PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married.
However, Velez went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again.
Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral
damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the
court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is
true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still
suffered frustration and public humiliation.
ISSUE:
Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral
damages?
RULING:
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it
is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple
have already filed a marriage license and already spent for
invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for
payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and
ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the
humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred
and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in
making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding
will push through.
APOLONIO TANJANCO V. CA and ARACELI SANTOS18
SCRA 994 December 17, 1996
FACTS:
About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age.
That Apolonio expressed his undyinglove affection to Araceli also in
due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of
Apolonio
promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Apolonio’s
pleas for carnal knowledge. U
ntilDecember 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of
marriage, defendant succeeded inhaving carnal access to plaintiff, as
a result of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli
informedAplolonio and pleaded with him to make good his promises
of marriage but instead of honoring hispromises and righting his
wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli since
about July1959 has not visited her and to all intents and purposes
has broken their engagement and his promises.
ISSUE:
WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth
in Art 21.
HELD:
No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts
stand out that for one whole year, from1958 to 1959, Araceli, a
woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
Apolonio, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Hence, the courts conclude
that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in
dismissing the complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and that of
CFI is affirmed.
ART. 21.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES,
respondents G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993
FACTS:
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Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29
years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and
was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the
respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter, which
convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged
that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her
family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the
marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment
experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was
held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that
the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the
respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom
of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom. The
decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages
incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since
the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that
she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the
latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment
for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner,
“deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was
true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her
claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent
had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception
and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused
by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims
of the respondent against the petitioner.
ABANAG vs MABUTE
FACTS:
The complainant alleged that respondent courted her and professed
his undying love for her. Relying on respondent’s promise that he
would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant,
but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her
to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her
baby. When she did not agree, the respondent turned cold and
eventually abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the
loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the
humiliation that she suffered. Respondent vehemently denied the
complainant’s allegations and claimed that the charges against him
were baseless, false and fabricated, and were intended to harass
him and destroy his reputation. He believes that the complainant’s
letter-complaint, which was written in the vernacular, was prepared
by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the
respondent would have used the "waray" or English language if she
had written the letter-complaint.
The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the
letter-complaint. She belied the respondent’s claim that she was
being used by Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him. The
Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint
against the respondent.
It defined what immoral conduct is as conduct that is willful, flagrant
or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community.
To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
A grossly immoral act is one that is as corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of respondent is considered as disgraceful or
immoral conduct.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
Held:
We find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as
disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. Mere sexual relations
between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to
warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior.
The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a
man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under
any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a
criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a
certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide
on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those
that will affect their and their family’s future.
We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or
should not marry. However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary
employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety
or scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but also in
their behaviour outside the Court as private individuals. This is the
best way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of
our courts.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present
administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit.
Nocosts.SO ORDERED.
HERMOSISIMA vs. CA G.R. No. L-14628, September 30,
1960
FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial
High School in Cebu, and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, who
was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in Cebu City, where intimacy
developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953,
when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in
his cabin on board M/V "Escaño,"to which he was then attached as
apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that
she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954. However, on July
24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4,
1954, Soledad filed with the court an action against Francisco for
recognition of paternity of their child, Chris Hermosisima, and for
moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner
admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support
the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.
The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and even increasing the award for damages. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for
him in order to satisfy his sexual desires – that being said, the award
for moral damages is proper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry.
HELD:
No. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong as has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
Further, in the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making
body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the
award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly,
untenable. The Court of Appeals, rely its decision on the award of
moral damages on paragraph 3 of Article2219 of the Civil Code: . . .
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases: xxx (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
However, the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that
the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such
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in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not
exist in the present case. The Court was unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately
ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but
also because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, she was "overwhelmed
by her love" for him, and she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of
their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Constantino vs. Mendez
Facts:
Amelita Constantino , petitioner, was a waitress at Tony’s
Restaurant where she met Ivan Mendez, respondent. On that first
meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to have dinner with him at Hotel Enrico
where the former has stayed. While eating dinner, Ivan confessed his
love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then they had
sexual intercourse. However, after the act, Ivan confessed that he is
already married to someone else. Despite the fact that Ivan is
already married, they had repeated their sexual contact whenever
Ivan is in Manila which resulted to petitioner’s pregnancy.
