HUMAN SCIENCES
Such a conception is bound to conflict with the mani-
festly "transcendental" project of Sein und Zeit to artic-
ulate the general, i.e., the presumably timeless and tran-
shistorical, structures of human existence. This leads
Heidegger, not long after the publication ofthat work,
to what most interpreters see as an abandonment of
phenomenology, at least in any form that could appear
continuous with Husserl or even with the phenomen-
ological tradition in FRANCE. And it may be largely the
influence ofthis !ater Heidegger in France that leads to
the decline of phenomenology in that country during
the POSTMODERN phase. It remains to be seen whether
phenomenology will be done in by a conception ofhis-
tory that originally arose from phenomenology itself.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Carr, David. Phenomenology and the Prohlem of History: A
Studv o{ Husserl:~ Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- . Time, Narrative, and Historv. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1986.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Gesammelte Schnjien. 5th ed. Voi. 7. Ed.
Bernard Groethuysen. Stuttgart: Teubncr, 1968.
Gadamcr, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tiibingen:
Mohr, 1962; 7htth and Method. Trans. Garrct Barden and
John Cumming. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
Hohl, Hubcrt. Lehenswelt und Geschichte. Freiburg: Karl
Alber, 1962.
Janssen, Paul. Geschichte und Lehenswelt. The Hague: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1970.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der
Gcisteswissenschaften." Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie und
phănomenologische Forschung 9 ( 1928), 237-367.
Misch, Georg. Lehensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
Bonn: Cohen, J930; 2nd. ed. Leipzig: Teubner, J93 J
Olafson, Frederick. The Dialectic o{Action. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, J 978.
Soffer, Gail. Husserl and the Prohlem o{ Relativism. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
DAVID CARR
Emory Universi(v
HUMAN SCIENCES Also called the "eul-
tura! sciences," the human sciences (die Geisteswis-
senschaften, les sciences humaines) are special or pos-
itive theoretical sciences that are concerned in various
ways with aspects of human cultural life and cultural
worlds. These disciplines are related to practica! appli-
cations as well as to the everyday prescientific life from
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
315
which they, like ali sciences and also philosophy, origi-
nale. This genus ofsciences currently includes COMMU-
NICOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHNOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY,
POLITIC AL SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, and SOCIOLOGY as sin-
gle disciplines, but human or cultural sciences are also
increasingly included in multidisciplines such as EHI-
NIC STUDIES and those re}ated to ECOLOGY, FEMINISM,
RELIGION, and TECHNOLOGY. The rise of sciences of this
kind, which ha ve their prehistories in the medieval and
ancient worlds and were accelerated through the ex-
panding contact with non-European societies in recent
centuries, is as much a distinctive feature ofthe modern
Western wor}d as the rise ofthe NATURAL SCIENCES.
Beyond such chiefly theoretical disciplines there
are what can be called normative, evaluative, or axi-
otic disciplines, which are concerned with ARCHITFC-
TURE, DANCE, FILM, LITERATURE, MUSIC, THEATER, etc.,
and there are also practica/ disciplines, such as ED-
UCATION, LAW, MEDICINE, NURSING, PIIYSICAL EDUCATION,
and PSYCHIATRY. A broader category, CULTURAL DISCI-
PLINES, has been called for and theoretical, axiotic,
and practica! species might then be recognized within
it, although many cultural "sciences" already include
practica! components, e.g., the way psychotherapy is
often considered part of psychology. Practica! action
always has cognitive foundations within it and when
these foundations are scientific, scientific technologies
and technigues can be spoken of. There are also eval-
uational foundations in, e.g., social work, that make
nontheoretical disciplines normative.
The mentioned non-philosophical disciplines have
not only been reflected upon from standpoints in
phenomenological philosophy, but also increasingly
have phenomenological tendencies within them. Non-
philosophical contributors to disciplines affected by or
convergent with philosophical phenomenology include
the psychiatrists LUDWIG BINSWANGER and KARL JASPERS
and the SOCioJogists GEORG SIMML'L and MAX WERER. Dis-
tinguishing philosophy as such from human science is
among the problems of the philosophy of the human
sciences.
