropriate
F&G Detection Design
Fire dampers to close on fire Criteria Note: all dampers in rated fire divisions and
detection and be fail safe on boundaries
loss of control signal Confirm by sample witness function test, that fire
dampers automatically close on fire activation of the
ITPs Commissioning frangible bulb / fusible loop or similar and fail safe
on loss of control signal
F&G Cause Review Cause and Effects to confirm that HVAC
HVAC dampers to close and and Effects dampers are specified to close within the specified
all HVAC fans to trip within Design
Vendor Data maximum duration on confirmed detection of smoke
the specified maximum D&IDs or gas at the ventilation inlet
duration of confirmed smoke
or gas detection at the Confirm by witness function test that the HVAC
Commissioning dampers
ventilation inlet to enclosed close and all HVAC fans trip within the
ITPs
areas. specified duration or less on confirmed detection of
smoke or gas at the ventilation inlet.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 53
Table C2 - Emergency shutdown system

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Emergency Shutdown System Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
 
OBJECTIVES: To provide facilities which detect abnormal conditions and initiate appropriate shutdown and isolation
actions to minimise the likelihood of escalation into a major hazardous event and to minimise the duration of any such
event.
ESD System (including field initiation devices and output driven executive action safety function devices)
ESD Valves – Incoming and recirculation piping and other ESD valves considered critical
EN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – ship to shore interface (move to control and ESD)
IEC-61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems
IEC 61511 Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
ANSI/ISA-91.00.01-2001 Identification of Emergency Shutdown Systems and Controls that are Critical to Maintaining
Safety in Process Industries
SIGTTO ESD Systems & Linked Ship/Shore Systems on Liquefied Gas Carriers (for Marine Transfer Facilities)

Confirm by review of the ESD system hierarchy and
ESD Shutdown project Safety Concept that all types of scenarios,
Philosophy associated hazardous conditions and required
ESSA executive actions have been identified correctly.
ESD and F&G Initiators and shutdown levels shall be in
Cause and Design compliance with project requirements.
The ESD System shall Effect
continuously monitor all Safety Concept Guidance: In the case of LNG facilities,
instrumentation and devices HAZOPs consideration shall be given to combined shutdown
associated with the system to P&IDs operations of LNG vessel during loading/unloading
provide a systematic means of and the shore based facilities.
processing the signals and Confirm by review of P&IDs and system
carrying out necessary architecture that appropriate process and utility
automatic alarm and executive inputs are specified for the appropriate hazards
actions. P&IDs
Safety Concept Design identified in the ESD system hierarchy and Safety
The system shall be resistant to Concept. Confirm the compliance of process and
single fault failure, and the utility causes for ESD shutdown according to project
system as a direct consequence requirements.
of any single accident or fault ESD and F&G Confirm by review of ESD and F&G Cause & Effect
shall not be disabled and shall Cause and diagrams that the appropriate executive actions are
remain capable of identifying Effects Design undertaken by the ESD system in response to the
the hazard for which it has ESD Hierarchy detected hazard. Consideration should be taken of
been provided. Logic the conclusion identified in preceding activities.
Confirm by witness of function testing that the ESD
control system undertakes appropriate executive
ITPs Commissioning actions in response to the detected hazard in
accordance with the ESD and F&G Cause & Effect
diagrams
Ship to Control Confirm by design review of the ESD control
Schematic system, jetty control panel arrangement drawing and
ESD Cause & Ship to Control schematic that the means of
Design
There shall be means of Effect manually initiating an ESD from a normally manned
manually initiating an ESD ESD pushbutton area has been specified.
from a normally manned area. layout
Confirm by Survey and function test, that the means
ITPs Commissioning of manually initiating an ESD from a normally
manned area has been provided
Confirm by design review of ESDV hydraulic &
Instrument P&IDs that all ESD devices move to
P&IDs
Design their safe condition (fail safe) on loss of system
All ESD devices shall move to Function testing output or electrical / hydraulic power or instrument
their safe condition on loss of air.
system output, hydraulic
power or instrument air. Confirm by witness sample of function tests and
ITPs Commissioning review of records that all ESD devices move to their
safe condition (fail safe) on loss of system output or
electrical / hydraulic power or instrument air.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 54 – App.B

Vendor data For ESDVs specified on the PIDs, review the safety
HAZID studies and layouts to confirm that the fire and
Equipment Design explosion scenarios which may affect the ESDVs or
Layouts their actuators have been identified and confirm
P&IDs which ESDVs and actuators will require protection.
Review the design and fabrication data for ESDVs
which require protection to ensure that they are
All ESDVs and actuators shall suitably protected against relevant hazards
remain functional following an
explosion or under fire Guidance: Where protection or PFP or other
conditions for a sufficient time Vendor data and Design protection is required for either valves or actuators
period to perform their calculations then review vendor drawings, calculations, test data
intended function. and relevant certificates [including explosion
survivability calculations for the actuators]
provided by vendor to confirm that the specified
protection is suitable and sufficient for the
applicable fire and explosion scenarios.
Survey all ESDVs and actuators to confirm that they
ITPs Construction are installed in the correct location and protected as
required
Safety Concept Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable
Cable requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule
specification that all cables associated with the ESD system are
ESD system cables shall be fire Cable schedule Design fire resistant.
resistant to Specifications. As Cable Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a
far as is reasonably practical, requisition and minimum to maintain availability of the system.
ESD system cables shall be vendor data
protected from mechanical
damage. Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed
Cable
specification are fire resistant. Cable markings and certification
Construction shall be verified as being compliant.
Cable
Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as far
Certification
as is possible, protected from mechanical damage.
HAZID Review the safety studies to determine that credible
FERA event scenarios which may affect the ESD Panel and
Design
Equipment associated equipment along with the time required to
layouts complete ESD have been clearly identified.
ESD panels and associated HAZID Confirm by documentation review that the ESD
equipment shall be protected FERA panel and associated equipment is protected from
against fire, blast and dropped Building the identified credible event scenarios.
objects, such that its ability to structural All aspects of the building design relevant to
function is not impaired until calculations maintaining the integrity of the ESD system (to fulfil
ESD is complete. JCR, SS and Design its function in an emergency situation for the
ITR equipment required duration) shall be confirmed as being
room(s) heat acceptable for the identified hazard conditions.
rise study
Equipment
layouts
Safety Concept Confirm by review of vendor data and SIL
SIL Assessment Assessment Study that the ESD System and
The ESD System shall have a Study associated loops are based on a probability of failure
minimum SIL rating and meet SIL on demand as defined in the relevant specifications.
the requirements of the SIL Classification
Classification Study. Study Design
SIL Verification
Guidance: Hazard Studies are Report
used to decide SIL rating Vendor
Verification
Report
Hydraulic / Pneumatic vent Confirm by Inspection that the Hydraulic /
lines from ESDV valve Pneumatic vent lines from ESDV actuators have
actuators to be located so they been located so they are not (as far as practicable)
are not (as far as practicable) ITPs
Construction vulnerable to mechanical damage.
vulnerable to mechanical
damage
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 55
Table C3 – Blowdown system

