Sumipat vs.

Banga
G.R. No. 155810 dated August 13, 2004

FACTS:

The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple had no
children. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children as a result of an extra-marital affair. They
are the petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated “Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or
Quit-Claim over Real Properties” in favor of the petitioners covering three parcels of land. On the
document appears the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates her marital consent thereto.
Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed the assailed document when he was already very sick and
bedridden that upon petitioner Lydia’s (Lauro Sumipat’s daughter) request, their neighbor Benjamin
Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document.
Lydia left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife, Placida to sign on
the said document. After Lauro’s death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the
properties, 50% of the produce went to his wife. As wife’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled,
she filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject
document.

Petitioner Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she claiming to have
acquired knowledge of its existence only five days after its execution when Lauro Sumipat gave the same
to her.

RTC decided the case in favor of the petitioner holding that by virtue of the assailed document the due
execution of which was not contested by the respondent, the properties were absolutely transferred to
the petitioners.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a co-ownership was formed from the said deed.

Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred
title to the disputed properties to the petitioners?

HELD:

NO. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation —
although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be
entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and
support.

Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation
until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The
acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in
the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not
given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation
is null and void.
In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a
separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.

Neither can we give effect to the deed as a sale, barter or any other onerous conveyance, in the absence
of valid cause or consideration and consent competently and validly given.

Mendezona vs. Ozamiz

G.R. No. 143370 dated February 6, 2002

FACTS:

A suit was instituted on September 25, 1991 by the petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita
M. Mendezona as initial plaintiff and in the amended complaint filed on October 7, 1991, herein co-
petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona joined as co-plaintiff. In their compliant, the petitioners as plaintiff
therein alleged that petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona petitioner
spouses Luis J. Mendezona and Maricar Mendezona own a parcel of land each in Lahug, Cebu city with
similar areas 3462, 3466 and 3468 square meters covered and described in TCT Nos 116834, 116835 and
116836. The petitioners ultimately traced their titles of ownership over their respective properties from
a deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz and in consideration of P 1,040,000. It
appears than on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with RTC
Oroquieta, City alleging that Carmen Ozamiz had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her
friends and could no longer take care of her properties by reason of weak mind and absentmindedness.
As guardians Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August 6, 1991 with the guardianship court
their Inventories and Accounts including the 10,369 square meters Lahug property. Said Lahug property
covered by deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of petitioners.
In their Answer, respondents opposed the claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the
titles issued to the petitioners are defective and illegal and the ownership of said properties was acquired
in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and
unconscionable. Respondents further alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing
and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and that her properties having been placed in
administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. On September 23, 1992, the
Trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed its decision
and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed
to prove that the consideration was actually paid.

ISSUE:

Whether the court erred in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated
contract.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the contact was not simulated. Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of
the appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be inferred from the mere non production of checks. It
was not the burden of the petitioner to prove so. It is significant that the deed of Absolute Sale dated April
28, 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged before a notary public. As such, it is in favor of
presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution. Moreover, a person is not incapacitated to contact merely because of advanced years or by
reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent
as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights is considered
incapacitated.

Perez vs. Catindig

G.R. No. 162580 dated January 27, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage
produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided
to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States
and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines
and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed
a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be intervenor in
Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?

RULING:

No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still
lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic
never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed
by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and
legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a
petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting
an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioner’s claim
that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner
never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.