Freedom of Expression

a)prior restraint (censorship)

367. Burgos Sr. v Chief of Staff (1984)
368. Corro v Lising (1985)
369. Chavez v Gonzales
370. Near v Minnesota (1931)
371. National Press Club v comelec (1992)
372. Adiong v comelec (1992)
373. ABS CBN v Comelec (2000)
374. SWS v comelec (2001)
375. Iglesia n Kristo v CA GR 119673
B.) subsequent punishment
376. Salonga v Pano (1985)
377. People v Perez (1923)
378. Espiritu v General Lim Gr 85727
Commercial Speech
379. Pharmaceutical v Secretary of Health GR 173034
H. Freedom of Religion
380. Aglipay v Ruiz
381. Manosca V CA GR 106440
Freedom of Expression

a)prior restraint (censorship)

367. Burgos Sr. v Chief of Staff (1984)

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of
the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated
only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical
error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two
warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case
at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were
placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement
of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of
Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not
indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
368. Corro v Lising (1985) (wala)

369. Chavez v Gonzales

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005,
Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the
presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye
identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second
compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs was not
President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine
copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired
the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci
Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued
to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of
censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the “acts,
issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1)
respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned
radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June
2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

1. Standing to File Petition

Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the present
case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in violation
of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen. Freedom of
expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental
importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an
indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression
allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make
informed choices of candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution
commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out
narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely:

pornography,false or misleading advertisement,advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national

security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based
prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means
what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public
debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new
tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it
burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the
expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-
neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the
date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on
protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of
validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value expression. By
definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed because
of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected expression
that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or misleading advertisement as unprotected
expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional.
Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. Although
subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint
prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to subsequent
punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior
restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls
under this class of unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it
cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate
speech” against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such
expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to
subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior
restraint on such expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing prior
restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless
action, and danger to national security – is the clear and present dangertest.32 The expression restrained
must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and
duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative regulation, or
impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible
pressures need not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate from policies,
advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case

The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of the Garci
Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press
release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio
and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may
establish that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that may
be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in
imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that
the State has a right and duty to prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone
conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an opportunity to
be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC also
concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be established that the Garci
Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not
even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed
at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain “false information
and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is
content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four
existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is
essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper
conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the
sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any
event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine
that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of
the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim
here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing
the tapes would endanger the security of the State.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a
matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on matters
of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a
complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent
punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for
protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint
on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for actual
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not
vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject to prior
restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of
whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil
that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on
whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of
invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of the
Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to observe
the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards. Respondents have not explained
how and why the observance by radio and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC
circulars constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject to
criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or endanger
the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and television stations
constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat
is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes
radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have invested
substantial sums in capital equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of
their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. There
can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.
370. Near v Minnesota (1931)

Primary Holding
Prior restraints on speech are generally unconstitutional, such as when they forbid the publication of
malicious, scandalous, and defamatory content.

Facts
In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford alleged that the police
chief, the mayor, a prosecutor, and grand jury members were neglecting their duties to prosecute known
criminal activity. The anti-Semitic newspaper suggested that these authority figures were colluding with
Jewish gangs. Despite two ensuing assassination attempts on Guilford, the newspaper's disclosures resulted in
the conviction of a local gangster.

The prosecutor, Floyd Olson, sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it
violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. He received a
temporary injunction after an ex parte hearing, prior to a hearing at which Near and Guilford would be
required to show cause for why they should not be permanently enjoined from publishing the newspaper.

The state Supreme Court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually
issued from the trial court. With assistance from the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, Robert R. McCormick,
Near appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Procedural History

Minnesota Supreme Court - 219 N.W. 770 (Minn. 1928)

Defendants' demurrer denied. The temporary injunction was appropriate because a newspaper is capable of
disturbing the public peace and causing violence, which the state could prevent by exercising its police
powers. The First Amendment does not apply to this type of publication, but only to media that is honest and
conscientious.

Minnesota Supreme Court - 228 N.W. 326 (Minn. 1929)

Permanent injunction affirmed. The order is not too broad because it does not prohibit the defendants from
running another newspaper that supports the public welfare, and the law is constitutional.

Opinions

Majority

 Charles Evans Hughes (Author)

 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
  Louis Dembitz Brandeis
 Harlan Fiske Stone
 Owen Josephus Roberts

In a 5-4 decision, the Court issued a strong prohibition against prior restraints, or government censorship.
Hughes noted that his decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific
context of this case. According to the majority opinion, government officials could not be trusted with the
responsibility of regulating speech before it even reaches the public. Hughes used the incorporation doctrine,
echoing Gitlow v. New York, to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, he admitted that the ban on prior restraints was not categorical. In some
situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might
be able to justify a prior restraint.

Dissent

 Pierce Butler (Author)

 Willis Van Devanter
 James Clark McReynolds
 George Sutherland

Case Commentary
The government does not have the right to prohibit negative speech about it if there is some truth to it. There
must be a case-specific analysis to determine whether the allegations have a basis in truth, although war or
other types of national emergency may reduce the protections of the press.

