INTRODUCTION

Natural justice is a legal philosophy used in the determination of just, or fair processes in legal
proceedings. Natural justice imposes a code of fair procedure, including the right to be given a fair
hearing and the right to have a decision made by an unbiased decision-maker. The notion of natural
justice has developed as a common law concept: an obligation to provide a minimum level of
fairness when an individual’s rights are affected in any of a broad range of factual scenarios. The
principles of natural justice have come out from the need of man to protect himself from the
excesses of organized power. These rules of natural justice as they are called owe, largely, their
development to the famous Dr. Bentley’s case of 1723 whose decision hinged on the right to a fair
hearing. In this paper therefore I will endeavor to define to a precise extent what is meant by natural
justice while at the same time discussing the two pillars or essential headings that fall thereunder.
This paper will further illustrate, in the course of the discussion, the importance of the statements
issued in Dr. Bentley’s case with regard to the development of the rules of natural justice – as this
can only be achieved following a thorough understanding thereof. After these tasks have been
completed a conclusion will then be drawn.

WHAT ARE THE RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE?

The rules of natural justice can be said to be rules of fair play. Natural justice is a concept of
common law and represents higher procedural principles developed by the courts, which
every judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative agency must follow while taking any decision
adversely affecting the rights of a private individual1. Natural justice implies fairness, equity and
equality. While the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been
replaced and extended by the general “duty to act fairly”. The principles of natural justice concern
procedural fairness and ensure a fair decision is reached by an objective decision maker. The
opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision maker is the heart of the rules of natural justice
and procedural fairness. Maintaining procedural fairness protects the rights of individuals and
enhances public confidence in the process. The principles of natural justice were derived from the
Romans who believed that some legal principles were natural or self-evident and did not require a

1
Oxford Dictionary of Law 7th edition

1
statutory basis. Generally, no provision is found in any statute for the observance of the principles
of natural justice by the adjudicating authorities. Then, the question then arises as to whether the
adjudicating authority is bound to follow the principles of natural justice. The law is well-settled
after the powerful pronouncement of Byles, J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works2,
wherein His Lordship observed: “A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case
and ending with some very recent cases, establish that, although there are no positive words in the
statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the
omission of the legislature.”
In Administrative law natural justice is a well-defined concept which comprises two fundamental
rules of fair procedure: that a man’s defense must always be fairly heard (audi alterum partem);
and that a man may not be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in rea sua)3. These principles
have come to apply to the exercise by administrative authorities of powers of a judicial nature. In
other words, administrative authorities, Ministers, public officials, local government authorities
and so on are expected to observe the principles of natural justice whenever they act judicially.
There is authority for regarding the requirements of “natural justice” as a special part of the ultra
vires rule, on the ground that a decision made contrary to the principles of natural justice, when
the rights of particular individuals are adversely affected, is no decision within the terms of the
enabling Act. In essence, a decision maker must give a person who is the subject of the decision
an adequate opportunity to present their case (fair hearing rule) and must make a decision free
from actual or apprehended bias (no bias rule). The rules will apply when a decision is being made
that affects the rights, interests, status or legitimate expectations of a person. A legitimate
expectation to an entitlement is a right or liberty that will not be removed without providing an
opportunity to the person to put their case to the decision maker4. In Local Government Board
v. Alridge5, Lord Haldane, L.C., said “when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those
whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them
without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting
the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a
tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice.”

2
(1863), 14 C.B.N.S. 180
3
Wade, H.W.R, & Forsyth, C.F. Administrative law at p. 440
4
Phillips, O.H., & Jackson, P. Constitutional and Administrative Law at p. 603
5
(1915) A.C. 120, at p. 132

2
 a) THE “AUDI ALTERUM PARTEM” PRINCIPLE -
THE HEARING RULE
The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic concept of the principles of natural justice. This
expression implies that a person must be given opportunity to defend himself. This principle is
sine qua non of every civilized society. This aspect of natural justice, to the effect that the “judge”
must hear both sides, must give each party a chance to state his case, and that any person who will
or may be affected by an administrative decision has a right to his “day in court”, is an essential
characteristic of any legal process6. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be
heard: audi alterum partem, ‘hear the other side’. Each individual must have the opportunity to
present his version of the facts and to make submissions on the relevant principles of the Code of
Conduct and the allegations against him This is the more far-reaching of the principles of natural
justice, since it can embrace almost every question of fair procedure, or due process, and its
implications can be worked out in great detail. It is also broad enough to include the rule against
bias, since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing7. Therefore, each party must have reasonable
notice of the case he has to meet; and he must be given an opportunity of stating his case, and
answering (if he can) any arguments put forward against it8. The general principle is not usually
applied in an administrative context so as to require a full investigation by the deciding body, but
rather that the decision must not be arrived at until the “judge” has heard both sides; the “judge”
must “hear both sides and must not hear one side in the absence of the other”9.

