"Confessions"
Author(s): Margaret Miles
Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 125-142
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1202858 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 21:47
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Religion.
http://www.jstor.org
125
the senses about what we are looking for, for what one of them reports to us
also holds true for the rest. Let us therefore use in particularthe testimony of
the eyes, because this sense far excels the rest, and although it is a different
kind of vision, it is close to spiritual vision.4
The metaphor of physical vision constitutes a leitmotiv throughout
Augustine's many accounts of spiritual vision. It occurs as early as De
quantitateanimae 23.43 and reappears with emphasis on various aspects
of the motif in preaching, in scriptural exegesis, and in the autobio-
graphical writings, and it appears in its most fully articulated form in
De trinitate. It is a metaphor which enables Augustine "to distinguish
internal spiritual things more subtly and to describe them more easily."
In identifying and selecting the metaphor of physical vision for explora-
tion, we must acknowledge that its proper location is within Augustine's
description of the primacy of divine illumination in any act of human
understanding. Yet a long history of interpretive work on Augustine's
theory of divine illumination has focused on the meaning and activity
of divine illumination and has largely neglected analysis of the role of
human beings in understanding. It is not accidental that in discussions
of divine illumination the role of human responsibility has not received
its proper attention. Augustine's model of physical vision underlines
and supports his description of the necessity of human effort, concen-
tration, and training; if this model is not noticed, the initiative of the
viewer and the necessity for training "the eye of the mind" are not likely
to be given their proper weight. This article will attempt to redress the
neglect of attention to the balancing role of human responsibility by
exploring the model which emphasizes it.
We will look first, then, at the account of physical vision with which
Augustine worked. Second, we will look at his description of "seeing
God." Finally, we will ask whether there are, for Augustine, any points
of continuity between physical and spiritual vision, that is, whether the
training of the physical eye is useful for the training of spiritual vision.
The following observations are not intended to provide a "key" to the
difficult and complex arguments of De trinitatebut only to draw a facet
of Augustine's teaching on the vision of God which illuminates that
teaching.
Contemporary analyses of the visual metaphor to describe an act of
human knowledge rely on a long historical development which has
come to emphasize the distance between the viewer and the object that
is necessary in every act of seeing. The viewer must, it is alleged, stand
4 Augustine De trinitate11.1.1; 1.1.2. Translations are
adapted from Saint Augustine, The
Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1963). I am grateful to ProfessorJames Halporn, Department of
Classics, Indiana University (Bloomington), for his help with these emended translations.
Further citations in parentheses in text are from De trinitateunless otherwise specified.
126
127
are barely distinguishable, even "to the judgment of reason." In the act
of vision itself, "the will possesses such power in uniting these two
[viewer and object] that it attaches the sense to be formed to that thing
which is seen" (11.2.5). Vision, then, connects or attaches the viewer to
the object. Moreover, the soul of the viewer both initially projects the
visual ray, and it also "absorbs into itself" the form or image of the
object, which is then permanently retained by the memory. Vision is
definitely, for Augustine, a two-way street: the soul forms images of
sensible things "out of its own substance" (substantiaesuae), but the result
is that the mind itself is formed by the very images it formulates and
carries. The soul is "fitted together" with, or "takes the shape of'
(10.5.7-8),7 the objects of its focused attention.
The energy required to initiate vision and to retain the form of its
object in the memory is also an investment of the soul's affection. The
soul's selection of objects becomes habitual so that the soul does not
recognize itself without a constant supply of its objects: "The mind
draws in with itself those things upon which it has long reflected with
love, and to which it has become attached through its devoted care
[curaeglutino inhaeserit],even when it returns in some way to think of
itself' (10.5.7).8 The mind, when its attention and affection is compul-
sively directed outward, "binds itself to these images with so strong a
love as even to regard itself as something of the same kind . . . it is
made like them" (10.6.8).9
This strong interpretation, both of the initiating role of the viewer
and of the powerful effect of the objects of vision on the viewer, is
important if we are to grasp Augustine's account of spiritual vision.
The soul, to mix metaphors for a moment, votes with its feet; it cannot
be passive in vision as, for example, the ear can be passive-to a far
greater extent-in hearing. In the act of hearing, the soul neither
necessarily selects its objects nor necessarily turns its attention toward
them. Rather, hearing is initiated by the object which imposes itself on
the ear; the ear is helpless, while it is in the environs, not to hear a
sound that strikes it.10
But although it is tempting to extend the contrast of vision and
hearing, we must be careful to acknowledge Augustine's imprecise use
of both senses to indicate activity and passivity, reaching out and being
drawn by an attractive and powerful object. In De trinitatehe says he
7 See also De doctrina christiana 1.20.19: "incipit configuari."
Augustine
8 See also Augustine De trinitate 11.2.2: "conjungit."
9 See also
Augustine De trinitate 10.8.11: The mind "can no longer separate the images of
sensible things from itself, so as to see itself alone. For they have marvelously cohered to it with
the glue of love [glutino amoris], . . . sensible things leave the footprints
[simulacra], as it were, in
our mind of many attentive actions."
10
Augustine Confessions 6.8.13.