A human scientific discipline can be said to be
phenomenological, first, if it is devoted to basing
knowledge on the best possible EVIDENCE ofthe matters
themselves in the relevant region. This evidence can
occur with respect to the ancient Hellenic world, for
example, not only through the study of texts, but also
316 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
through considering depictions and artifactual and non-
artifactual remains, the last mentioned including, e.g.,
the remains of wild animals, such as fish bones, that
were available as food in the ecosystem of an ancient
society.
Second, it is characteristic of phenomenology in
general for matters, persons and communities included,
tobe taken as they present themselves to and are dealt
with in the cultural life reflected upon, in which case
the belief systems, value systems, and systems of ends
and means correlative to the habitual believing, valu-
ing, and willing discernible in that culturallife can be
reflectively observed and analyzed from the theoretical
standpoint of a cultural science. The approach is then
reflective, and such an approach is not alien to human
sciences and philosophy prior to and independent of
the rise of phenomenology.
Third, an approach that is phenomenological distin-
guishes description of what phenomena are from the
explanation ofthem in terms ofpsychological motives,
historical influences, etc., and emphasizes both empir-
ica! descriptions and the a priori descriptions attain-
able through EIDFTIC METIIOD (most cultural scientific
description and explanation is, however, in terms of
empirica! types).
Phenomenological phi losophy and phenomenologi-
cal human science are not distinguished, however, in
these three respects, which they share. Some phenome-
nologists distinguish philosophical and cultural scien-
tific phenomenology in terms ofthe transcendental vs.
the mundane attitude, others in terms ofthe ontologica!
vs. the ontic, and yet others in terms of o ne worldly dis-
cipline, phenomenological psychology or PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ANTHROPOLOGY, on which the other disciplines are
founded.
There is an early history ofthe philosophy ofthe hu-
man sciences that goes back to Hume's Treatise ( 1739)
and Mill's Logic (1843), where the title "moral sci-
ences" is used, if not to Vico, Hegel, Aristotle, Plato,
and especially to the Sophists. The history, however, of
this part ofphilosophy ofscience was foca! for the neo-
Kantians, most recently ERNST CASSIRER, as well as for
various phenomenologists, and began in relation to WIL-
HELM DILTHl'Y's Ein/eitung in die Geisteswissenschaften
(lntroduction to the Human Sciences, 1883).
The expression Geisteswissenscha{t, currently ren-
dered in English as "human science," has been traced
back to the Geschichte des Hellenismus (History of
Hellenism, 1843) of Johann Droysen ( 1808~1884 ), but
Dilthey made it prominent. The human sciences for
Dilthey include the more humane disciplines that study
the arts, the more socially oriented sciences, such as po-
litica! theory, and the more normative disciplines such
as AESTHETICS and ETHICS, and his broad title for these
disciplines played a certain role in the administrative
structure ofthe Imperial German university.
Dilthey is best known for defending the indepen-
dence ofthe human sciences from the natural sciences,
but he also recognized that the world of spirit or eul-
ture is never separable from nature and that both kinds
of science have a common base in our prescientific
understanding of life. The difference for him is that
the human sciences never Iose sight of the need to un-
derstand the original wholeness, connectedness, and
purposefulness of life, while the natural sciences be-
gin with separated partial elements whose connections
must be explained by hypothetical generalizations.
Against the neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband
(1848~1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863~1936) ~
who were concerned to distinguish psychology from
transcendental philosophy, considered it a natural sci-
ence, and excluded it from the Kulturwissenscha{ten
~ Dilthey included psychology in the Geisteswis-
senschaften. His position became widely accepted
in Germany; furthermore, these two titles are inter-
changeable in Cassirer's final writings and also in
those of ALFRED SCHUTZ. The !ater Dilthey relied in-
creasingJy on the interpretation of expressions and ob-
jectivations of experience and Lebensphilosophie und
Phanomenologie ( 1930), by Dilthey's follower GFORG
MISCH, was widely read. Dilthey considered EDMUND
HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-190 1) sup-
port for his project and Husserl came to acknowl-
edge considerable influence on him by Dilthey. In
"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ), Husserl
objected to considering philosophy a worldview be-
cause that led to historicism, RELATIVISM, and skep-
ticism. But after correspondence with Dilthey, study
of others such as Windelband and Rickert, and his
own investigations of the constitution of the cultural
world in the ldeen zu einer reinen Phanomeno/ogie
und phanomenologischen Phi/osophie Il [ 1912~ 15)
and elsewhere, he accepted Dilthey's problematics and
advocated the phenomenological philosophy ofthe hu-
 HUMAN SCIENCES
man sciences, which is also evident in Die Krisis der
europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Philosophie ( 1936).
