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G.R. No.

176556

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,


vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO,
LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their
mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The family is the basic and the most


important institution of society. It is
in the family where children are born
and molded either to become useful
citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community.
Thus, we are saddened when parents
have to separate and fight over
properties, without regard to the
message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not
shirk from our obligation to rule on
this case involving legal separation
escalating to questions on
dissolution and partition of
properties.

The Case

This case comes before us via


Petition for Review on Certiorari1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner seeks that we vacate
and set aside the Order2 dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City.
In lieu of the said order, we are asked
to issue a Resolution defining the net
profits subject of the forfeiture as a
result of the decree of legal
separation in accordance with the
provision of Article 102(4) of the
Family Code, or alternatively, in
accordance with the provisions of
Article 176 of the Civil Code.

Antecedent Facts

On October 26, 2000, herein


respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed
a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the
RTC rendered a Decision4 dated
October 10, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, viewed from the


foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the
legal separation of plaintiff Rita C.
Quiao and defendant-respondent
Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article
55.

As such, the herein parties shall be


entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bond shall
not be severed.

Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of


legal age, the three minor children,
namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all
surnamed Quiao shall remain under
the custody of the plaintiff who is the
innocent spouse.

Further, except for the personal and


real properties already foreclosed by
the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, namely:

1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las


Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

2. coffee mill in Durian, Las


Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las


Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

4. coffee mill in Esperanza,


Agusan del Sur;

5. a parcel of land with an area


of 1,200 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City;

6. a parcel of agricultural land


with an area of 5 hectares
located in Manila de Bugabos,
Butuan City;

7. a parcel of land with an area of


84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;

8. Bashier Bon Factory located


in Tungao, Butuan City;

shall be divided equally between


herein [respondents] and [petitioner]
subject to the respective legitimes of
the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[₱]45,740.00.

[Petitionerʼs] share, however, of the


net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children.

He is further ordered to reimburse


[respondents] the sum of
[₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]

SO ORDERED.5

Neither party filed a motion for


reconsideration and appeal within
the period provided for under
Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on
Legal Separation.6

On December 12, 2005, the


respondents filed a motion for
execution7 which the trial court
granted in its Order dated December
16, 2005, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"Wherefore, finding the motion to be


well taken, the same is hereby
granted. Let a writ of execution be
issued for the immediate
enforcement of the Judgment.

SO ORDERED."8

Subsequently, on February 10, 2006,


the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9
which reads as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods


and chattels of the [petitioner]
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be
made the sums stated in the afore-
quoted DECISION [sic], together with
your lawful fees in the service of this
Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.

But if sufficient personal property


cannot be found whereof to satisfy
this execution and your lawful fees,
then we command you that of the
lands and buildings of the said
[petitioner], you make the said sums
in the manner required by law. You
are enjoined to strictly observed
Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

You are hereby ordered to make a


return of the said proceedings
immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full in
consonance with Section 14, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.10

On July 6, 2006, the writ was


partially executed with the petitioner
paying the respondents the amount
of ₱46,870.00, representing the
following payments:

(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's


share of the payment of the
conjugal share;

(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's


fees; and

(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation


expenses.11

On July 7, 2006, or after more than


nine months from the promulgation
of the Decision, the petitioner filed
before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification,12 asking the RTC to
define the term "Net Profits Earned."

To resolve the petitioner's Motion for


Clarification, the RTC issued an
Order13 dated August 31, 2006,
which held that the phrase "NET
PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the
remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts."14 The Order further
held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall
be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to
any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The
dispositive portion of the Order
states:

WHEREFORE, there is no blatant


disparity when the sheriff intends to
forfeit all the remaining properties
after deducting the payments of the
debts for only separate properties of
the defendant-respondent shall be
delivered to him which he has none.

