Nuclear Engineering and Design 286 (2015) 89–93

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Nuclear Engineering and Design

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/nucengdes

Modern design and safety analysis of the University of Florida

Training Reactor
K.A. Jordan a,∗ , D. Springfels a , D. Schubring b
a
University of Florida, 106 UFTR Bldg., PO Box 116400, Gainesville, FL 32611-6400, United States
b
University of Florida, 202 Nuclear Science Building, PO Box 118300, Gainesville, FL 32611-8300, United States

h i g h l i g h t s

• A new safety analysis of the University of Florida Training Reactor is presented.

• This analysis uses modern codes and replaces the NRC approved analysis from 1982.
• Reduction in engineering margin confirms that the UFTR is a negligible risk reactor.
• Safety systems are not required to ensure that safety limits are not breached.
• Negligible risk reactors are ideal for testing digital I&C equipment.

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: A comprehensive series of neutronics and thermal hydraulics analyses were conducted to demonstrate
Received 23 November 2014 the University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR), an ARGONAUT type research reactor, as a negligible risk
Received in revised form 28 January 2015 reactor that does not require safety-related systems or components to prevent breach of a safety limit.
Accepted 29 January 2015
These analyses show that there is no credible UFTR accident that would result in major fuel damage
or risk to public health and safety. The analysis was based on two limiting scenarios, whose extremity
bound all other accidents of consequence: (1) the large step insertion of positive reactivity and (2) the
release of fission products due to mechanical damage to a spent fuel plate. The maximum step insertion of
positive reactivity was modeled using PARET/ANL software and shows a maximum peak fuel temperature
of 283.2 ◦ C, which is significantly below the failure limit of 530 ◦ C. The exposure to the staff and general
public was calculated for the worst-case fission product release scenario using the ORIGEN-S and COMPLY
codes and was shown to be 6.5% of the annual limit. Impacts on reactor operations and an Instrumentation
& Control System (I&C) upgrade are discussed.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction As part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) mandated

The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is a 100 kW
ARGONAUT type research reactor, and serves as a resource for edu-
cation on reactor physics, control, operations, nuclear regulations,
and safety culture. Over its nearly six decades of operation, the reac-
tor has been used for applications such as nuclear medicine isotopes
production, reactor design benchmarking, and neutron activation
analysis for research in multiple fields, including agricultural, bio-
logical, and geological studies.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 352 294 2106.
E-mail addresses: kjordan@ufl.edu (K.A. Jordan), dspringfels@ufl.edu
(D. Springfels), dlschubring@ufl.edu (D. Schubring).
URL: http://jordan.mse.ufl.edu (K.A. Jordan).
20-year operating license renewal, a comprehensive safety analysis
was conducted using state-of-the-art methodologies to demon-
strate that the UFTR has inherently negligible risk. This new safety
analysis replaces the previous analysis (from 1982), which was
based on the more primitive computational methods available at
that time.
The new UFTR safety analysis, based on modern codes and
methods, leverages the advantages of more than three decades
of progress in computational reactor analysis. High-fidelity com-
putation was employed to significantly lower engineering safety
margins and validate that there is no credible accident that would
result in damage to UFTR fuel, even in the absence of any automatic
protective functions or operator action.
Two postulated accidents were investigated: first, a Maximum
Hypothetical Accident (MHA) and the second, an Excess Reactivity

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2015.01.019
0029-5493/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
90 K.A. Jordan et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 286 (2015) 89–93

Insertion Accident. Other potential accidents have been evaluated Table 1

Comparison of measured vs. calculated core parameters.
for the ARGONAUT reactor design, including explosive chemical
reactions, graphite fires, and a fuel handling accident (FHA). How- Parameter Measured (PCM) Calculated (PCM) % Difference
ever previous work has shown that these are less severe than the Excess Reactivity 600 539 −10.2
MHA and reactivity insertion accidents chosen for analysis here Shutdown Margin 3290 3441 4.6
(Hawley et al., 1981; Miller et al., 1964). These two accidents were
Regulating Blade Worth 760 733 −1.7
chosen for analysis because they are limiting scenarios, whose Safety Blade 1Worth 1400 1414 1.0
extremity bound all other accidents of consequence. If these bound- Safety Blade 2Worth 1730 1793 3.6
ing scenarios are shown to not exceed fuel safety limits, then it Safety Blade 3Worth 1900 1841 −3.1
follows that the reactor is passively safe and that active scrams are
not strictly required to protect reactor integrity. Table 2
UFTR reactivity coefficients for BOL and EOL.