Husserl distinguished sciences in the "personal-
istic attitude" from those in the naturalistic attitude
of the natural sciences and recognized both a natu-
ral scientific psychology and a human scientific psy-
chology, in the latter respect also adopting the strat-
egy ofproceeding from a human scientific psychology
to how the social and historical world is constituted.
In Phănomenologische Psychologie [ 1925] he praised
Dilthey's psychology as a true phenomenological psy-
chology and advocated a way to transcendental pheno-
menology from Dilthey's universal human science as
an alternative to his own Cartesian way that began, by
contrast, in complete emptiness of content. This alter-
native path begins from the LIFEWORLD and ultimately
invo[ves GENERATIVE PIIENOMENOLOGY.
Besides the view of the lifeworld as cultural,
Husserl 's own contributions are especially related to IN-
TERSUB.IECTIVITY and TIME-consciousness. Dilthey's dis-
tinction between elementary understanding and higher
understanding can be used to refine Husserl's analyses.
The former is immediate and does not usually require
methodical interpretation, while the latter, founded
upon it, requires empathic activities of reliving the
social, historical, and personal contexts of life expres-
sions as structured wholes. Husserl 's phenomenology
ofthe cultural world chiefly pertains to systematic hu-
man sciences such as economics, sociology, jurispru-
dence, and politica! science. Dilthey's concern with the
historical and philological human sciences and their
methods, i.e., HERMENEUTICS, is, however, missing in
Husserl, but can be supplied.
Husserl 's students LUDWIG LANDGREBE and FRITZ
KAUFMANN wrote dissertations that were explicitly con-
cerned with Dilthey in relation to phenomenology, and
EDITII STEIN and GERDA WALTHER earlier published es-
says in Husserl 's Jahrbuch on topics pertinent to the
human sciences. MAX scHELER offered relevant insights
on empathy, group solidarity, VALUE THEORY, and the
sociology of knowledge.
Philosophical reflections especially on the WORLD
as historical and on history as a science of it are to
be found in MARTIN HEIDEGGER's work, beginning with
Sein und Zeit ( 1927). Heidegger is also chiefly respon-
sible for beginning the post-Diltheyan discussions of
317
interpreti ve methods within HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY and for the enduring phenomenological con-
cerns with HISTORY, LANGUAGE, and TECHNOLOGY, which
ha ve been carried further by IIANS-GEORG GADAMER, DON
IHDE, .IOSEPII .1. KOCKELMANS, and PAUL RICCEUR.
In Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The
meaningful structure of the social world, 1932) and
Collected Papers ( 1962-96), Alfred Schutz began phi-
losophizing about the social world and the specifi-
cally social sciences, particularly Weberian-style so-
ciology and Austrian-school economics. doing so in
the perspective of a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
TIIE NATURAL ATTITUDE; this effort has been contin-
ued by MAURICE NATANSON and others. Subsequent
contributors to transcendenta[ CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY of the cultural or human sciences include ARON
GURWITSCII and THOMAS M. SEEBOHM. In FRANCE, the
classica[ expression in EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY is
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's "Les sciences de ['homme
et la phenomenologie" ( 1961 ). His student, GEORGES
GUSDORF, wrote lntroduction aux sciences humaines
( 1960). Ricceur's hermeneutica[ phenomenology carne
!ater. Non-phenomenologists in France, such as MICHEL
FOUCAULT, and in GERMANY, such as Jiirgen Habermas,
ha ve also been interested in the philosophy of the hu-
man sciences. lnterest in the philosophy of the hu-
man sciences as such in the UNITED STATES is chiefly
phenomenological, but there is also interest in them
in STRUCTURALISM, CRITIC AL THEORY, and even ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY.
Systematically speaking, the philosophy of the hu-
man or cultural sciences has a vast and complex subject
matter. Natural matters- including those with psy-
ches, genetic endowments, and ecosystems-are rela-
tively easy to distinguish, classify, and re late, while the
types of human persons, communities, and traditions
approached in the cultural sciences are more numerous
and have more aspects amenable to thematization, as
the disciplines and multidisciplines listed at the outset
of this entry already indicate. And unlike the natural
sciences, the human sciences are prone to a reflexiv-
ity whereby there can be a sociology of psychology,
an economics of sociology, a history of historiogra-
phy, etc., and also an overlapping of provinces, which
hardly simplifies their tasks.