Continuing with his inflammatory activities, Guilford remained in the Minneapolis newspaper business. He was
assassinated three years after this decision, probably by members of a gang that he had denounced.

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Near v. Minnesota

No. 91

Argued January 30, 1931

Decided June 1, 1931

283 U.S. 697

Syllabus

1. A Minnesota statute declares that one who engages "in the business of regularly and customarily producing,
publishing," etc., "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical," is guilty
of a nuisance, and authorizes suits, in the name of the State, in which such periodicals may be abated and
their publishers enjoined from future violations. In such a suit, malice may be inferred from the fact of
publication. The defendant is permitted to prove, as a defense, that his publications were true and published
"with good motives and for justifiable ends." Disobedience of an injunction is punishable as a
contempt. Held unconstitutional, as applied to publications charging neglect of duty and corruption upon the
part of law-enforcing officers of the State. Pp. 283 U. S. 704, 283 U. S. 709, 283 U. S. 712, 283 U. S. 722.

2. Liberty of the press is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action. P. 283 U. S. 707.

3. Liberty of the press is not an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse. P. 283 U. S. 708.

4. In passing upon the constitutionality of the statute, the court has regard for substance, and not for form;
the statute must be tested by its operation and effect. P. 283 U. S. 708.

Page 283 U. S. 698

5. Cutting through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of the statute is that public authorities
may bring a publisher before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and
defamatory matter -- in particular, that the matter consists of charges against public officials of official
dereliction -- and, unless the publisher is able and disposed to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and
are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and
further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence of censorship. P. 283 U. S. 713.

6. A statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is inconsistent with the conception of the
liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed. P. 283 U. S. 713.

7. The chief purpose of the guaranty is to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The libeler, however,
remains criminally and civilly responsible for his libels. P. 283 U. S. 713.

8. There are undoubtedly limitations upon the immunity from previous restraint of the press, but they are not
applicable in this case. P. 283 U. S. 715.
9. The liberty of the press has been especially cherished in this country as respects publications censuring
public officials and charging official misconduct. P. 283 U. S. 716.

10. Public officers find their remedies for false accusations in actions for redress and punishment under the
libel laws, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals. P. 283 U. S. 718.

11. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any
the less necessary the immunity from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. P. 283 U. S. 720.

12. Characterizing the publication of charges of official misconduct as a "business," and the business as a
nuisance, does not avoid the constitutional guaranty; nor does it matter that the periodical is largely or chiefly
devoted to such charges. P. 283 U. S. 720.

13. The guaranty against previous restraint extends to publications charging official derelictions that amount
to crimes. P.283 U. S. 720.

14. Permitting the publisher to show in defense that the matter published is true and is published with good
motives and for justifiable ends does not justify the statute. P. 283 U. S. 721.

15. Nor can it be sustained as a measure for preserving the public peace and preventing assaults and crime.
Pp. 283 U. S. 721, 283 U. S. 722.

179 Minn. 40; 228 N.W. 326, reversed.

Page 283 U. S. 699

APPEAL from a decree which sustained an injunction abating the publication of a periodical as malicious,
scandalous and defamatory, and restraining future publication. The suit was based on a Minnesota
statute. See also s.c., 174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770.
Facts of the Case:

Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were
implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his
newspaper under a state law that allowed such action against periodicals. The law provided that any person
"engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be
enjoined (stopped) from further committing or maintaining the nuisance.

Issue:

Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History
had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court
held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First
Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow
exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the
communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding.
371. National Press Club v comelec (1992)

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling
or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one
for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters
who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being
curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-
based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is
in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public
opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and
Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4)
which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the
election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard
to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the
basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian
demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or
administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not
gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of
Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods.
Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and
programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in
fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as
reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates
for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly
repressive or unreasonable.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1

Facts:

-Question raised in the case: constitutionality of Sec 11 (b) of RA 6646. Petitioners argue that said provision
violates and invades the constitutional guarantee comprising of freedom of expression.

- Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful; xxx xxx xxx b) for any
newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass
media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of
absence from his work as such during the campaign period.

-Petitioners in this case include: representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political advertisements; two individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

Issue: WON Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 is valid.

Held:

- Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881,
known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as follows:

Sec. 90. Comelec space. — The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation
in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done
in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein
candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially
by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec
Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all
radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations
are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign.

-The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and
poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war
chests."

-No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by Section
11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code). That
objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme
disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of
poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty line." It is supremely important, however,
to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional status by
the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:

Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

- The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The
fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the
ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable
rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and
forums among candidates."
372. Adiong v comelec (1992)

Facts:

- On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

-Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed
materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided,
That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own
residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.

-Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave
and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving
vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not
received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed
"Comelec Poster Areas."

Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private,
and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Held:
-The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.

-The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of
election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and,
therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the
same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice
and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his
personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
373. ABS CBN v Comelec (2000)

FACTS:

COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution in 1998 approving the issuance of a restraining order stopping ABS-CBN
or any other groups, its agents/representative from conducting such exit survey during the May 11 elections.
COMELEC believed it might conflict with the official count, as well as the unofficial quick count of NAMFREL.