Coefficient BOL EOL

2. Description of reactor
ARGONAUT type reactors are especially effective training tools
due to its similarity to a pressurized water reactor (PWR) (Miller
et al., 1964). In both designs, primary coolant flows up through and
around cladded fuel assemblies. Further, the ARGONAUT design,
like a PWR, uses forced convection coolant, in contrast to most other
research reactors use a standing pool design (free convection).
The primary coolant (demineralized water) is pumped upward
past the fuel plates at slightly above atmospheric pressure. The exit-
ing warm coolant (approximately 40 ◦ C at 100 kW) is gravity-fed
to a heat exchanger, where the heat is transferred to the sec-
ondary coolant through the heat exchanger. This secondary coolant
is pumped in from a well and returned to the storm sewer.
The UFTR licensed rated thermal power level is 100 kW giving
a power density of 17.88 kW/L. The thermal flux at the Cen-
tral Vertical Port (CVP) is approximately 1.5 × 1012 (n/cm2 s). At
rated thermal power the fuel depletion rate is approximately
0.35 (g − UO2 /1000 EFPH).1 The core is divided into six fuel boxes
and each box is sub-divided into four fuel bundle locations. Each
fuel bundle consists of 14 plates of U3 Si2 -Al LEU enriched to
19.75%. Water serves as the both the coolant and partial moderator.
Graphite blocks surrounding the fuel boxes provide further mod-
eration and neutron reflection. Dummy plates and dummy bundles
are loaded as necessary to limit the installed excess reactivity.
Reactor control is provided by four swing-arm, cadmium-tipped
control blades. Three blades are for safety and the fourth is for reg-
ulating reactor power. Using mechanical drives, the control blades
are moved in a vertical arc within the spaces between the fuel boxes.
The drives are located outside of the reactor for ease of accessibility
and maintenance. These drives can be disconnected from the blades
by means of an electromagnetic clutch, which allows the blades to
fall by gravity into the reactor for scram.
The UFTR provides a range of irradiation ports for experimental
capabilities. Vertical foil slots have been placed at intervals in the
graphite between the fuel compartments. Foils provide a means
for flux mapping and can be installed by using the overhead bridge
crane to lift off the top part of the reactor shielding.
There are also three vertical experimental holes that are
centrally located with respect to the fuel elements, allowing
for maximum neutron flux. These ports holes are 3.8 cm long
and have diameters of 5.08, 4.45, and 3.81 cm (2.0, 1.75, and
1.5 inches) allowing for samples to be inserted for neutron acti-
vation analysis. A thermal column is also provided. The horizontal
column is 1.52 m × 1.52 m × 1.42 m (60 in. × 60 in. × 56 in). Samples
are placed in the center of the thermal column, while surround-
ing graphite stringers provide high thermalization for experiments.
Additionally, there are six other horizontal ports positioned around
the reactor central plane. With 10 cm (4 in) diameters, these
1
Effective full power hours at rated thermal power.
˛void (PCM/%void) 0–5% Void −125 ± 4 −94 ± 4
˛void (PCM/%void) 5–10% Void −140 ± 4 −106 ± 4
˛water (PCM/◦ C) 21–99 ◦ C −6.7 ± 0.3 −4.8 ± 0.3
˛fuel (PCM/◦ C) 21–127 ◦ C −1.9 ± 0.2 −1.7 ± 0.2
˛fuel (PCM/◦ C) 21–127 ◦ C −1.7 ± 0.1 −1.6 ± 0.1
experimental ports can be fitted with collimators to form neutron
beams external to the reactor shielding.
The reactor shield water tank also provides multiple experimen-
tal capabilities. The water tank measures 1.52 m × 1.52 m × 4.27 m
(5 ft. × 5 ft. × 14 ft.) and is located on the back (west) side, sur-
rounded on three sides by concrete. Additional shielding can be
placed above the water tank to minimize the effects of sky shining
radiation. The tank can be used to perform shielding analyses or
to irradiate large samples. If the fast neutron flux at the sample is
insufficient, thermal neutrons from the core can be converted to
fast neutrons through the installation of a converter plate inside
the tank. An aluminum pipe can also be installed in order to allow
for the extraction of a neutron beam from the core.
Finally, the UFTR offers a pneumatic sample transfer system,
which can quickly transfer small samples to and from the core
for activation analysis. The sample is transferred inside of a small
polyethylene capsule (the rabbit). The sample moves through
installed piping, through the shield tank, to the reactor centerline.
The rabbit then returns along the same path back to the receiv-
ing station. Directional nitrogen gas flow is used to control the
motion of the sample, and the system is designed such that the
sample is pulled rather than pushed, in order to minimize chances
of damaging or lodging a sample inside of the core.
3. Neutronics modeling
A full-core MCNP5/X model was created to perform calculations
of core physics parameters using the ENDF/B-VII.1 cross-section
library. Core physics parameters evaluated include reactivity
coefficients, the delayed neutron fraction, and generation time.
Measurements of regulatory required parameters were taken
following the UFTR HEU-to-LEU conversion in 2006. Shutdown
margin is the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcriti-
cal assuming all blades are fully inserted except for the single blade
of highest reactivity worth that is assumed to be fully withdrawn.
Measured parameters are listed alongside their MCNP-calculated
counterparts in Table 1. The measured and calculated values show
good agreement, verifying the accuracy of the MCNP model.
The MCNP model was also used to calculate the core reac-
tivity coefficients for the beginning of life (BOL) and end of life
(EOL) conditions. As shown in Table 2, the UFTR design has neg-
ative coefficients for fuel temperature, coolant temperature, and
void. This ensures that an increase in reactor power will result in
a decrease in core reactivity at any core burnup level, which is a
precondition to demonstrating that the UFTR is an inherently safe,
negligible risk reactor.
 K.A. Jordan et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 286 (2015) 89–93 91