Nevertheless, the human sciences can, upon reflec-
tion, be seen to approach the cultural world in one or an-
318 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
other ofthree species ofperspectives. This is analogous
to the sorting of naturalistic sciences into the physical
and the biologica!. The most popular approach begins
with a reflective-experiential thematization of individ-
ual or personal human life, and then proceeds through
social psychology to approach the social and then the
historical world. Since there are actually severa! disci-
plines ~ e.g., child psychology, geriatrie psychology,
and psychology of learning ~ within the psychologi-
cal perspective, it seems best to speak in the plural of
psychological human sciences.
Alfred Schutz bcgins with the constitution ofmean-
ingful behavior within an abstractly nonsocial individ-
ual life and then divides the world of others or social
world in a broad signification into directly encountered
"consociates," indirectly encountered but also simul-
taneously alive "contemporaries," and then the "pre-
decessors" and the "successors," who are of course
deceased or yet to be born, respcctively. Consociates
and contcmporaries make up the social world in a nar-
rower signification. There is interes! in the constitution
of groups in these regions, but Schutz's emphasis is on
the individuals and their social actions, interactions,
and relationships.
As Dilthey showed in Die Aufbau der geschicht-
lichen Welt in den Geisteswissenscha(ten [The con-
struction ofthe historical world in the human sciences,
191 0], it is also possible, however, to begin in the phi-
losophy of the cultural sciences not with individual or
personal life, but rather with collective or communal
life. This can be done in two ways. In social sciences
such as linguistics and politica] science, the function-
ing of communal life in relation to language or to the
politica! system is considered synchronically, i.e., with
great emphasis on how these systems are structured at
a given time, usually the present. To be sure, histor-
ical considerations are not absolutely excluded when
such aspects of the cultural world at one time are in-
vestigated, but they are subordinated. Because social
scientific results often ha ve practica! applications in the
current situation, the articulation of social science into
particular sciences and academic departments and the
numbers of scientists in them are considerably greater
than in the psychological and historical sciences. For
this reason and others, such as the current traditional
academic classifications ofpsychology as a natural sci-
ence and of history as part of the humanities, the phi-
losophy of the human sciences is often narrowed into
a philosophy ofthe social sciences.
Yet there are also what are best called historical
sciences, species of which include politica! history,
economic history, history oftechnology, history ofart,
military history, etc., whether or not these particulars
are recognized as distinct disciplines with separate de-
partments in universities. Archaeology, for example,
is properly understood as a historical human science,
but, at least in most American universities, it is inter-
estingly combined with ethnology under the heading of
"cultural anthropology" and placed among the social
sciences. The historical sciences nonetheless ha ve it in
common to thematizc the cultural world not only as it
is lived communally, but also in a diachronic way, i.e.,
to emphasize continuities and changes over time.
The human sciences have in general been much in-
fluenced by NATURALISM during the past two centuries.
This is manifest in the positivistic attempt to imi tate the
natural sciences by treating cultural objects as natural
objects, if not physical things, and resorting to math-
ematics whenever possible. Opponents of positivistic
tendencies within the human sciences and the philoso-
phy ofthem often reject mathematical methods, which
seems unfortunate, in order to emphasize sheerly qual-
itative and interpreti ve methods. It is also important to
recognize that cultural situations and worlds are formed
of objects with cultural characteristics, i.e., the values
and uses whereby objects are good and bad and ends
and means.
Some phenomenologists emphasize the considera-
tion of cultural characteristics not only as what distin-
guishes the region of the cultural sciences, but also as
what justifies the contention that the latter ha ve prior-
ity over the former, which, phenomenologically, would
seem to require an abstraction for the derivation of
their naturalistic regions. When acceptance of the val-
ues and uses of cultural objects is not abstracted from
for the sake of natural science, there can bea tendency
of researchers to identify with ( or oppose) the cultural
worlds they research.