Consequently, Amelita appealed for help and support from Ivan, but
failed. She then filed for the recognition of the unborn child and
payment for damages. However, Ivan rebutted by the petition of the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. RTC ruled in
favor of Amelita, respondent petition the complaint CA that RTC
erred in its ruling. CA favored the respondent and dismissed the
complaint of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of
Ivan to her son Michael to warrant support.
Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Petitioner was not able
to prove the paternity of Ivan to her son. She was inconsistent in her
response whether they did or didn’t have any sex in Manila in the 1st
and 2nd week of November. At first, she said she remembered
during cross-examination. Later in her response, she said she
doesn’t remember. This fact is notable because the child Michael is a
FULL TERM baby. He was conceived approximately sometime in the
2nd week of November. Amelita wrote to Ivan asking for support
around February wherein she stated that she was four months
pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child on
October. She wrote to Ivan’s wife where she revealed her attachment
to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIÑONESG.R. No.
175822 (October 23, 2013)
A. Legal Facts:
Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific
Air, bought a pair of black jeans worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA
Boutique. While she was on her way to Mercury Drug Store, a Guess
employee approached her and said that she failed to pay for the
black jeans. Nevertheless, she presented an official receipt and
suggested that they should talk about the matter in the Cebu Pacific
Office located within the mall. While they were in the office, the
Guess employees allegedly humiliated her in front of the clients of
Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded payment and even searched the
respondent’s wallet to check how much money she had. Another
argument ensued and after that, respondent went home.
The Guess employees submitted two letters to the Director of Cebu
Pacific narrating the incident but the said letters were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners,
California Clothing, Inc., Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and
Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due to the incident, she suffered
physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious
apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and humiliation.
She demanded payment for moral, nominal, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached the respondent to clarify
whether or not payment wasmade and that they approached and
talked to the respondent in a gentle and polite manner. They sought
payment for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
litigation expenses as counterclaim. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim stating that the
petitioners acted in good faith and the respondent was the one who
put herself in that situation by inviting the Guess employees to the
Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the issue of payment.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional
Trial Court decision stating that there was preponderance of
evidence showing the petitioners acted in bad faith but, Hawayon
and Villagonzalo were absolved from liability due to good faith. Since
petitioners acted in bad faith, respondent was entitled to damages
and attorney’s fees.
B. Legal Issue:
Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which resulted to the
Court of Appeals awarding moral damages and attorney’s fees to
respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones.
C. Ruling:
Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for moral damages
and attorney’s fees to respondent was proper. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The principle of abuse of
rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code is present in the case.
Respondent complained when petitioners embarrassed her and
insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans despite the issuance
ofan official receipt in her favor. The court cited the case of Carpio
vs. Valmonte in which the elements of abuse of rights were
enumerated.
“The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements stated are complete
in the present case.
First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no payment made
when respondent already presented the black jeans with the original
receipt. Second, they accused the respondent that not only did she
fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly
left the shop. Third, the letters sent to the respondent’s employer was
not only intended to ask for assistance in collection of the payment
but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be in
accordance with the purpose of its establishment and not abused.
Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
BDO v Gomez GR No. 199601 June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic
Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R. Harrington
opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in
January 1985. The following day, Harrington presented two (2)
genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of
New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to
"C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of
US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington." Upon receipt
of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor,
Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R.
Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of
Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after
receiving from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine
Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts,
Josephine received the deposit slip.
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself
as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45, 000.00 and P5, 600.00.
Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the
withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington
P50, 600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why
no disciplinary action should be taken against her for having
accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being
a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of
the job. She further alleged that she had asked the approval of her
immediate supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.
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On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of
P-423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask
why the deduction was made.
After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for
performing acts in violation of established operating procedures.
The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-
50,600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and
profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. Josephine wrote the PCIB
to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent and
liable to pay the amount of P50, 600.00. During trial, the RTC found
that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however,
alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and explained that
she was afforded due process and the deductions made prior to
January 15, 1986, were merely a withholding pending the
investigation.
On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She
claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting
from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Josephine and ordered the PCIB to pay her actual damages. The
RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and
allowance of Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith and
contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy.
In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in ruling that its
actions were in total and wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith
on how it had treated Josephine.
HELD: No.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as
the "abuse of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this
fundamental principle are found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear
violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for
damages.
While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of
negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In
the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary
even if the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued
a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her
to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's
impostor.