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: SHUTDOWN HAZARD MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
Blowdown System
 
OBJECTIVES: To enable rapid depressurisation of the gas inventory so as to minimise the potential for escalation of the
initiating event. To reduce the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressure
owing to pressure control device failure, isolated and “locked in” equipment, overheating or fire impingement. To safely
dispose of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves, lifting of
relief valves, opening of emergency blow-down valves and manual purging, draining and maintenance depressurisation.
Functionality of relief valves / blow-down valves; Knock out drum; HP & LP system
Note, hydrocarbon containment of relief, flare and vent lines is covered by the hydrocarbon containment performance
requirement
ISO 4126 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure
EN 764-7 Pressure equipment Safety systems for unfired pressure equipment
API 521/ISO2351 Pressure relieving and de-pressuring systems
API520 PT 1&2 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices in Refineries Sizing and Section and
Installation

Confirm by review of the safety studies and HAZOP
Report that a suitable blow down time has been
Design derived accounting for, but not limited to, the balance
between potential for escalation, PFP requirements
and material selection.
Blow down Confirm by review of the blow-down study and
study to process simulations that the inventory shall be blown
incorporate Design
down within a time period suitable to ensure that
results of escalation of the incident does not occur.
FERA
HAZOP Report Confirm by review of the PIDs that isolatable
Design sections are specified in accordance with the blow
Inventory shall be blown- down requirements
down to a sufficiently low
Review blow-down orifice data sheets and sizing
pressure within a time period
Design calculations and confirm these comply with
suitable to ensure that no appropriate codes and process design data.
significant escalation of the
incident occurs. Confirm by witness of blow-down tests that the
process inventory is to blow-down to a sufficiently
low pressure within the correct time period, in the
correct valve sequence and without exceeding the
minimum design temperature
Commissioning Guidance: This is achieved by a full blow-down from
operating pressures then making a comparison of the
field data obtained with the process models and
calculations developed for the design case to confirm
the suitability of the latter. Special consideration is
given to blow-down of liquid containers in LNG
facilities.
Confirm by review of the blow-down study and
Design of relief
system process simulations that the maximum allowable
The maximum allowable back Blow down Design back pressure and minimum design temperature of
pressure and minimum design study the relief system shall be suitable for the highest
temperature of the relief identified flow rate.
system shall be suitable for Confirm by review of records that the blow-down
the highest identified flow valves, blow-down restriction orifice and blow-
rate. Construction down/cold vent piping (including sizing and
approximate routing) has been installed in
accordance with the design.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 56 – App.B

Blow down will be primarily Confirm by review of Cause & Effect Diagrams that
manually operated and if no blow-down shall be primarily manually operated and
operator intervention within if no operator intervention within a project specified
the 3 minutes time period then time period then will be automatically initiated on:
will be automatically initiated Design
on: - confirmed fire detection in a hazardous area
Cause and - confirmed gas detection
- confirmed fire detection in Effects - signal from the installation control room
a hazardous area Diagrams - manual push-buttons in control room.
- confirmed gas detection Confirm by witness of test that blow-down is initiated
- signal from the installation
in accordance with the Cause & Effect Diagrams.
control room Construction
- manual push-buttons in
control room.
The blow down system shall Design Review to confirm that blow-down system has been
be designed and fabricated calculations Design designed such that the risk of significant escalation
such that the risk of P&IDs due to failure to achieve blow down is ALARP.
significant escalation due to Confirm by witness test and review of records that
failure to achieve blow down blow-down valves function as required by design.
is according to the defined
safety objectives.
P&IDs
Guidance: Scenarios to be Construction
ITP
considered should include the
potential for loss of actuating
media and / or loss of signal
from the ESD System.
Confirm by review P&IDs and piping drawings that
all flare, relief and blowdown lines are self draining,
Liquid accumulation shall be P&IDs Design and where low points are unavoidable these have an
prevented in the relief and appropriate drain connection with locked open
disposal system such that the isolation valve.
route from protected Confirm by sample inspection and review of records
equipment to the flare tip or that all flare, relief and blowdown lines are self
vent shall not be impaired. P&IDs Construction draining, and where low points are unavoidable these
have an appropriate drain connection with locked
open isolation valve.
Flare tip or the vent shall be Confirm by review of the Flare Design Report and
located such that: Ventilation Studies that the flare tip positions have
It limits the risk of an un- Operating Design been selected such that the risk of an un-ignited gas
ignited release from forming a philosophy; release resulting in a flammable cloud over the
flammable cloud in areas of Flare tip Installation is minimised.
the Installation where ignition selection
Flare vendor Confirm by review of the Flare Design Report and
may occur Flare Radiation Study that the radiation levels as
An ignited release in the calculations Design
specified in the performance requirement are not
vicinity of the flare or vent exceeded or that protection is provided.
does not exceed maximum
allowable radiation limits in Confirm by inspection that the flare tips are located in
normally manned areas and accordance with the design
on escape routes.
Guidance: Typical allowable Specifications
limits are: Construction
Drawings
(i) short term heat radiation
6.31 kW/m2
(ii) continuous radiation not
more than 1.58 kW/m2.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 57