Besides the questions of the generic, specific, and
particular subject matters and scienccs thematized in
the phenomenological philosophy ofthe human or cul-
tural sciences ~ and the questions of the relations
between such sciences and the natural and formal sci-
ences, on the one hand, and also between them and
 HUMAN SCIENCES
thc everyday life from which they arise and in which
their results are employed for practica! purposes, on
the other hand- there are long stand ing methodolog-
ica/ prob/ems that have interested phenomenological
philosophers.
In the background of such problems are the prob-
lems in early 20th century neo-Kantianism concerning
the social vs. the historical sciences in terms of distinc-
tions between generalizing and nomothetic vs. partic-
ularizing and idiographic disciplines, which have also
been of concern to LOGICAL POSITIVISM, but ha ve not yet
held much interest for phenomenologists.
Stemming chiefly from the historical sciences, there
is first of ali the methodology of interpretation and cri-
tique oftcxts and traces, which is called HERMENEUTICS
and which drew much renewed attention by figures in
Gcrmany from Heinrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)
to Wilhelm Dilthey. This classical modern hermeneu-
tics has been adapted creatively into what became
hermeneutica! phenomenology by Heidegger and oth-
ers; atternpts have also been madc by THOMAS M.
SEEBOHM to disclose the transcendental phenornen-
ological grounds of hermeneutica! method and by
RUDOLF MAKKREEL to clarify its transcendental reflec-
tive grounds. It is not clear, however, that the rneth-
ods for the interpretation of nonlinguistic data, which
Dilthey called "rnonurnents," ha ve been appreciated as
well as the herrneneutics of texts. Such nonlinguistic
data are fundamental for archaeology and LESTER EM-
BREE has attempted to clarify how they are accessed
pre-predicatively.
In the social sciences, STRUCTURALISM is a prominent
method that addresses the structures of cultural objects
in language and in nonlinguistic representations such as
pictures. These stern largely from Ferdinand de Saus-
sure ( 18 5 7-1913) and are extended by Roland Barthes
(1915-1980), MICHEL FOUCAULT, Jacques Lacan ( 190 ]-
), and Claude Levi-Strauss. Although many concepts
and rnost terminology are different and also some of
the concerns, e.g., those with unconscious processes, it
is not clear that semiotic and structuralist methods are
substantially incornpatible with those of phenomen-
ology, but most of the work of showing overlaps and
complementarities has yet to be done.
The other mcthodological concern stemming from
reflection on chiefly social science occurs in Schutz
when he attempts to develop Weber 's method of ideal
319
types phenomenologically. Schutz holds that the cul-
tural sciences differ from the natural in that the latter
rely on primary constructs about natural objects that
are not pre-interpreted, while the former are conversant
with secondary constructs, which are constructs about
the constructs in ordinary languagc and everyday life.
In other words, he is emphatic that the subjective mean-
ing or insider interpretations of individuals and groups
are what the constructs of outsiders, theoreticians and
philosophers included, are about.
Whether or not comrnonsense interpretation some-
how includes the pre-prcdicative constitution of val-
ues and uses for Schutz is not always clear. But where
the idealizing construction of the models used in the
cultural sciences for selves, others, actions, interac-
tions, relationships, motives, human products, and so-
cial groups are concerned, his contributions are enor-
mous and also do not seern incompatible with the re-
sults of methodological reflections on hermeneutica!
and also structuralist and semiotic efforts. The over-
laps and complementarities have begun to be studied,
e.g., by RICHARD LANIGAN.
Whilc individual personal life is treated in the his-
torical and social sciences as at best derivative from
comrnunallife in the socio-cultural world, psycholog-
ical human science begins with personal life and, as
mentioned, works out from there to the rest of the
world. Its methods include interpretation and other ap-
proaches taken toward personal documents and other
representations, but it can most effectively rcly on self-
observation and reflection on others. In the latter ap-
proach, it does proceed on the basis of somatie indi-
cations such as gait, gesture, posture, intonation, and
visage, and thus has a prominent place for the pheno-
meno1ogy ofthe BODY.
Because of the need to know a good deal not only
about the current states but also the histories of the
actual practices of observation and theorizing in the
wide variety ofhuman sciences- as well as, e.g., de-
partmental structures within the academy- there is a
tendency among ali philosophers, and thus not merely
phenomenologists, to emphasize either particular cul-
tural sciences, e.g., sociology, or species of cultural
science, e.g., the social sciences, and not the human
or cultural sciences in general. But social science is a
species of human or cultural science just as physical
science is a species rather than the genus of natural sci-
320 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ence. Phenomenological reflection on this entire family
of sciences is as difficult as it is desirable.
