FRANK N.

LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse The orders of the probate court dated 19 and 23 March 1976
Diana Liu, and children, namely: Walter, Milton, Frank, Jr., approving the contracts of sale to the Loys are VOID and did
Henry and Jockson, all surnamed Liu, Rebecca Liu Shui and not ratify the sales because there was already a prior order of
Pearl Liu Rodriguez, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO LOY, JR., the probate courted dated 24 February 1976 approving the
TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE VAÑO, respondents. sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Frank Liu. Hence, the probate court
had already lost jurisdiction over Lot Nos. 5 and 6 since the lots
LIU vs. LOY no longer formed part of the Estate of Jose Vaño.
G.R. No. 145982, September 13, 2004

Digested by: Erven John Claros

FACTS:
Teodoro Vaño, in his capacity as Attorney-in-Fact of Jose Vaño,
sold Lot Nos.5 and 6 to BENITO LIU on 13 January 1950, or prior
to the death of Jose Vaño on28 January 1950.

On 22 April 1966, Benito Liu sold the lots to Frank Liu.

On 19August 1968, Teodoro Vaño sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy

while Lot No. 5 was sold to Alfredo Loy, Jr. on 16 December
1969.

Prior to the sale of the above-mentioned lots to the Loys,

Teodoro Vaño wrote Frank Liu a letter and it was apparently
shown that the latter offered to settle the whole balance of the
lot should the title be immediately transferred in his brother’s
name and Mr. Pangalo’s.

The letter also informed Liu of Supreme Court’s decision

regarding all the sales Vaño had made over the properties of
his father to be legal.

The Loys, on the other hand, insisted that the transaction

between Teodoro Vaño and Benito Liu was a contract to sell
while the transaction between the former and Teodoro Vaño
was a contract of sale and that the contracts of sale in favor of
the Loys transferred ownership as the conveyances were
absolute.

ISSUE:
W/N the sale of the lots by Teodoro Vaño to Benito Liu was
valid.

HELD:
YES. The SC held that a prior contract to sell made by the
decedent during his lifetime PREVAILS over a subsequent
contract of sale made by the administrator without probate
court approval.

It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to sell

and does not immediately convey ownership. Moreover, Frank
Liu’s contract to sell became valid and effective, upon its
execution and bound the estate to convey the property on full
payment of the consideration.
 G.R. No. L-50261 May 31, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE MINORS CECILIA,
REBECCA, FLORIDA, RAPHAEL, RODOLFO, LUISITO,
TEODORO, all surnamed LAVIDES, ALBERTO C. LAVIDES
vs.
CITY COURT OF LUCENA, Branch I

Note:
I tried to tailor the facts, issue and ruling in relation to
Article 777, but wala talagang discussion regarding sa
provision. Parang gi-mention lang sya bigla ng Court. The case
was not also discussed in the TSNs. Better check na lang the full
text so you can see for yourself. Sorrryyy. 
 G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor)
and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the
minors
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA
BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the
Court of First Instance of Abra
Digested by: Franklin Flores
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano
Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First
Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to
dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion
to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint in order to include certain allegations therein.
The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on
July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975.
In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death
of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her
minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but
the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case
on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in
interest and has no legal personality to sue.
Counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother,
but the CFI denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
W/N ROSALIO BONILLA AND SALVACION BONILLA BE
ALLOWED TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR DECEASED MOTHER
FORTUNATA BARCENA.
YES, ROSALIO BONILLA AND SALVACION BONILLA SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR DECEASED MOTHER
FORTUNATA BARCENA.
RULING:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot
sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this
case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place
on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on
March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her
person.
*** If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency
of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending
case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested
before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died
on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of
parties in the case. ***
The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a
dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave
error.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law.
The moment of death is the determining factor when the
heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent.
The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests
in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs
in the testate or intestate proceedings.
When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right
to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her
heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There
is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to
allow their substitution as parties in interest for the
deceased plaintiff.