Suit Against Public Officers

Veterans Manpower v. CA

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under Section 4
and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987 Constitution against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and
institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO)
which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying
Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col.
Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as
members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located...”.
As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum
monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro
Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in
the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a
security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.

VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and
consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO.

ISSUE: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent.

HELD: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official
duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their
private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to
be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative
act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in toto.
Larkins v. NLRC

On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch
No.III of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages.
Charges were against petitioner T/Sgt Aldora Larkins who was a member of the United States
Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron
(3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.,Lt. Col. Frankhauster, and Joselito Cunanan the new
contractor (JAC Maintenance Services) employed for 3 AGS.
Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the
hearings. They, likewise, failed to submit their position paper, which the Labor Arbiter deemed
a waiver on their part to do so. The case was therefore submitted for decision on the basis of
private respondents' position paper and supporting documents which therefore on November
21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the claims of private respondents.
He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and ordered them
to reinstate private respondents with full back wages, or if that is no longer possible, to pay
private respondents' separation pay.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction
over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended,
were ever served on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal," petitioner argued that
the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of
the R.P. – U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947.

Issue:
Petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void because respondent
Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. Petitioner alleges that
she never received nor was served, any summons or copies of the original and amended
complaints, and therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under Article XIV
of the R.P. – U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
For Reference:
R.P. –U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
". . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with the permission of
the commanding officer of such base; but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such
permission he shall forthwith take the necessary steps . . . to serve such process, as the case
may be, and to provide the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate
court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to
prove such service as the case may require."

Ruling: Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case as summonses and other processes
issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces
personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead
designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the
appropriate court. Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He instead,
addressed the summons to Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not the Base Commander.
Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever issued and served on
her. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her. BUT as contended
notices of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil
Procedure may be applied by analogy to NLRC proceedings. (Revised Rules of the NLRC,
Rule I, Sec. 3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent without the latter being served with summons (cf. Vda. de Macoy v. Court of
Appeals, 206 SCRA 244 [1992]; Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
, 149 SCRA 193 [1987]). In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the
hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void.
Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral
argument before the said body. This, however, does not constitute a waiver of the lack of
summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She
may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were
discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner
set forth only one issue and that is the absence of jurisdiction over her person. If an appearance
before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of
the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons (De los Santos v.
Montera 221 SCRA 15 [1993]).
 Be that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons
on her, still the case could not prosper. There is no allegation from the pleadings filedthat Lt.
Col. Frankhauser and petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities fortortious acts
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). However, private respondents
named 3 AGS as one of the respondents in their complaint.
Indeed, assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and
the monetary claims of private respondents proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by
Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal capacities, but bythe United States
government ( Sandres v. Veridiano II 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
Shauf v. CA

Facts: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US
Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at
Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a
complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private
respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director),
for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex. Shauf was offered a temporary
position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that
if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy
occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s
available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate
her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed
to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the
appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this
allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with
the applicable regulation. Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as
the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of
such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected
from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are
immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that
the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According
to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit
against the US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their
immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers &
employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of
international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Held: No they are not immune.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby
ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of
the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or
abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents
committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused
appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and
has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human
behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling
psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for
approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the
application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed
Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection
to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the
1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts
complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf
to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be
held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under
the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is
allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a
foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain
and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and
protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine
courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive
representations of private respondents on that score.
Republic v. Hon. Sandoval

Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a
marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were
wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to
be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola
massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers
involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners.
The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the
victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the
purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the
Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to
litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the
State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were
responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their
authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and
police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages
as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.