Once the multiplicity of cultural worlds as opposed
to the allegedly one natural world are understood to
be the common theme, the perspectives, thematized
aspects, and methodologies of particular cultural sci-
ences and their species can be approached, as can the
basic question of the difference between and relations
of the human and natural sciences. Further questions
concern how the knowledge gained in the theoretical
human sciences is used in cultural disciplines of the
axiotic and practica! sorts. Included in these further
questions is the already mentioned question ofthe dif-
ferences between and relations of philosophy and the
cultural sciences.
Emerging issues for the human sciences and the
phenomenological philosophy of them include ecol-
ogy, ethnicity, and gender. If there are major differ-
ences between masculine and feminine worldviews in
ali societies, earlier observation and theory is distorted
and needs to be corrected for gendered variations in
experience, believing, valuing, and willing, since over
half of humanity is female. Ethnic identities, groups,
and conflicts may ha ve been suppressed and ignored in
many nation states and empires in the past, but this is
increasingly difficult to do, and like gender, ethnicity
is a fundamental structure of human culturallife. And
while the environment might be thought, naturalisti-
cally, to be nature in relation to organisms, it is diffi-
cult, upon reflection, not to consider plants, animals,
and ecosystems as parts ofhuman cultural worlds, i.e.,
as cultural matters shaped by and including values and
uses for humans.
Finally, there is an interesting issue for the philos-
ophy of the natural sciences insofar as they are now
deeply interested in science as a human activity and
thus how its traditions and communities are amenable
to historical and sociologica! and other particular forms
ofhuman scientific investigation. How does the natural
scientific world ofphysics relate to the cultural worlds
out of which it arises? What is the impact of physics
back upon the cultural world, not only with respect to
the natural scientific technologies that it makes possi-
ble, but also with respect to the everyday values and
uses of cultural objects? How different is natural sci-
ence from religion in these respects?
Can the same questions not be asked about the ori-
gins and impacts of the cultural sciences, e.g., how
everyday thinking in some communities has come to
be affected by MARXIST politica[ theory or PSYCHOANAL-
YSJS? And, most philosophically, can RELATIVISM and
thus skepticism be avoided once one begins to re-
flect on how objects and theories present themselves to
and are dealt with by socio-historical groups and indi-
viduals, scientists and philosophers included? In other
words, are non-trivial and non-relative truths, values,
and purposes attainable or not?
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschajien.
Versuch einer Grundlegung fur das Studium der
Gesellschafl und der Geschichte [1883]. Gesammelte
Schriften 1. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 4th ed., 1959; lntro-
duction to the Human Sciences. Ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel
and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989; Introduction d l 'etude des sciences humaines.
Trans. L. Sauzin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1942.
Gusdorf, Georges. Introduction aux sciences humaines.
Paris: Publications de la Faculte des Lettres de 1'Universite
de Strasbourg, 1960.
Makkreel, Rudolf. Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Stud-
ies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Les sciences de l 'homme et
la phenomimologie. Paris: Cours de Sorbonne, 1961;
"Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man." Trans. John
Wild. In his The Primacy of Perception. Ed. James M.
Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1964,
43-96.
Misch, Georg. Lebensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
Bonn: Cohen, 1930; 2nd ed. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931.
Mohanty, J. N. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Natanson, Maurice, ed. Phenomenology and the Social Sci-
ences. 2 vols. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University
Press, 1973.
Orth, Emst Wolfgang, ed. Dilthey und die Philosophie der
Gegenwart. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1985.
Polkinghome, Donald. Methodology for the Human Sci-
ences. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1987.
Ricceur, Paul. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Ed.
and trans. John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
Sche1er, Max. On Feeling, Knowing. and Valuing: Selected
Writings. Ed. Harold J. Bershady. Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 1992.
Schrag, Cal vin O. Radical Reflection and the Origin of the
Human Sciences. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University
Press, 1980.
Seebohm, Thomas M. Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Ver-
nunft. Bonn: Bouvier, 1972.
Strasser, Stephan. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963.
 HUNGARY
Thines, Gcorges. Phenomenology and the Science of Be-
haviour: An Historical and Epistemologica/ Approach.
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977.
