IN RE: MANZANO [166 SCRA 246 (1988)]

A letter was sent by Judge Rodolfo Manzano addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court requesting that he may accept the appointment as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December
1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988.

Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases
of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are:

1. Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be
found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action; and

2. Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Manzano may be allowed to accept the appointment as member of the
Committee on Justice.

Ruling: No. The committee was created by the Executive branch and discharges administrative
functions. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established
by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

The Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs.
Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that—

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the

supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Justice.

ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (63 PHIL 139)

Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

Issue: Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling:

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
[W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
CASIBANG VS. AQUINO (G.R. NO. L-38025. AUGUST 20, 1979)
Facts:

Respondent Remigio Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan over his
rival, petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest with the trial court, presided by respondent Judge,
who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.

In the meantime, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under
Martial Law; thereafter, a new Constitution was adopted. Yu moved to dismiss the election protest
on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — (principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Yu
contended that "the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been
superseded by the 1973 Constitution.

Respondent Judge sustained the political question theory and ordered the dismissal of the electoral
protest. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the electoral protest filed by the petitioner remained a justiciable question
even after the 1973 Constitution was adopted, thus remains to be under the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance.

HELD:

The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution,
through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time
of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their
term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or
committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that
Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local
government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of
policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short,
for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest
of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the
government."

The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political
question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President
or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge
decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Tañada
vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957).

BELGICA, ET. AL. VS. OCHOA, ET. AL. (November 19, 2013)
Facts:

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF
required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds.
PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and
other personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.

The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision
on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies.

Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district.
Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

Issue: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on separation of powers.

Ruling:
Yes, the PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel is unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional provisions on separation of powers.

Any post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which
belongs to the executive department

The role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature; hence, the admission that
the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be
tapped as a funding source clearly connotes a participative role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law making it unconstitutional.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC (73 SCRA 333)

Facts :
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies
(“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and
length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the
questions that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether
or not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several
proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
 The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16,
and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution.

Also, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the
power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of
October 16 asserting that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions
of 1935 and 1973. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for
deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question.
This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process
by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session,
the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution
and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that
time also sits as the legislature.

DAZA VS. SINGSON (180 SCRA 496, 1989)

Facts:

The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the liberal party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation
in the commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The Petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the commission
on appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition
for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction ,we issued a temporary restraining
order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the
Commission on Appointments.

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
commission on appointments because his elections thereto is permanent. His claim is that the
reorganization of the House of Representatives in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

Issue : Whether or not the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Held. :

No. The court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a
discretionary act of the HOR that may not be reviewed because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments.

The Term Political questions connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which, under
the constitution, are to be decided by the person in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail
the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional.

RULINGS:

No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power
of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority,and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se ,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.

However, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to

scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power
of confirmation and investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in
this class. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.