The Sheriff is herein directed to


proceed with the execution of the
Decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.16

Not satisfied with the trial court's


Order, the petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration17 on September
8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC
issued another Order18 dated
November 8, 2006, holding that
although the Decision dated October
10, 2005 has become final and
executory, it may still consider the
Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify
the meaning of "net profit earned."19
Furthermore, the same Order held:

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated


August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered
set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED,
which is subject of forfeiture in favor
of [the] parties' common children, is
ordered to be computed in
accordance [with] par. 4 of Article
102 of the Family Code.20

On November 21, 2006, the


respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,21 praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order
dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter,
on January 8, 2007,22 the trial court
had changed its ruling again and
granted the respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration whereby the Order
dated November 8, 2006 was set
aside to reinstate the Order dated
August 31, 2006.

Not satisfied with the trial court's


Order, the petitioner filed on
February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, raising the
following:

Issues

IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE


CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE
COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE
HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF
THE FAMILY CODE?

II

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET


PROFITS EARNED BY THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE
FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?

III

WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE


PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT
MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE
NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF
FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED
RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE?

IV

WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE


INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF
THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE
IN THE NET CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF
LEGAL SEPARATION?23

Our Ruling

While the petitioner has raised a


number of issues on the applicability
of certain laws, we are well-aware
that the respondents have called our
attention to the fact that the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 has attained
finality when the Motion for
Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we
are constrained to resolve first the
issue of the finality of the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 and
subsequently discuss the matters
that we can clarify.

The Decision dated October 10,


2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion
for Clarification was filed on July 7,
2006.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of


Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.


- The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be


interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we


clarified that to standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, we
held that "it would be practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for
reconsideration."26

In Neypes, we explained that the


"fresh period rule" shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs;
Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the RTCs to the Court of Appeals
(CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the CA and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. We also said,
"The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or
resolution."27 In other words, a party
litigant may file his notice of appeal
within a fresh 15-day period from his
receipt of the trial court's decision or
final order denying his motion for
new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Failure to avail of
the fresh 15-day period from the
denial of the motion for
reconsideration makes the decision
or final order in question final and
executory.

In the case at bar, the trial court


rendered its Decision on October 10,
2005. The petitioner neither filed a
motion for reconsideration nor a
notice of appeal. On December 16,
2005, or after 67 days had lapsed,
the trial court issued an order
granting the respondent's motion for
execution; and on February 10, 2006,
or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial
court issued a writ of execution.
Finally, when the writ had already
been partially executed, the
petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after
270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion
for Clarification on the definition of
the "net profits earned." From the
foregoing, the petitioner had clearly
slept on his right to question the
RTCʼs Decision dated October 10,
2005. For 270 days, the petitioner
never raised a single issue until the
decision had already been partially
executed. Thus at the time the
petitioner filed his motion for
clarification, the trial courtʼs decision
has become final and executory. A
judgment becomes final and
executory when the reglementary
period to appeal lapses and no
appeal is perfected within such
period. Consequently, no court, not
even this Court, can arrogate unto
itself appellate jurisdiction to review
a case or modify a judgment that
became final.28

The petitioner argues that the


decision he is questioning is a void
judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still
be disturbed even after 270 days had
lapsed from the issuance of the
decision to the filing of the motion for
clarification. He said that "a void
judgment is no judgment at all. It
never attains finality and cannot be a
source of any right nor any
obligation."29 But what precisely is a
void judgment in our jurisdiction?
When does a judgment becomes
void?

"A judgment is null and void when the


court which rendered it had no power
to grant the relief or no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or over the
parties or both."30 In other words, a
court, which does not have the
power to decide a case or that has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter
or the parties, will issue a void
judgment or a coram non judice.31

The questioned judgment does not


fall within the purview of a void
judgment. For sure, the trial court
has jurisdiction over a case involving
legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8369 confers upon an RTC,
designated as the Family Court of a
city, the exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide, among others,
complaints or petitions relating to
marital status and property relations
of the husband and wife or those
living together.32 The Rule on Legal
Separation33 provides that "the
petition [for legal separation] shall be
filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner
or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the
date of filing or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may
be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner."34 In the
instant case, herein respondent Rita
is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan
City for more than six months prior to
the date of filing of the petition; thus,
the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over
the respondent's petition below.
Furthermore, the RTC also acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, considering that summons
and a copy of the complaint with its

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