When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of
negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances,
and bonuses.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
Hing vs. Choachuy September 13, 2016
FACTS:
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against
the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence
without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their
building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in
order to get evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally
set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property.
Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the
fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for
violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a
order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the
Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance cameras they
installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
and the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then
raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance
cameras of Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to privacy.
HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s
under Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence.” Although it is a business office and not a residence, the
owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, et al. 481 SCRA 384 (2006)
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) hired the services of
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to send a
telegram to her sister respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
(Zenaida), asking her to send money for their mother Editha Verchez
(Editha) who at that time was confined in a hospital in Sorsogon. But
it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to Zenaida.
When Editha died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez
(Alfonso), along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their
respective spouses, filed an action for damages against RCPI before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon. They alleged that the
delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the early death of
Editha. RCPI argues that there is no privity of contract between other
respondents except with Grace, also the delay in the delivery is
caused by force majeure, maintaining further that they exercised due
diligence in choosing their employees; hence they must be released
from any liability. The RTC rendered judgment against RCPI. RCPI
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the
fact that there was no direct connection between the injury and the
alleged negligent acts
HELD:
RCPI‘s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on
culpa contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on
tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents. Article
1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of
their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within
the shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to
deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio
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noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission
and/or reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its
messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it
was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the
telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one
has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One‘s negligence may have concurred
with an act of Godin producing damage and injury to another;
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from
liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person‘s
participation – whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act
– the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI
from delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should
have at least informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-
delivery s that she could have taken steps to remedy the situation.
But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace‘s co-respondents
following Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides that whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
RCPI‘s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could
prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. RCPI
failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by
Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided
that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified
and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55%
provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per
pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule,
reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by
Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was
passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended
that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that
respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued
RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible
for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause
of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA,
who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability
may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec.
38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable
for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs
of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may
have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by
law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability
may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on
the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same
Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s
act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V.
CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted
with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly
sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer:
(1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article
32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the
Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a
wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or
omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives
some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation.
There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of
the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an
evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an
invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not
precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINOTUAZON, JR.
being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City,
respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition,
petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case
for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question
to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial
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question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without
merit. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
ARTHUR TE V CA, LILIANA CHOA
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision
of the Court of Appeals denying Te's motion for reconsideration.
Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in Sept 1988. They do not
live together but meet regularly until after Liliana gave birth that
Arthur stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while their marriage
was still subsisting, Arthur contracted a second marriage with Julieta
Santella. On August 1990, Liliana filed an information charging Arthur
with bigamy. Meanwhile, in July 1990, Arthur Te filed an action for
annulment on the ground that he was forced to marry her, that she
concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and psychologically incapacity. On November 8, 1990,
Liliana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the
revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that
they committed acts of immorality and an act of falsification against
Arthur when he stated in his 2nd marriage contract that he was still
single.
After the prosecution or criminal case, petitioner filed demurrer to
evidence and motion to inhibit the judge were filed but were
eventually denied by the court. Thus: petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari filed with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for(1) exhibiting
antagonism and animosity towards his counsel;(2) violating the due
process by denying his motion for reconsideration and demurrer to
evidence(3) x x x
(4) ruling that in a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is
sufficient for conviction of an accused. Petitioner filed with the Board
of Civil Engineering of the PRC a motion to suspend the proceedings
therein in view of the pendency of the case for annulment of his 1st
marriage and case for bigamy, but it was subsequently denied. Thus,
he filed with the CA another petition for certiorari against Board for
grave abuse of discretion:(1) NOT holding that the annulment case is
prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case;(2) X X X(3)
making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative
proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal
and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent
involving the same set of facts.CA rendered ff decision:
1. upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s
failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge
exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case.
2. denial of motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question was in accord with law
3. affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by
petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the
same
4. no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board
5. no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved
is a civil case
ISSUES:
WON there is a prejudicial question between the civil case of
annulment and criminal case of bigamy. NO
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
WON there is a prejudicial question between the civil case of
annulment and administrative case. NO
WON there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA and Board.
NO
HELD:
Prejudicial Question - one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.1. Civil case for annulment did NOT pose a prejudicial
question to the criminal case of bigamy. The outcome of the civil
case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for bigamy
to prosper is that the 1st marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd
marriage is contracted. Even a declaration that their marriage was
void ab initio would NOT necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability.