Confirm by review of P&IDs that a gas purge is
specified for the flare system, and by review of
Design
calculations; confirm it is capable of preventing air
ingress into the system.
Flare system Confirm by review of P&IDs that any valves in the
design Design purge gas supply are specified as either ‘locked open’
P&IDs
Air ingress to the disposal or ‘normally open’.
system shall be prevented in Confirm by review of P&IDs that instrumentation is
order to prevent an explosion Design specified to alert the operator in the event of a loss of
hazard in the system. purge gas (low pressure or low flow)
Confirm by review of records that the gas purge
P&IDs Construction
system is installed in accordance with the design.
Confirm by review of commissioning records that the
Commissioning purge system functions in accordance with the design
Commissioning
reports requirements, including means of alerting the
operator of loss of purge gas.
By reviewing the blow-down study in conjunction
with the P&IDs and the purchase order data, confirm
Blow-down valves, including Blow-down Design
that all BDVs and actuators have sufficient protection
those with a time delay study measures specified for their intended purpose
specified prior to opening Purchase Confirm by review of calculations, certification or
shall remain functional requisitions type test data that all blow-down valve and actuator
following an explosion and Vendor data Design assemblies will open following the maximum
under fire loading for a specified blast overpressure and under the
sufficient time to perform
appropriate fire loading.
their intended function
Confirm by survey that all specified protection
Drawings Construction
measures are correctly provided
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 58 – App.B
Table C4 - Fire and gas detection system

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: DETECTION HAZARD MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
Fire and Gas Detection System
 
OBJECTIVES: To detect flammable gas releases, fires and smoke in designated areas of the gas installation and initiate
the appropriate emergency response.
All fire and gas detection, logic and outputs to ESD System
Includes executive actions driven directly from the F&G system
Excludes: Control devices initiated by the ESD System as a result of outputs from the fire and gas detection system
Including High Sensitivity Smoke Detection System in Control and Switch Gear Rooms.
IEC 60331 Tests for electric cables under fire conditions
NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code

The F&G system shall Confirm by review of the safety studies that all
continually monitor for fire, F&G Detection
hazardous conditions which are required to be
smoke and flammable gas in all Layout
detected by the fire & gas system have been
areas of the berth where a risk identified and dimensioned.
F&G
of flammable gas accumulation Philosophy
may occur (including HVAC ESD and F&G
inlets and airlocks) and initiate
Cause & Effect
appropriate status and alarm HAZID
signals. FERA study
Design
Detectors shall be located,
Schedule of
spaced and voted such that a hazardous
hazardous condition is detected releases
before significant damage or
Hazardous area
escalation occurs drawings /
Alarm signals shall be relayed layouts
to a normally manned area and
appropriate actions taken.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 59

F&G Detection Confirm by design review that the type and location,
Layouts spacing and voting of detection devices is
Detector appropriate to the identified and dimensioned
Vendor hazardous conditions.
performance Type and location of all detection devices (including
data MACs, all Fire and Smoke detection (both indoor
Schedule of and outdoor) and hydrocarbon gas detection,
hazardous including battery room) shall comply with the
Design
releases project requirements
Hazardous area
Guidance: drawings /
layouts
— distribute appropriate FERA study
output signals to the ESD Gas release and
system for implementation dispersion
of shutdown actions study
— Installation and Jetty Confirm by review of the Cause and Effect
general alarm (GA) on F&G Detection diagrams, in conjunction with the detector layouts
confirmed fire or gas Layout that the appropriate executive actions and status /
detection Fire and Gas alarm signals are undertaken by the F&G control
— fire-pump start on Design system in response to the detected hazard.
Philosophy
confirmed fire detection in ESD and F&G
open areas Guidance: Check interactions with ESD are
Cause & Effect appropriate and confirm logic for the F&G actions
— Fire and Gas detection
placement to be in is in compliance with the project requirements.
accordance with project Confirm by Survey, that the detector coverage as
specifications Design installed meets the intent of the conclusions
Drawings Construction identified in design.
ITPs All deviations from the accepted detector layouts to
be justified.
Confirm by witness function test, that the F&G
control system undertakes appropriate executive
Design actions and status / alarm signals in response to the
Drawings Commissioning detected hazard in accordance with the Cause &
ITPs Effect diagrams and within the time periods
stipulated by the design [time to closure of ESDVs
shall be confirmed through this activity].
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 60 – App.B

Fire and Gas Detector cables specification that all cables associated with the F&G detectors are
shall be fire resistant to project Cable schedule Design fire resistant.
specifications Cable Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a
As far as is reasonably requisition and minimum to maintain availability of the system.
practical, Fire and Gas Detector vendor data
cables shall be protected from Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed
mechanical damage. Cable
are fire resistant. Cable markings and certification
specification
Construction shall be verified as being compliant.
Cable
Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as far
Certification
as is possible, protected from mechanical damage.
Safety Concept Confirm by review of vendor data and SIL
SIL Assessment Study that the F&G System and
Assessment associated loops are based on a probability of failure
The Fire and Gas Control Study on demand as defined in IEC-61508 and IEC 61511,
System shall have a minimum SIL and meets Performance requirements.
SIL rating as specified for the Classification
Project. Study Design
SIL
Guidance: Hazard Studies are Verification
used to decide SIL rating Report
Vendor
Verification
Report
Confirm by design review that the Fire and Gas
Safety Concept Control System is appropriately protected [by
The F&G system shall be HAZID
protected against fire, blast and location or otherwise].
Fire & Blast Review to include but not be limited to:
dropped objects, such that its
study
ability to function is not Building — HAZID
impaired either during a major Structural — fire & blast study
accident event and/or for a Design
Design — building structural design
specified minimum duration Equipment — equipment room(s) heat rise study
thereafter. room(s) heat — equipment layouts.
Control System shall include all
rise study
status monitoring and actions to Equipment This activity shall, if possible, be combined with
and from the Control Rooms. layouts similar activities where the protection of the ESD
System is assessed.
Table M1 – Fire and blast protection systems

HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROTECTION SYSTEMS HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Fire and Blast Protection Systems Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To protect key items of the Installation or structure against fire and explosion, where failure of these items
could result in major escalation of an initial event.
To provide and aid in fire recovery by provision of equipment and devices allowing application of fire fighting agents for
control or extinguishing by automatically or manually controlled methods.
To cover fighting of fire hazards at the Installation facilities including the following fire protection systems:
Passive Fire Protection, Firewater Pumps, Deluge System, Foam and Water System, Water Curtains, Total Gaseous
Extinguishing System
(if provided for Building protection)
Fire-Zone Layout
Hazardous Area classification
Fire-Water systems
Fire Extinguishing systems
Passive Fire Protection
NFPA 2001
NFPA 20 Fire Water Pumps
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 61

Specification
Basis of Design Confirm that accident scenarios with the potential to
Safety Philosophy cause escalation have been identified and
HAZID Design dimensioned correctly.
QRA / FERA Review the safety studies to confirm that the
ESSA proposed fire and explosion loadings are justified
Fire Protection Review the fire protection philosophy (or similar) to
Philosophy ensure that all the identified accident scenarios are
Design
Fire System Basis correctly mitigated by an appropriate combination
of Design of active and passive fire protection
PFP Specifications Ensure that correctly dimensioned PFP is specified
Material for equipment and structures as required
Certificates commensurate with the hazards.
Calculations Design
application
schedule
Design Drawings
Approved Design Survey to ensure that PFP is installed in line with the
Coating Records Construction design.
ITP
Fire Protection Ensure that deluge coverage and rates are
Philosophy appropriately specified for the relevant hazards
Design
Fire System Basis using appropriate extinguishing medium (water/
of Design foam).
Calculations – Design review to ensure the fire water supply chain
amount required supply and distribution is adequate:
All hydrocarbon and storage Sufficient firewater and foam available
containment equipment sizing calcs. Firewater pumps sized correctly
and piping with the Hydraulic analysis Firewater system sized adequately
potential to give rise to P&IDs Design Firewater system routed correctly and adequately
significant escalation Layouts & (proven by hydraulic analysis)
hazards are to withstand Calculations Confirm the correct number, location and type of
the effects of an explosion Material deluge nozzles (or other firewater application
followed by fire Specifications systems as specified)
impingement with no loss Fabrication Specs Suitable materials and fabrication process specified
of containment before the Fabrication Design review to ensure firewater system is
Installation inventory has specifications designed to survive foreseeable loadings and
been reduced to a safe level Corrosion accidental events
(blowdown is complete) Protection Corrosion
and personnel have DO study Supply routed to avoid or be protected from dropped
escaped to a place of ISO Drawings objects.
safety. Piping GAs Supplied by duplicated feeds from separated
Design
Surge Analysis isolatable section of firewater ring main.
P&IDs Deluge valve sets located as far as practicable from
Fire zone location the fire areas they serve
plot plans Firewater system suitably design to be capable for
Equipment layouts withstanding all foreseeable extremes of operating,
Pipe stress pressure and temperate (including water hammer
Analysis and transient effects from surge or water hammer).
Survey to ensure the firewater system is fabricated
and installed as specified in the design:
Pumps
Routing
Approved Design Sections/isolation
Documentation Construction Nozzle layout
ITPs Fabrication and workmanship
Materials
Deluge Valve set locations
Pipe supports
Mechanical completion records
Design review to confirm the correct initiators, for
F&G / ESD C&Es active fire protection systems, are specified and
F&G / ESD included in the ESD executive actions:
Specifications F&G/ESD initiation
Design
Active Fire Manual initiation
Fighting Fusible loop initiation
Philosophy Fail safe initiation (loss of IA or hydraulic pressure)
Time from initiation to supply specified in design
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Page 62 – App.B

Specification
Survey and witness test to ensure firewater/foam is
ITPs Commissioning supplied when initiated (check each initiator in
every fire zone including fusible loop).
Firewater and Survey to confirm the required coverage is achieved
Foam Protection in each fire zone.
Commissioning
Layouts
P&IDs
Visual Inspection Confirm the firewater is supplied within the time
Commissioning Commissioning specified in the design.
Test Reports
The reliability / availability Confirm by review of the Fire Protection
of fire water system shall Active Fire philosophy [or other relevant documents] that the
be commensurate with the Protection Design hazards have been identified and the appropriate
identified hazards and in Philosophy Reliability and Availability has been specified
accordance with project Fire Water System commensurate with the identified hazards.
requirements and fire Design Basis Confirm the reliability and availability of fire water
protection philosophy Design
system in accordance with the project requirements.
Specified critical buildings DALS (design Confirm by review of the DALS that critical
and control rooms accidental load Design buildings and control rooms are in accordance with
normally occupied by specification) the project requirements.
personnel shall survive Confirm by visual inspection that construction
blast loads defined by the ITP Construction complies with the requirements of the design
project
Specified critical building Building structural Confirm by review of building design that internal
and enclosure boundaries design Design boundary rated divisions comply with the project
shall prevent passage of documentation requirements.
Fire & Smoke and Confirm by visual inspection that rated divisions
maintain an acceptable comply with the requirements of the design. All
temperature on the inner penetrations through rated divisions shall maintain
surface when subject to fire ITPs Construction
the rating of the division certification shall be
load exposure for the time reviewed for compliance.
specified
Building and Confirm by review that all building areas and
Enclosure Design enclosures requiring protection have been correctly
Extinguishing identified and that the correct extinguishing system
Specifications has been selected.
Buildings and enclosures Review area protection plans and vendor data, and
shall be protected by total Vendor Drawings confirm that enclosures have been specified to be
flooding systems where equipped with an appropriate flooding system as
and Discharge
required at concentration Calculations appropriately defined in the project specifications
levels and flow-rates in Equipment and and that total flooding extinguishing systems
accordance with project Design provided meet the specific discharge requirements
Building Layouts
requirements. The follow System Schematics (volumes, rates, type, etc.) of each protected area
up flow shall be sufficient System Logic and and the system requirements (interlock, discharge
to compensate for leakage. alarms, systems control, feedback, 100% back-up,
Control Drawings etc…) of the applicable Flooding System
Specification
Confirm by survey that the flooding systems have
ITP Construction been provided as specified in design.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 63
Table E1 – Emergency power system supply

HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY HAZARD MANAGEMENT
RESPONSE Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
Emergency Power System Supply
 
OBJECTIVES: To maintain power to the ESD and F&G Systems as well as the telecoms systems that requires power to
function in an emergency and to allow the plant to be safely shut down and evacuated. The system shall be from a reliable
source of electrical power and shall be available after the identified major hazard events.
Includes emergency battery power supply for ESD system, FGS system, PA/GA audible and visual alarms and power to
all other identified end users which must function under an emergency condition.
Cable Specifications (e.g. IEC60331)
NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems
EN 50091 Uninterruptable Power Systems

There shall be sufficient UPS Load Confirm by design review that the UPS emergency
emergency battery power Schedule power system type is capable of supplying UPS
supplied to support all safety Load Design
emergency power to all identified emergency
critical systems for the time Calculations systems for the required durations.
required for each system to Vendor Battery
perform its intended function as Calculations
noted below. Review FAT Load & Discharge tests to confirm
F&G Control system – duration FAT Reports Design that UPS is of sufficient capacity to supply the
of the event (see guidance) specified equipment.
ESD Control System – duration
to be determined as long Confirm by survey and witness test that sufficient
enough to complete all ESD UPS capacity for the required duration periods has
actions (see guidance) been provided and that it supports the equipment as
PA/GA System – duration of required by their normal operations mode.
the event
Guidance: 1hr to be
considered as minimum ITPs Commissioning
For emergency and escape
lighting systems
Guidance: 1hr to be
considered as minimum for
other Safety Critical Systems –
duration required to function
correctly.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Page 64 – App.B

Review the design documents (safety studies etc)
and layouts to confirm that all scenarios which may
Design
Safety Concept affect the emergency power system have been
HAZID identified.
Fire & Blast Confirm by design review that the emergency
study power systems (UPS) is appropriately protected [by
Building location or otherwise].
All emergency power systems Structural Review to include but not be limited to:
are to be protected from fire, Design FERA
blast and accidental events such TR/Critical Fire & Blast study
that the function is not impaired equipment Design TR / SCE equipment room(s) heat rise study
while there is a requirement for room(s) heat rise Equipment layouts
emergency power. study Guidance: This activity shall, if possible, be
Equipment combined with similar activities where the
layouts protection of the ESD and FGS Systems are
assessed. Main and emergency distribution
equipment should be located in separate rooms.
Confirm by Survey that the emergency power
Construction system is appropriately protected [by location or
otherwise]
UPS field cabling to all Safety specification that all cables associated with UPS feed to HSE
Critical Systems (as listed Cable schedule Design Critical Systems are fire resistant.
above) should be segregated Cable requisition
from main power cables and and vendor data
shall be fire resistant according Cable Confirm by sample Survey that the cables actually
to specifications. specification installed are fire resistant. Cable markings and
Cable Construction certification to be verified for compliance.
certification
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 65
Table E2 – Escape and Evacuation

Escape and Evacuation

OBJECTIVES: To provide reliable, secure and effective systems for alerting personnel to the existence of an emergency
and for communicating additional information to personnel during, or after, a major hazard incident.
To provide routes and facilities which personnel can use to move away safely from the effects of a hazardous event in
their vicinity and to continue their movement in safety along readily identifiable access routes to the Muster Areas and
evacuation points.
To provide reliable facilities which allow communication both internally and to external locations in the event of an
emergency condition at the facility.
To provide rescue of injured personnel
Emergency Lighting
Escape routes
Personal protective equipment
Temporary Refuge/Muster Area
Emergency Lighting and signage
Personal Survival Equipment
EN1838 Lighting applications – Emergency lighting, EN50171 Central Power Supply Systems, EN50172 Emergency
Escape Lighting Systems, EN60598-2-22 Luminaries, Particular requirements Luminaries for emergency lighting

Specification
At least two unobstructed Confirm by design review that escape route
diverse escape routes shall be drawings show two correctly dimensioned
provided from all potentially Safety Concept escape routes from all normally manned areas
manned working areas to the Building Escape
Design
and that the escape routes do not run through
muster areas. All escape routes Route Layouts process areas containing hydrocarbons. Escape
shall be provided to ensure that Plant Layouts route widths and provision shall be confirmed as
any area can be rapidly and being compliant with project or national
safely evacuated in the event of specifications.
an emergency. Escape route Survey the primary and secondary escape routes
width and provision shall be as to confirm the actual dimensions meet the
defined in project Building Escape specified requirements.
specifications. Route Layouts Construction
Guidance: Escape routes Plant Layouts
should be greater than 1m
wide.
All escape and access routes Survey the primary and secondary escape routes
shall remain clear of to confirm that they are non slip and free from
obstructions. obstruction and that marking, and signposts are
All escape routes including acceptable.
emergency exit doors to be Building Escape
readily accessible, non-slip, Route Layouts Commissioning Guidance: This only applies to routes to muster
marked and signposted. Plant Layouts areas.
Markings and signs to be
clearly visible if there is loss of
artificial lighting outside
daylight hours.
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Page 66 – App.B
Confirm by design review that all escape route