128
129
130
granted to the clean of heart: for 'blessed are the clean of heart, for they
shall see God,' unless he is loved by faith the heart cannot be cleansed
so as to be fit and ready to see him" (8.4.6.). Faith is the initial invest-
ment of attention and affection, of love and of longing, in God who is
not yet seen "face to face": "We walk by faith and not by sight" (8.4.6; 2
Cor. 5:7). And yet, blind faith is not required: "Who loves that which
he does not know? . . . And what does it mean to love God except to
see him and to perceive him steadfastly with our mind?" (8.4.6). We
will shortly examine Augustine's nuanced claim that a vision of God is
possible in this life; for now it is enough to note that Augustine insists
that faith is essential; it is the willingness "to prepare the means of
seeing what you love before you try to see it."17
Just as the bodily eye requires the most strenuous exercise and
strengthening before it can see strongly illuminated objects, so the eye
of the mind requires intensive exercise and training before it can
see-even momentarily-eternal truth. Here a development in
Augustine's thought is clearly discernible; in an early work Augustine
said: "There are some eyes so healthy and vigorous [tam sani et vegeti],
that they can without hesitation turn toward the very sun as soon as
they are opened. . . . Others, however, are dazzled by the very luster
that they so ardently desire to see. . . . To these . . . it is dangerous to
want to show what they are as yet incapable of seeing. . . . They are,
therefore, first to be trained and . . . their love is to be trained and
nourished."18 In the later work, De trinitate, however, Augustine
acknowledges no automatically "healthy and vigorous" eye. The
agenda of De trinitate is the careful, steady drawing of a cumulative
understanding of the Trinity. Even though, at the beginning of the
effort, the Trinity's "own light seemed to be present around us, still, no
trinity appeared to us in nature, for in the midst of that splendor we did
not keep the eye of our mind fixed steadily upon searching for it . . .
because that ineffable light beat back our gaze, and the weakness of our
mind was convinced that it could not yet adjust itself to it" (15.6.10).
Preliminary, even to "seeing somewhat," then, are faith and the
cleansing and the strengthening of the eye of the mind. At this point,
Augustine is explicit about his use of the physical model of the visual
ray, indicating both its relevance and the point at which it may not be
an accurate model. Augustine questions his model at an important
point: he has argued, in De trinitate10 and 11, that a certain kind of self-
17
Augustine Enarrationes in Psalmos99.5; see also De trinitate14.2.4: "We must walk by faith,
and sight will take its place by which we shall see face to face, just as now,
although we do not see,
yet because we believe, we shall deserve to see [videremirebimur], and shall rejoice that we have
been brought to sight through faith."
18 Augustine Soliloquies1.23.
131
132
133
134
This same desire by which one yearns for the knowing of the thing
becomes love of the thing when known, while it holds and embraces
[tenet atque amplectitur], the beloved . . ." (9.12.18).31 Longing, the
visual ray of the soul, contacts its object: "The more ardently we love
God, the more certainly and calmly do we see him" (8.9.13). To the
extent that the concentrated and strengthened eye of the mind partici-
pates in the activity of love, it touches the God who is love: "The God of
God [Deus ex deo] therefore, is love" (15.17.31).
At this point another dissimilarity appears between physical vision
and the vision of the eye of the mind: in physical vision, the soul
creates, from its own substance (substantiaesuae) (10.5.7), the image of a
sensible object which then remains in the memory and informs the
mind. The vision of God, on the other hand, is the only activity in
which the soul does not construct from its own substance the image
which is seen and remains in the memory after the moment of vision.
Augustine's extended discussion of the love of God as God's very
substance (15.17.27-29) precedes his claim that, in the activity of
loving, a human being actually participates in God's substance, which
then informs the soul through the activity of the Holy Spirit: "When
God the Holy Spirit, therefore, who proceeds from God has been given
to a human being, he inflames him with the love of God and for his
neighbor, and he himself is love. For human beingsdo not have whenceto
love God exceptfrom God"(15.17.31; emphasis mine).
Just as, in physical vision, the will unifies, in the act of vision, two
separate entities- the viewer and the object-so in the vision of God, it
is love, "a stronger form of will" (15.21.41),32 that, in the activity of
loving, connects and unites human longing with God's activity of love.
Augustine is careful to insist on both distinction and unity in his
account of the vision of God, just as he had been careful to emphasize
both the distinctness of viewer and object and their unity in the act of
physical vision.
A further aspect of Augustine's analysis of physical vision is impor-
tant to Augustine's account of spiritual vision and the vision of God.
Again and again he quotes 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a
darkened mirror; then, however, face to face." How can Augustine
hold both that human longing can touch God under the present condi-
tions of human life, and that our vision is flawed and not yet "face to
31 Cf. the following quotation from a contemporary novel: "To crave and to have are as alike
as a thing and its shadow. For when does a berry break upon the tongue as sweetly as when one
longs to taste it, and when is the taste refracted into so many hues and savors of ripeness and
earth, and when do our senses know anything so utterly as when we lack it? And here again is a
foreshadowing-the world will be made whole" (Marilynne Robinson, Housekeeping [New York:
Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1980], pp. 152-53).