Table 3 Table 5
UFTR thermal hydraulic parameters. UFTR radionucleide inventory [Curies].

Parameter Value Isotope HPFEa MHA (0.2% of HPFEb )

◦ −2
Max. Fuel Temperature 64.5 C 85
Kr 9.35 × 10 1.79 × 10−4
Max. Clad Temperature 64.4 ◦ C 85m
Kr 9.54 × 10−4 1.83 × 10−6
Mixed Mean Coolant Outlet Temp. 40.5 ◦ C 88
Kr 3.98 × 10−6 7.63 × 10−9
Max. Coolant Channel Outlet Temp. 59.1 ◦ C 129
I 1.17 × 10−7 2.24 × 10−10
Minimum ONBR 2.1 130
I 1.67 × 10−4 3.20 × 10−7
Minimum DNBR 376 131
I 1.08 × 102 2.08 × 10−1
132
I 1.18 × 102 2.26 × 10−1
133
I 3.15 × 101 6.05 × 10−2
Table 4 135
I 1.59 × 10−1 3.04 × 10−4
UFTR nominal operating conditions. 133
Xe 2.65 × 102 5.08 × 10−1
Parameter Value 133m
Xe 2.11 × 100 4.06 × 10−3
135
Xe 4.43 × 100 8.49 × 10−3
Inlet Temperature 30 ◦ C 135m
Xe 1.63 × 10−2 3.12 × 10−5
Inlet Mass Flow Rate 2.69 kg/s
a
Power 100 kW Highest power fuel element.
b
For the maximum hypothetical accident (MHA), it is assumed that 0.2% of the
total gaseous activity instantaneously escapes from the exposed fuel surfaces into
4. Thermal hydraulic modeling the reactor cell.

The PLTEMP/ANL v3.0 code, specifically designed for steady
state thermal hydraulics analysis of research reactors, was used
for the UFTR thermal safety evaluation (Olson and Kalimullah,
2006). The code begins calculation at the coolant channel inlet and
marches upward to the channel outlet, calculating friction factors,
steady state temperatures, Onset of Nucleate Boiling Ratio (ONBR)
and Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR), and other
parameters. Important core parameters output from PLTEMP/ANL
v 3.0 are listed in Table 3. Table 4 lists the key thermal hydraulics
inputs to the code, representing the UFTR at nominal full-power
conditions. The ONBR and DNBR were calculated to be 2.09 and
376, respectively. The inlet temperature is approximately 30 ◦ C and
the average outlet temperature is 40.5 ◦ C. The maximum fuel box
outlet temperature is 59.1 ◦ C which is 40.9◦ subcooled indicating
single phase flow in the hottest fuel channel. The large thermal mar-
gin to boiling demonstrate adequate safety margin under normal
operating conditions (Safety, 2013).
PLTEMP/ANL obtains default friction factors for hydraulically
smooth pipes from Moody. The equation for the Fanning friction
factor used is:
 