Building Escape doors have been identified correctly and can be
All escape doors shall be of a Route Layouts easily opened in the event of an emergency
type that can easily be opened Door Schedule Design Guidance: e.g. panic bar, fail safe for electrical
in an emergency situation. Security Door locking systems, integral key on egress side etc.
System Spec Escape route doors which normally open
outwards should be fitted with panic bars,
Rescue breathing apparatus Safety Concept Review Safety Equipment Layouts to confirm
sets and other equipment Building Escape that breathing apparatus is provided in sufficient
necessary shall be located at Route Layouts quantities and at locations appropriate to hazards
Design
strategic locations around the Installation Safety envisaged.
facilities to allow prompt Equipment
rescue of personnel. Layouts
Emergency lighting shall be Building Escape Confirm by design review that provision of
provided to permit safe egress route Layouts emergency lighting and illumination levels are
during escape and evacuation Installation Safety sufficient to allow safe egress from building and
in the event of loss of normal Equipment installation locations. Minimum provision and
power, by means of emergency Layouts Design lighting levels shall comply with project or
power generation and integral Lighting Layout national requirements.
battery backed fluorescent Drawings
Lighting Vendor Guidance: Emergency lighting should have a
fittings, located on/at: minimum capacity of 30 – 60 minutes
Data
- main escape and evacuation Survey the escape route lighting by night to
routes, confirm the battery endurance period and
- main access points measure the lux at ground level to ensure the
- muster area ITPs Commissioning escape routes are sufficiently lit or alternatively
- first aid station(s) the testing of part of the Installation lighting may
- fire fighting area be extrapolated to other areas based on lighting
- stairways and landings. layouts and analysis.
Table E3 – Emergency Communications

Emergency Communications

OBJECTIVES: To maintain an uninterrupted and reliable means of indicating alarm and implementing effective
communication with personnel working on or around process equipment during a major incident
SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Emergency Communication to/from Control Room
PA/GA System
Project Standards
ISO 7240-19 Fire Detection and alarm systems

Specification
Effective communication, both internal Confirm by design review that
and external shall be provided for Safety Concept/EERS emergency communication systems
emergency situations. Telecommunications equipment shall provide both normal
The systems shall be protected by, System Philosophy Design and emergency communications
location of equipment, spatial diversity Telecommunications between the emergency response
and equipment redundancy. Equipment Layouts team and the team managing the
Internal and external situation
telecommunications in order to perform Confirm by design review of telecoms
the emergency function defined by Telecommunications
Schematics / block diagram and specification that
project requirements shall be confirmed the telecommunications systems
between the Control Room, vessel/s and Diagrams Design
meets the project requirements in
storage / pumping locations and Muster Telecommunications
Specification terms of protection, location, diversity
area and redundancy.
DET NORSKE VERITAS

App.B – Page 67
PA/GA system shall provide a means of Telecommunications Review amplifier loading to ensure
alerting all personnel to the existence of Schematics / that the number of speakers on a
an emergency situation, provide the Diagrams Design speaker ring does not exceed the
means to communicate additional Telecommunications amount which the amplifier can drive,
information to personnel during an Specification
emergency and shall be capable of Confirm by witness test that the GA
operating without impairment for the System provides clear communication
minimum time required to escape to between the Control Room and all
muster locations and then to evacuate to PA/GA Layouts / Installation areas to alert personnel of
a place of safety after the start of a major Arrangement potential hazardous or emergency
accident. drawings conditions.
The provision and minimum alarm System architectural The PA/GA system shall be in
noise level above local ambient shall be drawings accordance with the project
in accordance with project System block Commissioning requirements. The minimum alarm
requirements. In areas with greater diagrams noise level above local ambient shall
ambient noise levels, visual alarms shall System specification meet the project requirements.
also be provided. Noise study and
Layouts
Guidance: Audible alarms should be ITPs
provided in all areas with minimum of
+6dBA above local ambient and visual
alarms in high noise areas (>85 dBA)
Confirm by review of the vendor data
pertaining to the GA system that it
will not be adversely affected by, nor
Emergency communications equipment adversely affect, the operation of
shall not be adversely affected by the nearby equipment.
operation of other devices/equipment in Design Guidance: Review of vendor
close proximity (electromagnetic technical file, EC Declarations of
compatibility). Conformity and associated technical
file for individual equipment as well
as data pertaining to the compatibility
of all nearby equipment
Confirm by review of the vendor data
Emergency communications equipment pertaining to the emergency
shall not create additional hazards Design communication system that it can be
during an emergency situation operated in situations where a
flammable gas mixture is present.
GA control systems to be protected Confirm by design review that GA
against fire, blast and credible accident Control System shall be protected by
events, by location or otherwise, such location or otherwise, such that its
Design ability to function is not impaired.
that its ability to function is not
impaired for the time taken to muster Note: Secondary method is hand held
after a major accident event. radios or fixed intercom system.
Confirm by review of the cable
specification, cable requisition,
Safety Concept
vendor data sheets and cable schedule
Cable specification that all cables associated with the PA
Cable schedule Design / GA system are fire resistant.
Cable requisition and
PA / GA cables should be located so Cable supports / racks shall offer
vendor data equal rating as a minimum to maintain
that they are protected against
accidental loads as far as possible and availability of the system.
shall be fire resistant to specifications Confirm by sample survey that the
cables installed are fire resistant and
Cable specification are protected against accidental loads
Construction
Cable certification as far as possible. Cable markings and
certification shall be verified as being
compliant.
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Table N1 – Environment
HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: ENVIRONMENT HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Environmental Control Systems Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
 
OBJECTIVES: To limit the emissions to the air, limit the discharge to water, limit the generation of waste and spill
prevention.
SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Complete Gas Installation or Process Plant
Project and National Regulations
ISO 14001 (environmental management system)
Council Directive 96/61/EC (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control)
NORSOK S-003

