vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most
important institution of society. It is in the family where children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via
Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order2 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein
respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the
foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be
entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of
legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and
real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las
Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las
Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las
Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area
of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land
with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of
84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located
in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between
herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitionerʼs] share, however, of the
net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse
[respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for
reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the
respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be
well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006,
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods
and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore- quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property
cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a
return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10
On July 6, 2006, the writ was
partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the amount of ₱46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's
share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's
fees; and
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation
expenses.11
On July 7, 2006, or after more than
nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for
Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13 dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant
disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to
proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Not satisfied with the trial court's
Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order18 dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated
August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.20
On November 21, 2006, the
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,22 the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's
Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE
CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET
PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE
INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a
number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10,
2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.
- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we
clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration."26
In Neypes, we explained that the
"fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi- judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution."27 In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court
rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned." From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCʼs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courtʼs decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the
decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
"A judgment is null and void when the
court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not
fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together.32 The Rule on Legal Separation33 provides that "the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non- resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner."34 In the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its