Art. 40 of Family Code is already in effect at the time of their
marriage (Sept 1988) stating that a marriage, even one which is void
or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding,
2. Civil case for annulment does NOT pose a prejudicial question to
suspend an administrative proceeding. There is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.
The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal
case. Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC
Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before
it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal
and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as
the administrative case. The Board shall proceed independently with
the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision
without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial
body.
3. Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two
grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for
bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in
the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. The
denial for the motion to inhibit was also correct. Mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA,
respondents G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active
military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of
Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due
to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949,
Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano
allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property
through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of
Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings
to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial
court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus,
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s
Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the
trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated
by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On
April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of AbsoluteDonation of Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In
addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give
the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of
6|LADP
sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On
August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and
Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence
presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed
of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to
her children is legally in possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals and denied the petition. A donation is an act of
liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts
presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or
with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be
free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be
clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract,
renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners
failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June
16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental
facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of
sound mind at that time and this condition continued to exist until
proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid.
Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose.
Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that
Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or
falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus
Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches
for the first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the
Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation
was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding
as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. No. L-16439.
July 20, 1961
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her
husband before their marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita
Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant
and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the
pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by
Geluz. In less than two years, she again became pregnant and had
her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos.
Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware
and did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the
award of damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated
the award of damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the
case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and
incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages
which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
fetus, on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and
the disappointment of their parental expectations. In this case,
however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his
wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental hopes and expectations.
The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.
Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215
FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of
Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his sister Margarita
Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be of
legal age to give their consent into the contract of sale of the land
they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister
of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the
annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and Josepha were
minors during the perfection of contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented
themselves that they were of legal age.
HELD:
The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it
were made and entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal
age. The court stated that they will not be permitted to excuse
themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled.
The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel
and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A which states that “whenever a
party has, by its own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to be true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.
Atizado v. People GR No. 173822
Hernandez v Santos GR No. 169217
People v Bulagao GR No. 184757
OROPESA VS OROPESA Petitioner: Nilo Oropesa (son)
Respondent: Cirilo Oropesa (father)
Facts:
This is a petition for review (Rule 45), CA affirmed the order by RTC
Paranaque dismissed Nilo’s petition for guardianship over the
properties of his father (widower).Nilo alleged that his father was:-
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years
already having suffered a stroke in 2003- that his judgment and
memory were impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization.- that even before his stroke, he was observed to have
had lapses on memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property.- due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot w/out outside aid, manage his property wisely and become an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly his GF (Luisa Agamata). RTC: nilo failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Oropesa is incompetent to
run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Gen’s
demurrer to evidence is granted, and the case is dismissed.
Issue: WON respondent is considered an incompetent person as
defined under Sec 2, rule 92 of the ROC who should be placed under
guardianship.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit. Sec 2: Incompetent includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. Finding that a
person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and
definite evidence. Nilo lacks material evidence to support his claims
7|LADP
that his father is incompetent due to his alleged deteriorating medical
and mental condition. The only medical document presented “report
of neuropsychological screening proves that he is indeed competent
to run his personal affairs.
INSANITY CREWLINK v. TERINGTERING
Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto
Teringtering, and in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint against
Crewlink for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child,
burial assistance, damages and attorney’s fees. Editha alleged that
her husband entered into an overseas employment contract with
Crewlink – he took a medical exam and was declared fit to work. On
April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for
compensation but was denied by Crewlink. She claimed that in order
for her to get compensation it is enough that Jacinto died during the
term of his contract and while still on board. She asserted that
Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or mood disorder
bipolar type. She further alleged that the death was not deliberate
and of his own will but as a result of a mental disorder. Crewlink
alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. He was saved the first
time and someone was assigned to watch over him. He jumped off a
second time and was no longer saved. Crewlink asserted that Editha
was not entitled to the benefits because Jacinto committed suicide.
ISSUE: WON Jacinto was insane.
RULING:
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that
Jacinto's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself
by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare
allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no
evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support her
claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when the
alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family
problems may result to depression, but the same does not
necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a
question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible
of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in
the mind of another, the state or condition of a person’s mind can
only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person
claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a
person was insane based on the witness’ own perception of the
person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. No
such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim.
People v Boaquina, GR No. 1889878
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9,
2012
FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He
migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35,
he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau
of Immigration.