During the development of Review project documentation that takes into account
the project, technically and options such as energy efficiency/conservation (e.g.
financially feasible and cost combined heat and power and waste heat recovery) use
effective options should be Environmental of alternative energy resources, alterations of project
evaluated to reduce or offset Management Design and system design, reduction of VOCs (Volatile
project related GHG (Green System Organic Compound) and reduction of gas flaring.
House Gas)
emissions during the design
of the project.
Facilities with the potential Review project documentation pertaining to the
to generate e.g. process following:
Environmental
waste water, sanitary sewage Management — discharge to surface water
or storm water should System — discharge to Sanitary Sewer Systems
incorporate necessary Design
Project and — discharge to Storm Water
precautions to avoid, national — cooling water discharge.
minimize and control regulations
adverse impacts to health, to ensure that impacts to health, safety and the
safety or the environment environment are as low as possible.
Environmental Confirm by review that measures have been addressed
Water conservation
Management and taken to reduce water consumption e.g.:
programs should be System Water monitoring and management
implemented in conjunction Project and
Design Process water recycling
wit the magnitude and cost of
National Sanitary Water conservation
water use. Regulations
Plans shall be developed that Confirm by review that operations have developed a
considers prevention, Waste Management Plan to define categories of all
reduction, reuse, recovery, Waste types of waste and plans for treatment, disposal and
recycling, removal and Management shipment.
disposal of wastes (including Plan Design
hazardous waste) National
generated during all project Regulations
phases and modes of
operation.
The project to address Review project documentation of existing land
potential environmental Environmental conditions, the proximity to ecologically sensitive or
impacts on protected areas, check if strategies are in place that
Management Design
existing conditions such as contribute to improvement of local conditions and
System
surface, groundwater and evaluate project location alternatives.
soils.
Confirm by review of the vendor data pertaining to
Plans shall be developed to HSE (Health
emissions that they will be according to project or
minimize or reduce Safety and
regulatory levels.
emissions as far as Environmental)
reasonably practicable, System Construction Review to include but not limited to:
resulting from Environmental Air emissions (SO2, NOx, Particulate Matter (PM),
Ozone, Ozone Depleting Substances)
commissioning and testing Management
activities System Noise and vibration emissions (traffic, turbines,
compressors and other major equipment
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App.C – Page 69
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS
A. Verification Documents
A 100 Validity of verification documents
101 Verification documents are, in principle, documents confirming that an examination has been carried out,
and are valid only at the time of issue.
A 200 Statement of Compliance
201 A Statement of Compliance can be issued on completion of each particular project phase, or natural part
thereof, and shall be based on a dedicated verification report.
202 A Statement of Compliance shall be issued as a formal statement confirming that verification of
documents and or activities, has found that the onshore gas installation, a part thereof, or a verification activity,
complies with the requirements applicable for that particular project phase.
203 The technical information on a Statement of Compliance shall contain:
— onshore gas installation description and item number, if relevant
— application (operational limitations and conditions of use) for which the onshore gas installation is intended
— codes and standards with which the onshore installation has been found to comply
— level of verification
— an appendix containing the accompanying dedicated verification report.
204 A Statement of Compliance shall be signed by the DNV Project Manager.
An example of a typical Statement of Compliance is shown at the end of this appendix.
A 300 Verification Reports
301 Verification Reports are issued to confirm that the relevant product or service has been completed in
accordance with specified requirements.
302 The report shall include information such as:
— product or service description and item number, if relevant
— application (operational limitations and conditions of use) for which the product or service is intended
— codes and standards with which the product or service has been verified against
— safety objectives and performance requirements
— clear statement of the conclusion from the verification (does it or does it not meet the specified
requirements)
— codes and standards used as reference
— documentation on which the verification report is based (documents, drawings, correspondence, including
revision numbers)
— project-specific scope of work tables
— any comments
— identification of any non-conformances.
303 The Verification Report shall always be dated and have two signatures, the originator and the DNV
internal verifier.
A 400 Verification Comments
401 Reviews of documents shall be reported using Verification Comment Sheets (often called VerComs).
These documents give details to the client of aspects of onshore installation design and construction that DNV:
— considers do not meet the specified requirements
— does not have enough information to make a decision
— offers advice based on its own experience.
402 Only in the first two instances does DNV expect a response from the Client or its contractors.
403 An example of a typical Verification Comment sheet is shown at the end of this appendix.
A 500 Audit report
501 Audit reports are issued to confirm that a company’s quality management system has been reviewed to
confirm compliance (or not) with the nominated standard and project requirements. In addition, the audit
reports confirm compliance with the documented procedures and that these procedures are effective.
502 Audit reports shall contain information such as whether:
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Page 70 – App.C
— The company has a documented quality system.

— This quality system been certified by an accredited Certification Body for the product (or service) in
question.
— The quality system covers the following quality assurance elements adequately for the product:
— organisation
— authority and responsibility
— job descriptions for key persons
— internal quality audits
— documentation change control
— job instructions and procedures
— non-conformance and corrective action.
— There are adequate procedures for activities such as:
— calibration of equipment
— material identification and marking
— control of special processes such as welding, NDT PWHT
— non-conformance identification and handling
— inspection status
— final inspection.
— The company’s facilities are, in general, considered adequate for the scope of supply.
— A quality plan been prepared for the order concerned.
— The purchaser or their appointed inspection agency are planned to attend the works.
— There are any problem areas identified.
A 600 Survey Reports
601 Survey reports are documentation and recording of attendance activity by DNV.
Guidance note:
Survey reports are and may be called by different names. Examples are Inspection Release Note, Visit Report,
Inspection Certificate, Site Report, etc.
602 A survey report shall contain enough information to identify clearly the product or service that has been
examined, the operating conditions or specifications to which it has been examined and the conclusion reached
by DNV.
603 The survey report shall be printed on the relevant form and shall contain as much information as possible
in accordance with the standard headings in the form. In addition, the report number shall be shown.
604 An example of a typical Survey Report is shown at the end of this appendix.
B. Use of quality management systems