1/ f  = 4. ∗ log(Re ∗ f  )0.4
PLTEMP then solves for the Darcy–Weisbach friction factor
f = 4f .
For the DNBR ratios the code allows 9 different correlations to
be used as input options. The Groeneveld Lookup Table was used
for the transient and steady state conditions found in the UFTR.
5. Accident analysis
5.1. Maximum hypothetical accident (MHA)
The MHA is the most hazardous accident scenario. A 2045 kg
(4500 lbs.) block of concrete shielding is assumed to have been
dropped on the core, resulting in severe mechanical damage to
a fuel element and the release of fission products into the air of
the reactor cell. This analysis assumes that the core was previously
operated at full power for 30 straight days, then shut down for three
days, since this is the earliest time at which the concrete blocks may
be moved according to UFTR standard operating procedures. Con-
servatively, the fuel bundle with the highest power is assumed to
be the one broken by the accident.
For the MHA, it is postulated that damage would be sufficient
to expose fuel surface areas equivalent to stripping all the cladding
from one face of one fuel plate. It is further assumed that 100% of the
gaseous activity is produced within the recoil range of the fission
fragments (1.37 × 10−3 cm), or 0.2% of the total gaseous activity
instantaneously escapes from the exposed fuel surfaces into the
reactor cell. This is a very conservative estimate given the low fuel
temperature and the fact that not all fission gases would move out
of the fuel and occupy the full volume of the recoil range within the
aluminum clad (Pacific Northwest Labs, 1981).
With these assumptions, inventories in the fuel of radioisotopes
of interest were calculated using the ORIGEN-S code, specifically
radioiodine, krypton, and xenon (SCALE, 2006). ORIGEN-S is a cal-
culational sequence in the SCALE code system to perform rapid and
accurate point-depletion and decay calculations. These results are
shown in Table 5, along with the full activity that is assumed to
escape to the air of the reactor cell.
Using these activity levels, dose rates were calculated for occu-
pational exposures following an MHA, and were compared to
allowable limits (Eckerman et al., 1988). The total effective dose
equivalent (TEDE) and thyroid dose rates to a member of the UFTR
staff inside the reactor cell following an MHA were determined to
be 0.016 Sv/h and 0.50 Sv/h, respectively. Drills have been run to
show that five minutes is a reasonable amount of time for an indi-
vidual to exit the reactor cell following a fuel handling accident,
(1) and the resulting exposure from this exposure time was calculated
to be 0.0014 Sv to the thyroid and 0.042 Sv for TEDE.
As the data shows, however, an individual could remain in
the reactor cell for approximately one hour following the acci-
dent before reaching an occupational dose limit, which would even
provide sufficient time for the assisted evacuation of any injured
personnel.
Similarly, public exposure was also examined, using the NRC-
endorsed COMPLY code. The UFTR reactor cell was designed such
that, following an accident, air could be drawn from the reactor
cell and exhausted to atmosphere through a stack for activity mon-
itoring and dilution. The maximum postulated TEDE to a member of
the public following an MHA was estimated to be 0.065 mSv/year at
10 m from the reactor exhaust stack, which is significantly less than
the annual public dose limit of 1 mSv. Therefore, even for the most
limiting reactor accident, the UFTR is shown to have no significant
health or safety impacts on the staff or public.
5.2. Excess reactivity insertion
This analysis examines a large addition of positive reactivity. All
automatic protective functions are ignored and no operator action
is assumed to provide the most conservative analysis. The rise in
fuel element temperature is used as a metric to measure the sever-
ity of the accident, since the integrity of the fuel will be maintained
as long as the fuel maximum temperature remains below the 530 ◦ C
safety limit.
92 K.A. Jordan et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 286 (2015) 89–93

Fig. 2. Change in reactor power following 1480 PCM of reactivity inserted in 0.5 s.
The peak power achieved is 116 MW and is reached 15 ms after the 0.5 s insertion
was completed.