The courts took their stand several centuries ago on the broad principle that bodies entrusted with
legal power could not validly exercise it without first hearing the person who was going to suffer.
This principle was applied very widely to administrative as well as judicial acts. Even where an
order or determination is unchallengeable as regards its substance, the court can at least control
the preliminary procedure so as to require fair consideration of both sides of the case 10. The
numerous new administrative authorities, both local and central, which came into being in the

6
Garner, J. F. Administrative law at p. 113
7
Wade, H.W.R, & Forsyth, C.F. Administrative law at p. 476
8
Phillips, O.H., & Jackson, P. Constitutional and Administrative Law at p. 604
9
Per Greener, L.J., in Errington v. Minister of Health (1935) 1 K.B. 249, at p. 268
10
Supra note 5

3
nineteenth and twentieth centuries opened up a large new territory for the principles of natural
justice. The character of the authority was not what mattered: what mattered was the character of
the power exercised. If it adversely affected legal rights or interests, it must be exercised fairly11.
Thus in the old but yet highly relevant case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works12, a
builder who had erected a house without giving the Board of Works the required statutory notice
of his intention to do so was held to be entitled to damages for trespass when the Board, without
giving him an opportunity to be heard, exercised its statutory power to demolish any building
erected in default of the required statutory notice. In criminal cases this elementary principle of
justice is expressed in the saying that “no one ought to be condemned unheard”. One of the earliest
cases in which the principle was expressly formulated is R v. Cambridge University13, commonly
known as Dr. Bentley’s Case, where the Court of King’s Bench declared a decision of the
University of Cambridge to be a nullity, because in depriving Dr. Bentley of his degrees, they had
first not given him an opportunity of appearing before them and stating his case, although Dr.
Bentley had first contemptuously put aside originating process and then accused the Vice-
Chancellor of the University of foolish behavior. It was quaintly stated in the above case by
Fortescue, J, when he said: “The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity
to make his defense, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very
learned man upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon
Adam, before he was called upon to make his defense.” After Dr Bentley's Case the hearing rule
was reinforced by Lord Kenyon CJ in R v. Gaskin14. It was Lord Kenyon who apparently coined
the Latin term 'audi alteram partem' to encapsulate the rule, of which he said: It is to be found at
the head of our criminal law that every man ought to have an opportunity of being heard before he
is condemned. This is how principle of audi alterm partem evolved in common law system and
came to be an integral part or fulcrum of the rules of natural justice and the further development
thereof.

It was established in Ridge v. Baldwin15 that failure to give a fair hearing renders the decision not
merely voidable, but void. The brief facts of that case were that following an acquittal in a trial on

11
Ibid
12
Supra note 2
13
(1723), 1 Str. 557.
14
(1799) 661
15
(1964) A.C. 40

4
corruption charges in which the judge criticized him, a Chief of Police (Ridge) was sacked without
a hearing. After reconsideration by the Police Authority and an unsuccessful appeal to the Home
Secretary, Ridge brought an action for a declaration that the dismissal was unlawful. The House
of Lords granted the declaration. Further, Lord Denning M.R. said in Schmidt v. Secretary of
State for Home Affairs16 that “the hard and fast distinction between ‘judicial’ and ‘administrative’
functions for this purpose has been abandoned; a person is entitled to be heard if he has some right,
interest or legitimate expectation”. Therefore, if hearing is not given by the adjudicating authority
to the person concerned and the principles of natural justice are violated the order is void and it
cannot be justified on the ground that hearing ‘would make no difference’ or ‘no useful purpose
would have been served’. In General Medical Council v. Spackman17, Lord Wright observed:
“If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is, indeed, immaterial
whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the
essential principles of natural justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision”. Natural
justice allows a person to claim the right to adequate notification of the date, time, and place of the
hearing as well as detailed notification of the case to be met. This information allows the person
adequate time to effectively prepare his or her own case and to answer the case against him or her.
In a nutshell, for a hearing to be said to be fair it must at least contain the following components;

(i) RIGHT TO NOTICE

Notice embodies the rule of fairness and must precede an adverse order. It should be clear
enough to give the party enough information of the case he has to meet. There should be
adequate time for the party, so that he can prepare for his defense. Thus notice is the starting
point in the hearing. Unless a person knows about the subjects and issues involved in the case,
he cannot be in the position to defend himself.

(ii) RIGHT TO KNOW THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM

Every person before an administrative authority, exercising adjudicatory powers has right to
know the evidence to be used against him.