B 100 General
101 The assurance of onshore gas installation integrity and function requires that gross errors during design,
construction and operation be minimised. The likelihood of gross errors shall be reduced in a systematic
manner by the operation of a quality management system adequate for the work being carried out.
102 Quality management systems frequently are documented at three levels:
— The quality manual and related procedures document how the organisation, as a whole, manages the quality
of all its products and services.
— The quality plan documents the specific procedures related to a particular project.
— The inspection and test plan documents how the quality control activities for a particular project shall be
carried out and recorded.
B 200 Quality plans
201 The basic function of a quality plan is to be a memory aid in the management of a project. In an
organisation with many quality procedures for a variety of functions the quality plan states those that are
applicable to that particular project. The quality plan acts as a route map through the complexities of
management of the project and highlights those activities relevant to quality management.
202 The project quality plan normally consists of two parts; firstly, a narrative description of the means of
controlling the project, and secondly, a tabular description of the inspections and tests to be carried out during
the work.
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App.C – Page 71
203 The quality plan should address:

— organisational details of the project
— authorities and responsibilities of key personnel
— interfaces between, the client, contractors, sub-contractors and third parties
— quality assurance activities placed on sub-contractors
— cross references to existing company procedures.
204 The narrative part of the quality plan should include a description of:
— the applicable standards
— project organisation and responsibilities
— review of the contractual requirements
— project planning and progress reporting
— procedures for such activities as design control, purchasing, construction, installation, commissioning,
interface control and auditing
— procedures for inspection and maintenance as well as normal operation
— emergency response issues.
205 Additionally, the narrative part of the plan should describe the documentation requirements. It should be
specified:
— what documents are required
— at what stage these documents are required
— who is responsible for preparing the documents
— relevant parties to whom documents are submitted
— how any necessary approvals are acquired
— who has originals and who has copies
— if copies have to be certified copies
— the length of time documents are to be retained and by whom.
B 300 Inspection and test plans
301 The tabular description of the inspections and tests to be carried out during the work is frequently known
as the inspection and test plan.
302 The following items should be checked for inclusion within the inspection and test plan:
— each inspection and test point and its relative location in the production cycle should be shown
— the characteristics to be inspected and tested at each point should be identified
— the use of sub-contractors should be indicated and details of how the verification of sub-contractor’s quality
shall be carried out should be shown
— hold points established by the constructor, the operator or a third party, where witness or review of the
selected inspection or test is required, should be shown.
B 400 Review of quality management programme
401 The contractor’s quality manual shall be reviewed for compliance with ISO 9001 or 9002 as appropriate.
The contractor’s operations should be audited to establish compliance with the documented system.
402 If the contractor has a quality system certified by an accredited third party certification body, this may
be taken as evidence of a satisfactory quality system provided the certificate is relevant to the contractor’s scope
of work for the project. However, the last two years’ periodical audit reports shall be reviewed to identify if
any recurring non-conformities have been revealed.
403 Any weaknesses revealed during this audit, or review of periodical audit reports, shall be considered
when planning the contractor monitoring activities.
404 Surveillance of the continuing acceptability of the contractor’s quality management system is carried out
by observing a selection of audits carried out by the contractor as part of its internal audit system. The audits
to be observed should be selected over the length of the project at suitable intervals and should cover as wide
a selection of activities as possible.
405 Contractor’s inspection and test plans for the various activities undertaken during their scope of work for
the pipeline shall be reviewed and accepted, if adequate.
C. Document forms
C 100 Introduction
101 The end of this appendix includes example forms for use by DNV in verification.
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Page 72 – App.C
102 The following forms are included:

a) Statement of Compliance.
b) Verification Comments Sheet.
c) Survey Report.
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App.C – Page 73
C 200 Statement of Compliance
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Page 74 – App.C
C 300 Verification comments sheet
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App.C – Page 75
C 400 Survey report
Folder:
Cert. No.:
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SURVEY REPORT
Client :
Order/Project. No. :
Item Description :
Survey Location :
Date: :
SURVEY SCOPE
Verification Activity No.:
Description of Verification Activities:
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Specifications:
Drawings:
VERIFICATION COMMENTS
NON-CONFORMITIES
Report Ends
Signed for Det Norske Veritas

Signature:
Name:
Title:
Date:
If any person suffers loss or damage which is proved to have been caused by any negli
gent act or omission of Det Norske Veritas, then Det Norske Veritas shall pay compensation to such person for his proved direct loss or
damage. However, the compensation shall not exceed an amount equal to ten times the fee charged for the service in quest ion, provided that the maximum compensation shall never exceed USD 2 million.
In this provision "Det Norske Veritas" shall mean the Foundation Det Norske Veritas as well as all its subsidiaries, directors, officers, employees, agents and any other actingn obehalf of Det Norske Veritas.
DET NORSKE VERITAS AS, Veritasveien 1, NO-1322 Høvik, Norway, Telephone: +47 67 57 99 00, Telefax: +47 67 57 99 11, Org.No. NO
945 748 931 MVA
Form No.: 40.91a Issue: January 2008 Page 1 of 1
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VERIFICATION OF ONSHORE LNG

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Any comments may be sent by e-mail to rules@dnv.com

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Sec. 1 General ............................................................................................................................................... 6

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B. Risk Based Verification

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D e finitio n o f V e rifica tio n In v o lve m e n t

V erific a tio n P lan

Ve rific a tio n Ex e c u tio n

B 400 Certificate of Conformity

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C. Definitions and Abbreviations

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contribute substantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives.

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C. Selection of Level of Verification

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Table 2-1 Levels of Verification - Summary of Involvement

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C 200 Overall Verification Objective

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Table 3-1 Scope of work for initial verification plan

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D 200 Verification of overall project management

Table 3-2 Scope of work for verification of overall project management

Table 3-3 Scope of work for verification of design

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Review of specifications for construction and operation by:

D 400 Verification during construction

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Verification activity Level

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Table 3-6 Scope of work for verification of site construction

Surveillance during testing and completion activities

Review of test results x x x

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Table P1 – Support Structures

Performance Requirement Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

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Performance Requirement Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

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Performance Requirement Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

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Table P2 - Installation Layout

Performance Requirement Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

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Performance Requirement Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

Table P3 – Non-cryogenic pressure vessels, piping & equipment

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