The Court then issued the TRO prayed for by ABS-CBN.

ISSUE:

WON the act of COMELEC in restraining the conduct of the exit polls violates the right to freedom of expression

HELD:

No. Our Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The
freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and
stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.

In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free
press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint
(uninhibited, robust, and wide open).

However, the freedoms of speech and of the press are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of
its police power. While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds
has limitations.

The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the
former is only part of the latter. Exit polls properly conducted and publicized can be vital tools for the holding
of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other
electoral ills. There can be no free and honest elections if the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the TRO by issued is made PERMANENT. COMELEC resolution is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

NOTES:

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters
whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are
announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion
of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been
resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

In Cabansag v. Fernandez, there are 2 theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such
freedoms:
(1) "clear and present danger" rule – the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger
to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented.
(2) "dangerous tendency" rule. – i.e. if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has
a right to prevent, then such words are punishable
374. SWS v comelec (2001)

Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue
that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their
results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”

Xxxxx

FACTS:
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation
and features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the
validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5.4 which provides that surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published 7 days before the election.

SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local
levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its
part, intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise
of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint

RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and
the press.
The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the
right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information
and forms among candidates.

Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the O’brient test
for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such
as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because
the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is
inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of
balancing by weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other
considerations (for example, prevention of last minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of
freedom of expression.
375. Iglesia n Kristo v CA GR 119673

6 IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA, 259 SCRA 529

Facts:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121
and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and
constitute an attack against otherreligions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it
appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a
letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the
decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present
danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of itsTV program and in x-
rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo
insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to
be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and
Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue:

WON the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression.

Held:

Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will
be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of otherreligions . RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The
respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of otherreligions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of
the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.Religious dogmas and
beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent
board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks otherreligions, even if
said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary
to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, includingreligious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is
inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the
content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed,
its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended
cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration
or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function
which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint
may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
B.) subsequent punishment

376. Salonga v Pano (1985)

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation”
in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which
to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies
of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated
12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD
885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges
against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981,
Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied
the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation
of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the
said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is
the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing
of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January
18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop
the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in
the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft
ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded
agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision
has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several
occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language
clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command
of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be
created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter
pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article
XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and
academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most
voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
377. People v Perez (1923)

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged for rape. The information alleged that the victim was his stepdaughter but did
not allege that the victim was only 13 years old at the time of the rape.

During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation against him. During trial it was proved that
the victim was the stepdaughter of the accused and was in fact 13 years old at the time the crime of rape was
committed. Accused was then convicted of qualified rape and was meted out the penalty of death.

ISSUE: WON an accused may be convicted of qualified rape when the information alleged only simple rape?
HELD: NO. Citing People vs. Garcia, the court held that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple
rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he
was arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the minority of Maribel and the relationship of appellant and his
victim were established during the trial, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape because he cannot be
punished for a graver offense than that with which he was charged.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance to be considered as such must be so alleged
in the information, which is not required of aggravating circumstances.
The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the
accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charge against him, so that be may adequately prepare for
this defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
378. Espiritu v General Lim (wala)

Commercial Speech

379. Pharmaceutical v Secretary of Health GR 173034

FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby
amending and expanding the coverage of said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING:

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health
and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed
out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH
may implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our
domestic system. Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. “Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of
general or customary international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim
reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general
public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee
(IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-
binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed
by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states
and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of
the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how
such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under the
Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except
Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose
and intent of the Milk Code.
H. Freedom of Religion

380. Aglipay v Ruiz

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz,
the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd
Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and
selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a
particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate
any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance,
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the
Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people
‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies
of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
381. Manosca V CA GR 106440

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWER OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN; CONCEPT. - Eminent domain, also
often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist;
instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as the highest and most exact idea of
property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in
the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within
the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in
its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification
is that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This proscription is
intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against
whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE GUIDELINES SET BY THE SUPREME COURT IN GUIDO VS. RURAL PROGRESS
ADMINISTRATION WHERE NOT MEANT TO BE PRECLUSIVE IN NATURE AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN SHOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING CONFINED ONLY TO EXPROPRIATION OF VAST TRACTS
OF LAND AND LANDED ESTATES. - The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the
Presidents power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision
into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context
of the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guidowere not meant to be
preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as
being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PUBLIC USE EXPANDED. - The validity of the exercise of the power
of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that
public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly limited
to clear cases of use by the public has long been discarded.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNIFICANT FACTOR TO BE CON-SIDERED IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE
OF THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER AND NOT THE CASUAL CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT FOLLOW FROM
SUCH EXERCISE. - The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration,
for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow
from the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit
may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use.
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth
site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use.

382. Garces v Estenzo

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente
Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified
by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of
the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast
day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image to the council on
the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition until after
the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the
parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the
subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because
the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the
constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to
favor any sect or church.

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in
connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela",
and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting
shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash
donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate
money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with
tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased
in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for
the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the
highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church
when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a
patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is
a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the
monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.