On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship,
executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with
Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos
acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived. He
applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act.
Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name
in the COMELEC voters list.
Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’
name from the official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He
appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTC’s. On November 28,
2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor
of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’
COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation in
the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A.
9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because it
failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos
won the elections
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency
requirement
HELD:
Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’
domicile of origin, the place of his birth. His domicile was changed
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26
years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by
choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to
live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos
did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia,
gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to
that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in
his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave
up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her
husband before their marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita
Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant
and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the
pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by
Geluz. In less than two years, she again became pregnant and had
her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos.
Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware
and did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the
award of damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated
the award of damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the
case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and
incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages
which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
fetus, on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and
the disappointment of their parental expectations. In this case,
however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his
wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental hopes and expectations.
The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.
Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October
13, 2009
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim was for
Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature
delivery while she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female
fetus died during the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim
for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not
8|LADP
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive
or must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the
said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an unborn child
or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2)
status of legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s
case. They further contend that the only one with civil personality
could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to
petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued
that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the
very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but
CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced.
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered
born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-
42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception.
ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The
fetus would have not reached 38-39 weeks without depending upon
its mother.
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba
Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which
dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for
amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao
succeeded in having sexual relations with her through force and
intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and
drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed
for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of
Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child had been born in
her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a
cause of action.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from
defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the
child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for
damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional
personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support
from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may
receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings
of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield
to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per
Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219,
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3
which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts.
De Jesus vs Syquia 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier
in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to
have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence,
Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a
constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev
father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be
given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously
wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and
“junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend
at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in
Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in
Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year.
When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this
time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the
defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony
caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia
Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters
written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves
acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been
in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child,
justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of
paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission
with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period
in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit
the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to
provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise
to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be
based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to
the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount
of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the
trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of
pension.
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO,Petitioner, vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF
PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased,Respondent.G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948EN BANC
HILADO, J.: FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for
a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant
9|LADP
in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission
issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims
that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is contravention of
law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the PSC erred in granting the application for CPC
2.Whether the estate of Fragante is a person.
3. Whether the estate of Fragante may be considered as a citizen.
HELD:
1. NO. The right of Fragante to prosecute the application to its final
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his
death. It constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right
was property despite the possibility that in the end the PSC might
have denied the application. Rule 88, Sec. 2 provides that the
executor or administrator may bring or defend actions for the
protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive. It
is true that a proceeding upon an application for a CPC before the
PSC is not an "action”. But the provisions of the law go to prove that
the decedent’s rights which by their nature are not extinguished by
death, go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
which, being placed underthe control and management of the
executor or administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in
representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees
or legatees, if any and the heirs of the decedent.
2. YES. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself,
under the Bill of Rights, it seems clear that while the civil rights
guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons,
the term “person” must be deemed to include artificial or juridical
persons. It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or
juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional
immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these artificial or
juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, the
Court held that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of
Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived
after his death.
3. YES.
The fiction of such extension of Fragante’s citizenship is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and
heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the investment
which he had already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding.
Dumlao vs Quality Plastics GR No. L27956, April 30,
1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962
ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus
legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became
final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the
bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given.
Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962
which he has given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960.
Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death. The summons and
copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a
deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in
his own behalf and his co-defendants.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS WEEK 3

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic
Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio
also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his
land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned
that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The
Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was
unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in joining
Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment
against him is a patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria
in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria
was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was
lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the
judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim
attorney’s fees against the corporation.
has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257
FACTS:
During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the
following sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club building:
Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-
33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30);
and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The building was set on fire and
Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to
leave the building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his
son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they came
out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground
to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many people
presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and Francisco
sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On
February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met
Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The trial court
ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son
outlived his mother.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside.

Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared
void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered
by OCT No. 28732 is also void.
Eugenio vs Velez 185 SCRA 45
ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.
[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession.
If mother died first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first
marriage, would inherit]

FACTS:
HELD: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his
Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death mother did. This presumption was based on speculations, not
on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on
27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was which civil cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail.
forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect, circumstantial or
confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial inferential.
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ
of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s
body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected
to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of
heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence.
The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral
parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the

deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an

unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the
burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art.

294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law
marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. In addition,
it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner

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