16
(1969) 2 Ch. 149, 168
17
[1943] K.B. 627

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 (iii) RIGHT TO PRESENT CASE AND EVIDENCE
The adjudicatory authority must provide the party a reasonable opportunity to present his case.
This can be done either orally or in written form. The requirement of natural justice is not met
if the party is not given the opportunity to represent in view of the proposed action.

b) THE RULE AGAINST BIAS

The rule against bias (nemo judex in rea sua) is one of the two pillars of natural justice.
Although easily capable of being embodied in the hearing rule above, it has been settled that the
hearing rule governs the procedural features of decision making while the bias rule governs the
attitude or state of mind of the decision maker. A judge is disqualified from determining any
case in which he may be, or may fairly be suspected to be, biased18. The second rule states that no
one ought to be judge in his or her case. This is the requirement that the deciding authority must
be unbiased when according the hearing or making the decision. Additionally, investigators and
decision makers must act without bias in all procedures connected with making of a decision. A
decision maker must be impartial and must make a decision based on the balanced and considered
assessment of the information and evidence before him or her without favoring one party or
another. Even when no actual bias exists, investigators and decision makers should be careful to
avoid the appearance of bias. Investigators should ensure that there is no conflict of interest which
would make it inappropriate for them to conduct the investigations.

Not only is a person affected by an administrative decision entitled to have his case heard by the
agency seized with its determination, but he may also insist on his case being heard by a fair judge,
one free from bias. ‘Bias’ in this context has usually meant that the adjudicator must have no
financial interest in the matter under dispute, but is not necessarily so limited, and allegations of
bias have been upheld in circumstances where there was no question of any financial interest19.
The classic example of an offence against this rule in the regular courts of law is that of the case

18
Wade, H.W.R, & Forsyth, C.F. Administrative law at p. 450
19
Garner, J. F. Administrative law at p. 118

6
of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal20 wherein a decree of Lord Chancellor Conttenham, granting
an injunction to a company and confirming its title, was held voidable and set aside by the House
of Lords on the ground that he was a shareholder in the company, although it was not suggested
that Lord Cottenham was influenced by the interest he had in the company; the House of Lords
though agreeing that the result was the same, nevertheless quashed Lord Cottenham’s decision,
although as Lord Campbell said: “No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be, in the
remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had in this concern.” The appearance of bias is
regarded as seriously by the supervising court as is actual bias; the judge who appears to have or
who has a bias may have the most excellent and upright motives and may not in fact allow his
judicial discretion to be impaired in any way by the vitiating “interest”, but the courts will still find
there has been a breach of natural justice. Therefore, not only must the adjudicator be free from
bias, but there must not even be the appearance of bias21. The usual test is whether a real likelihood
of bias has been created. In The King v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy22, Lord Hewart
L.C.J. said that: “A long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance, but is of
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

Therefore, in a nutshell, a person is barred from deciding any case in which he or she may be, or
may fairly be suspected to be, biased. This principle embodies the basic concept of
impartiality, and applies to courts of law, tribunals, arbitrators and all those having the duty to act
judicially. A public authority has a duty to act judicially whenever it makes decisions that affect
people's rights or interests, and not only when it applies some judicial-type procedure in arriving
at decisions.

The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal
system. The erosion of public confidence undermines the nobility of the legal system, and leads to
ensuing chaos. The essence of the need for impartiality was observed by Lord Denning,
in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon23 wherein he said: “Justice must be
rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking:

20
(1852) 3 H.L.C. 759.
21
Supra note 2
22
(1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259
23
[1968] EWCA Civ 5

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‘The judge was biased.’” . The brief facts of this case were that tenants of apartments asked the
Rent Officer to fix the fair rents. On appeal, the rents were then set at a rate lower even than they
had requested. The rents would serve as a guide for other local rents. The landlords now
complained that the chairman of the Rent Assessment Committee had been assisting his own father
in negotiating a rent for such a local property, and had represented other tenants. They complained
of bias. It was held that he should not have sat on the committee. It was acceptable that he had no
pecuniary interest himself, and had acted scrupulously, but because of the impression which would
be given to people of a real likelihood of bias on his part his decision could not stand.

The two main aspects of this rule are that a person deciding on a dispute must have no pecuniary
or proprietary interest in the outcome of the proceedings and must not reasonably be suspected, or
show a real likelihood, of bias. Bias can take many forms: Personal Bias, pecuniary Bias, subject-
matter bias, departmental bias, preconceived notion bias and many others.

CONCLUSION

Therefore in summary, the principles of natural justice have been developed and followed by the
judiciary to protect the right of the public against the arbitrariness of the administrative authorities.
One can note that the rules of natural justice relate to fairness: they exist to protect the fair dealing
with individuals who find themselves before a court, tribunal or any hearing to whose judgment
an individual is subject. The concept that natural justice should at all stages guide those who
discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable, but essential part of the philosophy of the
law to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Having discussed adequately the rules of
natural justice and their relevance having been duly noted, their development can be traced back
centuries ago and credit accorded to Dr. Bentley’s case for a large early contribution to their
development into what they are today. That case is a nice example of the old conception of natural
justice as divine and eternal law.

It is important to note that any decision which violates natural justice would be found null and
void, hence one must always bear in mind that the doctrine of natural justice is important
for any administrative decision to be valid. It must further also be recollected that the rights
to fair hearing and a judge not adjudicating over a matter in which he has an interest is

8
germane. The extent and application of the rules of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the
strait jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the
jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority and upon the character of the rights of the
person affected.