Dialdas v.
Percides Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the
FACTS: a alien who operated a retail store in Cebu decided to
close his Cebu store and transfer it to Dumaguete. RTL (retail
trade law) and Tax Code Sec. 199 were the statutes taken into
consideration in this case. The former authorizes any alien
who on May 15, 1954 is actually engaged in retail, to continue
to engage therein until his voluntary retirement from such
business, but not to establish or open additional stores for
retail business. The latter provides that any business for which
the privilege tax has been paid may be removed and continued
in any other place without payment of additional tax.
ISSUE: whether the transfer by the alien from Cebu to
Dumaguete can be considered as a voluntary retirement from
business.
RULING: No. Although the trial court affirmed the question,
the SC ruled otherwise stating that RTC overlooked the clear
provision of Sec. 199.
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.,
INC., digested
GR # 111097 July 20, 1994 (Constitutional Law – Police
Power, Ordinance, Delegated Legislative Power)
FACTS: Petitioners opposed the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting
the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing
business permit to establishment for the operation of casino,
and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
casino and providing penalty for its violation.
ground that both violated P.D. 1869, permitting the operation
of casinos centralized and regulated by PAGCOR.
Petitioners contends that pursuant to the Local Government
Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the
operation of casino for the general welfare.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 are valid exercise of police power.
HELD: No. The ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the
character and force of a statute as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games
of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Ordinances should not contravene a statute because local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
to them by Congress.
Petition is denied.
Almeda v. Florentino
Law – “the municipal board shall have a secretary who shall
be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the
members thereof”
Amendment – “the vice-mayor shall appoint all employees of
the board who may be suspended or removed in accordance
with law”
Construction of both Law and Amendment – the power of the
vice-mayor to make appointment pursuant to the amendatory
act is limited to the appointment of all employees of the board
other than the board secretary who is to be appointed by the
board itself
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SITCHON, ET AL. v. AQUINO
FACTS : This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead
Aquino (the City Engineer of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from
causing the demolition of their respective houses situated in different areas along
public streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public nuisances. All of the
petitioners occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent.
However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the
land with the agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to
an order to vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners
vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses.
Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public
nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.
ISSUES: Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineer have authority to cause
the abatement of the nuisance?
HELD: There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 ¶ 4, classifying as a
nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public
because it affects a community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute
nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal
of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business,
hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s
premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR
commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and
other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a
delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed
by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR
the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to
act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had
made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla
surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said
that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him
from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to
17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial
which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual
designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.
Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified
therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in
signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to
take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed
authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor
by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for
the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to
appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act
as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
2
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the
State in the exercise of police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its
police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. Certainly the
solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but
somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the
worthy from the unworthy.
Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco
for violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited
money for the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched
a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident
of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a
complaint against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation
Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a
permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit
Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious
purpose” is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law
does not include, it excludes.
Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.
Held/Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious”
separately and independently of each other.
In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that
it was not the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious
purposes. The world “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with the expression
“charitable purpose”.
The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law
does not contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State
in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable
therefor.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno
is acquitted of the offense charged.
3
Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon. Zeus Abrogar Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same is not included in the enumeration of
GR No. 155076 Real Properties under the Civil Code.
January 13, 2009
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject to
FACTS appropriation.
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing,
and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems “Forces of Nature” which are brought under the
Resale (ISR) – “a method of outing and completing international long-distance calls control of science, as Personal Property.
using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science can
local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined”. PLDT be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such
alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or
damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92. using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication
or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
objects of theft. equipment or apparatus to PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able
to resell or re-route international long distance calls using PLDT’s facilities
ISSUE constituteSubtraction.
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is
HELD capable of appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real properties.
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are
property of another without the latter’s consent. personal property which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act
of engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under the said article.
Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be
1. There be taking of Personal Property; considered as personal property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT
2. Said Personal Property belongs to another; since it could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
3. Taking be done with Intent to Gain; communications infrastructure and facilities.
4. Taking be done without the owner’s consent; Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that
such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
5. No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without
Personal Property – anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in Real PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services &
Property businesses.
Thus, the term “personal property” as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the
the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. theft were services and business of the offended party.
Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos; US v

4
SIAN TRANSMISSION CORPPORATION VS. CA
425 SCRA 478. March 15, 2004
FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary
Cresenciano B.Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin, wherein it clarified, that
employees are entitled to 200% of theirbasic wage, which, apart from being Good
Friday, and, therefore, a legal holiday, is also
Araw ngKagitingan,
which is also a legal holiday, even if unworked. Despite the explanatory bulletin,
petitionerAsian Transmission Corporation opted to pay its daily paid employees only
100% of their basic
pay.Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In acc
ordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement existing between petitioner and BATLU,the controversy was submitted for
voluntary arbitration. The Office of the Voluntary Arbitratorrendered a decision
directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just 100% of
theirregular daily wages for the unworked.In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian
Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), the VoluntaryArbitrator held that Article 94 of the
Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, thecomputation of which
is determined by a legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there aretwo
holidays falling on one day; and that that the law, as amended, enumerates 12 regular
holidays forevery year, and should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine
the number of paid regularholidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain
years, is also Holy Friday or MaundyThursday."The Court of Appeals upheld the
findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the CollectiveBargaining Agreement
between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them,clearly
recognizes their intent to consider
Araw ng Kagitingan
and Maundy Thursday, on whatever datethey may fall in any calendar year, as paid
legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "thereis no condition,
qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall
becompensated.The Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit
provision in law whichprovides for [a] reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen
to fall on the same day, any doubt in theinterpretation and implementation of the Labor
Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved infavor of labor."Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays
which fallon the same day
RULING:
Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that
the Stateshall afford protection to labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution
of the monthly incomeof the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words,
although the worker is forced to take arest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his
holiday pay.” It is also intended to enable the worker toparticipate in the national
celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical andcultural
significance.Independence Day (June 12),
Araw ng Kagitingan
(April 9),National Heroes Day (last Sunday of August), Bonifacio Day(November 30)
and Rizal Day (December 30) were declared national holidays toafford Filipinos with a
recurring opportunity to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people,promote
national identity, and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day (May 1) is a day
traditionally reserved to celebrate the contributions of the working class to the
development of the nation, while thereligious holidays designated in Executive Order
No. 203 allow the worker to celebrate his faith with hisfamily.As reflected above, Art.
94 of the Labor Code, as amended, afford a worker the enjoyment of 12paid regular
holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on
amonthly or daily basis.Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of 12 paid regular
holidays, the fact that two
holiday’s fall onthe same date should not operate to reduce to 11 the 12 holiday pay
benefits a worker is entitled toreceive.It is elementary, under the rules of statutory
construction, that when the language of the law isclear and unequivocal, the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, there isnothing in the law
which provides or indicates that the entitlement to 12 days of holiday pay shall
bereduced to 11 when two holidays fall on the same day.In any event, Art. 4 of the
Labor Code provide that all doubts in the implementation andinterpretation of its
provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved infavor
of labor. For the working m an’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration.Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement
the Labor Code provides that"Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer
in withdrawing or reducing any benefits,supplements or payments for unworked regular
holidays as provided in existing individual or collectiveagreement or employer practice
or policy. From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by theparties, petitioner
had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.
5
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