32 "Vel amorem seu dilectionem
quae valentior est voluntas."
135
33 Augustine De doctrinachristiana1.32.35.
136
34
Augustine Soliloquies1.1; cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summatheologica2a-2ae, 23,1: "Not
every love has the quality of friendship. In the first place it is reserved to that love for another that
wills his well-being. When what we will is not the other'sgood for his own sake, but the desire of it
as it affects us, that is not friendship but self-regarding love, and some form of concupiscence."
137
ipates in the very activity which is God, for "God is love and the one
who abides in love abides in God." It is, according to Augustine's
description, impossible to love without such participation. The only
other possibility of relationship with other human beings is that of
cupiditas, the anxious desire to manipulate the "neighbor" into the
position of supporting and reinforcing one's fantasies of sex, power,
and possession. But: "Let a person love his brother, and he will love the
same love, i.e. God-who-is-love" (8.8.12).
In all love that is not possessive, the "love by which one loves" is more
immediately knowable to the loving person than is the person loved,
because the person loved must necessarily be loved as she or he is seen,
namely, "through a darkened mirror." It is, therefore, in one's activity
of loving relationship that God becomes accessible, concrete, and
"visible": "How, then, can he who does not love his brother whom he
sees, love God, whom he does not see, since God is love, and this is
wanting to him who does not love his brother" (8.8.12). This argument
lays the foundation that Augustine will develop in later books of De
trinitate,for the claim that in loving human relationships - admittedly a
rarity in proportion to exploitive relationships and the inevitable aspect
of possessiveness in all human relationship-God is directly experi-
enced. Augustine emphasizes that only this kind of love preserves the
consummate value of the neighbor; it is clearly possible to "desire"
another human being too much, but it is not possible to love, in the
proper sense of the word, too much: "Neither should we let this other
question disturb us, how much love we ought to spend upon our
brother, how much upon God. . . . We love God and our neighbor
from one and the same love" (8.8.12).35
One further effect of Augustine's use of the visual ray theory of vision
as a model for the vision of God should be noticed. The model of the
visual ray, requiring exercise, strengthening, and training before it can
touch its object, allows Augustine to balance-although not to inte-
grate-two theological statements both of which he is committed to
maintaining in full strength. On the one hand, Augustine fully affirms
the exclusive prerogative of God to determine the course of a human
life, the necessity of divine illumination, and of predestination to
salvation. On the other hand, Augustine was acutely aware of the
necessary effort involved in preparing oneself for participation in the
love, service, and vision of God. Augustine's careful statement of the
sine qua non of both God's grace and human effort appears in De
trinitate 14.17.23: "Whoever, then, is being renewed in the knowledge
of God, and injustice and holiness of truth, by making progress day by
138
day, transfers his love from temporal to eternal things, from visible to
intelligible things, from carnal to spiritual things, and constantly
endeavors to restrain and turn desire from the former and to align
himself in love to the latter. He does so, however, to the extent that he
receives divine help [Tantum autemfacit, quantumdivinitus adiuvatur]."
The remaining task of this paper is to explore the relationship
between physical and spiritual vision. Does physical vision act only as a
metaphor for spiritual vision? We have already seen that physical and
spiritual vision are contiguous,36 but is there any sense in which they
are continuous? Is there, for Augustine, any sense in which the training
of the physical eye is useful for the training of spiritual vision? I think
we must find that there is, and the remainder of the paper will attempt
to unravel Augustine's claim that, on the one hand, the accurate
"seeing" of visible objects irreducibly involves the exercise of spiritual
vision, while, on the other hand, spiritual vision ultimately includes
seeing with the eyes of the body.
The mechanics of physical vision, according to Augustine's analysis,
require that the viewer exercise an essentially spiritual capacity.
Because physical vision takes place "in the sense," that is, in the uniting
of viewer and object in the connecting visual ray, there is irreducibly in
physical vision "something spiritual, because it cannot take place
without the soul." The will which energizes and focuses the visual ray is
a spiritual energy. Therefore, physical vision which fails to recognize
the spiritual aspect of its own functioning fails also to "see" its object
accurately in that it fails to take into account an essential feature of the
object- its life, that is, the spiritual quality which informs or creates it. 37
Augustine's description of the inference of the life of another human
being from the perception of the person's body is the paradigm for all
perception of spiritual qualities in visible things; one never sees life or
the soul, but one learns to recognize this from one's self-knowledge:
"For we recognize the movement of bodies also from their resemblance
to ourselves, and from this fact we perceive that others live besides
ourselves. . . . For even when a living body is moved, there is no way
opened for our eyes to see the soul, a thing which cannot be seen with
the eyes; but we notice that something is present within that bulk, such
as is present in us, so that we are able to move our bulk in a similar
way, and this is the life and the soul" (8.6.9).
The perception of visible objects "in their life" is the perception of
36 See n. 4 above.
37 Cf.
Goethe, quoted in Paul Friedlinder, Plato, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1958), 1:21: "The eyes of the mind must constantly cooperate with the eyes of
the body in a loving bond, because otherwise there is a danger that we will see and still miss
seeing."
139
140
141
142