LESTER EMBREE
F/orida Atlantic University
HUNGARY The emergence ofHungarian phi-
losophy at the beginning ofthe 19th century was inftu-
enced by two factors. On the one hand, as citizens of
the Habsburg Empire, Hungarian philosophers sought
to define a national identity by opposing speculative
philosophy of German origin and promoting the writ-
ing ofphilosophy in Hungarian. This tendency, similar
to other national awakenings throughout Austrian- and
German-ruled East Central Europe, was paralleled by
another tendency that aimed to absorb the results of
German philosophy, especially those of Kant and his
followers. Before the revolution in 1848 and the war
ofliberation against the Habsburgs in 1849, there were
attempts to create what was called "national philoso-
phy," along with a Hungarian vocabulary ofphilosoph-
ical terminology. The stai led development of Hungar-
ian philosophy after 1849 cannot be reduced to the
defeat of the Magyars in their 1849 war of liberation.
The Hungarian philosophers had also proved unable
to develop an adaptable. practicable philosophical vo-
cabulary, or to cultivate a lasting national tradition in
philosophy.
The an ti speculative tendency ofHungarian philoso-
phy through the first half ofthe 19th century is likewise
expressed by the far greater interest and sympathy of
Hungarian scholars for politica) and legal rather than
philosophical ideas. In this context, one could mention
Janos Erdelyi (18 14-1868), who saw this tendency
as a national characteristic of the Hungarian people.
The other key inftuence in Hungarian philosophy can
be clearly measured in the first systematic philoso-
pher writing in Hungarian, Kăroly Bohm ( 1854-1911 ),
whose work shows the inftuence, first of KANT and Kan-
tianism, then, in the third volume of his Az ember es
vi/aga (Man and his world, 4 vols, 1883-1942), of a
revised yet naive kind of Fichtean subjectivism.
The inftuence of phenomenology in Hungary was
preceded by a renaissance of philosophical culture at
the end of the 19th century. This renaissance took the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
321
form of an authentic Neo-Kantianism, connected with
the name ofBernăt Alexander ( 1850-1927). Alexander
was a genuine thinker, yet his pedagogica! talents and
broad knowledge of the history of phi1osophy proved
even more important for Hungarian philosophy. As
a professor at Budapest, he taught whole generations
of young philosophers, many of whom made impor-
tant contributions to international philosophical life
(Valeria Dienes, GYORGY LUKACS, Geza Revesz, VILMOS
SZILASI, Arnold Hauser, Menyhert Palăgyi).
Some of Alexander's students became connected to
phenomenology. These were also familiar with the an-
alytic tradition in Austrian philosophy (Bolzano, I'RANZ
BRENTANO, and the representatives of Brentanism).
From the viewpoint of phenomenology, these students
of Alexander and other thinkers in this period can be
divided into two groups. The first includes philoso-
phers who explicitly considered themselves phenome-
nologists (.!ENO F.NYVV ARI, vilmos szilasi); the second
includes significant thinkers strongly inftuenced by
phenomenology in some sense (Bela Zalai, Baron
Ă.kos von Pauler, Kăroly Mannheim, ANTAL scHOTz,
Săndor Sîk). Another figure, though not a phenomen-
ologist, was Menyhert Palăgyi ( 1859-1929), who be-
came known through his attacks on EDMUND HUSSERL 's
position in the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ).
In Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in
der modernen Logik (The conflict of psychologizers
and formalizers in modern logic, 1903), Palăgyi up-
holds Husserl 's rejection oflogical PSYCHOLOGISM, but
criticizes his approach as too closely resembling a Kan-
tian logica] formalism. Palăgyi's views on the inte-
grated character of sensation likewise inftuenced the
history ofphenomenology-see especially his Natur-
philosophische Vorlesungen (Lectures in nature phi-
losophy, 1924) and his Wahrnehmungslehre (Theory
ofperception, 1924), which was welcomed and devel-
oped by MAX SCHELER.
JENO ENYVV ARI studied at Budapest and Gottingen,
and was connected first to the Bolzanian tradition,
then to phenomenology. His understanding of pheno-
menology was based on Husserl's Logische Unter-
suchungen; for him, the main task of phenomen-
ology was a precise description and analysis of
the structure of human consciousness, reducing im-
mediate consciousness data to their essential con-
tenis. In A phansikus (phaenomenologiai) adottsagok