Fig. 1. Schematic of the UFTR MCNP5 and MCNPX models. The core was divided into
agreement within 50% can be expected when using the Tong cor-
six fuel boxes, each containing four fuel bundles. (a) The radial projection (top-down
view). (b)The axial projection (side view). relation for DNB heat transfer. The uncertainties associated with
the input parameters (i.e. reactivity coefficients) allows for an
The PARET-ANL (Obenchain, 1969) code was used to conduct additional 50% error. This implies that for this analysis, using the
this examination, which is a coupled reactor kinetics/hydraulics propagation of uncertainties method, an error of up to 70% for the
code. Previous work has validated this code using experimental increase in fuel temperature must be accounted for. That is;
data and quantified the resulting uncertainties (Chatzidakis et al.,
Tmax, with uncertainty − Tcoolant = 1.7 ∗ (Tmax, calculated − Tcoolant ) (2)
2012). Combined with the uncertainties associated with the core
input parameters, a total uncertainty of 70% on temperature dif- The 70% uncertainty on temperature difference means that rise
ferences (increase during the accident) must be included when of 223.2 ◦ C must be considered, for a maximum fuel temperature
analyzing the final temperature results. of 283.2 ◦ C is still well below the 530 ◦ C safety limit. The PARET-
PARET-ANL uses the Martinelli-Nelson method to predict two- ANL code therefore shows that a positive reactivity insertion of
phase pressure drop in the case of saturated boiling. WCAP-1997 1480 PCM or less is incapable of causing damage to the fuel, even
developed by Westinghouse and contains correlations used by in the event that no operator action is taken nor automatic protec-
PARET-ANL for evaluating subcooled two-phase and single-phase tive features activated. The UFTR core design therefore maintains
pressure drop. an adequate margin to safety in the event of a reactivity insertion
The UFTR was modeled in PARET-ANL by using the hottest chan- accident.
nel and conservative initial conditions of maximum 100 kW power
operation with the minimum coolant flow rate of 128.7 L/min 6. Implications for instrumentation and control
(34 gpm). The reactivity insertions simulated by the PARET-ANL
model were incrementally increased, and throughout all simula- The accident analysis demonstrates that no automatic con-
tions the fuel temperature was shown to remain well below the trol or safety functions are needed to prevent reaching the fuel
safety limit (Safety, 2013).
PARET is limited in its prediction of a thermal crisis by the
fact that it employs a steady state DNB correlation. Thus, PARET is
limited in its accuracy in the description of hydrodynamic instabili-
ties. The largest reactivity insertion studied was 1480 PCM inserted
in 0.5 s. Any larger or faster insertion of reactivity would produce
unverifiable results based on stated code limitations. For compari-
son, a fuel loading of 23 fuel bundles and 1 dummy bundle would
increase the excess reactivity by 1297 PCM. The excess reactivity
insertion studied would be indicative of adding more than one full
fuel bundle into the core while the control blades are removed.
Under these conditions the fuel temperature rose from the initial
condition of 60.0 ◦ C to a maximum of 191.3 ◦ C (131.3 ◦ C increase)
and a peak power level of 116 MW. Fig. 1 shows the change in fuel
temperature over time for such an excursion. The oscillation in the
reactor power response seen after 1.5 s is due to time step incre-
mentation within PARET-ANL rather than any anomalous behavior
of the reactor model (Figs. 2 and 3).
Obenchain (1969) validates the PARET-ANL code against exper-
imental data from tests on the high-enriched, plate-type SPERT III
Fig. 3. Change in fuel temperature following 1480 PCM of reactivity inserted in 0.5 s.
C-core. Additionally, Chatzidakis et al. (2012), in a more exten- The peak fuel temperature is reached at 38 ms after the insertion was completed,
sive analysis of the DNB correlations used in PARET, show that and provides a significant margin to fuel safety limits.
 K.A. Jordan et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 286 (2015) 89–93
temperature Safety Limit. This has several important implications
with regard to reactor instrumentation and control (I&C). Specif-
ically, the UFTR relicensing is being accompanied by a full facility
renovation, including an upgrade of the analog I&C system to a new
digital control protection system (DCPS).
The system will process signals from core instrumentation and
equipment, and will allow the operator to control various plant
functions. This includes commands for the initiation of automatic
processes such as the startup of a subsystem, or manual control
of individual components such as the movement of control blades.
The system also includes various interlocks and command inhibits
as a backup to proper operator action. The Reactor Protection Sys-
tem (RPS) monitors the status of the UFTR by examining reactor
power, reactor period, primary/secondary coolant loops, the reac-
tor cell, and auxiliary systems. The RPS compares the signals from
these systems to their associated limit settings in order to deter-
mine if a trip signal is required. The list of digital trips include:
reactor period, secondary cooling system, high flux, ventilation sys-
tem, nuclear instrumentation (NI) high voltage, shield tank low
water level, loss of offsite electrical power, primary coolant high
temperature, primary cooling system, area radiation monitors, and
operator-initiated evacuation.
A digital I&C system upgrade provides a range of new capa-
bilities to aid the operator in safely operating the plant. More
importantly, the analyses described in previous sections show that
there is no safety significance for instrumentation or control system
failure, since the reactor is inherently safe.
7. Conclusions
This comprehensive analysis, conducted using advanced and
validated methodologies, demonstrates that the UFTR is a
93
negligible risk research reactor that requires no safety-related sys-
tems or installed components to prevent a safety limit from being
reached. The reactor design prevents major core damage or the
release of fission products that would be detrimental to safety of
the general public. Currently, the reactor instrumentation and con-
trol system for the UFTR is listed as Safety Related equipment. This
analysis shows that I&C protection is not required to mitigate a
reactor transient. Listing the I&C equipment as non-Safety Related
removes major regulatory burden for the facility and provides an
avenue for modernization.
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